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## Online Study Materials on **PEACE-KEEPING AND PEACE-MAKING**

# 9

## Peace-keeping

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The term “peace-keeping operation” does not occur in the United Nations Charter. It came into general usage only in the 1960s, to describe a concept and practice that had evolved out of necessity. This happened because, soon after the creation of the United Nations in 1945, it was clear that some of the means provided in the Charter to maintain international peace could not be applied because of the cold-war confrontation among the permanent members of the Security Council. Thus, instead of the strongest countries using their joint military might to enforce world peace, as the Charter envisaged, the United Nations began to field military observer missions and, later, lightly armed forces drawn normally from medium and small powers. Though the League of Nations used a similar technique (sending a 3,300-member multilateral force to be present during the 1935 plebiscite to decide the fate of the Saar Valley), peace-keeping operations are a genuine innovation of the United Nations. Sent with the agreement of the parties in conflict, the United Nations personnel aim not to enforce peace but to contain explosive situations and give peace a chance. They are essentially a holding action, designed to halt or control a conflict while concerted efforts are made to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table or otherwise provide the time and create the climate necessary to bring about a peaceful settlement. The definition of a peace-keeping operation as used in the Secretary-General’s reports is that of an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, established by the United Nations to help maintain or restore peace in areas of conflict.

Such operations fall broadly into two main categories: observer missions and peace-keeping forces. In either form they operate under

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the same basic principles. They are established by the Security Council and, exceptionally, by the General Assembly, and they are directed by the Secretary-General. They must have the consent of the host Governments and, normally, also that of other parties directly involved. The military personnel required are provided by Member States on a voluntary basis. The military observers are not armed and, while the soldiers of United Nations peace-keeping forces are provided with light weapons, they are not authorised to use force except in self-defence. The operations must not interfere in the internal affairs of the host country and must not be used in any way to favour one party against another in conflicts affecting Member States.

Another requirement of peace-keeping is a broad political consensus among the membership for its mandate and continued functioning. Also fundamental is the need for the continuing support not only of the countries or parties principally concerned in the conflict but also of the States contributing troops.

Besides support, there must be co-operation. Since the peace-keepers have no capacity for enforcement and their use of force is limited to self-defence— as a last resort—any determined party could effectively defy a peace-keeping force.

Peace-keeping operations have usually been employed in regional conflicts. They fulfil the role of an impartial and objective third party to help create and maintain a ceasefire and form a buffer zone between opposing forces. They have become an important instrument of the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, in preventing local or regional conflicts from escalating.

Ground rules and other arrangements for the organisation and conduct of a peace-keeping operation have not so far been formally established. The typical United Nations peace-keeping operation has had to improvise from the outset.

There have been 13 peace-keeping operations (the international force in Korea was an enforcement action and was not under United Nations control). Over the last four decades, 664 men have given their lives in keeping the peace for the United Nations.

The first peace-keeping operation established by the United Nations was an observer mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), set up in Palestine in June 1948. Later, other observer missions were set up: the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1949, the United Nations

Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958, the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) in 1963, the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) in 1965, and the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP), also in 1965. Of these, UNTSO and UNMOGIP are still in operation.

There have been in all, seven peace-keeping forces. The first was the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), which was in operation in the Egypt-Israel sector from November 1956 until June 1967. The United Nations Force in the Congo was deployed in the Republic of the Congo (now Zaire) from July 1960 until June 1964. The United Nations Security Force in West Irian (UNSF) was in operation from October 1962 until May 1963. The second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) functioned from October 1973 until July 1979. The other three forces, which are still in operation, are the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), established in March 1964; the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), established in the Syrian Golan Heights in June 1974; and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), established in March, 1978.

### **Truce Supervision Organisation**

The first United Nations peace-keeping operation was the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), set up in 1948 to supervise the truce called for by the Security Council in Palestine during the first Arab-Israeli war. UNTSO played a pioneering role in the Middle East, the functions of its observers changing as the situation changed in the areas they covered. UNTSO personnel have also been available at short notice to form the nucleus of other peace-keeping operations and have remained to assist those operations.

While UNTSO was initially used in supervising the original truce of 1948, its function was radically altered in 1949 with the conclusion of four General Armistice Agreements between Israel and the four neighbouring Arab countries. Its main responsibility then was to assist the parties in supervising the application and observance of those Agreements. Its headquarters was established at Government House in Jerusalem, where it remains today. While Israel has denounced the General Armistice Agreements, following the 1956 and 1967 wars, this unilateral action has not been recognised by the United Nations and the machinery of supervision has been retained, although it is not being used at present.

In the wars of 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982, UNTSO observers remained on the ceasefire lines, often under fire, performing an invaluable service as go-betweens and often preventing isolated incidents from escalating into larger conflicts. Following the 1967 war, UNTSO established two ceasefire observation operations, in the Israel-Syria sector and in the Suez Canal zone. In 1972 a similar operation was set up in southern Lebanon. When peacekeeping forces were later deployed, in the Sinai in 1973, on the Golan Heights in 1974 and in southern Lebanon in 1978, UNTSO observers were attached to the new forces to assist them. Today, UNTSO observers continue to be assigned to the last two of these forces which are still in operation. In addition, a group of UNTSO observers has remained in the Sinai to maintain a United Nations presence. There is also a group of observers in Beirut.

UNTSO has also made available observers to other United Nations operations not connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict. In June 1984, the Governments of Iran and Iraq, in response to an appeal by the Secretary-General, undertook to refrain from initiating military attacks on purely civilian population centres in either country. The Secretary-General, with the agreement of the two countries, set up two observer teams, based in Teheran and Baghdad, each composed of three military observers and a civilian political adviser, to verify compliance. (*See also the section on Iran and Iraq in chapter eleven*).

UNTSO reached its maximum strength of 572 observers in 1948. In 1985 it had an authorised strength of 298 observers, provided by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the Soviet Union and the United States.

### **Observer Missions in India and Pakistan**

Less than a year after UNTSO was established, a new group of military observers was formed to supervise the cessation of hostilities in Jammu and Kashmir. Under the scheme of partition provided by the Indian Independence Act of 1947, the State of Jammu and Kashmir was free to accede to India or Pakistan. The accession became a matter of dispute between the two countries, and fighting broke out later that year.

The question first came before the Security Council in January 1948, when India complained that tribesmen and others were invading Kashmir and that extensive fighting was taking place. India charged that Pakistan was assisting and participating in the invasion. Pakistan

denied India's charges and declared that Kashmir's accession to India following India's independence in 1947 was illegal.

In January 1949, a ceasefire came into effect, and the military observers, who were subsequently organised as the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), were deployed to assist in its observance. In July 1949, India and Pakistan concluded the Karachi Agreement, which was negotiated under United Nations auspices. The agreement established a ceasefire line and prohibited strengthening of defences or increase of forces in certain areas. It also confirmed the functions of the United Nations observers.

In 1965, a brief border war between India and Pakistan brought into being a new observer group—the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM). UNIPOM had the job of consolidating the ceasefire along the international border south of Kashmir and of supervising the withdrawal of armed forces on both sides. UNMOGIP performed a similar function in Kashmir. By March 1966, UNIPOM and UNMOGIP had done their jobs successfully; the latter reverted to its original task of supervising the ceasefire, while UNIPOM was terminated.

At the end of 1971, hostilities again broke out between India and Pakistan relating to the secessionist movement in East Pakistan which was to lead to the creation of the independent State of Bangladesh. By the time hostilities had ended and a ceasefire had gone into effect, a number of positions on both sides of the 1949 ceasefire line had changed hands. In July 1972, India and Pakistan agreed at Simla on a Line of Control which, with minor deviations, follows the same course as the ceasefire line established by the Karachi Agreement. While Pakistan continues to submit complaints of ceasefire violations to UNMOGIP, India has stopped doing so and takes the position that UNMOGIP has no role in relation to the Line of Control.

UNMOGIP reached its maximum strength of 102 observers in 1965. In 1985, it comprised 39 observers from Australia, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Uruguay.

### **First Emergency Force in the Middle East**

A new demand for United Nations peace-keeping efforts came with the Suez crisis of 1956, precipitated by the armed intervention of Israel, France and the United Kingdom following the Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. The Security Council, finding itself unable to act at several meetings between 30 October

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and 1 November, invoked the "Uniting for peace" resolution and asked the General Assembly to meet in its first emergency special session. The Assembly called for a ceasefire and withdrawal of forces and asked the Secretary-General "to submit to it within 48 hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities."

The Secretary-General's plan, submitted later the same day, proposed that the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (already in the area) head a new command to be made up of troops drawn from countries that were not permanent members of the Security Council. The plan was approved on 5 November, and 10 of the 24 States volunteering troops were asked to send contingents. Troops from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia arrived in short order. By early February 1957, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was at its full 6,000-member strength. The objectives of UNEF were to supervise the cessation of hostilities and to assist in the process of withdrawal of forces.

Establishment of UNEF was a task of great complexity. The concept had no real precedent. A key principle governing the stationing and functioning of UNEF, and later of all other peace-keeping forces, was the consent of the host Government. Since the operation was not mandatory enforcement action, UNEF could enter and operate in Egypt only with the consent of the Government. Firm assurance was given to the Egyptian authorities that co-operation with the United Nations would not infringe Egyptian sovereignty. The Secretary-General impressed on those authorities that the Force could not stay or operate in Egypt if consent were withdrawn.

By March 1957, all British, French and Israeli troops had been withdrawn from Egyptian territory. Following their withdrawal, UNEF set up and manned a buffer zone on the Egyptian side of the border with Israel. Its basic functions were to act as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces along the Armistice Demarcation Line and the international frontier in order to avoid incidents, prevent illegal crossings and observe and report on all violations of the Line, whether by land, sea or air. Thanks to its presence, quiet was maintained in this sensitive area of the Middle East for more than 10 years.

In the spring of 1967, tension in the area rose sharply, and, in May, Egypt requested the withdrawal of the Force, reduced by then to 3,378 troops, from Egyptian territory. The Secretary-General asked

Israel to accept UNEF on its side of the line, thus maintaining the buffer, but this was rejected by that country. The Secretary-General also held urgent consultations with the troop-contributing countries and members of the Security Council, who were deeply divided on the issue. In the circumstances, he had no alternative but to accede to the Egyptian request.

Following the decision to withdraw UNEF, Israel stated that it would heed the Secretary-General's appeal for restraint but warned that closing of the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping would be a cause for war. The Secretary-General arranged to visit Cairo to discuss with the Egyptian Government possible security arrangements along the Israeli-Egyptian borders, but, just before he arrived, Egypt announced closure of the Tiran Strait. With this decision, the fate was sealed; on 5 June 1967, full-fledged war erupted.

### **Observation Group in Lebanon**

In May 1958, serious disturbances broke out in Lebanon after President Camille Chamoun made known his intention to seek an amendment to the Constitution which would enable him to be re-elected for a second term. On 22 May, President Chamoun requested a meeting of the Security Council to consider Lebanon's complaint concerning "a situation arising from the intervention of the United Arab Republic"—from February 1958 to October 1961, Egypt and Syria joined together to form the United Arab Republic—"in the internal affairs of Lebanon". On 11 June, the Council decided to send an observation group to Lebanon to ensure that "there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other *materiel* across the Lebanese borders", and it authorised the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to that end. During the initial phase, 100 observers from 14 countries were assigned to the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL).

In its first report, in early July 1958, UNOGIL indicated that the observers faced difficulties in gaining access to the area near the Lebanese-Syrian border and had no substantiated evidence as yet of mass infiltration. The report was criticised by the Lebanese Government, which insisted that the United Arab Republic was continuing massive intervention in Lebanon's internal affairs.

On 14 July, the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq raised the spectre of a much wider regional crisis. The Lebanese President immediately requested United States intervention, and United States troops landed in Beirut the next day. This was followed

on 17 July by a Jordanian complaint of interference by the United Arab Republic in its internal affairs and the announcement that British troops would be sent to Jordan at the request of that country's Government.

Meanwhile, UNOGIL reported that it had succeeded in gaining access to all sections of the frontier in Lebanon. The Secretary-General decided to increase the number of observers as quickly as possible so as to enable UNOGIL to carry out its tasks fully and thus to expedite the withdrawal of the United States troops. Subsequently, a re-assessment of the developments in the region took place, which led to a gradual alleviation of the serious concerns that had been triggered by the *coup* in Iraq. The strengthening of UNOGIL provided further reassurance. On 31 July 1958, a new President, General Fouad Chehab, was elected in Lebanon, thus removing the controversial question of a second term for Chamoun.

In the event, the United States troops remained in bivouac on the beaches and did not engage in any military action. They were withdrawn from Lebanon in October 1958 and British troops from Jordan in early November. In the same month, Lebanon informed the Security Council that close ties had been resumed with the United Arab Republic. In agreement with the Lebanese Government, UNOGIL was withdrawn in December 1958.

UNOGIL had a maximum strength of 591 observers and supporting personnel, drawn from 21 countries: Afghanistan, Argentina, Myanmar (Burma), Canada, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Sweden and Thailand.

### **The Congo Operation**

The largest of all United Nations peace-keeping efforts began in 1960 in the Congo (now Zaire), a mineral-rich former Belgian colony that had become independent on 30 June of that year. When disorder broke out immediately after independence, Belgium sent its troops back into the Congo, without the agreement of that country, stating that the aim was to protect and evacuate Europeans. In the wake of this intervention, the Province of Katanga, the richest province of the Congo, which provided the country with more than half of its resources, was proclaimed independent by Moïse Tshombe, the President of the province. On 12 July 1960, the Congolese Government of President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba asked for United Nations military assistance in order to end external aggression.

Two days later, the Security Council called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo and authorised the Secretary-General to provide the Congo with military assistance. In less than 48 hours, the first contingents began to arrive. At the same time, United Nations civilian experts were rushed into help ensure the continued operation of essential public services jeopardized by the large-scale departure of European personnel.

At its peak strength the United Nations Force in the Congo totalled 20,000, and there were, in addition, 2,000 experts. During its operation, which lasted nearly four years, the Force was comprised at various times of contingents from Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Malaysia, Mali, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) and Yugoslavia. Canada, the Soviet Union, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States provided transport free of cost to the United Nations.

The original standing orders to the United Nations troops were to use force only in self-defence and not to intervene in the internal affairs of the Congo. But when internal conflict worsened, the Security Council authorised the use of force, as a last resort, to prevent civil war. Later, it authorised the use of force to remove mercenaries.

Over the four years of its operation in the Congo, the United Nations was faced with the vast and complex task of helping the Congolese Government restore and maintain the country's political independence and territorial integrity, helping to maintain law and order, and putting into effect a wide and long-term programme of training and technical assistance.

The initial successes of the United Nations Force in bringing about the withdrawal of Belgian troops did not resolve the problem, for the secessionist regime of Katanga remained, helped by European mercenaries and advisers. Things became more difficult when a conflict developed between Prime Minister Lumumba and President Kasavubu. In the midst of that confrontation, the army Chief, Colonel Joseph Mobutu, seized power in Leopoldville. For 11 months thereafter there was no legal government in the country, and the United Nations forces had to carry out their mandate of keeping order in co-operation with whatever local authority existed in different parts of the country.

The murder of Patrice Lumumba in February 1961 worsened the crisis both in the Congo and in the United Nations, where the Soviet Union declared its loss of confidence in Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. Nevertheless, a majority of Member States, within a now deeply divided Organisation, continued to support the Secretary-General and the conduct of United Nations operations in the Congo.

With the help of the United Nations, the constitutional crisis was resolved, the national parliament reconvened in June 1961, and a national unity government was created under Cyrille Adoula, but the secessionists in Katanga remained aloof. Perceiving the intransigence of the Katanga authorities to be based on the presence of mercenary soldiers, the Security Council strengthened its instructions to the United Nations Force. Hostilities followed between United Nations troops and the Katanga forces. It was on a mission to meet with Moise Tshombe in an effort to restore peace that Dag Hammarskjold was killed in an air crash on 17 September near Ndola in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). An unsuccessful United Nations attempt to negotiate the peaceful reintegration of Katanga was followed by clashes initiated by mercenary-led Katanga forces. The Security Council, shortly after the appointment of U Thant as Acting Secretary-General, authorised the Secretary-General to use the requisite measure of force to complete removal of the mercenaries. U Thant proposed a "plan of national reconciliation" under a federal government, and a draft federal constitution was prepared by United Nations experts, but the Katangese under Tshombe and the mercenaries and foreign military advisers dragged their feet. After repeated unsuccessful discussions with Tshombe, United Nations troops, largely unopposed, acted and, on 14 January 1963, Tshombe ended his secession.

In February 1963, after Katanga had been reintegrated into the national territory of the Congo, a phasing out of the United Nations Force was begun, aimed at its termination by the end of that year. At the request of the Congolese Government, however, the General Assembly authorised a reduced number of troops to stay on for a further six months. The Force was completely withdrawn by 30 June 1964. The United Nations civilian operations remained and continued to provide the Congo with an extensive programme of technical assistance.

### **Security Force and Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea (West Irian)**

While the United Nations Force in the Congo was in operation, the United Nations was also involved in two other peace-keeping missions.

One was in West New Guinea (West Irian), whose status had remained unresolved when Indonesia became independent in 1949, ending Netherlands rule there. West Irian remained under the Dutch. Fighting broke out in December 1961 between Dutch and Indonesian forces in the territory. Initiatives taken by Secretary-General U Thant led to talks between the two sides in July 1962, and in August an agreement was signed providing for the United Nations to take over the administration of the territory from 1 October 1962 to 1 May 1963, before transferring power to Indonesia. The United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), with a military force of 1,500 provided by Pakistan—the United Nations Security Force in West Irian (UNSF)—and a civilian administration, ran West Irian for the transitional period and handed over control to Indonesia peacefully.

During this period, the United Nations had a dual role, monitoring a ceasefire and ensuring the maintenance of law and order, in addition to its administrative responsibilities as executive authority. For the first time in its history, the United Nations had authority over a vast territory, under the jurisdiction of the Secretary-General. On 1 May 1963, full administrative control was transferred to Indonesia.

In accordance with the Indonesia-Netherlands agreement, the Secretary-General, in April 1968, appointed a representative to participate in arrangements for the envisaged “act of free choice” by the people of West Irian, who were to choose between retaining or severing ties with Indonesia. In 1969, consultative assemblies pronounced themselves, without dissent, as favouring the territory’s remaining with Indonesia.

### **Observation Mission in Yemen**

The other United Nations operation during the same period was the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), authorised by the Security Council in June 1963 to help the disengagement of the forces in conflict within Yemen. The civil war there, which had broken out in September 1962, contained the seeds of a wider conflict with international dimensions because of the involvement of Egypt and Saudi Arabia with rival republican and royalist forces.

Secretary-General U Thant undertook a peace initiative, and the Governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia agreed to identical terms of disengagement by which the former would end all support to the royalists of Yemen and the latter would begin a phased withdrawal of its troops sent there at the request of the new Government. The agreement provided that a United Nations observation mission was to

certify the implementation of the disengagement. The two Governments agreed to defray the costs of the mission.

UNYOM comprised 25 military observers, a reconnaissance unit of 114 provided by Yugoslavia and an air unit of 50 from Canada. The presence of UNYOM in Yemen for 14 months exercised an important restraint on hostile activities in the area, but the disengagement agreed to by the parties in conflict was not fully carried out in regard either to troop withdrawal or external military supplies. By agreement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the operation was wound up in September 1964. Subsequently, relations between the parties steadily improved and issues were resolved between them.

### **Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus**

While the Congo and Middle East operations were under way, new and urgent demands arose for another United Nations operation, this time in Cyprus. The Mediterranean island had become independent of British rule in 1960 under a Constitution aimed at balancing the interests of the two communities—approximately 80 per cent Greek Cypriot and 18 per cent Turkish Cypriot. Relative calm prevailed in the island until late 1963, when the situation gradually deteriorated because of political differences between the two communities.

In March 1964, after widespread communal violence in Cyprus, the Security Council established a United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), with the consent of the Government of Cyprus. UNFICYP's mandate was to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and to contribute to the maintenance of law and order and a return to normal conditions. UNFICYP was deployed throughout Cyprus and positioned so as to interpose itself between opposing sides in areas of tension. By September 1964, the Force had managed to restore calm to the island.

The situation changed dramatically following a *coup d'etat* by the Cyprus National Guard in July 1974 against the Cyprus Government headed by President Makarios, and the subsequent landing of Turkish military forces. UNFICYP endeavoured to arrange local and general ceasefires, patrolled the battle zone, evacuated foreign nationals and did its best to ensure the safety of civilians. When a ceasefire came into effect in August 1974, the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces were in control of the northern part of the country. This necessitated a change in UNFICYP's operations. In particular, it has since then maintained a buffer zone between the two sides, extending

approximately 180 kilometres across the island. UNFICYP has also carried out humanitarian functions and supported the relief efforts of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Food Programme.

In mid-1985, the Force had a strength of 2,337, made up of contingents from Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

### **Mission to the Dominican Republic**

Towards the end of April 1965, a political crisis developed in the Dominican Republic, resulting in civil strife that had considerable international repercussions. A three-man junta was overthrown by a group of young officers and civilians who sought return to office of a former President deposed by a military *coup* in September 1963, and restoration of the 1963 Constitution. Two rival governments eventually emerged during the first weeks of the civil war.

At the end of April, the United States announced that its troops had been ordered to land in the Dominican Republic to protect United States citizens and escort them to safety. The Soviet Union requested a Security Council meeting to consider the question of armed intervention by the United States in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic. The Council called for a ceasefire and invited the Secretary-General to send a special representative to the country for the purpose of reporting to the Council on the prevailing situation.

The Secretary-General appointed Jose Antonio Mayobre as his representative. Mr. Mayobre was assisted by a small staff, including up to three military observers. He regularly reported to the Secretary-General on breaches of the ceasefire and any events which might affect the maintenance of peace and order in the country.

In succeeding weeks the tense situation continually exploded into violence. An Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), operating under the auspices of the Organisation of American States and composed of 1,700 troops from six Latin American countries and 12,400 United States troops, was sent to the Dominican Republic. Eventually, the situation quieted down. On 1 July 1966, general elections were held in the country, as a result of which a new President was elected and a government led by him installed. Soon thereafter, the IAPF was withdrawn. At the request of the new Government, the United Nations mission was terminated on 22 October 1966.

## **Second Emergency Force in the Middle East and Disengagement Observer Force**

On 6 October 1973, war erupted again in the Middle East between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Suez Canal area and the Sinai and between Israeli and Egyptian forces on the Golan Heights. On 24 October, as fighting between Egypt and Israel reached a critical stage, the Security Council decided to set up a second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II). Within 24 hours of the Security Council resolution, UNEF II was moving into place between the Israeli and Egyptian armies in the Suez Canal area, and its arrival effectively stabilised the situation.

The authorised strength of UNEF II was 7,000, including contingents from 12 countries: Austria, Canada, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Poland, Senegal and Sweden.

UNEF II's first objective was to stop the fighting and prevent all movements forward of troops on both sides. Urgent measures also had to be taken to provide Suez City and the Egyptian Third Army trapped on the east bank of the Canal with non-military supplies. Troops were dispatched to the front line as soon as they arrived. They interposed themselves wherever possible between the forward positions of the opposing forces. Observation posts and check points were set up and patrols undertaken. These activities took place in close liaison with the parties concerned, including meetings of high-level military representatives of Egypt and Israel in the presence of UNEF representatives.

When an agreement on the disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces was concluded on 18 January 1974, with the assistance of the Force Commander, UNEF II supervised the redeployment of the two armies in accordance with the agreement and, after the redeployment, manned a buffer zone between them. In September 1975, following negotiations held under the auspices of the United States, Egypt and Israel concluded a second disengagement agreement which led to a further limited withdrawal of Israeli forces under similar arrangements as before. UNEF II carried out its task successfully until July 1979, when its mandate was allowed to lapse.

A disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria was reached in May 1974 within the framework of the military working group of the Geneva Peace Conference. In accordance with the agreement, Israeli and Syrian troops on the Golan Heights were redeployed, and an area of separation between them was created in which a United Nations

Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was stationed. UNDOF was established by the Security Council on 31 May 1974, the same day the agreement was signed. Areas of limited armaments and forces were established on both sides of the area of separation and were inspected by UNDOF. Syrian civilian administration returned to the area of separation.

Since the establishment of UNDOF, the Israel-Syria sector has been generally quiet. UNDOF has continued to perform its functions effectively with the co-operation of the parties, and for many years there have been no major incidents.

The strength of UNDOF was originally set at 1,250, including a small number of military observers of UNTSO, who form an integral part of the Force. The Security Council subsequently authorised an increase in strength, which currently stands at 1,330. Contingents are provided by Austria, Canada, Finland and Poland.

### **Interim Force in Lebanon**

The latest United Nations peace-keeping operation, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), has not enjoyed the favourable conditions that enabled UNDOF and, until 1979, UNEF II to function successfully. The Security Council established UNIFIL in March 1978, following an Israeli invasion of Lebanon that resulted in the occupation of all territory south of the Litani River except for a pocket around the city of Tyre. The Israeli action had been preceded by a commando attack in Israel in which 37 civilians were killed and 76 others wounded; the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) had claimed responsibility for that attack.

The Security Council gave UNIFIL the following mandate: to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon; to restore international peace and security; and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. These tasks were to be carried out in two stages. In the first stage, the Force would confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory to the international border. Once this was achieved, it would establish and maintain an area of operation. It would ensure the peaceful character of that area, control movement and take all measures deemed necessary to assure the effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty.

The conflict was not between Lebanon and Israel, but between the latter and the PLO. The situation was further complicated by the

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involvement of Lebanese militias, the armed elements of the Lebanese National Movement allied with the PLO and the *de facto* forces (Christian and associated militias) supported by Israel.

While the arrival of UNIFIL provided a reprieve to the opposing parties in the south, they never fully accepted the UNIFIL mandate with all its implications. The PLO felt that it had a right to be in southern Lebanon under agreements with the Lebanese Government and to pursue the armed struggle against Israel on that front. Israel felt that, for the protection of its northern border, it should rely on its own security arrangements in the form of a protective belt under its control inside Lebanese territory.

Given these attitudes, UNIFIL established itself with difficulty in the area evacuated by the Israeli forces during April 1978. It did not deploy in the Tyre pocket, which had not been occupied by Israeli forces. This left a sizeable number of Palestinian and Lebanese armed elements south of the Litani, and in the spring of 1978 most of the armed clashes in which UNIFIL was involved were with them. UNIFIL was also unable to deploy in the enclave along the border, because in the final stage of their withdrawal the Israeli forces turned that area over to the *de facto* forces. UNIFIL had barely taken up its positions when both sides began persistent attempts to make inroads into the UNIFIL area—the PLO and its Lebanese allies by infiltrating arms and men, the *de facto* forces and the Israel Defence Forces by threat or use of force against certain individuals and whole villages. The actions of one side inevitably produced reactions from the other, creating a cycle of violence which was further fuelled by incidents and events that took place elsewhere.

Despite these conditions, UNIFIL brought an element of stability to southern Lebanon. While there were frequent exchanges of fire between positions outside the UNIFIL area of deployment, the presence of UNIFIL prevented confrontations on the ground. UNIFIL also managed to keep its own area relatively peaceful, mainly by preventing armed persons from entering it or moving in it. The Force also rendered essential assistance in the restoration of public services and in efforts aimed at restoring the authority of the Government.

In July 1981, a *de facto* ceasefire, arranged through the joint efforts of the United Nations and the United States, came into effect, after which no hostilities at all took place in southern Lebanon. However, following terrorist attacks against Israeli personnel in Paris and London, Israel launched air raids against PLO targets in Lebanon on

21 April and 9 May 1982. In the first case, the PLO did not respond; in the second, it fired rockets into northern Israel, which led to further attacks by the Israeli forces.

In early June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon again, employing more than two mechanised divisions with air and naval support. UNIFIL had neither the mandate nor the means to oppose a organised force of such overwhelming strength and, while it attempted to halt the advance of the Israeli troops, its positions in the line of the invasion were overrun or bypassed. The Israeli forces occupied all of southern Lebanon within a few days and, continuing their advance, reached the outskirts of the capital city of Beirut in early July.

The Israeli invasion radically altered the conditions in which UNIFIL had to function. In these circumstances, the Secretary-General instructed the force to continue to man its positions and, as an interim task, to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to the population in its area of deployment. The Security Council subsequently endorsed these instructions and has continued to extend the mandate of the Force, bearing in mind the views of the Government of Lebanon, which attaches great importance to the continued presence of UNIFIL. The Council has also repeatedly reaffirmed the original mandate of the Force.

From August 1982 until June 1984, a multinational force composed of troops from France, Italy, the United States and later the United Kingdom was stationed in the Beirut area, first to facilitate the evacuation of PLO forces from Beirut and later to assist the Lebanese Government in maintaining quiet in the area. In May 1983, Israel and Lebanon concluded an agreement under the auspices of the United States, but it was never carried out. In September of the same year, as attacks by Lebanese resistance groups increased, the Israeli forces withdrew from the Beirut area to a line along the Awali River, on which they remained for more than a year.

In the summer of 1984, the Israeli Government indicated its intention to effect further withdrawals. In November, the Secretary-General convoked a conference of military representatives of Lebanon and Israel with the objective of expediting the orderly withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and discussing security arrangements in southern Lebanon. The conference was held under United Nations auspices at UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura. It lasted until January 1985 but produced no results. That same month, Israel announced a plan for the unilateral phased redeployment of its forces. In accordance

with the plan, the Israeli forces were withdrawn from most of the occupied Lebanese territory by June 1985, but they have continued to maintain a "security zone" in the border area. In that zone, which extends into part of the UNIFIL area, the so-called "South Lebanon Army" and other local militias armed and controlled by Israel maintain a number of positions with the backing of the Israeli forces.

Because of the presence of the Israeli forces and the "South Lebanon Army" in the "security zone", UNIFIL has not been able to extend its deployment to the border as required by its mandate. It is continuing its efforts to this end and, in the meantime, it endeavours to maintain peace and to curb the activities of the Israeli forces and Israel-controlled militiamen in its area of deployment.

UNIFIL originally had an authorised strength of 4,000. On the recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Security Council twice authorised an increase in its strength, first to 6,000 and then to 7,000. In 1985 UNIFIL had a strength of about 5,700, with contingents provided by Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Norway and Sweden.

# 10

## Soldiers of Peace

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### **Soldiers of Peace**

Peace-keeping is one of the ways in which the United Nations helps to maintain peace and security around the world. Member States of the UN provide troops who are sent to areas of the world where there is trouble. Peace-keeping forces can be set up only when the countries who are fighting agree and when the Security Council supports the idea.

A peace-keeping force may be asked to supervise ceasefires between two countries at war. They might also be sent as observers or to supervise troop withdrawals. Sometimes they are sent into a country to keep the peace between fighting groups within a country or to protect UN humanitarian relief convoys.

The “Blue Helmets”, as UN peace-keeping forces are often called, are highly respected. They may only shoot in self-defence and do not wage war as normal soldiers would. In representing the UN they also represent the wishes of the whole world and countries would be foolish to ignore them.

In 1988, the UN peace-keepers were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In receiving the award, the then Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, said:

“To remain calm in the face of provocation, to maintain composure when under attack, the United Nations troops, officers and soldiers alike, must show a special kind of courage, one that is more difficult to come by than the ordinary kind. Our United Nations troops have been put to the test and have emerged triumphant.”

UN forces may be used for a number of other purposes. In Namibia (1989-90), they supervised the elections which established a government for Namibia—a country which had previously been fighting for Independence from South Africa. They also provide emergency medical services and help to resettle refugees. The UN may ask its members to provide troops in order to stem aggression. This would be called a military enforcement action rather than a peace-keeping action. It has happened only twice in the history of the UN—in Korea in 1950 and in Kuwait in 1991.

### **Making Peace-keeping Stronger**

Many people would like to see the UN's peacekeeping operations strengthened. Here are some of the suggestions:

1. At the moment one of the fighting countries can ask for them to be removed—some people feel that only the Security Council should be able to do this.
2. Peace-keeping forces should be sent in *before* fighting starts.
3. Countries should train their soldiers in peacekeeping as well as combat so that they are ready and able to serve the UN.
4. The UN should have a permanent peace-keeping force.
5. There should be a more reliable way of paying for peace-keeping forces. Each member country must pay an agreed contribution, but many fail to do so.

### **UN Factfile: United Nations Peace-keeping**

Peace-keeping is not described in the Charter because it was felt that the five great powers (China, France, the then Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and the United States of America) would be able to keep the peace. They were to be the only heavily armed countries and, in time, developed nuclear weapons as well. This never worked because, during the Cold War, they could rarely agree with each other. So other methods had to be tried. Peace-keeping was really 'born' with the creation of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF 1) in Suez in 1956.

In 1994, there were 16 peace-keeping operations:

1. UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO)  
— Jerusalem
2. UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)
3. UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)  
— Damascus, Syria

4. UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
5. UN Interim Force in the Lebanon (UNIFIL)
6. UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)
7. UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)
8. UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)
9. UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
10. UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)-Yugoslavia
11. UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II)
12. UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)
13. UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)
14. UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)
15. UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)
16. UN Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)

As you can see, they cover most of the world's trouble spots.

Peace-keepers come from their own national armies and wear their own uniforms along with the UN blue berets or helmets. They are under a UN commander. They carry light arms and are allowed to use minimum force only if they are attacked or if armed people try to stop them carrying out their orders. By August 1994, 961 peace-keepers had lost their lives in the service of the United Nations.

*Banovic Strahinja Primary School  
Belgrade Yugoslavia*

Dear Secretary-General

I am writing to you from Yugoslavia from Belgrade. It is peaceful in my town, but there is a war going on in my country. Many people were killed, many were left homeless and what is most terrible for me is that many children were left without their parents, friends, without their childhood.

Please, help to bring back peace to my country. Try to explain to the adults in my country that we, children, are terribly afraid and there are already too many unhappy children. Convince them or make them stop shooting and, instead of fear, to allow us to study and work in peace because we would be more useful to our country in that way.

I know that you have helped many people a lot of times before so maybe you will be able to help us. Please try!

My friends and I will be grateful to you! We give you our regards.

Sincerely yours,

Jelena Urosevic, Age 9

**Activities**

1. Using a world map (Resource *Point F*) and atlas, find out where the peace-keeping operations are and mark them on the map.
2. List three differences between "soldiers of peace" (as the peace-keepers have been called), and normal soldiers.
3. In small groups discuss a conflict or argument you have had. Then take turns assigning someone, a one-person peace-keeping force, to examine the conflict and propose how it could have been avoided.
4. Now imagine you are a UN commander in charge of, say, UNIFIL. Read all the information in the sheet again. If you and your forces are to do your job properly they will need clear orders. Suggest three orders that you might give your troops - remember they are "soldiers of peace."
5. Study carefully the recommendations for strengthening peace-keeping. There are countries which would not support them. Suggest arguments against each one.

# 11

## **Peace-keeping is a Technique that Expands the Possibilities for both the Prevention of Conflict and the Making of Peace**

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*Boutros Boutros-Ghali,  
United Nations Secretary-General  
An Agenda for Peace, June 1992*

### **A Way to Control Conflicts and Promote Peace**

Peace-keeping was pioneered and developed by the United Nations as one of the means for maintaining international peace and security. Interposed between hostile States, or sometimes between hostile communities within a State, international military personnel under the United Nations command have saved countless lives and contributed to creating the conditions necessary for the peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiations.

United Nations peace-keeping activities have increased and broadened dramatically in recent years. In the span of only five years, the organisation has launched more operations than in the previous 40 years. The growth is not only in quantity but also in quality. Peace-keeping operations are taking on new tasks and often go far beyond traditional activities. They may protect relief shipments, provide services for victims, respond to refugee needs, enforce embargoes, remove mines and seek to disarm warring parties. In addition to military-related aspects, many United Nations operations now involve a large civilian dimension: election monitoring, human rights verification, humanitarian relief, administrative management, institution-building, and the restoration of infrastructure and services.

From 1948 through May 1993, over 600,000 soldiers and civilians have served under the United Nations flag in 28 peacekeeping operations. Over 900 peace-keepers have died while monitoring ceasefires, patrolling demilitarised areas, manning buffer zones and defusing conflicts. In May 1993, more than 80,000 United Nations personnel—military, police and civilian—were deployed in 13 ongoing operations; and an anticipated expansion of several operations could require an additional 40,000 or more personnel.

The effectiveness of peace-keeping forces derives from a combination of factors, foremost among them the presence of United Nations peace-keepers as physical expression of the moral authority of the Organisation and the concern of the international community.

In traditional peace-keeping operations, United Nations troops carry light arms and are allowed to use minimum force only in self-defence, or if armed persons try to stop them from carrying out the orders of their commanders. United Nations observers carry no arms at all. When acting under peace enforcement measures, however, United Nations troops may be authorised to use force in carrying out their responsibilities (see p. 5).

### **Honoured with Nobel Peace Prize**

In 1988, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to United Nations peace-keepers for “demanding and hazardous service in the cause of peace”. In accepting the award on their behalf, the then Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar\* said:

“Peace-keeping operations symbolise the world community’s will to peace and represent the impartial, practical expression of that will. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to these operations illustrates the hope and strengthens the promise of this extraordinary concept.”

Of the peace-keepers, he said:

“To remain calm in the face of provocation, to maintain composure when under attack, the United Nations troops, officers and soldiers alike, must show a special kind of courage, one that is more difficult to come by than the ordinary kind. Our United Nations troops have been put to the test and have emerged triumphant...”

### **The United Nations Charter and Collective Security**

Under its Charter, the first of the purposes of the United Nations is “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to

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\* Javier Perez de Cuellar served as the fifth United Nations Secretary-General, from 1 January 1982 until 31 December 1991.

take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.”

Chapters VI and VII of the Charter spell out concrete measures which the United Nations Security Council—the principal organ vested with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security—can take to achieve this purpose. Chapter VI, on the peaceful settlement of disputes, provides that international disputes “likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security” can be brought to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly. The Security Council is mandated to call on the parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means, to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment and, in addition, to recommend actual terms of a settlement. The action of the Security Council in this context is limited to making recommendations; essentially, the peaceful settlement of international disputes must be achieved by the parties themselves, acting on a voluntary basis to carry out the decisions of the Council in accordance with the Charter.

If the Security Council determines that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression exists, it may use the broad powers and enforcement measures at its disposal under Chapter VII of the Charter. To prevent a situation from deteriorating, the Security Council may call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it considers necessary or desirable. Next, it may decide, under Article 41, what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed by the Members of the United Nations, including the complete or partial interruption of economic relations and means of communication and the severance of diplomatic relations. Should the Security Council consider those measures inadequate, it may take, under Article 42, “such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”. For this purpose, all Members of the United Nations undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with special agreements, the necessary armed forces, assistance and facilities. Plans for the application of armed force are to be made by the Security Council with the advice and assistance of its Military Staff Committee.

The measures outlined in Articles 41 and 42 constitute the core of the system of collective security envisaged by the Charter. A basic feature of this system is the determining role assigned to the five permanent members of the Security Council—China, France, the Russian Federation\* the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. These Powers can use their veto (negative vote) to block any substantive decision by the Council. Therefore, the United Nations collective security system, and especially its key provision concerning the use of armed force, can work only if there is full agreement and cooperation among the permanent members.

Peace-keeping as a concept is not specifically described in the United Nations Charter. It goes beyond purely diplomatic means for the peaceful settlement of disputes described in Chapter VI, but falls short of the military or other enforcement provisions of Chapter VII. As former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld\*\* stated, peace-keeping might be put in a new Chapter “Six and a half”. Peace-keeping has evolved over the years as a flexible, internationally acceptable way of controlling conflicts and promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes. This technique—born of necessity, largely improvised, and used as a practical response to a problem requiring action—partly compensated for the impaired ability of the Security Council to function fully during the cold war.

### **How Peace-keeping Operations are Set Up**

When a United Nations Member State or group of States, or the Secretary-General, proposes the establishment of a peacekeeping operation, a number of basic conditions have to be met to be met. First, the proposal must command the consent of the parties to the conflict. The operation must neither interfere in the internal affairs of the host countries nor favour one party against another. Second, the

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\* The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was an original Member of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. In a letter dated 24 December 1991, the President of the Russian Federation informed the Secretary-General that the membership of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Security Council and all other United Nations organs was being continued by the Russian Federation with the support of the 11 member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

\*\* DAG Hammarskjöld served as the second United Nations Secretary-General, from 1953 until 17 September 1961, when he died in a plane crash in the course of securing a cessation of hostilities and achieving reconciliation among Congolese factions (see “United Nations Operation in the Congo”, p. 40).

proposal must enjoy broad support from the international community—specifically, it must be adopted by the Security Council. Third, Member States must be ready to volunteer personnel to serve under the command of the United Nations Secretary-General.

The success of a peace-keeping operation also requires a clear and practicable mandate, the cooperation of the parties in implementing that mandate, effective United Nations command at Headquarters and in the field, and adequate logistic and financial support.

In order for the 15-member Security Council to adopt a proposal for a peace-keeping operation, there have to be at least nine votes in favour and no negative vote from any of its five permanent members. The Secretary-General reports to the Council on how the operation can be launched and carried out. Subject to the Council's approval, he must then make the necessary arrangements: choosing the head of the mission and asking Member States to provide troops, police or other civilian personnel, supplies and equipment, transportation and logistics support. He also consults with the parties to the conflict about the troop-contributing countries.

In approving the Secretary-General's report, the Council also decides how the operation will be paid for: on a voluntary basis or, as is usually the case, on an obligatory basis as expenses of the organisation in accordance with provisions in the Charter. In the latter case, the General Assembly decides how those costs are apportioned among the Member States.

The Secretary-General keeps the Security Council informed of relevant developments; all matters which may affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the operation are referred to the Council for its decision.

### **Peace-keeping—an Evolving Technique**

Peace-keeping operations have been used most commonly to supervise and help maintain ceasefires, to assist in troop withdrawals and to provide a buffer between opposing forces. However, peace-keeping operations are flexible instruments of policy and have been adapted to a variety of uses.

Of the 13 operations which were set up before the cold war era began to dissipate around 1988, all, with the exception of the operation in West Irian, were what are now described as "traditional" peace-keeping operations. They were largely military in composition and in functions, entrusted to maintain calm on the front lines while giving

the peacemakers time to negotiate a settlement of the dispute. Sometimes the peacemakers succeeded. Sometimes they did not. Five of the "traditional" peace-keeping operations remain in the field today, as they continue to ensure calm in spite of the intractability of the conflicts.

In the course of the past few years, the new political climate emerging from the end of the cold war has contributed to an increase in demand for United Nations peace-keeping. Of the 28 peace-keeping operations established by the United Nations since its inception, 15 have been set up since 1988; only five of these "post-cold war" operations have been of the traditional military kind.

The character of peace-keeping operations is also undergoing some profound changes, as the "second generation" of peace-keeping is emerging to respond to new facts of international life in the post-cold war era. One such development is the difficulties being experienced by some regimes in coping with the withdrawal of super-Power support, weak institutions, collapsing economies, natural disasters and ethnic strife. As new conflicts take place within nations rather than between them, the United Nations today deals with civil wars, secessions, partitions, ethnic clashes and tribal struggles. Rescuing "failed States", according to Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, may become an inherent part of second-generation peace-keeping. Complicated military tasks must be complemented by measures to strengthen institutions, encourage political participation, protect human rights, organise elections and promote economic and social development.

The reality of these remarkable changes in United Nations peace-keeping is also revealed in numbers. In 1987, there were some 10,000 United Nations military personnel deployed. In May 1993, the number rose to almost 70,000. As for civilian police, 35 were deployed in 1987, as against over 4,500 in May 1993. In 1987, there were approximately 900 civilians employed in peacekeeping operations; five years later, the number of international and local civilian personnel reached more than 10,000.

The first in the new generation of peace-keeping operations was the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), which supervised the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia's transition to independence. Although UNTAG's military tasks were similar to those of earlier peace-keeping operations, the operation's civilian components were equally vital to the success of the mission. They supervised every aspect of the difficult political process

which led to Namibia's first free and fair elections in November 1989. Namibia acceded to independence on 21 March 1990 and was admitted to the United Nations on 23 April of the same year.

Another example of the new multidimensional peacekeeping operation is the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), which, since 1991, has been verifying the implementation of all agreements negotiated, with the assistance of the Secretary-General and his Personal Representative, between the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional. These agreements involve not only a ceasefire and related measures but also reform and reduction of the armed forces, creation of a new police force, reform of the judicial and electoral systems, human rights, land tenure and other economic and social issues. ONUSAL will also verify the March 1994 elections in El Salvador.

The United Nations operation in Cambodia is one of the most ambitious and complex operations thus far in the Organisation's history. The Peace Agreement signed by four Cambodian parties in October 1991 has required the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to supervise various parts of the existing administration, organise elections, monitor the police, promote human rights, repatriate 350,000 refugees and begin rehabilitation of the country, as well as to carry out a familiar range of traditional military functions.

When the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established in the territory of the former Yugoslavia in early 1992, its mandate in Croatia was consistent with the traditional concept of interposition and was intended to maintain and promote peace pending a final overall settlement. Later, however, the deteriorating situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina prompted the Security Council to expand UNPROFOR's mandate to include protection of humanitarian convoys and convoys of released civilian detainees. Also, in a first preventive operation in the history of United Nations peace-keeping, UNPROFOR has been deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) is designed to restore order in the country through massive military presence, humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and political settlement, as well as the rehabilitation of political institutions and the economy. Acting on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter, on enforcement measures, the Security Council authorised UNOSOM II troops to use force in their very important task of disarming Somali

factions. In fact, UNOSOM II, with the enforcement element in its mandate, may well represent the emergence of a third generation of peace-keeping operations.

### **Agenda for Peace**

On 31 January 1992, the Security Council held its first summit meeting at the level of heads of State and Government, marking an unprecedented recommitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The summit noted the increased and broadened peace-keeping tasks in recent years, and called on the Secretary-General to recommend ways of strengthening the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. In June 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented to the Member States a report entitled *An Agenda for Peace*, in which he analysed recent developments affecting international peace and security and introduced proposals for more effective United Nations operations in identifying potential conflicts, their short- and long-term resolution and post-conflict measures to build peace among former adversaries.

Among the recommendations for enhancing the United Nations' performance in preventing conflicts was the increased use of confidence-building and fact-finding measures, as well as preventive deployment of a United Nations presence or establishment of demilitarised zones in potential conflict areas. The Secretary-General also suggested new ways of using military force under United Nations command in the pursuit of peace, either in response to aggression, as foreseen by the United Nations Charter, or to enforce ceasefires. He also envisaged various post-conflict—"peace-building"—measures designed to foster confidence between the parties to an armed conflict.

With regard to peace-keeping operations themselves, the Secretary-General's recommendations focused on meeting the growing need for personnel, logistical and financial support for United Nations operations, including the holding in reserve of basic peace-keeping equipment, such as vehicles and communications gear to facilitate the quick deployment during the start-up phase of a new peace-keeping operation. He also supported the idea of financing such missions out of States' defence, rather than foreign affairs, budgets.

### **Financial Aspects**

Assured and adequate financing for peace-keeping operations is vital. Whenever a new operation is established, all personnel must be

transported to the area of operation. Once in the field, they must be provided with accommodation, food, medical care, transport, communications and all the other equipment needed to carry out their functions.

The recent dramatic increase in demands for United Nations peace-keeping has resulted in a corresponding increase in expenditures. In the last two years, the annual United Nations peace-keeping budget grew fivefold, from some \$600 million in 1991 to \$2.8 billion in 1992. The operations now envisaged in 1993 may bring the annual budget to \$4.3 billion. As of mid-May 1993, overdue payment of Member States' obligatory contributions to peace-keeping operations amounted to some \$1.4 billion.

As the Secretary-General stated in *An Agenda for Peace*: "The contrast between the costs of United Nations peace-keeping and the costs of the alternative, war—between the demands of the Organisation and the means provided to meet them—would be farcical were the consequences not so damaging to global stability and to the credibility of the Organisation." He also noted that, at the end of the last decade, global defence expenditures' had reached \$1 trillion a year, or \$2 million per minute. Following up on one of the recommendations contained in *An Agenda for Peace*, the General Assembly, in December 1992, decided to establish, under the Secretary-General's authority, a Peace-keeping Reserve Fund of \$150 million as a cash-flow mechanism to ensure that the United Nations is able to respond rapidly to the needs of peace-keeping operations.

### **The Operations—A Brief Overview**

United Nations peace-keeping operations have traditionally fallen into two broad categories: observer missions, which consist largely of officers who are almost invariably unarmed; and peace-keeping forces, which consist of lightly armed infantry units, with the necessary logistic support elements. These categories, however, are not mutually exclusive. Observer missions are sometimes reinforced by infantry and/or logistic units, usually for a specific purpose and a brief period of time. Peace-keeping forces are often assisted in their work by unarmed military observers. And many recent peace-keeping operations have large civilian components, which carry out essential political, humanitarian and administrative functions.

The first use of military personnel by the United Nations was in 1947, in two United Nations bodies: the Consular Commission in Indonesia and the Special Committee on the Balkans. Since the small

officer groups worked not under the Secretary-General's authority but as members of the national delegations comprising those bodies, they cannot be considered United Nations peace-keeping operations, as the term has come to be used.

### ***Observer Missions***

The first observer mission established by the United Nations was the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), set up in Palestine in June 1948. Later observer missions were the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), in 1949; the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), in 1958; the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), in 1963; the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP), in 1965; the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), in the same year; the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), in 1988; the "United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), also in 1988; the United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I), in 1989; and the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), in the same year. In 1991, four new missions were established: the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), ONUSAL and the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC). Of these, UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNIKOM, UNAVEM II and ONUSAL are still in operation.

### ***Peace-keeping Forces***

There have been, in all, 15 peacekeeping forces. The first was the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), which was in operation in the Egypt-Israel sector from 1956 until 1967. The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was deployed in the Republic of the Congo (now Zaire) from 1960 to 1964. The United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNSF) was in place from 1962 until 1963. The Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) functioned between Egypt and Israel from 1973 until 1979. UNTAG was deployed in Namibia from 1989 to 1990. The United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) was functional from 1992 to 1993. The other forces, which are still in operation, are the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), established in 1964; the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), deployed in the Syrian Golan Heights in 1974; the United Nations

Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), established in 1978; the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), set up in 1991; UNPROFOR, UNTAC and the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), all three established in 1992; and UNOSOM II, set up in 1993.

## **PEACE-KEEPING**

"While traditional peacekeeping had focused mainly on monitoring ceasefires, today's complex peace operations are very different. Their objective, in essence, is to assist the parties engaged in conflict to pursue their interests through political channels instead."

*Secretary-General Koffi Annan in the Millennium Report*

### **Two Peace Missions**

#### ***UN Mission in East Timor***

Some of the people had not slept overnight just to be among the first to cast their ballots. A new day was breaking in East Timor, and the people were determined to be part of it. After years of political turmoil and civil unrest, elections were being held to decide the future course of the territory. The United Nations was in charge of organising the elections. This gave people confidence and hope.

Vannary Ing, a UN volunteer from Cambodia serving with the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), was one of those overseeing the elections. "I am happy to give back some of what I received through the UN's involvement," said Vannary. Less than seven years ago, in May 1993, his own country had gone through the same process, with the United Nations in the lead.

"Seeing the suffering of innocent people is never easy no matter which part of the world you are in. The closer you are to such tragedies, the more determined you become to end them," said another UNAMET volunteer.

#### **UN Mission in Rwanda**

The memories still haunt Major Comfort Ankomah-Danso, a member of the Ghana battalion serving the UN mission in Rwanda. The country was still reeling from a brutal ethnic war, a war that would eventually take away as many as 1 million human lives. "Sporadic killings" were still going on when she arrived. Her battalion, being the main external military force remaining in the country, was

**PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS PAST AND PRESENT**

UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation	June 1948-To present
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group In India and Pakistan	January 1949-To present
UNEF I	First United Nations Emergency Force	November 1956-June 1967
UNOGIL	United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon	June 1958-December 1958
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo	July 1960 -June 1964
UNSF	United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian)	October 1962-April 1963
UNYOM	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission	July 1963-September 1964
UNFICYP	United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus	March 1964-To present
DOMREP	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General In the Dominican Republic	May 1965-October 1966
UNIPOM	United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission	September 1965-March 1966
UNEF II	Second United Nations Emergency Force	October 1973-July 1979
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force	June 1974-To present
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	March 1978-To present
UNGOMAP	United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	April 1988 -March 1990
UNIIMOG	United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group	August 1988-February 1991
UNAVEM I	United Nations Angola Verification Mission I	January 1989-June 1991
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group	April 1989-March 1990
ONUSCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America	Nov. 1989-January 1992
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	April 1991 -To present
UNAVEM II	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II	June 1991-To present

ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador	July 1991 -To present
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	September 1991 -To present
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia	October 1991 -March 1992
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force	March 1 1993-To present
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia	March 1992-September 1993
UNOSOM I	United Nations Operation in Somalia I	April 1992 -April 1993
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique	December 1992-Dec. 1994
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation In Somalia II	May 1993 -To present
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda	June 1993-September 1994
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia	August 1993-To present
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia	September 1993-To present
UNMIH	United Nations Mission In Haiti	September 1 1993-To present
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda	October 1 1993-To present
UNASOG	United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group	May 1 1994-June 1994
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	December 1994 - To present

tasked with undertaking mass burials, exhuming bodies and reburying the victims of the massacres.

“It was not pleasant at all,” the Major remarked.

### **VITAL STATISTICS**

- Since 1948, there have been 54 UN peacekeeping operations, 41 of which were created by the Security Council between 1988 and 2000.
- As of 1 March 2001, there were 39 completed missions and 15 current missions. Of these; 4+15 (current/completed) have been in Africa; 8 (completed) in the Americas; 2 + 6 in Asia, 5 + 5 in Europe, and 4 + 5 in the Middle East.
- As of 31 December 1999, 87 Member States had joined a system of standby arrangements for peacekeeping operations; 65 had provided information on the specific capabilities they are prepared to offer military units, individual, civilian and military specialists; specialised services; equipment and other capabilities, such as transport (progress report of the Secretary-General of 1 May 2000).
- Fifteen UN missions are currently under way, with 38,905 peacekeepers serving in them as of 1 March 2001.
- As of 28 February 2001, 1,655 peacekeepers had died while serving in these missions; seven eighths were military personnel; one third died by hostile acts.
- Well over 750,000 military and civilian police personnel and thousands of other civilians from 111 countries have served in UN peacekeeping operations.
- In 1988, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the United Nations Peacekeepers.

### **Peacekeeping, a UN Innovation**

The Charter of the United Nations calls upon the peoples of the world “to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security”, and charges the Security Council with the task of “determining the existence of any threat to the peace and deciding what measures shall be taken”.

Peacekeeping was never mentioned in the Charter as one of the tools to be employed by the United Nations. Yet, it took only three years for this whole new technique to be conceived: that of using

troops under UN command to keep disputing countries or communities from fighting while peacemaking efforts are pursued. This technique of keeping peace was to be implemented 13 times in the UN's first 40 years. Since then, 40 new missions have been created, expanding the concept of peacekeeping dramatically and moving into the arena of peacemaking and peace-building.

Peacekeeping originated and evolved on a largely *ad hoc* basis. Each operation has been tailor-made to meet the demands of a specific conflict. As a concept, peacekeeping lies somewhere in between Chapters VI and VII of the Charter of the United Nations:

**Chapter VI** outlines specific means which countries may use to settle disputes: negotiations, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional institutions or arrangements or other peaceful means.

**Chapter VII** provides for enforcement action by UN Member States, including the use of armed force or other collective measures for dealing with "threats to peace."

### **What is Peace-keeping?**

Simply put, peacekeepers are people helping the parties to a conflict to resolve their differences peacefully. The presence of these people, soldiers, military observers or civilian police, encourage hostile groups not to use arms and instead to keep negotiating for peaceful settlement of disputes.

Most UN peacekeepers—often referred to as "blue helmets" because of the colour of the helmets they wear while on duty—have been soldiers, volunteered by their Governments to apply military discipline and training to the task of restoring and maintaining peace: monitoring ceasefires, separating hostile forces and maintaining buffer zones. Civilian police officers, electoral observers, human rights monitors and other civilians have joined UN peacekeepers in recent years. Their tasks range from protecting and delivering humanitarian assistance to helping former opponents carry out complicated peace agreements.

Traditionally, peacekeeping operations fall into two main categories: observer missions and peacekeeping forces.

**Observer missions** usually consist of unarmed military and civilian personnel who monitor the implementation of ceasefire agreements.

**Peacekeeping forces** are composed of lightly armed forces, and include fully equipped infantry contingents.

## **This is How it Started**

The first UN peacekeeping operation—the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), an observer mission, was established in 1948, in the Middle East.

Earlier in 1947, the United Nations adopted a plan to divide Palestine and create a Jewish, and an Arab State. On 15 May 1948, the British administrative power formally ended its control over Palestine, and within 24 hours the State of Israel was proclaimed. Fierce hostilities broke out immediately between the Arab and Jewish communities. Count Bernadotte of Sweden, who was appointed by the United Nations to mediate the conflict, was able to negotiate a ceasefire.

But as the hostilities continued and the number of Palestinian refugees fleeing Israel grew, the Security Council decided to create a Truce Commission to supervise the cease fire. Count Bernadotte was to be assisted in this by a group of military observers. However, the Count was assassinated in the Israeli-held sector of Jerusalem on 17 September 1948. He was succeeded by Ralph Bunche of the United States, who took over as Acting Mediator. He directed the military observers and laid down the operation procedure.

Today, more than 50 years later, UNTSO remains in force, helping to keep peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours.

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## **What are the Common Features of Peacekeeping Operations?**

While each UN peacekeeping operation is unique, their unique features are:

- All require the consent of parties involved in a dispute;
- None can be imposed unilaterally or from outside;
- None involves military enforcement measures or coercive actions, except in the very limited context of self-defence or defence of civilian populations;
- All involve the deployment in the field of existing UN staff and of personnel (military and/or civilian) made available to the Secretary-General by Governments;

- All are under the operational command of the Secretary General;
- All are deployed to help control and resolve' international conflicts or, increasingly, internal conflicts having an international dimension.

### **How Does a Peacekeeping Mission Start?**

Peacekeeping operations are normally set up by the Security Council, the UN organ with primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The Council decides the operation's size, its overall objectives and its time frame. As the United Nations has no military or civilian police force of its own, Member States decide whether to participate in a mission and, if so, what personnel and equipment they are willing to offer. Under the present structure, it can take considerable time for the actual forces to be authorised and reach their destination.

In some cases, peacekeepers have been sent to places where there was no peace to keep. In Sierra Leone, while monitoring a peace agreement, contempt rather than cooperation was experienced by UN soldiers who were abducted; some were later killed. In Somalia, the parties repeatedly violated ceasefire agreements, and UN personnel became targets for murder, kidnapping and intimidation. Those who committed these crimes knew well that casualties can undermine support for a peacekeeping operation among the nations providing troops for it. Even in cases where there was a peace agreement, as in Angola and in Cambodia, peacekeepers have had to contend with recalcitrant rebel groups for whom war was a profitable enterprise, since these groups controlled valuable export commodities, such as diamonds, drugs and timber.

### **How Much Does it Cost?**

The estimated UN peacekeeping budget for 2000 was approximately \$2.2 billion. This declined from about \$3 billion in 1995, which reflected the expense of UN peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia. All Member States contribute to peacekeeping costs under a formula that they have designed and agreed upon. As on June 2000, Member States owed the United Nations about \$2.5 billion in current and back peacekeeping dues. However, there is no amount of money that could repay the loss of life of a peacekeeper.

The volatility and danger of the environments in which the United Nations operates are underlined by the increased number of casualties suffered by UN peacekeepers. From 1 January 1998 to 19 August

1999, 34 UN personnel gave their lives in peacekeeping operations. These are costs that can never be repaid.

### **Changes in Peace-keeping Operations**

The traditional concept of UN peacekeeping, as it was first developed, was to deploy in a 'buffer zone' separating fighting forces, e.g. in the Golan Heights between Israeli and Syrian forces.

Today, its meaning has changed, its role has widened and its responsibility has broadened. Most peacekeeping operations now are multidimensional, requiring each to carry out a variety of functions involving peace-making and peace-building. Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his 1999 report on the work of the organisation, thus summarised these functions:

"While some traditional peacekeeping operations remain, peacekeepers throughout the decade of the 1990s have been involved in the broader post-conflict peace-building processes associated with the implementation of peace agreements. This involves the return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, reconciliation, rebuilding judicial systems, strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights, electoral assistance and assistance in rebuilding war-torn political, economic and social infrastructures, as well as more traditional peacekeeping tasks."

**Peacekeeping and peacemaking** are two sides of the same coin. While soldiers and civilian observers help maintain peace between warring groups, efforts are made by diplomats to negotiate the dispute and lasting peace. Peacekeeping takes place only after a crisis emerges, but peacemaking may begin long before that. In a variety of ways, the United Nations can try to prevent new disputes from flaring up, or existing disputes from escalating into conflicts. This may involve making personal contacts, using the "good offices" of the Secretary-General, sending fact-finding missions or installing an early warning system.

**Peace-building** means efforts to identify and support areas that tend to consolidate peace. Once a ceasefire is achieved and a peace agreement is negotiated, peace-building can start. Opposing parties may be disarmed and weapons destroyed, refugees may be repatriated, elections can be held and steps can be taken to monitor respect for human rights. In cases where the conflict is between two or more countries, sustained cooperative work may be undertaken to deal with their economic, social, cultural and ethnic problems. Only such peace-building measures can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation.

The nature of conflict has changed in recent years. It is a complex mix of inter-State and internal conflicts: their roots may be essentially internal, but they are complicated by cross-border involvement, either by State or non-State actors. And their consequences can quickly become international, because of destabilising refugee flows as well as the dangers posed by factions pursuing each other across borders. This is what happened in recent years in Sierra Leone, Angola, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) and the Sudan.

In each of the above cases, the United Nations had to tackle a number of challenges concurrently: helping to maintain ceasefires and to disarm and demobilise combatants; assisting the parties to build or strengthen vital institutions and processes and respect for human rights, so that all concerned can pursue their interests through legitimate channels rather than on the battlefield; providing internal monitoring of elections following electoral reform to ensure that the reforms will take effect; providing humanitarian assistance to relieve immediate suffering; and laying the groundwork for longer-term economic growth and development through interim administration on the understanding that no post-conflict system can long endure if it fails to improve the lot of impoverished people.

### **Some Recent Examples**

According to the Secretary-General, the United Nations can claim significant successes among its peace operations in the last decade or so, beginning with Namibia in the late 1980s, and including Mozambique, El Salvador, the Central African Republic, Guatemala, Eastern Slavonia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and, at least partially, Cambodia. These operations helped lead to, for example, Namibian independence; democratic elections in Mozambique; far-reaching political reform in El Salvador; and new human rights protections in Guatemala.

### ***Election Monitoring***

From Namibia to Nicaragua, from Cambodia to Croatia, from Mozambique to Liberia, UN-supervised or -monitored elections have helped open the way to democracy. This may mean providing technical advice on electoral laws and procedures, support with the transportation of voting materials and the setting up of polling stations and communications networks, or sending international observers to help make the voting free and fair.

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### ***Police Training***

UN police training and monitoring programmes in Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Eastern Slavonia region of Croatia and elsewhere have helped make local police forces operate more professionally, with respect for the human rights of residents in the area under patrol.

### ***Mine Clearance***

Mine clearance is now an integral part of many peacekeeping operations. UN peacekeepers not only perform mine clearance but also train local deminers, carry out mine-awareness programmes and conduct mine surveys. Such programmes have been carried out in several countries, including Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mozambique, Rwanda and Yemen.

### ***Demobilising Soldiers***

UN peacekeepers have supervised the dismantling of arms collected from demobilised soldiers in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mozambique and Guatemala. In some of these countries, the United Nations has also helped armed opposition movements transform themselves into political parties.

### **How do Governments Contribute to Peacekeeping?**

Contributions come in various forms, both human and material. The soldiers and officers serving a UN peacekeeping operation are trained, selected and sent by their own countries. Besides the military troops, there are often civilian police officers, engineers to build roads, medical personnel, pilots, communications experts and many others. Military personnel, international civilian observers and local civilians from the area all work together in an operation.

Governments also contribute a wide range of components for the many functions of peacekeeping operations such as tents, portable structures for housing, hospitals or offices, furnishings and equipment, road transport and transport utility aircraft and many others, as well as such services as strategic sealift/airlift operations.

### **New Times, New Challenges**

In recent years, in a growing number of countries, Governments no longer seem to be capable of protecting the civilians from attacks by local warlords and militia—leaders whose only aim is power and personal enrichment. The threat of international isolation or

condemnation has little or no effect on them. In such a scenario, what can the United Nations do?

**In Sierra Leone**, Foday Sankoh led a militia which is believed to be responsible for either killing or seriously hurting innocent civilians. His soldiers allegedly chopped off limbs of people suspected of opposing him. When UN peacekeepers were sent, they were attacked; some were killed and hundreds of others kidnapped.

Recently addressing the students of Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C., Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan mentioned Foday Sankoh by name and answered the question this way:

“Given the enormity of these challenges—and the fact that, in many cases, if the United Nations doesn’t take them on, no one will—we are taking a hard look at how and under which conditions we carry out peacekeeping missions. We have had to reconsider some of the most basic assumptions about neutrality, the good faith of the parties and the non-use of force that were the basis of the successful operations of the cold-war era.”

### **Could the Genocide in Rwanda Have been Prevented?**

In 1994, in Rwanda, over 800,000 people, mostly from the country’s Tutsi minority but also many from its Hutu majority, were killed in a bloody intra-ethnic strife. A small UN peacekeeping operation in place could not stop the genocide. Several national contingents were also withdrawn in the midst of the slaughter.

To find out what happened and who was responsible, the United Nations in 1999 set up an independent inquiry. In its report published in December 1999, the inquiry found that the failure by the United Nations to prevent and, subsequently, to stop the genocide in Rwanda was a failure by the UN system as a whole. The fundamental failure was the lack of resources and political commitment devoted to developments in Rwanda and to the UN presence there.

There was a persistent lack of political will by Member States to act, or to act with enough assertiveness. This lack of political will affected the response by the Secretariat and decision-making by the Security Council, but was also evident in the recurrent difficulties to get the necessary troops for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).

Finally, the inquiry found that, although UNAMIR suffered from a chronic lack of resources and political priority, serious mistakes

were made with those resources that were at the disposal of the United Nations.

While the peacekeeping environment may have changed, Annan said, the basic requirements for success have not. There is no substitute for sufficient means, robust mandates and the willingness of those States capable of doing so to provide first-rate military and logistical support. "The best peacekeeper is a well-trained, disciplined and well-equipped soldier."

In Eastern Slavonia, where growing ethnic tension posed grave risks to international peace, the United Nations deployed a force of heavily mechanised infantry and helicopter gun-ships, and by showing force in order not to use it, it successfully fulfilled the mandate.

### **Areas Needing More Attention**

While there have been successes, there have also been tragic failures, none more so than Rwanda and the fall of Srebrenica. With the wide range of responses or lack of response to each situation that arises, the structural weaknesses are apparent. The most serious areas are:

- Delays in the deployment of forces;
- The small number of military standby arrangements that are in a high state of readiness;
- The difficulty of recruiting qualified civil personnel for missions, such as police officers, judges or people to run correctional institutions to focus only on law-enforcement needs.

The system for launching operations has sometimes been compared to a volunteer fire department, but that description is too generous. Every time there is a fire, the United Nations must first find fire engines and the funds to run them before there can be any start to dousing the flames. The present system relies almost entirely on last-minute, ad hoc arrangements that guarantee delay, with respect to the provision of civilian personnel even more so than military.

### **The Case for a Rapid Response Capacity**

For many years now, the United Nations has been seeking to build a reliable system in which trained and equipped troops are available immediately after the Security Council's decision to establish an operation. Under the so-called "standby" arrangements, more than 80 countries have identified more than 80,000 troops that could be available for service.

However, Member States can still decline to participate, which means that standby arrangements are somewhat like traveller's cheques with only one signature: until the owner countersigns, the currency cannot be used. In practice, standby arrangements have not proved themselves to be enough to meet the challenge of rapid deployment.

- Some countries have taken the initiative to form a multinational standby high-readiness brigade, called SHIRBRIG, which could be ready to respond in as little as 48 hours following a Council decision and if the Member States involved decide they want to participate.

### **SUGGESTED ACTIVITIES FOR STUDENTS**

1. With the wide range of peacekeeping missions, research is advised on individual missions—either current or completed. Materials are available from the Public Inquiries Unit of the United Nations, the UN web site for peacekeeping or a wide range of news sources. Why do some operations receive much more attention by the media than others? Compare and contrast the news coverage of the missions. What factors affect the extent of coverage? An outline to follow for research of each mission is: duration, location, headquarters, mandate, authorised strength, current strength, contributors and historical background. Students may then prepare a news broadcast to present their information.
2. Research other areas of UN work, such as that of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organisation, the United Nations Development Programme, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the World Food Programme and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). For individual peace-keeping missions, how is the work of these agencies coordinated with the mission? What other non-governmental organisations or private voluntary organisations (such as the International Red Cross, CARE, Oxfam, Doctors Without Borders, Save the Children, World Vision, the American Friends Service Committee, Catholic Relief Services) are active in the area of the mission? What kind of work are they doing?

3. Choose an individual mission and research the following steps for details:
  - (a) There is a disagreement or war between opposing forces or sides.
  - (b) The issue is brought before the UN Security Council.
  - (c) The opposing forces agree on the specific purpose of the operation, whether it is to monitor a ceasefire, patrol a border area, transport humanitarian aid or monitor an election.
  - (d) The Security Council passes a resolution defining the mandate of the operation and establishing the peacekeeping mission for a fixed period of time (generally six months).
  - (e) The mandate is implemented once countries voluntarily contribute forces and equipment to the operation; UN members are assessed for costs of the operation.
  - (f) The Secretary-General appoints the UN peacekeeping commander for the military operation, who reports to the Secretary-General and other UN peacekeeping commanders from other countries to assist this person.
  - (g) The Secretary-General selects a special representative to coordinate all civilian and military undertakings of the mission.
  - (h) The Secretary-General reports on the progress of the operation to the Security Council.
  - (i) At the end of the fixed period (or sooner if required), the Security Council determines the next step (continuation, reorientation or termination of the mission).
4. Choose a particular country (your own or any other) and follow its contributions to peacekeeping efforts. Some recipient countries of peacekeepers have turned into contributing countries. Can you find them?
5. Design your own visual representation of what you think a successful/ideal peacekeeping mission would look like. Share the representations with others.

### **An Independent Panel Recommends**

In March 2000, Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan set up a panel of international experts to review and recommend actions to improve UN peace operations. The report of the panel was issued in

August 2000, just ahead of the Millennium Summit (6-8 September 2000). Here are the highlights of the report:

- The panel recommends providing peacekeeping troops with the authorisation, equipment and backing to respond to violence against civilians and to take action against one side in a conflict if it violates peace agreements. The Security Council is urged not to finalise resolutions authorising large peacekeeping missions until Member States have pledged the necessary troops and resources to deploy them successfully. The Secretary-General is called upon to maintain a roster of qualified candidates for key peacekeeping jobs in the field, while Member States are asked to prepare personnel that can be deployed once an operation is established.
- It calls for more steady funding for the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations so as to overcome confusion of "the temporary nature of specific operations with the evident permanence of peacekeeping and other peace operation activities as core functions of the UN."
- While reaffirming that the consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping, the Panel nevertheless clarifies that impartiality should not imply lack of action. In cases "where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the UN can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil".
- The panel points out, "No failure did more damage to the standing and credibility of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor." In order to correct this, the Panel recommends that rules of engagement be sufficiently robust so that UN contingents will not be forced to cede the initiative to their attackers. Furthermore, UN peacekeepers who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorised to stop it, within their means, in support of basic UN principles.
- The Panel emphasises the importance of conflict prevention, noting that it is "far preferable for those who would otherwise suffer the consequences of war, and a less costly option for the international community than military action, emergency

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humanitarian relief, or reconstruction after a war has run its course”.

- The Panel recommends the creation of a new information gathering and analysis entity within the UN to accumulate knowledge about conflict situations, distribute that knowledge efficiently, generate policy analyses and formulate long-term strategies.
  - The report also calls for creating an on-call list of about 100 experienced and well-qualified military officers, along with lists of civilian police, international judicial and penal experts and human rights specialists. Member States should establish pools of police officers and related experts, according to the report.
  - The Panel warns that the changes it recommends will have no lasting impact unless Member States summon the political will to support the United Nations politically, financially and operationally in order to enable it to be truly credible as a force for peace.
6. Access the lesson plans on peacekeeping prepared by the Cyber School Bus web site. Conduct a dialogue with a peacekeeper. (see <http://www.un.org>)
  7. Research some of the missions that were successful and those that were not. Compare and contrast those factors that led to the success or failure of the missions. What lessons were drawn from these experiences? Look at the lessons learned portion on the UN peacekeeping site to see how your assessments compare with those of UN staff.
  8. The United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Cambodia was one of the largest ever undertaken. Research the history of Cambodia since the Vietnam War. You might wish to read the book or view the movie *The Killing Fields*. Research the two UN missions in Cambodia. What were the mandates of the missions? How did they turn out? Now that the peacekeeping operation is officially completed, what is happening in that country?
  9. Research recent events in southern Lebanon. What changes have occurred there? What implications might this have for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mission?
  10. Conduct a poll within your school or community on UN peacekeeping. What are people’s views concerning a rapid

response force? What kinds of questions do people have about UN peacekeeping? Do respondents feel that their country's forces should serve in UN peacekeeping operations? Tally your answers and write an article for your school or community paper.

11. Select one of the current missions. Write letters or e-mail those serving in the missions. Find out what additional support may be given by fellow students. Organise efforts to provide that support.

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### **On the World Wide Web**

[www.un.org/Depts/dpko](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko)

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# 12

## UN Peace-keeping: Composition and Organisation

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### Composition

A United Nations peace-keeping operation is considered a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, established pursuant to a resolution of the Security Council or, exceptionally, of the General Assembly.

***Military Component.*** A United Nations Force consists of a Commander and a number of contingents provided by selected Member States of the United Nations upon the request of the Secretary-General. In all peace-keeping forces established since October 1973, the contingents are selected in consultations with the Security Council and with the parties concerned, bearing in mind the principle of equitable geographical representation. The members of the Force, although remaining in their national service, are, during the period of their assignment to the Force, international personnel under the authority of the United Nations and subject to the instructions of the Commander, through the chain of command. The functions of the Force are exclusively international, and members of the Force are expected to discharge those functions and regulate their conduct with the interest of the United Nations only in view.

***Civilian Component.*** A civilian administrative staff of the Force is provided, as a rule, by the Secretary-General from among existing United Nations staff. These personnel are to follow the rules and regulations of the United Nations Secretariat. Additionally, the Commander may recruit such local personnel as the Force requires. The terms and conditions of employment for locally recruited personnel are prescribed by the Commander and generally, to the extent possible, follow the practice prevailing in the locality.

### Chain of Command

United Nations peace-keeping operations are normally established by the Security Council and fall under its authority. The Secretary-

General is responsible to the Council for the organisation, conduct and direction of the Force, and he alone reports to the Council about it. The Secretary-General keeps the Security Council fully informed of developments relating to the functioning of the Force. Under the guidance of the forces established since October 1973, all matters which may affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Force are to be referred to the Council for its decision.

The Secretary-General is assisted in the performance of his duties, in this regard, by the Office of the Under-Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs.

**Command in the field.** Command within the Force is exercised in the field by a Force Commander appointed by the Secretary-General with the consent of the Security Council. The Commander is responsible to the Secretary-General. The Force Commander exercises full command authority of the Force except for disciplinary questions. The Commander has full authority with respect to all assignments of members of his headquarters staff and, through the chain of command, of all members of the Force, including the deployment and movements of all contingents in the Force and units assigned to the Force. The contingents comprising the Force are integral parts of it and take their orders exclusively from the Force Commander. The Force has its own headquarters, whose personnel are international in character and representative of the contingents comprising the Force. The Commander designates the chain of command for the Force, making use of the officers of his headquarters staff and the commanders of the national contingents made available by troop-contributing Governments. He may delegate his authority through the chain of command. The Force undertakes no functions which are not consistent with the definition of the mandate of the Force set forth in the Security Council resolution establishing the Force. Any doubt about a proposed action of the Force being consistent with such definition must be submitted to the Secretary-General for decision.

**Discipline.** The Commander has general responsibility for the good order and discipline of the Force. He may make investigations, conduct inquiries and require information, reports and consultations for the purpose of discharging this responsibility. Responsibility for disciplinary action in national contingents provided for the force, however, rests with the commanders of the national contingents. Reports concerning disciplinary action are communicated to the Force Commander who may consult with the commander of the national contingent and, if necessary, through the Secretary-General with the authorities of the troop-contributing Government concerned.

**Administration.** The Office of Field Operational and External Support Activities, in general terms, is responsible for organising the civilian administrative staff to support the Force and, in close collaboration with

the Office of the Under-Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs and the Office of Financial Services, makes arrangements for airlift of the contingents of the Force, prepares the final budgetary proposals for the Force and presents those proposals to the General Assembly's Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Assembly's Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee. Additionally, it arranges for the procurement of the necessary stores for the maintenance of the Force and directs the operations of the civilian administrative staff in the field.

The Commander with his civilian Chief Administrative Officer, in accordance with procedures prescribed by him within the limits of the budgetary provisions for the Force and financial rules and regulations of the United Nations, arranges for: the billeting and provision of food for the military component of the Force; the establishment, maintenance and operation of service institutes providing amenities for members of the Force and other United Nations personnel as authorised by the Commander; the transportation of personnel and equipment; the procurement, storage and issuance of supplies and equipment required by the Force which are not directly provided by the participating Governments; maintenance and other services required for the operation of the Force; the establishment, operation and maintenance of telecommunication and postal services for the Force; and the provision of medical, dental and sanitary services for personnel in the Force. The foregoing is achieved through the co-ordinated effort of the military logistic staff of the Force and the civilian staff. Formulation of provision systems and review of requirements are the responsibility of the military Chief Logistics Officer and his staff, and the responsibility for procurement and timely delivery of provisions rests with the civilian Chief Procurement Officer.

***Privileges and Immunities.*** The Force, as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, enjoys the status, privileges and immunities of the Organisation provided in Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. Additionally, the Secretary-General endeavours to conclude a status of the Force agreement with the host Government concerning the work of the Force. This agreement covers matters such as the status of the Force and its members, responsibility for criminal and civil jurisdiction of the members of the Force, premises of the Force, taxation, customs and fiscal regulation pertaining to the members of the Force, freedom of movement, use of roads, water-ways, port facilities and airfields, water, electricity and other public utilities, locally recruited personnel, settlement of disputes or claims, liaisons, etc.

The following charts indicate the chain of command of United Nations peace-keeping operations and the organisational structure of current operations.

## APPENDIX

### FACTS AND FIGURES

#### UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANISATION (UNTSO)

Authorisation:	Security Council resolutions: 50(1948) of 29 May 1948 54(1948) of 15 July 1948 73(1948) of 11 August 1949 101(1953) of 24 November 1953 (to strengthen UNTSO) 114(1956) of 4 June 1956 236(1967) of 11 June 1967
	Consensus of 9/10 July 1967 (S/8047) (Suez Canal) Consensus of 19 April 1972 (S/10611) (Southern Lebanon) Security Council resolution 339(1973) of 23 October 1973 (Sinai)
Function:	Established in June 1948 to assist the Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce in Palestine called for by the Security Council. Since then, UNTSO has performed various tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council, including the supervision of the General Armistice Agreements of 1949 and the observation of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal area and the Golan Heights following the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. At present, UNTSO assists and co-operates with UNDOF and UNIFIL in the performance of their tasks; observer groups are stationed in Beirut and in Sinai
Headquarters:	Government House, Jerusalem
Duration:	11 June 1948 to date
Maximum strength:	572 (19481)
Current strength:	298 military observers (October 1985)
Fatalities:	21 (killed in action/accidents) 3 (other causes) 24 (October 1985)

Expenditures:	From inception of mission to October 1985:	\$224,307,066
Method of financing: Appropriations through the United Nations regular budget		
Mediators:	Count Folke Bernadotte (Sweden) Ralph J. Bunche (United States) (Acting)	May-Sep. 1948 Sep. 1948-Aug. 1949
Chiefs of Staff:	Lieutenant General Count Thord Bonde (Sweden) Major General Aage Lundstrom (Sweden) Lieutenant General William E. Riley (United States) Major General Vagn Bennike (Denmark) Lieutenant-General E.L.M. Burns (Canada) Colonel Byron V. Leary (United States) (Acting) Major General Carl C. von Horn (Sweden) Colonel R. W. Rickert (United States) (Acting) Lieutenant-General Carl C. von Horn (Sweden) Lieutenant-General Odd Bull (Norway) Major General Ensio Siilasvuo (Finland) Colonel Richard W. Bunworth (Ireland) (Acting) Major General Bengt Liljestrand (Sweden) Colonel K.D. Howard (Australia) (Acting) Major-General Emmanuel A. Erskine (Ghana) Colonel William Callaghan (Ireland) (Acting) Colonel O. Forsgren (Sweden) (Acting) Major-General Erkki R. Kaira (Finland) Lieutenant-General Emmanuel A. Erskine (Ghana)	Jun.-Jul. 1948 Jul.-Sep. 1948 Sep. 1948- Jun. 1953 Jun. 1953-Aug. 1954 Aug. 1954-Nov. 1956 Nov. 1956-Mar. 1958 Mar. 1958- Jul. 1960 Jul.- Dec. 1960 Jan. 1961- May 1963 Jun. 1963-Jul. 1970 Aug. 1970-Oct. 1973 Nov. 1973-Mar. 1974 Apr. 1974- Aug. 1975 Aug.-Dec. 1975 Jan. 1976- Apr. 1978  Apr. 1978- Jun. 1979 Jun. 1979- Jan. 1980 Feb. 1980- Feb. 1981 Feb. 1981 to date

Contributors of military observers:	Duration
Argentina	1967 to date
Australia	1956 to date
Austria	1967 to date
Belgium	Jun. 1948 to date
Burma	1967-1969
Canada	1954 to date
Chile	1967 to date
Denmark	1954 to date
Finland	1967 to date
France	Jun. 1948 to date
Ireland	1958 to date
Italy	1958 to date
Netherlands	1956 to date
New Zealand	1954 to date
Norway	1956 to date
Sweden	Jun. 1948 to date
USSR	1973 to date
United States	Jun. 1948 to date
Other contributions (without cost to UN):	
United States	1949- Jun. 1967 Aircraft
Netherlands	Jun.-Nov. 1967 Aircraft
Switzerland	Nov. 1967 to date Chartered commercial aircraft and crew

### UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF I)

Authorisation:	General Assembly resolutions:	993 (ES-I) of 4 Nov. 1956 1000(ES-I) of 5 Nov. 1956 1001(ES-I) of 7 Nov. 1956 1125(XI) of 2 February 1957
Function:	To secure and to supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory, and after the withdrawal to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces	
Location:	First the Suer; Canal sector and the Sinai peninsula. Later along the Armistice Demarcation Line in the Gaza area and the international frontier in the Sinai peninsula (on the Egyptian side)	
Headquarters:	Gaza	
Duration:	November 1956-June 1967	
Maximum strength:	6,073 (February 1957)	
Strength at withdrawal:	3,378 (June 1967)	
Fatalities:	64 (killed in action/accidents) <u>26</u> (other causes) 90	
Expenditures:	From inception to end of mission:	\$220,124,012
(The financial cost was considerably reduced by the absorption by the countries providing contingents of varying amounts of the expenses involved)		
Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account		
Commanders:	Lieutenant-General E. L. M. Burns (Canada) Lieutenant-General P. S. Gyani (India)	Nov. 1956-Dec. 1959 Dec. 1959- Jan. 1964



**UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF II)**

Authorisation:	Security Council resolutions:	
	340(1973) of 25 October 1973	371(1975) of 24 July 1975
	341(1973) of 27 October 1973	378(1975) of 23 October 1975
	346(1974) of 8 April 1974	396(1976) of 22 October 1976
	362(1974) of 23 October 1974	416(1977) of 21 October 1977
	368(1975) of 17 April 1975	438(1978) of 23 October 1978
Function:	To supervise the cease-fire between Egyptian and Israeli forces and, following the conclusion of the agreements of 18 January 1974 and 4 September 1975, to supervise the redeployment of Egyptian and Israeli forces and to man and control the buffer zones established under those agreements	
Location:	Suez Canal sector and later the Sinai peninsula	
Headquarters:	Ismailia	
Duration:	25 October 1973-24 July 1979	
Maximum strength	6,973 (February 1974)	
Strength it withdrawal:	4,031 (July 1979)	
Fatalities:	30 (accidents) 13 (other causes) 9 (killed in a UNEF aircraft crash in Syria, as a result of anti-aircraft _ fire, during a flight in support of UNDOF on 9 August 1974) 52	
Expenditures:	From inception to end of mission:	\$446,487,000
Method of Financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account		

Commanders:	Lieutenant-General Ensio P. H. Siillasvuo (Finland) Interim Commander: Commander: Lieutenant-General Bengt Liljestrand (Sweden) Major-General Rais Abin (Indonesia)	25 Oct. 1973-11 Nov. 1973 12 Nov. 1973-19 Aug. 1975 20 Aug. 1975-30 Nov. 1976 1 Dec. 1976- 6 Sep. 1979																																										
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Japan	Feb. 1974	Cash contribution for airlift of Nepalese troops Kathmandu Calcutta, and transport of its equipment to UNEF
Norway	Oct. 1973	Airlift: Swedish troops, Sweden-UNEF
Poland	Nov. 1973	Airlift: Polish troops
Sweden	Oct. 1973	Airlift: Swedish troops
Switzerland		Aircraft placed at disposal of UNTSO was available to UNEF as required
United Kingdom	Oct. 1973	Airlift: Austrian, Finnish, Irish and Swedish troops and vehicles, Cyprus-UNEF
USSR	Nov. 1973	Airlift: Austrian troops, Austria-UNEF, Irish troops and heavy equipment Finland-UNEF
United States	Nov. 1973	Airlift: Irish troops, Ireland-UNEF
	Nov. 1973	Finnish troops, Finland-UNEF
	Nov. 1973	Peruvian troops, Peru-UNEF
	Dec. 1973	Austrian troops, Austria-UNEF
	Dec. 1973	Indonesian troops, Indonesia-UNEF
	Dec. 1973	Panamanian troops, Panama-UNEF
	Oct. 1976	\$10 million in goods and services

**UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE (UNDOF)**

## Authorisation: Security Council resolutions:

350(1974) of 31 May 1974	429(1978) of 31 May 1978	506(1982) of 26 May 1982
363(1974) of 29 November 1974	441(1978) of 30 November 1978	524(1982) of 29 November 1982
3691(1975) of 28 May 1975	449(1979) of 30 May 1979	531(1983) of 26 May 1983
381(1975) of 30 November 1975	456(1979) of 30 November 1979	543(1983) of 29 November 1983
390(1976) of 28 May 1976	470(1980) of 30 May 1980	551(1984) of 30 May 1984
398(1976) of 30 November 1976	481(1980) of 26 November 1980	557(1984) of 28 November 1984
408(1977) of 26 May 1977	485(1981) of 22 May 1981	563(1985) of 21 May 1985
420(1977) of 30 November 1977	493(1981) of 23 November 1981	

Function: To supervise the cease-fire between Israel and Syria; to supervise the redeployment of Syrian and Israeli forces; and to establish a buffer zone, as provided in the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces of 31 May 1974

Location: Syrian Golan Heights

Headquarters: Damascus

Duration: 3 June 1974 to date

Authorised strength: 1,450

Current strength: 1,316 (October 1985)

Fatalities: 14 (accidents)  
6 (other causes)  
20 (October (1985))

Amount apportioned: From inception of mission to 30 November 1984: \$702,700,000

Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account

Commanders: Brigadier-General Gonzalo Briceno

Zevallos (Peru), Interim Commander Colonel 3 Jun.- 14 Dec. 1974

Hannes Philipp (Austria), Officer-in-Charge 15 Dec. 1974-7 Jul. 1975  
 Major-General Hannes Philipp (Austria) 8 Jul. 1975-21 Apr. 1979  
 Colonel Guenther G. Greindl (Austria),  
 Officer-in-Charge 22 Apr.-30 Nov. 1979  
 Major-General Guenther G. Griendl (Austria) 1 Dec. 1979-25 Feb. 1981  
 Major-General Erkki R. Kaira (Finland) 26 Feb. 1981-31 May 1982  
 Major Carl-Gustav Stahl (Sweden) 1 Jun. 1982-31 May 1985  
 Major General Gustav Hagglund (Finland) 1 Jun. 1985 to date

Contributors: Austria 3 Jun. 1974 to date Infantry  
 Canada 5 Jun. 1974 to date Logistics: signals, supply  
 and transport units  
 Finland 16 Mar. 1979 to date Infantry  
 Iran 26 Aug. 1975-15 Mar. 1979 Infantry  
 Peru 3 Jun. 1974-10 Jul. 1975 Infantry  
 Poland 5 Jun. 1974 to date Logistics: engineers and  
 some transport service

#### UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL)

Authorisation: Security Council resolutions:  
 425(1978) of 19 March 1978 498(1981) of 18 Dec. 1981  
 426(1978) of 19 March 1978 519(1982) of 17 August 1982  
 434(1978) of 18 September 1978 523(1982) of 18 October 1982  
 444(1979) of 19 January 1979 529(1983) of 18 January 1983  
 450(1979) of 14 June 1979 536(1983) of 18 July 1983  
 459(1979) of 19 December 1979 549(1984) of 19 April 1984  
 474(1980) of 17 June 1980 555(1984) of 12 October 1984  
 483(1980) of 17 December 1980 561(1985) of 17 April 1985  
 488(1981) of 19 June 1981 575(1985) of 17 October 1985

Function:	To confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, to restore international peace and security and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area		
Location:	Southern Lebanon		
Headquarters:	Naqoura		
Duration:	19 March 1978 to date		
Authorised strength:	7,000		
Current strength:	5,773 (October 1985)		
Fatalities:	97 (killed in action/accidents) 14 (other causes) 111 (1 October 1985)		
Amount apportioned:	From inception of mission to 18 October 1984: \$945,300,000		
Method of Financing:	Assessments in respect of a Special Account		
Commanders:	Lieutenant General Emmanuel A. Erskine (Ghana)	19 Mar. 1978-14 Feb. 1981	
	Lieutenant-General William Callaghan (Ireland)	15 Feb. 1981 to date	
Contributors:		Duration	Contribution
	Canada	22 Mar.-7 Oct. 1978	Signals and movement control units
	Fiji	20 May 1978 to date	Infantry battalion
	Finland	4 Nov. 1982 to date	Infantry battalion
	France	23 Mar. 1978-15 Mar. 1979	Infantry battalion
		23 Mar. 1978 to date	Logistics: engineering, supply, transport and maintenance units

Ghana	7 Sep. 1979 to date	Infantry battalion (advance party from UNEF)
	25 Sep. 1979 to date	Integrated headquarters camp command (defence platoon and engineering platoon)
Iran	22 Mar. 1978-Mar. 1979	Infantry battalion
	24 May 1978 to date	Infantry battalion
	16 Oct. 1978-24 Sep. 1979	Headquarters camp command (defence platoon and adm. personnel)
Italy	16 Oct. 1978 to date	Integrated headquarters camp command (administrative personnel)
	10 Jul. 1979 to date	Air unit: helicopters, ground and air crews
	11 Apr. 1978-20 May 1980 1 Jun. 1981-18 Nov. 1982 18 Jan. 1985 to date	Infantry battalion Infantry battalion Infantry battalion
Netherlands	27 Feb. 1979-19 Oct. 1985	Infantry battalion
	4 May 1978-23 Feb. 1983	Infantry battalion
Nigeria	26 Mar. 1978 to date	Infantry battalion
	26 Mar. 1978-Jul. 1979	Logistics: air unit
	26 Mar. 1978-Aug. 1980	medical unit
	26 Mar. 1978 to date 26 Mar. 1978 to date	maintenance company movement control unit
Senegal	11 Apr. 1978-1 Nov. 1984	Infantry battalion
Sweden	23 Mar-17 May 1978	Infantry company
	21 Aug. 1980 to date	Logistics: medical unit

Other contributions (without cost to UN): Australia	Jun. 1978	Arms and ammunition for Fijian contingent
Germany, Federal Republic of	Mar. 1978 Apr. 1978	Airlift: Norwegian troops Provided substantial part of vehicles and equipment for Nepalese contingent
United Kingdom United States	Jun. 1978 Mar.-Jun. 1978	Airlift: Fijian troops Airlift: Norwegian, Nepalese, Senegalese and Irish troops Nepalese, Airlift: equip- ment for Fijian troops
<b>UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN (UNMOGIP)</b>		
Authorisation:	Security Council resolutions:	47(1948) of 21 April 1948 911(9511) of 3d March 1951 201(1965) of 6 Sept. 1965 (to strengthen UNMOGIP)
Function:	To supervise, in the State of Jammu and Kashmir the cease-fire between India and Pakistan	
Location:	The State of Jammu and Kashmir and the border between that State and Pakistan	
Headquarters:	Rawalpindi (November-April) Srinagar (May-November)	
Duration:	24 January 1949 to date	
Maximum strength:	102 (October 1965)	
Current strength:	39 military observers (October 1985)	
Fatalities:	4 (killed in action/accident!) 1 (other causes) 5 (1 October 1985)	

Expenditures:	From inception of mission to 1985:	\$53,445,005
Method of financing: Appropriations through the United Nations regular budget		
Chief Military Observers:		
	Brigadier H. H. Angle (Canada)	1 Nov. 1949-Jul. 1950
	Colonel Siegfried P. Coblenz (United States) (Acting)	Jul.- 27 Oct. 1950
	Lieutenant General R. H. Nimmo (Australia)	28 Oct. 1950-3 Jan. 1966
	Colonel J. H. J. Gauthier (Canada) (Acting)	4 Jan.- 7 Jul. 1966
	Lieutenant General Luis Tassara-Gonzalez (Chile)	8 Jul. 1966-18 Jun. 1977
	Lieutenant-Colonel P. Bergevin (Canada) (Acting)	19 Jun. 1977-8 Apr. 1978
	Colonel Pospisil (Canada) (Acting)	9 Apr.- 3 Jun. 1978
	Brigadier General Stig Waldenitrom (Sweden)	4 Jun. 1978-7 Jun. 1982
	Brigadier-General Thor Johnsen (Norway)	8 Jun. 1982 to date
Contributors of military observers:		
	Australia	Duration 1952 to date
	Belgium	Jan. 1949 to date
	Canada	Jan. 1949-Jan. 1979
	Chile	1950 to date
	Denmark	1950 to date
	Ecuador	1952
	Finland	1963 to date
	Italy	1961 to date
	Mexico	1949
	New Zealand	1952 to date
	Norway	Jan. 1949-1952
	Sweden	1957 to date
	Uruguay	1950 to date
	United States	1952 to date
		Jan. 1949 to date

Other contributions (without cost to UN)			
Australia	1 Apr. 1975-31 Dec. 1978		Aircraft
Canada	15 Jun. 1974-31 Mar. 1975		Aircraft
Italy	1957-1963		Aircraft
United States	1949-1954		Aircraft

### UNITED NATIONS INDIA-PAKISTAN OBSERVATION MISSION (UNIPOM)

Authoritarian:	Security Council resolution 211(1965) of 20 September 1965		
Function:	To supervise the cease-fire along the India/Pakistan, border except the State of Jammu and Kashmir where UNMOGIP operated, and the withdrawal of all armed personnel to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965		
Location:	Along the India/Pakistan border between Kashmir and the Arabian Sea		
Headquarters:	Lahore (Pakistan) Amritsar (India)		
Duration:	23 September 1965-22 March 1966		
Maximum strength:	96 military observers (October 1965)		
Strength at withdrawal:	78 military observers		
Fatalities:	None		
Expenditures:	From inception to end of Mission: \$1,713,280		
Method of financing:	Appropriations through the United Nations regular budget		
Chief Officer:	Major General B. F. Macdonald (Canada)	Sep. 1965-Mar. 1966	
Contributors:	In its initial stage	28 Sep. 1965-22 Mar. 1966	
	(from UNTSO and UNMOGIP)		
	Australia		Brazil
	Belgium		Burma

Canada	Canada [also air unit, Oct. 1965-Mar. 1966]
Chile	
Denmark	
Finland	
Ireland	Ceylon [now Sri Lanka]
Italy	Ethiopia
Netherlands	Ireland
New Zealand	Nepal
Norway	Netherlands
Sweden	Nigeria
	Venezuela

#### UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON (UNOGIL)

Authorisation:	Security Council resolution 128(1958) of 11 June 1958
Function:	To ensure that there was no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders
Location:	Lebanese-Syrian border areas and vicinity of zones held by opposing forces
Headquarters:	Beirut
Duration:	12 June-9 December 1958
Maximum strength:	591 military observers (November 1958)
Strength at withdrawal:	375 military observers
Fatalities:	None
Expenditures:	From inception to end of mission: \$3,697,742
Method of financing:	Appropriations through the United Nations regular budget

Members of Observation Group:	Galo Plaza Lasso (Ecuador): Rajeshwar Dayal (India): Major General Odd Bun (Norway):	Chairman Member Executive member in charge of military observers
Contributors of military observers:	Afghanistan Argentina Burma Canada Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) Chile Denmark Ecuador Finland India	Indonesia Ireland Italy Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Norway Peru Portugal Thailand
<b>UNITED NATIONS YEMEN OBSERVATION MISSION (UNYOM)</b>		
Authorisation:	Security Council resolution 179(1963) of 11 June 1963	
Function:	To observe and certify the implementation of the disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic	
Location:	Yemen	
Headquarters:	San'a	
Duration:	4 July 1963-4 September 1964	
Maximum strength:	25 military observers 114 officers and other ranks of reconnaissance unit (Yugoslavia) 50 officers and other ranks of air unit (Canada) 189	

## Strength at withdrawal: 25 military observers and supporting air unit (Canada)

Fatalities:	None																																							
Expenditures:	From inception to end of mission: \$1,840,450																																							
Method of financing:	Contributions from Saudi Arabia and Egypt in equal parts																																							
Commanders:	Lieutenant-General Carl C. von Horn (Sweden) 4 Jul.- 25 Aug. 1963 Colonel Branko Pavlovic (Yugoslavia) (Acting) 26 Aug.-11 Sep. 1963 Lieutenant-General P. S. Gyani (India) 12 Sep.- 7 Nov. 1963																																							
Special Representative of Secretary-General and Head of Mission:	P. P. Spinelli (Italy) 4 Nov. 1963-4 Sep. 1964																																							
Chiefs-of-Staff:	Colonel Branko Pavlovic (Yugoslavia) 8-25 Nov. 1963 Colonel S. C. Sabharwal (India) 26 Nov. 1963-4 Sep. 1964																																							
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**MISSION OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (DOMREP)**

Authorisation:	Security Council resolution 203(1965) of 14 May 1965
Function:	To observe the situation and to report on breaches of the cease-fire between the two de facto authorities
Location:	Dominican Republic
Headquarters:	Santo Domingo
Duration:	15 May 1965-22 October 1966
Strength:	2 military observers
Fatalities:	None
Expenditures:	From inception to end of mission: \$275,831
Method of financing:	Appropriations through the United Nations regular budget
Representative of the Secretary-General:	Jose Antonio Mayobre (Venezuela)
Military Adviser:	Major-General Indar J. Rikhye (India) (The Military Adviser was provided with a staff of 2 military observers at any one time. These observers were provided, one each, by Brazil, Canada and Ecuador)

**UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO (ONUC)**

Authorisation:	Security Council resolutions:	143(1960) of 14 July 1960 145(1960) of 22 July 1960 146(1960) of 9 August 1960 161(1961) of 21 February 1981 169(1961) of 24 November 1961
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Function:	Initially, to ensure withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance. The function of ONUC was subsequently modified to include maintaining the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war, and securing the removal from the Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries	
Location:	Republic of the Congo (now Zaire)	
Headquarters:	Leopoldville [now Kinshasa]	
Duration:	15 July 1960-30 June 1964	
Maximum strength:	19,828 (July 1961)	
Strength at withdrawal:	5,871 (30 December 1963)	
Facilities:	195 (killed in action/accidents) 39 (other causes) 234	
Expenditures:	From inception to end of mission:	\$400,130,793
Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account		
Special Representatives:	Ralph J. Bundle (United States) Andrew W. Cordier (United States) Rajeshwar Dayal (India) Mekki Abbas (Sudan) (Acting)	Jul. -Aug. 1960 Aug.-Sep. 1960 Sep. 1960-May 1961 Mar.-May 1961
Officers in Charge:	Sture Linner (Sweden) Robert K.A. Gardiner (Ghana) Max H. Dorsinville (Haiti) Bibiano F. Osorio Tafall (Mexico)	May 1961-Jan. 1962 Feb. 1962-May 1963 May 1963-Apr. 1964 Apr.-Jun. 1964

Commanders:	Lieutenant General Carl C. von Horn (Sweden)	18 Jul.-Dec. 1960	
	Lieutenant General Sean MacEoin (Ireland)	Jan. 1961-Mar. 1962	
	Lieutenant General Kebede Guebre (Ethiopia)	Apr. 1962-Jul 1963	
	Major General Christian Kaldager (Norway)	Aug.-Dec. 1963	
	Major General Aguiyu Ironsi (Nigeria)	Jan.-Jun. 1964	
Contributors:		Contribution	
	Argentina	Jul. 1960-Feb. 1963	Aircraft personnel (air and ground)
	Austria	14 Dec. 1960-Aug. 1963	Aircraft personnel (air and ground), field hospital and personnel, staff personnel
	Brazil	Jul. 1960-Jun. 1964	Aircraft personnel (air and ground) staff personnel
	Burma	Aug. 1960-Jun. 1964	Staff personnel
	Canada	Jul. 1960-Jun. 1964	Aircraft personnel (air and ground), staff personnel, signals
	Ceylon (now Sri Lanka)	Aug. 1960-Apr. 1962	Staff personnel
	Denmark	Aug. 1960-Jun. 1964	Aircraft personnel (air and ground), staff personnel, workshop control, transport company
	Ethiopia	15 Jul. 1960-16 Jun. 1964	Infantry, aircraft personnel (air and ground), staff personnel
	Ghana	15 Jul. 1960-25 Sep. 1963	Infantry, 2 medical units, staff personnel, police companies

Guinea	25 Jul. 1960-Jan. 1961	Infantry
India	Jul. 1960-Jun. 1964	Infantry, aircraft personnel (air and ground), field hospital and personnel, staff personnel, supply unit, signal company, air dis patch team, postal unit
Indonesia	4 Oct. 1960- Apr. 1964	Infantry
Iran	Dec. 1962-Jul. 1963	Aircraft and air and ground personnel
Ireland	28 Jul. 1960-11 May 1964	Infantry, staff personnel
Italy	Oct. 1960-Jun. 1964	Aircraft personnel (air and ground), field hospital, staff personnel
Liberia	25 Jul. 1960-May 1963	Infantry, movement control, staff personnel
Malaya Federation of Mali (now Mali and Senegal)	30 Oct. 1960-Apr. 1963	Infantry, staff personnel
Morocco	1 Aug. 1960-Nov. 1960	Infantry,
Netherlands	15 Jul. 1960-31 Jan. 1961	Infantry, parachute company
Nigeria	Aug. 1960-Oct. 1963	Hygiene teams, staff personnel
Norway	10 Nov. 1960-30 Jun. 1964	Infantry, police unit, staff personnel
	Jul. 1960-Mar. 1964	Aircraft personnel (air and ground), staff personnel, workshop control

Pakistan	31 Aug. 1960-May 1964	Ordnance and transport units, staff personnel
Philippines	Feb. 1963-Jun. 1963	Aircraft personnel (air and ground), staff personnel
Sierra Leone	Jan. 1962-Mar. 1963	Infantry
Sudan	Aug. 1960-Apr-Dec. 1961	Infantry
Sweden	20 Jul. 1960-15 May 1964	Infantry, aircraft personnel (air and ground), movement control, engineering personnel, workshop unit, signal detachment, staff personnel
Tunisia	15 Jul. 1960-May 1963	Infantry
United Arab Republic	20 Aug. 1960-1 Feb. 1961	Infantry, parachute battalion
Yugoslavia	Jul. 1960-Dec. 1960	Aircraft personnel (air and ground)
From February 1963 to the end of the United Nations Operation in the Congo, a battalion of the Congolese National Army was incorporated in ONUC		
Other contributions (without cost to UN):		
Canada	Beginning of operation	Airlift of food
Switzerland	Beginning of operation	Airlift of food and other supplies
USSR	Beginning of operation	Airlift of food
United Kingdom	Beginning of operation	Airlift of food and Ghanaian troops
United States	Beginning of operation	Airlift of food supplies and equipment
		Aircraft
		Airlift of Ghanaian, Guinean, Moroccan, Swedish and Tunisian troops
		Sealift of Malayan troops

## UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS (UNFICYP)

Authorisation:	Security Council resolutions:
	186(1964) of 4 March 1964
	187(1964) of 13 March 1964
	192(1964) of 20 June 1964
	Consensus of 11 August 1964
	194(1964) of 25 September 1964
	198(1964) of 18 December 1964
	201.(1965) of 19 March 1965
	206(1965) of 16 June 1965
	219(1965) of 17 Dec. 1965
	220(1966) of 16 March 1966
	222(1966) of 16 June 1966
	231(1966) of 15 December 1966
	238(1967) of 19 June 1967
	244(1967) of 22 December 1967
	247(1968) of 18 March 1968
	254(1968) of 18 June 1968
	261(1968) of 10 December 1968
	266(1969) of 10 June 1969
	274(1969) of 11 December 1969
	281(1970) of 9 June 1970
	291(1970) of 10 December 1970
	293(1971) of 26 May 1971
	305(1971) of 13 December 1971
	315(1972) of 15 June 1972
	324(1972) of 12 December 1972
	334(1973) of 5 June 1973
	343(1973) of 14 Dec. 1973
	349(1974) of 29 May 1974
	364(1974) of 13 Dec. 1974
	370(1975) of 13 June 1975
	383(1975) of 13 Dec. 1975
	391(1976) of 15 June 1976
	401(1976) of 14 Dec. 1976
	410(1977) of 15 June 1977
	422(1977) of 15 Dec. 1977
	430(1978) of 16 June 1978
	443(1978) of 14 Dec. 1978
	451(1979) of 15 June 1979
	458(1979) of 14 Dec. 1979
	472(1980) of 13 June 1980
	482(1980) of 11 Dec. 1980
	486(1981) of 4 June 1981
	495(1981) of 14 Dec. 1981
	510(1982) of 15 June 1982
	526(1982) of 14 Dec. 1982
	534(1983) of 15 June 1983
	541(1983) of 18 Nov. 1983
	544(1983) of 15 Dec. 1983
	553(1984) of 15 June 1984
	559(1984) of 14 Dec. 1984
	565(1985) of 14 June 1985

Function:	In the interest of international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent the recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. Since the hostilities of 1974, this has included supervising the cease-fire and maintaining a buffer zone between the lines of the Cyprus National Guard and of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces.	
Location:	Cyprus	
Headquarters:	Nicosia	
Duration:	27 March 1964 to date	
Maximum strength:	6,411 (June 1964)	
Current strength:	2,345 (October 1985)	
Fatalities:	83 (killed in action/accidents)	
	55 (other causes)	
	138 (1 October 1985)	
Estimated cost:	from inception of mission to 1b December 1984:	\$470,500,000
Method of financing:	Voluntary contributions	
Mediators:	Sakari S. Tuomioja (Finland)	Mar.-Sep. 1964
	Galo Plaza Lasso (Ecuador)	Sep. 1964-Dec. 1965
Special Representative:	Galo Plaza Lasso (Ecuador)	May-Sep. 1964
	Carlos A. Bernardes (Brazil)	Sep. 1964-Jan. 1967
	P.P. Spinelli (Italy) (Acting)	Jan-Feb. 1967
	Bibiano F. Osorio Tafall (Mexico)	Feb. 1967-June 1974
	Luis Weckmann-Muñoz (Mexico)	Jul. 1974-Oct. 1975
	Javier Pirez de Cuellar (Peru)	Oct. 1975-Dec. 1977
	Remy Gorge (Switzerland) (Acting)	Dec. 1977-Apr. 1978

Reynaldo Galindo-Pohl (El Salvador)	May 1978-Apr. 1980
Hugo Juan Gobbi (Argentina)	May 1980-31 Dec. 1984
James Holger (Chile) (Acting)	Jan. 1985 to date
<b>Commanders:</b>	
Lieutenant-General P.S. Gyani (India)	Mar- Jun. 1964
General K.S. Thimayya (India)	Jun. 1964-Dec. 1965
Brigadier A.J. Wilson (United Kingdom) (Acting)	Dec. 1965-May 1966
Lieutenant-General I.A.E. Martola (Finland)	May 1966-Dec. 1969
Lieutenant-General Dewan Prem Chand (India)	Dec. 1969-Dec. 1976
Major-General J.J. Quinn (Ireland)	Dec. 1976-Feb. 1981
Major-General G.G. Greindl (Austria)	Mar. 1981 to date
<b>Contributors</b>	
Australia	Duration 25 May 1964 to date
Austria	14 Apr. 1964-27 Jul. 1977
	17 May 1964-Oct. 1973
	Oct. 1973-Apr. 1976
	25 Apr. 1972 to date
Canada	13 Mar. 1964 to date
	Apr. 1976 to date
Denmark	22 May 1964 to date
	25 May 1964-4 Jun. 1975
Finland	28 Mar. 1964-31 Oct. 1977
	31 Oct. 1977 to date
Ireland	28 Mar. 1964-31 Oct. 1973
	31 Oct. 1973 to date
New Zealand	22 May 1964-28 Jun. 1967
Sweden	28 Mar. 1964 to date
	5 May 1964 to date
United Kingdom	27 Mar. 1964 to date
	Apr. 1976 to date
	Contribution
	Civilian police
	Civilian police
	Field hospital and personnel
	Medical centre
	Infantry
	Infantry
	Medical centre
	Infantry
	Civilian police
	Infantry
	Staff officers, military police
	Infantry
	Staff officers
	Civilian police
	Infantry
	Civilian police
	Infantry, logistics, air unit
	Medical centre

Other contributions (without cost to UN)	Australia	Basic salaries, overseas allowances, travel outside Cyprus, uniforms and equipment initially brought from Australia, compensation
	Austria	Domestic salaries of medical and police contingents
	Canada	Contingent costs
	Denmark	Salaries of service personnel
	Finland	Pay of professional personnel
	Ireland	Pay and allowances, including overseas and per diem allowances, supplies and equipment
	Italy	Airlift
Other contributions (without cost to UN) (cont)	New Zealand	Pay, overseas allowances, equipment, arms, ammunition and travel outside Cyprus for its police contingent
	Sweden	Airlift, pay to professional personnel contributions, arrangements for staff, remuneration to administrative personnel and other expenditures in Sweden
United Kingdom		Airlift, contingent costs and those of UNFICYP head quarters personnel
United States		Airlift

**UNITED NATIONS SECURITY FORCE IN WEST NEW GUINEA (WEST IRIAN)**

Authorisation:	General Assembly resolution 1752(XVII) of 21 September 1962		
Function:	To maintain peace and security in the territory under the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) established by agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands		
Location:	West New Guinea (West Irian)		
Headquarter:	Hollandia (now Jayapura)		
Duration:	3 October 1962-30 April 1963		
Maximum strength:	1,500 infantry personnel and 76 aircraft personnel		
Strength at withdrawal:	1,500 infantry personnel and 76 aircraft personnel		
Fatalities:	None		
Method of Financing:	The Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands paid full costs in equal amounts		
Commander:	Major-General Said Uddin Khan (Pakistan)		
Contributors:		Duration	Contribution
	Pakistan	3 Oct. 1962-30 Apr. 1963	Infantry
	Canada	3 Oct. 1962-30 Apr. 1963	Supporting aircraft and crews
	United States	3 Oct. 1962-30 Apr. 1963	Supporting aircraft and crews
	(From 18 August to 21 September 1962, the Secretary-General's Military Adviser, Brigadier-General Indar Jit Rikhye (India), and a group of 21 military observers assisted in the implementation of the agreement of 15 August 1962 between Indonesia and the Netherlands on cessation of hostilities. The military observers were provided by Brazil, Ceylon, India, Ireland, Nigeria and Sweden.)		

**CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS**

June 1948 to date	UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
Jan. 1949 to date	UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
Nov. 1956- June 1967	UNEF I First United Nations Emergency Force
June 1958- Dec. 1958	UNOGIL United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon
July 1960- June 1964	ONUC United Nations Operation in the Congo
Oct. 1962- April 1963	UNSF United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian)
July 1963- Sept. 1964	UNYOM United Nations Yemen Observation Mission
March 1964 to date	UNFICYP United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus
May 1965- Oct. 1966	DOMREP Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic
Sept. 1965- March 1966	UNIPOM United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission
Oct. 1973- July 1979	UNEF II Second United Nations Emergency Force
June 1974 to date	UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
March 1978 to date	UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
April 1988- March 1990	UNGOMAP United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Aug. 1988- Feb. 1991	UNIIMOG United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group

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Jan. 1989- June 1991	UNAVEM I United Nations Angola Verification Mission I
April 1989- March 1990	UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group
Nov. 1989- Jan. 1992	ONUCA United Nations Observer Group in Central America
April 1991 to date	UNIKOM United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
June 1991 to date	UNAVEM II United Nations Angola Verification Mission II
July 1991 to date	ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
Sept. 1991 to date	MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
Oct. 1991- March 1992	UNAMIC United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
March 1992 to date	UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
March 1992 to date	UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
April 1992- April 1993	UNOSOM I United Nations Operation in Somalia I
Dec. 1992 to date	ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique
May 1993 to date	UNOSOM II United Nations Operation in Somalia II

# 13

## The Blue Helmets

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### **A Holding Action**

The evolution of international relations after the Second World War, the process of decolonisation and differing concepts among the membership about the use of United Nations machinery quickly affected the functioning of the World Organisation founded in 1945. It became apparent that since all international disputes were not at once to be resolved by peaceful means, some way had to be found to stop or contain those which escalated into armed conflict. Out of that need, United Nations peace-keeping operations evolved as, essentially, a holding action. They do not purport to replace the means of voluntary settlement of disputes which are set out in Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, nor the enforcement action envisaged in Chapter VII, but rather seek to supplement the purposes and intent of those two Chapters. As Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld put it, they could take the place of a new Chapter of the Charter—to be numbered “Six and a Half”.

As suggested by that comment, peace-keeping operations were not originally envisaged in the Charter as among the measures to preserve world peace; they are a purely empirical creation born of necessity. The term “peace-keeping operation” gained currency in the 1960s, not only well after the Charter was drawn up but also, in effect, after the pragmatic use of this novel concept had already been established within the strict limits set by the essentially voluntary nature of dispute resolution, the burden of resolution resting with the parties themselves.

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## Characteristics

The definition of a peace-keeping operation followed in the Secretary-General's reports is that of an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, established by the United Nations to help maintain or restore peace in areas of conflict.

Such an operation falls broadly into two main categories: the observer missions and the peace-keeping forces. In either form they operate under the same basic principles. They are normally established by the Security Council (two were exceptionally authorised by the General Assembly), and they are directed by the Secretary-General. They must have the consent of the host Governments and, normally, also of the other parties directly involved. The military personnel required are provided by Member States on a voluntary basis. The military observers are not armed and, while the soldiers of United Nations peace-keeping forces are provided with light defensive weapons, they are not authorised to use force except in self-defence. A further key principle is that the operations must not interfere in the internal affairs of the host country and must not be used in any way to favour one party against another in internal conflicts affecting Member States. This latter point, together with the non-use of force, demands exceptional restraint but is fundamental not only on grounds of principle but to ensure the operations' effectiveness. The United Nations operations cannot take sides or use force without becoming part of the problems at the root of the dispute.

Another requirement of peace-keeping is a broad political consensus among the membership for its mandate, not only at the creation of the operation, but in its continuing functioning.

The most important element in that consensus is the Security Council, whose continuing support is essential. Also fundamental is the need for the continuing support not only of the countries or parties principally concerned in the conflict but also of the States contributing troops to the peace-keeping operation.

Besides support, there must be co-operation. Since the peacekeepers have little or no capacity for enforcement and their use of force is limited to self-defence—as a last resort—any determined party can effectively defy a peace-keeping force.

There should be a clear mandate, or one as clear as possible given the probable consensus nature of the decisions taken by the Security Council. A clear mandate, based on specific agreement by the parties,

means that the peace-keeping operation should encounter few difficulties. An unclear or ambiguous mandate means that the operation will face recurrent difficulties and become involved in actions likely to be viewed as controversial. Nevertheless, there are times when the mandate is not as clear as could be wished, e.g. when the Security Council has decided that the prime requirement of international peace and security requires creation of an operation even in the face of the obvious fact that the operation will not easily achieve the objectives set. A final characteristic is the general improvisational nature of most peace-keeping operations. The United Nations has no sovereignty of its own and can undertake peace-keeping operations only by specific mandate from the Security Council, and exceptionally from the General Assembly. The present political, constitutional, administrative and budgetary arrangements of the United Nations are such that no permanent establishment can be maintained for peace-keeping.

Normally, peace-keeping operations deal with regional conflicts that potentially threaten international peace and security and where, often, power vacuums have resulted from the decolonisation process. They have become tested devices for maintaining the delicate balance of international peace when that peace is threatened by a regional conflict in which there is the likelihood of great-Power involvement. Characteristically they fulfil the role of an impartial and objective third party to help create and maintain a ceasefire and form a buffer zone between conflicting States. They have become an important instrument in preventing local or regional conflicts from escalating to encompass much wider areas and in precluding the introduction of outside forces.

### **Charter Provisions**

As mentioned earlier, it is almost necessary to imagine a new bridging "Chapter Six and a Half" of the United Nations Charter when considering peace-keeping operations. But while the Charter sheds little light on the nature of these operations, since it contains no specific reference to them, the maintenance of international peace and security, to which United Nations peace-keeping operations are closely related, is, of course, prominently mentioned in the Charter.

The first of the purposes of the United Nations listed in the Charter is "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means,

and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace”.

The concrete measures to be taken by the United Nations to achieve this purpose are set out in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. Chapter VI provides for disputes to be brought to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly and for the former to call on the parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. The action of the Security Council in this context is limited to making recommendations; essentially, the peaceful settlement of international disputes must be achieved by the parties themselves on a voluntary basis.

If the peaceful means outlined in Chapter VI should prove insufficient and the dispute should develop into a conflict endangering the maintenance of international peace and security, then Chapter VII may come into play. This Chapter provides that when the Security Council determines “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression”, it may take certain measures of an enforcement character in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. In this connection, the Council may first take, under Article 41, measures not involving the use of armed force, including “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations”.

Should the Security Council consider the measures provided for in Article 41 to be inadequate, it may then take, in accordance with Article 42, “such action by air, sea and land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”. Such action may include “demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations”. Plans for the application of armed force as an enforcement action are to be made by the Security Council with the assistance of a United Nations Military Staff Committee. All Members of the United Nations undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with special agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities “necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security”.

The measures outlined in Articles 41 and 42, which must be decided by the Security Council acting on behalf of the international community as a whole, constitute the core of the system of collective security

envisioned by the Charter to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security.

A basic feature of this system is the determining role reserved for the five major Powers, namely, China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. These Powers are permanent members of the Security Council and can block any of its substantive decisions by their veto. They also control the activities of the Military Staff Committee, which is made up exclusively of their military representatives. Consequently, the United Nations collective security system, and especially its key provision concerning the use of armed force, can work only if there is full agreement and co-operation among the major Powers. But this essential condition has never been met as, shortly after the establishment of the United Nations, the cooperation that had existed during the Second World War rapidly collapsed.

The inapplicability of Chapter VII in its most important provisions created a vacuum, which had to be filled somehow, and hence the development of peace-keeping operations. These operations can be considered as based on Article 40 of the Charter, which provides that before resorting to the action provided for in Articles 41 and 42, the Security Council may take provisional measures to prevent the aggravation of a conflict situation without prejudice to the rights, claims and position of the parties concerned.

### **Peace-keeping and Peace-making**

Peace-keeping is only part of a large machinery for attempting to maintain international peace and security. This machinery includes the Security Council, the diplomatic role of the Secretary-General and bilateral efforts of Member States. Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, dealing with the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes", says the parties to the dispute "shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice". Each of the methods mentioned has been used in conjunction with the peace-keeping process, together with specific mandates for the Secretary-General to use his good offices, directly or through appointment of a Special Representative.

Essentially, United Nations peace-keeping operations are provisional measures which the Organisation may take to prevent aggravation of a conflict situation. They can stop and contain hostilities

but cannot resolve the political problems underlying the conflict. They can, and do, create the climate, buy the time, and promote the minimum goodwill necessary for settlement through negotiations or other peaceful means. Thus peace-keeping operations and peace-making efforts are closely interrelated. The first promotes the second by creating conditions conducive to negotiations. The second helps the first since, when peace-making efforts give hope for a peaceful solution of the conflict, the parties will be more inclined to observe a ceasefire and to co-operate with the peace-keeping operation.

Conversely, when peace-making fails, or is not pursued vigorously, one or both parties may give up the possibility of a peaceful settlement and resort to force.

### **The Operations**

The first use of the military by the United Nations was in 1947, in two United Nations bodies: the Consular Commission on Indonesia and the Special Committee on the Balkans. Since the small officer groups worked as members of the national delegations comprising those bodies, and were not under the Secretary-General's authority, they cannot be considered as United Nations peace-keeping operations as the term has come to be used.

The international force in Korea was also not a United Nations peace-keeping operation in the current sense of the term since it was not under the control of the United Nations, it was not based on the consent of the parties, and it used force.

The first peace-keeping operation established by the United Nations was an observer mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), set up in Palestine in June 1948. Later, other observer missions were set up according to the same principles as UNTSO: the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1949, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in June 1958, the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) in 1963, the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) in 1965 and the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) in 1965. Of these, UNTSO and UNMOGIP are still in operation.

There have been, in all, seven peace-keeping forces. The first was the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), which was in operation in the Egypt-Israel sector from November 1956 until May

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1967. The United Nations Force in the Congo was deployed in the Republic of the Congo (now Zaire) from July 1960 until June 1964. The United Nations Security Force in West Man was in operation from its establishment in September 1962. until April 1963, while the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) functioned from October 1973 until July 1979. The other three forces, which are still in operation, are the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), established in March 1964; the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) established in the Syrian Golan Heights in May 1974; and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), established in March 1978.

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## Past Peace-keeping Operations

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### UNEF I

#### *First United Nations Emergency Force*

<b>Duration</b>	November 1956-June 1967
<b>Location</b>	First the Suez Canal sector and the Sinai peninsula. Later along the Armistice Demarcation Line in the Gaza area and the international frontier in the Sinai peninsula (on the Egyptian side)
<b>Headquarters</b>	Gaza
<b>Mandate</b>	To secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory and, after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces
<b>Maximum strength</b>	6,073 all ranks (February 1957)
<b>Strength at withdrawal</b>	3,378 all ranks
<b>Fatalities</b>	90
<b>Expenditures</b>	\$214.3 million
<b>Method of financing</b>	Assessments in respect of a Special Account
<b>Contributors (military personnel)</b>	Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, Yugoslavia

## UNEF II

### *Second United Nations Emergency Force*

<b>Duration</b>	October 1973-July 1979
<b>Location</b>	Suez Canal sector and later the Sinai peninsula
<b>Headquarters</b>	Ismailia
<b>Mandate</b>	To supervise the ceasefire between Egyptian and Israeli forces and, following the conclusion of the agreements of 18 January 1974 and 4 September 1975, to supervise the redeployment of Egyptian and Israeli forces and to man and control the buffer zones established under those agreements
<b>Maximum strength</b>	6,973 all ranks (February 1974)
<b>Strength at withdrawal</b>	4,031 all ranks
<b>Fatalities</b>	52
<b>Expenditures</b>	\$446.5 million
<b>Method of financing</b>	Assessments in respect of a Special Account
<b>Contributors</b>	Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland,
<b>(military personnel)</b>	Nepal, Panama, Peru, Poland, Senegal, Sweden

## UNOGIL

### *United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon*

<b>Duration</b>	June-December 1958
<b>Location</b>	Lebanese-Syrian border areas and vicinity of zones held by opposing forces
<b>Headquarters</b>	Beirut
<b>Mandate</b>	To ensure that there was no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other <i>materiel</i> across the Lebanese borders
<b>Maximum strength</b>	591 military observers (November 1958)
<b>Strength at withdrawal</b>	375 military observers
<b>Fatalities</b>	None
<b>Expenditures</b>	\$3.7 million
<b>Method of financing</b>	Appropriations through the United Nations regular budget

<b>Contributors (military personnel)</b>	Afghanistan, Argentina, Burma (now Myanmar), Canada, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Thailand
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### ONUC

#### *United Nations Operation in the Congo*

<b>Duration</b>	July 1960-June 1964
<b>Location</b>	Republic of the Congo (now Zaire)
<b>Headquarters</b>	Leopoldville (now Kinshasa)
<b>Mandate</b>	Initially, to ensure withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance. The function of ONUC was subsequently modified to include maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the removal from the Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries,
<b>Maximum strength</b>	19,828 all ranks (July 1961)
<b>Strength at withdrawal</b>	3,297 all ranks
<b>Fatalities</b>	234
<b>Expenditures</b>	\$400.1 million
<b>Method of financing</b>	Assessments in respect of a Special Account
<b>Contributors (military personnel)</b>	Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burma (now Myanmar), Canada, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Malaya, Federation of Mali (now Mali and Senegal), Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia

## UNSF

***United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian)***

<b>Duration</b>	October 1962-April 1963
<b>Location</b>	West New Guinea (West Irian)
<b>Headquarters</b>	Hollandia (now Jayapura)
<b>Mandate</b>	To maintain peace and security in the territory under the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), established by agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands
<b>Maximum strength</b>	1,576 all ranks
<b>Strength at withdrawal</b>	1,576 all ranks
<b>Fatalities</b>	None
<b>Method of financing</b>	The Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands paid full costs in equal amounts.
<b>Contributors (military personnel)</b>	Canada, Pakistan, United States. In addition, from 18 August to 21 September 1962, the Secretary-General's Military Adviser and a group of 21 military observers assisted in the implementation of the agreement of 15 August 1962 between Indonesia and the Netherlands on cessation of hostilities. The military observers were provided by Brazil, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), India, Ireland, Nigeria and Sweden.

## UNYOM

***United Nations Yemen Observation Mission***

<b>Duration</b>	July 1963-September 1964
<b>Location</b>	Yemen
<b>Headquarters</b>	Sana'a
<b>Mandate</b>	To observe and certify the implementation of the disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic
<b>Maximum strength</b>	25 military observers and 164 military personnel of reconnaissance and air units
<b>Strength at withdrawal</b>	25 military observers and supporting air unit
<b>Fatalities</b>	None
<b>Expenditures</b>	\$1.8 million

<b>Method of financing</b>	Contributions from Saudi Arabia and Egypt in equal parts
<b>Contributors (military personnel)</b>	Australia, Canada, Denmark, Ghana, India, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, Yugoslavia

### **DOMREP**

#### ***Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic***

<b>Duration</b>	May 1965-October 1966
<b>Location</b>	Dominican Republic
<b>Headquarters</b>	Santo Domingo
<b>Mandate</b>	To observe the situation and to report on breaches of the ceasefire between the two de facto authorities in the Dominican Republic
<b>Strength</b>	2 military observers
<b>Expenditures</b>	Approximately \$0.3 million
<b>Fatalities</b>	None
<b>Method of financing</b>	Appropriations through the United Nations regular budget
<b>Contributors (military personnel)</b>	The Military Adviser to the Representative of the Secretary-General was provided with a staff of 2 military observers at any time. These observers were provided, one each by Brazil, Canada and Ecuador.

### **UNIPOM**

#### ***United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission***

<b>Duration</b>	September 1965-March 1966
<b>Location</b>	Along the India/Pakistan-border between Kashmir and the Arabian Sea
<b>Headquarters</b>	Lahore (Pakistan)/Amritsar (India)
<b>Mandate</b>	To supervise the ceasefire along the India/Pakistan border except in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, where UNMOGIP operated, and the withdrawal of all armed personnel to the positions held by them before 6 August 1965
<b>Maximum strength</b>	96 military observers (October 1965)
<b>Strength at withdrawal</b>	78 military observers

<b>Fatalities</b>	None
<b>Expenditures</b>	\$1.7 million
<b>Method of financing</b>	Appropriations through the United Nations regular budget
<b>Contributors (military personnel)</b>	In its initial stage (detailed from UNTSO and UNMOGIP): Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden. 28 September 1965-22 March 1966: Brazil, Burma (now Myanmar), Canada, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Ethiopia, Ireland, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Venezuela

### UNGOMAP

#### *United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan*

<b>Duration</b>	May 1988-March 1990
<b>Location</b>	Afghanistan and Pakistan
<b>Headquarters</b>	Kabul and Islamabad
<b>Mandate</b>	To assist the Representative of the Secretary-General to lend his good offices to the parties in ensuring the implementation of the Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan and in this context to investigate and report possible violations of any of the provisions of the Agreements
<b>Maximum strength</b>	50 military observers (May 1988)
<b>Strength at withdrawal</b>	35 military observers
<b>Fatalities</b>	None
<b>Expenditures</b>	\$ 14 million
<b>Method of financing</b>	Appropriations through the United Nations regular budget
<b>Contributors (military personnel)</b>	Austria, Canada, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Nepal, Poland, Sweden

### UNIIMOG

#### *United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group*

<b>Duration</b>	August 1988-February 1991
<b>Location</b>	Iran and Iraq
<b>Headquarters</b>	Tehran and Baghdad

<b>Mandate</b>	To verify, confirm and supervise the ceasefire and the withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognised boundaries, pending a comprehensive settlement
<b>Strength</b>	400 all ranks
<b>Fatalities</b>	1
<b>Expenditures</b>	\$171.4 million
<b>Method of financing</b>	Assessments in respect of a Special Account
<b>Contributors (military personnel)</b>	Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ghana, Argentina, Australia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Poland, Senegal, Sweden, Turkey, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Zambia

### UNAVEM I

#### *United Nations Angola Verification Mission I*

<b>Duration</b>	January 1989-June 1991
<b>Location</b>	Angola
<b>Headquarters</b>	Luanda
<b>Mandate</b>	To verify the redeployment of Cuban troops northwards and their phased and total withdrawal from the territory of Angola in accordance with the timetable agreed between Angola and Cuba
<b>Maximum strength</b>	70 military observers (April-December 1989)
<b>Strength at withdrawal</b>	61 military observers
<b>Fatalities</b>	None
<b>Expenditures</b>	\$16.9 million
<b>Method of financing</b>	Assessments in respect of a Special Account
<b>Contributors (military personnel)</b>	Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Congo, Czechoslovakia, India, Jordan, Norway, Spain, Yugoslavia

### UNTAG

#### *United Nations Transition Assistance Group*

<b>Duration</b>	April 1989-March 1990
<b>Location</b>	Namibia and Angola
<b>Headquarters</b>	Windhoek
<b>Mandate</b>	To assist the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to ensure the early

<b>Strength</b>	independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations At maximum deployment, during the elections from 7 to 11 November 1989, UNTAG's overall strength was approximately 8,000, consisting of just under 2,000 civilians (including local employees and more than 1,000 additional personnel who came specifically for the elections), 1,500 police and approximately 4,500 military personnel.
<b>Fatalities</b>	19 (military and civilian personnel)
<b>Expenditures</b>	\$368.3 million
<b>Method of financing</b>	Assessments in respect of a Special Account
<b>Contributors (military personnel, police monitors and electoral supervisors)</b>	Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, China, Congo, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad Tobago, Tunisia, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia

### **ONUCA**

#### ***United Nations Observer Group in Central America***

<b>Duration</b>	December 1989-January 1992
<b>Location</b>	Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua
<b>Headquarters</b>	Tegucigalpa, Honduras
<b>Mandate</b>	To verify compliance by the Governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua with their undertakings to cease aid to irregular forces and insurrectionist movements in the region and not to allow their territory to be used for attacks on other States. In addition,

	ONUCA played a part in the voluntary demobilisation of the Nicaraguan Resistance and monitored a ceasefire and the separation of forces agreed by the Nicaraguan parties as part of the demobilisation process.
<b>Maximum strength</b>	1,098 all ranks (May 1990)
<b>Strength at withdrawal</b>	121 military observers and 31 naval personnel
<b>Fatalities</b>	None
<b>Expenditures</b>	\$90.5 million
<b>Method of financing</b>	Assessments in respect of a Special Account
<b>Contributors (military personnel)</b>	Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, Venezuela

### UNAMIC

#### United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia

<b>Duration</b>	November 1991-March 1992
<b>Location</b>	Cambodia
<b>Headquarters</b>	Phnom Penh
<b>Mandate</b>	To assist the four Cambodian parties to maintain their ceasefire during the period prior to UNTAC's establishment and deployment, and to initiate mine-awareness training of civilian populations. Later, the mandate was enlarged to include a major training programme for Cambodians in mine-detection and mine-clearance and the mine-clearing of repatriation routes, reception centres and resettlement areas.
<b>Authorised Strength</b>	1,504 military and civilian personnel
<b>Expenditures</b>	\$ 20 million
<b>Fatalities</b>	None
<b>Method of financing</b>	Assessments in respect of a Special Account
<b>Contributors (Military Personnel)</b>	Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, Russian Federation, Senegal, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay.

**UNOSOM I****United Nations Operation in Somalia I**

<b>Duration</b>	April 1992-April 1993
<b>Location</b>	Somalia
<b>Headquarters</b>	Mogadishu
<b>Mandate</b>	To monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, and to provide protection and security of United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the sea-and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centres in the city and its immediate environs. In August 1992, UNOSOM's mandate and strength were enlarged to enable it to protect the humanitarian convoys and distribution centres throughout Somalia.
<b>Fatalities</b>	None
<b>Expenditures</b>	The General Assembly appropriated a total amount of \$ 109.7 million for the period from 1 May 1992 to 30 April 1993.
<b>Authorised strength</b>	50 military observers, 3,500 security personnel, up to 719 logistic support personnel and some 200 international civilian staff.
<b>Method of financing</b>	Assessments in respect of a Special Account
<b>Contributors</b>	Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium,
<b>(Military Personnel)</b>	Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Zimbabwe

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## Current Peace-keeping Operations

### UNTSO

#### *United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation*

<b>Duration</b>	June 1948 to date
<b>Headquarters</b>	Government House, Jerusalem
<b>Mandate</b>	Established in 1948 to assist the Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce in Palestine. Since then, UNTSO has performed various tasks, including the supervision of the General Armistice Agreements of 1949 and the observation of the ceasefire in the Suez Canal area and the Golan Heights following the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. At present, UNTSO assists and cooperates with the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the performance of their tasks; observer groups are stationed in Beirut and in the Sinai.
<b>Maximum strength</b>	572 military observers (1948)
<b>Current strength</b>	224 military observers
<b>Fatalities</b>	28
<b>Expenditures</b>	The annual cost to the United Nations is approximately \$31 million.
<b>Method of financing</b>	Appropriations through the United Nations regular budget

<b>Chief of Staff</b>	Major-General Krishna Narayan Singh Thapa
<b>Contributors (military personnel)</b>	(Nepal) Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Myanmar (1967-1969), Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, United States

### UNDOF

#### *United Nations Disengagement Observer Force*

<b>Duration</b>	June 1974 to date
<b>Location</b>	Syrian Golan Heights
<b>Headquarters</b>	Damascus, Syria
<b>Mandate</b>	To supervise the ceasefire between Israel and Syria; to supervise the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces; and to supervise the areas of separation and limitation, as provided in the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces of 31 May 1974
<b>Authorised strength</b>	1,450 all ranks
<b>Current strength</b>	1,120 troops assisted by the military observers of UNTSO's Observer Group Golan
<b>Fatalities</b>	31
<b>Expenditures</b>	The annual cost to the United Nations is approximately \$36 million.
<b>Method of financing</b>	Assessments in respect of a Special Account
<b>Outstanding contributions (as at 30 April 1993)</b>	Approximately \$26 million
<b>Force Commander</b>	Major-General Roman Misztal (Poland)
<b>Contributors (military personnel)</b>	Austria, Canada, Finland, Iran (1975-1979), Peru (1974-1975), Poland

### UNIFIL

#### *United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon*

<b>Duration</b>	March 1978 to date
<b>Location</b>	Southern Lebanon
<b>Headquarters</b>	Naqoura, Lebanon
<b>Mandate</b>	To confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, to restore international peace and security and to assist the

	Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area
<b>Authorised strength</b>	7,000 all ranks
<b>Current strength</b>	Some 5,280 troops assisted by 57 military observers of UNTSO's Observer Group Lebanon, and approximately 520 international and local civilian staff
<b>Fatalities</b>	190
<b>Expenditures</b>	The annual cost to the United Nations is approximately \$146 million.
<b>Method of financing</b>	Assessments in respect of a Special Account
<b>Outstanding contributions (as at 30 April 1993)</b>	Approximately \$259 million
<b>Force Commander</b>	Major-General Trond Furuhojve (Norway)
<b>Contributors (military personnel)</b>	Canada (1978), Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Iran (1978-1979), Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Netherlands (1979-1985), Nigeria (1978-1983), Norway, Poland, Senegal (1978-1984), Sweden

### UNMOGIP

#### *United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan*

<b>Duration</b>	January 1949 to date
<b>Location</b>	The ceasefire line between India and Pakistan in the State of Jammu and Kashmir
<b>Headquarters</b>	Rawalpindi (November-April), Srinagar (May-October)
<b>Mandate</b>	To supervise, in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the ceasefire between India and Pakistan
<b>Maximum strength</b>	102 (October 1965)
<b>Current strength</b>	38 military observers
<b>Fatalities</b>	6
<b>Expenditures</b>	The annual cost to the United Nations is approximately \$7 million.
<b>Method of financing</b>	Appropriations through the United Nations regular budget
<b>Chief Military Observer</b>	General Ricardo Jorge Galarza-Chans
<b>Contributors (military personnel)</b>	(Uruguay) Australia (1952-1985), Belgium, Canada (1949-1979), Chile, Denmark, Ecuador (1952),

Finland, Italy, Mexico (1949), New Zealand (1952-1977), Norway, Sweden, United States (1949-1954), Uruguay

### UNFICYP

#### *United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus*

<b>Duration</b>	March 1964 to date
<b>Location</b>	Cyprus
<b>Headquarters</b>	Nicosia
<b>Mandate</b>	To use its best efforts to prevent the recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. Since the hostilities of 1974, this has included supervising the ceasefire and maintaining a buffer zone between the lines of the Cyprus National Guard and of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces.
<b>Maximum strength</b>	6,411 Gune 1964)
<b>Current strength</b>	1,480 military personnel and 38 civilian police
<b>Fatalities</b>	159
<b>Expenditures</b>	As a result of the recent reduction of the Force, the annual cost of UNFICYP to the United Nations is approximately \$19 million. [Before 1993, the annual cost to the United Nations amounted to approximately \$31 million.]
<b>Method of financing</b>	The costs of the Force are met by the Governments providing the military contingents and by voluntary contributions received for this purpose by the United Nations:
<b>Outstanding contributions</b>	Total deficit in the Special Account for UNFICYP amounts to approximately \$197 million. As a result, reimbursement claims from the troop-contributing countries have been paid only up to December 1981.
<b>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</b>	Joe Clark (Canada)
<b>Force Commander</b>	Major-General Michael F. Minehane (Ireland)
<b>Contributors</b>	Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark,

**(military and civilian police personnel)** Finland, Ireland, New Zealand (1964-1967), Sweden, United Kingdom

### UNIKOM

#### *United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission*

**Duration** April 1991 to date

**Location** The demilitarised zone (DMZ) along the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait

**Headquarters** Umm Qasr

**Mandate** Originally established as an unarmed observation mission with the mandate to monitor the Khawr 'Abd Allah waterway between Iraq and Kuwait and the DMZ, to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the DMZ, and to observe any hostile action mounted from the territory of one State against the other. In February 1993, following a series of incidents in January, the Security Council decided to increase UNIKOM's strength and to extend its terms of reference to include the capacity to take physical action to prevent violations of the DMZ and of the newly demarcated boundary between Iraq and Kuwait.

**Authorised strength** 3,645 military personnel and approximately 270 international and local civilian staff

**Current strength** 320 military personnel and 188 international and local staff

**Fatalities** 1

**Expenditures** The annual cost to the United Nations *is* approximately \$65 million.

**Method of financing** Assessments in respect of a Special Account

**Outstanding contributions (as at 30 April 1993)** Approximately \$46 million

**Chief Military Observer** Major-General Tirnothy K. Dibutama (Ghana)

**Contributors (military personnel)** Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Chile (1991-1992), China, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Hungary,

India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. Two fixed-wing aircraft operated by civilians have been made available by Switzerland.

## UNAVEM II

### *United Nations Angola Verification Mission II*

<b>Duration</b>	June 1991 to date
<b>Location</b>	Angola
<b>Headquarters</b>	Luanda
<b>Mandate</b>	Established to verify the arrangements agreed by the Angolan parties for the monitoring of the ceasefire and for the monitoring of the Angolan police during the ceasefire period and to observe and verify the elections in that country, in accordance with the Peace Accords, signed by the Angolan Government and the United Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA). Despite the United Nations verification that the elections—held on 29 and 30 September 1992— had been generally free and fair, their results were contested by UNITA and renewed fighting broke out between the Government and UNITA forces. Since then, UNAVEM II has continued its presence in Angola in order to help the two sides reach agreement on modalities for completing the peace process and, at the same time, to broker and help implement ceasefires at the national or local level.
<b>Authorised strength</b>	350 military observers, 126 police monitors, 83 international civilian staff and 155 local staff, and up to 400 electoral observers
<b>Current strength</b>	75 military observers, 28 police observers and some 40 international and 75 locally recruited civilian staff
<b>Fatalities</b>	3

<b>Expenditures</b>	The annual cost to the United Nations is approximately \$36 million.
<b>Method of financing</b>	Assessments in respect of a Special Account
<b>Outstanding contributions (as at 30 April 1993)</b>	Approximately \$30 million (UNAVEM I and UNAVEM II)
<b>Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission</b>	Margaret Joan Anstee (United Kingdom)
<b>Chief Military Observer</b>	Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba (Nigeria)
<b>Contributors (military and civilian police personnel)</b>	Algeria (1991-1993), Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia (1992-1993), Congo, Egypt (1991-1993), Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Ireland, Jordan, Malaysia (1991-1993), Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand (1991-1993), Nigeria, Norway, Senegal (1991-1993), Singapore (1991-1992), Slovakia Spain, Sweden, former Yugoslavia (1991-1993), Zimbabwe

### ONUSAL

#### *United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador*

<b>Duration</b>	July 1991 to date
<b>Location</b>	El Salvador
<b>Headquarters</b>	San Salvador
<b>Mandate</b>	To verify the implementation of all agreements negotiated between the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN). The agreements involve a ceasefire and related measures, reform and reduction of the armed forces, creation of a new police force, reform of the judicial and electoral systems, human rights, land tenure and other economic and social issues. The armed conflict between the Government of El Salvador and FMLN was formally brought to an end on 15 December 1992. ONUSAL continues to monitor implementation of the remaining provisions of the peace agreements. It will also verify the March 1994 elections in El Salvador.

<b>Authorised strength</b>	Approximately 1,000 military and police personnel and 146 international civilian staff
<b>Current strength</b>	380 military and police personnel and some 70 international civilian staff and 180 locally recruited personnel. In addition, during the polling 900 electoral observers will be required.
<b>Fatalities</b>	1
<b>Expenditures</b>	The annual cost to the United Nations is approximately \$34 million.
<b>Method of financing</b>	Assessments in respect of a Special Account
<b>Outstanding contributions (as at 30 April 1993)</b>	Approximately \$27 million (ONUSAL and ONUCA)
<b>Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission</b>	Augusto Ramirez Ocampo (Colombia)
<b>Contributors (military and civilian police personnel)</b>	Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, France, Guyana, India, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Venezuela. In addition, eight medical officers are provided by Argentina.

### MINURSO

#### *United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara*

<b>Duration</b>	September 1991 to date
<b>Location</b>	Western Sahara
<b>Headquarters</b>	Laayoune
<b>Mandate</b>	Established in accordance with "the settlement proposals", as accepted by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) on 30 August 1988, to monitor a ceasefire, verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in the Territory, monitor the confinement of Moroccan and Frente POLISARIO troops to designated locations, ensure the release of all Western Saharan political prisoners or detainees, oversee the exchange of prisoners of war, implement the repatriation

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	programme, identify and register qualified voters, organise and ensure a free referendum and proclaim the results. However, due to divergent views and different interpretations by the two parties of some of the key elements contained in the settlement plan, it has not been possible to implement the plan in conformity with the original timetable. The primary function of MINURSO in its present limited deployment is restricted to verifying the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities.
<b>Authorised strength</b>	Approximately 1,600 military observers and troops, 300 police officers and about 800 to 1,000 civilian personnel
<b>Current strength</b>	225 military observers, 100 military support personnel and 103 international and local civilian staff members
<b>Fatalities</b>	2
<b>Expenditures</b>	The annual cost to the United Nations of MINURSO, in its present deployment, is approximately \$35 million.
<b>Method of financing</b>	Assessments in respect of a Special Account
<b>Outstanding contributions (as at 30 April 1993)</b>	Approximately \$21 million
<b>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</b>	Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan (Pakistan)
<b>Force Commander</b>	Brigadier-General Andre Van Baelen
<b>Contributors (military personnel)</b>	(Belgium), Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Russian Federation, Switzerland, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela

### **UNPROFOR**

#### ***United Nations Protection Force***

<b>Duration</b>	March 1992 to date
<b>Location</b>	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

**Headquarters**

Zagreb, Croatia

**Mandate**

**Croatia.** Established in March 1992 as an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. The Force is deployed in three “United Nations Protected Areas” (UNPAs) in Croatia. UNPROFOR’s mandate is to ensure that the UNPAs are demilitarised, through the withdrawal or disbandment of all armed forces in them, and that all persons residing in them are protected from fear of armed attack. There were several enlargements of the mandate in Croatia—in June 1992, to include monitoring of certain areas in Croatia (the so-called “pink zones”) which were outside the agreed UNPA boundaries; in August 1992, to enable UNPROFOR to control the entry of civilians into the UNPAs and to perform immigration and customs functions at the UNPA borders at international frontiers; and in October 1992, to include monitoring of the demilitarisation of the Prevlaka Peninsula near Dubrovnik and to ensure control of the Peruca dam, situated in one of the “pink zones”.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina.** In June 1992, after the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina had rapidly deteriorated, UNPROFOR’s mandate and strength were enlarged in order to ensure the security and functioning of the airport at Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and its environs. In September 1992, UNPROFOR’s mandate was further enlarged to enable it to support efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to protect convoys of released civilian detainees if the International Committee of the Red Cross so requested. In addition, since November 1992, UNPROFOR’ has been monitoring compliance with the ban on all

military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In April 1993, the Security Council declared Srebrenica a "safe area". In May, it demanded that five more towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac) be treated as "safe areas" and authorised the strengthening of UNPROFOR's mandate by additional observers to monitor the humanitarian situation in those areas.

**The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.** In December 1992, in response to a request by the President of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UNPROFOR was deployed there to monitor and report any developments in its border areas which could undermine confidence and stability in that Republic and threaten its territory.

<b>Current strength</b>	Over 24,000 military and civilian personnel, including approximately 14,000 personnel in Croatia, 9,200 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 750 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
<b>Fatalities</b>	43
<b>Expenditures</b>	The annual cost to the United Nations is approximately \$1,020 million.
<b>Method of financing</b>	Assessments in respect of a Special Account
<b>Outstanding contributions (as at 30 April 1993)</b>	Approximately \$325 million
<b>Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General</b>	Thorvald Stoltenberg (Norway)
<b>Force Commander</b>	Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgren
<b>Contributors (military and civilian police personnel)</b>	(Sweden), Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Ghana, India (1992-1993), Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela

**UNTAC*****United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia***

<b>Duration</b>	March 1992 to date
<b>Location</b>	Cambodia
<b>Headquarters</b>	Phnom Penh
<b>Mandate</b>	<p>Under the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, signed in Paris on 23 October 1991, the Supreme National Council of Cambodia (the SNC) is “the unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodia are enshrined”. The SNC, which is made up of the four Cambodian factions, has delegated to the United Nations “all powers necessary” to ensure the implementation of the Agreement. UNTAC’s mandate includes aspects relating to human rights, the organisation and conduct of free and fair general elections (23-28 May 1993), military arrangements, civil administration, the maintenance of law and order, the repatriation and resettlement of the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons and the rehabilitation of essential Cambodian infrastructure during the transitional period. The transitional period commenced with the entry into force of the Agreement (23 October 1991) and will terminate when the constituent assembly elected in conformity with the Agreement has approved the new Cambodian Constitution and transformed itself into a legislative assembly, and thereafter a new Cambodian Government has been created.</p> <p>Upon becoming operational on 18 March 1992, UNTAC absorbed the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), which had been established immediately after the signing of the Agreement in October 1991 to assist the Cambodian parties to maintain the ceasefire.</p>

<b>Strength</b>	Some 22,000 military and civilian personnel
<b>Fatalities</b>	52 (military and civilian personnel)
<b>Expenditures</b>	The total cost of UNAMIC and UNTAC for the period from 1 November 1991 to 31 July 1993 has been estimated at approximately \$1,600 million. In addition, repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons, as well as rehabilitation assistance, are funded from voluntary contributions; some \$880 million was pledged for these activities.
<b>Method of financing</b>	Assessments in respect of a Special Account
<b>Outstanding contributions (as at 30 April 1993)</b>	Approximately \$283 million (UNTAC and UNAMIC)
<b>Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission</b>	Yasushi Akashi (Japan)
<b>Force Commander</b>	Lieutenant-General John M. Sanderson
<b>Contributors (military and civilian police personnel)</b>	(Australia), Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Fiji, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Russian Federation, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay

### ONUMOZ

#### *United Nations Operation in Mozambique*

<b>Duration</b>	December 1992 to date
<b>Location</b>	Mozambique
<b>Headquarters</b>	Maputo
<b>Mandate</b>	In accordance with the General Peace Agreement, signed on 4 October 1992 in Rome by the President of the Republic of Mozambique and the President of the Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO), the mandate of ONUMOZ includes four elements. <b>Political:</b> to facilitate impartially the

implementation of the Agreement, in particular by chairing the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission and its subordinate commissions

**Military:** to monitor and verify the ceasefire, the separation and concentration of forces, their demobilisation and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons; to monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces and to provide security in the transport corridors; to monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups; to authorise security arrangements for vital infrastructures; and to provide security for United Nations and other international activities in support of the peace process

**Electoral:** to provide technical assistance and monitor the entire electoral process

**Humanitarian:** to coordinate and monitor humanitarian assistance operations, in particular those relating to refugees, internally displaced persons, demobilised military personnel and the affected local population

<b>Authorised strength</b>	Between 7,000 and 8,000 military and civilian personnel
<b>Fatalities</b>	3
<b>Expenditures</b>	The annual cost to the United Nations is approximately \$210 million.
<b>Method of financing</b>	Assessments in respect of a Special Account
<b>Outstanding contributions (as at 30 April 1993)</b>	Approximately \$114 million
<b>Interim Special Representative of the Secretary-General</b>	Aldo Ajello (Italy)
<b>Force Commander</b>	Major-General Lelio Goncalves Rodrigues
<b>Contributors (military personnel)</b>	Silva (Brazil), Argentina Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Portugal, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay, Zambia

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## UNOSOM II

### *United Nations Operation in Somalia II*

<b>Duration</b>	May 1993 to date
<b>Location</b>	Somalia
<b>Headquarters</b>	Mogadishu
<b>Mandate</b>	<p>UNOSOM was originally established in April 1992 to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, and to provide protection and security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the sea- and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centres in the city and its immediate environs. In August 1992, UNOSOM's mandate and strength were enlarged to enable it to protect the humanitarian convoys and distribution centres throughout Somalia; however, the further deteriorating security situation in Somalia prevented UNOSOM from fully implementing its mandate. In these circumstances, the Security Council authorised, in December 1992, a countrywide military action by a group of Member States. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF), organised and led by the United States, was authorised to use "all necessary means" to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. UNOSOM itself remained responsible for the political aspects and for humanitarian assistance, liaised with UNITAF and planned for the transition to normal peace-keeping functions. In March 1993, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, approved the Secretary-General's proposal for the second part of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) to take over from UNITAF and to expand the size and the mandate of UNOSOM II. The transfer of budgetary and administrative control from UNITAF to UNOSOM II took place on 1 May 1993, followed by the transfer of the military command on 4 May.</p>

	<p>The mandate of UNOSOM II is to take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II seeks to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. UNOSOM II is also entrusted with assisting the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure.</p>
<b>Authorised strength</b>	28,000 military personnel and approximately 2,800 civilian staff
<b>Expenditures</b>	Estimated costs for 12 months amount to \$1,550 million.
<b>Method of financing</b>	Assessments in respect of a Special Account
<b>Outstanding contributions (as at 30 April 1993)</b>	Approximately \$352 million (UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II)
<b>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</b>	Admiral Jonathan T. Howe (United States)
<b>Force Commander</b>	Lieutenant-General Cevik Bir (Turkey)
<b>Contributors (military personnel)</b>	Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United States, Zambia, Zimbabwe

# 16

## Peace-Keeping and Arab-Israeli Conflict

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### GENERAL REVIEW

No other international issue is more complex and more potentially dangerous for the maintenance of international peace and security than the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. No other issue has claimed more of the Organisation's time and attention. It is also the issue out of which the concept of United Nations peace-keeping evolved. The first such operation, in the form of an observer mission, was created in the Middle East in 1948; the first of the United Nations peace-keeping forces was also created in the Middle East, in 1956.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has its origin in the problem of Palestine which arose from the conflicting claims of the Arab and Jewish communities over the future status of that territory. In 1947, Palestine was a territory administered by the United Kingdom under a Mandate from the League of Nations, with a population of about 2 million, two thirds of whom were Arabs and one-third, Jews. Both communities laid claims to the control of the entire Territory after the United Kingdom Mandate ended. Unable to find a solution acceptable to both communities, the British Government brought the matter before the General Assembly in April 1947. A Special Committee appointed by the Assembly to make recommendations for the future status of Palestine proposed in a majority plan the partition of the Territory into an Arab State and a Jewish State, with an international regime for Jerusalem. The partition plan was adopted by the Assembly in November. A United Nations Palestine Commission was to carry out its recommendations, with the assistance of the Security Council. The

plan was not accepted by the Palestinian Arabs and Arab States, and the Commission's efforts were inconclusive.

As the impasse continued, violent fighting broke out in Palestine, and the Security Council on 23 April 1948 established a Truce Commission for Palestine, composed of the consular representatives of Belgium, France and the United States, to supervise a ceasefire the Council had called for. The Assembly on 14 May decided to appoint a United Nations Mediator for Palestine who would promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine. On the same day, the United Kingdom relinquished its Mandate over Palestine, and the Jewish Agency proclaimed the State of Israel (which became a United Nations Member a year later, on 11 May 1949) on the territory allotted under the partition plan. The next day, the Palestinian Arabs, assisted by Arab States, opened hostilities against Israel. The war ended with a truce, called for by the Security Council, which was to be supervised by the United Nations Mediator with the assistance of military observers. The first United Nations peace-keeping operation, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), came into being as a consequence.

Since 1948, there have been six full-fledged wars directly connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict, and five United Nations peace-keeping operations have been established in the region. Of these, three are still active—the overall UNTSO operation, an observer force on the Golan Heights and a peace-keeping force in southern Lebanon. The other two operations, now discontinued, were the first and second United Nations Emergency Forces, both in the Egypt-Israel sector.

In addition to the peace-keeping operations, the United Nations has undertaken a series of peace-making efforts, which included the Palestine Commission and the United Nations Mediator (leading to General Armistice Agreements), the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General under the Security Council's resolution 242(1967) of 22 November 1967. In December 1973, a Peace Conference on the Middle East was convened under the auspices of the United Nations and the co-chairmanship of the United States and the USSR. There were also a number of peace initiatives by interested Governments, some of which relied on United Nations machinery to implement agreements arrived at.

Besides the specific peace-keeping and peace-making efforts of the United Nations, humanitarian assistance for refugees began with the

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United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees in December 1948. The following year, the Assembly created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) whose mandate has been continuously extended.

## **UN TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANISATION**

### **A. Introduction**

The first peace-keeping operation in the Middle East was the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), which continues to operate in the Middle East. It initially came into being during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, to supervise the truce called for in Palestine by the Security Council. In 1949 its military observers (UNMOs) remained to supervise the Armistice Agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbours which were for many years the main basis of the uneasy truce in the whole area. A unique feature of UNTSO is that its activities have been and still are spread over territory within five States, and therefore it has relations with five host countries (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syrian Arab Republic).

Following the wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973, the functions of the observers changed in the light of changing circumstances, but they remained in the area, acting as go betweens for the hostile parties and as the means by which isolated incidents could be contained and prevented from escalating into major conflicts.

UNTSO personnel have also been available at short notice to form the nucleus of other peace-keeping operations and have remained to assist those operations. The availability of the UNMOS for almost immediate deployment after the Security Council had acted to create a new operation has been an enormous contributory factor to the success of those operations. Rapid deployment of United Nations peacekeepers has always been essential to the success of any operation, since their actual presence becomes the initial deterrent to renewed fighting.

In the Middle East, groups of UNMOS are today attached to the peace-keeping forces in the area: the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). A group remains in Sinai to maintain a United Nations presence in that peninsula. There is also a group of observers in Beirut, Lebanon.

The body of experienced and highly trained staff officers and its communications system were invaluable in setting up the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) at short notice during the time of the Suez crisis, as well as for the United Nations Operation in the Congo (now Zaire) in 1960, the observer group in Lebanon during the crisis of 1958, the United Nations Yemen observer group in 1963, UNEF II in Sinai in 1973, UNDOF the following year, and UNFIL in 1978. They are used today in Iran and Iraq.

At the present time, the following countries provide military observers to UNTSO: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the USSR and the United States. UNTSO's authorized strength in 1985 was 298 observers.

As of early 1985, the total number of fatal casualties suffered by UNTSO since its inception was 24—both observers and civilian supporting personnel. Of the observers who died, one was assassinated (with the Mediator) and nine were killed in incidents involving firing or mines.

## **B. Supervision of the Truce**

### ***The First Observer Group***

In early May 1948, the Truce Commission established by the Security Council the previous month brought to the Council's attention the need for control-personnel for effective supervision of the ceasefire which the Council had called for when it created the Commission. As the situation worsened, the Commission, on 21 May, formally asked the Council to send military observers to assist it.

On 29 May, the Security Council, in calling for a four-week cessation of all acts of armed force and non-introduction of fighting personnel or war material into Palestine and Arab countries involved in the fighting, decided that the Mediator (Count Folke Bernadotte, of Sweden), in concert with the Truce Commission, should supervise the truce and be provided with a sufficient number of military observers for that purpose. Resolution 50(1948) formed the basis of what would become UNTSO.

After intensive discussions in the area, the Mediator reported a truce agreement, which went into effect on 11 June 1948. Ralph J. Bunche, the then Personal Representative of the Secretary-General with the Mediator, was instrumental in putting into effect the arrangements for the group of military observers. These arrangements

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had to be made without previous guidelines and implemented within a period of less than two weeks between adoption of the Council's resolution and the effective truce.

The question of the nationality of the observers was resolved by the Mediator's requesting 21 observers each from the States members of the Truce Commission (Belgium, France and the United States), with a further five colonels coming from his own country (Sweden), to act as his personal representatives in supervising the truce. The Mediator appointed one of them, Lieutenant-General Count Thord Bonde, as his Chief of Staff. The United States supplied 10 auxiliary technical personnel such as aircraft pilots and radio operators. The Secretary-General made available 51 guards, recruited from the Secretariat's security force at Headquarters, to assist the military observers.

While these arrangements were being made, the beginnings of what were to become different positions on the question of authority became discernible. The Soviet Union made known its views that selection of military observers should be decided by the Security Council, and expressed the hope that Soviet observers would be appointed. This view was not supported by the Council.

Administratively, the observers remained under their respective army establishments, receiving their normal remunerations from their Governments but getting a daily subsistence allowance from the United Nations, which also met extra expenses resulting from the mission. National uniforms were worn with a United Nations armband. (The distinctive blue beret with United Nations badge was not used until November 1956.) During their assignments with the Organisation, the observers were to take orders only from the United Nations authorities. The parties to the conflict were required to co-operate with the observers, to whom the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations applied, and ensure their safety and freedom of movement.

The first group of 36 observers arrived in Cairo between 11 and 14 June and were immediately deployed in Palestine and some of the Arab countries. The number of observers was subsequently increased to 93–31 from each of the States members of the Truce Commission. Their activities, under the general control of the Secretary-General, were directed in the field by the Chief of Staff on behalf of the Mediator. For political and practical reasons, the Mediator clearly separated the truce operation from his mediation mission, with Haifa becoming the

temporary headquarters for the former and the island of Rhodes remaining the base for the latter. Close liaison was maintained between the Commission, which supervised the truce in Jerusalem, and the Mediator, who supervised the remainder of the operations area. The functions of the observers and the operating procedures were laid down by the Mediator in consultation with the Secretary-General.

### ***Method of Operation***

These observers were, and remain today, unarmed. They operated then, as they still do, with the consent of the parties and were dependent on the co-operation of the parties for their effectiveness. Thus, they had no power to prevent a violation of the truce or to enforce any decisions. There was no element of enforcement in their functioning, although their very presence was something of a deterrent to violations of the truce and, acting on the basis of United Nations resolutions, they exercised a degree of moral suasion. In the case of any complaint or incident where they could not achieve a settlement between the parties on the spot, their only recourse was to report the matter to their supervisors and ultimately to the Mediator, who, in turn, at his discretion, could report to the Secretary-General and, through him, to the Security Council. Complaints from local civilians or from troops of the parties concerned were dealt with by observers on the spot, those from military commanders by an area commander or the Chief of Staff, and those from Governments by the Mediator himself. In cases requiring investigation, the inquiries were carried out by observers at the scene whenever possible.

The four-week truce expired on 9 July 1948. While the provisional Government of Israel accepted the Mediator's proposal for an extension, the Arab Governments did not. As soon as the truce expired, large-scale fighting erupted again between Arab and Israeli forces. On 15 July, in response to an appeal by the Mediator, the Security Council ordered a ceasefire, with a clear threat of applying the enforcement procedures of Chapter VII of the Charter if necessary (resolution 54(1948)). The Mediator set the time for commencement of the ceasefire at 1500 GMT on 18 July. Both parties complied with the Council's ceasefire order and all fighting stopped by the appointed time.

### ***The Second Group***

Since the new truce was of indefinite duration and was to remain in force until a peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine was reached, a more elaborate system of truce supervision was required.

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As the observers for the first truce and their equipment had already left the area, the new operation had to be created and equipped from scratch. However, profiting from the experience gained earlier, the Mediator was able to set up a larger and more effective operation in a relatively short time.

The Mediator requested the Governments of Belgium, France and the United States each to place at his disposal 100 observers for the supervision of the truce. By 1 August 1948, 137 of those observers had arrived in the mission area. Subsequently, a total of 682 observers and auxiliary technical personnel was requested by the Mediator, of which 572 were actually provided. Major-General Aage Lundstrom of the Swedish Air Force was appointed Chief of Staff, and he along with nine other Swedish officers formed the Mediator's personal staff. The headquarters of the operation remained in Haifa and the general principles and rules devised for the first truce continued to apply. However, the deployment of observers underwent important changes. Observers were now divided into a number of groups assigned to each Arab army and each Israeli army group. One group was assigned to Jerusalem, one to cover the coast and ports of the truce area, one to control convoys between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and, later, an additional group was set up to cover airports in the truce area. The Chief of Staff was assisted by a Central Truce Supervision Board, presided over by him and consisting of a senior officer from each member of the Truce Commission, together with the Chief of Staff's political adviser, who was a member of the United Nations Secretariat.

On 17 September 1948, the Mediator was assassinated in Jerusalem by Jewish terrorists said to belong to the Stern Gang. Ralph Bunche took over the Mediator's duties and was appointed Acting Mediator. Increased tension led to renewed fighting in October in Jerusalem, the Negev and, to a lesser extent, the Lebanese sector. The Security Council adopted a series of decisions and resolutions to restore the ceasefire and strengthen the observation operation.

The decisions and resolutions of the Security Council between October and December 1948 were the following: on 19 October, a call for an immediate and effective ceasefire in the Negev, to be followed by negotiations through United Nations intermediaries to settle outstanding problems in the area; also on 19 October, a call to the Governments and authorities concerned to grant United Nations observers freedom of movement and access in their areas of operation, to ensure their safety and to co-operate fully with them in their conduct

of investigations into incidents; on 4 November, a call to Governments concerned to withdraw their troops to the positions they had occupied on 14 October and to establish truce lines and such neutral or demilitarized zones as desirable; and on 16 November, a request to the parties to seek agreement directly or through the Acting Mediator with a view to the immediate establishment of an armistice.

### ***Acting Mediator's Efforts***

With the full support of the Security Council and the General Assembly, the Acting Mediator resumed his mediating efforts, concentrating first on arranging indirect negotiations between Egypt and Israel. But his efforts were momentarily interrupted in late December, when hostilities erupted again between Egyptian and Israeli forces in southern Palestine.

Upon receipt of the Acting Mediator's report on this subject, the Security Council adopted another resolution on 29 December (resolution 66(1948)), by which it called upon the Governments concerned to order an immediate ceasefire and to facilitate the complete supervision of the truce by United Nations observers. An effective ceasefire was established by the Acting Mediator soon afterwards.

## **C. General Armistice Agreements**

### ***Four General Armistice Agreements***

The Acting Mediator's efforts led to the conclusion of four General Armistice Agreements between Israel and the four neighbouring Arab States—Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria—in early 1949. On 11 August 1949, the Security Council assigned new functions to UNTSO in line with these Agreements (resolution 73(1949)). The role of Mediator was ended. While the resolution made no reference to the Truce Commission, this body had become inactive since the armistice and had in fact been abolished, although the Council took no formal decision to that effect.

With the termination of the role of the Mediator, UNTSO became an autonomous operation, officially a subsidiary organ of the Council, with the Chief of Staff assuming command of the operation. The functioning was radically altered, since UNTSO's main responsibility now was to assist the parties in supervising the application and observance of the General Armistice Agreements. In two cases, the Israel-Egypt and Israel-Syria sectors, demilitarized zones were established and UNTSO became responsible for ensuring that the parties excluded their armed forces from these zones.

In addition to its functions relating to supervision of the Armistice Agreements, UNTSO had responsibility for observing and maintaining the ceasefire ordered by the Security Council in 1948, which had no time-limit.

UNTSO's main responsibilities related to the work of the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACS) set up by the Armistice Agreements. The Egypt-Israel General Armistice Agreement provided for a MAC of seven members, three from each side and the Chief of Staff (or a senior officer designated by him) as Chairman. The Commission was empowered to employ observers which, if they were to be United Nations military observers, would remain under UNTSO command. The other General Armistice Agreements were similar, except that the respective MACS were composed of five members, two from each party and the Chairman.

### ***Structural Changes***

After the departure of the Mediator, the Chief of Staff assumed command of the operation. He reported to the Secretary-General and was responsible to him. Although the title of Chief of Staff was no longer fully suitable, it was maintained since it was specifically mentioned in the Armistice Agreements and also in Security Council resolution 73(1949). Until 1951, the Chief of Staff had, administratively, the same status as the observers. This was changed in that year when he was given an appointment as a senior official of the United Nations Secretariat with the grade of Principal Director (later Assistant Secretary-General). This arrangement, which greatly strengthened the control of the Secretary-General over UNTSO, was applied to the heads of subsequent peace-keeping operations.

### ***Demilitarized Zones***

In two cases, armistice arrangements included the establishment of demilitarized zones. One of these zones was established in the El Auja area on the Israeli side of the Armistice Demarcation Line between Egypt and Israel. The Egypt-Israel General Armistice Agreement provided that both Egyptian and Israeli armed forces should be totally excluded from the demilitarized zone and that the Chairman of the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission and the observers attached to the Commission should be responsible for ensuring the full implementation of this provision. The Israel-Syria Armistice Agreement contained similar provisions concerning the demilitarized zone established near Lake Tiberias. In this case, the Chairman of the

Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission was also empowered to authorise the return of civilians to villages and settlements in the demilitarized zone and the employment of limited numbers of locally recruited civilian police in the zone for internal security purposes.

### ***Mixed Armistice Commissions***

The main task of the Commissions was the investigation and examination of the claims or complaints presented by the parties relating to the application and observance of the Armistice Agreements. These claims or complaints concerned, mainly, firing across the Armistice Demarcation Line, crossing of the Line by persons or animals, overflights on the wrong side of the Line, the presence of troops or equipment in demilitarized zones or defensive areas and illegal cultivation contrary to agreements. Occasionally, the Commissions also gave attention to special problems of common interest to the parties.

The observers assigned to each Commission carried out the investigations of complaints submitted to the Commission. They assisted in the handing over of people who had crossed the Armistice Demarcation Line, as well as the handing over of animals and property, and they witnessed the work done by the parties under anti-malaria, anti-rabies and anti-locust agreements. They also participated in rescue and search missions when such missions were undertaken by UNTSO at the request of one of the parties. The Chief of Staff was given special responsibilities for the protection of Mount Scopus, in Jerusalem.

### ***Ceasefire Supervision***

In addition to its functions relating to the supervision of the General Armistice Agreements, UNTSO had the responsibility of observing and maintaining the ceasefire, since the unconditional ceasefire ordered by the Security Council in its resolution 54(1948) continued to be in force. When an outbreak of violence threatened, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO would, on his own initiative, seek to prevent it by appealing to the parties for restraint, and when a firing incident actually occurred, he would arrange for an immediate ceasefire. In serious cases, the Chief of Staff could bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council through the Secretary-General.

### ***Government House, UNTSO Headquarters***

On 25 May 1949, the headquarters of UNTSO was transferred from Haifa to Government House in Jerusalem. Government House

had been the seat of the British Mandatory Administration during the Mandate period. On the departure of the British authorities from Palestine, and at their request, the International Committee of the Red Cross took over Government House in trust for any successor administration and, during the early fighting in Jerusalem, it established a neutral zone in the area where the building and its grounds were located. On 7 October 1948, following renewed fighting, during which the status of the neutral zone was violated by both Israeli and Jordanian forces, the International Committee transferred Government House and the surrounding grounds to United Nations protection. Both States parties were informed of these arrangements and did not raise any objections.

The ceasefire agreement of 30 November 1948 for the Jerusalem area left intact Government House and the security zone. The General Armistice Agreement concluded between Israel and Jordan on 3 April 1949 provided that in the Jerusalem sector the Armistice Demarcation Lines should correspond to the lines defined in the ceasefire agreement of 30 November 1948, and therefore the status of the Government House area and the neutral zone remained unaltered. Shortly after the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement, Government House became the headquarters of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation.

On 5 June 1967, after fighting broke out in Jerusalem, Israeli forces occupied Government House and escorted UNTSO staff out of its premises. Following this event, the Secretary-General at United Nations Headquarters and the Chief of Staff of UNTSO in Jerusalem repeatedly pressed the Israeli authorities for the return of Government House to UNTSO. Following lengthy negotiations, the Israeli Government agreed on 22 August 1967 to return Government House and most of its surrounding grounds. The headquarters of UNTSO was immediately re-established at Government House and has remained there until today.

### ***Commission Headquarters***

The re-organisation of UNTSO after August 1949 was geared to the activities of the four Mixed Armistice Commissions. Each Commission had a headquarters and such ancillary installations as it decided to establish. The headquarters of the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission was set up in the neutral zone in Jerusalem. The Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) was headquartered in Beirut with a substation located at Naqoura near

the Armistice Demarcation Line, the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC) was established in Damascus with a control centre at Tiberias on the Israeli side of the Armistice Demarcation Line. Finally, the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (EIMAC) was established in the demilitarized zone of El Auja and was later transferred to Gaza.

### ***Implementation of the Armistice Agreements***

The 1949 General Armistice Agreements were meant to be temporary arrangements to be followed by the conclusion of peace treaties. But that was not to be. Two major obstacles appeared soon after the signing of the Armistice Agreements. Israel, for security reasons, refused to let the many Palestinian Arab refugees who had fled their homes during the hostilities return to the areas it controlled, and the Arabs continued to refuse to recognise the existence of Israel and to enter into peace negotiations with it. Thus, the basic issues remained unresolved.

Because of constant disagreement between the parties concerned, the Chief of Staff and the UNTSO observers assigned to the Commissions came to play an increasingly important role. In each Commission, sensitive issues were often deadlocked and resolutions had to be decided by the casting vote of the Chairman. Most investigations into incidents and violations of the Armistice Agreements were carried out by UNTSO observers alone, since the military representatives of the parties could not work with each other. To smooth over difficulties and avert incidents, UNTSO personnel often had to exercise good offices or act as mediators. But, however active and important their functions were, the ultimate responsibility for the observance and application of the provisions of the Armistice Agreements rested with the parties themselves, and without their co-operation and goodwill the Agreements steadily eroded.

### ***Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission***

The difficulties encountered in the implementation of the General Armistice Agreements and the relationships between the parties varied from one Mixed Armistice Commission to another. The most difficult Commission was the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission. From the start, Egypt strongly protested against Israel's expulsion of thousands of Palestinians to the Gaza Strip. The matter was brought before the Security Council, which, in its resolution 89(1950) of 17 November 1950, requested EIMAC to give urgent attention to the

Egyptian complaint and reminded both Egypt and Israel, as Member States of the United Nations, of their obligations under the Charter to settle their outstanding differences. But despite the Council's decision, the problem remained unresolved. In 1951 Egypt decided to impose restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods destined for Israel through the Suez Canal. Despite the request contained in Security Council resolution 95(1951) of 1 September 1951, Egypt maintained these restrictions, and indeed extended them to the Strait of Tiran in 1953. By early 1955, Palestinian *fedayeen* undertook, with increasing frequency, commando raids into Israeli territory which were followed by harsh retaliation from Israel. In reaction to the establishment of Egyptian military positions in the El Quseima-Abu Aweigila area, near the border, the Israeli forces occupied the demilitarized zone of El Auja on 21 September 1956 and, shortly thereafter, the Commission became paralysed as Israel prevented the Egyptian delegates to the Commission from entering the area. Following the outbreak of the October 1956 war, Israel denounced the Armistice Agreement with Egypt.

### ***Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission***

Great difficulties were also experienced by the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission. Two of the most frequent disputes concerned the cultivation of disputed lands by Israeli farmers in the demilitarized zone and the activities of Israeli patrols and fishermen on the eastern side of Lake Tiberias next to the Armistice Demarcation Line. These Israeli activities were considered to be illegal by the Syrians and often led to intense exchanges of fire between Israeli and Syrian forces. In addition, there was the unending cycle of violence marked by Palestinian commando raids and Israeli reprisals in the border areas.

In order to ease the situation, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO decided, with the agreement of the parties, to establish in the 1950s a number of observation posts along the Armistice Demarcation Line. These served to reduce tension to some extent in the sensitive areas, but incidents nevertheless continued to occur frequently. On 19 January 1956, after a particularly violent Israeli attack against Syrian forces, the Security Council adopted resolution 111(1956), by which it condemned the attack and called once again on the parties to implement the General Armistice Agreement and to respect the Armistice Demarcation Line and the demilitarized zone. But despite the call of the Security Council, the situation was not improved. As of 14 October 1966, there were 35,485 Israeli complaints and 30,600 Syrian

complaints pending before the Commission. The Commission was completely paralysed by the large number of complaints and constant disputes between the parties. It held its last regular meeting in 1951 and its last emergency meeting in February 1960. From 1966 onwards, relations between Israel and Syria deteriorated sharply. At the beginning of 1967, the Secretary-General succeeded in arranging a series of "extraordinary emergency meetings" of the Commission in order to discuss the cultivation problem in the demilitarized zone which at the time had led to many incidents. But these meetings ended in failure, and on 7 April a serious incident occurred during which Israeli aircraft attacked Damascus itself and shot down six Syrian aircraft. This incident created a new situation and marked the beginning of a new escalation which eventually led to the June 1967 war.

### ***Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission***

The Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement was subject to different pressures. The West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem formed part of the Holy Land and were of special importance. They contained large numbers of Palestinian Arabs, many of whom were uprooted and displaced from the area held by Israel. A narrow strip of neutral zone supervised by the United Nations separated the Israeli and Jordanian sectors of the Holy City. The Armistice Agreement created two enclaves: an Israeli enclave on Mount Scopus in Jerusalem and a Jordanian enclave in Latrun on the road from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv. The West Bank was a staging area for the activities of Palestinian *fedayeen*. These factors led to many disputes and problems, which often resulted in exchanges of fire across the Line between the two opposing armies. Despite the difficulties, the Commission continued to meet in emergency sessions until June 1967, and sub-committee meetings were held regularly, on a weekly basis, in an effort to resolve outstanding problems.

### ***Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission***

Unlike the other Commissions, that for Israel-Lebanon functioned smoothly and often effectively from 1949 until 1967. The main difficulties arose in connection with the activities of Palestinian commandos. However, the Lebanese authorities acted firmly to stop or contain those activities and there were few incidents along the Armistice Demarcation Line. Problems of common concern were discussed and resolved in regular meetings of the Commission, which

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functioned until the June 1967 war, when Israel denounced the Armistice Agreement with Lebanon as it did the others, although no hostilities took place along the Israel-Lebanon Armistice Demarcation Line.

### ***Observer Strength***

As for the personnel involved, in 1948 there were 572 observers and auxiliary technical personnel, but with the entry into force of the General Armistice Agreements, UNTSO's observer strength was reduced to between 30 and 140 according to prevailing circumstances. There were 128 observers at the outbreak of the June 1967 war.

### ***Maintenance of Armistice Supervision Machinery***

Following its denunciation of the Armistice Agreement with Egypt in November 1956, the Israeli Government refused to take part in EIMAC. The Secretary-General did not accept this unilateral denunciation as valid, and consequently UNTSO continued to maintain the machinery of the Mixed Armistice Commission. The Commission's headquarters was transferred from El Auja to the town of Gaza in Egyptian-controlled territory. The Commission continued to examine complaints submitted by Egypt, and UNTSO observers continued to conduct patrols on the Egyptian side of the Armistice Demarcation Line. But without Israel's co-operation, these activities were largely symbolic and the real peace-keeping functions were carried out by the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), which was established in the wake of the war and with which UNTSO co-operated closely.

Eleven years later, when UNEF I was withdrawn at the request of the Egyptian Government, the Secretary-General pointed out in his report of 19 May 1967 to the Security Council that EIMAC remained in existence and could, as it had done prior to the establishment of UNEF, provide a limited form of United Nations presence in the area. With this in view, the number of observers assigned to the Commission was brought up from 6 to 20 towards the end of May and their patrol activities along the Armistice Demarcation Line were markedly increased. The Government of Israel, while maintaining its position on the Armistice Agreement, raised no objection to this action, and the additional observers sent from Jerusalem to Gaza passed through the Israeli check-point on the coastal road without difficulty. But this emergency measure was not enough and, soon after the withdrawal of UNEF, tension in the area reached the crisis level and war erupted again between Israel and Arab States.

After the June 1967 war, Israel denounced the other three Armistice Agreements and the Secretary-General again refused to recognise the validity of this unilateral action. In the introduction to his annual report to the twenty-second (1967) session of the General Assembly, which was submitted shortly after that war, the Secretary-General explained his position in the following terms:

“... there has been no indication either in the General Assembly or, in the Security Council that the validity and applicability of the Armistice Agreements have been changed as a result of the recent hostilities or of the war of 1956; each Agreement, in fact, contains a provision that it will remain in force ‘until a peaceful settlement between the parties is achieved’. Nor has the Security Council or the General Assembly taken any steps to change the pertinent resolutions of either organ relating to the Armistice Agreements or to the earlier ceasefire demands. The Agreements provide that by mutual consent the signatories can revise or suspend them. There is no provision in them for unilateral termination of their application. This has been the United Nations position all along and will continue to be the position until a competent organ decides otherwise.”

The machinery for the supervision of the four Armistice Agreements was symbolically maintained. The headquarters of the Israel-Lebanon Commission and the Israel-Syria Commission remained in Beirut and Damascus, respectively, with reduced staffs. That of the Israel-Jordan Commission, which was located in Jerusalem, could no longer operate there, but UNTSO established a liaison office in Amman and the Chief of that office served nominally as Chairman of the Commission. The headquarters of EIMAC in Gaza was closed down in July 1967 and the Officer-in-Charge of the Ismailia Control Centre, which had just been established for the observation of the ceasefire in the Suez Canal sector, was assigned, symbolically, the additional function of Chairman of the Commission. This arrangement continued until the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in March 1979.

#### **D. Ceasefire Observation Operations, 1967**

##### ***Background***

UNTSO played a crucial role in helping to bring the June 1967 war to an end. The war started in the early morning of 5 June between Israeli and Egyptian forces and quickly spread to the Jordanian and Syrian fronts. On 6 June, the Security Council adopted resolution 233(1967), calling upon the Governments concerned to take forthwith, as a first step, all measures for an immediate ceasefire. As hostilities continued, the Council met again on 7 June and, by resolution

234(1967), demanded that the Governments concerned should discontinue all military activities at 2000 hours GMT on the same day. Fighting stopped on the Egyptian and Jordanian fronts on 8 June, but it went on unabated between the Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights. On 9 June, the Security Council adopted resolution 235(1967), by which it confirmed its previous resolutions for an immediate ceasefire, demanded that hostilities should cease forthwith and requested the Secretary-General "to make immediate contacts with the Governments of Israel and Syria to arrange immediate compliance with the above-mentioned resolutions, and to report to the Security Council not later than two hours from now".

On instructions from the Secretary-General, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lieutenant-General Odd Bull of Norway, contacted the Israeli and Syrian authorities on 10 June and proposed to them, as a practical arrangement for implementing the ceasefire demanded by the Security Council, that both sides cease all firing and movement forward at 1630 hours GMT on the same day. He also proposed that the observers, accompanied by liaison officers of each side, be deployed along the front lines as soon as possible in order to observe the implementation of the ceasefire. Those proposals were accepted by both sides and the UNMOS were deployed accordingly in the combat area in the early morning of 11 June.

### ***Israel-Syria Sector***

On the following days, UNTSO observers demarcated the ceasefire lines on each side. The two ceasefire lines, which included a buffer zone approximately one to three miles wide, were agreed to by the two sides in indirect negotiations conducted by the observers. In signing the map demarcating the ceasefire lines, the Syrian representative stressed that the lines were a purely practical arrangement for the specific purpose of facilitating the observation of the ceasefire by the United Nations and should not affect or prejudice the claims and positions of the Syrian Government.

With the demarcation of the ceasefire lines, UNTSO set up a number of observation posts on each side of the buffer zone. There were, by the end of 1967, seven observation posts on the Israeli side and nine on the Syrian side. Those on the Syrian side were under the control of the headquarters of ISMAC in Damascus and those on the Israeli side reported to the Control Centre at Tiberias. General direction was assumed by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO. The observers, all of whom were drawn from the existing establishment of UNTSO,

performed their duties by manning the observation posts and by conducting patrols along the lines as necessary. The two parties were notified by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO that all firings, movements forward of the ceasefire line on each side and overflights would be considered as breaches of the ceasefire.

Arrangements made by the Chief of Staff were endorsed by the Security Council, which, in resolution 236(1967) of 11 June 1967: affirmed that its demand for a ceasefire and discontinuance of all military activities included a prohibition of any forward military movements subsequent to the ceasefire; called for the prompt return to the ceasefire positions of any troops which might have moved forward subsequent to 1630 hours GMT on 10 June 1967; and called for "full, cooperation with the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation and the observers in implementing the ceasefire, including freedom of movement and adequate communications facilities".

After the adoption of the resolution, the observers submitted regularly to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, reports on the ceasefire situation in the Israel-Syria sector. These arrangements continued until the October 1973 war.

### ***Suez Canal Area***

When the ceasefire went into effect in the Egypt-Israel sector on 8 June 1967, no observation machinery was set up in that area. At that time, the Israeli forces had reached the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, except for a small area around Port Fuad on the northern tip of the Canal. The situation in the Suez Canal sector was generally quiet during the last part of June but, from early July on, tension began to rise. On 8 July, heavy fighting broke out between Egyptian and Israeli forces at various locations along the Canal, with each side accusing the other of violations of the ceasefire. When the Security Council met on that day, the Secretary-General expressed regret that he was unable to provide the Council with information about the new outbreak of fighting since no United Nations observers were stationed in the area. In this connection, he indicated that as early as 4 July he had decided to take the initiative towards a possible alleviation of this situation and had undertaken exploratory talks with the representatives of Egypt and Israel about the stationing of United Nations military observers in the Canal sector.

On 9 July, the Security Council approved a consensus statement in accordance with which the Secretary-General requested the Chief

of Staff of UNTSO to work out with the Governments of Egypt and Israel, as speedily as possible, the necessary arrangements to station observers in the Suez Canal sector. Two days later, having received the agreement of both parties, the Secretary-General instructed the Chief of Staff to work out with the local authorities of both sides a plan for the actual stationing of military observers.

The Chief of Staff proceeded in much the same way as for the observation operation on the Golan Heights. The problem of demarcation of the ceasefire lines was much simpler in this case since, except for the Port Fuad area, the Suez Canal itself constituted a natural buffer zone. The observers made an attempt to demarcate a line of separation in the Port Fuad area, but no agreement could be reached. This question, therefore, remained a subject of controversy, but because of the marshy terrain in the area there were few incidents.

The observation operation began on 17 July when seven observation posts were established along the Canal. This number was eventually increased to 15: eight on the eastern side of the Canal under the Control Centre at Qantara and seven on the western side under the Control Centre at Ismailia. At the beginning, military observers drawn from the existing UNTSO establishment were assigned to the Suez Canal. However, the nationalities of the observers gave rise to some difficulty, as certain countries were not acceptable to Israel, and others not acceptable to Egypt. Finally, after lengthy discussions, agreements were reached on six countries from which observers might be drawn: Austria, Myanmar, Chile, Finland, France and Sweden. The original observers were then replaced by 90 new observers from those six countries.

The main task of the observers was to observe and report on breaches of the ceasefire, including firings, overflights and movements forward which, in this case, meant movement of boats and craft in the Canal. An understanding was reached on 27 July whereby the two parties agreed to stop all military activities in the Suez Canal, including the movement in or into the Canal of boats or craft for one month, it being understood that the Canal authorities would continue to re-victual and secure the safety of the 15 ships stranded in the Canal. This agreement was later extended indefinitely.

With these arrangements, the situation in the Suez Canal sector became stabilized and, although there were occasional exchanges of fire, the ceasefire generally held. This lull lasted until early 1969, when fighting suddenly broke out again. From that time until August

1970, there were extremely intense exchanges of artillery fire across the Canal between the Egyptian and Israeli positions every day, with occasional air strikes by one side or the other. This period of fighting, which lasted nearly 20 months, was known as the "war of attrition". It was full-fledged warfare except that the positions of the opposing armies did not move forward. During the entire period of hostilities, the Secretary-General reported in detail to the Security Council on all the developments monitored by the observers, and appealed on several occasions for an end to the hostilities, but his efforts were inconclusive. Egypt stated that it refused to continue to observe the ceasefire, which it regarded as in effect perpetuating the Israeli occupation of its sovereign territory, while Israel asserted that it would observe the ceasefire only if the other side were willing to do so. Neither side brought the matter before the Security Council and, largely because of the opposing positions taken by two of the permanent members, the Council did not attempt to take up this problem.

The fighting came to an end on 7 August 1970 under a proposal initiated by the United States Government. Under the proposal, Egypt, Israel and Jordan agreed to designate representatives to discussions to be held under the auspices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Middle East, Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring of Sweden. In order to facilitate the Ambassador's task of promoting agreement in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 (containing general principles for a Middle East settlement), they undertook strictly to observe the ceasefire resolutions of the Security Council as from 7 August. On that day, fighting stopped in the Suez Canal sector and the situation there remained quiet until 6 October 1973, when hostilities once again broke out between Egyptian and Israeli forces.

### ***Israel-Jordan Sector***

No ceasefire observation was established in the Israel-Jordan sector. At the end of the June 1967 war, Israeli forces had occupied the entire West Bank up to the Jordan River. The situation in that sector was generally quiet until the end of 1967 but there was increasing tension in 1968 and 1969, mainly because of the activities of Palestinian commandos operating from the east side of the Jordan Valley and retaliatory action by the Israeli forces. The Secretary-General sounded out the Israeli and Jordanian authorities about the possibility of stationing United Nations observers in the Jordan Valley but could not secure an agreement. On several occasions, the Security Council

met to consider serious incidents in the Israel-Jordan sector, and the Secretary-General drew attention to the fact that in the absence of agreements from the parties or of a decision by the Security Council, it was not possible to establish a machinery for the observation of the ceasefire in the sector.

The situation in the Israel-Jordan sector, however, became much quieter after September 1970, when the bulk of the Palestinian armed elements moved to Lebanon.

### ***Israel-Lebanon Sector***

During the June 1967 war, no fighting took place between Israel and Lebanon, and the Armistice Demarcation Line between the two countries remained intact. Nevertheless, the Israeli Government denounced the Armistice Agreement with Lebanon after the war, as it did the other Armistice Agreements, on the grounds that during the hostilities Lebanese authorities had claimed that they were at war with Israel. The Lebanese Government, however, denied this and insisted on the continued validity of the Agreement. Since the Secretary-General held the view that the Armistice Agreement could not be denounced unilaterally, UNTSO continued to maintain the headquarters of ILMAC at Beirut, as well as a substation at Naqoura in southern Lebanon. But the Commission had few activities and the number of observers assigned to it was considerably reduced.

Following the 1967 war, the Palestinian population in Lebanon markedly increased with the influx of a sizeable number of displaced persons from the occupied West Bank and Gaza, and the Palestine Liberation Army stepped up its training activities in the country, especially in the south. As a result, anti-Israeli raids by Palestinian commandos from Lebanon and reprisals by Israeli forces became more frequent. The situation deteriorated further following the departure of Palestinian armed elements in 1970 from Jordan to Lebanon.

In early 1972, tension heightened in the Israel-Lebanon sector as a result of increasing activities by Palestinian commandos based in southern Lebanon and severe reprisal attacks by Israeli forces. On 29 March, the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations submitted the following request to the Security Council:

“The Lebanese Government, because of repeated Israeli aggression against Lebanon and because the work of the Lebanon-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission has been paralysed since 1967, wishes the Security Council to take necessary action to strengthen the United Nations machinery in the Lebanese-Israeli sector by increasing the number of observers, on the basis of the Armistice Agreement of 1949.”

On 30 March, the members of the Security Council decided that the request of the Lebanese Government should be met, and the Secretary-General was asked by the Council to make the necessary arrangements to this effect. In a memorandum dated 4 April, the Secretary-General informed the Council that, following consultations with the Lebanese authorities, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO had recommended the establishment of three observation posts on the Lebanese side of the Armistice Demarcation Line, together with an increase in the number of observers assigned to the Armistice Commission from the existing seven to 21. On 19 April 1972, the members of the Security Council, in informal consultations, agreed with the proposed plans.

The ceasefire observation operation in the Israel-Lebanon sector commenced on 24 April 1972 with the establishment of the three proposed observation posts, all on Lebanese territory. Two additional observation posts were later set up and the total observer strength was increased to 34. Those observers, who were all drawn from the existing establishment of UNTSO, manned the five observation posts and conducted patrols along the Armistice Demarcation Line as necessary. Their responsibility was to observe and report on violations of the Demarcation Line.

Unlike the previous ceasefire observer operations, the one in Lebanon was established without the agreement of Israel. However, Israel did not seek to obstruct the operation, and the additional observers and their equipment which were transferred from Jerusalem to southern Lebanon passed through the Israeli border check-point without hindrance.

From establishment in April, 1972 until the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in March 1978, the observers assigned to the Israel-Lebanon sector reported regularly to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, on the situation along the Armistice Demarcation Line. These reports dealt mainly with violations of the Line by the Israeli forces, since no such violations were committed by the Lebanese forces. The Israeli violations included firings across the Line overflights and the establishment of some six positions on the Lebanese side of the Line.

### ***Civil War Situation, Lebanon***

Severe difficulties were experienced by the UNTSO operation following the outbreak of civil war in Lebanon in 1975. Since United Nations observers are never armed, their protection must be ensured by the host Government. When the five observation posts were set up

along the Demarcation Line in 1972, the Lebanese army established a check-post next to each of them. At the beginning of the civil war, the Lebanese army disintegrated and the United Nations observers manning the posts were left on their own in an increasingly dangerous situation. The Secretary-General had three choices at the time: suspend the operation, arm the observers for their protection, or ask them to continue to operate as before in spite of the changed conditions. After careful consideration, the last-mentioned solution was adopted; after consulting the contributing countries and with their agreement. On a number of occasions, observers' vehicles were hijacked and their observation posts forced into by one faction or another. But there were few serious incidents and, on the whole, the fighting factions respected the status of the UNTSO.

Another problem facing the operation after the outbreak of the 1975 civil war concerned the reporting procedure. Fighting involving various Lebanese armed groups as well as Palestinian forces occurred sporadically in the areas where the United Nations observation posts were located. However, it was decided that the reports submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council during that period should continue to be limited to developments along the Armistice Demarcation Line. In this connection, a footnote in each report explained that no reference was made to fighting inside Lebanon since, in accordance with the consensus reached by the members of the Security Council on 19 April 1972, the observers were concerned only with the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon called for by the Council.

## **E. UNTSO Assistance to Other Operations**

### ***Assistance to UNEF II***

The ceasefire observation operation in the Suez Canal sector was terminated shortly after the outbreak of the October 1973 war at the request of the Egyptian Government. On 6 October, in a surprise attack, the Egyptian force crossed the Canal and soon advanced beyond the UNTSO observation posts on the eastern bank of the Canal, while, in a co-ordinated move, Syrian troops attacked simultaneously the Israeli positions on the Golan Heights. The first days of the war were marked by heavy air and ground activity, which was fully reported to the Security Council by the Secretary-General on the basis of information received from the observers. In the course of the hostilities, two United Nations observers were killed.

On 8 October, the Egyptian Permanent Representative informed the Secretary-General that, since the United Nations observers were

now behind the Egyptian lines, which put them in physical danger and made their presence unnecessary, the Government of Egypt requested the Secretary-General to take measures for their transfer to Cairo for their security. The Secretary-General immediately brought this request to the attention of the Security Council, which agreed that it should be acceded to by 9 October, all the United Nations observation posts on both sides of the Canal were closed and the observers were withdrawn to the Cairo area.

Following the closure of the observation posts, the United Nations no longer had direct information on the hostilities between Egypt and Israel which were raging in the western part of the Sinai.

The situation is considered in greater detail in the chapter below regarding UNEF II. As far as UNTSO is concerned, in accordance with Security Council resolution 340(1973) of 25 October 1973, the number of UNTSO observers in the Egypt-Israel sector was increased and they were given the task of assisting and co-operating with the second United Nations Emergency Force in the fulfilment of the Force's mandate. During the initial phase, the observers manned certain check-points and observation posts in the area controlled by UNEF II. They also assisted in exchanges of prisoners of war and undertook searches for bodies of soldiers killed during the hostilities. In addition, some observers were assigned as staff officers at UNEF II headquarters. After the conclusion of the disengagement agreement of January 1974, they conducted patrols in the buffer zone established in the Sinai in accordance with that agreement and carried out inspections of the areas of limitation of forces and armament on both sides of the buffer zone. While the observers remained administratively attached to UNTSO, they were placed under the operational control of the Commander of UNEF II.

At the end of October 1973, additional observers (three from Sweden and 10 from Finland), were provided at the request of the Secretary-General to strengthen the observer group in the Egypt-Israel sector. Thus, the total strength of UNTSO was increased to 225 observers, from 16 countries. In November 1973, the Governments of the United States and of the Soviet Union, in a joint approach to the Secretary-General, offered to make available observers from their countries for service with UNTSO. The Soviet Union would provide 36 observers and the United States 28—who, with the eight Americans already assigned to the mission, would bring the number of United States observers also to 36. The Secretary-General accepted these offers with the informal concurrence of the Security Council.

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***Assistance to UNDOF***

During the October 1973 war, the central part of the buffer zone established by UNTSO on the Golan Heights was the scene of fierce fighting. In the first days of the war, Syrian forces attacked and overran several Israeli positions along the ceasefire lines. However, by 11 October, the Israeli troops had counter-attacked and in turn crossed over to the eastern side of the buffer zone around the Quneitra-Damascus road. As the battle see-sawed, some of the United Nations observation posts had to be evacuated, but others continued to operate.

When the ceasefire called for by the Security Council took effect on 25 October 1973, Israeli forces had occupied a pocket around the village of Saassa on the eastern side of the buffer zone, some 40 kilometres West of Damascus. The United Nations observers set up temporary observation posts around that pocket and, with these changes, the ceasefire observation operation was resumed.

UNTSO's observation in the Israel-Syria sector was discontinued on 31 May 1974 when the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force was established, and the United Nations observers of the Israel-Syria sector were incorporated into UNDOF and formed an integral part of that Force. The tasks they were assigned included the manning of observation posts and check-points in the UNDOF buffer zone, and patrolling and inspection of the areas of limitation of forces and armament. Selected observers were appointed to staff posts at UNDOF headquarters in Damascus. In addition, the observers assigned to ISMAC in Damascus were asked to assist UNDOF in non-operational matters as occasion required. These arrangements have continued to this day.

***Assistance to UNIFIL***

Following the invasion of Lebanon by Israeli forces, the Security Council decided on 19 March 1978 to set up the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). As in the Sinai and on the Golan Heights, the ceasefire observation operation in the Israel-Lebanon sector was discontinued with the establishment of the new peace-keeping force, but the observers of the sector remained in the area and were given the task of assisting UNIFIL in the performance of its mandate. Those observers, who were constituted as the Observer Group Lebanon, were placed under the operational control of the Commander of UNIFIL. They continued to man the five observation posts along the Armistice Demarcation Line. In addition, they conducted patrols and performed liaison duties with the parties concerned in and around the UNIFIL

area of operation. In this connection, observer teams were set up at Tyre, Chateau de Beaufort and Marjayoun, and also at Metulla in Israel. The headquarters of ILMAC in Beirut functioned as a liaison office for UNIFIL. In the principles governing the functioning of UNIFIL, which were approved by the Security Council on 19 March 1978, it was stipulated that "... The termination of the mandate of UNIFIL by the Security Council will not affect the continued functioning of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission, as set out in the appropriate Security Council decision."

### ***Special Missions in the Middle East***

#### *Observer Group in the Sinai*

When UNEF II ended, the Secretary-General, after consultations held by the Security Council, issued a statement on 24 July 1979 in which he indicated that in view of the fact that the withdrawal of UNEF was without prejudice to the continued presence of the UNTSO observers in the area, he intended to make, in accordance with existing decisions of the Security Council, the necessary arrangements to ensure the further functioning of UNTSO.

In accordance with the above statement and with the agreement of the Egyptian Government, five observation posts were established in the Sinai and manned by UNTSO observers, as was also the liaison office in Cairo. This arrangement has continued to this day.

#### *Observer Group in Beirut*

The headquarters of ILMAC in Beirut has been maintained and, since 1978, has functioned also as a liaison office for UNIFIL. Ten observers were assigned to the Commission in Beirut in early 1982. When, in the wake of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon that year, Beirut was subjected to intense air bombings, the headquarters of ILMAC was badly damaged and the Chairman of the Commission established temporary offices at Yarze, a suburb of Beirut where the headquarters of the Lebanese National Army was located.

At the beginning of August 1982, after incursions of Israeli forces into West Beirut, a new observation operation was set up in the area. Although that operation was relatively modest in size and its functions were limited it encountered unusual difficulties because of the opposition of the of the Israeli authorities in the initial stage

On 1 August, the Security Council had adopted resolution 516 (1982) by which, after taking note of the latest massive violations of

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the ceasefire in the Beirut area, it confirmed its previous demands for an immediate ceasefire and authorized the Secretary-General "to deploy immediately, on the request of the Government of Lebanon, United Nations observers to monitor the situation in and around Beirut".

The Secretary-General immediately instructed the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to make the necessary arrangements to this effect in consultation with the parties concerned. The Lebanese authorities, as well as the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, promised to co-operate fully with the observers in accordance with the Security Council's resolution. The Israeli authorities informed the Chief of Staff that this was an important matter which had to be decided by the Israeli Cabinet itself.

On 3 August, upon learning that the Israeli Cabinet would take up this matter only on 5 August, the Secretary-General decided, as a purely temporary and practical arrangement, to instruct the Chief of Staff to take immediate steps to set up observation machinery in the Beirut area in territory controlled by the Lebanese Government. In accordance with these instructions, the 10 observers already in Beirut were constituted into the Observer Group Beirut (OGB) and began to carry out observation duties in the area. On 4 August, the Security Council, in resolution 517(1982), expressed its appreciation for the steps taken by the Secretary-General and authorized him, as an immediate step, to increase the number of observers in and around Beirut.

The Israeli Cabinet met on the next day and issued a statement which amounted to a rejection of the new observation operation. Despite another demand of the Security Council, contained in resolution 518(1982) of 12 August 1982, the Israeli authorities refused to cooperate with UNTSO. No additional observers could be sent to Beirut, since they could not reach the area without going through Israeli checkpoints, and the 10 observers in Beirut were denied access to areas controlled by Israeli troops. Nevertheless, OGB was able to monitor and report on the main developments in the Beirut area, such as the arrival of the (non-United Nations) multinational force and the evacuation of the Palestinian and Syrian armed forces, the departure of the multinational force after the evacuation of Palestinian forces was completed, the occupation of West Beirut by Israeli forces after the assassination of Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel and, in the morning of 17 September, the massacre of Palestinian civilians that had occurred in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut.

In the early morning of 19 September, the Security Council adopted resolution 521(1982), by which it condemned the criminal massacre of Palestinian civilians in Beirut, authorized the Secretary-General as an immediate step to increase the number of observers in and around Beirut from 10 to 50, and insisted that there be no interference with the deployment of the observers. The Council also insisted that all concerned permit the observers and forces authorized by the Council to be deployed and to discharge their mandates, and called attention to the obligation of all Member States under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council.

On 20 September, the Israeli Cabinet concurred with the proposed dispatch of additional observers, and on the same day 25 observers proceeded to Beirut, followed by another 15 during the next two days. The 40 additional observers passed through Israeli check-points without hindrance and the total observer strength of OGB was thus raised to 50. The UNTSO observers in the Beirut area carry out their duties by means of observation posts and mobile patrols. Their task is mainly to monitor the situation in and around Beirut, with emphasis on developments involving the Israelis and the Palestinians. As a rule, the United Nations observers will not concern themselves with matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of Lebanon, since it is a fundamental principle of United Nations peace-keeping operations that they should not be involved in such matters.

Following the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Beirut area, the tasks of the Observer Group were reduced and its total strength had been brought down to 18 as of October 1985.

#### *Other Assistance*

While UNTSO's assistance to some other United Nations operations are not connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict, they may conveniently be mentioned here in pointing to the pool of experienced military personnel which UNTSO has been able to provide, as an *ad hoc* arrangement, at almost immediate notice for other operations, particularly in the initial stages.

Thus, at the outset of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (now Zaire) in July 1960, a group of UNTSO observers was detailed to Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) to form the nucleus of the headquarters staff of the United Nations Force. Others were assigned with UNEF personnel to the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission in 1963.

On 12 June 1984, the Governments of Iran and Iraq, in response to an appeal by the Secretary-General, undertook to refrain from initiating military attacks on purely civilian population centres in either country. In this connection, the Secretary-General, with the agreement of the two Governments, set up two observer teams, based in Teheran and Baghdad respectively, each composed of three military observers and a civilian political adviser, for the purpose of verifying compliance with the above undertakings. UNTSO provided, and continues to provide, the military elements of the two teams.

## **FIRST UN EMERGENCY FORCE**

### **A. Creation**

#### ***Background***

In October 1956, the United Nations faced a major crisis. The 1949 General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel—concluded under the auspices of and supervised by the United Nations—collapsed when Israel and two major Powers occupied large portions of Egyptian territory. The Organisation reacted to the crisis with speed and firmness and, to overcome it, conceived a new form of peace-keeping and set up its first peace-keeping force. This historic development was made possible mainly through the vision, resourcefulness and determination of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and Lester Pearson, who was at the time Secretary for External Affairs of Canada.

Since the summer of 1955, relations between Egypt and Israel had been steadily deteriorating, despite the efforts of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and the Secretary-General himself. Palestinian *fedayeen*, with the support of the Egyptian Government, had been launching frequent raids against Israel from their bases in Gaza, and these had been followed by increasingly strong reprisal attacks by Israeli armed forces. The decision taken by Egypt in the early 1950s to restrict Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, in contravention of a decision of the Security Council, remained a controversial and destabilising issue. In the heightening tension, the control of armament—which the Tripartite Declaration of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, of May 1950, had sought to achieve in the Middle East—had broken down, and Egypt and Israel were engaging in an intense arms race, with the East and the West supplying sophisticated weapons and equipment to the opposing sides.

On 19 July 1956, the United States Government decided to withdraw its financial aid for the Aswan Dam project on the Nile River. President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company a week later and declared that Canal dues would be used to finance the Aswan project.

On 23 September 1956, the Governments of France and the United Kingdom requested the President of the Security Council to convene the Council to consider the "situation created by the unilateral action of the Egyptian Government in bringing to an end the system of international operation of the Suez Canal, which was confirmed and completed by the Suez Canal Convention of 1888". On the following day, Egypt countered with a request that the Security Council consider "actions against Egypt by some Powers, particularly France and the United Kingdom, which constitute a danger to international peace and security and are serious violations of the Charter of the United Nations."

The Security Council first met on 26 September to consider both items. At the same time, private negotiations were being carried out between the Foreign Ministers of the three countries with the good offices of the Secretary-General. By 12 October, Hammarskjöld was able to work out six principles on which there seemed to be general agreement. These principles were incorporated in a draft resolution which the Security Council unanimously adopted on the next day. This became resolution 118(1956), by which the Security Council "agrees that any settlement of the Suez question should meet the following requirements":

- "(1) There should be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination, overt or covert— this covers both political and technical aspects;"
- "(2) The sovereignty of Egypt should be respected;"
- "(3) The operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country;"
- "(4) The manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users;"
- "(5) A fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development;"
- "(6) In case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government should be settled by arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable provisions for the payment of sums found to be due."

Following the adoption of this resolution, Hammarskjöld announced that he would pursue his efforts to promote an agreement based on the principles laid down by the Security Council. However, a new situation developed in late October 1956, when Israel, in cooperation with the British and French Governments, launched an all-out attack on Egypt.

The Israeli forces crossed the border on the morning of 29 October, advancing in three columns towards El Arish, Ismailia and the Mitla Pass. In the early hours of 30 October, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General E.L.M. Burns of Canada, called for a ceasefire and requested Israel to pull its forces back to its side of the border. In the afternoon of the same day, the British and French Governments addressed a joint ultimatum to Egypt and Israel calling on both sides to cease hostilities within 12 hours and to withdraw their forces to a distance of 10 miles on each side of the Suez Canal. They also requested Egypt to allow Anglo-French forces to be stationed temporarily on the Canal at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez for the purpose of separating the belligerents and ensuring the safety of shipping. The ultimatum was accepted by Israel whose troops in any case were still far from the Suez Canal, but was rejected by Egypt. On 31 October, France and the United Kingdom launched an air attack against targets in Egypt, which was followed shortly by a landing of their troops near Port Said at the northern end of the Canal.

### ***General Assembly's First Emergency Special Session***

The Security Council held a meeting on 30 October at the request of the United States, which submitted a draft resolution calling upon Israel immediately to withdraw its armed forces behind the established armistice lines. It was not adopted because of British and French vetoes. A similar draft resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union was also rejected. The matter was then transferred to the General Assembly, on a proposal by Yugoslavia, in accordance with the procedure provided by Assembly resolution 377(V) of 3 November 1950 entitled "Uniting for peace". Thus, the first emergency special session of the General Assembly called under that resolution was convened on 1 November 1956.

In the early hours of the next day, the General Assembly adopted, on the proposal of the United States, resolution 997(ES-I), calling for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines and the reopening of the Canal. The Secretary-General was requested to observe and report promptly on compliance to the

Security Council and to the General Assembly, for such further action as those bodies might deem appropriate in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

The resolution was adopted by 64 votes to 5, with 6 abstentions. The dissenters were Australia and New Zealand, in addition to France, Israel and the United Kingdom. In explaining Canada's abstention, Lester Pearson stated that the resolution did not provide for, alongside with the ceasefire and a withdrawal of troops, any steps to be taken by the United Nations for a peace settlement, without which a ceasefire would be only of a temporary nature at best.

Before the session, Pearson had had extensive discussions with Hammarskjöld and he felt that it might be necessary to establish some sort of United Nations police force to help resolve the crisis. Pearson submitted to the General Assembly, when it reconvened the next morning, a draft resolution on the establishment of an emergency international United Nations force.

### ***Enabling Resolutions of the United Nations Force***

The Canadian proposal was adopted by the General Assembly on the same morning and became resolution 998(ES-I) of 4 November 1956, by which the Assembly:

*“Requests, as a matter of priority, the Secretary-General to submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the aforementioned resolution (997(ES-I)).”*

The voting was 57 to none, with 19 abstentions. Egypt, France, Israel, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and Eastern European States were among the abstainers.

At the same meeting, the General Assembly also adopted resolution 999(ES-I), by which it reaffirmed resolution 997(ES-I) and authorities the Secretary-General immediately to arrange with the parties concerned for the implementation of the ceasefire and the halting of the movement of military forces and arms into the area.

On the same day, the Secretary-General submitted his first report on the plan for an emergency international United Nations Force, in which he recommended certain preliminary steps, including the immediate setting up of a United Nations Command. All his recommendations were endorsed by the General Assembly and included

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in resolution 1000(ES-I) adopted on 5 November 1956, by which the Assembly:

- Established a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of General Assembly resolution 997(ES-I) of 2 November 1956;
- Appointed, on an emergency basis, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General (later Lieutenant-General) E.L.M. Bums, as Chief of the Command;
- Authorized the Chief of the Command immediately to recruit, from the observer corps of UNTSO, a limited number of officers who were to be nationals of countries other than those having permanent membership in the Security Council, and further authorized him, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to undertake the recruitment directly, from various Member States other than the permanent members of the Security Council, of the additional number of officers needed;
- Invited the Secretary-General to take such administrative measures as might be necessary for prompt execution of the actions envisaged.

The resolution was adopted by 57 votes to none, with 19 abstentions. As with resolution 998(ES-I), Egypt, France, Israel, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Eastern European States abstained.

### ***Concept and Guiding Principles***

On 6 November, the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly his second and final report on the plan for an emergency United Nations Force. In this report, Hammarskjold defined the concept of the new Force and certain guiding principles for its organisation and functioning. The main points:

(a) At the outset, Hammarskjold observed, an emergency international United Nations Force could be developed on the basis of three concepts. In the first place, it could be set up on the basis of principles reflected in the constitution of the United Nations itself. This would mean that its chief responsible officer should be appointed by the United Nations itself and in his functions should be responsible ultimately to the General Assembly and/or the Security Council. His authority should be so defined as to make him fully independent of the policies of any one nation and his relations to the Secretary-General should correspond to those of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO. A second

possibility would be for the United Nations to charge a country, or a group of countries, with the responsibility to provide independently for an international Force serving for the purposes determined by the United Nations. In this approach, which was followed in the case of the Unified Command in Korea, it would obviously be impossible to achieve the same independence in relation to national policies as would be established through the first concept. Finally, as a third possibility, an international Force might be set up in agreement among a group of nations, later to be brought into an appropriate relationship to the United Nations. This approach was open to the same reservation as the second concept and possibly others. Hammarskjöld noted that in deciding on 5 November 1956 to establish a United Nations Command, on an emergency basis, the General Assembly had chosen the first type of international force.

(b) Hammarskjöld set out certain guiding principles for the organisation and functioning of the Force:

- The decision taken by the General Assembly on the United Nations Command recognized the independence of the Chief of Command and established the principle that the Force should be recruited from Member States other than the permanent members of the Security Council. In this context, the Secretary-General observed that the question of the composition of the staff and contingents should not be subject to agreement by the parties involved since such a requirement would be difficult to reconcile with the development of the international Force along the course already being followed by the General Assembly.
- The terms of reference of the Force were to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the General Assembly's resolution 997(ES-I) of 2 November 1956. It followed from its terms of reference that there was no intent in the establishment of the Force to influence the military balance in the current conflict, and thereby the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict. The Force should be of a temporary nature, the length of its assignment being determined by the needs arising out of the current conflict.

(c) Guidelines on the functions to be performed were outlined:

The General Assembly's resolution of 2 November 1956 urged that "all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate ceasefire and, as part thereof, halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area", and further urged the parties to the Armistice

Agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids against those lines into neighbouring territories and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the Agreements. These two provisions combined indicated that the functions of the United Nations Force would be, when a ceasefire was established, to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Government, in order to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian forces and to secure compliance with the other terms established in the resolution.

- The Force obviously should have no rights other than those necessary for the execution of its functions, in co-operation with local authorities. It would be more than an observer corps, but in no way a military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it was stationed; nor should the Force have functions exceeding those necessary to secure peaceful conditions, on the assumption that the parties to the conflict would take all necessary steps for compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly. Its functions could, on this basis, be assumed to cover an area extending roughly from the Suez Canal to the Armistice Demarcation Lines established in the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel.

(d) The Secretary-General indicated that the question as to how the Force should be financed required further study. As a basic rule, which could be applied provisionally, would be that a State providing a unit would be responsible for all costs of equipment and salaries, while all other costs should be financed by the United Nations outside its normal budget. It was obviously impossible to make any estimate of the costs without knowledge of the size of the Force and the length of its assignment. The only practical course therefore would be for the General Assembly to vote on a general authorisation for those costs on the basis of general principles such as those suggested in the report.

(e) The Secretary-General stated that, because of the time factor, he could discuss the question of participation in the Force with only a limited number of Member Governments. The reaction so far led him to believe that it should be possible to meet quickly at least the most basic need for personnel. It was his hope that broader participation would be possible as soon as a plan was approved so that a more definite judgement might be possible concerning the implications of participation. Noting that several matters had to be left open because of the lack of time and the need for further study, the Secretary-General suggested that those matters be submitted to exploration by a

small committee of the General Assembly. Such a committee might also serve as an advisory committee to the Secretary-General for questions relating to the operation.

### ***Advisory Committee***

After considering the report of the Secretary-General, the General Assembly adopted, on 7 November, resolution 1001(ES-I)—approving the guiding principles for the organisation and functioning of the emergency international United Nations Force as expounded in the Secretary-General's report; concurring in the definition of the functions of the Force in the report; and approving provisionally the basic rule concerning the financing of the Force laid down in that report. The Assembly established an Advisory Committee composed of Brazil, Canada, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Colombia, India, Norway and Pakistan. It requested the Committee, whose Chairman was the Secretary-General, to undertake the development of those aspects of the planning for the Force and its operation not already dealt with by the General Assembly and which did not fall within the area of the direct responsibility of the Chief of Command. It authorized the Secretary-General to issue all regulations and instructions, essential to the effective functioning of the Force, following consultation with the Committee, and to take all other necessary administrative and executive action. The Committee was to continue to assist the Secretary-General in his responsibilities, and it could request the convening of the General Assembly if necessary. Finally, the Assembly requested all Member States to afford assistance as necessary to the United Nations Command in the performance of its functions, including arrangements for passage to and from the area involved.

This resolution, which, with resolution 998(ES-I) of 4 November, formed the basis for the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force, was adopted by 64 votes to none, with 12 abstentions. France and the United Kingdom voted this time with the majority. Egypt and Israel remained with the abstainers, together with South Africa and the Soviet Union and Eastern European States. The representatives of France and the United Kingdom indicated that the resolution was acceptable to their Governments because it provided, as they had urged, for an effective international Force in the area. In explaining his abstention, the representative of the Soviet Union stated that the establishment of the Force under General Assembly resolution 1000(ES-I) and the plan for its implementation in resolution 1001(ES-I) were contrary to the Charter, and that the only reason for

abstaining rather than voting against the proposal lay in the hope of preventing any further extension of the aggression against Egypt.

### ***Further General Assembly Resolutions***

On the same day, 7 November, the General Assembly also adopted resolution 1002(ES-I), by which it called once again upon Israel immediately to withdraw all its forces behind the armistice lines, and upon France and the United Kingdom immediately to withdraw all their forces from Egyptian territory.

The voting was 65 to 1, with 10 abstentions. Israel cast the lone negative vote. France and the United Kingdom abstained, together with Australia, Belgium, Laos, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal and South Africa. The representatives of France and the United Kingdom indicated that an immediate withdrawal of their forces could lead to a power vacuum between Egyptian and Israeli forces and that withdrawal could only be effected subsequent to proof of the effective operation of UNEF.

The first emergency special session of the General Assembly ended on 10 November 1956. Before closing the session, the Assembly adopted resolution 1003(ES-I), by which it decided to refer the matter to its eleventh regular session which was then about to convene.

During the first emergency special session, the General Assembly had adopted a total of seven resolutions. By these resolutions, the Assembly gave the Secretary-General the authority and support he required to bring about the cessation of hostilities in Egypt and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egyptian territory with the assistance of a new type of peace-keeping machinery, the United Nations peace-keeping force. The idea of such a force initially, which was to have such an impact on the work of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, came from Lester Pearson. Dag Hammarskjöld, through his untiring efforts and extraordinary diplomatic and administrative skill, made it a practical reality.

### ***Initial Stages of UNEF***

The United Nations Emergency Force was the key element in the United Nations efforts to resolve the crisis arising from the military action of the Israeli and Anglo-French forces against Egypt. It was a pre-condition for securing the ceasefire and a pre-condition for bringing about the withdrawal of the invading forces. Therefore, a priority objective of the Secretary-General, after the adoption of the enabling

resolutions, was to assemble a usable Force and land it in Egypt as rapidly as possible.

The establishment of this first peace-keeping Force in the United Nations history was a task of great complexity. The concept had no real precedent. The nearest parallel was UNTSO, which also had peacekeeping functions but was a much simpler operation and did not provide much help as regards the many organisational and operational problems involved.

Immediately after the Assembly authorized the Force, the Chief of Command, General Burns, who was in Jerusalem at the time, selected a group of UNTSO observers who began planning the organisation of the new Force. Hammarskjold approached the Governments of the potential participating countries to obtain the required military personnel. He also initiated negotiations with the Egyptian Government to secure its agreement as the host country for the entry and stationing of the Force in Egypt.

### ***Negotiations with the Egyptian Government***

A key principle governing the stationing and functioning of UNEF, and later of all other peace-keeping forces, was the consent of the host Government. Since it was not an enforcement action under, UNEF could enter and operate in Egypt only with the consent of the Egyptian Government. This principle was clearly stated by the General Assembly in adopting resolution 1001(ES-I) of 7 November 1956 concerning the establishment of UNEF.

Immediately after the adoption of that resolution, Hammarskjold instructed General Burns to approach the Egyptian authorities in Cairo in order to prepare the ground for the prompt implementation of the resolution. The Government of Egypt had already accepted the terms of resolution 1000(ES-I) on the establishment of a United Nations Command, and this was considered by the Secretary-General as an acceptance in principle of the Force itself.

However, before consenting to the arrival of the Force on its territory, Egypt wished to have certain points in the Assembly resolution clarified. In particular, it wanted to know in clearer terms the functions of the Force, especially in regard to whether, when the Force reached the Armistice Demarcation Line, the Governments concerned would agree to the areas to be occupied by it, how long the Force would stay, whether it was supposed to have functions in the Suez Canal area apart from observing the withdrawal of the Anglo-

French forces and whether it would stay in the Canal area after the Anglo-French withdrawal.

Firm assurance was given to the Egyptian authorities that cooperation with the United Nations would not infringe Egyptian sovereignty, detract from Egypt's power freely to negotiate a settlement on the Suez Canal or submit Egypt to any control from the outside. The Secretary-General impressed upon those authorities that the Force provided a guarantee for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt and that, since it would come only with Egypt's consent, it could not stay or operate in Egypt if that consent were withdrawn.

On the basis of the General Assembly's resolutions as interpreted by the Secretary-General, the Government of Egypt gave its consent on 14 November to the arrival of UNEF in Egypt and the first transport of UNEF troops took place on the next day.

While the exchange of views that had taken place was considered sufficient as a basis for the sending of the first units of UNEF to Egypt the Secretary-General felt that a firmer foundation had to be laid for the presence and functioning of the Force in Egypt and for the continued co-operation with the Egyptian authorities. He also considered it essential to discuss personally with the Egyptian authorities, at the highest level, various questions which flowed from the decision to send the Force to Egypt, including the selection of national contingents.

Hammaraskjold therefore visited Cairo from 16 to 18 November. During this visit, he reached agreement with the Egyptian Government on the composition of the Force. President Nasser had first opposed the inclusion of the Canadian, Danish and Norwegian units because they belonged to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and because, in his view, Canada and the United Kingdom were too congeneric. But on the insistence of Hammaraskjold, this opposition was withdrawn. The basic discussions centred on the stationing and functioning of the Force.

### ***The Good Faith Agreement***

On this essential matter, a "good faith agreement" was worked out and included in an *aide-memoire* which served as the basis for the stationing of UNEF in Egypt. It noted that the Assembly, by resolution 1001(ES-I) had approved the principle that the Force could not be requested "to be stationed or operate on the territory of a given country without the consent of the Government of that country". It then went on to say:

The Government of Egypt and the Secretary-General of the United Nations have stated their understanding on the basic points for the presence and functioning of UNEF as follows:

1. The Government of Egypt declares that, when exercising its sovereign rights on any matter concerning the presence and functioning of UNEF, it will be guided, in good faith, by its acceptance of General Assembly resolution 1000(ES-I) of 5 November 1956.

2. The United Nations takes note of this declaration of the Government of Egypt and declares that the activities of UNEF will be guided, in good faith, by the task established for the Force in the aforementioned resolutions; in particular, the United Nations, understanding this to correspond to the wishes of the Government of Egypt, reaffirms its willingness to maintain UNEF until its task is completed.

3. The Government of Egypt and the Secretary-General declare that it is their intention to proceed forthwith, in the light of points 1 and 2 above, to explore jointly concrete aspects of the functioning of UNEF, including its stationing and the question of its lines of communication and supply; the Government of Egypt, confirming its intention to facilitate the functioning of UNEF, and the United Nations are agreed to expedite in co-operation the implementation of guiding principles arrived at as a result of that joint exploration on the basis of the resolutions of the General Assembly.

The Secretary-General brought this *aide-memoire* to the attention of the General Assembly in a report of 20 November 1956. In so doing, he stated that.... The *aide-memoire*, if noted with approval by the General Assembly, with the concurrence of Egypt, would establish an understanding between the United Nations and Egypt on which the co-operation could be developed and necessary agreements on various details be elaborated." No-objection was raised by the Assembly in this connection.

### ***Other Hammarskjold/Nasser Memoranda and Agreements***

In addition to the good faith agreement, two other memoranda were agreed upon between Hammarskjold and President Nasser. One of them set out the understanding that the area to be occupied by UNEF after the Israeli withdrawal would be subject to agreement and that the Force would have no function in the Port Said and the Suez Canal areas after the withdrawal of the Anglo-French troops. UNEF could not stay or operate in Egypt unless Egypt continued its consent. The other memorandum specifically separated the question of the reopening of the Suez Canal from the functions of UNEF. Hammarskjold brought these memoranda to the attention of the Advisory Committee.

With these agreements, UNEF was set up. Subsequent discussions were continued between the Secretariat and the Egyptian authorities to work out more detailed and comprehensive arrangements on the status of the Force in Egypt. These arrangements were set out in a letter dated 8 February 1957 from the Secretary-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt and were accepted by the latter in his reply of the same date to the Secretary-General. This exchange of letters constituted the agreement on the status of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt which the General Assembly noted with approval in its resolution 1126(XI) of 22 February 1957.

### ***Status of the Force Agreement***

The status of the Force agreement covered a wide range of problems, including the premises of the Force and the use of the United Nations flag, freedom of movement, privileges and immunities of the Force, civil and criminal jurisdiction and settlement of disputes or claims. Two of the key provisions concerned freedom of movement and criminal jurisdiction. Members of the Force were to enjoy full freedom of movement in the performance of their duties. They were to be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national Governments in respect of any criminal offences which they might commit in Egypt.

The agreement on the status of UNEF was the first document of this kind. It provided a pattern which was followed for the subsequent peace-keeping forces in the Congo and Cyprus. No agreements of this kind could be worked out for later forces for various political reasons but the status of the Force agreement for UNEF has been used as a precedent to deal with various problems arising from the operations of UNEF II, UNDOF and UNIFIL.

### ***Negotiations with the Participating Countries***

The principles of consent applied not only to the host Government but also to the participating countries. In accordance with the principles approved by the General Assembly, the Force was to be composed of national contingents accepted for service by the Secretary-General from among those voluntarily offered by Member States. Troops from the permanent members of the Security Council or from any country which, for geographical and other reasons, might have a special interest in the conflict would be excluded. In selecting the contingents, the Secretary-General had to take due account of the views of the host Government and such other factors as their suitability in terms of the needs of the Force, their size and availability, the extent to which they would be self-contained, the undesirability of too great a variation in

ordnance and basic equipment, the problem of transportation and the goal of balanced composition.

The size of the Force was to be determined by the Commander in consultation with the Secretary-General and in the light of the functions to be performed. The original estimate by the Force Commander of the manpower needs to perform those tasks was the equivalent of two combat brigades, or about 6,000 men. It was decided that the national contingents should be sufficiently large to be relatively self-contained and that the Force should have adequate support units, including a light air-unit. From the point of view of balance, it was desirable that the differences in the size of the units should not be so great as to lead to excessive dependence on any one State.

The Secretary-General sought certain assurances from the participating countries. He pointed out that the effective functioning of UNEF required that some continuity of service of the participating units should be assured in order to enable the Force Commander to plan his operations. He also insisted that the Commander of each national contingent should take orders exclusively from the Force Commander and should be in a position to exercise the necessary disciplinary authority with the members of his contingent.

The arrangements between the United Nations and the contributing countries were expanded and set out in formal agreements in the form of an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the respective participating Governments.

By 5 November 1956, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Pakistan and Sweden had replied affirmatively. In the following days, Afghanistan, Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Laos, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, Romania and Yugoslavia also offered to provide contingents. In addition, the United States Government informed the Secretary-General that it was prepared to help as regards airlifts, shipping, transport and supplies. Italy agreed to place at the disposal of the United Nations the facilities of Capodichino Airport at Naples for the assembly and transit of UNEF personnel and equipment and to help in the airlift of personnel and equipment from Italy to Egypt. The Swiss Government, a non-member State, offered to defray part of the cost of Swissair charter planes.

### ***UNEF's Composition***

In consultation with the Force Commander and after discussions with the Government of Egypt, Hammarskjold accepted contingents

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from 10 countries: Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia. The offers of assistance from the United States, Italy and Switzerland were also accepted. With the agreement of Egypt, an air base at Abu Suweir near Ismailia was used as the central depot for the early contingents.

The extent of the area to be covered by UNEF called for highly mobile reconnaissance. This need was met by Yugoslavia, which provided a complete reconnaissance battalion. Canada later supplied a fully equipped, light-armoured squadron. Supporting units were obtained and assigned with the same urgency as those engaged in patrolling. The Indian contingent was given responsibility for the supply depot and the service institute; Canada and India provided units for transport, the Provost Marshal and signals; Norway and Canada covered the medical needs. The Canadian contingent was also made responsible for the ordnance depot and workshop, the base post office, engineering, the dental unit, movement control and air support.

General Burns and his group of UNTSO military observers arrived in Cairo on 12 November 1956 and set up a temporary headquarters there. The first UNEF units, composed of Colombians, Danes and Norwegians, flew to Egypt on 15 and 16 November. They were followed by other contingents. The target strength of about 6,000 men was reached on February 1957 after the Brazilian battalion had arrived at Port Said by sea. With the appointment of staff officers selected from the participating countries, the UNEF military observers returned to their normal duties in Jerusalem.

The Governments of Indonesia and Finland, which had agreed to participate in the Force only for a limited period, withdrew their contingents in September and December 1957, respectively. The Colombian Government withdrew its contingent in December 1958. The other contingents continued to serve with UNEF until the withdrawal of the Force in 1967. The deployment and assignment of the contingents were changed from time to time according to the requirements of the operation.

The strength of the Force remained at the authorized level of about 6,000 until the end of 1957. In the following years, it was gradually reduced because the situation in the area of operation remained quiet and also because of financial difficulties. There were 5,341 all ranks with the Force in 1960, 5,102 in 1963, 4,581 in 1965 and 3,959 in 1966. In November 1965, a survey team was sent to the area to examine the possibility of further reductions. In accordance

with its recommendations, the strength was further brought down to 3,378 at the time the Force began its withdrawal in May 1967.

### ***UNEF's Organisation***

The United Nations Emergency Force, established by the General Assembly, was a subsidiary organ of the Assembly under Article 22 of the Charter. It was directed by the Secretary-General under the general authority of the General Assembly.

The Secretary-General was authorized to issue all regulations and instructions which might be essential to the effective functioning of the Force and to take all other necessary administrative and executive actions. To assist him in these matters, Hammarskjold set up an informal military group at headquarters composed of military representatives of participating countries and headed by his military adviser—Major-General I.A.E. Martola of Finland, during the formative period. The Secretary-General was also assisted by the Advisory Committee established under Assembly resolution 1001(ES-I).

The command of the Force was assumed in the field by the Force Commander (originally designated as the Chief of Command), who was appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Secretary-General. The Commander was operationally responsible for the performance of all functions assigned to the Force by the United Nations and for the deployment and assignment of the troops placed at the disposal of the Force. He had direct authority for the operation of the Force and also was responsible for the provision of facilities, supplies and auxiliary services. He reported to the Secretary-General and was responsible to him. He was normally a general officer seconded by a Member State at the request of the Secretary-General, and during his assignment with the United Nations received an appointment as a senior official of the United Nations Secretariat with the rank of Assistant Secretary-General (Under-Secretary during Dag Hammarskjold's time).

The Force Commander was authorized to appoint the officers of his command in consultation with the Secretary-General. In selecting the officers, the Commander was required to give due consideration to the goal of a balanced composition and to the importance of contributions made by the participating countries. The national contingents were under the command of the contingent commanders, who were appointed by their respective Governments. These contingents remained part of their respective national armed forces

but, during their assignment to UNEF, they owed international allegiance and were placed under the operational control of the United Nations. This control was exercised through the contingent commanders, who received their instructions from the Force Commander. Changes in contingent commanders were made by the Governments of participating countries in consultation with the Force Commander.

The officers and soldiers of each contingent continued to wear their national uniforms but with United Nations insignia. The blue beret and helmet were created by Hammarskjold during the formative days of UNEF. Responsibility for disciplinary action in national contingents rested with the contingent commanders. Reports concerning disciplinary action were communicated to the Force Commander, who might consult with the contingent commanders and, if necessary, with the authorities of the participating Governments concerned.

Military police were provided by the Force Commander for all camps, establishments and other premises occupied by the Force and for such areas where the Force was deployed in the performance of its functions. Elsewhere, UNEF military police might be employed in so far as such employment was necessary to maintain discipline and order among members of the Force, subject to arrangements with the authorities of the host country and in liaison with those authorities.

## **B. Ceasefire and withdrawal of Foreign Forces**

### ***Establishment of the Ceasefire***

The first objective of Secretary-General Hammarskjold was to secure a ceasefire in accordance with the call of the General Assembly contained in resolution 997(ES-I) of 2 November 1956.

During the meeting at which this resolution was adopted, the representative of Israel stated that his Government agreed to an immediate ceasefire, provided that a similar answer was forthcoming from Egypt. On the same day, the Egyptian Government informed the Secretary-General that it would accept the call for a ceasefire on the condition that military actions against Egypt were stopped. The Secretary-General immediately notified Israel, France and the United Kingdom of Egypt's position and called upon all four parties to bring hostilities to an end.

On 4 November, Hammarskjold requested all four parties concerned to bring to a halt all hostile military action by 2400 hours GMT on the

same day. In identical messages addressed to the Governments of France and the United Kingdom, he pointed out that in the light of the replies received from Egypt and Israel, it was obvious that the positions of France and the United Kingdom would determine whether or not it would be possible to achieve a ceasefire between Egypt and Israel. He urged the two Governments to give him a definitive acceptance on his ceasefire call at the earliest possible moment. On 5 November, France and the United Kingdom informed the Secretary-General that as soon as the Governments of Egypt and Israel signified acceptance of, and the United Nations endorsed a plan for an international force with the prescribed functions, they would cease all military action.

Later in the day, the British representative announced that a ceasefire had been ordered at Port Said. Orders had also been given to cease all bombing forthwith throughout Egypt, and other forms of air action would be limited to the support of any necessary operation in the Canal area. Also on the same day, Egypt accepted the Secretary-General's request for a ceasefire without any attached conditions and Israel informed the Secretary-General that in the light of Egypt's declaration, it confirmed its readiness to agree to a ceasefire.

In an *aide-memoire* dated 5 November, the Secretary-General informed France and the United Kingdom that, since on that date the General Assembly had taken a decisive step towards setting up the international Force by establishing a United Nations Command, and since Egypt and Israel had agreed, without conditions, to a ceasefire, the conditions for a general ceasefire would seem to be established.

In their replies of 6 November, the two Governments announced that their forces were being ordered to cease fire at midnight GMT on the same day, pending confirmation that Egypt and Israel had accepted an unconditional ceasefire and that there would be a United Nations Force competent to secure and supervise the attainment of the objectives of resolution 997(ES-I). The Secretary-General promptly informed Egypt and Israel that the ceasefire would become effective at midnight. He noted that the Assembly had not made the ceasefire dependent on the creation or the functioning of UNEF, since its call for a ceasefire and its decision to establish the Force were in separate resolutions.

The ceasefire was established at midnight GMT on 7/8 November and, except for isolated incidents, generally held.

### ***Withdrawal of the Anglo-French Force***

At the same time as the Secretary-General was taking urgent steps to set up the new Force, he was pressing France and the United Kingdom for an early withdrawal of their forces from the Port Said area. The two Governments told him that their troops would be withdrawn as soon as the proposed United Nations Force was in a position to assume effectively the tasks assigned to it and, in particular, to ensure that hostilities would not be resumed in the area.

Hammarskjöld therefore endeavoured to move the first units of UNEF to Egypt and build up its strength as rapidly as he could. But the establishment of this first United Nations peace-keeping force was not an easy job, and it took time to obtain the required units from the various contributing countries, transport them to the area of operations and make them fully operational. The first units from the Colombian, Danish and Norwegian contingents arrived in the area on 15 and 16 November and were immediately deployed in the Suez Canal area.

On 24 November, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1120(XI), by which it noted with regret that two thirds of the French forces and all of the British forces remained in Egypt, and it reiterated its call to the British and French Governments for the immediate withdrawal of their forces.

In messages dated 3 December, the British and French Governments noted that an effective United Nations Force was currently arriving in Egypt, that the Secretary-General had accepted the responsibility for organising the task of clearing the Suez Canal as expeditiously as possible, that free and secure transit would be re-established through the Canal when it was cleared and that the Secretary-General would promote as quickly as possible negotiations with regard to the future regime of the Canal on the basis of the six requirements set out in the Security Council's resolution 118(1956) of 13 October. The two Governments confirmed their decision to continue the withdrawal of their forces from the Port Said area without delay.

The Secretary-General immediately instructed General Burns to get in touch with the Anglo-French Commander and work out with him arrangements for the complete withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces without delay, ensuring that UNEF would be in a position to assume its responsibilities in the Port Said area by the middle of December.

On 22 December, the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces was completed and UNEF took over the Port Said area.

***Initial Withdrawal of the Israeli Forces: November 1956—  
Mid-January 1957***

The negotiations undertaken by Hammarskjöld to achieve the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces required nearly two months; those regarding the withdrawal of Israeli forces took much longer. By resolution 997(ES-I) of 2 November 1956, the General Assembly had urged the parties to the Armistice Agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across those lines into neighbouring territory and to observe scrupulously the Armistice Agreements. In resolution 1002(ES-I) of 7 November, the Assembly, after noting its decision to establish a United Nations Command for an international force, called once again upon Israel immediately to withdraw its forces behind the armistice lines.

On 7 November, the Prime Minister of Israel, David Ben Gurion, in a statement to the Israeli Knesset (Parliament), stated that the armistice lines between Egypt and Israel had no validity and that "on no account will Israel agree to the stationing of a foreign force, no matter how called, in her territory, or in any of the areas occupied by her". On hearing of this statement, the Secretary-General immediately wrote to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, Golda Meir, to inform her that this position was in violation of the resolutions of the General Assembly and, if maintained, would seriously complicate the task of giving effect to those resolutions.

On 21 November, in reply to queries by the Secretary-General, the Government of Israel stated that there had already been a withdrawal of its forces for varying distances along the entire Egyptian frontier. It reiterated its position regarding the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and indicated that the satisfactory arrangements it sought were such as would ensure Israel's security against the recurrence of the threat or danger of attack and against acts of belligerency by land or sea. Noting that it had not yet had an opportunity to discuss the question of satisfactory arrangements be made with the United Nations in connection with UNEF, it stated that it was awaiting information on the proposed size, location and stationing arrangements of the Force and on the methods proposed for the discharge of its functions/as laid down in the General Assembly's resolutions of 2, 5 and 7 November. It was also awaiting a clarification by Egypt on its policy and intention with respect to belligerency or peace with Israel which must influence Israel's dispositions on matters affecting its security.

At a meeting held on 24 November, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1120(XI) by which, after noting that the Israeli forces had

not yet been withdrawn behind the armistice lines, reiterated its call to Israel to comply forthwith with its resolution. On the same day, the representative of Israel informed the Secretary-General that the equivalent of two infantry brigades had been withdrawn from Egyptian territory into Israel.

In a letter dated 1 December, the representative of Israel advised the Secretary-General that on the morning of 3 December, Israeli forces would be removed from a wide belt of territory (about 50 kilometres) in proximity to the Suez Canal along its entire length. Elements of UNEF immediately entered the evacuated area, although progress in this process was slowed down because of minefields and destroyed roads. On 11 December, Israel announced that it was ready to effect further withdrawal of troops in the Sinai peninsula in order to enable UNEF to extend its occupation eastward.

General Burns met with General Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Commander, on the morning of 16 December. They agreed on specific arrangements for a first phase of withdrawal, and UNEF troops moved forward to within five kilometres of new Israeli positions.

Regarding further withdrawals, General Dayan informed the UNEF Commander that according to his instructions, the Israeli forces were to withdraw from the remainder of the Sinai at an approximate rate of 25 kilometres each week during the next four weeks. This plan was considered by General Burns to be inadequate. Consequently, at his request, a new withdrawal proposal was submitted by the Israeli Government on 21 December. The new proposal envisaged that the remaining Israeli withdrawal would take place in two phases. The second phase would involve a full Israeli withdrawal behind the armistice lines at an unstated date.

In accordance with this proposal, a further withdrawal of Israeli forces took place on 7 and 8 January 1957 to a north-south line roughly following meridian 33 degrees, 44 minutes, leaving no Israeli forces west of El Arish. On 15 January, the Israeli forces withdrew eastward another 25 to 30 kilometres, except in the area of Sharm el Sheikh. This phase involved the entry into El Arish and St. Catherine's Monastery of the United Nations Emergency Force, which had closely followed the withdrawing Israeli troops.

### ***Sharm el Sheikh and the Gaza Strip***

A day earlier, on 14 January, the Government of Israel had informed the Secretary-General that by 22 January the Sinai Desert would be

entirely evacuated by Israeli forces with the exception of the Sharm el Sheikh area, that is "the strip on the western coast of the Gulf of Aqaba which at present ensures freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tiran and in the Gulf". Reporting on this matter to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General stated that under the terms of the Assembly's resolution, the Israeli forces should be withdrawn also from that area.

In this connection, he observed that the international significance of the Gulf of Aqaba might be considered to justify the right of innocent passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf in accordance with recognized rules of international law. He did not consider that a discussion of the various aspects of this matter and its possible relation to the action requested in the General Assembly on the Middle East crisis fell within the mandate established for him in resolution 999(ES-I) of 4 November. Like the ceasefire, withdrawal was a preliminary and essential phase in the process through which a viable basis might be laid for peaceful conditions in the area. The General Assembly, in giving high priority to the ceasefire and withdrawal, in no way disregarded all the other aims which must be achieved in order to create more satisfactory conditions than those prevailing during the period preceding the crisis. The basic function of UNEF, which was to help maintain quiet, gave the Force great value as a background for efforts towards resolving such pending problems, although it was not in itself a means to that end.

On 19 January 1957, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1123(XI) by which, after recalling its resolutions of 2, 4, 7 and 24 November 1956, requested the Secretary-General "to continue his efforts for securing the complete withdrawal of Israel in pursuance of the above-mentioned resolutions, and to report on such completion to the General Assembly, within five days".

In pursuance of that resolution, Hammarskjöld held further discussions with Israeli representatives on 20 and 23 January. On 23 January, Israel presented its views in an *aide-memoire* on the Israeli position on the Sharm el Sheikh area and the Gaza Strip. Its position on each of the two areas was:

- (a) For the Sharm el Sheikh area, Israel's aim was the simultaneous reconciliation of two objectives: the withdrawal of Israeli forces from that area and the guaranteeing of permanent freedom of navigation by the prevention of belligerence. In this matter, Egyptian compliance with the decision of the Security Council—

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resolution 95(1951) of 1 September 1951—had a legal and chronological priority over Israel's duty to fulfil recommendations in which Egypt had an interest. Accordingly, Israel formally requested the Secretary-General to ascertain Egypt's intentions with respect to the Council's 1951 resolution concerning the Suez Canal.

- (b) For the Gaza Strip, Israel, after questioning the legality of the Egyptian occupation of Gaza from 1948 to 1956 and criticising its actions during this period, proposed a plan under which the Israeli military forces would be withdrawn but an Israeli civilian administration would remain to deal with security and administrative matters; the United Nations Emergency Force would not enter and be deployed in the Gaza area, but Israel would co-operate with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East regarding the care and maintenance of the refugees in the area. In this connection, Israel was ready to work out with the United Nations a suitable relationship with respect to the Gaza Strip.

The position of the Secretary-General was set out in his report of 24 January 1957:

- In connection with the question of Israeli withdrawal from the Sharm el Sheikh area, attention had been directed to the situation in the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. This problem was of longer duration and was not directly related to the current crisis. It followed from principles guiding the United Nations that the Israeli military action and its consequences should not be elements influencing the solution of this problem. The Secretary-General concluded that upon the withdrawal of the Israeli forces, UNEF would have to follow them in the same way as it had in other parts of the Sinai, its movements being determined by its duties in respect of the ceasefire and the withdrawal. In accordance with the general legal principles recognized as decisive for the deployment of the Force, UNEF should not be used in such a way as to prejudice the solution of the controversial questions involved.
- Regarding the status of Gaza, the United Nations could not recognise a change of the *de facto* situation created under the Armistice Agreement, by which the administration and security in the Strip were left in the hands of Egypt, unless the change was brought about through settlement between the parties. Nor could it lend its assistance to the maintenance of a *de facto*

situation contrary to the one created by the Agreement. These considerations excluded the United Nations from accepting Israeli control over the area even if it were of a non-military character. Deployment of UNEF in Gaza under the resolutions the General Assembly would have to be on the same basis as its deployment along the Armistice Demarcation Line and in the Sinai peninsula. Any broader function for it in that area, in view of the terms of the Armistice Agreement and a recognized principle of international law, would require the consent of Egypt.

### ***Second Withdrawal of Israeli Forces: February 1957***

On 2 February 1957, the General Assembly, after receiving the Secretary-General's report, adopted two resolutions.

By resolution 1124(XI), it deplored the failure of Israel to complete its withdrawal behind the Armistice Demarcation Line and called upon it to do so without delay. By resolution 1125(XI), the Assembly recognising that withdrawal by Israel must be followed by action which would assure progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions, called upon Egypt and Israel scrupulously to observe the provisions of the 1949 General Armistice Agreement and considered that "after full withdrawal of Israel from the Sharm el Sheikh and the Gaza areas, the scrupulous maintenance of the Armistice Agreement requires the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Demarcation Line and the implementation of other measures as proposed in the Secretary-General's report, with due regard to the considerations set out therein with a view to assist in achieving situations conducive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area." The General Assembly further requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties concerned, to take steps to carry out these measures and to report to it as appropriate.

On 4 February, the Secretary-General met with the representative of Israel to discuss implementation of the Assembly's resolutions. Israel presented to him an *aide-memoire* in which it raised two points. First, it requested the Secretary-General to ask the Government of Egypt whether Egypt agreed "to the mutual and full abstention from belligerent acts, by land, air and sea, on withdrawal of Israeli troops". Secondly, Israel sought clarification as to whether "immediately on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sharm el Sheikh area, units of the United Nations Emergency Force will be stationed along the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba in order to act as a restraint against hostile acts, and will remain so deployed until another effective

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means is agreed upon between the parties concerned for ensuring permanent freedom of navigation and the absence of belligerent acts in the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.”

During the same meeting, the Secretary-General asked whether, with regard to Gaza, it was understood by the Government of Israel that the withdrawal had to cover elements of civilian administration as well as military troops. Hammarskjöld considered a clarification on this point to be a prerequisite to further consideration of the Israeli *aide-memoire*. There was, in his view, an unavoidable connection between Israel's willingness to comply fully with General Assembly resolution 1124(XI) as concerned the Gaza Strip and what might be done towards maintaining quiet in the Sharm el Sheikh area, and it was unrealistic to assume that the latter question could be solved while Israel remained in Gaza.

With regard to the second point raised by Israel, the Secretary-General noted that the debate in the General Assembly and the report on which it was based made it clear that the stationing of the United Nations Emergency Force at Sharm el Sheikh would require Egyptian consent. In the light of this implication of Israel's question, the Secretary-General considered it important, as a basis for his consideration of the *aide-memoire*, to learn whether Israel itself consented in principle to the stationing of UNEF units on its territory in implementation of the functions established for the force by the Assembly's resolutions and, in particular, its resolution 1125(XI) where it was indicated that the Force should be placed on the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Demarcation Line.

This meeting was followed by an exchange of communications between the Secretary-General and the representative of Israel, and a meeting between them was held on 10 February. But these were all inconclusive, as each side wanted to receive the clarifications it had sought before replying to the questions addressed to it. In this connection, the Secretary-General stated that the fact that Israel had not found it possible to clarify elements decisive for the consideration of its requests had complicated the efforts to achieve implementation of the Assembly's resolutions.

In reporting on this matter to the General Assembly on 11 February, the Secretary-General commented that the relationship between resolution 1124(XI) on withdrawal and resolution 1125(XI) on measures to be carried out after withdrawal afforded the possibility of informal explorations of the whole field covered by these two resolutions,

preparatory to negotiations. Later, the results of such explorations might be used in the negotiations through a constructive combination of measures, representing for the two countries parallel progress towards the peaceful conditions sought. However, such explorations could not be permitted to invert the sequence between withdrawal and other measures, nor to disrupt the evolution of negotiations towards their goal. Progress towards peaceful conditions, following the general policy suggested in the last report of the Secretary-General, on which General Assembly resolution 1125(XI) was based, had to be achieved gradually.

### ***Final Withdrawal of Israeli Forces: March 1957***

In concluding his report, the Secretary-General stated that, in the situation now facing the United Nations, the General Assembly, as a matter of priority, might wish to indicate how it wished him to proceed with further steps to carry out its decisions.

The Assembly did not adopt any further resolution on this matter after the Secretary-General's report, but the Israeli Government eventually softened its position on the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, although it maintained its denunciation of the 1949 General Armistice Agreement with Egypt and continued to oppose the stationing of the United Nations Emergency Force on its side of the Armistice Demarcation Line.

On 1 March, the Foreign Minister of Israel announced in the General Assembly the decision of her Government to act in compliance with the request contained in Assembly resolution 1124(XI) to withdraw behind the Armistice Demarcation Line.

The same day, the Secretary-General instructed the Commander of UNEF as a matter of utmost urgency to arrange for a meeting with the Commander-in-Chief of the Israeli forces in order to agree with him on arrangements for the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Israel in accordance with the Assembly's decision.

On 4 March, the declaration of 1 March was confirmed by the Israeli Government. The same day, General Burns met at Lydda with General Dayan. Technical arrangements were agreed upon for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and the entry of UNEF troops in to the Gaza Strip during the hours of curfew on the night of 6/7 March. Agreement was also reached for a similar takeover of the Sharm el Sheikh area on 8 March.

On 6 March, General Burns reported that UNEF troops were in position in all camps and centres of population in the Gaza Strip. The operation was carried out according to plan and without incident. By 0400 hours GMT, all Israelis had withdrawn from the Strip with the exception of an Israeli troop unit at Rafah Camp. By agreement, that last Israeli element was to be withdrawn at 1600 hours GMT on 8 March and full withdrawal from the Sharm el Sheikh area would be effected at the same time. These withdrawals took place as agreed and thus the Secretary-General was able to report to the General Assembly on 8 March 1957 full compliance with its resolution 1124(XI) of 2 February 1957.

### **C. UNEF Deployment**

#### ***Deployment Along the Armistice Demarcation Line***

In its resolution 1125(XI), on measures to be taken after the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Egyptian territory, the General Assembly called upon the Governments of Egypt and Israel to observe scrupulously the provisions of the 1949 General Armistice Agreement and considered that, after full withdrawal of Israel from the Sharm el Sheikh and Gaza areas, "the scrupulous maintenance of the Armistice Agreement requires the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line".

On 11 February 1957, the Secretary-General reported to the Assembly that Egypt had reaffirmed its intent to observe fully the provisions of the Armistice Agreement to which it was a party, on the assumption that observance would be reciprocal. The Secretary-General drew attention to the desire expressed by Egypt to see an end to all raids and incursions across the Armistice Line in both directions, with effective assistance from United Nations auxiliary organs to that effect.

Israel maintained its denunciation of the Armistice Agreement. In a letter of 25 January, the representative of Israel had stated that "Israel does not claim that the absence of an armistice agreement means the existence of a state of war with Egypt, even though Egypt insisted on the existence of a state of war even when the Agreement was in existence. Israel is prepared to confirm its position on this by signing immediately with Egypt an agreement of non-belligerency and mutual non-aggression, but the Agreement, violated and broken, is beyond repair".

The Secretary-General did not accept Israel's denunciation as valid, as there was no provision in the 1949 Agreement for unilateral

termination of its application. Consequently the machinery for the supervision of the Armistice Agreement was maintained by UNTSO.

In his report of 8 March 1957, the Secretary-General informed the General Assembly that arrangements would be made through which, without any change in the legal structure or status of UNTSO, its functions in the Gaza area would be placed under the operational control of UNEF. Close co-operation between the two United Nations peace-keeping operations was maintained.

Regarding the placing of UNEF along the Armistice Demarcation Line, the Secretary-General interpreted this as requiring the deployment of the Force on both sides of the Line. The Egyptian Government had consented to the deployment of UNEF on its territory along the Line as well as in the Sharm el Sheikh area on the basis of the "good faith agreement" set out in the *aide-memoire* of November 1956 (*see above*). At the beginning of February 1957, the Secretary-General had sought clarification from Israel as to whether, as a question of principle, it agreed to the stationing of UNEF units on its side of the Armistice Demarcation Line. No clarification was obtained and, in a letter dated 6 February to the representative of Israel, the Secretary-General said he assumed that, at least for the present, Israel's reply to this question was essentially negative. In view of the Israeli position, UNEF could be deployed only on the Egyptian side.

As of 8 March 1957, UNEF was deployed along the western side of the Armistice Demarcation Line along the Gaza Strip, the international frontier between the Sinai and Egypt, as well as in the Sharm el Sheikh area.

### ***Phases of Deployment and Activities***

UNEF began operating in Egypt on 12 November 1956, when the Force Commander and a group of military observers detached from UNTSO set up a temporary headquarters in Cairo. It was withdrawn ten-and-a-half years later, on 18 May 1967, at the request of the Egyptian Government. The operation of the Force during this period may be divided into four phases: The first phase, which extended from mid-November to late December 1956, was centred on the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces from the Port Said area. The second, from that time to early March 1957, concerned the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Sinai peninsula, except the Gaza Strip and the Sharm el Sheikh area. The third, in March, related to those areas. The fourth and last phase, which began with the deployment of UNEF along the

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borders between Egypt and Israel, covered a period of more than 10 years from March 1957 until May 1967, during which time the Force effectively maintained peace in those sensitive areas.

***First Phase: Suez Canal Area (November-December 1956)***

When UNEF became operational in mid-November 1956, the ceasefire had been achieved and was generally holding. The Anglo-French forces were occupying the Port Said area including Port Fuad in the northern end of the Suez Canal. The Israeli forces were deployed west of the Canal about 10 kilometres from it. The Secretary-General was actively negotiating with the three Governments concerned and pressing for the early withdrawal of their forces from Egyptian soil.

The objectives of UNEF were to supervise the cessation of hostilities and to assist in the withdrawal process once agreement was reached on this matter. Shortly after its arrival in Egypt, UNEF was interposed between the Anglo-French and the Egyptian forces, occupying a buffer zone. All incidents involving the ceasefire were reported to the proper authorities, who were urged to prevent recurrences. No provisions had been made for the establishment of joint machinery whereby incidents could be examined and discussed. UNEF's role was limited to investigating, reporting and, if warranted, protesting to the relevant authorities.

By arrangements with the Anglo-French forces, units of UNEF entered Port Said and Port Fuad and took responsibility for maintaining law and order in certain areas, in co-operation with the local authorities. The Force also undertook guard duty of some vulnerable installations and other points.

In the period of transition, when the Anglo-French forces were preparing to leave and during the withdrawal process, UNEF undertook certain essential administrative functions such as security and the protection of public and private property, with the co-operation of the Governor and the Police Inspector in Port Said. With the sanction of the local authorities, UNEF personnel also performed administrative functions with respect to public services, utilities and arrangements for the provisioning of the local population with foodstuffs, and exercised limited powers of detention. All administrative and policing responsibilities were turned over to the Egyptian authorities the day following the Anglo-French evacuation.

Other tasks of the Force included clearing minefields in the Suez Canal area and arranging for exchanges of prisoners and detainees

between the Egyptian Government and the Anglo-French command. In the last stage of the withdrawal of the Anglo-French troops from Port Said and Port Fuad, UNEF units were stationed around the final perimeter of the zone occupied by the withdrawing forces, thus preventing clashes between them and the Egyptian troops.

### ***Second Phase: Sinai Peninsula (December 1956-March 1957)***

After the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces, UNEF concentrated its efforts on maintaining the ceasefire between the Egyptian and Israeli forces and on arranging for Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian-controlled territory.

The Israeli forces withdrew from the Sinai peninsula, with the exception of the Gaza and the Sharm el Sheikh areas, in three stages: on 3 December 1956, on 7 and 8 January 1957 and from 15 to 22 January 1957.

On the whole, the functions performed by UNEF in the Sinai were similar to those undertaken in the Canal area. The Force was interposed between the Egyptian and Israeli forces in a temporary buffer zone from 3 December onwards, moving eastbound as the Israeli forces withdrew, and in accordance with pre-arranged procedures.

During the successive stages of the Israeli withdrawal, UNEF temporarily undertook some local civic responsibilities, including security functions in a few inhabited areas, handing over such responsibilities to the Egyptian civilian authorities as soon as they returned to their posts. The Force also arranged and carried out exchanges of prisoners of war between Egypt and Israel and discharged certain investigatory functions. It cleared minefields in the Sinai and repaired portions of damaged roads and tracks crossing the peninsula.

### ***Third phase: Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh (March 1957)***

After 22 January 1957, Israel held on to the last two areas it still occupied. The persistent negotiations to ensure withdrawal are described above. The withdrawal from the Gaza Strip took place on 6 and 7 March 1957 and that from the Sharm el Sheikh area from 8 to 12 March.

In accordance with the arrangements agreed to by the Egyptian Government, a UNEF detachment was stationed in Sharm el Sheikh following the withdrawal of the Israeli forces. This detachment maintained an observation post and kept the Strait of Tiran under constant watch.

In the Gaza Strip, two local conditions were of special concern to UNEF as it moved into the area. It was across the Armistice Demarcation Line along the Strip that the greatest number of infiltrations and raids had occurred during past years and there were in the area a large number of Palestinian Arab refugees, who were being assisted by UNRWA.

UNEF units entered the Gaza Strip on 6 March as the withdrawal of Israeli forces began. As a first step, arrangements were made between the Force Commander and the Israeli authorities for the United Nations to assume its responsibilities in the Strip as the Israeli troops and civil administrators withdrew.

On 7 March, General Burns notified the population of Gaza that UNEF, acting in fulfilment of its functions as determined by the General Assembly and with the consent of the Government of Egypt, was being deployed in the area for the purpose of maintaining quiet during and after the withdrawal of the Israeli forces. He also announced that until further arrangements were made, UNEF had assumed responsibility for civil affairs in the area and that UNRWA would continue to provide food and other services as in the past.

The involvement of UNEF in civil administration was of a purely temporary nature, pending the re-establishment of local civilian authority. In this connection, UNEF co-operated closely with UNRWA in meeting the needs of the local population. The operation of the Force during this initial period was greatly facilitated by the presence in Gaza of an important branch of UNRWA and by the fact that the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission had its headquarters in Gaza and made available to the Force its personnel and its communications facilities.

### ***Final Phase: Deployment Along the Borders (March 1957-May 1967)***

After the completion of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Egyptian territory, the main objective of UNEF was to supervise the cessation of hostilities between Egypt and Israel. Its basic functions were to act as an informal buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces along the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) and the international frontier in order to avoid incidents, prevent illegal crossings of the Line by civilians of either side for whatever purposes, and to observe and report on all violations of the Line whether on land, sea or in the air.

To perform these functions, UNEF troops were deployed on the western side of the ADL and the international frontier, covering a distance of 273 kilometres. The Sinai coast from the northern end of the Gulf of Aqaba to the Strait of Tiran, a further distance of 187 kilometres, was kept under observation by UNEF air reconnaissance. As indicated earlier, a UNEF detachment was stationed at Sharm el Sheikh near the Strait of Tiran.

By day, the entire length of the ADL (about 59 kilometres) was kept under observation by some 72 intervisible observation posts. Each post was manned during daylight hours; by night, the sentries were withdrawn and replaced by patrols of five to seven men each. The patrols moved on foot, covering the length of the ADL on an average of three rounds each night and giving particular attention to roads likely to be used by infiltrators. Platoon camps were set up to the rear of the posts, each holding a reserve detachment available to go to the aid of an observation post or patrol should the need arise. Telephone communications by day and a system of flare signals, supplemented by wireless, at night ensured a speedy response to calls for help.

Along the international frontier, rough terrain and scattered minefields restricted the access roads for potential infiltrators, who tended to confine their activities to certain areas. These sensitive areas were covered by a system of patrols. Eight outposts were established along the frontier. Motor patrols from these outposts covered the areas between the outposts and certain tracks. In addition to ground observers, the entire length of the international frontier was also patrolled by air reconnaissance planes on a daily basis, later reduced to three times a week. Any suspicious activity seen from the air could be checked by ground patrols dispatched from the outposts.

To prevent infiltration and incidents, UNEF secured the cooperation of the Egyptian authorities. The inhabitants of Gaza were officially informed that the Government of Egypt, as a matter of policy, was opposed to infiltration across the Armistice Demarcation Line. They were notified that they were forbidden to approach the ADL within 50 to 100 metres by day and 500 metres by night. The police in Gaza were instructed to take effective measures to find persons responsible for laying mines and for other incidents and to prevent recurrences. The local Palestinian police also co-operated with UNEF in preventing infiltrations. UNEF was authorized to apprehend infiltrators and persons approaching the ADL in suspicious circumstances. In practice, this applied to a zone extending up to 500 metres from the line. The

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persons so apprehended were interrogated by UNEF and then were handed over to the local police

In the performance of their duties, UNEF soldiers were not authorized to use force except in self-defence, they were never to take the initiative in the use of force, but could respond with fire to an armed attack upon them, even though this might result from a refusal on their part to obey an order from the attacking party not to resist. UNEF maintained close liaison with the two parties, particularly with the Egyptian authorities as representatives of the host Government,

UNEF enjoyed full freedom of movement in the Gaza Strip and between the Sinai posts, UNEF headquarters and the units deployed along the Armistice Demarcation Line. This included freedom of flight over the Sinai peninsula and the Gaza Strip for UNEF aircraft, as well as the manning of the Gaza airport by UNEF.

The deployment of UNEF along the ADL raised a question of the respective responsibilities of the Force and UNTSO. As indicated earlier, Israel denounced the General Armistice Agreement with Egypt in early November 1956, but the United Nations did not accept this unilateral action. Therefore, the Chairman of the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission and the UNTSO military observers had remained at their posts throughout the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and afterwards. Upon the withdrawal of the Israeli forces, the Secretary-General, as a practical arrangement and without any change in the legal status of the Mixed Armistice Commission, placed the UNTSO personnel assigned to EMIAC under the operational control of the Commander of UNES. In view of its position with respect to the General Armistice Agreement, the Government of Israel lodged its complaints of violations of the ADL only with UNEF, but the Force maintained that official investigations of incidents should be carried out through the Armistice Commission. In practice, problems arising between Israel and the United Nations relating to matters covered by the General Armistice Agreement were resolved in a practical way, with UNEF taking over some of the duties previously performed by UNTSO.

The activities carried out by UNEF following its deployment along the Armistice Demarcation Line and the international frontier, and the methods followed in this connection, remained virtually unchanged until the withdrawal of the Force in May 1967. Its area of operations, which had been one of the most disturbed areas in the Middle East, became remarkably quiet. Incidents, such as crossings of the ADL/

international frontier, firing across the Line and air violations, naturally continued to occur, but they were relatively infrequent and generally of a minor nature. Virtually uninterrupted peace prevailed in the area, thanks to the presence and activities of UNEF.

### ***UNEF Withdrawal, 1967***

While quiet prevailed along the Egyptian-Israeli borders after November 1956, there was continued tension in other sectors of the Middle East, particularly on the Israel-Jordan and Israel-Syria fronts. After the creation, in 1964, of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and its main group, El Fatah, there appeared to be a new level of organisation and training of Palestinian commandos. Palestinian raids against Israel, conducted mainly from Jordanian and Syrian territory, became a regular occurrence, and the Israeli forces reacted with increasingly violent retaliation. There was a marked contrast between the quiet along the Egyptian border and the confrontation situation in other sectors.

In early 1967, tension between Israel and Syria again reached a critical level, mainly because of disputes over cultivation rights in the demilitarized zone near Lake Tiberias. For years, Syria complained that Israelis were illegally seizing lands belonging to Arab Palestinians in the demilitarized zone, and the cultivation of disputed land had led to frequent firing incidents between Israeli and Syrian forces. Efforts within the Mixed Armistice Commission failed. On 7 April 1967, an exchange of fire across disputed farmland led to heavy shelling of Israeli villages by Syrian artillery and intensive air attacks by Israel against Syrian targets—the most serious clash since 1956. The incidents of 7 April were followed by a heightening of tension in the entire region, despite appeals by Secretary-General U Thant for restraint, and the moderating efforts of UNTSO.

In the evening of 16 May, the UNEF Commander received a request from the Egyptian Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces for withdrawal of “all UN troops which installed OP’s [observation posts] along our borders.” The general who handed the message to the Force Commander told him that UNEF must order immediate withdrawal from El Sabha and Sharm el Sheikh, commanding the Strait of Tiran and therefore access to the Red Sea and southern Israel. The UNEF Commander replied that he did not have authority to do that. The Secretary-General, on being informed, gave instructions to the Commander to “be firm in maintaining UNEF positions while being as understanding and as diplomatic as possible in your relations with

local UAR (United Arab Republic] officials". While the Secretary-General sought clarifications from Cairo, Egyptian troops moved onto UNEF's line, occupying some United Nations posts.

The Secretary-General met with members of the UNEF Advisory Committee and told them of the events in the field, making it known that if a formal request for UNEF's withdrawal came from the Egyptian Government he would have to comply. He pointed out that the Force was on Egyptian territory only with the consent of the Government and could not remain there without it. He also consulted members of the Security Council. The various meetings held by the Secretary-General showed that within the United Nations there was a deep division among the membership of the Advisory Committee and the Security Council on the course of action to be followed. After consulting the Advisory Committee, the Secretary-General informed the representative of Egypt that while he did not question in any sense Egypt's authority to deploy its troops as it saw fit on its own territory, the deployment of Egyptian troops in areas where UNEF troops were stationed might have very serious implications for UNEF and its continued presence in the area.

In the mean time, the Egyptian Foreign Minister in Cairo summoned representatives of nations with troops in UNEF to inform them that UNEF had terminated its tasks in Egypt and the Gaza Strip and must depart forthwith. The Governments of India and Yugoslavia decided that, whatever the decision of the Secretary-General, they would withdraw their contingents from UNEF. The same day, 18 May, Egyptian soldiers prevented UNEF troops from entering their posts.

While these activities were taking place, the Secretary-General raised with the Israeli Government the question of stationing UNEF on the Israeli side of the Line, thus maintaining the buffer, but this was declared entirely unacceptable to Israel. Shortly thereafter, the Permanent Representative of Egypt delivered a message to the Secretary-General stating his Government's decision to terminate UNEF's presence in the territory of Egypt and the Gaza Strip and requesting steps for withdrawal as soon as possible. The Secretary-General informed contributing countries he would report to the General Assembly and the Security Council about the events, stating it was up to Member countries to decide whether the competent organs should or could take up the matter and pursue it accordingly. He then informed Egypt that the request would be complied with, while indicating his

serious misgivings. UNEF's Commander was instructed to take the necessary action for withdrawal to begin on 19 May and end in the last days of June.

During two tense days from 16 to 18 May 1967, the Secretary-General did all he could to persuade Egypt not to request the withdrawal of UNEF and to persuade Israel to accept the Force on its side of the border. But neither Government agreed to co-operate. In such circumstances, U Thant could have brought the matter before the Security Council by invoking Article 99 of the Charter, but he chose not to do so because he knew that with the United States and the Soviet Union firmly on opposing sides of the question, no action could be taken by the Council.

The fundamental fact is that United Nations peace-keeping operations are based on the principle of consent. To maintain UNEF in Egypt against the will of the Egyptian Government, even if it had been possible to do so, which was not the case, would have created a dangerous precedent which would have deterred potential host Governments from accepting future United Nations peace-keeping operations on their soil.

In the case of UNEF, its withdrawal would not have, in itself, necessarily led to war in the area. Following an appeal by the Secretary-General, the Government of Israel made it known to U Thant that it would exercise restraint but would consider a resumption of terrorist activities along the borders, or the closure of the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping, as *casus belli*. Immediately after the withdrawal of UNEF, U Thant increased the number of UNTSO observers of the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission to provide a United Nations presence along the Armistice Demarcation Line, and he arranged to visit Cairo on 22 May to discuss with the Egyptian Government possible security arrangements along the Egyptian-Israeli borders. However, just before he arrived in Cairo, President Nasser announced the closure of the Strait of Tiran. With this decision the die was cast, and, on 5 June, full-fledged war erupted.

Some UNEF units which were awaiting repatriation were caught up in the fighting in Gaza, and 15 United Nations troops were killed. All military personnel had gone by 13 June, except for the Force Commander and a small group of staff officers who left on 17 June.

UNEF is a telling example of the importance of United Nations peace-keeping forces and their limitations. Its establishment in October 1956 put an end to a destructive war and, for more than 10 years, it

effectively maintained peace in one of the most sensitive areas of the Middle East. But in the absence of a complementary peace-making effort, the root cause of the conflict between Egypt and Israel remained unresolved. Moreover, because Israel refused to accept UNEF on its territory, the Force had to be deployed only on the Egyptian side of the border, and thus its functioning was entirely contingent upon the consent of Egypt as the host country. Once that consent was withdrawn, its operation could no longer be maintained.

## **SECOND UN EMERGENCY FORCE**

### **A. Background**

The situation in the Suez Canal sector and on the Golan Heights from June 1967 until October 1973 is described in the chapter on UNTSO, which had set up ceasefire observation operations in those areas.

On 6 October 1973, in a surprise move, Egyptian forces crossed the Canal and soon advanced beyond the UNTSO observation posts on its eastern bank, while, in a co-ordinated move, Syrian troops simultaneously attacked the Israeli positions on the Golan Heights. By 9 October, following a request by Egypt acceded to by the Security Council, United Nations observation posts on both sides of the Canal were closed and the observers withdrawn.

The Security Council met from 8 to 12 October to consider the conflict and the overall situation, but, because of the opposing positions of the major Powers, could not reach a decision. Meanwhile war raged on. By 21 October, the situation had become critical; an Israeli armoured column had crossed the Canal where it was ENGAGING EGYPTIAN FORCES and the Egyptian Third Army on the east bank was about to be cut off. The Soviet Union and the United States jointly requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council. On 22 October, the Council, on a proposal submitted jointly by the two major Powers, adopted resolution 338(1973) which called for a ceasefire and a start to implementing resolution 242(1967). The ceasefire call was confirmed in a further resolution (339(1973)) on 23 October, and the Secretary-General was requested to dispatch United Nations observers immediately.

Fighting continued, however, and President Anwar Sadat of Egypt issued direct appeals to the Soviet Union and the United States, requesting them to send American and Soviet troops to the area to

enforce the ceasefire. The United States Government was opposed to the request, but the USSR agreed. The two major Powers, in disagreement after their joint ceasefire initiative, were suddenly on a collision course, each threatening military action. It was probably the most dangerous situation confronting the world since the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.

At the request of Egypt, the Security Council was convened again on 24 October. The non-aligned members of the Council, in close cooperation with the Secretary-General, worked out a resolution calling for an increase in UNTSO observers in the area and the establishment of a new United Nations Peace-keeping force, which became the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II). The establishment and dispatch of the new peace-keeping operation effectively brought the crisis to an end.

### ***Establishment***

On 25 October 1973, on a proposal by Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia, the Security Council adopted resolution 340(1973), by which it demanded that immediate and complete ceasefire be observed and that the parties return to the positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973. The Council also requested the Secretary-General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations military observers on both sides, and decided to set up immediately under its authority a United Nations Emergency Force to be composed of personnel drawn from United Nations Member States except the permanent members of the Security Council. It requested the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on the steps taken to that effect.

Immediately after the adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council, indicating that he would deliver the requested report within the time-limit set by the Council. In the mean time, as an urgent measure and in order that the Emergency Force might reach the area of conflict as soon as possible, he proposed to arrange for units of the Austrian, Finnish and Swedish contingents serving with the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to proceed immediately to Egypt. He also proposed to appoint Major-General (later Lieutenant-General) Ensio P.H. Siilasvuo, of Finland, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, as interim Commander of the new Force and to ask him to set up a provisional headquarters in Cairo with personnel from UNTSO.

The Secretary-General requested the Council President to let him know urgently whether the proposal was acceptable to the members of the Council, adding that the proposed steps would be without prejudice to the more detailed and comprehensive report on the Emergency Force which he would submit to the Council on the next day. The President, after informally consulting the members of the Council, conveyed the Council's agreement to the Secretary-General on the same evening. This procedure would henceforth be used frequently by the Secretary-General to get the Security Council's consent when measures needed to be taken urgently.

### ***Guidelines for UNEF II***

The Secretary-General's report requested by the Council set forth proposals regarding the guidelines for the functioning of the Force as well as a plan of action for the initial stages of the operation.

The proposed principles and guidelines for the Emergency Force were as follows:

- (a) Three essential conditions must be met for the Force to be effective. Firstly, it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council. Secondly, it must operate with the full co-operation of the parties concerned. Thirdly, it must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit.
- (b) The Force would be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. The command in the field would be exercised by a Force Commander appointed by the Secretary-General with the Council's consent. The Commander would be responsible to the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General would keep the Security Council fully informed of developments relating to the functioning of the Force. All matters which could affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Force would be referred to the Council for its decision.
- (c) The Force must enjoy the freedom of movement and communication and other facilities necessary for the performance of its tasks. The Force and its personnel should be granted all relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. The Force should operate at all times separately from the armed forces of the parties concerned. Consequently, separate quarters and,

wherever desirable and feasible, buffer zones would have to be arranged with the co-operation of the parties. Appropriate agreements on the status of the Force would also have to be concluded with the parties.

- (d) The Force would be composed of a number of contingents to be provided by selected countries, upon the request of the Secretary-General. The contingents would be selected in consultation with the Security Council and with the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographical representation.
- (e) The Force would be provided with weapons of a defensive character only. It would not use force except in self-defence. Self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the Security Council's mandate. The Force would proceed on the assumption that the parties to the conflict would take all the necessary steps for compliance with the Council's decisions.
- (f) In performing its functions, the Force would act with complete impartiality and would avoid actions which could prejudice the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned.
- (g) The costs of the Force would be considered as expenses of the Organisation to be borne by the Members, as apportioned by the General Assembly.

In the same report, the Secretary-General set forth certain urgent steps to be taken. In order that UNEF II might fulfil the responsibilities entrusted to it, it was considered necessary that the Force should have a total strength in the order of 7,000. The Force would initially be stationed in the area for a period of six months, subject to extension.

The Secretary-General engaged in the necessary consultations with a number of Governments, in addition to Austria, Finland and Sweden, regarding provision of contingents of suitable size for the Force at the earliest possible time. In addition to his requests to countries to provide contingents for the Force, the Secretary-General proposed to seek logistic support as necessary from a number of other countries which might include the permanent members of the Security Council.

Finally, the Secretary-General stated that, while there were many unknown factors, the best possible preliminary estimate of cost, based upon past experience and practice, was approximately \$30 million for the Force for a six-month period.

This report was approved by the Security Council on 27 October (resolution 341(1973)). In accordance with the Secretary-General's recommendations, the Council set up the new Force—for an initial period of six months, subject to extension.

### ***Composition and Strength of the Force***

UNEF II had already begun its operations on the basis of interim arrangements approved by the Security Council. On the morning of 26 October, General Siilasvuo and his group of UNTSO military observers set up temporary headquarters in Cairo using UNTSO's liaison office. During the same afternoon, advance elements of Austrian, Finnish and Swedish troops arrived from Cyprus and were immediately deployed along the front line. They were joined a few days later by an Irish company. The four contingents were quickly reinforced, and their presence and activities effectively defused a highly explosive situation.

Having taken these emergency measures, the Secretary-General had then to secure other contingents and build up the Force to its authorized level of 7,000 all ranks. In accordance with the guidelines approved by the Security Council, the Force was to be composed of contingents from countries selected by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties and the Security Council, bearing in mind the principle of equitable geographical representation.

The question of the composition of the Force gave rise to some difficulties during the consultations with the Security Council. In view of the need to set up a working force without delay, the Secretary-General wanted to secure contingents from countries that could provide the required troops at short notice. In particular, he had planned to ask Canada to supply the logistics component, since it was, aside from the major Powers, one of the few countries which could readily do so. But the Soviet Union insisted that a Warsaw Pact country should be included in the new Force if a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation member was. After a lengthy debate held in closed session, the Security Council decided that the Secretary-General should consult with Ghana (African regional group) Indonesia and Nepal (Asian regional group), Panama and Peru (Latin American regional group), Poland (Eastern European regional group and Canada (Western European and other States group) the two last-mentioned having particular responsibility for logistic support.

In accordance with this decision, the Secretary-General held urgent consultations with the various Governments concerned with a view to obtaining the required personnel and equipment and working out

acceptable administrative and financial arrangements. As a result of these contacts, in addition to Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden, whose troops had already arrived, Canada, Ghana, Indonesia, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Poland and Senegal were asked to provide contingents.

The Secretary-General had planned to set a ceiling of 600 for each contingent. However, in view of the complexity of the logistical problems and the decision of the Security Council to divide responsibilities in this regard between Canada and Poland, whose respective military establishments were differently organized and had different equipment and weapons, the strength of the logistical support elements had to be considerably increased.

The strength of the Canadian and Polish logistics components and the division of responsibilities between them were the subject of lengthy negotiations between the military representatives of those two countries and experts from the Secretariat. After more than two weeks of such discussions, an understanding was reached. The logistics support system was to be composed of a Polish road transport unit including a maintenance element, and a Canadian service unit consisting of a supply company, a maintenance company, a movement control unit and a postal detachment. In addition, Canada would provide an aviation unit and Poland a medical unit subject to the availability of a suitable building. The Canadian contingent would have a total strength of about 1,000 and the Polish contingent about 800.

While these negotiations were going on, General Siilasvuo was pressing for the early arrival of the logistics units. He indicated that because of the difficulty of getting local supplies, it was important that the logistics facilities be set up before the arrival of additional contingents. In light of this recommendation, it was decided that the Austrian, Finnish, Irish and Swedish units which had arrived in the area at the beginning of the operation should be brought up to battalion strength as soon as possible, and operate with vehicles, stores and equipment borrowed from UNFICYP and from UNTSO.

By mid-November, advance parties of the Canadian and Polish contingents had arrived in the area and they were soon followed by the main bodies of those contingents. By the end of November, the logistics components were well established and the other contingents of UNEF II began to arrive in the area at a steady rate. By 20 February 1974, the strength of UNEF II had reached the authorized level of 7,000 (actually, 6,973). It included contingents from 12 countries: Austria (604), Canada (1,097) Finland (637), Ghana (499), Indonesia

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(550), Ireland (271), Nepal (571), Panama (406), Peru (497), Poland (822), Senegal (399), Sweden (620).

From February until May 1974, the strength of UNEF II was slightly decreased (to 6,645.), mainly because of some reduction of the Finnish, Peruvian and Swedish contingents. In May, the Irish contingent was withdrawn at the request of its Government. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 350(1974) of 31 May 1974 on the establishment of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), and the approval by the Council of interim arrangements proposed by the Secretary-General to give effect to that resolution, the Austrian and Peruvian contingents and elements of the Canadian and Polish logistics contingents (approximately 1,050 troops in all) were transferred from UNEF II to UNEF in Syria. As a result, the total strength of UNEF II decreased to 5,079 in June 1974. It was brought up to 5,527 at the end of July with the arrival of additional Canadian and Polish personnel.

The Nepalese contingent was withdrawn beginning in August 1974 and the Panamanian contingent in November 1974. The total strength of UNEF II, with contingents from seven countries, was progressively reduced to 3,987 by October 1975.

On 17 October 1975, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that, owing to the more extensive responsibilities entrusted to UNEF II under an Agreement between Egypt and Israel signed at Geneva on 4 September 1975 and the large increase in the areas of operation, additional military personnel would be needed to enable the Force to execute its new functions adequately. He proposed accordingly to reinforce each non-logistic contingent by one company (an increase of some 750 all ranks) and the Polish and Canadian logistics contingents by 50 and 36 men, respectively. He also proposed to reinforce the air unit by additional aircraft and helicopters. In accordance with the Secretary-General's request, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia and Sweden each agreed to supply an additional rifle company while Canada and Poland provided additional personnel for logistic support. After consulting the Security Council in May 1976, the Secretary-General accepted the offer of the Government of Australia to supply four helicopters with their crews and supporting personnel (45 men) to UNEF II.

The Senegalese contingent was withdrawn in May and June 1976. In a report of 18 October 1976, the Secretary-General noted that in view of the satisfactory results in operational arrangements in the

current circumstances, and in the interest of economy, there was for the time being no intention to provide for the replacement of the Senegalese contingent unless a change in the situation should make it necessary. Upon the withdrawal of the Senegalese contingent, the total strength of UNEF II was reduced to 4,174. It remained more or less at that level during the next three years. At the time of its withdrawal in July 1979, UNEF II had 4,031 personnel, and its various contingents were: Australia (46), Canada (844), Finland (522) Ghana (595), Indonesia (510); Poland (923), Sweden (591). Of this Total, 99 all ranks were assigned to UNEF II headquarters. The international civilian supporting staff of (hat headquarters numbered 160. In addition to the above, UNEF II was assisted by 120 military observers from UNTSO.

### ***Mandate Renewals***

The mandate of UNEF II which was originally approved for six months, until 24 April 1974, was subsequently renewed eight times. Each time, as the date of expiry of the mandate approached, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council on the activities of the Force during the period of the mandate. In each of those reports, the Secretary-General expressed the view that the continued presence of UNIF II in the area was essential, and he recommended, after consultations with the parties, that its mandate be extended for a further period. In each case, the Council took note of the Secretary-General's report and decided to extend the mandate of the Force accordingly. Thus, the mandate of UNEF II was extended for six months in April 1974 (resolution 346(1974)), for another six months in October (resolution 362(1974)), for three months in April 1975 (resolution 368(1975)), another three months in July (resolution 371(1975)), and for one year in October 1975 (resolution 378(1975)), in October 1976 (resolution 396(1976)) and again in October 1977 (resolution 416(1977)). In October 1978, the mandate of UNEF II was extended a last time for nine months, until 24 July 1979 (resolution 438(1978)).

The discussions and decisions of the Security Council on the extension of the mandate naturally reflected the situation on the ground and the status of the negotiations undertaken for the disengagement of the forces in the area. Following the conclusion of the first disengagement agreement, in January 1974, both sides readily agreed to have the mandate extended for a further period of six months beyond 24 April 1974. But in April and July 1975, when negotiations aimed at

the second disengagement of forces were deadlocked, Egypt declined to extend the mandate of the Force for more than three months and, in fact, consented to the extension in July 1975 only after a special appeal by the Security Council. In contrast, when the September 1975 disengagement agreement was finally concluded, both parties wanted the period of extension to be expanded to one year, and the Security Council so agreed. In October 1978, the Soviet Union, which was opposed to the Camp David accords concluded earlier that year, opposed a further extension for one year, and the Security Council finally settled for an extension period of, nine months. In July 1979, after the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, which had entered into force on 25 April 1979, the Council was unable to extend the mandate of UNEF II and decided to let it lapse.

In this connection, in his report to the Security Council of 19 July 1979, the Secretary-General noted that the original context in which UNEF II had been created and in which it had previously functioned had basically changed during the past nine months. While the Governments of Egypt and Israel had both expressed themselves in favour of an extension of the mandate of UNEF II, the Soviet Union had expressed opposition to such a course. In this regard, the Secretary-General recalled that, according to the guidelines approved by the Security Council in October 1973, all matters which might affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Force would be referred to the Council for its decision. The Secretary-General added that whatever decisions the Council might reach, he would be ready to make the necessary arrangements.

The Security Council did not extend the mandate of UNEF II, which lapsed on 24 July 1979.

### ***UNEF Command***

General Siilasvuo, who had commanded UNEF II on an interim basis during its initial period, was appointed UNEF Commander on 12 November 1973 by the Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council. In August 1975, he was assigned to the new post of Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East and was replaced as UNEF Commander by Major-General (later Lieutenant-General) Bengt Liljestrand of Sweden, who held the post until 1 December 1976. Major-General Rais Abin of Indonesia, who became Acting Force Commander on that date, was appointed UNEF Commander on 1 January 1977 and held the post until the withdrawal of the Force in 1979.

### ***Status of the Force***

In accordance with established practice, the United Nations sought to work out an agreement on the status of the Force with Egypt as the host country and also with Israel as the other party concerned. The Office of Legal Affairs of the Secretariat engaged in negotiations to this end with both countries' Permanent Missions to the United Nations.

While no special agreement could be drawn up, it was agreed that as a practical arrangement the parties would be guided by the provision of the status of the Force agreement for UNEF I as well as by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

With this understanding, the Force functioned smoothly and effectively. There were, of course, a number of organisational, operational and administrative problems. One of the main difficulties concerned the question of freedom of movement. The Israeli Government had opposed the inclusion in UNEF II of contingents from Ghana, Indonesia, Poland and Senegal on the grounds that these countries had no diplomatic relations with Israel, and it refused to extend to the personnel of their contingents freedom of movement in the areas it controlled.

The Secretary-General strongly protested against these restrictions for practical reasons and as a matter of principle. He took the position that UNEF II must function as an integrated and efficient military unit and that no differentiation should be made regarding the United Nations status of the various contingents. But despite his efforts and those of the Force Commander, the Israeli authorities maintained the restrictions, and the contingents affected had to be deployed within the United Nations buffer zones or in the Egyptian-controlled areas. The restrictions on the freedom of movement were also applied to Soviet observers attached to UNEF II.

### **B. Activities of the Force**

The terms of reference of UNEF II were to supervise the implementation of Security Council resolution 340(1973), which demanded that immediate and complete ceasefire be observed and that the parties return to the positions they had occupied at 1630 hours GMT on 22 October 1973. The Force would use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting, and in the fulfilment of its tasks it would have the co-operation of the military observers of UNTSO. UNEF II was also to co-operate with the International Committee of

the Red Cross in its humanitarian endeavours in the area. These terms of reference, which were approved by the Security Council on 27 October, remained unchanged during UNEF's entire mandate, but within this general framework the activities of the Force varied considerably over the years in the light of prevailing circumstances and of the agreements reached between the parties.

In the light of changing developments, the activities of UNEF II may be divided into four main phases.

### ***First Phase: October 1973-January 1974***

Following the establishment of UNEF II, its immediate objective was to stop the fighting and prevent all movement forward of the troops on both sides. Urgent measures also had to be taken to provide Suez city and the Egyptian Third Army trapped on the east bank of the Canal with non-military supplies.

Troops from Austria, Finland, Sweden and, later, Ireland were dispatched to the front line as soon as they arrived. They interposed themselves whenever possible between the forward positions of the opposing forces. Observation posts and check-points were set up and patrols undertaken, with the assistance of UNTSO observers, in sensitive areas. These activities were carried out in close liaison with the parties concerned. With these measures, the situation was stabilized, the ceasefire was generally observed, and there were only a few incidents, which were resolved with the assistance of UNEF II.

A meeting between high-level military representatives of Egypt and Israel took place in the presence of UNEF representatives on 27 October 1973 at kilometre-marker 109 on the Cairo-Suez road to discuss the observance of the ceasefire demanded by the Security Council, as well as various humanitarian questions. At this meeting, preliminary arrangements were also agreed upon for the dispatch of non-military supplies to the town of Suez and the Egyptian Third Army. In accordance with these arrangements, convoys of lorries driven by UNEF II personnel were organized under the supervision of the Force and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to bring supplies of a non-military nature through Israeli-held territory to Suez, and then to the Egyptian Third Army across the Canal.

These priority tasks having been met, UNEF II turned to the Security Council's demand for the return of the forces of both parties to the positions they had occupied on 22 October 1973. More meetings were held at kilometre-marker 109 to discuss this matter, together

with possible mutual disengagement and the establishment of buffer zones to be manned by UNEF II.

In the mean time, the United States Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, during visits to Egypt and Israel, succeeded in working out a preliminary agreement between the two countries for the implementation of Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973). He transmitted it on 9 November to Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, who immediately instructed General Siilasvuo to take the necessary measures and to make available his good offices, as appropriate, for carrying out the terms of that agreement. On 11 November, at kilometre-marker 101 on the Cairo-Suez road, the new site for meetings, the agreement was signed by Major-General Mohamed El-Gamasy for Egypt and by Major-General Aharon Yaariv for Israel. It was also signed by General Siilasvuo on behalf of the United Nations.

The agreement, which was to enter into force immediately, contained the following six points:

- (1) Egypt and Israel agreed to observe scrupulously the ceasefire called for by the Security Council;
- (2) both sides agreed that discussions between them would begin immediately to settle the question of the return to the 22 October positions;
- (3) the town of Suez would receive daily supplies of food, water and medicine and all wounded civilians in the town would be evacuated;
- (4) there would be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the east bank;
- (5) the Israeli check-points on the Cairo-Suez road would be replaced by United Nations check-points; and
- (6) as soon as the United Nations check-points were established on that road, there would be an exchange of all prisoners of war, including wounded.

Immediately after the signing of this agreement, the parties started discussions under the auspices of General Siilasvuo on the modalities of its implementation. These discussions continued sporadically until January 1974. Except for the provision on the return to the 22 October positions, the agreement was implemented without much difficulty.

On the morning of 15 November, the Israeli personnel at the check-points on the Cairo-Suez road were replaced by UNEF II personnel. Convoys of non-military supplies plied smoothly to and from Suez. As

these convoys had to be driven by UNEF II personnel, some 100 military drivers were supplied by the Governments of Austria, Finland and Sweden at very short notice at the request of the Secretary-General. The exchange of prisoners of war took place in mid-November with aircraft made available without cost by the Swiss Government to the International Committee of the Red Cross.

But the most important clause, which concerned the return to the 22 October positions and the separation of the opposing forces under United Nations auspices, remained unresolved despite General Siilasvuo's efforts. On 29 November, Egypt broke off the negotiations, a decision which inevitably created a heightening of tension in the area. However, thanks to the presence of UNEF II, the ceasefire continued to hold.

Until mid-November, the operations were carried out by the Austrian, Finnish, Irish and Swedish battalions. After that date, the Canadian and Polish logistics components started to arrive. These were followed by other contingents. By mid-January 1974, 10 contingents were at hand. These contingents were deployed as follows:

- The Swedish battalion had established its headquarters in Ismailia and was deployed in the northern sector, both east and west of the Suez Canal, north of the town. The battalion provided the Force Reserve and drivers for the UNEF II convoys carrying non-military supplies to the Egyptian troops on the east bank of the Canal.
- The Austrian battalion had its headquarters in Ismailia and was deployed south of that town, west of the Canal. The battalion also provided drivers for the UNEF II convoys.
- The Finnish battalion had its headquarters in Suez city, and was deployed south of the Cairo-Suez road, including the Suez city and Adabiya areas. The battalion supervised the UNEF II convoys, as well as the supply convoys for Suez city.
- The Irish battalion, with headquarters in Rabah, was deployed in the northern sector east of the Suez Canal in the Qantara area.
- The Peruvian battalion, with headquarters in Rabah, was carrying out reconnaissance of its future positions, which would be located in the central sector east of the Suez Canal, south of the Irish battalion's area of responsibility.
- The Panamanian battalion, also with headquarters in Rabah, was carrying out reconnaissance of its future positions, which

would be located in the southern sector east of the Suez Canal, south of the Peruvian battalion's area of responsibility.

- The Indonesian battalion was to be deployed west of the Canal with base camp at Ismailia.
- The Senegalese battalion had not yet arrived except for an advance party which was carrying out reconnaissance for future operational assignment.
- The Canadian logistic support unit, with base camp in Cairo, provided supply, maintenance, communications and postal services throughout the mission area.
- The Polish logistic support unit, with base camp in Cairo, provided drivers for UNEF II transport and was carrying out reconnaissance in preparation for the establishment of the UNEF II field hospital.

The headquarters of UNEF II, with an international staff on which the various contributing countries were represented, remained in Cairo.

### ***Second Phase: January 1974—October 1975***

While the negotiations at kilometre-marker 101 for the return to the 22 October positions were dragging on, the United States and the Soviet Union initiated a joint effort to promote the implementation of Security Council resolution 338(1973), which called for negotiations to start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. This effort resulted in the convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East at Geneva on 21 December 1973 under the auspices of the United Nations and the co-chairmanship of the two Powers. The Secretary-General was asked to serve as the convener of the Conference and to preside at the opening phase which would be held at the Foreign Minister level. The Governments of Egypt, Israel and Jordan accepted to attend, but Syria refused and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was not invited.

The Conference, which discussed the disengagement of forces in the Egypt-Israel sector, as well as a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem, was inconclusive and adjourned on 22 December 1973 after three meetings. Before adjourning, it decided to continue to work through the setting up of a Military Working Group, which would start discussing forthwith the question of disengagement of forces. The Working Group was composed of the military representatives of Egypt and Israel and the Commander of UNEF II as Chairman.

During the first half of January 1974, the United States Secretary of State undertook a new mediation effort. In negotiating separately with the Government of Egypt and Israel, in what was known as his "shuttle diplomacy", he worked out an agreement on the disengagement and separation of their military forces. This agreement was signed on 18 January 1974 by the military representatives of Egypt and Israel, and by General Siilasvuo as witness, within the framework of the Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference at a meeting held at kilometre-marker 101 on the Cairo-Suez road. The agreement provided for the deployment of Egyptian forces on the eastern side of the Canal, west of a line designated on the map annexed to the agreement (the line ran parallel to the Canal, about 10 kilometres west of it), the deployment of Israeli forces east of another line, the establishment of a zone of disengagement manned by UNEF II, and areas of limited forces and armament on both sides of that zone.

In subsequent meetings held at kilometre-marker 101 under the chairmanship of General Siilasvuo, the military representatives of Egypt and Israel worked out a detailed procedure for the implementation of the agreement.

In accordance with this procedure, the disengagement operation began on 25 January. The operation proceeded by phases. At each phase, Israeli forces withdrew from a designated area after handing it over to UNEF II, and UNEF II held that area for a few hours before turning it over to the Egyptian forces. During the entire disengagement process, UNEF II interposed between the forces of the two sides by establishing temporary buffer zones. UNEF II was also responsible for the survey and marking of the lines of disengagement, which was carried out by UNTSO military observers under UNEF II supervision, with the assistance of Egyptian and Israeli army surveyors for their respective sides. The whole operation was carried out smoothly according to plan and was completed by 4 March 1974.

After the completion of the operation, most non-logistic contingents were deployed in or near the newly established zone of disengagement. By mid-March, UNEF II had a total strength of 6,814 all ranks. The various contingents were deployed as follows:

- The Irish battalion had its base camp at Rabah. It manned eight outposts in the zone of disengagement from the Mediterranean Sea to a line immediately south of Qantara.
- The Peruvian battalion had its base camp at Rabah. It manned 10 outposts in the zone of disengagement, in a sector from the

southern limit of the Irish battalion to a line directly east of Ismailia.

- The Swedish battalion had its base camp at Ismailia. It manned 14 outposts in the zone of disengagement, in a sector from the southern limit of the Peruvian battalion to a line east of Deversoir.
- The Indonesian battalion had its base camp at Ismailia. It manned 14 outposts in the zone of disengagement, in a sector from the southern limit of the Swedish battalion to a line east of Kabrit.
- The Senegalese battalion had its base camp at Suez city. It manned 12 outposts in the zone of disengagement, in a sector from the southern limit of the Indonesian battalion to a line east of a point 10 kilometres north of Suez.
- The Finnish battalion had its base camp at Suez city. It manned 15 outposts in the zone of disengagement, in a sector from the southern limit of the Senegalese battalion to the Gulf of Suez.

The headquarters of UNEF II was moved to Ismailia in August 1974.

As a result of this disengagement, the situation in the Egypt-Israel sector became much more stable. The main task of UNEF II was the manning and control of the zone of disengagement and, to do this, it established static check-points and observation posts and conducted mobile patrols. It also carried out, with the assistance of UNTSO observers, weekly and later bi-weekly inspections of the areas of limited forces and armament (30 kilometre zone), as well as inspections of other areas agreed by the parties. The Force Commander continued the practice of separate meetings with the military authorities of Egypt and Israel concerning the implementation of the Force's terms of reference and the inspections carried out by UNEF II, and he continued to lend his assistance and good offices in cases where one of the parties raised questions concerning the observance of the agreed limitations of forces and armament.

In addition, UNEF II continued to co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross on humanitarian matters. It played an important part in assisting in exchanges of prisoners of war and the transfer of civilians from one side to the other. UNEF II also undertook an operation, which was completed in July 1974, for the search for the remains of soldiers killed during the October 1973 war.

In view of the quiet that prevailed in the area, it was possible to reduce gradually the strength of UNEF II. The Irish Government decided to withdraw its troops in May 1974. In June, following the establishment of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights, the Security Council decided, upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General, to transfer the Austrian and Peruvian contingents and elements of the Canadian and Polish logistics components to the new UNDOF. The Nepalese contingent, which had been made available to the United Nations for six months only, was repatriated in August and September 1974. Finally, the Panamanian contingent was withdrawn in November 1974. As a result of these and later developments, the total strength of UNEF II decreased to 5,079 in June 1974, 4,029 in April 1975 and 3,987 in October 1975.

### ***Third Phase: November 1975-May 1979***

In September 1975, the United States Secretary of State, through further indirect negotiations, succeeded in obtaining the agreement of Egypt and Israel for a second disengagement of their forces in the Sinai. The new agreement provided for the redeployment of Israeli forces east of lines designated in a map annexed to the agreement, the redeployment of the Egyptian forces westwards and the establishment of buffer zones controlled by UNEF II. It also provided that there would be no military forces in the southern areas of Ras Sudar and Abu Rudeis. On both sides of the buffer zones, two areas of limited forces and armament were to be set up where the number of military personnel should be limited to 8,000 and the armament to 75 tanks and 72 artillery pieces, including heavy mortars.

Finally, the agreement set up a joint commission, under the aegis of the United Nations Chief Co-Ordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East, to consider any problems arising from the agreement and to assist UNEF II in the execution of its mandate. Attached to the agreement was a United States plan to establish an early warning system in the area of the Giddi and Mitla Passes, consisting of three watch stations set up by the United States and of two surveillance stations, one operated by Egyptian personnel and the other by Israeli personnel.

The Secretary-General submitted reports to the Security Council on this matter in September 1975. He advised the Council that the new agreement between Egypt and Israel had been initialled by the parties on 1 September and would be signed by them in Geneva on 4

September. Following the signing, the representatives of Egypt and Israel were, within five days, to begin preparation of a detailed protocol for the implementation of the basic agreement in the Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East. In accordance with previous practice, the Secretary-General instructed General Siilasvuo, the Chief Co-ordinator, who had presided at the previous meetings of the Military Working Group, to proceed to Geneva so as to be available in the same capacity for the forthcoming meetings of the Working Group.

The Working Group, meeting under the chairmanship of General Siilasvuo, reached agreement on the protocol of the agreement, which was signed on 22 September by the representatives of the two parties and by General Siilasvuo as witness. The protocol set out a detailed procedure for the implementation of the agreement.

The responsibilities entrusted to UNEF II under the agreement of 4 September and its protocol were much more extensive than those it had had previously, and its area of operations was much larger. The Force's first task was to mark on the ground the new lines of disengagement. To carry out this work, a group of surveyors was supplied by Sweden, at the request of the Secretary-General. Work began in October 1975 and was completed in January 1976, in accordance with the timetable set out in the protocol.

In November 1975, UNEF II began its assistance to the parties for the redeployment of their forces. The first phase of the redeployment took place in the southern area and was completed on 1 December 1975. During that period, UNEF II, through the Chief Co-ordinator, supervised the transfer of the oilfields and installations in the area. The second phase of the redeployment, which took place in the northern area, began on 12 January 1976 and was completed on 22 February. The Force monitored the redeployment of the forces of the two parties by providing buffer times for the transfer of evacuated areas to Egyptian control, occupying temporary buffer zones and manning temporary observation posts. The Force acted as a secure channel of communication and contact between the parties throughout the redeployment process.

After the completion of the redeployment operation, UNEF II carried out the long-term functions specified in the protocol. In the southern area, its task was to assure that no military or paramilitary forces of any kind, military fortifications or military installations were in the area. To perform that task, it established check-points and

observation posts in accordance with the protocol and conducted patrols throughout the area, including air patrols. It also ensured the control of buffer zones in the southern area and, to this effect, it maintained permanent check-points along the buffer-zone lines. It also supervised the use of common road sections by the parties in accordance with arrangements agreed to by them and it provided escorts in those sections when necessary.

The functions of UNEF II in the buffer zone in the northern area were carried out by means of a system of check-points, observation posts and patrols by land. In the early-warning-system area, which was located in the buffer zone, UNEF II provided escorts, as required, to and from the United States watch stations and the Egyptian and Israeli surveillance stations. The Force was also entrusted with the task of ensuring the maintenance of the agreed limitations of forces and armament within the areas specified in the agreement and, to this effect, it conducted bi-weekly inspections. Those inspections were carried out by UNTSO military observers under UNEF supervision, accompanied by liaison officers of the respective parties.

The joint commission established by the disengagement agreement met in the buffer zone under the chairmanship of the United Nations Chief Co-ordinator as occasion required. The Force received a number of complaints from both parties alleging violations by the other side. Those complaints were taken up with the party concerned by the Force Commander or the Chief Co-ordinator and, in some instances, were referred to the joint commission.

The Force maintained close contact with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross in its humanitarian endeavours and extended its assistance in providing facilities for family reunions and student exchanges, which took place at an agreed site in the buffer zone.

All these tasks were carried out efficiently. There were few incidents and problems and, whenever they occurred, they were resolved without difficulty with the co-operation of the parties concerned.

#### ***Fourth Phase: May-July 1979***

The peace treaty concluded in March 1979 between Egypt and Israel as a result of negotiations conducted under the auspices of the United States, and which entered into force on 25 April, had a direct bearing on the termination of UNEF II and affected its activities during the final period.

The treaty provided that, upon completion of a phased Israeli withdrawal over three years, security arrangements on both sides of the Egyptian-Israeli border would be made with the assistance of United Nations forces and observers. Article VI stipulated that "the parties will request the United Nations to provide forces and observers to supervise the implementation of the security arrangements". The United Nations forces and observers would have been asked to perform a variety of duties, including the operation of check-points, reconnaissance patrols and observation posts along the boundaries of and within the demilitarized zone, and ensuring freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran. United Nations forces would also have been stationed in certain areas adjoining the demilitarized zone on the Egyptian side, and United Nations observers would have patrolled a specified area on the Israeli side of the international boundary. In an annex to the treaty, the United States undertook to organize a multinational force of equivalent strength if the United Nations were unable to monitor the forces as envisaged by the treaty.

The intention of the parties was to have UNEF II perform these tasks. However, there was strong opposition to the treaty from the PLO and many Arab States, and opposition by the Soviet Union in the Security Council. As previously stated, the Security Council decided to allow the mandate of the Force to lapse on 24 July 1979.

On 25 May 1979, in pursuance of the relevant provisions of the peace treaty, the Israeli forces withdrew from the northern Sinai to the east of El Arish and the Egyptians took over control of that area. UNEF II was not involved in this move except by permitting access of Egyptian personnel to the buffer zone and the areas of limited forces and armament and by providing escorts to the parties within these areas as the Israeli withdrawal was being carried out. During this process, UNEF II withdrew from the northern part of the buffer zone, which was handed over to the Egyptian authorities. Except in areas of the Sinai controlled by Egyptian forces, UNEF II continued to function as previously. In particular, it continued to provide a physical separation of the areas of limited forces and armament. It also provided escorts to authorized non-United Nations visitors and to personnel of the parties travelling to and from the early-warning-system stations.

After the mandate of UNEF II lapsed in July 1979, the various contingents were rapidly repatriated, except for a Swedish guard unit and limited groups of the Canadian and Polish logistics contingents which remained in the area to assist in the winding up of the Force.

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## UN DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE

### A. Background and Establishment

#### *Background*

At the end of the October 1973 war, while tranquillity was restored on the Egyptian front with the deployment of the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II), no new peace-keeping force was established on the Syrian front in the Golan Heights. There, fighting subsided following the ceasefire call contained in Security Council resolution 338(1973) of 22 October 1973. By that time, the Israeli forces had crossed the 1967 ceasefire lines and occupied a salient up to and including the village of Saassa on the Quneitra-Damascus road. United Nations military observers set up temporary observation posts around that salient and, with these changes, the ceasefire observation operation in the Israel-Syria sector was resumed.

However, tension remained high in the area. There was a continuous pattern of incidents in and around the buffer zone supervised by the United Nations military observers. These involved artillery, mortar and automatic-weapon fire, and overflights by Israeli and Syrian aircraft. Frequent complaints of ceasefire violations were submitted by the two parties, although ceasefires proposed from time to time by the United Nations observers resulted in temporary cessation of firing. From early March 1974 until the end of May, the situation in the sector became increasingly unstable, and firing—involving use of artillery, tanks and rockets—intensified. Against this background, the United States Secretary of State undertook a mediation mission, which resulted in the conclusion of an Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces in May 1974.

#### *Agreement on Disengagement of Forces*

The Secretary-General, who was kept informed of these developments, reported to the Security Council on 29 May that the signing of the Agreement would take place on 31 May 1974 in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East. He also informed the Council that he had instructed General Ensio P.H. Siilasvuo, the Commander of UNEF, to be available for the signing of the Agreement; under the aegis of the United Nations. On 30 May, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of the Agreement as well as the Protocol to that Agreement which deals with the establishment of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNOF).

Under the terms of the Agreement, Israel and Syria were scrupulously to observe the ceasefire on land, sea and in the air, and refrain from all military actions against each other from the time of the signing of the document, in implementation of Security Council resolution 338(1973). It further provided that the two military forces would be separated in accordance with agreed principles, which called for the establishment of an area of separation and of two equal areas of limitation of armament and forces on both sides of the area. The detailed plan for the disengagement of forces would be worked out by the military representatives of Israel and Syria in the Military Working Group. They were to begin their work 24 hours after the signing of the Agreement and complete it within five days. Disengagement was to begin within 24 hours thereafter and be completed not later than 20 days after it had begun. The provisions of the Agreement concerning the ceasefire and the separation of forces were to be inspected by UNDOF personnel. All wounded prisoners of war were to be repatriated within 24 hours after signature of the Agreement, and all other prisoners upon completion of the work of the Military Working Group. The bodies of all dead soldiers held by either side would be returned for burial within 10 days. The final paragraph of the Agreement stated that it was not a peace agreement, but that it was a step towards a just and durable peace on the basis of Security Council resolution 338(1973).

### ***Protocol on UNDOF***

According to the Protocol to the Agreement, Israel and Syria agreed that the function of UNDOF would be to maintain the ceasefire, to see that it was strictly observed, and to supervise the Agreement and Protocol with regard to the areas of separation and limitation. In carrying out its mission, the Force was to comply with generally applicable Syrian laws and regulations and not hamper the functioning of local civil administration. It was to enjoy the freedom of movement and communication necessary for its mission and be provided with personal weapons of a defensive character to be used only in self-defence.

The strength of UNDOF was set at 1,250 men, to be selected by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties, from Member States of the United Nations which were not permanent members of the Security Council.

In transmitting the documents, the Secretary-General, noting that the Protocol called for the creation of a United Nations Disengagement

Observer Force, indicated that he would take the necessary steps in accordance with the Protocol's provisions, if the Security Council should so decide. He intended that the proposed Force would be drawn, at least initially, from United Nations military personnel already in the area.

### ***Establishment of UNDOF***

On 30 May 1974, the representative of the United States requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation in the Middle East, in particular the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces. At the meeting, the Secretary-General drew attention to his reports on this matter and said that, were the Council so to decide, he would set up UNDOF on the basis of the same general principles which had governed the establishment of UNEF II.

On 31 May, the Agreement on disengagement and the Protocol were signed at Geneva by the military representatives of Israel and Syria. Later on the same day, the Security Council adopted resolution 350(1974) by which it decided to set up UNDOF immediately, under its authority, and requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps. The Force was established for an initial period of six months, subject to renewal by the Security Council. The Secretary-General was asked to keep the Council fully informed of further developments.

### ***Secretary-General's Proposal***

After the adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General presented his proposals for interim arrangements. He suggested that initially UNDOF should comprise the Austrian and Peruvian contingents from UNEF II, supported by logistical elements from Canada and Poland, also to be drawn from UNEF II, and by UNTSO military observers who were already deployed in the area (except those from permanent member countries of the Security Council). The Secretary-General also proposed to appoint, as interim Commander, Brigadier-General Gonzalo Briceno Zevallos of Peru, who was at the time commanding the northern brigade of UNEF II. The interim Commander was to be assisted by staff officers drawn from UNEF and UNTSO. The Security Council agreed to the Secretary-General's proposals.

### ***Military Working Group***

The Military Working Group met in Geneva from 31 May 1974 until 5 June under the chairmanship of General Siilasvuo to work out practical arrangements for the disengagement of forces.

Military representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic joined the Group, and the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States, as co-chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference, also participated in the meetings.

Full agreement was reached on a disengagement plan, with a timetable for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the area east of the 1967 ceasefire line, as well as on a map showing different phases of disengagement. The map was signed at the final meeting on 5 June.

### ***Redeployment of Israeli Forces***

The disengagement plan involved not only the redeployment of Israeli forces from east of the 1967 line but also provided for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Quneitra and Rafid and the demilitarisation of an area west of Quneitra;

The redeployment of the Israeli forces would take place in four phases. After the completion of each phase, UNDOF would carry out an inspection of the evacuated area and report its findings to the parties. The disengagement process would be completed by 26 June, and thereafter UNDOF would man the area of separation between the two forces. After verifying on that date that the agreed limitation of forces was being observed, UNDOF would carry out regular bi-weekly inspections of the 10-kilometre restricted-forces area.

In the negotiations in the Military Working Group, the two parties also agreed that both sides would repatriate all prisoners of war by 6 June, that they would co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in carrying out its mandate.' including the exchange of bodies, which was also to be completed by 6 June. They would make available all information and maps of minefields in their respective areas and the areas to be handed over by them.

### ***UNDOF Beginnings***

On 3 June 1974, the Secretary-General, having obtained the agreement of the Government of Peru, appointed General Briceno as interim Commander of UNDOF. He arrived in Damascus from Cairo on the same day and immediately established a provisional headquarters in the premises of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission, assuming command over the 90 UNTSO observers detailed to UNDOF.

Later the same day, advance parties of the Austrian and Peruvian contingents arrived in the mission area. They were joined on the following days by the remainder of the two contingents and the

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Canadian and Polish logistic elements. Some logistic support was given by UNEF.

By 16 June, the strength of UNDOF was brought to 1,218 all ranks, near its authorized level of 1,250.

### ***Extension of the Mandate***

The initial six-month mandate of UNDOF expired on 30 November 1974. Since then, the mandate has been repeatedly extended by the Security Council upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General and with the agreement of the two parties concerned.

In November 1975, Syria was reluctant to agree to a further extension because no progress had been made in the settlement of the wider Middle East problem. The Secretary-General met with President Hafez Al Assad in Damascus that month and, after extensive discussions, the President gave his agreement for the renewal of the UNDOF mandate for another period of six months, to be combined with a specific provision that the Security Council would convene, in January 1976, to hold a substantive debate on the Middle East problem, including the Palestine question, with the participation of representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

Extending the UNDOF mandate for a further six months, the Security Council, in resolution 381(1975) of 30 November 1975, decided to reconvene on 12 January 1976 to continue the debate on the Middle East problem, taking into account all relevant United Nations resolutions.

In May 1976, the Secretary-General again had to travel to Damascus to secure the agreement of the Syrian Government for a further extension. However, from November 1976 onwards, the two parties readily gave their agreement for further extensions. On each occasion since that date, the Security Council, in renewing UNDOF's mandate for further six-month periods, called on the parties concerned to implement resolution 338(1973) and requested the Secretary-General to submit at the end of the extension period a report on the measures taken to implement that resolution. In connection with the adoption of the resolutions on the renewal of the mandate, the President of the Security Council made complementary statements endorsing the view of the Secretary-General that, despite the prevailing quiet in the Israel-Syria sector, the situation in the Middle East as a whole would remain unstable and potentially dangerous unless real progress could be made towards a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East problem in

all its aspects. The latest extension of UNDOF, approved by the Security Council in May 1985, was for a period of six months—until 30 November of the same year.

On 14 December 1981, the Israeli Government decided to apply Israeli law in the occupied Golan Heights. Syria strongly protested against this decision, and both the Security Council and the General Assembly declared that it was null and void. The Israeli decision, however, has not affected the operation of UNDOF in any significant way.

### ***Organisation of UNDOF***

The organisation of UNDOF is similar to that of UNEF II. The Force is under the exclusive command and control of the United Nations at all times. The Force Commander is appointed by the Secretary-General with the consent of the Security Council and is responsible to him. Following General Briceno, who was interim Commander until 15 December 1974, the command of UNDOF was assumed by Colonel (later Major-General) Hannes Philipp of Austria (December 1974-April 1979), Colonel (later Major-General) Guenther G. Greindl, also of Austria (until February 1981), Major-General Erkki R. Kaira of Finland (until June 1982), Major-General Carl-Gustav Stahl of Sweden (until May 1985) and Major-General Gustav Hagglund of Finland (since May 1985).

UNDOF was originally composed of the Austrian and Peruvian contingents and the Canadian and Polish logistic elements transferred from UNEF II. The Peruvian contingent was withdrawn in July 1975 and replaced by an Iranian contingent in August of that year. This contingent was in turn withdrawn in March 1979 and replaced by a Finnish contingent.

UNDOF in October 1985 was composed of contingents from Austria, Canada, Finland and Poland. A number of observers, detailed from UNTSO, who are not nationals of permanent members of the Security Council are included in UNDOF as an integral part of the Force. In addition, UNTSO observers assigned to the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission may assist UNDOF as occasion requires.

### ***UNDOF Strength***

Within two weeks of its establishment, the total strength of UNDOF was brought to near its authorized level of about 1,250. From that time until August 1979—except for a brief period from March to August

1979 when the strength of the Force was temporarily below the authorized level as a result of the withdrawal of the Iranian battalion—the strength of UNDOF remained around that figure. In August 1979, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that, as a result of the withdrawal of UNEF II which had hitherto provided third-line logistic support to UNDOF, it had become necessary to strengthen the existing Canadian and Polish logistic units. The Security Council agreed to the proposed increase. Following consultations with the parties, the strength of UNDOF was gradually brought up to 1,331 in May 1985. As of that date, the strength and composition of UNDOF was as follows: Austria (533); Canada (226); Finland (411); Poland (153). In addition, eight UNTSO observers were assigned to the Force.

## **B. ACTIVITIES OF UNDOF**

### ***Initial Deployment***

Following the signing of the Agreement on disengagement, all firings ceased in the Israel-Syria sector as of 1109 hours GMT on 31 May 1974. This was confirmed by the United Nations military observers stationed in the sector. These observers, who were later incorporated into UNDOF, continued to man selected observation posts and patrol bases along the ceasefire line while the newly arrived contingents of UNDOF began deployment in the area. The Austrian and Peruvian infantry battalions set up positions between the Israeli and Syrian forces, the former in the Saassa area and the latter from Quneitra south along the ceasefire lines.

### ***Disengagement Operation***

The disengagement operation began on 14 June and proceeded apace until 27 June. In accordance with the agreed plan, the operation was carried out in four phases.

During the first phase, the Israeli forces handed over to UNDOF an area of some 270 square kilometres (about 28 square kilometres in the Saassa area and about 243 square kilometres east of Lake Tiberias) in the afternoon of 14 June. The next morning, the Syrian forces commenced/deploying in that area while UNDOF established a new buffer zone east of the evacuated area.

The same procedure was followed for the second phase, which took place on 18 and 19 June and covered an area of some 374 square kilometres (about 214 square kilometres east of Lake Tiberias and about 160 square kilometres north and north-west of the Saassa area),

and for the third phase, which took place on 23 June and involved an area of about 132 square kilometres east and north of Quneitra.

The fourth phase took place on 24 and 25 June. During that phase, the Israeli forces evacuated the area of separation, which was taken over by UNDOF. On 25 June, after UNDOF completed its deployment, Syrian civilian administration was established in the area of separation. On 26 June, UNDOF observers inspected the areas of limited forces and armament (10-kilometre zone) on each side of the area of separation. The next day they proceeded with the inspection of the 20- and 25-kilometre zones, thus completing the implementation of the disengagement operation.

The disengagement process was marred by a serious incident during its last phase. Early on the morning of 25 June, four Austrian soldiers were killed and another wounded when their vehicle ran over a landmine near Mount Hermon in the area of separation. From 25 to 27 June, at the request of the Syrian Government and on the basis of an agreement reached with the Israeli authorities through UNDOF headquarters, a body of 500 Syrian soldiers equipped with mine-clearing tanks carried out mine-clearing operations at various locations in the area of separation, under the close supervision of UNDOF observers.

### ***Supervision of the Agreement***

Following the completion of the disengagement operation, UNDOF undertook the delineation and marking of the lines bounding the area of separation. This task, which was carried out with the co-operation and assistance of the Israeli and Syrian forces on their respective sides, proceeded smoothly and was completed in early July 1974.

After the delineation of the area of separation, UNDOF set up a series of check-points and observation posts within that area. In addition, two base camps were established, one on the east side of the area of separation and the other on the west side. At the same time, UNDOF headquarters, which remained in Damascus, was moved from the office of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission to a building made available by the Syrian Government. The Quneitra communication relay station, which had been set up by UNTSO, was placed under the control of UNDOF. This set-up has remained essentially unchanged.

The Chief of Staff of UNTSO performs liaison functions in Jerusalem for UNDOF as occasion arises, normally through the Israeli senior liaison officer. At the local level, the commanders of the UNDOF

contingents maintain liaison with one side or the other through liaison officers designated by the parties.

The Austrian battalion and the Polish logistic unit are currently in a base camp near Wadi Faouar, eight kilometres east of the area of separation, while the Finnish battalion and the Canadian logistic unit share a base camp near the village of Ziouani, west of that area. As of May 1985, the Austrian battalion manned 19 positions and seven outposts; the Finnish battalion, 15 positions and eight outposts—the former in the area north of the Damascus-Quneitra road and the latter south of that road. The UNTSO military observers attached to UNDOF, who operate out of Damascus on the Syrian side and Tiberias on the Israeli side, manned 11 observation posts near the area of separation.

The main function of UNDOF is to supervise the area of separation to make sure that there are no military forces within it. This is carried out by means of static positions and observation posts which are manned 24 hours a day, and by foot and mobile patrols operating along pre-determined routes by day and night. Temporary outposts and additional patrols may be set up from time to time as occasion requires.

In accordance with the terms of the Agreement on disengagement, UNDOF conducts fortnightly inspections of the area of limitation of armament and forces. These inspections, which cover the 10-, 20- and 25-kilometre zones on each side of the area of separation, are carried out by United Nations military observers with the assistance of liaison officers from the parties, who accompany the inspection teams on their respective sides.

These inspections have generally proceeded smoothly with the co-operation of the parties concerned, although restrictions have occasionally been placed on the movement of the inspection teams in some localities. The findings of the inspection teams are communicated to the two parties but are not made public. When one party complains about the other party's violation of the agreement on the limitation of armament and forces, the Force Commander will try to resolve the matter through his good offices. So far, no serious problems have arisen in this connection.

### ***Humanitarian Activities***

In addition to its normal peace-keeping functions, UNDOF has carried out activities of a humanitarian nature as occasion requires. At the request of the parties, UNDOF has from time to time exercised

its good offices in arranging for the release and hand-over of prisoners and bodies between Israel and Syria. It has assisted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) by providing it with facilities for the hand-over of prisoners and bodies, for the exchange of parcels and mail across the area of separation, and for the transit of Druse students from the occupied Golan to attend school in Syria. Of particular note was the assistance extended to ICRC on 28 June 1984 when 297 prisoners of war, 16 civilians and the remains of 77 persons were exchanged between Israel and Syria. In 1976, UNDOF worked out arrangements, with the co-operation of the two parties, for periodic reunions of Druse families living on different sides of the line of separation. Those family reunions took place every fortnight in the village of Madjel- Shams (Majdel Chams) in the area of separation, under the supervision of UNDOF, until February 1982, when they had to be discontinued because of the controversy arising from Israel's decision in December 1981 to apply Israeli law to the occupied Golan Heights.

### ***Incidents and Casualties***

During the initial period, there were a number of serious incidents. Besides the four Austrian soldiers killed and another wounded in a mining incident on 25 June 1974, another mine explosion occurred on 20 April 1977 in which an Austrian officer was killed and an Iranian officer was wounded. Despite the mine-clearing operations undertaken by the Syrian forces in 1974, there were still many unexploded mines in and near the area of separation. The engineers of the Polish logistic unit continue to search for and defuse unexploded mines, shells and bombs in and near the area.

On 9 August 1974, a United Nations aircraft, flying from Ismailia to Damascus in the established air corridor, crashed as a result of anti-aircraft fire, north-east of the Syrian village of Ad Dimas. All nine Canadians aboard were killed.

In November 1975, there was a shooting incident in which two Syrian shepherds were killed by an Israeli patrol. There were also alleged crossings of the area of separation, resulting in one case in the death of three Israeli citizens. In November 1977, two members of the Iranian battalion came under fire from the Israeli side and both were wounded.

Whenever such incidents occurred, UNDOF sought to resolve the situation by negotiation and appropriate corrective measures. The incidents have not seriously affected the operations of the Force.

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### ***Problems Affecting UNDOF***

Since November 1977, there have been no major incidents. The main problems in the area arise from the presence of Syrian shepherds grazing their flocks near the line. They often cross the line, either in ignorance or because there are good grazing lands on the other side.

Another problem faced by UNDOF are the restrictions placed upon its troops by one party or the other. Because Poland has no diplomatic relations with Israel, the Israeli forces have severely restricted the movement of the Polish forces on the Israeli side of the line. The Force Commander, fully supported by the Secretary-General, has strongly protested against these restrictions on the grounds that UNDOF is an integrated unit and all its elements must enjoy freedom of movement on an equal basis. As a result of this approach, the Israeli authorities have relaxed restrictions on the Polish unit, but the situation has not been fully resolved.

Some restrictions have also been placed by both sides on the movement of the UNDOF inspection teams, which were not allowed to visit certain localities when inspecting the area of limitation of armament and forces. These restrictions have been routinely protested by the Force Commander, but they are not considered as major issues impeding the functioning of UNDOF in this field.

On the whole, the difficulties encountered by UNDOF are not of a serious nature and have not affected its smooth functioning. In each periodic report on the activities of the Force, the Secretary-General has been able to report that the situation in the Israel-Syria sector has remained quiet and that UNDOF has continued to perform its functions effectively with the co-operation of the parties.

## **UN INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON**

### **A. Background and Beginning**

#### ***Background***

Although the Lebanese civil war which had broken out in April 1975 officially ended in October 1976—after the election of President Elias Sarkis, the constitution of a new central Government and the establishment of an Arab Deterrent Force—fighting did not completely stop in southern Lebanon. When Syrian troops of the Deterrent Force deployed towards the south, the Israeli Government threatened to take stern counter-measures if they should advance beyond an imaginary east-west red line, extending south of the Zahrani River.

Whether because of this threat or for some other reasons, the Syrian forces stopped short of the red line. The authority of the central Government was not restored in the south. Sporadic fighting continued in that area between the Christian militias, which were assisted by Israel, and the armed elements of the Lebanese National Movement, a loose association of a variety of Moslem and leftist parties, supported by the armed forces of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). The PLO was the dominant force in southern Lebanon at the time and had established many bases in the area, from which it launched commando raids against Israel which were followed by intensive Israeli retaliation.

On 11 March 1978, a commando raid, for which the PLO claimed responsibility, took place in Israel near Tel Aviv and, according to Israeli sources, resulted in 37 deaths and 76 wounded among the Israeli population. In retaliation, the Israeli forces invaded Lebanon on the night of 14/15 March, and in a few days occupied the entire region south of the Litani River except for the city of Tyre and its surrounding area.

### ***Establishment of UNIFIL***

On 15 March, the Lebanese Government submitted a strong protest to the Security Council against the Israeli invasion. It stated that it was not responsible for the presence of Palestinian bases in southern Lebanon and had no connection with the Palestinian commando operation. It said it had exerted tremendous efforts with the Palestinians and the Arab States in order to keep matters under control, but Israeli objections regarding the entry of the Arab Deterrent Force to the south had prevented the accomplishment of Lebanon's desire to bring the border area under control. The Security Council met on 17 March 1978 and on the following days to consider the Lebanese complaint.

On 19 March, on a proposal by the United States, the Security Council adopted resolution 425(1978), by which it called for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries. It called upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory. It also decided, "in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring

international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the force to be composed of personnel drawn from Member States". The Council requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council within 24 hours on the implementation of the resolution.

### ***Terms of Reference and Guidelines***

On the same afternoon, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council in which he set forth the terms of reference of the new Force, to be called the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the guidelines for the Force and a plan of action for its speedy establishment.

The Force was to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore international peace and security, and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. It would establish and maintain itself in an area of operation to be defined in the light of those tasks, and would use its best efforts to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to ensure that its area of operation would not be utilized for hostile activities of any kind. In the fulfilment of its tasks, the Force would have the co-operation of the military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation, who would continue to function on the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) after the termination of UNIFIL's mandate.

In the first stage, the Force would confirm the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Lebanese territory to the international border. Once this was achieved, it would establish and maintain an area of operation to be defined in consultation with the parties concerned. It would supervise the cessation of hostilities, ensure the peaceful character of the area of operation, control movement and take all measures deemed necessary to assure the effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. The Secretary-General also indicated that, with a view to facilitating UNIFIL's tasks, it might be necessary to work out arrangements with Israel and Lebanon as a preliminary measure for the implementation of the Security Council resolution, and it was assumed that both parties would give their full co-operation to UNIFIL in this regard.

In working out the terms of reference of UNIFIL, the Secretary-General had wanted to define more clearly the area of operation of the Force and its relationship with the PLO. But he could not do so, as the discussions he held with the member States of the Security Council and with other Governments concerned revealed a profound

disagreement among them on both subjects. As will be seen later, these two questions weighed heavily on the operations of UNIFIL.

The guidelines proposed by the Secretary-General were essentially the same as those applied to UNIFIL II and UNDOF. Important decisions on the organisation of UNIFIL, such as the appointment of the Force Commander or the selection of contingents, would be taken by the Secretary-General, but he would need to consult the Security Council and obtain its consent. All matters which might affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Force would be referred to the Council for its decision.

Particular emphasis was placed on the principles of non-use of force and non-intervention in the internal affairs of the host country. UNIFIL would not use force except in self-defence, which would include resistance to attempts by forcible means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the Council's mandate. Like any other United Nations peace-keeping operation, UNIFIL could not and must not take on responsibilities which fell under the Government of the country in which it was operating. Those responsibilities must be exercised by the competent Lebanese authorities, and it was assumed that the Lebanese Government would take the necessary measures to cooperate with UNIFIL in this regard.

In his report, the Secretary-General also proposed certain measures for the speedy establishment of the Force. Lieutenant-General Ensio P.H. Siilasvuo, Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East, would be instructed to contact immediately the Governments of Israel and Lebanon and initiate meetings with their representatives for the purpose of reaching agreement on the modalities of the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and the establishment of a United Nations area of operation. Major-General (later Lieutenant-General) E.A. Erskine of Ghana, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, would be appointed immediately as interim Commander and, pending the arrival of the first contingents of the Force, would perform his tasks with the assistance of a group of UNTSO military observers. At the same time, urgent measures would be taken for the early arrival in the area of contingents of the Force. The Secretary-General proposed that the Force have a total strength of the order of 4,000 and that it be stationed initially in the area for six months. The best possible preliminary cost estimate was approximately \$68 million for a Force of 4,000 all ranks for that period. As with UNEF II and UNDOF, the costs of UNIFIL were to be considered as expenses of the Organisation to be borne by Member States as apportioned by the General Assembly.

The Secretary-General's report was considered by the Security Council later in the same day. By resolution 426(1978) of 19 March 1978, the Council approved the report and decided that UNIFIL should be established for an initial period of six months, subject to extension.

### ***Beginnings of the Force***

While the members of the Security Council, in close consultation with the Secretary-General, were discussing the establishment of UNIFIL, the situation in southern Lebanon remained extremely tense and volatile. Israeli forces had occupied most of southern Lebanon up to the Litani River, but the PLO troops regrouped with much of their equipment in the Tyre pocket and in their strongholds north of the Litani, particularly Nabatiyah and Chateau de Beaufort. Intense exchanges of fire continued between the opposing forces.

The Secretary-General's two immediate objectives were to set up the new Force and deploy it along the front lines as soon as possible, and to initiate negotiations on the withdrawal of the Israeli forces.

General Erskine, who had been appointed as interim Commander of UNIFIL on 19 March, immediately set up temporary headquarters at Naqoura in southern Lebanon, in the premises of the UNTSO out station, with the 45 military observers who were already in the area. These were soon reinforced by 19 additional observers transferred from other sectors of UNTSO. In order to make UNIFIL operational without delay, the Secretary-General transferred some military personnel from the two existing peace-keeping forces in the Middle East, after obtaining the concurrence of the Governments concerned. One reinforced company from the Iranian contingent of UNDOF and another from the Swedish contingent of UNEF were temporarily assigned to the new Force, together with a movement control detachment and a signal detachment of the Canadian logistic unit of UNEF.

Meanwhile, urgent action had to be taken to seek and obtain 4,000 troops for the Force. During the Security Council debate, France, Nepal and Norway had offered to provide contingents. On 21 March, after securing the agreement of the Council, the Secretary-General accepted the offers of the three Governments. Later, in response to an appeal by the Secretary-General, Nigeria and Senegal each agreed to provide an infantry battalion.

The first French troops arrived in Beirut on 23 March and were brought to battalion strength within a few days. The Norwegian

contingent came a week later and the Nepalese by mid-April. With the Canadian, Iranian and Swedish units already in the area, the strength of UNIFIL reached 1,800 all ranks by 8 April, 2,502 by 17 April and 4,016 by the beginning of May.

### ***Strength of the Force***

On 1 May 1978, shortly after the Israeli withdrawal began, the Secretary-General recommended that the total strength of the Force should be brought to 6,000. He also indicated that the Governments of Fiji, Iran and Ireland were prepared to make available a battalion each for service with UNIFIL. By resolution 427(1978) of 3 May 1978, the Security Council approved the Secretary-General's recommendation. The three new battalions arrived in the mission area during the first days of June. The Swedish and Iranian companies that had been temporarily detached from UNEF and UNDOF returned to their parent units.

As of mid-June 1978, the strength of the Force was 6,100. The contingents were: Infantry battalions—Fiji (500), France (703), Iran (514), Ireland (665), Nepal (642), Nigeria (669), Norway (723), Senegal (634); Logistic units—Canada (102), France (541), Norway (207). In addition, 42 military observers of UNTSO assisted UNIFIL in the performance of its tasks.

From June 1978 until June 1981, the strength of UNIFIL oscillated between 5,750 and 6,100, according to the movements of the various contingents. The Canadian logistic detachments were returned to UNEF in October 1978. At the request of their Governments, the Iranian battalion was withdrawn beginning in January 1979 and the French infantry battalion in March 1979. The last was replaced by a Dutch battalion, which arrived in the mission area by early March, and a Ghanaian contingent joined UNIFIL in September 1979.

The strength of UNIFIL was further increased to about 7,000 in early 1982 on the recommendation of the Secretary-General (resolution 501(1982) of 25 February 1982). In response to a request of the Secretary-General, the French Government agreed to provide a new infantry battalion of about 600 all ranks and the Ghanaian and Irish Governments to increase their battalions. These changes brought the strength of UNIFIL to 6,945 at the beginning of June 1982. The composition of the Force at that date was: Infantry battalions—Fiji (628), France (595), Ghana (557), Ireland (671), Nepal (432), Netherlands (810), Nigeria (696), Norway (660), Senegal (561);

Headquarters camp command—Ghana (140), Ireland (51); Logistic units—France (775), Italy, (34), Norway (191), Sweden (144).

Following the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon, in June 1982, the strength and composition of UNIFIL underwent important changes. In September 1982, at the request of the French Government, 482 officers and men of the French infantry battalion were temporarily released from UNIFIL to their national authorities and were incorporated in the French contingent of the multinational force in Beirut (*see section below*). The Nepalese battalion was withdrawn by 18 November 1982 and replaced by a Finnish battalion. Two companies of the Nigerian battalion were repatriated without replacement in November 1982 and the remainder in January 1983. In October 1983, the Netherlands decided to reduce its contingent from 810 to 150. In February 1984, the French unit withdrawn in 1982 was returned to UNIFIL. In October 1984 the Senegalese contingent was withdrawn and was replaced by a Nepalese battalion which arrived in the area in January-February 1985. In October 1985, the Netherlands contingent was withdrawn. Thus, by late October 1985, the strength of UNIFIL stood at 5,773, with the following composition: Fiji (628), Finland (502), France (1,396), Ghana (707), Ireland (828), Italy (49), Nepal (665), Norway (849), Sweden (149).

### ***Force Commanders***

General Erskine, who acted as interim Commander at the outset of the operation, was appointed Force Commander on 12 April 1978. He remained at this post UNIFIL 14 February 1981 when he was reappointed Chief of Staff of UNTSO and was succeeded at UNIFIL by Lieutenant-General William Callaghan, from Ireland. During the initial period of UNIFIL, General Siilasvuo, the Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, played a leading role in the negotiations with the Israeli authorities concerning the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Lebanon. After the termination of UNEF II, the post of Chief Co-ordinator was discontinued, at the end of 1979, and since then the Chief of Staff of UNTSO has performed general liaison functions in Jerusalem regarding the activities of UNIFIL.

## **B. UNIFIL Activities: March-April 1978**

### ***Negotiating Problems***

Like all United Nations peace-keeping forces, UNIFIL has no enforcement power and requires the co-operation of the parties

concerned to fulfil its tasks. Resolution 425(1978) mentioned only Israel and Lebanon. Immediately after the adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General sought and obtained an undertaking from both of those countries to co-operate with UNIFIL.

But the same procedure could not be followed with the PLO because the Security Council did not mention it as a party to the conflict. To obtain the co-operation of Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of that organisation, the Secretary-General on 27 March issued an appeal to all the parties concerned, including the PLO, for a general ceasefire. This was followed up with a meeting between Arafat and General Erskine, the Force Commander, during which a pledge was secured from the PLO to co-operate with UNIFIL.

Another complication arose from the presence and activities in southern Lebanon of various Lebanese armed elements not controlled by the central Government. UNIFIL could not officially negotiate with these armed elements, although they were very much a part of the problem, some of them having sided with the PLO and others with Israel. The PLO was allied with the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), a loose association of Lebanese Moslem and leftist parties, and the armed elements of the two groups operated under a joint command. When difficulties arose with the armed elements, UNIFIL generally endeavoured to resolve them in negotiations with the PLO leadership.

On the opposite side, UNIFIL had to contend with the so-called *de facto* forces, which were composed mainly of Christian militias led by Major Saad Haddad, a renegade officer of the Lebanese National Army. When UNIFIL encountered problems with the *de facto* forces, it sought the co-operation and assistance of the Israeli authorities, since these forces were armed and supplied by Israel and, by all evidence, closely controlled by it.

### ***Operations Area Problems***

A second major difficulty encountered by UNIFIL arose from the lack of a clear definition of its area of operation. Security Council resolution 425(1978), which was the result of a compromise, was vague on this point. It indicated only that UNIFIL would operate in southern Lebanon and that one of its tasks was to confirm withdrawal of the Israeli forces to the international border. In his report on the implementation of the resolution, which had to take into account the views of the various members of the Security Council, the Secretary-General was unable to propose a clearer definition and merely stated

that UNIFIL would set up an area of operation in consultation with the parties. But the parties had very different perceptions of the tasks of UNIFIL and no agreement could be reached on a definition of its area of operation. This difficulty gravely hampered UNIFIL's work from the very start.

### ***First Deployment***

On 20 March 1978, General Erskine established temporary headquarters in Naqoura, while urgent action was being taken to bring a sufficient number of ground troops to the area at an early date. At the same time, General Siilasvuo initiated negotiations with the Israeli authorities in Jerusalem to secure their agreement to withdraw their troops from Lebanon without delay. Pending the withdrawal, plans were made to deploy the UNIFIL troops in a strip of land immediately south of the Litani River and, in particular, to assume control of the Kasmiyah, Akiya and Khardala bridges, which were the three main crossing-points into southern Lebanon.

The Iranian company of UNDOF and the Swedish company of UNEF, which had been temporarily transferred to UNIFIL at the outset of the operation, were instructed to proceed to the Akiya bridge in the central sector and the Khardala bridge in the eastern sector, respectively. Their movement to their destinations was initially delayed by the opposition of the Christian *de facto* forces which were deployed near those areas. However, this opposition was overcome through negotiations with the Israeli authorities, and the proposed deployment took place on 24 March and the following days. The Iranians established a position at the Akiya bridge and expanded their presence around it, while the Swedes were deployed at the Khardala bridge and in the area of Ebel es Saqi farther east. At the end of March, the Norwegian battalion had arrived and was deployed in the eastern sector and the Swedish company redeployed in the central/western sector.

The French battalion, which began to arrive in Beirut on 23 March, was immediately sent to the Tyre region. The initial plan was for the French troops to deploy throughout the Tyre pocket and take control of the Kasmiyah bridge. But this plan was strongly opposed by the PLO, and it became clear that it could not be achieved without heavy fighting and considerable casualties. In New York, the Arab representatives to the United Nations strongly supported the PLO's view that the Tyre pocket should not be included in UNIFIL's area of operation. In these conditions, the Secretary-General decided to delay the proposed deployment, pending negotiations with the PLO.

Meanwhile, the French battalion set up its headquarters in former Lebanese army barracks outside the city of Tyre. It established check-points around its headquarters and carried out patrolling activities along the front line, on the coastal road from Zahrani to Tyre and in the city of Tyre itself.

In his first periodic report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that, in the absence of a precise initial definition of the limits of the UNIFIL area of operation, attempts originally had been made to deploy elements of UNIFIL in the vicinity of the Kasmiyah bridge, as well as in the Tyre pocket. When this deployment was challenged on the grounds that the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) had not in fact occupied either the bridge or the city of Tyre during the fighting, UNIFIL deployment in the vicinity of that bridge and the Tyre pocket was not pressed.

The UNTSO observers assigned to UNIFILL played an extremely useful role during this formative phase, since they were already familiar with local conditions. They continued to man the five observation posts established by UNTSO in 1972 along the Armistice Demarcation Line. Selected observers served as staff officers at the Naqoura headquarters. Teams of two observers each were attached to the various contingents for liaison and other purposes. Other observers were providing liaison with the Lebanese authorities, the Israeli forces, the PLO and various other armed groups in southern Lebanon. The office of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission in Beirut ensured liaison between UNIFIL and the Lebanese central Government.

### ***Ceasefire***

The situation in southern Lebanon remained volatile during the first days of UNIFIL. As previously mentioned, on 27 March 1978, the Secretary-General had issued an appeal to all the parties concerned to observe a general ceasefire. On 8 April General Erskine reported that the area had been generally quiet since then. However, considerable tension with occasional exchanges of fire continued to prevail in the Tyre area and the eastern sector, which was close to the main base of the Christian *de facto* forces in Marjayoun (Marj Uyun) and the PLO stronghold of Chateau de Beaufort north of the Litani River. UNIFIL troops, which were deployed between the opposing forces in these two sensitive areas, endeavoured to maintain a precarious ceasefire, while the Secretary-General and General Siilasvuo, the Co-ordinator for the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, continued to press the Israeli authorities to withdraw their troops from Lebanon without delay.

## C. UNIFIL Activities: April-June 1978

### *Initial Withdrawal of Israeli Forces*

On 6 April 1978, the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces submitted to General Siilasvuo a plan for an initial withdrawal of the Israeli forces in two phases. In a first phase, to take place on 11 April, the Israeli forces would withdraw from an area west of Marjayoun. The Khardala bridge and a number of villages would be evacuated, but strategic villages such as El Khirba and Deir Mimes (Dayr Mimas) would remain occupied. A second withdrawal would follow on 14 April and would cover a zone extending from a point on the Litani River two kilometres west of the Akiya bridge to a point about one kilometre west of Deir Mimes. The area to be evacuated during the two first phases would cover about 110 square kilometres, about one tenth of the total occupied territory.

The next day, the Secretary-General indicated that the Israeli plan was not satisfactory since Security Council resolution 425(1978) called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces without delay from the entire occupied Lebanese territory. The plan, however, was accepted on the understanding that a further withdrawal would be agreed upon at an early date. The proposed withdrawal took place as scheduled without incident. All the positions evacuated by the Israeli forces were handed over to UNIFIL troops.

Further negotiations between General Siilasvuo and the Israeli authorities led to a third phase of the Israeli withdrawal, which took place on 30 April. This withdrawal was more extensive and covered an area of about 550 square kilometres with an average width of about 18 kilometres. As in the previous withdrawals, the positions evacuated by the Israeli forces were taken over by UNIFIL troops without incident.

Following the third phase of the Israeli withdrawal, UNIFIL was deployed in two separate zones south of the Litani River within an area of about 650 square kilometres or approximately 45 per cent of the territory occupied by Israel. The western zone had an area of about 600 square kilometres and the eastern zone about 50 square kilometres. Between the two zones, there was a gap some 15 kilometres wide just south of Chateau de Beaufort. In this gap, UNIFIL was able to maintain only four isolated positions, including one at the Khardala bridge.

Pending further withdrawals of the Israeli forces, UNIFIL acted to consolidate its control of the area in which it was deployed. Its main

objectives were to supervise and monitor the ceasefire and to ensure that no unauthorized armed personnel entered its area. To this end, observation posts and check-points were set up at various points of entry in its area of deployment, and frequent patrols were conducted throughout the area. All unauthorized armed and uniformed personnel were turned back at entry points and, if they were discovered within the area, UNIFIL troops would endeavour to disarm them and escort them out of its area.

### ***Problems After the Initial Israeli Withdrawal***

Following the third phase of the Israeli withdrawal, UNIFIL was faced with two major problems. First, the Israeli Government was reluctant to relinquish the remaining area and the United Nations efforts to achieve further withdrawal met with increasing resistance. Secondly, PLO armed elements attempted to enter the area evacuated by the Israeli forces on the grounds that they had a legitimate right to do so under the terms of the Cairo agreement of 3 November 1969, concluded between Lebanon and the PLO, under the auspices of President Nasser of Egypt, which dealt with the presence of Palestinians in Lebanon.

The unco-operative attitude of certain PLO armed elements led to some serious clashes during the first days of May in the Tyre area. On 1 May, a group of armed elements attempted to infiltrate a UNIFIL position manned by French soldiers in the Tyre area. When challenged, they opened fire on the French guards, who returned the fire in self-defence and killed two infiltrators. In the following days, French troops were ambushed at various locations and, during the ensuing exchanges of fire, three UNIFIL soldiers were killed and 14 wounded, including the Commander of the French battalion.

### ***Negotiations in the Area***

Strenuous negotiations were engaged in by the Secretary-General and his representatives in the field to prevent infiltration attempts by PLO armed elements and to avoid further incidents. Arafat confirmed that the PLO would co-operate with UNIFIL and that it would not initiate hostile acts against Israel from southern Lebanon, although it would continue its armed struggle from other areas. While the PLO's presence in southern Lebanon was a matter to be settled between itself and the Lebanese Government, the PLO would facilitate UNIFIL's tasks in response to the Secretary-General's appeal. In particular, the PLO would refrain from infiltrating armed elements into the UNIFIL

area of operation. In exchange, Chairman Arafat insisted that the Palestinian armed elements who were already in the UNIFIL area of operation should be allowed to remain there. In order to secure the cooperation of the PLO, UNIFIL agreed to this condition, on the clear understanding that the limited number of armed elements allowed to remain in its area of operation would not be used for military purposes. The agreement involved about 140 armed elements belonging to various groups of the PLO, assembled in six positions.

The Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that for humanitarian reasons, and as an *ad hoc* arrangement, UNIFIL had agreed to allow the delivery, under UNIFIL control, of certain non-military supplies—food, water and medicine—to limited Palestinian groups still in its area of operation. Strict instructions were given to the UNIFIL contingents concerned to keep a close watch over the six PLO positions.

Under the pressure of the United Nations, the Israeli Government announced its decision to withdraw its forces from the remaining occupied territory in Lebanon by 13 June 1978. The modalities for the withdrawal were to be determined between the Israeli authorities and Generals Siilasvuo and Erskine.

Following the announcement of this decision, intensive discussions were held between United Nations representatives and the Lebanese Government regarding the deployment of UNIFIL in the area to be evacuated and, in particular, regarding its relationship with the *de facto* forces under the command of Major Haddad. Pending full establishment of its authority in southern Lebanon, the Lebanese Government announced that it provisionally recognized Major Haddad as *de facto* commander of the Lebanese forces in his present area. The Lebanese army command would issue instructions to Major Haddad to facilitate UNIFIL's mission and deployment.

UNIFIL also engaged in discussions with the Israeli authorities to work out practical arrangements for its deployment in the border area following the Israeli withdrawal. However, no common ground could be reached, and the instructions issued by the Lebanese Government to Major Haddad to facilitate UNIFIL's mission were totally ignored.

#### **D. UNIFIL Activities: June 1978-July 1981**

##### ***Last Phase of the Israeli Withdrawal***

On the afternoon of 13 June 1978, General Erskine reported that, the Israeli forces had withdrawn from southern Lebanon. This

information was transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council. The manner in which the Israeli forces carried out the last phase of withdrawal, however, created major problems for UNIFIL. In contrast to the procedure followed during the previous three withdrawal phases, the IFD on 13 June turned over most of its positions not to UNIFIL but to the *de facto* forces of Major Haddad, on the grounds that the IDF considered him a legitimate representative of the Lebanese Government. UNIFIL units were able to occupy only five positions evacuated by the Israeli forces on that day, because the *de facto* forces, which had been strongly armed by the Israelis, threatened to use force to oppose any attempts by UNIFIL to gain wider deployment.

In a letter dated 13 June, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan informed the Secretary-General that Israel had fulfilled its part in the implementation of Security Council resolution 425(1978). In his reply, the Secretary-General observed that the difficult task lying ahead for UNIFIL had not been facilitated by the decision of the Israeli Government not to turn over control of the evacuated area to UNIFIL. He added that he was making efforts to deal satisfactorily with the consequences of that development, in co-operation with the Lebanese Government.

### ***Difficulties in Deployment***

In order to fulfil its mandate, UNIFIL had to be fully deployed in its entire area of operation, including the enclave controlled by the *de facto* forces of Major Haddad. The first objective of the Force after the events of 13 June 1978 was therefore to expand its deployment in the enclave. Pending realisation of this objective, UNIFIL would continue to ensure that the area where it actually was deployed would not be used for hostile activities of any kind. It would endeavour to stop and contain infiltrations by the armed elements of the PLO and the Lebanese National Movement, as well as incursions and encroachments by the *de facto* forces or the Israeli forces. It would also endeavour to maintain the ceasefire and prevent a resumption of hostilities in and around its area. At the same time, UNIFIL would exert all possible efforts to assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its authority and promote the return to normalcy in its area of deployment.

In these various fields of activity, UNIFIL encountered serious difficulties. No significant further deployment could be achieved in the enclave and, although hostile actions could be contained in UNIFIL's area of deployment to a large extent, there were frequent and destructive exchanges of fire between the opposing forces over

and across its area until 24 July 1981, when ceasefire arrangements were worked out through a joint effort by the United States and the United Nations. The various objectives pursued by the Interim Force were closely interconnected, and set-backs in one inevitably affected the others.

### ***Efforts Towards Further Deployment in the Enclave***

Immediately after 13 June, the Secretary-General instructed General Siilasvuo and General Erskine to exert every effort, in close co-operation with the Lebanese Government, to achieve progressively wider deployment of UNIFIL in the enclave until the Force would ultimately be in a position effectively to discharge its mandate in its entire area of operation. He made it clear, however, that it remained his intention to utilize peaceful and diplomatic means to achieve this objective.

As a result of renewed efforts, UNIFIL was able to occupy 14 additional positions in the enclave in June and July and another five positions in September 1978. By that date, UNIFIL held a total of 24 positions in the enclave, in addition to its headquarters at Naqoura and the five posts previously established by UNTSO along the Armistice Demarcation Line. But no further deployment could be achieved.

In his periodic report of 13 September 1978 to the Security Council, and in subsequent periodic reports, the Secretary-General pointed to the efforts made by him and his representatives to secure the full deployment of UNIFIL in its area of operation and the lack of progress in this regard. The Council repeatedly reaffirmed its determination to implement its resolutions on UNIFIL in the totality of the area of operation assigned to the Force, and called upon all the parties to extend the necessary co-operation to UNIFIL. The requests of the Security Council remained unheeded.

This situation prevented UNIFIL from fulfilling an essential part of its mandate and made its other tasks considerably more difficult.

### ***Prevention of Infiltration by Armed Elements***

Infiltration attempts resumed and increased soon after 13 June 1978. The inability of UNIFIL to take over the enclave from the pro-Israeli *de facto* forces was undoubtedly a contributing cause of the increase of infiltration attempts.

In order to prevent infiltration, UNIFIL established check-points at points of entry and along the main and secondary road networks in

its area of deployment. UNIFIL soldiers, often assisted by Lebanese gendarmes, checked and inspected vehicles and personnel for military equipment and supplies at the check-points. Foot and motorized patrols were conducted day and night along key highways, in villages, as well as in remote wadis (ravines), and random, night-time listening posts were established at selected localities to detect unauthorized armed movement.

After July 1979, UNIFIL's troops were redeployed in greater density along the perimeter of the UNIFIL area in order better to control infiltration, and a steady effort was made to improve its surveillance and detection capability. In particular, the number of night-vision by binoculars and strong searchlights was markedly increased, while the introduction of sophisticated ground surveillance radar provided the Force with an effective early warning system at medium range. Uniformed and armed personnel stopped at the check-points or caught by patrols were escorted out of the UNIFIL area.

According to the records of UNIFIL, 40 major attempts involving some 140 armed elements were thwarted by the Force during the first six months of 1979. Some 785 infiltration attempts were stopped and turned back during the second half of 1979, 500 during the first half of 1980, 384 during the second half of the same year, and 490 from January to June 1981.

The armed elements stopped at check-points generally surrendered their weapons and left the UNIFIL area peacefully. There were, however, exceptions, when the efforts of UNIFIL to stop infiltrations were resisted and led to violent incidents. In some cases, the armed elements stopped at check-points or by patrols reacted by firing at UNIFIL soldiers, who then had to return fire in self-defence. At other times, the infiltrators, after being turned back, would return with reinforcements to attack the UNIFIL position involved. In the most serious instances, armed elements retaliated by laying in ambush against UNIFIL personnel, not only at the scene of the original incident but also against UNIFIL positions or patrols elsewhere. As often as possible, UNIFIL tried to resolve all incidents by negotiation.

Given the difficulty of the terrain, the limited size of UNIFIL and its lack of enforcement power, it was virtually impossible to prevent all infiltration attempts. The difficulty in controlling infiltration was compounded by the existence of many arms caches in the UNIFIL area. Over the years, the PLO had set up a network of such caches throughout southern Lebanon. UNIFIL found and destroyed many of them, but many others remained.

Since UNIFIL did not want to hamper the movement of innocent civilians, persons in civilian clothes could freely enter its area, provided that they had a valid identification card and did not carry weapons. It was relatively easy for PLO personnel and their Lebanese allies to pass through UNIFIL check-points unarmed and, once inside the area, get the weapons from the caches. Armed elements could also infiltrate into the UNIFIL area with their weapons through uncharted trails and dirt tracks which could not be covered by UNIFIL check-points or observation posts. Inside the UNIFIL area, the PLO, and particularly the Lebanese National Movement, still had many sympathizers who voluntarily or under pressure gave the infiltrators shelter or other assistance. Despite its vigilance, UNIFIL could not detect and stop all such infiltrators.

In those conditions, the most effective way of stopping or at least controlling infiltration was to secure the co-operation of the PLO. The PLO leadership did co-operate with UNIFIL to a significant degree. There were no major-scale infiltration attempts and, when incidents involving infiltration occurred, the PLO leadership assisted UNIFIL in resolving them. But in a number of exceptional cases, the PLO was either unwilling or unable to help, and a number of armed elements succeeded in infiltrating into the UNIFIL area and in setting up some additional positions inside it.

By July 1981, the number of Palestinian armed elements inside the UNIFIL area had increased to about 450, according to UNIFIL estimates, and they had established some 30 positions inside that area. There was, in particular, a concentration of armed element positions in the Jwayya area near the Tyre pocket. UNIFIL tried to have those positions removed by negotiations with the PLO at the highest level, but its efforts were inconclusive.

Nevertheless, UNIFIL did control infiltration by armed elements to an important degree. The number of such elements who succeeded in infiltrating the UNIFIL area was relatively limited, and most of those remained confined to the northern part of the area, well away from the frontier.

Records of UNIFIL indicate that after its establishment in March 1978, there was only one major raid into northern Israel by PLO armed elements coming from its area. This happened on 6/7 April 1980, when five armed elements belonging to the Arab Liberation Front crossed the Armistice Demarcation Line and attacked the kibbutz of Misgav Am. To do this, a group would have had to cross not only

UNIFIL areas ' but also the enclave and the border. All five infiltrators and three Israeli civilians were killed during the incident.

### ***Harassment by de Facto Forces***

The activities of the *de facto* forces under the command of Major Haddad also created serious difficulties for UNIFIL. No precise figures on the strength of those forces are available, but it is generally estimated that they numbered about 1,500 in June 1978. The *de facto* forces were formed around a nucleus of some 700 former Christian soldiers of the Lebanese National Army, to which were added smaller groups of Christian phalangists from the north and locally recruited Christian and Shi'ite villagers. They were financed, armed and uniformed by the Israeli authorities.

The measures devised by UNIFIL to prevent infiltrations by the Palestinians and Lebanese leftist armed elements were also applied to the *de facto* forces, but there were few infiltrators from the enclave, and the main problems the United Nations encountered with these forces concerned the actions taken by them to harass UNIFIL and the local population, and their attempts to encroach upon the UNIFIL area.

While making clear that full deployment in the enclave remained its main objective, UNIFIL concentrated its immediate efforts on preserving the installations it held there and on securing the freedom of movement it required to this effect. With the assistance of the Israeli army, a *modus vivendi* was reached with the *de facto* forces whereby UNIFIL troops would enjoy freedom of movement on the main roads in the enclave five days a week in order to rotate personnel and re-supply its installations. UNIFIL helicopters could fly over the enclave when necessary, but each overflight had to be cleared with Major Haddad's command on an *ad hoc* basis. However, even this limited freedom of movement was occasionally denied UNIFIL. When difficulties of one kind or another arose between UNIFIL and the *de facto* forces, Major Haddad would retaliate by closing the roads in the enclave to United Nations personnel and vehicles. This retaliatory measure would be taken either against UNIFIL as a whole or against specific contingents.

During periods of tension, some UNIFIL positions in the enclave, and particularly the five observation posts along the Armistice Demarcation Line, were at times completely isolated, and the United Nations personnel manning them subjected to severe harassment. In some cases, the observation posts were broken into by militiamen,

their equipment stolen and the United Nations personnel threatened. On three occasions, the *de facto* forces attacked the UNIFIL headquarters itself with mortar and artillery fire, causing casualties and considerable material damage.

In October 1978, at about the same time as the PLO intensified its attempts to infiltrate the UNIFIL area, the attitude of the *de facto* forces hardened further. These forces began to harass the local population in the UNIFIL area in various ways. A number of Shi'ite villages were subjected to occasional shelling from positions in the enclave, and the villagers were threatened with punitive measures if they continued to co-operate with UNIFIL. In a few instances, the *de facto* forces sent raiding parties into the UNIFIL area to abduct persons suspected of pro-PLO sentiments or to blow up their houses. This sort of pressure on the local population markedly increased after Haddad proclaimed the constitution of the so-called "State of Free Lebanon" in April 1979. UNIFIL strongly protested the harassment with the Israeli authorities. To deter attacks against villages in its area, it established additional positions in their vicinity.

From December 1978 onwards, the *de facto* forces made several attempts to set up positions within the UNIFIL area. These attempts were carried out by strongly armed groups, sometimes supported by tanks. Whenever this occurred, UNIFIL sent reinforcements to surround the raiding parties and, at the same time, tried by negotiation to have their positions removed, usually with the assistance of the Israeli army. In some cases, the raiding parties were persuaded to leave peacefully, but in others the negotiations were unsuccessful. Thus, five encroachment positions were established by the *de facto* forces between July 1979 and July 1980, all of which were located in strategic areas commanding views of important access roads.

To remove these positions, UNIFIL would have had to use force against the *de facto* forces and possibly the Israel Defence Forces, and casualties would have been heavy. In the circumstances, it was decided instead to seek a negotiated solution through the Israeli authorities. The Secretary-General raised this matter with the Israeli Government at the highest level but was told that Israel considered those positions important for its security and would not intercede to have them removed.

While, as a matter of principle and policy, UNIFIL sought to contain the actions of the *de facto* forces by negotiation, its troops were sometimes obliged to resist harassments and to use force in self-defence.

Despite the restraint displayed by UNIFIL soldiers, violent incidents occurred in some cases.

On 24 April 1980, following an incident in which the *de facto* forces directed heavy shelling at UNIFIL headquarters, the Security Council adopted resolution 467(1980), by which it deplored all acts of hostilities against UNIFIL in or through its area of operation and condemned the deliberate shelling of the headquarters.

### ***Israeli Activities in and Near the Enclave***

After 13 June 1978, the Israeli Government took the position that its forces had withdrawn from Lebanese territory in accordance with Security Council resolution 425(1978) and that henceforth it was no longer responsible for what happened in the enclave.

During the initial months, the presence of the Israel Defence Force in the enclave appeared limited, but from November 1979 onwards, IDF activities increased. Israeli soldiers were frequently observed laying mines, manning check-points, transporting water and supplies and constructing new positions inside Lebanon in the border areas.

In late 1980, UNIFIL reported an increasing number of encroachments by the IDF along the Armistice Demarcation Line. The original border-fence remained intact, but beyond it the IDF established new positions at selected points, laid minefields, fenced in certain strips of land and built dirt tracks and asphalt roads. At the same time, the presence of the IDF inside the enclave was greatly expanded. IDF gun and tank positions were established near Marjayoun, Major Haddad's headquarters, and along the coastal road. IDF personnel were sighted in various locations well inside the enclave. In the course of 1980, the IDF openly conducted military exercises near OP Khiam, a United Nations observation post north of the border.

On a number of occasions, the IDF carried out incursions into the UNIFIL area in search of PLO armed elements. UNIFIL took all possible measures to stop those incursions, and its efforts led at times to confrontations with IDF personnel, which were generally resolved by negotiation.

In addition to its activities in the enclave, the IDF frequently intruded into Lebanese air space and territorial waters. Its aircraft constantly flew over Lebanon for observation purposes and its patrol boats were often observed cruising near the Lebanese coast. The air and sea violations greatly increased after June 1980. During November 1980 alone, UNIFIL observed 312 air violations and 89 sea violations.

## **E. Hostile Actions Near the UNIFIL Area**

### ***Introduction***

The UNIFIL area constituted an imperfect buffer between the opposing forces. The area was divided into two parts, with a gap of about 15 kilometres between them. In this gap, where the two opposing sides were separated only by the Litani River, UNIFIL was able to set up four positions, including one at the Khardala bridge, to provide at least a limited United Nations presence. But the gun positions of the PLO in its stronghold of Chateau de Beaufort north of the river, and those of the *de facto* forces in and around Marjayoun, reinforced in 1980 by IDF tanks and artillery, were not far apart. From its positions in the Tyre pocket and Chateau de Beaufort, the PLO's heavy artillery and rockets could easily reach villages and towns in northern Israel, including Nahariyya, Metulla and Kiryat Shemona.

From March 1979 onwards, there were frequent exchanges of fire between the PLO and the *de facto* forces across the gap and over the UNIFIL area. When fighting intensified, the IDF would come to the support of the *de facto* forces and, in retaliation, PLO fighters would direct their heavy artillery and rockets at targets in northern Israel, which would in turn provoke violent reprisals by the IDF. Whenever PLO shelling resulted in Israeli casualties, and also after incidents inside Israel or Israeli-occupied territories for which the PLO claimed responsibility, IDF would send its war-planes to launch massive attacks against PLO targets north of the UNIFIL area, sometimes as far as Beirut. In some cases, Israeli commandos were dispatched to destroy PLO installations.

Both the Israeli war-planes and the commandos would, as a rule, avoid the UNIFIL area by flying over the gap or taking the sea route. Since the armed forces engaged in the hostilities were located outside its area, UNIFIL could not take direct action to prevent or stop them. It did, however, endeavour to arrange ceasefires whenever possible, and brought the most serious cases to the attention of the Security Council. Within one year, there were two series of serious hostilities; one in August 1980 and the other in July 1981.

### ***Hostilities of August 1980***

During the evening of 18 August 1980, a heavy exchange of fire broke out between *de facto* /IDF forces and PLO positions north of the Litani and continued with varying intensity for five days. According to UNIFIL observers, the *de facto* forces fired approximately 2,460 rounds

of artillery, mortar and tank fire, and the PLO armed elements about 300 rounds. On 19 and 20 August, Israeli war-planes attacked various PLO targets in the Chateau de Beaufort and Arnun areas.

On 19 August, while the shelling and bombing were in progress, a group of about 200 IDF troops, transported by helicopter, carried out a commando raid to destroy PLO installations in and around the villages of Arnun and Kafr Tibnit. This operation was preceded by a buildup of IDF personnel and equipment throughout the enclave, where about 50 artillery pieces, 70 assorted vehicles and seven heavy helicopters were sighted by UNIFIL. According to Lebanese and Palestinian sources, the attacks resulted in at least 25 killed, including five Lebanese civilians, and 26 wounded, as well as very heavy destruction of houses and other property. The Israeli authorities indicated that the operation was intended to destroy PLO artillery and mortar nests which had shelled Israel's northern settlements and Major Haddad's enclave in southern Lebanon.

### ***Hostilities of July 1981***

The fighting which broke out in July 1981 was even more extensive. On 10 July, during an exchange of fire with the *de facto*/IDF positions, PLO forces shelled the town of Kiryat Shemona in northern Israel with rockets, resulting, according to Israeli authorities, in the wounding of six civilians. On the same day, Israeli war-planes attacked PLO targets in Lebanon north of the UNIFIL area. The air attacks were followed by renewed exchanges of fire between the PLO armed elements' and the IDF and *de facto* forces' positions.

On 13 and 14 July, widespread Israeli air attacks continued and PLO armed elements again fired rockets into northern Israel, wounding, according to Israeli sources, two Israeli civilians in the coastal town of Nahariyya. The next day, there was a particularly heavy exchange of fire with a total of about 1,000 rounds of artillery, mortar and rockets fired by the two sides.

On 16 and 17 July, exchanges of fire intensified, with Israeli naval vessels joining in, while Israeli aircraft destroyed bridges on the Zahrani and Litani rivers and launched an intense attack on Beirut itself, causing heavy loss of life and damage to property. Exchanges of fire in all sectors, as well as Israeli air strikes and naval bombardments, continued on 18 and 19 July and, on a gradually declining scale, until 24 July.

During the period of intense violence in July, UNIFIL recorded the firing of some 7,500 rounds of artillery, mortar, tank and naval

cannons by the IDF and the *de facto* forces, in addition to Israeli air strikes, and the firing of about 2,500 rounds of artillery, mortar and rockets by PLO armed elements. The total casualties during this period were six dead and 59 wounded on the Israeli side, immeasurably more among the Palestinians and Lebanese.

### ***Security Council Action***

The Security Council met on 17 July 1981 at the request of the Lebanese Government. On the same day, the Council President issued an urgent appeal to the parties for restraint and an immediate end to all armed attacks.

On 21 July, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 490 (1981), by which it called for an immediate cessation of all armed attacks and reaffirmed its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries.

### ***July Ceasefire***

Following adoption of the resolution, parallel efforts undertaken by the United Nations and the United States Government led to the establishment of a *de facto* ceasefire on 24 July 1981.

On the morning of that day, Ambassador Philip Habib, the personal representative of the President of the United States, issued a statement in Jerusalem to the effect that, as of 1330 hours, 24 July 1981, all hostile military action between Lebanese and Israeli territory in either direction would cease.

The Secretary-General, who had been kept fully informed of the efforts of Ambassador Habib, immediately brought this statement to the attention of the Security Council. He also reported to the Council that the Israeli Government had endorsed the statement, that the Lebanese Government had welcomed it, and that the PLO had assured him that it would observe the ceasefire called for by the Security Council. The Commander of UNIFIL reported on 24 July that, as of 1320 hours local time, the area was quiet.

## **F. Efforts to Restore the Authority of the Lebanese Government in Southern Lebanon**

### ***Civilian Administration***

After 13 June 1978, when it became apparent that Israeli control would continue in the enclave for an indefinite period, UNIFIL had to

alter its original plan. While the Force would continue its efforts to assume control of the enclave through negotiations, it took action to help the Lebanese to deploy as many administrators and elements of the Lebanese army and the internal security forces as possible in the area controlled by it.

Initially, UNIFIL's attention was focused on getting the Lebanese Government to send civilian administrative and technical personnel and elements of the Lebanese internal security forces (gendarmes) to southern Lebanon. By late July 1978, the Lebanese Government was represented south of the Litani River by a civilian administrator residing at Tyre, and by nearly 100 gendarmes based at Tyre and at three centres in the UNIFIL area. The gendarmes worked in close co-operation with UNIFIL in its area. They assisted UNIFIL soldiers in the inspection of personnel and vehicles at check-points and, in many instances, served as interpreters and liaison officers with the local population. Civil offences reported to UNIFIL were handed over to the gendarmes for investigation.

UNIFIL carried out various humanitarian activities and rehabilitation programmes in close co-operation with the Lebanese authorities and the Co-ordinator of United Nations Assistance for the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon. It took an active part in the execution of projects involving restoration of water, electricity and health services, distribution of supplementary food supplies and the rebuilding and repair of houses, schools and roads. The UNIFIL hospital and the medical facilities of its contingents were open to the local population, which used those services frequently.

### ***Army Deployment, 1978***

In the course of July 1978, extensive consultations were held between the Lebanese authorities and UNIFIL regarding the possibility of bringing Lebanese army units to the UNIFIL area of operation. Many obstacles had to be overcome. The *de facto* forces and the Israeli authorities were opposed to any move of the Lebanese army to the south. For different reasons, the PLO, which controlled the key coastal road from Sidon to Tyre, also opposed such a move.

The Lebanese National Army was still in the process of reconstruction and reorganisation. Despite the difficulties involved, the Government of Lebanon decided to dispatch a task force of the Lebanese army to southern Lebanon on 31 July. This task force, consisting of 700 men, and equipment, was to travel to Tibnin through the Bekaa Valley, through Kaoukaba (Kawkaba), a village on the

northern edge of the UNIFIL area, and through Marjayoun, the headquarters of the *de facto* forces. The Secretary-General was informed of this decision On 25 July and an announcement was made by the Lebanese Government on the same day.

Following this announcement, UNIFIL contacted the Israeli authorities at various levels and requested their help to ensure that the *de facto* forces would not oppose the proposed move. The Israeli authorities refused to intervene on the grounds that it was a Lebanese internal affair.

The task force left the Beirut area in the early morning of 31 July and reached Kaoukaba a few hours later. On arrival, it was subjected to intense artillery and mortar fire by the *de facto* forces. Confronted with this hostile action, the task force decided to remain in Kaoukaba while the United Nations tried to secure by negotiation the co-operation of the *de facto* forces for the peaceful transit of the Lebanese army contingent. But the efforts of the Secretary-General and his representatives in the field proved inconclusive in the face of the adamant opposition of Major Haddad and with the Israeli authorities declining to help.

On the following days, the *de facto* forces continuously harassed the task force and fired more than 300 artillery rounds at it, killing one Lebanese soldier and wounding nine others. In August, the task force withdrew from Kaoukaba.

### ***Army Deployment, 1979***

Following this attempt, UNIFIL engaged in new consultations with the Lebanese authorities in an effort to find alternative ways of bringing Lebanese army units into southern Lebanon.

On 22 December 1978, joint working group of UNIFIL and Lebanese army officials was set up to work out a plan of action. On the proposal of the group, small teams of Lebanese army personnel were flown to southern Lebanon by UNIFIL helicopters and were assigned to various UNIFIL contingents to represent the Lebanese Government in their respective sectors.

In renewing the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of five months, the Security Council, by resolution 444(1979) of 19 January 1979, invited the Lebanese Government to draw up, in consultation with the Secretary-General, a phased programme of activities to be carried out over the next three months to promote the restoration of its authority in southern Lebanon. The programme as worked out by

the Lebanese Government with the assistance of UNIFIL set for its first phase four main objectives: (1) an increase of the Lebanese civilian administrative presence in the south; (2) the introduction of a battalion of the Lebanese National Army in the UNIFIL area; (3) the consolidation of the ceasefire in the area; and (4) further deployment of UNIFIL in the enclave.

Within this programme, a Lebanese army battalion of 500 men was deployed in the UNIFIL area in April 1979. The *de facto* forces tried to prevent the deployment by subjecting UNIFIL headquarters and some of its positions to intense shelling from 15 to 18 April. These attacks caused casualties and heavy material damage, but UNIFIL stood firm, and the deployment of the Lebanese battalion proceeded as planned and was completed on 17 April. The Lebanese battalion, which was placed under the operational control of the Force Commander, set up its headquarters at Arzun in the Nigerian sector.

### ***Army Deployment, 1980-1981***

In December 1980, the strength of the Lebanese battalion was increased to 617 men with the addition of some medical and engineering elements. Initially, the Lebanese battalion confined its activities to the immediate vicinity of Arzun, but, from early 1981 on, some of its units were gradually deployed in various UNIFIL sectors.

In June 1981, a second Lebanese battalion was brought to the UNIFIL area, this time without incident, and raised the total strength of the Lebanese army presence in southern Lebanon to 1,350 all ranks. The new battalion included an engineering unit of 130, which assisted in various local projects, and a medical team of 10 assigned to the Tibnin hospital.

### ***Efforts to Reactivate the General Armistice Agreement***

To promote the restoration of its authority and sovereignty in southern Lebanon, the Lebanese Government sought to reactivate the 1949 General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon and the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) established under that Agreement.

In resolution 450(1979) of 14 June 1979, on a further extension of UNIFIL's mandate, the Security Council reaffirmed the validity of the General Armistice Agreement and called upon the parties to take the necessary steps to reactivate ILMAC. A plan of action, which the Secretary-General worked out in consultation with the Lebanese

Government in September 1979, set as the main long-term objective of the Force the restoration of the effective authority of the Lebanese Government in southern Lebanon up to the internationally recognized boundary, and the normalisation of the area, including the reactivation of ILMAC in accordance with the 1949 Agreement.

In resolution 467(1980) of 24 April 1980, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to convene a meeting of ILMAC, at an appropriate level, to agree on precise recommendations and further to reactivate the General Armistice Agreement conducive to the restoration of the sovereignty of Lebanon over all its territory up to the internationally recognized boundaries.

The Chief of Staff of UNTSO, General Erskine, who had been asked by the Secretary-General to follow up on that resolution, proposed on 18 November 1980 that a meeting preliminary to the convening of ILMAC be held at Naqura on 1 December. On 25 November, the Lebanese authorities agreed to the proposed meeting and insisted that it be attended by the Chairman of ILMAC. On 26 November, the Israeli authorities replied, stating that the Mixed Armistice Commission was no longer valid and that, as far as they were concerned, the proposed meeting could not be regarded as a preliminary meeting of ILMAC. They added, however, that this should not stand in the way of a meeting between Israeli and Lebanese representatives at the appropriate level, and they agreed to meet with the Lebanese representatives on the date and at the venue suggested by General Erskine.

The meeting took place at UNIFIL headquarters on 1 December 1980, under the chairmanship of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO. Israel and Lebanon were represented by senior military officers. Although the two sides disagreed on the validity of the General Armistice Agreement, they discussed the situation in southern Lebanon, particularly along the border. The Lebanese representative complained about the establishment of IDF positions in southern Lebanon and incursions by IDF personnel into Lebanese territory, while the Israeli representative asserted that Israel had no designs on Lebanon. Following this meeting, the UNTSO Chief of Staff kept in contact with both sides with a view to arranging another meeting in the near future, but no agreement could be reached.

### **G. Ceasefire: July 1981-April 1982**

The ceasefire arrangements of 24 July 1981 were accepted by all the parties, and on that day all firing stopped.

UNIFIL kept close contact with the parties to ensure the maintenance of the ceasefire. Lieutenant-General William Callaghan, Commander of UNIFIL, obtained an undertaking from each of the parties that in the event of a breach of the ceasefire by the opposing side, the other side would exercise maximum restraint and, rather than take retaliatory action, would refer the matter to UNIFIL for resolution.

During the following days, however, the situation remained unstable because a dissident PLO group led by Ahmed Jibril continued to fire sporadically at targets in the enclave. General Callaghan strongly protested those violations of the ceasefire to the PLO command. Chairman Arafat replied that the firings were due to a misunderstanding and that the PLO was determined to observe strictly the ceasefire. On 27 July, following a meeting with Arafat, Jibril announced that his group would respect the ceasefire.

A second problem which threatened the ceasefire during the initial period arose from the continuing overflights of Israeli reconnaissance aircraft in southern Lebanon, which the PLO protested as violations of the ceasefire arrangements. In spite of approaches by the Commander of UNIFIL, Israel refused to stop such overflights on the grounds that they were not covered by the ceasefire arrangements. The Israeli overflights did not, however, provoke retaliatory action by the PLO.

The ceasefire held remarkably well until April 1982. For eight months the situation in southern Lebanon was quiet and there were no firings between the PLO and the *de facto*/IDF forces in the area.

With the restoration of the ceasefire in July 1981, the general situation in southern Lebanon had become much less tense. However, UNIFIL continued to experience serious difficulties with both the armed elements of the PLO and the Lebanese National Movement and with the *de facto* forces of Major Haddad. The armed elements continued their infiltration attempts after July 1981, though at a lower level. UNIFIL soldiers turned back 175 infiltrators in July 1981, 95 in August, 18 in September, 90 in October, 27 in November, 25 in December, 70 in January 1982, 27 in February, 98 in March, 69 in April and 27 in May. In a more serious development, PLO armed elements established additional positions in the UNIFIL area near the Tyre pocket. The Force immediately placed those positions under close surveillance to ensure that they would not be used for tactical or hostile purposes. At the same time, negotiations were engaged in with the PLO leadership to have them removed, but the talks were inconclusive.

Relations with the *de facto* forces also remained tense. Those forces continued to impose restrictions on UNIFIL's freedom of movement in the enclave. In the UNIFIL area of deployment, they not only continued to maintain four positions they had established, but set up a new one near the village of At Tiri, in the Irish sector. The Force Commander sought the assistance of the Israeli authorities in this regard, stressing that the position was clearly provocative and might jeopardize the ceasefire. While the negotiations were in progress, the *de facto* forces harassed the UNIFIL headquarters at Naqoura and some of its positions in the enclave by cutting off their supply lines. The harassments were eventually stopped with the help of the IDF, but the new position remained.

During this period of relative quiet, UNIFIL had to contend with a new problem in its area. In the later months, Amal, a Shi'ite paramilitary organisation, became more active in southern Lebanon, and there was mounting animosity between its followers and members of the pro-Palestinian Lebanese National Movement. Serious clashes broke out between the two groups in January and in April 1982 in the Senegalese sector, and UNIFIL had to intervene to help restore law and order.

#### **H. Israeli Invasion: 1982-1985 Breakdown of the Ceasefire**

In early April 1982, tension markedly increased in southern Lebanon, not because of any violations of the ceasefire in the area but as a consequence of events elsewhere.

On 3 April, an Israeli diplomat was assassinated in Paris and the Israeli Government held the PLO responsible, although responsibility was denied by that organisation. On 13 April, the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations complained to the Security Council that, on the previous night, two PLO terrorists with large quantities of explosives had attempted to infiltrate into Israel from Jordanian territory. On 21 April, Israel launched massive air attacks against PLO targets in southern Lebanon. The PLO took no retaliatory action.

On the same day, the Secretary-General appealed for an immediate cessation of all hostile acts and urged all parties to exercise maximum restraint so that the ceasefire could be fully restored and maintained. On 22 April, the President of the Security Council issued a statement on behalf of the members of the Council in which he demanded an end to all armed attacks and warned against any recurrence of violations

of the ceasefire, in accordance with Security Council resolution 490(1981) of 21 July 1981.

On 9 May 1982, Israeli aircraft again attacked PLO targets in several localities in Lebanon, causing many casualties. Following these attacks, PLO positions in the Tyre pocket fired rockets into northern Israel, for the first time since July 1981. The next day, the Lebanese Government strongly protested the Israeli air attacks as an act of aggression against Lebanon. The Permanent Representative of Israel, also addressed a letter to the President of the Council on that day in which he drew attention to recent terrorist attacks against civilians in Israel, for which Israel held the PLO responsible. Intense efforts were made by the United Nations both at its New York Headquarters and in the field to restore the ceasefire. There were no further incidents in the area in May, but the situation remained extremely volatile.

On the night of 3 June, the Israeli Ambassador to the Court of St. James was seriously wounded in London in a terrorist attack. Although the PLO disclaimed any responsibility for this assassination attempt, Israel launched on 4 June massive bombing raids against PLO targets in and around Beirut, causing heavy loss of life and destruction. Shortly after those attacks, intense exchanges of fire broke out between the PLO and the *de facto*/IDF positions in southern Lebanon, over the UNIFIL area. The Israeli towns of Nahariyya, Kiryat Shemona and Metulla came under PLO artillery and rocket fire.

On the same afternoon, the Secretary-General urgently appealed to all concerned to desist from all hostile acts and to make every effort to restore the ceasefire. Later that day, the President of the Security Council made a similar appeal on behalf of the members of the Council. Nevertheless, the exchanges of artillery fire continued unabated on 5 June in the same general areas. There were also intense Israeli air strikes in the vicinity of Beirut and Damur, and shelling by Israeli naval vessels in the Tyre area.

The Secretary-General, who was in continuous touch with the parties concerned, again made an urgent appeal on 5 June for a simultaneous cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible time. Later the same day, the Security Council met and unanimously adopted resolution 508(1982), by which it called upon all the parties to the conflict to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Israeli-Lebanese border at no later than 0600 hours local time on Sunday, 6 June.

Immediately after the adoption of that resolution, the Secretary-General instructed the Commander of UNIFIL to utilise every possibility of following up on the Council's resolution. On the same evening, the PLO reaffirmed its commitment to stop all military operations across the Lebanese border, while reserving the right to respond to Israeli attacks. The Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General that, while Israeli actions were taken in the exercise of its right of self-defence, the Council's resolution would be brought before the Israeli Cabinet. From 2300 hours local time on 5 June until 0600 hours the next morning, there were intermittent and relatively light exchanges of fire between the opposing sides, but shortly after 0600 hours, which was the ceasefire time set by the Security Council, Israeli forces launched intensive air attacks against various PLO targets in southern Lebanon.

### ***Israeli Invasion, June 1982***

At 1030 hours local time on the morning of 6 June, General Callaghan met with Lieutenant-General Rafael Eitan, the Chief of Staff of the IDF, at Metulla in northern Israel. General Callaghan's purpose was to discuss the implementation of Security Council resolution 508(1982), but instead he was told by General Eitan that the IDF planned to launch a military operation into Lebanon within half an hour, at 1100 hours local time. General Eitan also intimated that the Israeli forces would pass through or near UNIFIL positions and that he expected that UNIFIL would raise no physical difficulty to the advancing troops. General Callaghan protested in the strongest terms to this totally unacceptable course of action.

Immediately after the meeting, General Callaghan issued instructions to all UNIFIL units, in case of attack by one of the parties, to block advancing forces, take defensive measures and stay in their positions unless their safety was "seriously imperilled".

At 1100 hours local time, about two IDF mechanized divisions, with full air and naval support, crossed the border and entered the UNIFIL area. They advanced along three main axes: in the western sector, along the coastal road; in the central sector, towards Ett Taibe (At Tayyibah) and the Akiya bridge; and in the eastern sector, through the Kafr Shuba-Shab'a (Chouba-Chebaa) area.

In accordance with their general instructions, UNIFIL troops took various measures to stop, or at least delay, the advance of the Israeli forces. On the coastal road leading to Tyre, Dutch soldiers planted

obstacles before an advancing Israeli tank column and damaged one tank. During the encounter, Israeli tank barrels were trained on the Dutch soldiers while Israeli troops pushed aside the obstacles.

Other UNIFIL battalions also put up obstacles of various kinds, which were forcibly removed or bulldozed. A small Nepalese position guarding the Khardala bridge stood its ground for two days despite continued harassments and threats. Only after two days, on the morning of 8 June, could the Israeli tanks cross the bridge after partially destroying the Nepalese position.

Despite these efforts, the UNIFIL soldiers with their light defensive weapons could not withstand the massive Israeli invading forces, and the UNIFIL positions in the line of the invasion were bypassed or over—run within 24 hours. One Norwegian soldier was killed by shrapnel on 6 June.

On the morning of 6 June, the Security Council met again and unanimously adopted resolution 509(1982), by which it demanded that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon, and that all parties observe strictly the ceasefire.

On the evening of 7 June, Chairman Arafat informed the Secretary-General that the Lebanese-Palestinian joint command had decided to abide by the Security Council's resolution. The Permanent Representative of Israel replied on behalf of his Government that the "Peace for Galilee" operation had been ordered because of the intolerable situation created by the presence in Lebanon of a large number of "terrorists" operating from that country and threatening the lives of the civilians of Galilee, and that any withdrawal of Israeli forces prior to the conclusion of concrete arrangements which would permanently and reliably preclude hostile action against Israel's citizens was inconceivable.

### ***UNIFIL's Interim Tasks***

In commenting on the invasion in his report of 14 June 1982 to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that UNIFIL, like all other United Nations peace-keeping operations, was based on certain fundamental principles, foremost of which was the non-use of force, except in self-defence. The Force was not meant to engage in combat to attain its goals; it had a strictly limited strength, armed only with light defensive weapons. It was for these reasons that certain essential conditions had been laid down at the time of the establishment of the

Force. Those included, first, that it must function with the full co-operation of the parties concerned and, second, that it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council. In this connection, it was a fundamental assumption that the parties would fully abide by the Council's decisions and that, in the event of non-compliance, the Council itself and those Member States in a position to bring their influence to bear would be able to act decisively to ensure respect for those decisions.

In the case of UNIFIL, those conditions were not met. Instead, UNIFIL had been faced with inadequate co-operation throughout its existence, culminating in an overwhelming use of force. Once the Israeli action commenced, it was evident that UNIFIL troops could, at best, maintain their positions and take defensive measures, seeking to impede and protest the advance.

The Israeli invasion of June 1982 radically altered the circumstances in which UNIFIL had been set up and under which it had functioned since March 1978. By 8 June, the UNIFIL area of operation had fallen under Israeli control and the Force had to operate behind the Israeli lines. Under those conditions, UNIFIL could no longer fulfil the tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council. Pending a Council decision on the Force's mandate, which was due to expire on 19 June 1982, the Secretary-General instructed General Callaghan, as an interim measure, to ensure that all UNIFIL troops and the UNTSO military observers attached to it continued to man their positions unless their safety was seriously imperilled, and to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to the local population to the extent possible.

These interim tasks were endorsed by the Security Council on 18 June, when it decided, by resolution 511(1982), to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for an interim period of two months. At the same time, the Council made clear that the Force's original terms of reference remained valid, and reaffirmed its call for the complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Lebanese territory. The mandate of UNIFIL was later repeatedly extended with the same reservations for further interim periods varying from two to six months.

In accordance with the instructions of the Secretary-General, UNIFIL remained deployed in its area of operation with only minor adjustments. Some positions considered as non-essential in the changed circumstances were closed down, while others were reinforced. UNTSO observers continued to man the five observation positions along the

Armistice Demarcation Line and to maintain three teams outside the UNIFIL area—at Tyre, at Metulla in northern Israel and at Chateau de Beaufort north of the Litani River.

Much in the same way as they had done before the invasion, UNIFIL troops operated observation posts and check-points and conducted patrols in sensitive areas in order to prevent hostile actions and to ensure the security and safety of the local population. They continued to prevent infiltrations and incursions into the UNIFIL area by non-authorized armed elements, but they could not control the movement and actions of the Israeli forces or of the armed irregulars acting with those forces' direct support. In such cases, UNIFIL could only monitor their activities and report to the Secretary-General. In carrying out their functions, the UNIFIL troops co-operated closely with the local authorities and with the Lebanese gendarmes when they were available.

Much of UNIFIL's efforts was now devoted to humanitarian assistance. In co-operation with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross, UNIFIL humanitarian teams distributed to needy local inhabitants food and water and other essential supplies. A UNIFIL hospital maintained by the Swedish medical company and the medical teams of the various national contingents dispensed medical care to the local population, including conducting vaccination campaigns for Lebanese children. UNIFIL also assisted the local authorities with various community projects and with the repair of public buildings such as schools and local dispensaries. A French engineering unit did much to clear the area of mines, shells and explosive devices, which were a constant danger to the population. In many cases, the officers and soldiers of the various contingents and their Governments made voluntary contributions to help villages in their sectors in various ways, for example by giving them water trucks, by helping them to repair school-buildings or by providing the manpower to clean sewage systems.

In the new situation created by the invasion, the capacity of UNIFIL to operate was necessarily contingent upon the degree of cooperation received from the Israeli occupation authorities. Despite the difficulties encountered, UNIFIL was able to carry out its interim tasks in its area of operation most of the time without impediment. However, serious problems were encountered on occasion, particularly during the first days of the invasion, as a result of activities of the Israeli forces and the Lebanese local armed groups they controlled.

Immediately after the invasion, the Israeli forces frequently searched houses in sensitive areas, confiscated weapons they uncovered and arrested local inhabitants suspected of affiliation with the PLO or the Lebanese National Movement. These activities subsided after July 1982, and the presence of the IDF in the UNIFIL area of deployment was reduced to approximately battalion strength. However, the situation deteriorated again after April 1983, when the activities of a Shi'ite resistance movement against the Israeli occupation, which became increasingly active in the northern part of the occupied territory, began to spill over into the UNIFIL area. Although the area remained relatively quiet until February 1985, there were occasional attacks against the Israeli forces by resistance groups, particularly in the form of roadside bombs planted along the IDF-patrolled routes, and countermeasures by the Israeli forces, mainly in the form of cordon-and-search operations in the Shi'ite villages. UNIFIL could not prevent countermeasures by the Israeli forces, but endeavoured, by pressure and suasion, to mitigate violence, and protect the civilian population as much as possible. It also provided medical care and humanitarian assistance to the affected population.

Following the invasion, the *de facto* forces of Major Haddad attempted to extend their activities into the UNIFIL area. Although some of those groups were able to penetrate the UNIFIL area on the tail of the Israeli invading forces, in most cases UNIFIL was able to turn them back.

In April 1984, three months after the death of Major Haddad, Major-General Antoine Lahad, also a former officer of the Lebanese National Army, took over the command of the *de facto* forces, which were renamed the "South Lebanon Army" (SLA). According to available information, the strength of the SLA had been increased to approximately 2,100 as of October 1984. Although Israel gave the SLA an expanded role in the northern part of the occupied territory, it did not make any determined attempt to increase its activities in the UNIFIL area.

More serious problems were encountered by UNIFIL when new local militias, armed and uniformed by Israel, began to appear in its area towards the end of June 1982. These militias were recognized neither by the Lebanese Government nor by the established local authorities. Acting with the assistance of the IDF and under its control, they attempted to set up check-points and conduct patrols in the villages. They were generally ill-disciplined and their actions were

deeply resented by the local inhabitants and often led to friction with them. UNIFIL was under standing instructions to disarm the local militias and to contain their activities whenever they were not accompanied and directly protected by the Israeli forces. A number of incidents occurred at UNIFIL check-points when militiamen refused to submit to having their vehicles searched or to surrender their weapons.

Until February 1985, the incidents outlined above were exceptions rather than the rule, and the situation in the UNIFIL area was generally quiet—much quieter than in other parts of Lebanon during those years of turmoil. This was widely recognized by the Lebanese Government and the local population alike. Each time the mandate of UNIFIL neared its expiration, many *mukhtars* (village mayors) would write to the Secretary-General to beseech him not to withdraw the Force, and the Lebanese Government would request its extension in insistent terms.

The Secretary-General repeatedly recommended the extension of UNIFIL's mandate in accordance with the requests of the Lebanese Government. In support of his recommendation, he pointed out that despite the difficulties confronted by it, UNIFIL remained an important element of stability in southern Lebanon. Its presence represented the commitment of the United Nations to support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon and to help bring about the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 425(1978) and 509(1982). A withdrawal of the Force before the Lebanese Government was in a position to assume effective control of the area with its national army and its internal security forces would unquestionably be a serious blow to the prospect of restoring the authority of that Government in southern Lebanon, as well as to the security and welfare of the local population.

## **I. Aftermath of the Invasion**

The 1982 invasion set off a train of events which deeply affected Lebanon as well as Israel and the PLO. Although they took place outside the UNIFIL area of operation, these events had an important bearing on the activities and future of the Force.

As the Israeli forces neared west Beirut, to where large numbers of PLO fighters had retreated, the situation in and around the Lebanese capital became increasingly critical, and the need for a peace-keeping

operation to prevent further escalation of the conflict was urgently felt. The PLO called for the deployment of UNIFIL in the Beirut area, but this was strongly opposed by Israel. Various proposals for the establishment of a United Nations military observer group in and around Beirut were examined by the Security Council in June and July, but no agreement could be reached.

### ***Security Council Actions***

On 1 August, upon learning that an IDF unit had entered west Beirut, the Security Council met again and adopted resolution 516(1982), by which it took note of the massive violations of the ceasefire in and around Beirut and expressed alarm at the intensification of military activities there. It demanded an immediate cessation of all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border, and authorized the Secretary-General to deploy immediately, on the request of the Government of Lebanon, United Nations observers to monitor the situation in and around Beirut.

Following the adoption of that resolution, the Lebanese Government immediately submitted a request for the stationing of United Nations observers in Beirut. Although Israel withheld its support for the proposed operation, the Secretary-General decided to proceed with the establishment of an observer mission in Beirut, which was called the Observer Group Beirut (OGB). On 3 August, OGB became operational, but with only the 10 UNTSO observers already stationed in Beirut, because Israel prevented additional observers from reaching the capital.

On 4 August, the Security Council met again and adopted resolution 517(1982), in which it expressed shock and alarm at the consequences of the Israeli invasion of Beirut. It confirmed its demand for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, censured Israel for its failure to comply with its resolutions, and called for the prompt return of Israeli troops which had moved forward after 1325 hours, New York time, on 1 August. The Council also took note of the PLO's decision to remove the Palestinian armed forces from Beirut and authorized the Secretary-General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations observers in and around the city.

Meeting again on 12 August, the Security Council adopted resolution 518(1982), by which, expressing most serious concern about continued military activities in Lebanon, it demanded that Israel and all parties to the conflict observe strictly the terms of Council resolutions relevant to the immediate cessation of all military activities within Lebanon and, particularly, in and around Beirut. It further demanded

the immediate lifting of all restrictions on the city of Beirut in order to permit the free entry of supplies to meet the urgent needs of the civilian population in the city. The Council also requested the United Nations observers to report on the situation in and around Beirut, and demanded that Israel co-operate fully in the Secretary-General's efforts to secure the effective deployment of the observers.

On the afternoon of the same day, a ceasefire was established according to an agreement worked out by Ambassador Habib of the United States. The agreement provided that, following the establishment of the ceasefire, the Israeli forces would withdraw from west Beirut and the PLO fighters in the area would be evacuated from Lebanon.

### ***Multinational Force***

On 20 August, Lebanon informed the Secretary-General that it had requested the deployment of a multinational force in Beirut to assist the Lebanese armed forces as they carried out the orderly and safe departure from Lebanon of Palestinian armed personnel in the Beirut area, in a manner which would further the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Government of Lebanon over the Beirut area. France, Italy and the United States had entered into agreements with the Government of Lebanon for the deployment of their troops to participate in that multinational force.

The ceasefire that had gone into effect on 12 August was generally effective. The first contingent of the multinational force arrived in Beirut on 21 August and the remainder on 25 and 26 August. The evacuation from the Beirut area of the Palestinian armed elements, together with a Syrian battalion of the Arab Deterrent Force, began on 21 August and was completed on 1 September without incident. In all, some 10,000 PLO fighters and about 3,500 Syrian troops were evacuated. Immediately after their departure, elements of the Lebanese army and the internal security forces moved into west Beirut. A few days later, on 10 September, the multinational force began to withdraw from Beirut, and by 13 September the last soldiers of the force had left the area.

### ***Assassination of the Lebanese President-Elect***

One day after the completion of the withdrawal of the multinational force, Bashir Gemayel, the President-elect of Lebanon, was assassinated in a bomb explosion. The next morning, Israeli forces moved back in strength into west Beirut.

On 16 September, the Secretary-General issued a statement expressing concern at the developments in Lebanon following the assassination, and, in particular, at the movement of Israeli forces into west Beirut. The same day, the Security Council met at the request of Lebanon and, on 17 September, adopted resolution 520(1982), by which it condemned the recent Israeli incursions into Beirut in violation of the ceasefire agreements and of Council resolutions. It called again for strict respect for Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence under the sole and exclusive authority of the Lebanese Government through the Lebanese army throughout Lebanon, and it reaffirmed its resolutions 512(1982) and 513(1982) calling for respect for the rights of the civilian population. The Council also expressed its support for the efforts of the Secretary-General to implement resolution 516(1982) concerning the deployment of United Nations observers, and requested all the parties concerned to co-operate fully in the application of the resolution.

### ***Palestinian Camps Massacre***

While the Security Council was meeting in New York, a most tragic event was unfolding in west Beirut. In the afternoon of 17 September, Kataeb (phalange) units were able to enter the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps in the southern suburbs of Beirut and soon went on a rampage, killing large numbers of Palestinian refugees, including women, children and old people, in a most brutal manner. The freedom of movement of the 10 United Nations observers of OGB was restricted by the Israeli forces after their re-entry into west Beirut and they were not able to approach the camps before 18 September. Their report, which was received by the Secretary-General on that day, confirmed the massacre which had taken place and the involvement of phalangists.

Upon receiving the first reports of the massacre, the Secretary-General issued, on the morning of 18 September, a statement expressing shock and horror, and calling urgently for an end to the violence. Later the same morning, he submitted a report to the Security Council on the developments mentioned above. After recalling his repeated efforts since 13 June 1982 to increase the number of United Nations observers in Beirut, the Secretary-General indicated that he had instructed General Erskine, the UNTSO Chief of Staff, to make a renewed approach to the Israeli authorities in that regard. At the same time, he expressed the view that, in the situation that prevailed, unarmed military observers, however courageous or numerous, were

not enough. He noted in this connection that in the UNIFIL area in the south, conditions had remained quiet and UNIFIL had successfully prevented the harassment of the civilian population by any armed groups.

On the evening of 18 September, the Security Council met to consider the above developments. In the early morning of 19 September, it adopted resolution 521(1982), by which it condemned the criminal massacre of Palestinian civilians in Beirut, and authorized the Secretary-General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations observers in and around Beirut from 10 to 50. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to initiate urgent consultations, in particular with the Government of Lebanon, on additional steps which the Council might take, including the possible deployment of United Nations forces, to assist that Government in ensuring full protection for the civilian population in and around Beirut.

### ***Observation in Beirut***

On 20 September, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that General Erskine was sending 40 additional observers to Beirut. He also indicated that the Commander of UNIFIL, General Callaghan, had said that, if required, he could send to Beirut a group of about 2,000 men drawn from selected contingents of UNIFIL. However, the Government of Lebanon decided to request the return of the multinational force to Beirut.

At the end of September 1982, the situation in Beirut was generally quiet. The French, Italian and United States contingents of the multinational force had started returning to Beirut on 24 September and by 30 September the total strength of the force had reached approximately 4,000. Later they were joined by a small British contingent of 90 men. Following the arrival of the multinational force, the Israeli forces withdrew from the Beirut area to a line near Khalde, south of the Beirut International Airport.

During the following months, the United States launched a peace initiative which led to the signing, on 17 May 1983, of an agreement between Israel and Lebanon. In essence, this agreement provided for the withdrawal of the Israeli and other non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon and for joint security arrangements by the two countries in the border area of southern Lebanon. The agreement, however, never came into effect and was eventually abrogated by the Government of Lebanon.

In early September 1983, the Israeli forces, which had been frequently attacked by Lebanese Moslem guerrilla groups in the Aley and Shouf areas, decided to redeploy south of the Awali River. Withdrawal of the Israeli forces set the stage for fierce fighting between Government forces and Christian phalangists on the one hand, and Shi'ite and Druse militias on the other, in the evacuated areas.

In this new serious situation, the Secretary-General sought to expand the activities of OGB so as to provide a restraining element in the areas evacuated by the Israeli forces. But his efforts were abortive because of the opposition of some of the parties concerned.

As hostilities spread and intensified in these areas, the French and United States contingents of the multinational force became embroiled in the fighting and there were some serious and tragic incidents involving them and certain Moslem groups.

In February 1984, Moslem militias took control of west Beirut and most of the Aley and Shouf areas. The situation of the multinational force which was deployed in and around west Beirut became rapidly untenable.

The four contingents of the multinational force were successively withdrawn from Beirut during the first half of 1984. Before the final withdrawal of the force, the Security Council met at the end of February 1984 at the request of France, and considered a French draft resolution which would have had the Council issue an urgent appeal for an immediate ceasefire throughout Lebanon and decide to constitute a United Nations force to take up positions in the Beirut area as soon as all elements of the multinational force had withdrawn from Lebanese territory. The draft resolution, however, could not be adopted because of the veto of the Soviet Union.

In the mean time, national reconciliation talks were held at Lausanne, Switzerland, among leaders of the major political and religious groups of Lebanon, and, as a result, a National Unity Government headed by Prime Minister Rashid Karami was set up in Beirut in May 1984. This development, however, did not end intersectorian fighting in Beirut and other areas of Lebanon.

## **J. Withdrawal of the Israeli Forces**

### ***Secretary-General's Views on UNIFIL's Mandate***

The Secretary-General, in his report of 9 April 1984 to the Security Council, expressed the view that an expanded role for UNIFIL in southern Lebanon might be useful in the future, taking into account

the concerns of the various parties involved and the objectives of the Security Council. He suggested that, at the appropriate time, the Council consider making the mandate of UNIFIL more effective in southern Lebanon, in the context of a withdrawal of the Israeli forces, by: the temporary deployment of UNIFIL, with elements of the Lebanese army and internal security forces, in areas vacated by Israeli forces; the immediate deployment of elements of UNIFIL in the Sidon area upon Israeli withdrawal from that area, with a view to assuring the safety and security of the population, including Palestinian refugees in the camps in that area; and the working out of the necessary arrangements to ensure that southern Lebanon became a zone of peace under the sovereignty and authority of the Lebanese Government.

In a further report dated 9 October 1984, the Secretary-General again brought these suggestions to the Council's attention. He indicated that in recent weeks there had been a number of developments which seemed to him to have brought about more positive prospects for the realisation of the course of action he had outlined. It was his impression, from recent contacts with the leaders concerned, that there was general agreement on the objective of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon and on the necessity of working out arrangements which would ensure peace and security in the region and the restoration of Lebanese authority and sovereignty in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal. He also noted that there was general agreement that an expanded mandate for UNIFIL and a widening of its area of operation would be key elements in such future arrangements. The Secretary-General went on to say that if these conclusions were valid, he hoped that it would be possible in the near future to move forward in agreeing upon the necessary practical arrangements which would have to be made. Naturally, the United Nations machinery, and in particular UNIFIL, would be available to the parties to facilitate the reaching of agreements and to provide the auspices for the necessary discussions, if they so desired.

After considering the report of the Secretary-General, the Security Council adopted resolution 555(1984) on 12 October 1984, by which it extended the mandate of UNIFIL for a further interim period of six months, until 19 April 1985. The Council reiterated that UNIFIL should fully implement its mandate as defined by the Council in resolution 425(1978) and all other relevant resolutions, and requested the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned, and report to the Council.

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***Withdrawal Discussions, Naqoura (November 1984-January 1985)***

Following the adoption of the Security Council's October 1984 resolution, the Secretary-General approached the Governments of Israel and Lebanon and suggested that they begin negotiations as soon as possible on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory and related security arrangements in southern Lebanon. After consultations with those Governments, he convoked a conference of military representatives of the two countries at UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura to discuss those topics. The conference began on 8 November 1984 and met intermittently until 24 January 1985.

From the outset of the conference, the Lebanese representative insisted on the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory and the subsequent deployment of the Lebanese Army together with UNIFIL down to the international boundary, in accordance with Security Council resolution 425(1978). The Israeli representative took the position that UNIFIL should be deployed in the entire area to be evacuated by the Israeli forces, with the positioning of the main forces of UNIFIL between the Zahrani and the Awali rivers up to the border between Lebanon and Syria. While Israel would accept a limited UNIFIL presence further south, the Israeli representative maintained that local forces should be responsible for security arrangements in the southernmost part of Lebanon. There was little change in these basic positions as the conference progressed.

On 14 January 1985, the Israeli Government announced a plan for the unilateral redeployment of the Israeli forces in three phases. This redeployment plan was formally presented to the Naqoura conference on 22 January. In the first phase, relating to the western sector, the Israel Defence Forces would evacuate the Sidon area and deploy in the Litani-Nabatiyah region. In the second phase, relating to the eastern sector, the IDF would deploy in the Hasbayya area. In the third phase, it would deploy along the Israel-Lebanon international border, while maintaining a security zone in southern Lebanon where local forces (the so-called "South Lebanon Army") would function with IDF backing.

The first phase would be carried out within five weeks of the Government's decision. Notification of the timing would be given to the Lebanese Government and the United Nations Secretariat in order to allow them to make arrangements and deploy forces in the areas to be evacuated by the IDF. The timing of each subsequent phase would

be decided by the Government. Israeli officials indicated subsequently that the second and third phases of the redeployment were tentatively scheduled to be completed in the spring and summer of 1985.

On 24 January 1985, the Lebanese representative announced at the conference that the Israeli redeployment plan did not satisfy his Government's demand for a detailed plan and timetable for the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory. While reiterating his Government's willingness to co-operate with the United Nations with a view to expediting the withdrawal of those forces, he maintained that the role of the United Nations could not be discussed before the presentation of such a detailed plan and timetable by Israel.

At the end of the fourteenth meeting, on that date, the Naqoura conference was adjourned *sine die*.

### ***Withdrawal of Israeli Forces From the Sidon Area***

On 16 February, the Israeli forces proceeded with the first phase of the redeployment plan and withdrew from the Sidon area. Early that morning, the Commander of UNIFIL was informed of the withdrawal and immediately communicated it to the Lebanese army authorities. Those authorities advised General Callaghan the next day that the Lebanese army had taken over the evacuated area without incident.

From early February onwards, and particularly after the withdrawal from Sidon, there was an intensification of guerrilla attacks against the Israeli forces by Shi'ite resistance groups and of Israeli cordon-and-search operations against Shi'ite villages. An increasing number of these operations occurred in the UNIFIL area. In a statement made on 27 February, the Secretary-General outlined the dilemma faced by UNIFIL. He stated that for obvious reasons the Force had no right to impede Lebanese acts of resistance against the occupying forces, nor did it have the mandate and the means to prevent Israeli countermeasures. In the circumstances, the men of UNIFIL had done their utmost to mitigate violence, protect the civilian population and reduce acts of reprisal to the minimum.

On 25 February, Lebanon requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider "the continuing acts of aggression and abusive practices of Israeli occupying forces in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district." The Security Council held four meetings from 28 February to 12 March on this question. During the debate, Lebanon submitted a draft resolution which would have

had the Council: reaffirm the urgent need to implement Security Council resolutions 425(1978), 508(1982) and 509(1982), which demand that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundary of Lebanon; reiterate its call for strict respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Lebanon; affirm that the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 (on the protection of civilian persons in time of war) applied to the territories occupied by Israel in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district; and demand that Israel desist forthwith from its practices against the civilian population in those territories, and immediately lift all restrictions and obstacles to the restoration of normal conditions in the area under its occupation. On 12 March, the Security Council voted on the draft resolution, which was not adopted owing to the negative vote of the United States.

Before the expiry of UNIFIL's mandate the Permanent Representative of Lebanon, in a letter dated 27 March to the Secretary-General, requested, on behalf of his Government, an extension of UNIFIL for a further six months. In his report of 11 April, the Secretary-General said he considered that the presence of UNIFIL was essential in the present circumstances and recommended an extension of the Force, taking into account the request of the Lebanese Government. As regards the role of UNIFIL, he recalled his efforts to bring together the positions of the Lebanese and Israeli Governments. He felt that the main problem was to reach a situation in Lebanon south of the Litani, after the Israeli withdrawal, in which international peace and security could be assured and normal conditions progressively restored. He believed that the best means of achieving this would be an orderly takeover from Israeli forces, perhaps in the first instance by UNIFIL with elements of the Lebanese army, with the ultimate aim of restoring the complete authority of the Lebanese Government and army. He also believed that to achieve effective and constructive results, some form of consultative mechanism under United Nations auspices would be essential. If the Naqoura talks or the 1949 Israel-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement were not acceptable for one reason or another to one or the other of the parties, the Secretary-General would be prepared to consider convoking a new conference of military representatives of the two Governments for the purpose.

After considering the Secretary-General's report, the Security Council decided, by resolution 561(1985) of 17 April 1985, to extend UNIFIL's mandate for a further interim period of six months, until 19

October 1985. In the same resolution, the Council reiterated its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries and called on all the parties concerned to co-operate with UNIFIL for the full implementation of its mandate.

### ***Further Withdrawals of the Israeli Forces***

Meanwhile, the Israeli forces proceeded with the second phase of redeployment, which was carried out gradually in the course of March and April 1985. They withdrew from the Nabatiah area on 11 March. The Jezzine area and the north-eastern sector, including the Bekaa Valley and the strategic position of Jebal Baruk, were evacuated on 14 April. On 29 April, the Israeli forces withdrew from the Tyre pocket and from the positions they had established in the western sector of the UNIFIL area. At the end of the second phase, the Israeli forces were redeployed in a strip of land north of the international border extending from the Mediterranean Sea to the Hasbayya area, with a depth varying between about two kilometres at its narrowest point and about 20 kilometres at its widest.

In accordance with the Israeli plan, this strip of land, which extended into part of the UNIFIL area, was to be maintained as a "security zone" where the "South Lebanon Army" and other local militias armed and controlled by the Israeli forces were to function with the latter's backing, after the completion of the third and last phase of the Israeli redeployment.

Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 561(1985), the Secretary-General initiated a new effort to work out, in consultation with the Lebanese and Israeli authorities, arrangements which would lead to the full withdrawal of the Israeli forces, the deployment of UNIFIL to the international border and the establishment of international peace and security in the area. Unfortunately, these efforts were inconclusive, and the Israeli forces proceeded with the third phase of the unilateral redeployment plan, without change, in May and the early part of June. During that period, those forces progressively withdrew from positions established in the "security zone", handing them over to elements of the SLA. On 10 June, the Israeli Government announced, that the third phase had been completed. It indicated that, while all combat units had been withdrawn from Lebanese territory, some Israeli troops would continue to operate in the "security zone" for an unspecified period of time and act as advisers to the SLA.

In these circumstances, UNIFIL was not able to extend its deployment to the border. Moreover, in that part of its area of deployment which overlapped with the "security zone", it found itself confronted with many positions manned by the Israeli forces and/or elements of the SLA. There were 18 such positions as of October 1985.

The greater part of the UNIFIL area was relatively quiet after its evacuation by the Israeli forces. UNIFIL continued to maintain liaison with the local leaders of Amal and other Lebanese resistance groups, which generally co-operated with the Force in the performance of its tasks.

In contrast, the situation in the "security zone" was very tense. Lebanese, resistance groups launched frequent attacks on Israeli troops and the Lebanese irregulars associated with them throughout that zone, both within and outside UNIFIL's area of deployment. In those attacks, small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, rockets and roadside bombs were employed against IDF/SLA positions and personnel. There were also a number of suicide bomb attacks.

On the other hand, the IDF and elements of the SLA Carried out a number of cordon-and-search operations against Shi'ite village some of them in the UNIFIL area Elements of the SLA also shelled Shi'ite villages in the UNIFIL area on several occasions. UNIFIL strongly protested to the Israeli authorities the attacks directed at villages in its area and endeavoured, within the limits of its means, to protect the civilian population and reduce acts of violence to the minimum

### ***Renewal of UNIFIL's Mandate, October 1985***

Before the expiry of UNIFIL's mandate, the Permanent Representative of Lebanon, in a letter dated 3 October 1985, informed the Secretary-General of his Government's decision to request an extension of UNIFIL's mandate for a further period of six months. He stated that his Government was convinced that despite the present circumstances, UNIFIL continued to be an important factor in providing stability in southern Lebanon.

In his report to the Security Council of 10 October 1985, the Secretary-General stated that the current situation in Lebanon south of the Litani was not only unsatisfactory but also dangerous. UNIFIL found itself once again between opposing forces and was precluded from deploying right up to the international border in accordance with its mandate. The Secretary-General had little doubt that, if the Israeli presence in the "security zone" was to continue for long, violence would

inevitably escalate and spread. In such an event, UNIFIL's situation would become even more difficult.

The Secretary-General went on to say that in these circumstances, making a recommendation to the Security Council on UNIFIL posed a dilemma. On the one hand, the conditions still did not exist in which UNIFIL could fully perform its functions or completely fulfil its mandate, and the situation was more likely to deteriorate than to improve. Such a state of affairs was contrary to the Council's intentions and also imposed a severe strain on the UNIFIL contingents and on the Governments which had so loyally supported the operation by making troops available. On the other hand, he was convinced that UNIFIL was an extremely important factor in whatever peace and normality existed in southern Lebanon. He believed that, if for some reason UNIFIL were to disappear, the level of violence would inevitably increase dramatically, with resistance operations giving rise to reprisals in a spiral of violence. Such a situation could well develop into a new and serious international crisis. After much thought, the Secretary-General had concluded that, especially in the light of Lebanon's request, it was his duty to recommend a further extension of the mandate. He believed, however, that such a decision must not be understood to mean that UNIFIL would be allowed to become an open-ended commitment for the troop-contributing countries and for the United Nations if the requisite conditions for the effective operation of the Force continued to be absent. He believed that there was still a good chance of re-establishing international peace and security in southern Lebanon if the correct actions were taken soon by all concerned, but he also believed that further undue delay was likely to produce a new and serious crisis, possibly with widespread ramifications.

After considering the Secretary-General's report, the Security Council decided, by resolution 575(1985) of 17 October 1985, to extend UNIFIL's mandate for six months, until 19 April 1986. In this connection, the Council expressed once again its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries, and called on all parties concerned to co-operate with UNIFIL for the full implementation of its mandate.

## **K. Financial Aspects**

UNIFIL and the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) are the two existing United Nations peace-keeping operations with serious financial problems. The difficulties of UNFICYP

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stem from the fact that the Force is financed mainly by voluntary contributions, and it was to avert this kind of problem that the Secretary-General insisted that the forces subsequently established by the Security Council should have a more stable source of income. When the Second United Nations Emergency Force was set up in October 1973, the Council decided, upon a proposal of the Secretary-General, that the costs of the new Force should be considered as expenses of the Organisation to be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly. This method was applied again to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force in May 1974 and to UNIFIL in March 1978.

However, in the case of UNIFIL, a number of Member States have refused, for political reasons, to pay their assessments, and as a result there has been a deficit in the UNIFIL Special Account which has steadily increased with the passing of time. In this situation, the United Nations has been forced to fall behind more and more in reimbursing Governments for the costs they have incurred in contributing troops, equipment and supplies to UNIFIL.

In December 1979, on a proposal of the Secretary-General, the General Assembly established a Suspense Account for UNIFIL—supplementing the Special Account—to be financed by voluntary contributions from Governments, international organisations and private sources. The funds in the Suspense Account were to be used solely for reimbursing Governments which contributed troops to UNIFIL.

The Secretary-General has repeatedly appealed to all Member States to pay their assessments without delay. Since 1979, he has also appealed to the Governments of the developed countries to consider making available, as a practical measure, voluntary contributions to UNIFIL's Suspense Account. However, the deficit in the UNIFIL budget has remained serious.

In his report to the Security Council on UNIFIL dated 10 October 1985, the Secretary-General stated that there was, as of the beginning of that month, an accumulated shortfall in the UNIFIL Special Account of some \$224 million and that, as a result, the Organisation was falling far behind in reimbursement of the troop-contributing countries, thus placing an increasingly heavy burden on them, particularly on the less wealthy ones. He expressed his extreme concern about this state of affairs, not only for the reasons just mentioned but also because it could jeopardize the functioning of the Force.

# 17

## Peace-making

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The peace-keeping operations described in the previous chapter have mainly been in response to specific conflicts or outbreaks of fighting. At the same time, the United Nations has continued its search for peaceful solutions to the underlying political problems of the conflicts in these and in other troubled areas. These efforts have been pursued not only in the Security Council and the General Assembly, but also through the good offices of the Secretary-General and his special representatives. Some examples of these peace-making efforts in areas of continuing conflict—the Middle East, Cyprus, Kampuchea, Iran and Iraq, Afghanistan and Central America—are described in this chapter.

### **The Middle East**

From its early days, the United Nations has been concerned with the problem of the Middle East. It has not only established peace-keeping machinery in response to hostilities which have broken out at various times in the course of almost four decades, but has also formulated principles for a peaceful settlement, and it continues its efforts to find a just and lasting solution of the underlying political problems.

The Middle East problem had its origins in the issue of the future of Palestine, which was brought before the United Nations early in 1947. At the time, Palestine was a territory administered by the United Kingdom under a mandate from the League of Nations. It had a population of about 2 million, two thirds Arabs and one third Jews. In November 1947, the General Assembly endorsed a plan, put before it by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, for the partition

of the territory, providing for the creation of an Arab and a Jewish State, with Jerusalem to be placed under international status. The plan was accepted by the Jewish Agency but not by the Palestinian Arabs or by the Arab States.

On 14 May 1948, the Assembly appointed a United Nations Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, who was to promote a peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine. On the same day, the United Kingdom relinquished its mandate over Palestine, and the Jewish Agency proclaimed the State of Israel on the territory allotted to it in the partition plan. On the following day, full-fledged war broke out between the Israelis and the Palestinian Arabs, assisted by Arab States. The hostilities were halted through a truce called for by the Security Council and supervised by the United Nations Mediator, with the assistance of a group of military observers which came to be known as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO).

Count Bernadotte was assassinated on 17 September 1948, in a part of the City of Jerusalem that was under Jewish control. Ralph Benche was appointed Acting Mediator, and under his auspices armistice agreements were signed in 1949 by Israel and four Arab countries—Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. In August 1949, the Security Council relieved the Acting Mediator of his responsibilities and urged the parties concerned to negotiate a final peace settlement, either directly or through the Palestine Conciliation Commission, which had been established by the General Assembly in December 1948 on the suggestion of Count Bernadotte. The Commission was able to arrange separate talks with the two sides, but its efforts to work out a settlement did not meet with success.

Following the June 1967 war, Israel occupied the Sinai and the Gaza Strip, the West Bank of the Jordan, including East Jerusalem, and part of the Golan Heights. On 22 November 1967, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 242 (1967), which defined principles for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The principles to be applied were: withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict; and termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force. The Council further affirmed the need to guarantee free navigation through international waterways in the area, to settle the refugee problem justly and to

guarantee the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones. It requested the Secretary-General to designate a special representative for the Middle East to help achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions of resolution 242 (1967).

Gunnar Jarring of Sweden, was appointed to that post and initiated talks with Egypt, Israel and Jordan in December 1967 (Syria did not accept resolution 242), launching an intensive effort of United Nations peace-making in the Middle East which was to last almost six years. But despite his efforts, no progress could be achieved because of the differences of the parties on the basic issues.

Large-scale fighting broke out again on 6 October 1973. The Security Council, on 22 October, adopted resolution 338 (1973), in which it called on the parties to cease fire and to start immediately thereafter the full implementation of resolution 242 (1967). It also decided that, concurrently with the ceasefire, negotiations should start between the parties concerned to establish a just and durable peace in the Middle East. As fighting continued, the Council decided on 24 October to set up a new United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II), which effectively restored quiet in the Egypt-Israel sector.

A Peace Conference on the Middle East was convened in Geneva on 21 December 1973, under United Nations auspices and the co-chairmanship of the Soviet Union and the United States, with Egypt, Israel and Jordan attending. Before adjourning the next day, the Conference decided to continue its work through a Military Working Group which would discuss the question of disengagement of forces. The disengagement agreements of January 1974 between Egypt and Israel and of May 1974 between Israel and Syria were signed within the framework of the Working Group and were carried out with the assistance of two United Nations peace-keeping forces, UNEF II and UNDOF (*see chapter ten*).

Meanwhile, the General Assembly had increasingly turned its attention to other aspects of the Middle East problem. In 1974 it reaffirmed "the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine" to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty, and recognized the Palestinian people as a principal party in the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East. It also invited the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) to participate in the work of the Assembly as an observer.

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The following year, the Assembly established the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and asked it to recommend a programme for the implementation of those rights. The Committee recommended that a timetable be established by the Security Council for the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the areas occupied in 1967. The evacuated areas, with all properties and services intact, would be taken over by the United Nations which, with the co-operation of the League of Arab States, would subsequently hand them over to the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. The Assembly has endorsed the Committee's recommendations at successive sessions since 1976. The Security Council has not acted on them.

In the fall of 1976, the General Assembly called for the convening of the Geneva Peace Conference not later than the end of March 1977 and requested the Secretary-General to consult the parties to the conflict and the Co-Chairmen of the Conference on the subject. In pursuance of the Assembly's request, the Secretary-General held intensive consultations with the representatives of the parties and of the two Co-Chairmen in early 1977. From his consultations, the Secretary-General concluded that, while all concerned were earnestly desirous of moving towards a negotiated settlement, a determined effort was necessary to overcome the lack of confidence and the mutual distrust and fears of all the parties as to the consequences of making compromises and concessions. He noted that, although the main elements of the Middle East problem remained intractable, there was an increasing consciousness in the area that an opportunity existed at the time to resume negotiations in a meaningful way.

In the following months, efforts were made at various levels to reach agreement on the modalities for resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference. On 1 October 1977, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union and the Secretary of State of the United States, as Co-Chairmen of the Conference, issued a joint declaration in which they expressed their belief that the only right and effective way of achieving a fundamental solution to all aspects of the Middle East problem in its entirety was negotiation within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, specially convened for this purpose, with the participation in its work of the representatives of all the parties involved in the conflict, including those of the Palestinian people.

A new element was introduced in the Middle East situation in November 1977 when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat visited Jerusalem. Subsequent direct negotiations between Egypt and Israel

under United States auspices led to the conclusion, in September 1978, of the Camp David accords (one on a framework for peace in the Middle East and the other on a framework for peace between Egypt and Israel) and to the signing of a peace treaty between the two countries on 26 March 1979.

The Council of the League of Arab States, meeting in Baghdad in November 1978, called on all countries to refrain from supporting the treaty. The General Assembly condemned "all partial agreements and separate treaties" which violated the rights of the Palestinian people, and declared that the Camp David accords and other agreements had no validity in so far as they purported to determine the future of the Palestinian people and of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967.

In August/September 1983, an International Conference on the Question of Palestine was held in Geneva in accordance with a decision of the General Assembly, which, in December 1983, endorsed the Declaration adopted by the Conference. The Assembly also endorsed the call by the Conference for the convening of an International Peace Conference on the Middle East in conformity with certain guidelines, in particular the attainment by the Palestinian people of its inalienable legitimate rights, including the right to return, the right to self-determination and the right to establish its own independent State in Palestine. The Assembly invited all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the PLO, as well as the United States, the Soviet Union and other concerned States, to participate in the International Peace Conference on the Middle East on an equal footing and with equal rights. It requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, to undertake preparatory measures to convene the Conference, and it invited the Security Council to facilitate the organisation of the Conference. In December 1984, the General Assembly reiterated its call for the convening of the Conference.

However, Israel and the United States opposed an international conference as called for by the General Assembly, and in September 1984, and again in March 1985, the Secretary-General reported that it was not possible, for the time being, to convene an international conference.

### **Assistance to Palestine Refugees**

Throughout the nearly four decades of the conflict in the Middle-East, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), established by the General

Assembly in 1949, has helped Arab refugees who lost their homes and livelihood as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict in Palestine in 1948, pending the solution of their problem. According to an earlier Assembly decision, this was to be by means of repatriation or compensation.

UNRWA provides schools, medical care and relief services to more than 2 million Palestine refugees registered with the Agency, including tens of thousands of refugees left destitute and homeless in recent years by continuing conflicts in the region. UNRWA depends on voluntary contributions, mainly from Governments, both for its normal operations and for emergency relief.

## **Cyprus**

Cyprus became independent in 1960 with a Constitution that was intended to assure the participation of the island's Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in the exercise of governmental functions and to avoid in a number of areas the supremacy of the larger community. The Constitution was based on agreements reached by Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, accepted by the representatives of the two communities, and embodied in the Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee, signed by Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, and the Treaty of Alliance, signed by Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.

The application of the provisions of the Constitution encountered difficulties almost from the very beginning and led to a succession of constitutional crises and to growing tension between the two communities. In November 1963, President Makarios, stating that the existing Constitution created many difficulties in the smooth functioning of the State and the progress of the country, that many of its provisions conflicted with internationally accepted democratic principles and were a source of friction between the communities, and that its effects were causing the latter to draw further apart, publicly set forth 13 points on which he considered that the Constitution should be amended. The Turkish Cypriots stated that the Greek Cypriots had never attempted to implement the Constitution in good faith and contended that the amendments proposed by the other side were designed to weaken those parts of the Constitution that recognized the existence of the Turkish Cypriot community. Accordingly, they refused to consider the proposed amendments, which were also categorically rejected by Turkey.

Whatever possibility might have existed at the time for finding a solution disappeared when violence broke out between the two

communities on 21 December 1963. Three days later, the Turkish contingent stationed in Cyprus under the Treaty of Alliance took up positions in the northern outskirts of Nicosia. The Security Council met on 27 December to consider a complaint by Cyprus that Turkey had committed aggression and had intervened in its internal affairs by the threat and use of force. Turkey denied the charges, maintaining that the Greek Cypriot leaders had tried for more than two years to nullify the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community. Subsequent attempts at restoring peace through the good offices of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey resulted in the establishment of a joint peace-making operation by those Governments and the arrangement of a cease-fire on 29 December. A conference held in London in January 1964 with the participation of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom failed, however, to reach agreement, and the situation continued to deteriorate.

On 4 March 1964, the Security Council recommended the establishment of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), with a mandate to prevent the recurrence of fighting, help maintain law and order, and promote a return to normal conditions (*see chapter ten*). The Council also recommended that the Secretary-General designate a United Nations Mediator to promote a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the Cyprus problem.

In March 1965, the Mediator, Galo Plaza, submitted to the Secretary-General a report on his mission, but it was rejected by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. This led to the Mediator's resignation in December of that year. Since that time, the search for a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem has been carried out through the good offices of the Secretary-General.

In 1967, intercommunal violence flared again, setting off a severe political crisis. In response to several appeals by the Secretary-General, an agreement was reached between Greece and Turkey and the situation was defused. At the same time, a formula was devised for informal meetings between Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktash, as representatives of the two communities. They met intermittently until mid-1974 and sought to arrive at a compromise solution, but the intercommunal contacts made little progress. After conversations between Greece and Turkey in June 1971, the Secretary-General suggested that his Special Representative should take part in the talks in the exercise of the Secretary-General's good offices, and that Greek and Turkish constitutional experts should attend as advisers. This arrangement was accepted in May 1972. The Secretary-General

made it clear that the reactivated talks would be based on the equal status of the representatives of the two communities, be exploratory in nature and be limited to internal constitutional matters of an independent Cyprus.

Early in 1974, it appeared that the parties had reached a measure of agreement on a "package deal" concerning the structure of the State and the degree of authority to be granted to the Turkish Cypriot community in exchange for its renunciation of certain provisions of the 1960 Constitution. However, political developments, including the reactions of Athens and Ankara, set back the prospects of agreement. The intercommunal talks were suspended at the beginning of April 1974.

On 15 July 1974, an attempted *coup d'état* in Cyprus by Greek Cypriot and Greek elements favouring *enosis* (union with Greece) resulted in renewed strife on the island and was followed on 20 July by military intervention by Turkey, whose troops subsequently established Turkish Cypriot control over the northern part of Cyprus. Following the outbreak of hostilities, the Security Council unanimously called for a cease-fire and laid the basis for negotiations designed to reach a settlement of the Cyprus problem. After negotiations between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom broke down on 14 August, large-scale fighting again erupted. The Security Council again called for a cease-fire and the resumption of negotiations.

During September 1974, the Secretary-General's Special Representative arranged for weekly meetings under his auspices between the representatives of the two communities to take up, in the first instance, humanitarian problems, including the exchange and release of prisoners with the assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

In November 1974, the General Assembly unanimously called on all States to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and non-alignment of Cyprus. It urged the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from the island, a halt to foreign interference, and the safe return of all refugees to their homes. The Assembly considered that constitutional issues were up to the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to resolve, and it urged the continuation of the contacts taking place between representatives of the two communities with the help of the Secretary-General. The Security Council endorsed the Assembly's resolution.

During December 1974 and January 1975, the representatives of the two communities met several times with the Secretary-General's Special Representative and agreed to begin the discussion of the powers and functions of the central Government. However, these contacts were broken off after the Turkish Cypriot leadership announced the creation of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" on 13 February 1975. On 12 March, the Security Council expressed regret regarding this unilateral move and called for new efforts to assist the resumption of negotiations. It asked the Secretary-General to undertake a new mission of good offices and to convene the representatives of the two communities under his auspices.

The talks called for by the Security Council began on 28 April 1975 in Vienna under the personal auspices of Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, and three further rounds were held that year. During the third round, it was agreed that the Turkish Cypriots in the south of the island would be allowed to proceed north with the assistance of UNFICYP and that a number of Greek Cypriots would be able to return to the north to be reunited with their families. Greek Cypriots in the north would be free to go south or to stay; those who stayed would be helped to lead a normal life, including freedom of movement in the north. UNFICYP would have free and normal access to Greek Cypriot villages in the north.

After the fourth round of talks, in New York, the General Assembly, in November 1975, again demanded the withdrawal without further delay of all foreign armed forces from Cyprus and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs. A further round of talks was held in February 1976, but wide differences persisted.

After a preliminary meeting under the auspices of the Special Representative in January 1977, President Makarios and Rauf Denktash met in Nicosia on 12 February under the personal auspices of the Secretary-General and agreed on new guidelines for the representatives of their communities in the intercommunal talks. The two sides agreed to seek an independent, non-aligned, federal and bicomunal Republic of Cyprus. They also agreed that the territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership; that questions of principle, such as freedom of movement and settlement and the right of property, would be open for discussion, taking into consideration certain practical difficulties that might arise for the Turkish Cypriot community; and that the powers and functions of the

central government should safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to its bicomunal character. On that basis, a new round of intercommunal talks was held in Vienna from 31 March to 7 April 1977. The talks were resumed in Nicosia in May, but they were not continued after 3 June.

A further initiative of the Secretary-General in 1978 led to a meeting in Nicosia in May 1979, under his auspices, between President Kyprianou and Rauf Denktaş at which an agreed basis for the resumption of the intercommunal talks was reached. The talks resumed in Nicosia on 15 June but soon encountered difficulties and were recessed on 22 June without achieving progress.

After extensive consultations with the parties, the intercommunal talks were resumed formally in Nicosia on 9 August 1980 under the auspices of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, who outlined the Secretary-General's understanding of the common ground that had been worked out. The intercommunal talks thereafter continued on a regular basis but, while the atmosphere was constructive, progress was slow. Following the submission of comprehensive proposals by both sides and intensive consultations with them, the Special Representative, on behalf of the Secretary-General, submitted in November 1981 a text containing elements of an "evaluation" of the status of the negotiations which was subsequently used as a method of discussion at the talks.

The intercommunal talks continued for some two years without, however, making decisive progress. In December 1982, Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar warned in a report to the Security Council that a major effort was needed, since time appeared to be eroding the "window of opportunity" for the solution of the Cyprus problem. In May 1983, the General Assembly adopted a resolution which was rejected by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. As a result, the Turkish Cypriot side decided not to attend the intercommunal talks on the grounds that the resolution undermined the basis for the negotiations.

Subsequent efforts by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative towards a resumption of the talks suffered a setback when, on 15 November 1983, the Turkish Cypriot authorities proclaimed a "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". The Security Council, in a resolution adopted three days later, considered the declaration of the purported secession as legally invalid and called for its withdrawal. The Council called upon all States not to recognise any

Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus and requested the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices in order to achieve the earliest possible progress towards a just and lasting settlement.

Following further efforts in early 1984 to pave the way for a high-level meeting and permit the reopening of the dialogue, the Secretary-General, in a new initiative, met separately in Vienna on 6 and 7 August 1984 with representatives of the two sides. In the light of their favourable reaction to his proposals, the Secretary-General invited the leaders of the two communities to meet with him separately in New York. Three rounds of "proximity talks" were held between September and December 1984. By 12 December, the Secretary-General had reached the assessment that the documentation for a draft agreement was ready for submission to a joint high-level meeting, at which an agreement could be concluded containing the necessary elements for a comprehensive solution aimed at establishing a Federal Republic of Cyprus.

The joint high-level meeting convened under the auspices of the Secretary-General was held at United Nations Headquarters from 17 to 20 January 1985. Although it did not prove possible at the meeting to overcome the difficulties that had arisen, the Secretary-General commented that the gap in the search for a solution had never been so narrow. Since then, the efforts of the Secretary-General have focused on preserving what had been achieved since August 1984 and on assisting the two sides in overcoming the remaining difficulties.

### **Kampuchea**

Following the outbreak of hostilities in December 1978 between Democratic Kampuchea and Vietnam, the situation in Kampuchea and related developments in South-East Asia were considered by the Security Council. In January 1979, the Council, meeting at the request of Democratic Kampuchea, which charged Vietnam with aggression, considered a draft resolution that would have demanded strict adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States and would have called on all foreign forces to observe a cease-fire, end hostilities and withdraw from Democratic Kampuchea. The draft resolution and a similar one considered again by the Council in March were not adopted because of the negative vote of a permanent member.

Later in 1979, the question was considered by the General Assembly at the request of five Asian States—Indonesia, Malaysia, the

Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The Assembly adopted a resolution in which it called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea, appealed to all States to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea and resolved that the people of Kampuchea should be enabled to choose democratically their own government, without outside interference, subversion or coercion. The Assembly also appealed to all States and national and international organisations to render humanitarian relief to the civilian population of Kampuchea.

The International Conference on Kampuchea, convened by a 1980 decision of the General Assembly and held in New York in July 1981, adopted the Declaration on Kampuchea, which reaffirmed the basic principles for a political settlement and set out the elements of such a settlement. The Conference also decided to establish an *Ad Hoc* Committee to assist it in seeking a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean question.

At its regular session later in 1981, the General Assembly endorsed the Declaration on Kampuchea and the establishment of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. It requested the Secretary-General to follow the situation closely and to exercise his good offices in order to contribute to a comprehensive political settlement. The Assembly also appealed for the continuation of relief assistance to Kampuchean still in need, especially those along the Thai-Kampuchean border and in the holding centres in Thailand, and requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts in co-ordinating humanitarian relief assistance and in monitoring its distribution. Similar resolutions have been adopted by the General Assembly since 1981.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee has met regularly at United Nations Headquarters since October 1981 and has also dispatched missions to consult with interested Governments in South-East Asia and other regions.

From the outset, the Secretary-General, in the framework of his good offices, maintained close contact with the States most directly concerned and other interested countries. Between 1981 and 1984, his Special Representative undertook several missions to South-East Asia in order to consult with Governments in the region and encourage progress towards a peaceful resolution of the problem.

At the beginning of 1985 the Secretary-General travelled to South-East Asia and held extensive discussions with the leaders of the

countries of the region, during which he obtained some clarifications on the respective positions of the parties concerned. He stressed that differences could only be bridged by a sustained dialogue and the initiation of negotiations on the main substantive aspects of the problem. In July his Special Representative undertook a follow-up visit to the region and held further consultations.

Reporting to the General Assembly in October 1985, the Secretary-General stated that a reasonable degree of convergence had emerged on the main elements of a comprehensive political settlement. However, differences still existed on the interpretation of those elements, as well as on the format for dialogue and negotiations. He said he was determined to continue to work, in the exercise of his good offices, towards a solution consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

With regard to humanitarian assistance programmes, consisting of three components—within Kampuchea, at the Thai-Kampuchean border and within Thailand—the United Nations has, since 1979, mobilized some \$850 million in aid to the Kampuchean people through voluntary contributions by Governments and agencies. Although this has been one of the biggest and most effective relief efforts ever organized under United Nations auspices, many of the problems still remain unresolved, requiring the continuation of this major operation.

### **Iran and Iraq**

The conflict between Iran and Iraq has been of continuing concern to the Security Council and the Secretary-General since the outbreak of hostilities in September 1980. On 22 September 1980, the Secretary-General appealed to both countries for restraint and a negotiated solution, and offered his good offices. The Security Council, meeting later the same month, called on Iran and Iraq “to refrain immediately from any further use of force and to settle their dispute by peaceful means and in conformity with principles of justice and international law”. It urged them to accept mediation, or conciliation.

The Council continued to support the Secretary-General’s efforts, and those of his Special Representative, towards resolving the situation, with a view to achieving a comprehensive, just and honourable settlement acceptable to both sides. Olof Palme, of Sweden, served as Special Representative from 1980 to 1982, making five trips to the area in an effort to achieve a settlement.

In 1982 the Council called for a cease-fire, “an immediate end to all military operations” and a withdrawal of forces to internationally

recognized boundaries. It has called for the cessation of military operations against civilian targets and for the possible dispatch of United Nations observers to verify and supervise a cease-fire and withdrawal. It has also called upon both parties to refrain from any action endangering marine life in the Gulf region and has affirmed the right of free navigation in international waters.

In response to accusations by Iran of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in the conflict, the Secretary-General twice dispatched specialists to investigate such charges. A team which visited Iran in March 1984 found that nerve and mustard gas had been used; these findings were confirmed by a medical specialist who examined Iranian patients hospitalized in Europe in March 1985. Upon receiving the reports, both the Security Council and the Secretary-General strongly condemned the use of chemical weapons and all violations of international humanitarian law and called for strict observance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol against the use of poison gas and bacteriological weapons.

Following the dispatch by the Secretary-General in 1983 of a mission to assess damage to civilian areas in both countries, Iran and Iraq gave undertakings in June 1984 that all deliberate military attacks on purely civilian population centres in either country would cease. Two United Nations teams were set up to inspect any specific allegation of a violation of those undertakings.

In January 1985, as an extraordinary measure and in the light of high humanitarian responsibility under the Charter, the Secretary-General, with the agreement of the two Governments, dispatched a fact-finding mission to Iran and Iraq to inquire into an incident in a prisoner-of-war camp in Iran and also to report on other concerns that both countries had expressed regarding the situation of prisoners of war and civilian detainees. The mission found that prisoners of war were being maltreated on both sides and that the fundamental purposes for which the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War was adopted were not being fulfilled.

Twice in statements issued in March 1985, members of the Security Council expressed deep concern over renewed hostilities. They emphasized anew the urgent necessity for a cessation of hostilities, commencing with the implementation of the moratorium on attacks against purely civilian population centres, with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. In a statement issued on 26 March, the Secretary-General said he was "deeply-disturbed by the continuing

conflict between Iran and Iraq", and he expressed dismay that the moratorium on attacks on purely civilian areas had not been observed. The Secretary-General reiterated his conviction that "the earliest possible cessation of hostilities, followed by progress towards a negotiated settlement, is essential to end the unconscionable carnage caused by this conflict". In meetings at United Nations Headquarters that same month with representatives of both parties, the Secretary-General presented proposals designed to reduce the level of conflict and to promote a cessation of hostilities.

In April 1985, the Secretary-General travelled to Teheran and Baghdad for wide-ranging discussions of all aspects of the conflict. Iran conveyed its sense that the Council's actions had not been impartial and indicated that it was prepared to accept a comprehensive cessation of hostilities provided that two conditions—condemnation of the aggressor and payment of reparations—were met. Iraq's position was that any specific measures to mitigate the effects of war—including mutual troop withdrawal, prisoner exchange and reactivation of all ports—must be clearly linked to a comprehensive cease-fire within a timetable.

### **Afghanistan**

On 3 January 1980, 52 Member States requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider "the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security". They stated that Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, which had taken place late in 1979, had destabilized the area and threatened international peace and security.

Afghanistan, as well as the Soviet Union and other States, objected to the Council's consideration of the question on the ground that it amounted to intervention by the United Nations in Afghanistan's affairs. Afghanistan said that it had requested Soviet aid, including military aid, in conformity with a 1978 bilateral treaty of friendship, good-neighbourliness and cooperation.

On 7 January, the Council considered a draft resolution which would have deplored the armed intervention in Afghanistan as a violation of a fundamental principle of the United Nations Charter—namely, preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State—and would have called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan. The draft resolution was not adopted because of the

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negative vote of a permanent member of the Council. The Council then decided to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly to examine the question of Afghanistan.

The Assembly, meeting in emergency special session that same month, reaffirmed that respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State is a fundamental principle of the Charter. It strongly deplored "the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan, which is inconsistent with that principle", and called for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan "in order to enable its people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social systems free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever". The Assembly appealed to all States and national and international organisations to extend humanitarian relief assistance to alleviate the hardships of the Afghan refugees, in co-ordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and it requested the Secretary-General to keep Member States and the Security Council informed on progress in implementing the Assembly's resolution.

The situation in Afghanistan was again discussed by the General Assembly at its regular session later in 1980. The Assembly expressed appreciation to the Secretary-General for his efforts in the search for a solution and said it hoped he would continue to extend assistance.

Over the next four years, the Secretary-General and his personal representative were involved in intensive efforts to promote a political solution through negotiations. During visits to Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, the Secretary-General's personal representative held consultations dealing with the four items that had previously been identified for consideration: the withdrawal of foreign troops; non-interference and non-intervention; international guarantees; and voluntary return of refugees to their homes. In 1982 the Secretary-General reported that, inasmuch as these issues were interrelated, the diplomatic process was aimed at achieving a comprehensive settlement. As part of this diplomatic process also, two rounds of discussions through the intermediary of the Secretary-General's personal representative were held in Geneva in 1982 and 1983.

The Secretary-General reported in 1984 that he had had an exchange of views during his visit to the Soviet Union in July of that year and that the Soviet Government had reaffirmed its support for a political settlement and the continuation of his efforts. He also said

that a set of understandings had been worked out whose purpose was to try to solve, within the context of drawing up various instruments for implementing a comprehensive settlement, serious difficulties that had arisen in the past year.

Accordingly, a third round of discussions—"proximity" talks between the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and Afghanistan held through the intermediary of the personal representative of the Secretary-General—was convened in Geneva in August 1984, on which, in accordance with established practice, the Iranian Government was kept informed. The interlocutors reviewed various draft instruments and related questions. A fourth round commenced in June 1985 to continue drafting specific instruments that would constitute the comprehensive settlement.

At its 1984 session, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts and called upon all the parties concerned to work for the urgent achievement of a political solution and the creation of the necessary conditions which would enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their homes in safety and honour.

### **Central America**

In March 1982, Nicaragua asked the Security Council to meet in view of the "worsening of tension in Central America, with the ever-increasing danger of a large-scale military intervention by the armed forces of the United States". Denying the allegations as without foundation, the United States charged the Nicaraguan Government with large-scale intervention in the affairs of neighbouring countries and of aggressive conduct designed to destabilise neighbouring countries.

A draft resolution by which the Council would have appealed to all Member States to refrain from the direct, indirect, overt or covert use of force against any country of Central America and the Caribbean, and would have appealed to all parties concerned to use dialogue and negotiation, was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.

Throughout the following years, in letters and statements to the Security Council, which met on several occasions at Nicaragua's request, Nicaragua and Honduras lodged accusations and counter-accusations of foreign interference, of numerous border incidents and of incursions by sea and air. It was pointed out that military and naval manoeuvres, the presence of military advisers and training

centres, the traffic in arms, the activities of armed groups, and the unprecedented build-up of arms and military and paramilitary forces constituted additional factors of tension.

Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, which comprise the countries of the Contadora Group—so called after a meeting of their Foreign Ministers in January 1983 on an island off the coast of Panama—initiated a series of consultations with five Central American Governments (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) in efforts to find a negotiated political solution to the problems affecting the region. In 1984 they elaborated a draft comprehensive agreement entitled the “Contadora Act on Peace and Co-operation in Central America”, for signature and ratification by the five Central American States.

The Security Council met again in May 1983 at the request of Nicaragua, which described what it termed the launching of a new stage of the invasion of Nicaragua “by counter-revolutionary Somozist forces operating out of Honduras and financed, trained and supported” by the United States. The Council adopted a resolution unanimously commending the efforts of the Contadora Group, urging pursuit of its efforts, and asking States to cooperate with it.

The Council met on four occasions in 1984 to consider complaints by Nicaragua relating mainly to the northern area of that country. In April, at a meeting following the mining of a number of Nicaraguan ports, a Nicaraguan draft resolution addressing that topic was not adopted because of the negative vote of a permanent member. In May 1985, the Council unanimously reaffirmed Nicaragua’s right freely to decide on its own political, economic and social systems without outside interference, called on the United States and Nicaragua to resume the dialogue they had been holding in Mexico towards normalising their relations, and reaffirmed its support for the Contadora Group.

The General Assembly, at its 1983 session, condemned the acts of aggression against the States of the region. Especially serious in this context, it stated, were the attacks launched from outside Nicaragua against its strategic installations, the continued destruction and loss of life in El Salvador and Honduras, and the increase in the number of refugees in several of the region’s countries. The Assembly also expressed firm support for the Contadora Group and urged it to persevere in its efforts. In 1984 it urged the five Central American Governments to speed up consultations with the aim of the early signing of the Contadora Act, and urged States to respect the purposes and principles of the Act.

Since then, the Secretary-General has kept both the Security Council and the General Assembly constantly informed of all developments in the region and of the periodic contacts and consultations which he has had with representatives of the interested countries. In those discussions, the Secretary-General has underlined the importance of the efforts of the Contadora Group to find a negotiated, political solution to the problems in Central America and of the need to persevere in those efforts.

# 18

## Peace-Keeping and Disarmament in the Peace-Building Process

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### **Introduction**

Since 1988, the international community has witnessed tremendous developments in the field of peace-keeping. The number of peace-keeping operations and their size are an indication of the expanding harmony between the major Powers and their desire to solve conflicts, and also of the increasing need to cope with conflicts at various levels.

In this article an attempt is made to outline some ideas on means to respond to the new requirements of United Nations peace-keeping in a more flexible way, thereby avoiding "peacekeeping fatigue" among Member States. It also discusses ways that peace-keeping and disarmament might facilitate regional peace-building processes.

### **Development of the Peace-Keeping Instrument**

Peace-keeping operations as now carried out by the United Nations were not foreseen by the founders of the Organisation and are not mentioned at all in the Charter. They were conceived and developed by the United Nations at the beginning of the cold war, mainly because disagreement among the permanent members of the Security Council had rendered the United Nations collective security system, outlined in Chapter VII of the Charter, unworkable. Thus peace-keeping operations became a practical mechanism for containing conflicts and facilitating their settlement. Former Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson and former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld introduced and promoted the idea of using a multinational force to control and supervise a negotiated cease-fire

between hostile States, thus preventing an escalation of conflict while keeping the peace. Their ideas were based primarily on two principles: that a United Nations peacekeeping operation should take place only with the consent of the States concerned; and that force should not be applied to end a conflict.

From 1948 to 1985 some 13 peace-keeping operations were established. In general, each was organized as a military observer mission, as a peace-keeping force or as a combination of the two. Each operation was provided with a mandate outlining the means to be used to assist in the control and resolution of conflicts between hostile States; or, as in Cyprus, between hostile communities within a single State, each backed by an outside Power.

United Nations efforts in the maintenance of peace have passed through four development phases. The first period, between 1948 and 1956, was an experimental phase, in which the United Nations introduced an international observation and reporting system with a view to maintaining fragile cease-fires. From this period, there are two important missions which are still in existence: the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) with headquarters in Jerusalem, and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in Jammu and Kashmir. These missions were initiated by the Security Council and financed from the regular budget.

The next ten years—1956 to 1967—were characterized by escalating tension between the two Super-Powers. Increasing rivalry for hegemony in the third world fuelled conflicts, which, in some regions, tended to escalate out of control. In order to help achieve the cease-fire and maintain international peace in this political climate, the first peace-keeping force, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), was launched in the Sinai in 1956, and became the first example of a valuable mechanism for constraining hostilities and thus to make possible conditions necessary for negotiations and/or mediation towards the peaceful settlement of conflicts—in other words, peace-making. In addition to UNEF I, two new forces—ONUC in the Congo and UNFICYP in Cyprus—were established by the Security Council, as well as four observer missions. The international community began to realise that peace-keeping operations, combined with the mutual deterrence of nuclear power, produced a new type of security—negative stability.

As the peace-keeping instrument was further refined and sharpened, terms such as “buffer zone”, “interposition” and “multi-

dimensional" were used for the first time. In the beginning, great expectations were placed on the United Nations, but the deteriorating East-West political climate, the impaired financial situation of the United Nations, and the 1967 war in the Middle East hampered the further use and development of the peace-keeping mechanism. Peacekeepers thus entered what might be called the "dormant" period. During these years (1967-1973), no new operations were initiated and only three remained in effect. The cold war effectively prevented any positive approach towards international peace under the auspices of the United Nations. In 1973, when the Yom Kippur War threatened to escalate into an all-out Super-Power confrontation, the usefulness of United Nations peace-keeping was re-discovered as a practical means for dealing with the situation. Consequently, peace-keeping was encouraged and revitalized as the world community became familiar with the new operations in Sinai (UNEF II), Lebanon (UNIFIL) and on the Golan Heights (UNDOF). However, tension between the super-Powers remained, and the rearmament continued, at tremendous cost. Even though other conflicts surfaced which threatened international peace and security, the political rivalry between the major Powers and the lack of financial resources remained major hindrances to the creation of additional peace-keeping operations.

Up to the present time, peace-keeping operations have been initiated only with the consent of the parties involved, and until the mid-1980s utilized as contributors of troops small countries that were neutral to the conflict. Peace-keeping worked as a mechanism for reassurance, brought an end to the hostilities in the areas concerned and simultaneously provided some measures for confidence-building.

In these years, the peace process focused primarily on peace-keeping, and to a lesser extent on peace-making, but peace-building was almost wholly neglected. Consequently, disarmament, which was foreseen by the founders of the United Nations as one of the major pillars of the peace process, was not developed as an integral part of the process.

In the last five years the decreased tension between the two super-Powers created a new political environment, which provided the basis for the developments in Central and Eastern Europe. The harmony that followed the end of the cold war contributed to unity and the process of consultation in the Security Council, as well as to its capability for solving long-standing conflicts. Consequently, the United Nations was inundated with requests for peace-keeping operations.

Another development at this time was the increased use of civilians in the new peace-keeping operations. Although the United Nations Military Observer Group in Iran-Iraq (UNIIMOG) was still a traditional operation, others were less traditional. In the operations in Namibia, as well as in Central America, we witnessed a new type of peace-keeping, which had a more complex structure and a more comprehensive mission. Here, the United Nations was asked to advance international peace and security on a wider scale by promoting a sound political and legal constitutional system. Such comprehensive and challenging goals required combining traditional peacekeeping with some novel methods such as upholding basic legal standards, monitoring by police, supervision of elections, and humanitarian assistance.

In the recent crisis in the Persian Gulf, we saw the United Nations performing in the role envisaged by its founders. For the first time (excluding the United Nations-sponsored action in Korea), the enforcement measures in Chapter VII were authorized and the international community involved undertook massive intervention by a coalition force—operating within the framework of international law and the United Nations Charter and with the consensus and authorisation of the Security Council. This activity was encouraging in that it enabled the United Nations to embark on a system of collective security. Another pioneer action taken during the Gulf crisis—an action which is still in effect—was the disarmament and verification mission in Iraq to ensure the destruction of nuclear, chemical, biological and missile weapons and certain stockpiles of arms.

Within the last ten years, the world has seen a variety of arrangements for meeting threats to international peace and security. It has witnessed traditional and experienced peacekeeping operations; multidimensional operations; and the enforcement action in the Gulf. What will the future security system be like?

### **Future Development**

Even though the international political climate has changed and improved, the changes have brought to the surface other kinds of conflicts.

Ethnic, religious, economic and social conflicts have become more apparent, and border disputes have again become an issue. Autocratic regimes contribute to domestic and intra-State conflicts, resulting in insurgency, civil war and subversive warfare. Thus, there is an

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indication of the need in the future for various kinds of national, regional and international security arrangements which must have the capacity to cope with conflicts at various levels. In order to promote these measures, practical arrangements are required to deal with demobilisation, including disarmament and arms control, election and human rights monitoring, and humanitarian assistance. Although the United Nations has been involved in the practical implementation of conflict management in terms of peace-keeping, little has been achieved in terms of peace-building.

Within this context, disarmament has been discussed for decades. However, the new political climate has also changed the prospects for it. The establishment of imposed disarmament and verification mechanisms within the United Nations framework in the case of Iraq, although based on enforcement action to reverse aggression, may provide some precedents, ultimately leading to machinery for multilateral arms control and verification.

It is likely that future peace-keeping activities—broadly defined—will include a number of new operations, some of which fall outside the traditional field of peace-keeping.

The Gulf crisis has indicated that there is a new era of political and military cooperation in which collective security actions are feasible through the United Nations. However, although the war in the Gulf provided a number of lessons, the question still remains whether the United Nations will have, or should have, the capacity to deal with the full range of such local, regional and international conflicts. In addition, we must bear in mind that since 1988 the United Nations has established 12 new operations, of which those in Yugoslavia and Cambodia are the most extensive. Both operations are huge and may involve up to 34,000 men and women working in different parts of the world at tremendous expense. Consequently, one must consider whether Member States are willing to contribute greater financial, human and material resources to conflicts in remote areas when the value for their own political, economic and strategic environment is not readily apparent to their people.

It seems obvious that the current situation and its future development call for a new collective security system, one in which national and regional security arrangements assume more responsibility within their own areas. Such a system must take into consideration the new environment, which is no longer under the mantle of the “negative stability” of the cold war—a fact that has left a

vacuum in regional security arrangements. This vacuum must be filled, because regions must deal with a broad spectrum of conflict management, requiring new thinking in terms of capacity and responsibility. Local or regional threats need to be met with a flexible response, corresponding to each particular situation and local conditions. Even though the Charter provides for a peace-making role for regional organisations—a fact which has been emphasized by the Secretary-General, as well as at the recent summit meeting of the Security Council—very little has been achieved in terms of implementing the concept.

### **Security Arrangements at Various Levels**

If all of these ideas are to be put into effect, the responsibility may be shared on five different levels.

It is clear that the United Nations must continue to take the responsibility for international peace and security in the future. But a security arrangement of this kind must be flexible, adapting its action to the nature of the conflict, and must not only involve the United Nations and the international community, but, whenever useful and/or possible, must also utilise regional and national security systems. Within this framework, the following arrangements might be considered for ensuring global security at several levels.

#### ***The First Level: National***

Many Governments are already prepared for the twenty-first century, while others are still in the process of nation-building, including the forming of national security arrangements. A national government must be responsible for its own security. Armed forces must be the insurance against foreign intervention as well as against domestic insurgency, civil war or subversive warfare.

At the same time, the armed forces of the developing countries could also play a more sophisticated role by participating in building the national infrastructure of their countries, an area in which military knowledge and capacity in engineering and transport will be essential. Finally, as a member of a regional security organisation and of the United Nations, a nation must be prepared to participate in the maintenance of international peace and security. Thus, national forces are the first and basic level in global security: a nation must deal with its own security, but should also be prepared to participate in regional or international security arrangements. Therefore, national forces must

be trained to participate, not only in national defence, but also in regional and international peace activities which may involve regional or international peace-keeping, and which may involve disarmament activities.

### ***The Second Level: Regional***

The second level would involve the regional organisations, which must support the development of regional security systems as part of global security arrangements. Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter provides, particularly in its Article 52, for such arrangements, assuming that they are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Although some "regional agencies" embody agreements in specific issue-areas—such as international law and economic integration—there are very few regional organisations with an institutional mechanism for handling violent conflicts. However, there are examples of the settlement of disputes in which regional bodies have been involved. The Organisation of American States (OAS), the League of Arab States and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) all have in common the purpose of promoting regional security. Although these organisations may have the institutional mechanisms for dealing with regional conflicts, they do not necessarily have the knowledge, experience and understanding required to implement practical peace-keeping and other arrangements. For the successful management of a conflict it is essential to incorporate not only political considerations but also a practical or operational dimension in which political arrangements will be implemented. Such an instrument now exists at the international level (the peace-keeping forces) but does not yet exist in the various regional arenas.

Apart from the ongoing operations in Yugoslavia and Cambodia, it is not certain whether such large and costly peacekeeping operations will be repeated in the future. These types of operations will probably be too expensive for the United Nations, as well as for the contributing States. It is to be hoped that serious disputes of such proportions will be handled at an earlier stage at the regional level, assuming that the constitutional and operational resources exist or can be mobilized.

In order to be able to implement the practical or operational security arrangements that must follow a political decision, each regional Organisation would have to develop a centre from which to deal with these regional questions. Such a centre should be able to deal with all the means of implementing traditional peace-keeping, but also with the newer aspects, such as disarmament and verification, the

monitoring of elections, human rights, and humanitarian assistance. Since the new political climate has fundamentally enhanced the prospects for the implementation of confidence-building arrangements, it is possible today to provide the machinery for bilateral or multilateral arms control verification. Regional peace-keeping centres must therefore be related and coordinated with existing or future disarmament centres, not only to promote peace-keeping and peace-building activities, but also to relate theory and practice in a natural way.

Regional disarmament and peace-keeping centres should explore the theoretical and practical processes of ending hostilities, and of enhancing the capacity of regional organisations to conduct regional peace-keeping/peace-building operations, and when required, to contribute to the international peace process. In the more practical aspects of such a mandate, a peace-keeping centre should provide the framework and coordination necessary to establish a regional stand-by peacekeeping force. This force should consist of 5,000 to 10,000 troops and be equipped and trained to operate on short notice, both regionally and globally. The centre should also have the capacity to provide the necessary tools ("verifiers") for some peace-building activities, for example verification of regional or bilateral disarmament and arms limitation treaties. In its peace-building efforts, the centre would also develop other practical mechanisms for resolving disputes in a non-violent manner, and in such a way as to promote and develop military integration in the region.

In order to facilitate regional peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building activities, the United Nations could assist regional organisations by giving them supplementary funding and some logistical support. It would also be useful—and more far-reaching—for the United Nations to be represented in the regional organisations.

### ***The Third Level: Regional and International Combined***

The third level will be a combination of regional and international security arrangements. If a conflict occurs in which the regional organisation decides to establish a regional peace-keeping force, such a force must carry out its mandate in an effective and impartial manner. In some cases the conflict might be so complex, particularly when the roots of the conflict are of ethnic origin, that the impartiality of the force would be questioned. In such cases, the United Nations Security Council would need to authorise the Secretary-General to provide, with the consent of the parties, and in coordination with the regional

organisation, an international body of observers who, under his command, would ensure the objectivity of the regional peacekeeping efforts.

However, this impartial body should not only ensure objectivity; it should also provide the United Nations with the capacity to promote the peace process by using these observers as monitors of human rights, elections and the verification of arms limitation.

### ***The Fourth Level: International***

International peace-keeping should be the fourth level in the global security structure. In some cases, international peace and security are threatened in ways that call for a truly international response, requiring peace-keeping units from the international community and the various regions. Peace-keeping units which are trained and prepared in the region and which are efficient and impartial would be provided to the United Nations in order to carry out the peace-keeping task, either in a traditional role or in a wider and more multifaceted way. The recent changes on the international scene have introduced some new elements into international peace-keeping, which make it feasible to use peace-keeping forces in new areas of peace and security, including the third component in the peace process—peace-building.

Peace-keepers have been used to monitor elections, human rights, demobilisation and other activities that have promoted peace and stability in a given area. So far, we have seen the peace-keepers monitor and supervise the demobilisation in Central America; it is hoped that they will do the same in Cambodia, demobilising up to 70 per cent of the existing forces.

But peace-keeping could be expanded even further. For example, it should be explored whether it is possible to use peace-keepers to supervise economic sanctions, or to use them in a situation relating to an environmental disaster resulting from violent conflict. But again, perhaps it is most important to use international peace-keepers for verification of multilateral disarmament and arms limitation agreements and treaties, thereby giving the United Nations an accurate and practical instrument with the knowledge and capacity to carry out ad hoc investigations of arms limitation or disarmament. The feasibility of naval peace-keeping has also been discussed, and of verification of sea-based cruise missiles. The technical and practical arrangements are difficult to foresee, as yet, but should be explored.

### ***The Fifth Level: Enforcement***

The fifth and last level in global security is enforcement action, in which a coalition could use force in order to impose a decision by the international community under the authority of the Security Council. As this step is within the purview of global security and accepted as the last resort in crisis management, it must be sanctioned and decided by the United Nations. It is very important that the United Nations should assume the responsibility for peace-building activities as soon as possible after the imposition of such a violent solution. In order to build confidence in the area, enforcement action, as well as peace-keeping, should involve peace-building steps to be implemented immediately after the conflict has ended. Moreover, disarmament must be one of a number of measures necessary for the achievement of peace and development in the area.

### **Preventive Measures**

So far we have examined methods for limiting a conflict. We must now explore the possibilities of preventing a conflict. Some have suggested the idea of using peace-keepers in preventive efforts, that is, using a peace-keeping force at the request of a single State or group of States threatened with an attack. In this respect, the force—whether a peace-keeping force or military observers—would serve as a “trip-wire” to warn an aggressor against attacking. A back-up force could be deployed behind the “trip-wire”, to act if the peace-keepers are overrun; although this idea seems feasible, it would be best if preventive activities could be implemented at an earlier stage.

Almost all Governments use a number of resources to collect information about the international situation. The most common and acceptable means of obtaining knowledge about countries is through embassies. Ambassadors act on behalf of their national Governments to collect information that is important to their own country's foreign policy. As a rule, the information may be taken as reliable and reasonably objective, providing national Governments with data on which they can base decisions concerning foreign policy. The United Nations should use the same system. United Nations officials should be appointed as United Nations ambassadors to critical areas in order to provide the Secretary-General with objective and non-filtered information about the actual situation. If required, these special representatives or ambassadors might be authorized to act as mediators and to carry out the Secretary-General's good offices with a view to

preventing a threatened conflict. If an emergency occurs, they could act as the Secretary-General's focal point for various emergency actions relating to peace-keeping, disaster relief, or other activities that require coordination at the highest level. United Nations representatives should not work only in areas of crisis management; they could also facilitate the peace-building process, implementing various confidence-building measures.

### **Conclusion**

As indicated, the peace-keeping of today and tomorrow is a rather complex and multifaceted undertaking. The international climate requires not only temporary problem-solving measures, but also a variety of tools for promoting lasting peace and security. Peace-keeping is one of the means that has proved workable. However, peace-keeping is only one fragment of the peace process. The complexity of the international situation requires a combination of available instruments and a flexible response to various types of conflicts.

Moreover, disputes must be identified before they have escalated into conflicts. Peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building are the pillars of the peace process: peacekeeping forces and negotiators/mediators are the natural mechanisms for both peace-keeping and peace-making, just as disarmament activities are among the mechanisms for peace-building. Each of these three tools has a far better chance of success if the three are approached as an integrated entity.

### **Peace-Keeping Operations mentioned in the article**

United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)

January 1949 to present

First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)

November 1956-June 1967

United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

March 1964 to present

Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II)

October 1973-July 1979

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

June 1974 to present

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

March 1978 to present

United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)

August 1988-February 1991

## **DISARMAMENT AND THE PEACE PROCESS IN CENTRAL AMERICA**

### **Background**

The decade of the 1980s in Central America was the period of the twentieth century most involved in conflict. Confrontations, especially militaristic, the dominance of powerful groups over economic and political affairs (oligarchy), the absence of democracy in political systems, together with intolerable economic conditions such as widespread poverty and economic reform the benefits of which never reached all groups of society provoked many crises. At the same time, crises were exacerbated by the activities of many countries which saw their dominance at stake (the United States in particular) and others which, owing to propinquity, realized the need to act because of the potential danger to their national security (those which originally constituted the Contadora Group), or those which sought to influence the political processes by expanding their network of allies (Cuba and the Soviet Union). Accordingly, when the crises erupted in 1979 and 1980, the unrest soon spread to other countries and acquired the character of geopolitical confrontation. The first conflict, which emerged from national confrontation involving three countries (Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador) developed into an international conflict. Thus, unprecedented militarisation broke out in the region as is demonstrated by the increased troop strength after 1980.

Another new element in Central America was the presence of foreign forces, which participated in the arms race and added to the military personnel: the United States stationed troops and carried out military manoeuvres in Honduras; the United States Military Group was established in El Salvador in 1980; Cuba incorporated military advisers in Nicaragua in 1981 (who withdrew in 1990); and the Soviet Union provided military aid to Nicaragua.

By way of cooperation, many countries rendered economic aid to Central America and urged *detente*. The first peace effort that won strong support from the international community was the work of the

**Military Balance in Central America: Troop Strength  
1977, 1980, 1985, 1992**

	1977	1980	1986	% Growth 1977-1986	Estimates 1992
Guatemala	14300	14900	51600	260	52000
Nicaragua	7100	—	62850	785	21000
Honduras	14200	11300	23000	61	23000
El Salvador	7130	7250	59650	736	53000
					26500
Costa Rica	5000	5000	20000	300	10000
Total	47730	38450	217100	354	

**Source:** *The Military Balance*, IISS, London (1977-1978; 1980-1981; and 1985-1986). In the case of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, police, security and civil defence forces are not included. The estimates for 1992 have been made by the author. In the case of Costa Rica the figures are for security and police forces, not armed forces.

Contadora Group. Contadora was established on 9 January 1983 by Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela. Contadora focused its work on an effort to bring about a dialogue between the five Governments involved in the conflict (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) and suggested that a peace pact be signed which would include many provisions designed to promote *detente* between the Governments, the reduction of armies, the expulsion of foreign military forces, integration of the guerrillas into civilian life by widening political opportunities, and the like. The Contadora Agreement was not signed. A last effort was made on 7 June 1986.

Nevertheless, the effort of the Contadora Group was not in vain, for several reasons: first, the dialogue between the Governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, with Nicaragua succeeded; secondly, it prevented a military clash between Honduras and Nicaragua; and thirdly, it prevented military intervention by the United States in Nicaragua. The Peace Agreement of the Contadora Group was not signed owing to the fact that, because of the internal conditions, the five Central American countries were not ready for peaceful co-existence inasmuch as both the Governments and the insurgent movements placed their trust in military strategies: (a) the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberation Nacional (FMLN) versus the army of El Salvador; (b) the National Revolutionary Union of

Guatemala (URNG) versus the Guatemalan army; and (c) the counter-revolutionaries versus the army of Nicaragua. To this was added the United States "containment of communism" strategy against the Government of Nicaragua and the guerrillas of El Salvador and Guatemala, known as a "war of low intensity".

The crisis in Central America can thus be divided into the following periods: Period of regional militarisation (1979-1987); period of civil war in Nicaragua (1978-1990), El Salvador (1981-1992) and Guatemala (1979- ); period of regional *detente* (1987 onwards); and period of implementation of the national peace processes (1987 onwards).

## Esquipulas II

On 7 August 1987, the historic document entitled "Procedure for the Establishment of a Strong and Lasting Peace in Central America", known as Esquipulas II, was signed in Guatemala. The peace process initiated in Esquipulas brought about regional *detente*. The process carried out by the Contadora Group was noteworthy because the Central American Governments agreed among themselves that there was a need to eliminate the tensions, mainly as regards Nicaragua, and to implement the mechanisms appropriate for that purpose. The International Verification and Follow-up Commission (CIVS) for the peace process in which representatives of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the Organisation of American States and members of the Contadora Group participated, was established. Similarly, amnesties were decreed for the rebel groups and it was proposed that national dialogues on peace should be initiated by the Governments with the guerrillas. At this first stage, mediation was internal: in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua mediation was initiated by the Catholic church, and the institutions established for that purpose in the three countries as a result of the signing of Esquipulas II were named the *National Reconciliation Commission*.

Another result of Esquipulas II was the establishment of a regional consultation mechanism at the presidential level: the summit meetings of Central American presidents. They began with the first Esquipulas meeting on 24 and 25 May 1986. In 1991, Panama joined in the tenth presidential meeting, held at San Salvador from 15 to 17 July. At the presidential summits the process of economic integration and cooperation for development was then discussed. These presidential meetings were the most important indicators of the new climate of *detente* prevailing in the region. There was a giant leap from that regional effort to "nationalisation" of the peace.

## Peace and Demilitarisation in Nicaragua

In Nicaragua the peace and demilitarisation process was more rapid. The Sandinist Government (19 July 1979-25 April 1990) was faced with the war waged by the counter-revolutionaries at a very high cost. The country was completely militarized, both politically and economically. From 1985 to 1989 over 50 per cent of the Government's budget was assigned to defence, the political struggle was reduced to a "state of emergency", and the Government received direct advisory assistance from Cuba (estimated to consist of about 200 military advisers) and technology from the Soviet Union. The counter-revolutionaries received full support from the United States Government (including covert action) and its strategy against the Sandinist Government consisted of destroying the country's economic infrastructure. For that reason Nicaragua became the most heavily indebted country in the entire third world (more than \$10 billion for a population of 3 million, or \$3,300 per capita). The United States made \$447,690,000 available for the counter-revolution between 1982 and 1990. The exact amount of Cuban and Soviet aid to Nicaragua is unknown. The Nicaraguan Government calculated the economic cost of the war to be \$9 billion.

The counter-revolutionaries used sophisticated anti-air weapons (SAM-7) and the Government used Soviet high-technology helicopters against the Contras. In 1989, in the period of maximum mobilisation for the war, the Sandinist army is estimated to have had 120,000 reservists and 60,000 regulars.

The peace process developed along with two elements: democratisation and demilitarisation. After the signing of Esquipulas II, the first step taken by the Nicaraguan Government was to establish the National Reconciliation Commission headed by Cardinal Obando y Bravo in August 1987. In September of the same year an amnesty was decreed and in October a national dialogue was convened, with 11 political parties of the opposition. On 23 March 1988, the first partial agreement with the counter-revolutionaries was signed: the "Sapoa Agreement", whereby the forces agreed not to engage in offensive military activities. This first achievement was frustrated by the counter-revolutionaries in June. In February 1989, a change of date was announced for the presidential elections; the National Assembly, municipalities and governors of the autonomous region on the Atlantic coast rescheduled it from November to February 1990. In March 1989, an amnesty was announced for 1,894 members of the Somoza National Guard and, in August, the Government signed an agreement with the

opposition parties guaranteeing impartiality in the elections. In December, nine opposition parties formed the National Opposition Union, and Violeta Chamorro was nominated to the presidency. In February 1990, Chamorro won the elections and became President on 25 April 1990. Demobilisation of the counter-revolutionaries was completed between April and June of 1990, and they were granted political and civil guarantees and given a piece of land, bringing the peace process to a successful end in July. The demobilisation included 22,000 counter-revolutionaries, of whom, as the International Support and Verification Commission of the Organisation of American States pointed out, fewer than 10,000 were combatants.

The demilitarisation process took place at the same time as the change of government and the demobilisation of the counter-revolutionaries. The Sandinist army decreased from more than 100,000 men (regulars and reservists) at the beginning of 1990 to 20,000 at the end of 1991, the largest reduction in the entire Central American region (not including Panama, where, as a result of the United States military intervention in December 1989, the army was disbanded). In budgetary terms, the demobilisation was very important because economic resources were then assigned to other priorities such as health and education.

### **Peace and Demilitarisation in El Salvador**

The civil war of El Salvador, which began in January 1981, was the military process with the largest geopolitical repercussions in the region after the conflict in Nicaragua had ended. The fighting between the army and the FMLN began to have great repercussions. It can be said that the regional process of Esquipulas II was not successful in the case of El Salvador. Moreover, in El Salvador, unlike Nicaragua and Guatemala, the National Reconciliation Commission was not effective. The casualties—dead and wounded—in the civil war amounted to an average of 4,000 per year for the two armies (44,000 *guerrilleros* and servicemen killed or wounded between 1981 and 1991), and over 70,000 civilian victims of repression and of the fighting. The highest peak of military warfare was during the guerrilla offensive of November 1989 in San Salvador, the capital of the country. Among other negative events, the governmental army murdered six Jesuit priests, accusing them of being “intellectual originators” of the guerrilla offensive.

Unlike the fighting in Guatemala and Nicaragua, according to most analysts, the civil war between the FMLN and the army was a

tie, because the negotiation for ending the war had been determined by a balance struck between the forces and it had not been easy for the Government to ask the guerrillas to surrender. Furthermore, the country was bound by a strong effort on the part of the United States to prevent a "communist regime" from winning, an effort in which more than \$6 billion were invested. From the war in Vietnam to the war in the Persian Gulf, it was the highest investment of the United States in the third world.

"Since 1981 policy makers believed instead that victory in El Salvador could be won by influencing the regime to do what was necessary to win its people's hearts and minds; and the United States believed that the \$6 billion in support it provided brought considerable leverage in that effort. But the Salvadorans had America trapped. They realized that the United States was involved in their war for its own national security interests."

The peace efforts were initiated in 1984. From 1981 to 1984 the FMLN tried to contact the Government without success. On 15 October 1984 the President of El Salvador, Jose N. Duarte, offered the FMLN a peace proposal, inviting it to participate in the political process in exchange for delivering the arms. This proposal was carried out one month later, at the second dialogue. By 1987 the talks came to a stop, when the third dialogue was held at the seat of the Apostolic Nuncio in San Salvador, on 4 and 5 December 1987. Later, in January 1989, the FMLN agreed, for the first time in the course of the war, to participate in the electoral process and abide by the legislation in force. After the change of government in June 1989, the new President, Alfredo Cristiani, formed a delegation for dialogue with the FMLN, a delegation that met in September and October 1989. In that delegation the possibility was mentioned that the guerrillas might comply with legality if they handed in their weapons. At the same time the repression against the trade-unionists increased. The Catholic church was the mediator at all these meetings, but its mediation was suspended because of the murder of the Jesuits on 16 November 1989.

In 1990, the need for a new mediating and negotiating body became felt. Finally, the guerrillas and the Government admitted that the United Nations should participate in the negotiations, as from 4 April 1990, when the "Geneva Agreement" was signed. Beginning with the United Nations mediation, the final stage of the war began and it ended on 16 January 1992.

The peace process lasted for 12 months. The two peace commissions held 23 meetings with the United Nations delegation. Of these meetings, 13 were held in Mexico City, 4 in Costa Rica, 2 in Caracas, 3

in New York and 1 in Geneva. Before the final peace act was signed, five partial agreements were signed, which led to progress in the talks: (1) the "Geneva Agreement", whereby the commitment to mediation was signed; (2) the "Agenda" and the "Timetable" of the peace process, signed in Caracas on 21 May 1990; (3) the "Agreement on Human Rights", signed on 26 July 1990 in Costa Rica; (4) the "Agreement on Constitutional Reforms", signed on 27 April 1991 in Mexico City; and (5) the "New York Agreement", signed on 25 September 1991 in New York. Moreover, as part of the final process, the "Act of New York" was signed on 31 December 1991, with a view to the signing of the comprehensive peace document. In the peace process the fact that a balance of military forces existed was very important. The mutual surrender of principles occurred basically as follows: the guerrillas agreed to be incorporated in the existing political process and to hand over their weapons, and the Government promised to make fundamental changes in the armed forces and security squads. Moreover, the United Nations Observer Mission (ONUSAL) was established as well as a national body in which all the political parties, the Government and the FMLN participated: the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ).

In order to achieve the foregoing it was necessary, as observed by Marcel Merle, for the parties gradually to initiate "a process for moderating their positions and cooling their passions", as well as to form a mediation body that would have legitimacy for the parties and for the international protagonists having influence on the conflict. Similarly, in the case of El Salvador, the "stabilising" concept of the negotiation process carried weight and, through the United Nations, good use was made of experience, because "the art of negotiation, which is not very susceptible to systematic treatment, is the fruit of talent, experience of the world and the thoughtful perusal of earlier negotiations". This important and favourable United Nations mediation had the firm support of four countries: Colombia, Mexico, Spain and Venezuela, known as the "Group of Friends of the Secretary-General" and, at its final stage, the United States gave decisive signals in favour of negotiation from September to December 1991.

The peace agreement indicates that the peace process is to begin on 1 February 1992 and end on 31 October 1992. Reducing the army personnel of El Salvador is very important. The Government pledges to reduce the present complement of 53,000 armed forces and to disband all the security squads and paramilitaries. In addition, a new national civil police force is to be established. Similarly, the FMLN is to be

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disbanded gradually from 1 February to 31 October 1992 to become a political party. The balance of this peace process is very favourable. In fact, according to many analysts, the signing of the Act of Peace was a great triumph on the part of the civilians of El Salvador and of the international community, and a disadvantage only for those who had benefited from 12 years of war.

## **THE SLOW AND INCONCLUSIVE PEACE PROCESS IN GUATEMALA**

From 1954 onwards, when the *coup d'etat* overthrew a democratic government, until 1986, when the civilian Vinicio Cerezo became President, the political process in Guatemala was dominated by the military. It was the country with the highest record of human rights violations in Latin America. In this context, since the 1960s there has been a guerrilla movement which has had many ups and downs in its military activity, but the counter-insurgency strategies used by the army have been unable to rout it. From the late 1970s onwards the guerrillas had the strong backing of the indigenous maya-quiche people. For this reason the guerrilla war became better organized and more intensive. In 1981 the four existing guerrilla groups, partly imitating the unity of the El Salvador guerrillas, were unified and the National Revolutionary Union of Guatemala (URNG) was established. The Government launched a vast military counter-insurgent campaign and managed to prevent an expansion of the guerrilla movement. The combination of forces therefore favoured the army but it lacked the capacity to rout the guerrillas, so that the only way of overcoming a state of civil war was through a pact of peace.

The process of dialogue between the URNG and the Government began in Madrid on 9 October 1987, after which the National Reconciliation Commission was established, by the Esquipulas II process, with the mediation of the Catholic church. Subsequently, the National Reconciliation Commission met with the guerrillas several times and consecutive peace talks were held between the Government and the URNG: in Oslo, Norway, on 26 to 30 March 1990; in El Escorial, Spain, from 27 May to 1 June 1990; in Metepec, Mexico, from 25 to 30 October 1990; and in Mexico City, where, on 27 April 1991, the "Mexico City Agreement" was signed to prevent breaking the continuity of the talks. Early in 1991, when the presidency changed, the new president, Jorge Serrano, announced a "Total Peace" plan, stating that during his administration peace with the guerrillas would be signed. The

talks continued without favourable results until late in 1991. Actually the signing of the peace in El Salvador may have had a positive effect in Guatemala.

Guatemala is the place in Central America where the dialogue process is slowest. The government position is that peace can be achieved only if the guerrilla movement hands over its arms and becomes a political party. The guerrillas state that the following must be guaranteed: the processes for reducing the army and the elimination of the security system and security police, which are responsible for the human rights violations. No partial agreement between the two parties has been achieved, for which reason the transition in the peace-making process, from dialogue to negotiation, is not taking place. Thus, the Guatemalan situation is the last redoubt of the cold war which exists in Central America and which affects a comprehensive process for disarmament and demilitarisation throughout the region.

### **Final Thoughts**

*Detente* in Central America is a process that goes hand in hand with the consolidation of democracy, the reduction of armies, and the establishment of confidence-building measures between the various Governments. It has a favourable effect on the credibility and subsequent ability of the international organisations which have participated as mediators, such as the United Nations and the Organisation of American States. Moreover, the support of many Governments in the peace process has brought about whatever success there has been in Nicaragua and El Salvador. The establishment of peace is a long, drawn-out effort in Central America. It began with the work of the Contadora Group, was then internalized by the Central American Governments through the signing of Esquipulas II, and has counted on the successful mediation of the Organisation of American States in Nicaragua and of the United Nations in El Salvador. In Guatemala, the most heavily populated and industrialized country in the region, it is necessary to expedite a signed peace which is favourable for the parties and which involves reducing the army, disarming the guerrilla movement and transforming it into a political party (or parties), and disbanding the security squads. In all of the Central American countries it is clear that without peace no one can speak of democracy, and peace is a *sine qua non* for consolidating *detente*.

In Central America it is essential that the armies be transformed into armies based exclusively on doctrines of defence, that the national security doctrine of the cold-war era be eliminated, and that they no

longer constitute a burden on their Governments. It is obvious that high-technology armaments are not necessary in the region and that they only generate tension between governments. In this connection, those countries of the region which have not lived through civil wars, such as Honduras, must also realise that demilitarisation and the reduction of their armed forces are a necessity. Costa Rica, which has no army (but does have security personnel), is an example, because its non-militarisation goes very well with a solid democracy under which attention is given to social problems. In Panama the army was disbanded with the intervention of the United States in December 1989. Nevertheless, internal tensions may again bring about resistance to a United States military occupation.

Other peace processes have had favourable effects in Central America. The cases of Angola and Namibia and the negotiations in Cambodia have been favourably repeated. The negotiating arrangement in the case of Angola in particular was handled in a way very similar to that in the case of El Salvador.

In Guatemala, in spite of the differences with El Salvador and Nicaragua, a formula for negotiation must be sought to overcome civil war and the militarisation of the State. The example of El Salvador may be repeated in some of its aspects, especially as regards army reductions, a cease-fire and guarantees of human rights. The case of El Salvador may also serve as an outline for the internal peace-keeping process in Colombia, which is still unfinished.

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## Peace Building: An Introduction

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Post-conflict activities should be incorporated as soon as feasible into the development strategy of the country. However, during the immediate, fragile post-conflict phase, which is by nature transitory, such activities are quite distinct from normal development activities for three main reasons. First, the overriding criterion for the selection and establishment of priorities is political and it involves addressing problems which, if left unresolved, could lead to the return of fighting. This criterion derives directly from the primary goal of the United Nations under the Charter, which is the maintenance of peace and security. Second, under normal circumstances, a development strategy should not discriminate among potential beneficiaries with the same socio-economic needs. In post-conflict situations, however, it is often necessary to give preferential treatment to those particularly involved in or affected by the conflict in order to address the grievances that led them to resort to arms, to discourage them from doing so again and to redress hardships or repression suffered during the war. Thus, the equity criterion may be supplanted or suspended because of the overriding ethic of peacemaking. Third, given the weight of the political criterion and the non-application of the equity criterion, and taking into account the many financial and technical constraints, the allocation of resources resulting directly from peace-related programmes may not be optimal from an economic point of view. Keeping this limitation in mind, it is nevertheless important to design and carry out these activities in such a way as to minimise any negative economic consequences and to supplement them through training, technical cooperation and credit to ensure that they are viable and sustainable in the long run.

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A number of characteristics of the *Inventory* should be highlighted. First, it is a list of activities which may have to be undertaken: not all items will be applicable under all circumstances. Those responsible will have to decide what is required and desirable after establishing the appropriate overall strategy suited to the particular case at the request of, and in full cooperation with, the sovereign State concerned. Initial conditions in the respective countries, including domestic capabilities, institutional, memory and the deterioration which occurred during the conflict, will to a large extent determine the appropriate policy mix. Most important, post-conflict peace-building activities should not be dictated by the international community but should reflect national needs and development aspirations and thus should be moulded by the particular political and socio-economic conditions of each case.

Second, the *Inventory* is illustrative, rather than comprehensive, in some of the broader and more technical areas. Although armed forces reform, demobilisation of combatants, reintegration of marginalized groups and economic rehabilitation and reconstruction are usually critical to post-conflict peace-building situations, some of the more specific tasks, while crucial to overall success, will vary in breadth and importance. The *Inventory* stresses only the most important tasks to be addressed. For example, of the many areas relating to rehabilitation of infrastructure, only transportation and energy (particularly the question of power supply), which are usually urgent, high-priority post-conflict concerns, have been separately identified.

Third, and related to the above, there is some imbalance in the level of detail with which the different areas are treated. Greater detail is provided in those areas which are specific to a post-conflict situation and in which the international community has relatively less experience (e.g., reintegration of ex-combatants) than in areas which are of more general application and in which the international community has more experience, although not necessarily in a post-conflict situation (e.g., food aid).

Fourth, while some effort has been made to list the activities by order of priority and there is a degree of chronological sequence in the way the main categories are presented, this should not be interpreted rigidly. In a number of instances, there may be some necessary preconditions for an activity (e.g., land may need to be demined before agricultural production can start). This may not apply in other cases,

particularly in the order of activities within each of the main categories (e.g., it is not necessary to incorporate human rights provisions in national legislation before starting to use the media to disseminate information on such rights).

Fifth, there are a number of generic principles that apply in equal measure to most development activities and to post-conflict situations. These are not necessarily highlighted in every area of activity, but should be borne in mind throughout. For example, an overriding concern must be the development as soon as feasible of a national capability in each of the areas identified in order to reduce dependence on external inputs. Training and institution-building must therefore be seen as an integral part of all activities. Employment-generating activities are needed across the board to incorporate large numbers of former combatants, returnees and other groups marginalized during the conflict into the productive life of the country.

Sixth, although a distinction has not been made, PCPB activities will be quite different in States and societies severely disrupted by civil war to the point that their domestic institutions have collapsed or lost international recognition (as in Cambodia, Rwanda and Somalia) from those in societies that, although wracked by civil war or ethnic conflict, have an established, internationally recognized Government (as in El Salvador, Guatemala and Mozambique). The United Nations role will be extensive in the former, including the actual implementation of vital parts of the mandate, and can be limited to monitoring, verification and good offices in the latter, where sovereign and effective institutions can implement the peace agreements.

Seventh, the *Inventory* does not specify which entities within the United Nations system, or which Governments and other parties to peace agreements, are to undertake the activities concerned. This should be part of the design of an overall strategy. The involvement of local administrative structures and national and international non-governmental organisations and the participation of the local population is imperative in all post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation efforts. National and international volunteers can also play an important role.

Eighth, although not always specifically mentioned, the media can play a critical role in peace-keeping and/or post-conflict reconciliation. By keeping the media well informed, the United Nations and other actors can play a constructive role in generating support for the different activities.

Ninth, the wide variety of activities reflected in the *Inventory* highlights the need for what the Secretary-General called “an integrated approach to human security”. Leadership is needed to ensure proper direction and to improve the chances of success. As set out in *An Agenda for Peace*, in peace-keeping and peace-building activities, different bodies of the United Nations have to work in an integrated manner; they must also jointly undertake analytical research, technical preparatory work and training of key personnel for these operations, and analyse and reflect on past and current operations so as to learn from both good and bad experiences and improve future performance.

Finally, the *Inventory* will also be useful in preventive diplomacy, since, as the Secretary-General has stated in the *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, many of the activities envisaged for post-conflict peace-building can also be valuable in a preventive context.

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## Peace Building: The Basic Political Agreement

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### **Nature of the Issue**

Peacemaking and peace-keeping need to be reinforced by a series of measures and actions to consolidate peace. Such activities should be reflected, as far as possible, in the agreement that ends the conflict. The way the peace-building issues and activities are incorporated in the agreement will be critical to its successful implementation. Peace-building activities are a critical step towards the reconstruction of society and they should be carefully planned and designed from the outset. This implies, of course, that at an early stage in the peace process and at the request of the sovereign State concerned, consultations should be undertaken between all relevant United Nations bodies, bilateral and multilateral donors and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to develop a common strategy and an integrated approach, in full cooperation with domestic authorities and other local entities.

### **Activities**

1. Identifying the precise activities that the United Nations system is expected to undertake, particularly in the negotiation, implementation and verification of the agreement to assist parties to a peace agreement. Ensuring that the United Nations is given an active role as the engine of the process and not a passive role as an observer.
2. Ensuring that adequate financial resources are available or mobilized and budgetary provisions are made for financing these

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activities. Ensuring complementary and often critical financing from donor countries and NGOs.

3. Ensuring that relevant issues are adequately reflected in the peace agreements. Vagueness or specificity in the peace agreements may determine the ease or difficulty with which the agreements will be implemented. The time invested in the negotiating phase to make the basic document more specific will be amply compensated in the implementation phase, and will create a more solid base for the success of the operation.
4. Ensuring that peace agreements do not build unrealistic expectations (disgruntled groups can seriously disrupt a peace process).
5. Creating consensus-building mechanisms, with the participation of all sectors of society, to ensure maximum support for the social and political changes brought about by complex peace processes (e.g., the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ) and the Forum for Economic and Social Consultation in El Salvador).
6. Ensuring that peace agreements reflect, or at least do not go against, the history, tradition, culture and values of the peoples involved.
7. Identifying the inputs needed to fulfil the role of the United Nations system, particularly the types of skills required of United Nations personnel in the field.
8. Identifying entities that are capable of carrying out these tasks and assigning responsibilities accordingly.
9. Identifying broadly based groups of residents representing local administrations (at the village, community and country levels) who can be consulted regularly concerning the courses of action proposed by the international community.
10. Ensuring that the financial and human resources available are adequate to complete these tasks over the long as well as the short term.
11. Identifying the inputs to be provided by Member States and making arrangements to secure them.
12. Deploying a United Nations advance component as soon as the signing of a peace accord has taken place to ensure that violations of the agreement by local commanders or other leaders are kept to a minimum.

13. Enlisting the support of “friends of the Secretary-General” to assist in resolving any political difficulties in the negotiation and implementation of the agreement as well as in facilitating financing.
14. Identifying the link between peace-keeping and peace-building activities and between the components of the peace-building process. Ensuring joint planning of the transition between peace-keeping and peace-building. Sensitising personnel from peace-keeping operations in their ground-breaking role for subsequent peace-building efforts.
15. Ensuring full coordination and avoiding duplication and inconsistencies in the actions and measures adopted and advocated by different bodies of the United Nations system as well as, to the extent possible, bilateral donors and NGOs. The SRSG should consider coordination of the international community and of the United Nations system and NGOs an essential part of his/her mandate. A clear unity of intent on the part of the international community, as well as its continuous support of the actions of the SRSG, are fundamental ingredients for the success of the operation. This unity and support can result only if the SRSG keeps the international community regularly informed of developments in the implementation of the peace agreements. The personality of the SRSG as well as his/her personal involvement will be of primary importance.
16. Determining a realistic plan of action and timetable for the implementation of the different programmes.
17. Identifying potential problems likely to be created by a premature and/or unduly/speedy withdrawal of the PKO.
18. Evaluating the political dimension of projects, even when they meet technical standards: even if the policy decision is not optimal, technically speaking, it must be borne in mind that PCPB belongs to a world of integrated, second-best solutions, where the whole is more than simply the sum of the parts.
19. Ensuring a smooth and stable transition in the implementation of PCPB activities from the PKO phase, in which the country is actively monitored by the Security Council, to the post-PKO phase, in which PCPB functions will be carried out largely by United Nations development agencies.

20. Determining whether it would be appropriate or necessary to establish a political office to serve as a bridge between the PKO and long-term PCPB activities, and to help orient development assistance towards projects that promote reconciliation.

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# 21

## Peace Building: Relief and Humanitarian Assistance in the Post-Conflict Context

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### RELIEF AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

#### Nature of the Issue

Humanitarian assistance is always aimed at providing the strict minimum to meet the so-called “immediate and basic needs of people” (i.e., food, water, primary health care and the like). As a general rule, therefore, it is a need that stands by itself and is not strictly related to the political goals of post-conflict peace-building. Confidence-building measures are important, even at the emergency phase. As a general policy, education and training should be part of any United Nations humanitarian and relief operation.

#### Activities

##### *Emergency measures*

1. Undertaking emergency action to ensure basic survival for returnees and internally displaced persons (shelter, food, water, health and sanitation, basic household kits, farm tools and inputs).
2. Undertaking quick-impact micro-projects at the local level to facilitate the transition from relief to rehabilitation. Criteria have to be established to ensure the sustainability of quick-impact projects in order to avoid uncoordinated and isolated activities without linkages to a broader rehabilitation strategy.
3. Ensuring funding for emergency programmes.

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### ***Education and training***

1. Quick assessment of the education and training needs of all groups of the population.
2. Assessment of the physical condition of the infrastructure (during conflicts, schools are often used by the combatants as army barracks and the educational process is completely stopped; e.g., Liberia, Somalia).
3. Provision of basic training and learning materials for teachers, children, demobilized soldiers, among others, adapted to this particular situation.

## **FOOD AID**

### **Nature of the Issue**

The United Nations system has extensive experience in the provision of food aid, both in response to emergencies, primarily natural disasters, and as a form of development assistance. Most of the principles and practices that have been developed over the years apply in equal measure to a post-conflict situation and so are not reiterated at length here. Probably the most difficult challenge is to ensure that food aid provided for emergency relief does not conflict with longer-term development objectives.

### **Activities**

1. Using food aid specifically in post-war rehabilitation; assisting in building up food production capacity; assisting in resettlement of refugees, returnees and the internally displaced; providing food to ex-combatants both as part of the demobilisation package and as assistance during a period of reconversion and re-employment; restoring/building up civic services capacity by assisting civil servants, teachers and health workers until such time as funding and budgetary provisions are made to "pay their salaries; building up human resources capacity: school and hospital feeding, maternal and child health (MCH) centres, training; rehabilitating infrastructure either by providing food aid in food-for-work programmes or by directly securing funding and arranging for repairs/reorganisation of ports, transport facilities and the like.
2. Ensuring that food aid is distributed in an equitable manner to all vulnerable groups (including refugees, displaced persons,

demobilized soldiers, disabled people) irrespective of their affiliation to parties to the conflict. A disparity of treatment of these groups would create tensions which would have a negative impact on the process.

3. Meeting the food needs of people who have lost their capacity to grow or acquire food and/or have been forced to leave their homes (dispossessed and displaced people, refugees and returnees).
4. Rehabilitating food production capacities damaged by the conflict by ensuring the availability of essential inputs, including seeds, tools, fertilizers, pesticides, draught animals and livestock (e.g., by exchanging external food supplies and food aid for local seed grain to ensure adequate seed reserves).
5. Identifying post-conflict and developmental food-for-work schemes (e.g., demining, rehabilitation and reconstruction of the physical and social infrastructure, including roads, bridges, water supply and transport networks, schools, clinics and health facilities) to follow the emergency phase.
6. Judging the timing and nature of the interventions (i.e., providing free emergency food when starvation is threatening, but avoiding saturating the market and thereby discouraging planting for the next harvest).
7. Reducing external support gradually so that basic food requirements are satisfied while avoiding delays in securing local food security and continued dependence on international food aid.
8. Encouraging closer cooperation between donor organisations involved in relief and those involved in recovery and development activities, so that the former are fully supportive of the latter.

## **POTABLE WATER AND SANITATION**

### **Nature of the Issue**

Very often in conflict situations, water and sanitation are neglected or destroyed, with immediate negative effects on the health situation of the community. In most post-conflict situations, there is an urgent need to restore and protect available supplies and make medically-safe water accessible to all population groups, thereby reducing the burden on the health system.

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**Activities**

1. Providing emergency water supplies if water sources are severely contaminated.
2. Providing new boreholes as an alternative source until water quality improves.
3. Restoring existing facilities, including isolating the damaged sections of piped water supply and sanitation systems, undertaking temporary repairs, ensuring disinfection and monitoring water quality at delivery points, and preparing plans and estimates for complete rehabilitation.
4. Establishing and maintaining appropriate latrines and providing disinfectant and material for the temporary repair of sewerage systems.
5. Preparing a detailed plan for the rehabilitation of water supply facilities.
6. Constructing new wells, storage tanks, reservoirs and water distribution systems.
7. Campaigning to ensure continued maintenance of water supply sources and adequate sanitation near water supply points.
8. Organising in-service training in the rehabilitation and maintenance of water facilities, environmental sanitation and hygiene.

**HEALTH****Nature of the Issue**

Basic health services and health institutions (including administrative structures) often disintegrate during conflicts because of the pressure to treat the victims of hostilities. In addition, the health infrastructure is destroyed or damaged during the conflict. A post-conflict health care programme needs to rebuild both institutions and infrastructure as an integral part of a national health programme and to ensure its viability through emphasis on local capacity, institution-building, training and the like.

**Activities**

1. Identifying immediate life-saving activities.
2. Assessing present and potential situations with regard to epidemics and disease outbreaks in the community, the types

of war injuries and psychological traumas, the state of health of displaced persons and returnees and the size and distribution of the conflict-affected population.

3. Assessing the resources needed and the local response capacity
4. Sensitisation and training campaigns on health and sanitation, with a special focus on communicable diseases and women and children.
5. Activating primary health care services through distribution of emergency drugs and medical supplies, contraceptive services, adolescent care, protection from rape and counselling to rape victims, and reorganisation of health centres and hospital facilities, including the strengthening of managerial capacity at all levels to promote effective, efficient and sustainable health service delivery.
6. Caring for those suffering from physical or mental war injuries, including civilians with psychological traumas with attention to the particular needs of women, children and adolescents, such as protection from sexual violence, including rape.
7. Organising health assistance in collective centres to assist ex-combatants, returnees and other dislocated persons.
8. Enhancing quality health care through nutrition services, drug abuse prevention counselling, opening dispensaries and laboratories, distributing medical kits and prosthetic materials and establishing primary health care centres offering reproductive health care services.
9. Planning and operating effective long-term sustainable health services at central and local levels, to ensure access of basic packages of public health and health care services to meet the needs of the majority of the population.

## **MINE CLEARANCE**

### **Nature of the Issue**

Mines are a major impediment to all stages of economic, social and political regeneration. The removal of land-mines and mines in estuaries, waterways and rivers can be a prerequisite for most other post-conflict peace-building activities. In post-conflict situations where the number of mines is large, mine clearance becomes a long-term operation, albeit with some short-term priorities. It is a dangerous

and time-consuming activity, which is often carried out at great expense. The experience of El Salvador and Mozambique has shown the advantages of using competent international private companies with the appropriate technologies. In a first phase, these companies should have as part of their contractual obligations a strong training component for local deminers and managers, who should be fully associated with the demining projects from the beginning of operations. In a second phase, local private companies or joint ventures should be created which could take over the demining activity when the contract of the international companies expires. This process should be closely monitored by the Government through its policy and evaluation structure. Such an approach would guarantee the immediate employment of local operational units formed on the spot at low cost. In addition, it would have the sympathy of a large group of donors willing to provide financial resources.

### **Activities**

1. Determining the approximate extent and nature of the landmine problem in the country.
2. Undertaking a nationwide survey to locate and identify mined areas, enlisting the help of ex-combatants for the location of their own mine fields.
3. Facilitating financial support, which will largely depend on voluntary contributions. To allow demining to start as soon as possible, the budget of PKOs may include a small amount for this purpose.
4. Conducting detailed individual minefield surveys.
5. Formulating a mine awareness educational plan and formulating procedures for reporting unexploded ordnance and artifacts.
6. Formulating a plan for mine clearance and the disposal of explosive artifacts, including an assessment of the financial implications.
7. Establishing mine clearance priorities (e.g., to respond to the need to open and/or establish vital infrastructure as quickly as possible, to needs relating to refugee repatriation and resettlement or to the need to re-establish the main revenue-earning capabilities of the country).
8. Detecting and clearing mines from surveyed minefields.

9. Implementing mine awareness training programmes.
10. Ensuring demining before any development projects start in mined areas.
11. Creating an in-country mine clearance management team, which can be developed into a national mine clearance authority.
12. Undertaking in-country mine clearance training.
13. Training in-country demining managers.

## **LOGISTICS**

### **Nature of the Issue**

In situations calling for emergency assistance, measures to facilitate the timely and efficient delivery of required materials are crucial.

### **Activities**

1. Setting up an office with a stock of essential items and equipped with communication facilities to ensure the launching of an operation without delay.
2. Preparing operation plans, incorporating necessary lead times for recruitment of personnel and purchase and shipping of equipment.
3. Mobilising logistic expertise and local knowledge.
4. Inspecting sites and making technical surveys.
5. Quantifying the various supplies that need to be delivered month by month to different locations and that have to be transported from locations worldwide.
6. Identifying logistics requirements and possibilities within the country.
7. Subcontracting logistical functions to private contractors such as NGOs and private firms (e.g.; computerisation of the voting I registration in Cambodia).
8. Establishing a pre-approved reserve fund for immediate emergency expenditures.
9. Determining for each sea and river port, the types/sizes of vessels able to be received and the current discharge, handling and storage capacities.
10. Determining for both international airports and airstrips in the affected areas the type of aircraft able to land and take off

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and the operational facilities available, navigation aids, refuelling points and so forth.

11. Evaluating all possibilities for transporting and storing the planned supplies.
12. Locating/hiring a transport firm to move supplies from the port or rail head to delivery points.
13. Locating a freight forwarding company to manage the arrival of supplies.
14. Establishing a central procurement and storage office.
15. Preparing a short-term plan for the deployment and scheduling of immediately available means of transport on specific routes and for the use of available storage capacity.
16. Preparing a delivery schedule and monitoring performance accordingly.
17. Identifying actions which need to be taken to increase capacity (such as minor repairs of roads) and specifying for each the material and expertise needed, the expected cost and implementation schedule and the expected capacity increase or saving.
18. Monitoring the situation and revising operational plans if and when requirements and possibilities change.
19. Building up, if possible, stocks of supplies in advance of peak requirements to ensure that delivery will be maintained at a steady rate.
20. Building up stocks of supplies as close as possible to targeted locations if it is expected that weather or other conditions will make transportation difficult in the foreseeable future.
21. Establishing a radio network between all key locations (central control unit, ports, airports and major warehouses).
22. Making arrangements for the disposal of equipment, including the possibility of transferring it to the host Government.

## **SECURING FINANCIAL RESOURCES**

### **Nature of the Issue**

Urgent and substantial financial contributions are essential to provide expeditiously and effectively relief and humanitarian assistance to people suffering from the effects of conflict. It is essential that

measures be taken to ensure that requests for financial resources are based on real and emergency needs and that appropriate coordination mechanisms are provided to avoid duplication and to maximise the effectiveness of the available resources. It is important to differentiate between the various forms of financial assistance (e.g., food assistance, project assistance, cash and debt relief). Financial assistance should be on terms consistent with the external debt situation of the country. Any financial assistance and its use should be under adequate safeguards and accounting, and consistent with a sustainable budgetary position. When appropriate, the role of the SRSG to coordinate and oversee the disbursement of funds for PCPB should be identified. The need to work closely with the international financial institutions from the very beginning is critical, particularly in the light of their experience in identifying the need for and mobilising balance of payments support within the donor community.

### **Activities**

1. Organising, in consultation with the Governments of the affected countries or other relevant authorities, United Nations agencies (particularly the Bretton Woods institutions), other intergovernmental agencies (particularly the development banks) and NGOs and bilateral donors, assessment missions designed to identify the nature of the basic requirements.
2. Preparing and issuing United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeals in consultation with relevant parties (including hosts, donors, United Nations system representatives, NGOs), taking into account the assessment missions and identifying the affected populations, the availability of local resources, the minimum outside help required and the detailed estimated cost.
3. Formulating an integrated operations plan.
4. Preparing and issuing sectoral appeals made by United Nations agencies.
5. Preparing and issuing interim appeals (in situations where assistance has to be provided before the completion of a well-structured inter-agency appeal).
6. Establishing modalities for the coordination of the actions of funding agencies with those of executing agencies and for the coordination of actions and policies among both sets of organisations.

7. Organising donor conferences to secure a better response to consolidated appeals by providing information concerning ongoing operations and incipient emergency situations, and an opportunity for dialogue on the country's development and projected financial requirements.

## **REBUILDING THE GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS**

### **Nature of the Issue**

The rebuilding of the governmental administrative apparatus will involve a careful process of re-establishing legitimacy, confidence and normalcy in the system. This process will need to be started during peace-making activities, continued in a transitional period and maintained during the rebuilding and reconstruction phase under a new Government.

This has been an immediate priority in countries that have been severely affected by civil unrest (e.g., Rwanda, Somalia). Rudimentary public administration is key to involving the parties to the peace agreement in beginning to restore economic capacity, obtaining the parties' perspective on the most urgent PCPB needs, and following up as well as coordinating the implementation of PCPB activities.

### **Activities**

1. Restoring security and confidence, including policing authority and the judicial system.
2. Restoring the government treasury, including banking and the monetary system, to enable payment of salaries.
3. Rebuilding the civil service through a public service census, human resource planning and development, repatriation and secondment, as necessary.
4. Redesigning government legal frameworks.
5. Promoting capacity-building initiatives related to humanitarian relief activities, especially those of NGOs and communities at the local level, focusing on the delivery of key services. This would reinforce the emerging local capacity, while re-establishing civil administration.
6. Identification of currently active units and organisations, especially at the local level, through a process of needs

- identification to identify the exact dimensions of civil administration which require restoration.
7. Assisting the parties involved in the peace agreement in identifying an appropriate structure for the interim governmental apparatus.
  8. Surveying the state of the current administrative apparatus.
  9. In collaboration with the prime minister's office, ministries of the interior and justice, law and order and ministries of finance, economic affairs and planning—identifying, mobilising and coordinating international support as well as budgeting in general; in collaboration with the treasury, and central bank (or monetary authority)—mobilising domestic resources and allowing for the beginning of rudimentary financial transactions in support of PCPB activities.
  10. Mobilising the necessary material and especially technical support from donors to launch the rebuilding.

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# 22

## Peace Building: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

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### DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILISATION OF EX-COMBATANTS

#### **Nature of the Issue**

Early and effective disarmament and demobilisation of combatants are essential to the building of a durable peace and are functions that are best undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations or another international organisation. Very careful demobilisation planning is required, and this takes time and requires advance planning. Confidence-building measures among conflicting parties in a wide variety of areas should be taken from the very beginning. The comparative experience of Central America, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Uganda demonstrates that alternative timetables can be designed to suit different conditions. One thing to keep in mind is that a conflict between the "culture of development" and the "culture of peace-keeping" is likely to arise.

According to the former, United Nations experts are not supposed to replace local people in doing any work; they should teach the locals how to work and let them do it. The time required for the work to be done is less important than the way in which it is done. In a peace-keeping operation, on the other hand, the main task once a cease-fire and separation of forces have been obtained and political solutions to conflicts have been achieved is to disarm troops, resettle them as soon as possible and consolidate peace. There is hardly any time for teaching;

time has a very high cost, especially when large numbers of troops are deployed. Substantive work must be done by the United Nations military and civilian staff to speed up the process and have things done effectively and in a timely fashion.

## **Activities**

### ***Demobilisation planning***

Elaborating a demobilisation plan and programme, including timetable, stages and costs.

### ***Encampment phase***

1. Selection and agreement on assembly areas/encampment sites/verification centres.
2. Arranging adequate living conditions for the combatants to be demobilized (food, water, shelter, health and sanitation). The peace-keeping operation needs a specific approach to food provision which is quite different from the humanitarian approach. The number of calories required by restless soldiers who have guns in their hands and know how to use them is, by definition, much higher than the number of calories needed by unarmed civilians.
3. Ensuring discipline and order in the assembly areas during the demobilisation phase. Providing soldiers with good food in ample quantity may be the best way to keep them quiet and assure the smooth implementation of the demobilisation process. The SRSG should be given the authority to make the necessary decisions about the quality and quantity of food, without wasting precious time fighting against bureaucratic rules and procedures.
4. Ensuring funding for the encampment phase.
5. Disarming combatants under the supervision of the United Nations or an appropriate regional organisation.
6. Storing and keeping custody of and disposing of the collected weapons and ammunition.
7. Setting up a technical unit, with civilian personnel seconded from United Nations agencies and the United Nations Volunteers, in charge of the preparation and equipment of the assembly areas (in coordination with military observers (MILOBs)); the registration of the soldiers (in coordination with

MILOBs); the preparation and delivery of demobilisation documents (in coordination with the relevant ministries and MILOBs); the establishment of a reliable database (in coordination with MILOBs); the planning and supervision of the resettlement of the demobilized soldiers (in coordination with the International Organisation for Migration and MILOBs). The technical unit should be present in each assembly area, together with the MILOBs, and be able to provide the technical skill and administrative expertise that the MILOBs lack.

8. Planning the full utilisation of the combatants' time during the encampment phase: providing information on demobilisation benefits (demobilisation allowances, demobilisation card to access future payments and procedures for the purpose, civilian clothing, food rations etc.), counselling (vocational, psychosocial), literacy and educational activities, training in life skills (information on civil life, rights and responsibilities, civic education), accelerated agricultural, skill or business training (if time permits) and information on reintegration programmes and options, recreation and physical education.

### ***Transition phase***

1. Preparing a detailed logistical plan for the transportation of ex-combatants to their selected home areas.
2. Ensuring physical and financial resources for the plan.
3. Arranging advance information to local administrations and receiving communities on the details of ex-combatants and their dependants.
4. Setting up local arrangements and procedures for accessing demobilisation benefits.
5. Providing incentives for resettlement in the area through agriculture (land, seeds, farm tools, draught animals, credit, extension services).
6. Exploring other options for paid or self-employment in the local area in cooperation with the community (food-for-work schemes, community development schemes of NGOs/donors), setting up small and micro-enterprises and businesses.
7. Provision of additional incentives (e.g., house-building material, access to social services, food rations).

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## REINTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS, REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

### **Nature of the Issue**

Before the combatants are disarmed and demobilized, it is necessary to ensure that a reintegration programme has been prepared, funded and made ready for implementation in step with demobilisation. The objective of the reintegration programme is to facilitate and assist the reintegration of ex-combatants into the civilian and productive life of the country. In the post-conflict situation, other conflict-affected groups also need reintegration assistance in varying degrees: returnees, internally displaced persons, and the resident population, particularly in areas of intense fighting. Reintegration of target groups is a complex and expensive activity rendered extremely difficult in stagnant economies. Advance planning for reintegration, at least for the short to medium term, should be undertaken well before the demobilisation process starts. Close coordination between demobilisation and reintegration planning is essential in all situations. An organisation should be established at the national level for the planning and coordination of reintegration programmes for ex-combatants and other target groups.

### **Activities**

#### ***Reintegration phase***

1. Designing adequate short-, medium- and long-term programmes, for reintegration and supporting them through the provision of training and technical assistance, including literacy, mine awareness training, psychosocial education and teaching of appropriate life skills. Special emphasis should be placed on reintegration programmes that simultaneously promote reconciliation (e.g., former combatants working side by side in a new police force). Peace-keeping operations should confine their actions to short-term projects and the bridging plans to be worked out in coordination with the World Bank, UNDP and other programmes and agencies of the United Nations system in charge of the medium- and long-term projects. The SRSG, as part of his/her coordinating role, should stimulate and monitor the design of long-term programmes and projects which are necessary to the smooth implementation of the peace agreement and its follow-up, without replacing the relevant organisations or overlapping with their work.

2. Ensuring that essential peace-related expenditures are reflected in the economic programme of a country and that adequate financing from foreign and domestic resources is secured.
3. Identifying the needs of different target groups and designing reintegration options to suit local conditions.
4. Assessing credit schemes in terms of their affordability by beneficiaries in order not to burden the beneficiaries with debts they cannot possibly service.
5. Providing some kind of indemnity through a reintegration support scheme to demobilized military personnel who, given the difficulties and long-term nature of the process of reintegration, are likely to be unemployed for a certain period of time, depending to a large extent on the possibilities for economic reactivation and employment creation of the country. This can act as a strong incentive and facilitate smooth demobilisation and reduce the risk of demobilized soldiers becoming involved in criminal activities.

### ***Substantive activities***

1. Promoting sustainable employment through an integrated approach involving interlinked activities in the areas of employment-intensive rehabilitation/reconstruction programmes at the community level, skills and entrepreneurship training and small enterprise development.
2. Agriculture: arranging allocation (or purchase) of land for cultivation and providing essential inputs and support (seeds, farm tools, draught animals, extension services).
3. Small and micro-enterprises and businesses: facilitating private-sector development through skill training, business training, credit and support services (raw materials, technology, marketing).
4. Facilitating job creation in the formal sector by increasing the employment intensity of public and private investment programmes.
5. Undertaking employment-intensive programmes for rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure (roads, bridges, communication and transport networks, schools, clinics and health facilities, water supply systems, community facilities).
6. Reactivating formal and informal commercial networks for both production inputs (seeds, fertilizers) and final products.
7. Facilitating housing for target groups.

8. Sensitising and encouraging the receiving communities, especially in areas of high density of target groups, and designing and implementing special local investment and social service programmes.

### ***Support activities***

1. Contacting NGOs, church groups, and workers' and employers' organisations, and defining their role in various aspects of the programme.
2. Capacity-building in voluntary organisations of demobilized combatants (veterans' associations).
3. Capacity-building of "delivery mechanisms" and community-based organisations to operate effectively in post-conflict situations.
4. Making provision for literacy and remedial education programmes and accelerated vocational and technical training.
5. Establishing job placement and counselling mechanisms.
6. Establishing and strengthening a non-discriminatory legislative and institutional framework for all affected groups, especially for property rights, contractual obligations and civil rights.
7. Providing and enforcing protective measures, including amnesties and other guarantees concerning the safety of returnees.
8. Assisting in improving and strengthening the social cohesion of communities through shelter and human settlements programmes.
9. Identifying [those factors which make illicit forms of income-generation (including drug production and trafficking) compelling to refugees and displaced persons. Providing external assistance in a sustainable manner to limit the appeal of such factors.

## **ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF OTHER VULNERABLE GROUPS**

### ***WOMEN***

#### **Nature of the Issue**

Although they may not necessarily have been engaged in combat, women suffer during and after conflict as a result of role changes

(income earners, household heads), displacement (loss of traditional family and community support networks), psychosocial trauma (loss of family members), physical abuse (rape and torture) and subsequent problems of acceptance by the post-conflict receiving community. The need to provide special assistance programmes for the reintegration of women has not been fully recognized.

## **Activities**

### ***Substantive activities***

1. Promoting measures aimed at ensuring the participation of women in all levels of public life (economic and political); in particular, after a conflict, ensuring the presence and effective participation of women in all public structures which work for consolidation of the peace process and respect for the peace agreements (at the community level as well as at the national level).
2. Providing services to maintain women's health, including support for nutrition, disease prevention and reproductive health services.
3. Providing specific assistance and training on health implications of communicable diseases (AIDS has taken a serious turn for the worse because of wars and conditions in refugee and settlement camps).
4. Providing psychosocial care and counselling for actions of rape and other forms of sexual violence within a framework of programmes to meet the general needs of women, children and adolescents. The presence of female staff is essential for the provision of these services.
5. Developing and implementing special programmes of reintegration through the creation of sustainable livelihoods (e.g., facilitating access to land, property and other assets).
6. Improving women's access to special education and vocational training and business training programmes to increase their employability and income-generating opportunities.
7. Improving women's access to credit through flexible schemes in combination with business training to enable them to establish small and micro-enterprises in the rural, urban and informal sectors.
8. Promoting women's employment in all sectors, including the formal sector, through post-conflict affirmative action programmes.

9. Providing counselling and support services to cover specific conflict-related needs (capacity-building for post-conflict women's organisations, dealing with psychosocial trauma, facilitating access to employment and income-generating activities and facilitating access to training and credit).

### ***Support activities***

1. Raising awareness among reintegration planners of the special needs of women ex-combatants and other vulnerable groups.
2. Establishing and strengthening a non-discriminatory legislative and institutional framework for the protection of women's legitimate rights, and providing and enforcing protective measures.

## **CHILDREN AND MINORS**

### **Nature of the issue**

There are two aspects: child combatants involved directly in conflict activities (not necessarily fighting) and children affected by conflict directly and indirectly. The needs at the macro level appear to be the same, but at the micro level they could be quite different. Child combatants under the age of 16 years are frequently not covered by reintegration programmes because they are not recognized as combatants. This generally means no coverage or only a humanitarian approach which, in any case, is limited by funding and capacity. The overall problem of children affected by conflict is very large and can also be divided into a few categories.

### **Activities**

1. Assessing the condition of children affected by the war.
2. Advocating policies and programmes which contribute to the preservation or re-establishment of a stable family environment.
3. Ensuring that preventive measures are taken to limit factors likely to induce drug abuse among minors traumatized by conflict.
4. Developing special reintegration programmes for ex-combatants who are minors.
5. Ensuring the rapid re-opening of schools and other community services to meet children's basic needs.
6. Ensuring the rapid identification, adequate documentation and medical screening of unaccompanied children.

7. Setting up programmes for family tracing and family reunification.
8. Supporting foster families or orphanages for displaced, orphaned and abandoned children in countries where there is no tradition for caring for extended family and children. Otherwise children should have a “normal” family life.
9. Developing programmes for the prevention of prostitution of minors.
10. Providing health-related assistance for children, including physical rehabilitation of disabled children.
11. Providing culturally appropriate and community-based counselling to minors traumatized by war.
12. Training social workers and teachers with respect to the specific needs of minors in difficult circumstances.
13. Providing assistance to single mothers and displaced mothers with children (day care centres, literacy programmes, training for income generation and small-scale loan programmes).
14. Developing vocational training programmes for street children.

## **PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES**

### **Nature of the Issue**

Conflicts create large numbers of physically and mentally wounded, many of whom suffer permanent disability. This is particularly the case when use is made of weapons, such as mines, which maim rather than kill many victims, and in cases of intra-State conflicts, where physical and mental abuse of non-combatants may inflict psychological damage. Peace-building requires a concerted effort to reintegrate these victims of war into society.

### **Activities**

1. Identifying disabilities among non-combatants, as well as combatants, and assessing the short- and long-term needs.
2. Providing emergency relief and humanitarian assistance for immediate medical rehabilitation and emergency survey procedures for base-line assessment.
3. Producing low-cost technical aids, prostheses and wheelchairs, and encouraging technology transfer in this area.
4. Planning and designing transport, housing and public structures to provide accessibility for all persons.

5. Encouraging community-based rehabilitation, including training of trainers for personal assistance to the disabled and measures to facilitate the independence of the disabled to provide services and to create opportunities for the social integration and the economic independence of disabled individuals in local communities.
6. Preventing disabilities through demining (see section II above, subsection on mine clearance).
7. Adopting any legislation necessary to protect the human rights of disabled persons, and taking action to prevent further violation of human rights that would be a major cause of disability.
8. Integrating people with disabilities (including moderately disabled persons, people with less obvious disabilities, households having a disabled person and elderly disabled persons) into the planning and management of all programmes and activities and avoiding the segregation or institutionalisation of disabled people.
9. Ensuring that programmes of vocational training, education, civil rights legislation and health care respond to the needs of people with disabilities.
10. Ensuring that health care, education, vocational training and employment programmes include persons with disabilities.
11. Creating a fund for the war-disabled (including children) so that those with disabilities that do not allow them to work, and their families, have a source of income.
12. Creating a solidarity fund for the continued supply of artificial limbs, wheelchairs and other support for children disabled by conflict.

## **ENHANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUILDING A PARTICIPATORY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AT ALL LEVELS STRENGTHENING HUMAN RIGHTS**

### **Nature of the Issue**

The violation of human rights has often been one of the causes of conflicts, and human rights have usually suffered further as a result

of the conflict itself. This includes violation of the principles of international humanitarian law, especially in intra-State conflicts. Enhancing respect for human rights, in all its aspects, should be a cornerstone of peace-building efforts. Faithful observance of the rules of international humanitarian law during and immediately after violent conflicts could also advance the goal of peace and stability.

### **Activities**

1. Determining modalities for United Nations human rights activity, for example an international tribunal, a commission of inquiry, a "truth commission", a human rights observation mission (on its own or within or co-deployed with a PKO), a United Nations human rights office, a programme of technical advice and cooperation, an education campaign, or visiting special rapporteurs or working groups.
2. Healing conflict-torn societies (ending impunity, bringing human rights violations to justice, establishing mechanisms to bring to light misdeeds of war ("truth commissions"), granting amnesty and security guarantees to former parties to conflicts, ensuring accountability and national reconciliation) and purging the military, police, judiciary and other organs of the State.
3. Enhancing the accountability of United Nations personnel, particularly troops, regarding respect for human rights, thereby setting an example for local troops and police.
4. Assisting and rehabilitating victims of human rights violations.
5. Tracing disappeared persons (normally a function of the International Committee of the Red Cross).
6. Incorporating international human rights standards in national legislation.
7. Enhancing/establishing legislative guarantees for the protection of human rights throughout the administration of justice, including guarantees for the treatment of prisoners and detainees, the independence of the judiciary and a fair trial.
8. Enhancing/establishing the legal protection of the human rights of women and children, disabled people, indigenous people and persons belonging to national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities.
9. Establishing/enhancing a national human rights commission or ombudsmen.

10. Collecting information about human rights violations and channelling it to national and international, including United Nations, human rights bodies.
11. Encouraging the role of national NGOs in maintaining human rights, investigating and publicising violations and undertaking public education.
12. Providing public information and basic education to enhance awareness at all levels of society of international human rights standards.
13. Providing protection to women and children through specific sensitisation of police forces and inclusion of women in international and national police and justice systems.
14. Mobilising the media to disseminate information on human rights and to divulge violations.
15. Incorporating human rights training in primary, secondary and tertiary education.
16. Incorporating human rights in police and military academy curricula and in the training of all officials involved in the administration of justice.

## **BUILDING OR STRENGTHENING A PARTICIPATORY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AT ALL LEVELS**

### **Nature of the Issue**

The lack of a participatory system of government is at the heart of many of the intra-State conflicts in the world today. Long-term consolidation of peace requires that this situation be remedied using a model of a participatory system of government that is not imported and that responds to the aspirations and the cultural values of the people. It is necessary to enable all members of society, without discrimination, to participate fully in political, civil, economic, social and cultural life, with a view to preventing a return to violence. This frequently requires constitutional reform, electoral reform, judicial reform, and reform of the police and armed forces. It also requires ratification of ILO standards.

### **Activities**

1. Consolidating freedom of expression and information (including freedom of the press), the right of peaceful assembly, freedom of association and freedom of movement.

2. Consolidating the right to participate in government directly or through freely chosen representatives, without distinction of any kind.
3. Consolidating the right of every citizen to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors, including former insurgents.
4. Consolidating the right of every citizen to have equal access to public service.
5. Strengthening mechanisms of government accountability.
6. Facilitating the establishment and registration of political parties and trades unions.
7. Strengthening mechanisms of participation at the community level, including the participation of women, in the planning, implementation and evaluation of economic, social and other programmes.
8. Respecting or strengthening local or national traditional forms of popular participation.
9. Developing measures for the full participation of persons belonging to national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, including disabled persons in these populations, in all aspects of the political, economic, social, religious and cultural life of society and in the development of their country.
10. Developing measures to ensure the full and free participation of indigenous people in all aspects of society, in particular in matters of concern to them.
11. Developing training programmes and information campaigns to raise awareness and consciousness among people about their rights to participate in the political and economic life of their country and about the way they can do it according to the laws and constitution of the country.

## **ELECTIONS**

### **Nature of the Issue**

The role of the United Nations is not only to maintain peace, but to help create an environment in which peace can be sustained. In this context, the provision of supervision and/or assistance for the conduct

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of free and fair elections, in which populations in post-conflict situations can determine their own political future, can be of paramount importance. In some cases, the United Nations will be involved in the actual planning, organising and conducting of the elections (e.g., Cambodia).

### **Activities**

1. Ascertaining that there is general agreement among all major political groups on the need for international involvement in the electoral process.
2. Undertaking, on the basis of a request from the Government, a needs assessment mission to clarify the type of United Nations involvement, the support available from non-United Nations parties or sectors, and the political, human rights, logistical and security situation in the country.
3. Formulating the modalities, timetable and financial requirements of the electoral assistance to be provided by the United Nations.
4. Providing technical assistance to the electoral authorities, including the drafting of electoral laws, and coordinating and supporting other international observers.
5. Providing coordination and accreditation of and logistical support to international observers, who become an important part of the monitoring and international legitimation that a successful election requires.
6. Supporting different groups participating in elections. In a PKO the intellectual and operational equilibrium between parties is an essential element for the effective and timely implementation of the peace agreement. Often a guerrilla organisation which has spent many years in the bush needs financial and logistical support in order to settle in the capital and to be able to function properly as a political party. If this process is not solved, the peace process can become endless. The creation of a trust fund with the support of the international community to facilitate the transformation of military organisations into political parties may be the solution. It may also give the SRSG a strong lever to make the peace process faster, smoother and more effective.
7. Coordinating United Nations assistance with that provided by other entities.

8. Undertaking civic and voter education programmes and determining rules of conduct in election campaign monitoring.
9. Undertaking public relations activities, particularly in the country but also elsewhere, to explain and promote the purpose and scope of United Nations involvement.
10. Establishing a political atmosphere conducive to free and fair elections.
11. Training election personnel in election techniques (procedures for logistics, registration, voting, ballot counting and complaint adjudication).
12. Monitoring the correct functioning of democratic institutions after the completion of the PKO and the holding of free and fair elections. Otherwise, there is a serious risk that the newly elected parliament will be given a marginal role to play.
13. Establishing a trust fund earmarked for the proper functioning of democratic institutions, especially the legislative and judicial powers, getting as much intellectual and financial support from the international community as possible.
14. Providing post-election assistance aimed at facilitating the transition from election and democratisation activities to the establishment of programmes for good governance.

## **CRIME PREVENTION AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE**

### **Nature of the Issue**

Law and order has often broken down as a result of intra-State conflicts, or has been exercised at great cost in terms of the violation of human rights. Rebuilding a system of justice and establishing or re-establishing the rule of law are among the necessary ingredients for an equitable and pluralistic society in which the human rights of all citizens are properly respected. Although criminal justice is usually a priority, strengthening the entire administration of justice and ensuring a functioning judiciary is sometimes required (e.g., in Rwanda there is a need for tribunals to adjudicate property claims efficiently and authoritatively).

### **Activities**

1. Obtaining a comprehensive view of the existing criminal justice arrangements and the law and order situation in the country.

2. Undertaking a needs assessment exercise for each element of the criminal justice system (e.g., the police, the judiciary, prosecutorial services, the legal profession and correctional arrangements).
3. Identifying the need for new or revised legislation, paying particular attention to the country's legal tradition but taking into account universally accepted principles.
4. Determining the level of local expertise and identifying modalities, such as training, for improvement.
5. Identifying the requirements for an effective and independent police force and criminal justice system, including facilities and equipment.
6. Establishing mechanisms for conflict prevention or peaceful resolution of conflicts and establishing an early warning system for preventing conflicts or escalation of conflicts.
7. Identifying the financial resources required for strengthening national capacity to maintain law and order so that both the police and the judiciary can be served by people of the highest standards.
8. Providing external assistance in the preparation of new or revised legislation, managing the criminal justice system, upgrading professional skills and providing new equipment.
9. Establishing, in circumstances of national institutional collapse, a transitional criminal justice system with capacities to arrest, hold and perhaps even try criminal suspects (e.g., Cambodia, Somalia).

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# 23

## Peace Building: Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reconciliation

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### REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

#### Nature of the Issue

In addition to all activities listed in section II and those specifically discussed below, there are a number of wide-ranging activities that are also likely to be of critical importance in the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Initial conditions in the respective countries, including domestic capabilities and institutional memory and the deterioration to which they were subjected during the conflict, will determine the appropriate policy mix required for the restoration of production and trade. Although such situations may provide an opportunity to eliminate some of the inefficient structures of the past and to adopt more modern technologies and efficient policies, it is important to keep in mind that under these conditions Governments are likely to operate under serious financial and other constraints determined by insufficient trained staff, inadequate or weakened statistical systems, low credibility in government policies, a weakened financial system, uncertainty regarding means of payments and large needs for economic reconstruction and rehabilitation.

In countries coming out of conflict or other chaos situations, adequate domestic economic policies and international support to ensure that such situations never recur are imperative. In this regard, the design of economic policy in general, and fiscal, monetary and

exchange rate policies and institutions in particular, should be oriented towards facilitating reconstruction and peace consolidation. Priority should also be given to modernisation of the public sector as well as private-sector development.

The damage to and/or destruction of industrial production and service facilities as well as housing and engineering structures is often widespread. The social fabric of society as well as the social infrastructure are frequently seriously damaged. The issue of employment promotion and related training as well as technical assistance in planning and programming recovery programmes should be considered in relation to all post-conflict situations. An inventory of available trained manpower to use in the reconstruction and rehabilitation process is important. The issue of medium- and long-term planning to allow for a link between early intervention and longer-term durable reconstruction is critical.

Environmental issues are often at the heart of conflicts (e.g., Somalia and to a certain extent Rwanda) and, unless these issues are addressed, the rehabilitation and reconstruction work may well be unsustainable. The environmental consequences of war are often devastating, as in the case of the Persian Gulf war. The wider impact of crises should also take into account the impact of returning refugees.

A quick restoration of communications services in the post-conflict period invariably serves as a morale-booster for affected populations. Revival of postal links within the country and with the world outside goes a long way in restoring public confidence in the peace process.

## **TRANSPORT**

### **Nature of the Issue**

Destroyed and damaged roads, bridges and other transport infrastructure, including air transport, are a severe constraint on the reactivation of normal economic life in a post-conflict situation. Rehabilitation of basic road and air transport as well as ports, harbours and inland waterways infrastructure is essential for the restoration of the movement of goods and people and hence for economic activity in general.

### **Activities**

#### ***Short-term***

1. Assessing the damage to different modes of transport.

2. Identifying priority repair and reconstruction and quantifying costs.
3. Identifying needs for and sources of: labour, supplies and materials; equipment and spare parts; technical assistance and training.
4. Preparing standard-design packages for structures on specific designs for each site based on survey information.
5. Repairing infrastructure for all transport modes.
6. Acquiring the immediately necessary transport equipment.

### ***Medium-term***

1. Restoring a maintenance system for all transport modes, including the necessary training.
2. Restoring safety conditions for transport: standard air traffic control and ground safety; safety on roads; and safety on railways.

### ***Long-term***

1. Developing a transport policy (including investment levels, means of funding, ownership arrangements).
2. Preparing a transport master plan defining modal roles and plans for future rehabilitation and reconstruction needs.

## **ENERGY**

### **Nature of the Issue**

In many post-conflict situations, one of the priority actions needed is the urgent development of programmes for the rehabilitation, upgrading, operation and maintenance of power plants and transmission systems in order to restore and enhance the provision of power supply to industries, agriculture, transport and households. In some situations the presence of power and/or research reactors may require special measures.

### **Activities**

1. Assessing the energy supply and demand situation in the post-conflict area; appraisal of patterns of energy use and opportunities for inter-fuel substitution.
2. Assessing the condition of equipment required for control,

- monitoring, measuring, testing, transmission and end-use.
3. Defining the requirements for the repair, upgrading and retrofitting of power plants and transmission systems.
  4. Defining the energy management options to develop an integrated energy resources planning strategy which emphasises energy demand management and efficiency improvements.
  5. Installing measuring, metering, monitoring and testing equipment.
  6. Developing standardized operation and maintenance plans and manuals.
  7. Developing training programmes in energy management, maintenance skills and repair techniques.
  8. Developing and installing maintenance and energy management systems.
  9. Surveying small-scale installations and renewable energy sources for supplying electricity to isolated areas.
  10. Formulating a national energy policy, including the reorganisation of the tariff structure and promotion of new and renewable sources of energy.

## **REHABILITATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY**

### **Nature of the Issue**

As conflicts are increasingly recognized to have social origins, so social structures and processes are likely to be profoundly affected by conflicts, whatever their nature may be. The need to heal the social fabric of societies, to foster the re-establishment of relations among groups that were previously in conflict, to strengthen the civil institutions that represent them and to promote participation of the population in the formulation of rehabilitation programmes may be decisive in avoiding a recurrence of the conflict.

### **Activities**

#### ***At the national level***

1. Socio-cultural analysis: analyse the culture, traditions and institutions in the country and in the regions where conflict has occurred to facilitate peacemaking and the design of post-

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conflict activities. Focus on the origin of social differentiation; structures of authority within ethnic groups and within their subdivisions; and relevant cultural characteristics.

2. Social impact analysis: identification of potential beneficiaries of the peace process.
3. Capacity-building: national institutions responsible for planning need to have the capacity to assess the social effects of the conflict. This entails an analysis of the composition of the population resulting from migration, internal displacement, population movements in terms of ethnic composition, age and gender; social vulnerability (prevalence and location of groups of the population that the war has made vulnerable); problems with the reintegration of young people; social institutions: families, marriage and fertility.

### ***At the local level***

1. Assessment of local social needs: communities, organisations, vulnerable and ethnic groups affected by war, and those included in the negotiations, should present their priorities for the formulation of medium- and long-term rehabilitation, programmes.
2. Promotion of social solidarity and cohesion within communities with potential for renewed conflict: innovative programmes must be design emphasising cultural, ethnic or religious diversity, and institutions must be developed" with a view to strengthening community solidarity and reducing community violence.

## **INTER-STATE JOINT VENTURES FOR PEACE-BUILDING**

### **Nature of the Issue**

One of the fundamental prerequisites for global peace is friendly and good-neighbourly relations among countries. Although United Nations PCPB is largely devoted to intra-State settings, it is essential to involve previously hostile parties to inter-State conflict in mutually beneficial undertakings which will not only contribute to economic and social development but also act as confidence-building measures necessary for lasting peace.

## **Activities**

1. Establishing legal and operative frameworks for cooperation.
2. Setting up consultative procedures for the harmonisation and coordination of policies on issues of common interest in the economic, social, environmental, technological and political fields.
3. Setting up mechanisms for the selection of projects and establishing a consolidated system of operational, administrative and financial management of projects.
4. Establishing an information exchange system on technical capacities, projects, past successes, information sources, training programmes and the like.
5. Formulating an emergency intercountry programme for dealing with urgent issues such as demining, demobilisation, integration of ex-combatants, returnees and displaced persons and food aid.
6. Identifying and evaluating financing machinery and provision of financing agreements.
7. Establishing common marketing services to support marketing of products in the region (evaluation of productive projects, market research, identification of dealers and exporters of proposed products, preparation of a registry of enterprises, traders and exporters).
8. Promoting regional cultural and sporting events.
9. Elaborating joint education and awareness programmes for human rights and the culture of peace targeted to educational systems, institutions of law enforcement, the media, groups of opinion leaders and the general population.
10. Developing peaceful conflict-resolution methods based on a common cultural and traditional heritage.
11. Establishing a standing inter-State office for crisis prevention and crisis monitoring.

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# 24

## **Human Rights Support for Peace-making, Peace-keeping and Peace-building Activities**

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### **INTRODUCTION**

OHCHR has field offices with protection mandates in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Colombia, Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. They usually combine protection and promotion work; activities include strengthening national human rights capacities, helping to formulate human rights national action plans, supporting ratification of human rights treaties, and providing basic human rights training. Offices such as those in the former Yugoslavia and Burundi were established in response to emergency situations and decisions taken by the Security Council and the General Assembly. Other offices, such as those in Colombia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, were established as a result of agreements between OHCHR and the countries concerned. These offices are not intended to be permanent: when conditions permit, usually after the creation of national human rights institutions and infrastructures, responsibilities for promoting and protecting human rights are handed over to implementing partners both within and outside the UN system. The activities and requirements of the aforementioned seven field offices are presented in this chapter of the Appeal; the work of other OHCHR field presences is described in the chapter on technical cooperation.

In addition to the seven OHCHR field offices, the Office added more international and/or national staff working within UN Country Teams to implement specific technical cooperation projects, such as

those in Azerbaijan, Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Madagascar, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Palestine, Solomon Islands, Somalia and Yemen.

An increasingly important aspect of OHCHR's field work is the development of human rights components in complex UN missions, involving peacekeeping and peace-making. The report of the Brahimi Panel on the United Nations peace operations laid the foundations for this approach. OHCHR is cooperating with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Eritrea, Georgia, Kosovo (FRY) and Sierra Leone, and with the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) in Afghanistan (Islamabad), Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Tajikistan.

OHCHR is represented in the field by regional advisors in the various UN Economic Commissions in Bangkok and Santiago de Chile, and is in the process of establishing such presences in Addis Ababa and Beirut as well. Sub-regional OHCHR offices for Africa have opened in Yaounde and Pretoria, and two others are being established in Abuja and Dakar.

In 2002, US\$ 16,7 million is requested for support to peace-making, peacekeeping and peace-building activities. This includes ensuring enhanced security back-stopping to field offices around the world. Both human and financial management in the field presences and support from headquarters have improved over the past year. This trend should continue during 2002, particularly since the General Assembly appropriated additional resources to support the human rights component of UN peacekeeping and peace-making operations, as recommended in the Brahimi report. All field offices are funded through voluntary contributions except for the office in Cambodia which will receive US\$ 1,174,000 from the UN regular budget in 2002.

#### **Budget Summary in US\$**

Staff security	690,242
Burundi	3,085,510
The Democratic Republic of the Congo	1,480,807
Colombia	5,088,482
Cambodia	1,799,333
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1,339,717
Croatia	752,117
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	2,471,163
<b>Total</b>	<b>16,707,371</b>

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## STAFF SECURITY

### Background

In the past few years, there has been a dramatic rise in security incidents around the world that directly affect UN staff. The United Nations has responded to this situation by enhancing its security management system. The main elements of this system are staff training, provision of appropriate equipment and the efficient dissemination of information and advice. The UN Security Coordinator's Office (UNSECOORD) manages the system worldwide from UN Headquarters in New York; it establishes policy and standards and monitors country and regional situations to provide timely advice to the Secretary-General. OHCHR is required to ensure that its organisational needs are met by participating in UNSECOORD activities, such as coordinating meetings and training events. For its part, OHCHR is becoming increasingly active during the earliest stages of conflicts in which human rights violations are rampant.

### Objectives

During 2002 the primary objectives of OHCHR will be to:

- Strengthen OHCHR's security focal point and related activities;
- Develop and implement the OHCHR security policy;
- Establish and maintain minimum obligatory requirements for staff security; and
- Implement the Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) and the Minimum Telecommunications Standards (MITS) in all field presences to meet existing standards.

### Activities in 2002

#### *Ensuring security in field operations*

UNSECOORD provides a field security officer in many locations where OHCHR operates, usually within the country or within UNDP's duty station office. The officer provides advice and disseminates information. In some locations, OHCHR shares the cost of these officers. However, the field security officer cannot dedicate his or her services to the needs of OHCHR only. In offices where there is a high level of activity, OHCHR has its own security officers who, in coordination with the UNSECOORD field security officer, provide the necessary advice and support to OHCHR staff. In locations where staff operate or visit, where no security coverage is readily available, and during

investigative and inquiry missions, support is provided as required on an *ad hoc* basis from a central location. OHCHR will ensure that staff are trained according to the new standards, are cleared by security, and that their travel is safely planned, including by ensuring adequate insurance coverage. Staff are issued with the appropriate communications and transportation equipment so they can safely carry out their tasks. Information gathered from local law enforcement sources, country field-security officers, UNSECOORD and other official sources are transmitted in a timely manner to staff. OHCHR shares information with UNSECOORD, other UN agencies and other actors. A regular reporting system between Geneva and the field will be established, as will guidelines for the safe operation of all field vehicles. Timely information and advice must also be available to the High Commissioner and her senior managers; a small team located within OHCHR's Geneva headquarters will provide these services.

### ***Strengthening OHCHR's security focal point***

The security unit in Geneva will provide technical supervision and assistance on policy, standards and procedures for all field presences and activities; it will also develop and implement OHCHR's security policy. Training programmes for staff will be designed, delivered and coordinated with other training programmes. Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) and Minimum Telecommunications Standards (MITS) will be implemented in all field presences to meet existing standards. UNSECOORD, supported by OHCHR and others, has established standards for equipment, communications and training for each duty station. These standards include an accountability aspect for all supervisors and staff, a budget implication for each activity and a compliance element. In essence, those who do not meet these standards will have restrictions placed on their ability to operate in the field on behalf of the United Nations. Professional security staff must also be available to accompany special activities, such as investigative missions and commissions of inquiry.

In accordance with established standards, staff must be equipped, prepared, cleared and briefed before departing on missions; a professional security unit is available for this purpose. Records will be kept of all staff movements to ensure that staff meet system-wide requirements related to evacuations and insurance programmes. This facility will enable OHCHR to receive and react to incident reports in accordance with the UNSECOORD field-reporting system. The OHCHR security unit must attain a sophisticated and professional level of

operational security support to meet the goals of the Office while keeping staff and property safe.

*Other related activities:*

- Evaluate existing and proposed field activities with a view to improving all aspects of safety and security of personnel, information and property.
- Conduct risk assessments and establish, standardise and implement security procedures.
- Develop an emergency telecommunications plan and maintain communication channels with the field presences.
- Establish the criteria and a programme for the selection, recruitment and training of security staff, including detailed job descriptions.
- Manage the OHCHR duty-officer system.

***Promoting security awareness among OHCHR staff***

- Provide support, training, advice and technical supervision to security staff deployed to OHCHR field operations.
- Raise the level of security awareness of all OHCHR staff.
- Establish a comprehensive training programme for Geneva-based personnel, field staff and professional security officers.

**Management Arrangements**

The OHCHR Security Coordinator (security focal point) supervises the unit, which is responsible for analysing the security situation in areas where OHCHR operates or foresees operations, advises OHCHR and liaises with other UN bodies and UNSECOORD in New York. Two professional security officers and a general service security officer will coordinate clearances, analyse conditions in the proposed locations, provide pre-deployment briefings, liaise with local law enforcement officers and, on occasion, accompany human rights staff to the field. They will also provide training and awareness programmes, ensure compliance with MOSS and MITS, and maintain an operations room that controls security support to all field activities.

**Funding Requirements**

Funds will be required for staff salaries, field evaluations, and security-related equipment for the field, training programmes and manuals. Information technology equipment is also needed to manage

and disseminate information in a secure and timely fashion. With the consent of donors, OHCHR proposes that a small portion of contributions received (i.e. 5 per cent) for field offices will be used for staff security.

#### Budget in US\$

Staff costs	497,334
Experts/consultants' fees and travel	0
Travel:	
- OHCHR staff	50,000
- Commission members	0
- Representatives and other participants	0
Contractual services	25,000
General operating expenses	0
Supplies and acquisitions	38,500
Grants, contributions, fellowships and seminars	0
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>610,834</b>
Programme support costs	79,408
<b>Total</b>	<b>690,242</b>

## BURUNDI

### Background

The Burundi office was established in 1994. A year later, OHCHR and the Government of Burundi signed an agreement authorising the deployment of human rights officers as observers throughout the country; in June 1998, OHCHR established two sub-offices in Gitega and Ngozi. Insecurity in Burundi persists despite the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord in August 2000. Burundi is at a crossroads in its political and social development. The country is still plagued by civil war fought among government forces and various rebel movements. Hundreds of civilians, including women, children and elderly persons, have been killed in the fighting. The situation is tense, and violence may escalate if the international community fails in its attempts to push the peace process forward. As of July 2001, the main political actors in Burundi agreed to support the Arusha peace process and to put in place a 36-month transitional government. The Mediator for Burundi named the first two transitional leaders who will lead the country for a period of 18 months starting November 2001. The nomination of the transitional cabinet, in which all parties are to be represented, is expected to follow. A regional Heads of States meeting

held in Arusha on 23 July 2001 called for the Burundian head of State to commit himself to implementing the peace agreement. Yet developments in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo and intensified fighting in the provinces bordering Tanzania are feeding the insecurity prevalent in the country.

### **Some Achievements to Date**

The office regularly monitors the human rights situation throughout the country. It carries out investigations into the most serious human rights violations, visits prisons and transitory detention places, monitors the situation of regroupment camps and displaced persons. Findings of these investigations are referred to the competent authorities and to the Government. Weekly and monthly reports are submitted to the High Commissioner. Training has been offered to 37 military magistrates and 30 police officials. More than 120 national human rights observers, one-third of whom are women, have been trained. The office has developed a consultative civil society body composed of local associations involved in human rights issues. Regular meetings are held under the auspices of OHCHR. A new Code of Penal Procedure was promulgated in January 2000 and has been fully implemented. Legal assistance has been offered to plaintiffs and defendants at the criminal courts and other courts and tribunals resulting in an improvement in the fairness of trials and the appropriateness of sentencing.

### **Objectives and Implementing Arrangements**

The main objective of the activities is to empower the Government, national institutions and local partners to take over the activities carried out by OHCHR, namely monitoring, providing legal assistance through national lawyers, and supporting the development of an independent civil society. Other objectives include:

#### ***Supporting the implementation of the Arusha peace process***

- The Observation Unit will carry out its activities with a special focus on gender and internally displaced persons (two new observers will be recruited) and will strengthen national capacities to investigate and follow up on human rights violations.
- The Justice Unit will help establish a legal framework for the exercise of political freedoms in Burundi, review provisions on temporary immunity to facilitate the return of refugees, handle

the issue of political prisoners, help draft legislation to combat crimes against humanity, including genocide, and conduct activities intended to strengthen the rule of law.

- The Promotion Unit will increase its training activities and carry out human rights awareness campaigns to promote a culture of peace.

### ***Strengthening national capacities in the field of human rights***

- OHCHR will play a leading role in assisting and coordinating the various emerging human rights structures, including the Government's Human Rights Commission, local human rights committees and human rights NGOs, which need better managerial and financial support as well as appropriate training.
- OHCHR will further develop its concept of a permanent NGO forum to bring together Burundian human rights associations; OHCHR will continue to serve as secretariat of the forum.

### ***Integrating a human rights dimension in all activities of UN partners in Burundi***

- The Head of Office chairs an inter-agency committee, established by the UN Country Team, whose task is to ensure that human rights are integrated in the work of each UN partner in Burundi. Human rights training has already been provided to all heads of agencies and will be provided to all UN staff. Advisory assistance on human rights issues will also be provided to the Representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region, and the mediation team when it moves to Bujumbura.

## **Activities in 2002**

### ***Monitoring***

In 2002 monitoring activities will include: identifying, monitoring and investigating serious human rights violations and abuses and their perpetrators; in close cooperation with UNHCR, monitoring respect for human rights of returnees and preventing illegal arrest or detention; monitoring the functioning of the judicial system and related institutions, such as the police, army and prison system; monitoring

the situation of internally displaced persons; making weekly visits to the central prison of Bujumbura, monthly visits to other prisons and detention centres (cachots) in administrative centres, bimonthly visits to cachots in the communes, and following up, with prison authorities or those in charge of the detention centres, cases involving prolonged or arbitrary detention and maltreatment. To strengthen national capacities, OHCHR will continue to organise training seminars in human rights monitoring techniques for representatives of civil society from each province. Assistance will also be provided in establishing a preventive monitoring network of national human rights monitors to ensure that the rights of returnees are protected and properly followed up, and that returnees are not subject to illegal arrest or detention.

### *Anticipated results*

Activities are expected to result in a decrease in the number of human rights violations, the release of illegally detained persons, respect for the rights of returnees, and the establishment of a national network for the promotion and protection of human rights. Human rights monitors will be present in every national sector to take over the activities carried out by OHCHR. An initial network of 124 national human rights monitors has already been trained through the OHCHR programme.

### ***Assistance to the judiciary***

In 2002 assistance to the judicial system will include: legal assistance to defendants and plaintiffs provided by international and national lawyers during four annual sessions of the criminal chambers and by national lawyers throughout the year; follow-up of trials related to the 1993 eruption of ethnic violence and requests for legal assistance emanating from plaintiffs and defendants; and meetings, brainstorming sessions and seminars on the Legal Assistance Programme, which will be attended by OHCHR, international and national lawyers, representatives of the Government, and local and international NGOs.

OHCHR will provide training for 90 police officers—60 from the gendarmerie and 30 from other police forces — in three two-week sessions; training for 30 magistrates from the *Tribunaux* de residence, which fall within the jurisdiction of the Appeal Courts in Ngozi and Gitega, in one four-week session; training for 30 court clerks and prosecution assistants in one two-week session; and training for 30 members of the prison administration on their rights and responsibilities concerning detention procedures and the treatment of detainees in one two-week session.

*Anticipated results*

The above activities will result in fewer arbitrary arrests and shorter periods of detention without trial; an increase in the fairness of trials and legal assistance provided in cases linked to the events of 1993; and a stronger judiciary, through the training of high courts and military courts magistrates and members of the gendarmerie and the prison administration. In addition, operational support will be provided to the judicial system to ensure its continuous functioning, and legal assistance will be offered to individual returnees or groups of returnees seeking to recover their property in accordance with Burundian law.

***Human rights promotion, education and training***

Promotion activities on human rights, a rights-based approach, democracy and good governance will be carried out through training seminars in each of five provinces for 150 leaders and members of local human rights organisations; three training seminars for 60 leaders and members of women associations; one training seminar for 30 trade-unionists; and one training seminar for 30 members of Parliament. In addition, training seminars on human rights and peaceful conflict resolution for 280 members of youth organisations in each of seven provinces are planned. To increase public awareness of the impact of human rights in daily life, particularly with regard to refugees and displaced persons, 52 micro-fictions illustrating different types of human rights violations will be produced and broadcast. Other activities include the production of three sensitisation campaigns, transferring techniques in developing information campaigns to civil society, and creating TV and radio broadcasts on human rights promotion and protection.

*Anticipated results*

As a result of these promotional activities, OHCHR anticipates the establishment of a permanent forum for civil society organisations involved in human rights. Civil society will be strengthened as leaders and members of local human rights groups, women and youth associations, and members of trade unions are trained in human rights.

**Coordination**

OHCHR works closely with the Government, particularly the Ministries of External Relations, Human Rights, Justice and Education. Weekly meetings with representatives from the Ministries of Defence and Interior and the Governmental Commission within the Ministry

of Human Rights address follow-up of protection activities, such as monitoring and legal assistance. OHCHR also works in close collaboration with other UN agencies. The Head of Office in Burundi is part of an inter-agency working group on human rights which assists with the integration of human rights issues in the work of all UN partners in the country. Excellent relations are also maintained with representatives from civil society, including with Ligue Iteka, Association Burundaise pour la Defense des Prisonniers (ABDP), Association Agir Dufantaye and Collectif des Associations et ONG feminines du Burundi (CAFOB) which represents women's associations, and the Burundi Bar Association.

### Structure of OHCHR's Presence

The Burundi office is led by the Chief of Office, located in Bujumbura, and is composed of three substantive units: the Observation Unit, the Promotion Unit and the Justice Unit. There are a total of 12 international staff, each unit is headed by an international human rights officer. The Observation Unit has four additional international officers, while the other units have national staff. Two international security officers, one logistical officer and one international administrative officer support these units. Sub-offices are located in Gitega and in Ngozi, which cover the eastern and northern provinces, respectively, and undertake legal assistance programmes. The western and southern provinces are covered by the Bujumbura-office.

### Budget in US\$

Staff costs	1,785,485
Experts/consultants' fees and travel	154,920
Travel:	
- OHCHR staff	85,000
- Commission members	0
- Representatives and other participants	0
Contractual services	214,930
General operating expenses	168,780
Supplies and acquisitions	134,504
Grants, contributions, fellowships and seminars	186,921
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>2,730,540</b>
Programme support costs	354,970
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,085,510</b>

## **DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO**

### **Background**

Since it was opened in Kinshasa on 10 December 1996, the Human Rights Field Office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (HRFOC) has been working to improve the human rights situation in the country, based on the *protocole d'accord* signed with the Government. A number of activities have been implemented according to the monitoring mandate and the technical cooperation programme, including support to NGOs, training activities, visits to prisons and detention centres, and support to government institutions, civil society and the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Congo. The situation remains grave, given the continuation of the war, inter-ethnic conflict, and recurring human rights abuses, such as summary executions, arbitrary detentions and violations of the right to a fair trial. Security in-country is tenuous.

Yet, despite these problems, some developments have been reported, including the start-up phase of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, the deployment of observers from the United Nations Mission in the Congo (MONUC), and the organising of the national conference on human rights. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue should bolster prospects for peace and democratisation. HRFOC will have a major role to play in strengthening institutions and promoting a culture of peace and human rights to foster reconciliation. The national conference on human rights held in late June 2001 issued a number of important recommendations, including the adoption of the National Charter on Human Rights, which will help strengthen the rule of law.

### **Objectives**

The main objectives of the project are to:

- Strengthen human rights national capacities and infra-structures;
- Reinforce the national human rights documentation centre established in 1999 in Kinshasa;
- Conduct human rights monitoring;
- Support the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights;
- Ensure appropriate coordination with MONUC; and
- Mainstream human rights within the UN Country Teams.

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## **Activities in 2002**

### ***Technical assistance***

The technical cooperation units of the Kinshasa office and of the Goma sub-office will play a leading role in assisting and coordinating the various emerging human rights structures, including the National Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. They will provide follow-up to the June 2001 national conference on human rights and implement its recommendations, in particular the National Charter on Human Rights. They will also support the implementation of the national human rights action plan which was launched in December 1999. The units will also focus on strengthening the Kinshasa documentation centre, establishing links with the Yaounde sub-regional centre, and supporting the Ministry for Human Rights. Follow-up to training activities conducted in 2001 will also be undertaken.

### ***Monitoring***

Visits to different parts of the country are generally carried out every three months, and/or when there is a specific need, as for monitoring trials. Such visits and monitoring activities help establish a picture of the human rights situation in the country. Observation units provide the Special Rapporteur with necessary background information and follow-up on individual cases. The observation units in Kinshasa and Goma will focus on children and internally displaced persons and work in coordination with UNICEF, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, and OCHA. National capacities to investigate and follow-up on human rights violations, in coordination with the human rights section of MONUC, will also be strengthened.

### ***Mainstreaming human rights***

To ensure human rights mainstreaming within UN Country Teams, the Head of HRFOC will chair a thematic working group on human rights. Human rights training will be offered to all UN staff, and advice on human rights issues will be provided to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the DRC.

### ***Supporting the implementation of the Lusaka Peace Process and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue***

Within the framework of the implementation of the Lusaka Peace Process, a number of activities have been envisaged whose

implementation is still at an early stage. HROC is prepared to offer its expertise, documentation and support to these activities. The Lusaka Peace Process also calls for the deployment of MONUC observers, the organisation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, the liberalisation of political activities, and the closing of a number of detention centres. The implementation of most of these activities is still at an early stage. HRFOC is prepared to offer its expertise, documentation and support to these activities.

### **Anticipated results**

HRFOC's monitoring presence has deterred flagrant human rights abuses. In addition, HRFOC has encouraged national NGOs and civil society, including churches, universities, the local press and local authorities, to help monitor the human rights situation. Civil society has been encouraged to voice its concerns and act upon them. It is anticipated that this positive trend will continue and that the dissemination of human rights standards and documentation, including through the Kinshasa documentation centre and partnerships with local universities, will help strengthen civil society as a monitoring partner. A large network of local NGOs, located mostly in the eastern part of the country, has been created to disseminate information and build local capacities.

### **Beneficiaries**

Beneficiaries will be victims of human rights violations, members of civil society, national institutions that promote and protect human rights, the media, relevant ministries, such as Human Rights, Information, Justice, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Social Affairs, and universities, notably the Universities of Kinshasa, Lubumbashi and Goma.

### **Risks**

Continued conflict and political instability are the main threats to the implementation of activities. The current situation may deteriorate if the conditions of the Lusaka Agreements (i.e., the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the deployment of the military wing of MONUC) are not met.

### **Coordination**

Since the establishment of the MONUC human rights section, steps have been taken to strengthen coordination with OHCHR. On 3

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October 2000, OHCHR and the MONUC signed the terms of reference of cooperation, which cover consultation and coordination, monitoring, human rights training for MONUC staff, human rights documentation and publications, reporting lines and exchange of information, and public statements.

Activities undertaken in accordance with the terms of reference aim to strengthen integration between OHCHR and MONUC. National counterparts for the implementation of activities include: Government institutions, universities, the army, the police, the media, human rights NGOs, trade unions, political parties, and women and youth associations. International partners include: the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UN agencies, including ILO, WHO, FAO, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP and OCHA, the Facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, the diplomatic and donor community, international NGOs and the Yaounde sub-regional centre. Meetings are organized regularly to ensure and strengthen coordination among all actors.

### **Structure of OHCHR's presence**

OHCHR's office in the DRC is composed of a head of office, his deputy, and 14 national staff. A sub-office, opened in Goma during 2000, consists of one international staff and four national staff. Both offices are responsible for human rights monitoring and for providing advisory services to the Government and NGOs on the promotion and protection of human rights.

#### ***Technical cooperation unit***

Recent training sessions on human rights were held in Kinshasa and Goma for magistrates and lawyers. A radio programme, broadcast in the eastern part of the country, has been launched to promote human rights, explore peaceful means of conflict resolution, and foster a culture of peace. Training in human rights education for teachers is being developed. All activities involve domestic human rights NGOs, the media and Government counterparts.

#### ***Monitoring unit***

The units responsible for monitoring in Kinshasa and Goma work closely with MONUC, relevant Government counterparts and domestic and international NGOs; the units visit prisons and both Government- and rebel-controlled areas.

<b>Budget in US\$</b>	
Staff costs	857,049
Experts/consultants' fees and travel	60,600
Travel:	
- OHCHR staff	0
- Commission members	0
- Representatives and other participants	0
Contractual services	195,300
General operating expenses	39,500
Supplies and acquisitions	158,000
Grants, contributions, fellowships and seminars	0
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>1,310,449</b>
Programme support costs	170,358
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,480,807</b>

## COLOMBIA

### Background

OHCHR's office in Bogota was established on 26 November 1996 under an agreement signed by the Government of Colombia and the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Under the terms of that agreement, the office is to observe and monitor the human rights situation in the country in order to advise the Colombian authorities on how to formulate and implement policies, programmes and measures that promote and protect human rights in the context of internal armed conflict. The High Commissioner should also be able to submit analytical reports on the situation to the Commission on Human Rights. The agreement has been extended three times, the latest until April 2002. As requested in the statement of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights in April 2001, the Bogota office plans to continue its efforts to expand its presence and enhance its monitoring capacity by opening regional offices in Cali and Medellin by the end of 2001. Human rights violations in Colombia can be described as grave, massive and systematic. The main rights affected continue to be the right to life and the rights to inviolability, freedom and security of the person. Breaches of international humanitarian law are also recurrent, massive and systematic and form part of a general assault on the civilian population. The worsening of the conflict is demonstrated by the combatants' frequent disregard for the humanitarian principle of proportionality and their targeting of defenceless civilians. The situation in Colombia is affected by a variety of influences, including the peace

dialogues between the government and the guerrilla groups, the "Plan Colombia" initiative, bilateral relations between Colombia and its neighbours, the deterioration of the country's economy, and the activities of Colombia's powerful drug-trafficking networks. As a presidential election year, 2002 will offer new opportunities for OHCHR and the international community to place human rights high on the national agenda.

### **Objectives and Strategy for 2002**

2002 will usher in important changes for OHCHR in Colombia. The opening of the two regional offices implies a re-structuring of responsibilities and lines of reporting. Significant changes in personnel are also foreseen, as some staff will be transferred to the two new offices. 2002 will therefore be a period of adjustment and consolidation, and the Bogota office will also seek to ensure that existing objectives are achieved.

The objectives for 2002 include:

- Observing, monitoring, and providing analytical reports to the High Commissioner so the international community remains informed of the human rights situation in Colombia;
- Advising the Colombian authorities on the formulation and implementation of policies and programmes to promote and protect human rights and providing technical assistance to selected State and non-governmental institutions to strengthen national capacity in human rights protection; and
- Developing public information and promotion campaigns on human rights, including publications and awareness-raising campaigns. This will be achieved by developing a communications strategy linking OHCHR with the local media. This strategy will allow the office to highlight human rights topics and raise the level of discussion within Colombian society, especially among policy-makers.

### **Activities in 2002**

#### ***Observation***

The observation unit in the Bogota office will be rearranged to give greater coverage to those areas that have not yet received the desired level of attention. Similarly, the responsibilities of officers in Bogota will increasingly focus on specific human rights themes. A new focal point will be established for the issues of children's rights and violence

against women in the context of armed conflict. Economic, social and cultural rights will be monitored more closely in cooperation with UN sister agencies. Information on cases and situations collected through field observation will be entered into the office's database and periodically assessed and analyzed to develop an understanding of how human rights and international humanitarian law can be applied throughout the country.

### ***Relations with the media and human rights promotion***

The Bogota office will expand its multifaceted public information strategy, which includes promoting international human rights standards, initiated in 2001. Particular emphasis will be placed on targeting the mass media, including journalists, political-interest groups, opinion-makers, presidential candidates, the academic community, social communicators, NGOs and the private sector. To support the work of the regional offices in Cali and Medellin, OHCHR will develop a series of radio and television spots and will produce written materials outlining its mandate and basic human rights issues. A short video outlining the work of OHCHR will also be produced. The office intends to continue writing editorial pieces, providing off-the-record briefings for specific interest groups, and offering human rights training activities to Colombian journalists. The OHCHR Colombia web site will be expanded to better exploit its potential as a public relations tool.

### ***Technical cooperation and legal advice***

A balance between the two main activities of the Bogota office, technical cooperation and observation, allows the office to underpin its reporting obligations (through observation) with constructive dialogue for change with national authorities (through technical assistance projects). During 2002, OHCHR Colombia plans to complete existing commitments with national human rights institutions. Some modest follow-up activities are foreseen to build the capacity of State institutions which work in the area of human rights. This includes the Attorney General's Office, the Office of the Public Prosecutor and *Defensor del Pueblo* (Office of the Ombudsman). These institutions should implement the recommendations and adopt measures specified through assessment studies supported by the office during 2000 and 2001.

In response to growing concerns for the safety of Colombian human rights professionals, the office plans to introduce a fellowship

programme that will allow three outstanding Colombian human rights defenders (one governmental, one non-governmental and one State) to participate in international human rights and international humanitarian law training initiatives, including the summer sessions at the Rene-Cassin Institute (Strasbourg), Washington University (Washington D.C.) and the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (San Jose, Costa Rica). Technical assistance also involves providing legal advisory services with a view to harmonising national legislation with international norms and recommendations. Through the development and promotion of analytical/ investigative studies, the office strives to strengthen the rule of law and encourage the correct interpretation and application of international norms and standards.

### ***Other related activities***

With a view to creating a best-practice model for the creation of OHCHR field presences, a historical record of the Bogota office will be published.

### **Anticipated Results**

The opening of the two regional offices will guarantee greater coverage of some of the country's worst-affected areas. The Medellin office will allow OHCHR to improve its observation capacity in the departments of Choco, Antioquia and South Cordoba. The Cali office will facilitate greater coverage of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Narino, Risaralda, Caldas, Quindio, Tolima and Huila. It is hoped that a more permanent presence in these areas will increase OHCHR's role in dissuading and preventing human rights violations and in encouraging the protection of human rights. The regional offices will work in close coordination with the human rights Ombudsman.

### **Beneficiaries**

#### *Direct beneficiaries:*

- Individuals and communities at risk of human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law.
- State and national institutions working for human rights protection and education.
- Vulnerable groups, including internally displaced persons and Afro-Colombian and indigenous minority groups.
- National media representatives (TV, newspaper and radio), especially journalists.
- National NGOs and other civil society organisations.

### *Indirect beneficiaries*

All Colombians will benefit from measures and policies resulting in an improvement in the conditions needed to guarantee the full enjoyment of their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.

### **Risks**

The unpredictable nature of the armed conflict, the deteriorating human rights climate and the political conditions in Colombia pose a number of risks that could impede the office's ability to meet its goals in 2002.

### **Coordination**

The Bogota office works with national partners, including the Office of the Vice-President, the Ombudsman for Human Rights, the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Attorney General's Office, the *Consejo Superior de la Judicatura*, national universities, the military and the police. Civil society partners include Colombian human rights NGOs, journalists, opinion-makers, members of Congress, union activists and representatives of the private sector. The office continues its dialogue with the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) guerrillas on issues of respect for international humanitarian law. International partners include UN agencies, international financial institutions, the diplomatic community, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and international NGOs. The Office maintains continuous dialogue with UNHCR through joint activities developed by its human rights officer for internally displaced persons. OHCHR works in close cooperation with the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on International Assistance to Colombia. The UN agencies in Colombia have set up four groups to coordinate work on priority areas of concern. OHCHR is coordinating the thematic group on human rights and international humanitarian law and has participated in the three other thematic groups: alternative development, local development and reconciliation and internal displacement.

### **Structure of OHCHR's presence**

Under the leadership of the Chief and Deputy Chief, the office is divided into four strategic, interdependent work areas:

*Observation:* responsible for consolidating data concerning cases and situations with a view to encouraging investigations by national authorities. Identifies and initiates follow-up on situations and themes requiring further analysis and preventive action.

*Public information and human rights promotion:* responsible for promoting and raising awareness of the office's mandate, functions

and activities and of international standards and recommendations concerning human rights and humanitarian law.

*Legal support:* responsible for analysing the legal and thematic aspects of human rights and international humanitarian law as applied to the office. Reviews complaints/cases for admissibility and legal categorisation and initiates follow-up strategies with the competent authorities.

*Technical cooperation:* responsible for identifying, formulating, monitoring and evaluating projects, maintaining relations with donors, and developing indicators for and measuring the impact of activities.

### Lessons Learned

OHCHR is aware of the need to ensure the early involvement of national human rights partners in as many activities as possible. The office anticipates greater collaboration with the Human Rights Ombudsman's Office in 2002. Since OHCHR's ultimate goal is to leave in place a self-sustaining environment for the protection, promotion and full enjoyment of human rights by all Colombians, the Ombudsman's Office, as OHCHR's natural counterpart, should receive increased support and training. The Ombudsman's Office could thus potentially act as a "project champion" once OHCHR has left the country. The development of a common understanding of and UN strategy for human rights in Colombia is essential. Appropriate training materials and activities with UN agencies are essential for the UN Country Team's efforts to integrate human rights into its overall strategy for Colombia. Headquarters' work to support mainstreaming in the field should be prioritized and strengthened.

#### Budget in US\$

Staff costs	2,799,981
Experts/consultants' fees and travel	734,560
Travel:	
- OHCHR staff	145,000
- Commission members	0
- Representatives and other participants	56,430
Contractual services	354,820
General operating expenses	113,600
Supplies and acquisitions	130,690
Grants, contributions, fellowships and seminars	168,000
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>4,503,081</b>
Programme support costs	585,401
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,088,482</b>

## **CAMBODIA**

### **Background**

The Cambodia office was established in 1993 at the end of the mandate of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The mandates of the field office and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia, which were defined in Resolution 1993/6 of the Commission on Human Rights and elaborated in subsequent resolutions, combine technical assistance, monitoring and the protection of human rights. After almost three decades of war and conflict, Cambodia suffers from a dearth of functioning state mechanisms and experienced personnel. During the past eight years, the country has gradually begun to rebuild major state institutions and a legal framework. Despite these positive developments, protecting human rights remains a challenge. Strengthening the legal framework and the advocacy role of NGOs and civil society are essential to promoting the rule of law and human rights. In its governance action plan of January 2001, the Government acknowledged the urgent need for legal reform. It also pointed to the need for transparency and strong anti-corruption measures and affirmed the importance of gender equality and the protection of children's rights. The plan defined specific actions the Government intends to take to address these issues. Communal elections are scheduled to take place in February 2002 as part of the Government's decentralisation programme. During the first part of 2002, the Cambodia office will undertake a review of its programmes and strategies. An external evaluation of the office and its activities will be organized in the latter part of the year.

### **Objectives**

Activities will focus on strengthening government institutions, NGOs and civil society. To address the complex human rights issues facing the country, the strategy will combine monitoring, technical assistance and capacity-building components. Activities envisaged for 2002 will both help sustain what has been achieved in the past eight years and provide fresh support for institutions that are being rebuilt. The office will also undertake an appropriate programme of monitoring and related activities during the municipal election process.

### **Activities and Anticipated Results**

- Help establish institutions and a legal framework, that promote and protect human rights consistent with international human

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rights standards, and an efficient and participatory law-making process. The office will provide training and technical advice to drafters of law, comment on draft laws, facilitate civil society consultations and otherwise help the State to integrate international human rights standards into law and practice.

- Strengthen judicial reform efforts and the justice delivery system to ensure human rights are promoted and protected under the rule of law. The office will deliver targeted technical assistance to judicial institutions, including the courts, and to legal aid and related NGOs through workshops and other training activities. The office will also provide technical advice, mentoring, and will prepare and disseminate materials.
- Strengthen national capacity to secure the rule of law and to ensure fair and professional law enforcement consistent with international human rights standards and national legislation. The office will participate in initiatives aimed at consolidating and institutionalising the capacity of the armed forces and law-enforcement bodies to act in accordance with international human rights standards, including by preparing training materials, providing training, and assisting in the development of human rights redress mechanisms. The office will also assist the Ministry of the Interior in its work to combat child trafficking.
- Enhance the capacity of the Government to meet its international human rights treaty reporting obligations and of NGOs both to participate in the treaty reporting process and to advocate for ratification of additional instruments. The office will assist in developing State capacity to implement and report on the implementation of human rights treaties and of treaty bodies' recommendations. Appropriate technical assistance will be provided to relevant NGOs within this framework.
- Strengthen the capacity of Cambodian NGOs and civil society organisations to carry out human rights protection and promotion activities. Greater attention will be given to strengthening NGO capacity to promote and protect economic, social and cultural rights and the human rights of vulnerable groups. The office will continue to support the course on human rights offered at the Royal University of Phnom Penh.
- Address human rights concerns in poverty-related issues, in particular by promoting equitable access to and management of land and other natural resources, adequate workers'

conditions, and equitable access to basic services, especially in the areas of health and education. The office will work with government, UN and NGO partners to promote rights-based approaches to poverty alleviation and environmental activities and will undertake appropriate monitoring activities.

- Promote an environment for free and fair elections at the commune level. The office will establish an election programme to monitor all phases of the electoral process and to promote a correct implementation of the legal framework relating to the elections.
- Support the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in implementing his mandate.

### **Beneficiaries**

Beneficiaries will include: the Ministries of Justice, Interior, Social Affairs and Labour, Environment, Women and Veterans' Affairs, Defence, and the Inter-Ministerial Committee responsible for preparing reports for treaty bodies; judges and prosecutors; parliamentarians and staff of the National Assembly and Senate; NGOs and civil society groups; the Royal University of Phnom Penh; the police; the Royal Gendarmerie and the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces; lawyers; and the future-elected Commune Councils.

### **Coordination**

The Cambodia office works with all three branches of the State: the ministries, the legislature and the judiciary. In addition, the office works closely with the Legislative and Human Rights Commissions of the National Assembly and Senate. The office also cooperates with UN agencies in promoting the rule of law and human rights by supporting human rights main-streaming within UN programmes. OHCHR gives high priority to its relations with NGOs and civil society.

### **Structure of OHCHR's Presence**

The Cambodia office currently consists of 12 international staff, 45 national staff and 10 consultants. The office is composed of:

- The Chief's office: responsible for the management of the office, including fulfilling reporting and other obligations to OHCHR Geneva, coordinating support to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, participating in UN system activities, and maintaining external and donor relations. The Chief of office is responsible for supervising the provincial office network.

- The Monitoring and Protection Unit: responsible for all aspects of the office's monitoring, investigation and protection activities. The head of unit also serves as assistant to the Special Representative.
- The Legal Assistance Unit: coordinates programmes and activities for strengthening the judiciary and law-making process, including by commenting on draft legislation and facilitating the involvement of civil society in the law-making process. It also coordinates the Judicial Mentor Programme, which places trained lawyers in provincial and municipal courts to train judges and court officials.
- The Education, Training and Information Unit: responsible for building the capacity of government and nongovernmental institutions through education and training and development of guidelines and training materials; supporting NGOs and civil society by providing both technical and financial assistance to local human rights NGOs; and assisting the Government in meeting its reporting obligations under International human rights instruments.
- The Provincial Office Network: consists of eight provincial offices and implements the programmes and activities in the provinces.
- The Administrative Unit: provides personnel, administrative and financial services, including providing transport and logistical support.

## Funding

Core funding for the office is provided under the regular budget, which covers seven professional international staff, 16 national professional and administrative support staff, costs related to travel of the Special Representative, and support provided by OHCHR headquarters for the Cambodia office. All other expenses are covered by the Trust Fund for Human Rights in Cambodia, established by UNTAC and transferred to OHCHR in 1993.

### Budget in US\$

Staff costs	488,800
Experts/consultants' fees and travel	106,970
Travel:	
- OHCHR staff	165,610
- Commission members	0
- Representatives and other participants	80,000

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Contractual services	263,100
General operating expenses	205,100
Supplies and acquisitions	172,750
Grants, contributions, fellowships and seminars	110,000
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>1,592,330</b>
Programme support costs	207,003
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<b>Total</b>	<b>1,799,333</b>

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## **BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

### **Background**

OHCHR in Bosnia and Herzegovina has produced reports on the human rights situation in the country since 1993 under the mandate of the Special Rapporteur (since 18 April 2001, the Special Representative) of the Commission on Human Rights. This traditional monitoring and reporting activity was expanded in August 1998 to include a focus on major human rights issues in the country, including gender discrimination, the protection of minorities and rule of law, and social and economic rights.

The human rights situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has improved considerably since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in November 1995; but continued improvement is hampered by the transitional nature of the nation's economy and the complicated constitutional and legal structure of the State. The economy is evolving from State control to a free market. A weak coalition government, installed after the most recent elections, is struggling in the uncertain political and economic climate. Although there is increased recognition of the need to comply with international human rights obligations, there is still insufficient cooperation between ministries at the Entity (i.e., the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska) and State levels to make substantial progress. It is still too soon to determine if sustainable changes will or can be implemented.

Most human rights violations in Bosnia and Herzegovina are predicated on some form of discrimination, whether on grounds at ethnicity, political affiliation or gender. The intersection of gender and ethnic discrimination has exacerbated the plight of women, particularly in the areas of social and economic rights and gender-based violence. Members of vulnerable groups, such as minority returnees, former detainees, and those who provide assistance to the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) are most at risk.

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The return of refugees and displaced persons and the reclamation of property continue. Yet six years after the Dayton Peace Accord, over 700,000 people from Bosnia and Herzegovina are still refugees or displaced persons and have no durable solution to their problem. Implementation of property laws remains far too slow and requires constant monitoring and pressure from the international community. The sustainability of returns remains a major concern. Bosnia and Herzegovina's weak economy adversely affects the entire population; but returnees suffer more, primarily because they often cannot exercise their rights. Many areas still do not meet the minimum criteria for compliance with international standards in effective policing, independent judiciary, and non-discriminatory protection of social and economic rights; as a result, there is no security for returnees.

The dearth of adequate public services, most notably access to pensions, health care and social protection, makes the return of vulnerable groups unrealistic without additional assistance and support. Decreasing levels of international aid and the weak economy only undermine the already-fragile national protection system.

With no multi-ethnic and professional police force and no functioning and independent judiciary, impunity and disregard for the rule of law persist. Corruption is of grave concern and hinders progress in disrupting and prosecuting organized crime. Trafficking in persons, primarily for the purpose of forced prostitution, and the smuggling of migrants are both issues of major concern in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in the region as a whole. While the Government's response to the problem has improved, there is concern that the international community has not adequately addressed the demand for the services of women forced into prostitution. The extent to which organized crime and corruption feature in the economy and in society, in general, remains a major obstacle to the creation of a society where human rights are respected and violations redressed.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country of destination for victims of trafficking and a country of transit for smuggled migrants. Since there is no coherent framework or system to deal with all forms of migration at the point of entry, the protection of those who may be seeking asylum is jeopardized.

Yet despite the above-mentioned problems, the evolution of civil society and the role played by NGOs in calling the authorities to account in Bosnia and Herzegovina are positive developments that prompt some optimism for the future.

## **Main Objectives and Strategy**

OHCHR's role in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to act as a catalyst for the promotion and protection of human rights. During 2002 the Office will:

- Ensure that the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights is kept fully informed of events in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that reports to the Commission and the General Assembly accurately reflect the situation in the country;
- Ensure that issues of gender-based violence as they relate to the international police mandate are addressed within the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH);
- Pursue the concept of gender mainstreaming and obtain greater gender analysis in the programmes and policies that are implemented in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Ensure that social and economic rights are addressed as human rights and that the principle is incorporated into the work done with national institutions and international agencies;
- Work with NGOs on rule of law issues, reporting and assessment of human rights;
- Work towards developing a return programme that respects human rights and recognises the nature of the obstacles encountered, not least by ensuring a gender analysis;
- Identify particularly vulnerable groups and help define the violations of their rights and any appropriate remedies; and
- Ensure that the legal framework on immigration and asylum and the mechanisms for its implementation provide for effective protection of human rights.

## **Activities in 2002**

In 2001, OHCHR started the Municipality Assessment Programme, designed to give an indication of factors that influence the conditions for a safe and dignified return of minorities to particular municipalities. A climate of security includes a broad array of institutions and measures related to rights and protection. This includes the composition and reactions of the police, the independence of the judiciary, access to and quality of health care, employment, education, housing, the provision of utilities, access to Government administrations, such as for passport applications, and freedom to participate in social and cultural activities. The programme will be expanded in 2002.

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OHCHR has been involved in activities to establish quality health care/protection in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ensuring non-discrimination and emphasising the full implementation of international human rights standards. The office established and chairs a working group of international and local institutions covering health issues, and has worked on interim solutions for access to health care. In 2002 OHCHR will continue to advocate for reforms in the health-care system, aimed at ensuring better health care/protection for all citizens on a non-discriminatory basis, by helping to develop a final agreement on the method and procedures for access to health care.

As trafficking in persons remains a major human rights violation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, OHCHR will continue to coordinate activities to provide immediate assistance to those who are victims of trafficking. This includes working with the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). Following an October 2000 meeting of ministries responsible for addressing trafficking, which was also attended by the chair of the trafficking task force of the Stability Pact to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Government committed itself to formulating and implementing a national plan of action. OHCHR will continue to play a leading role in providing assistance to the ministries in developing the plan and ensuring that the protection of human rights remains a central priority. The office will provide advice and expert analysis of the legal frameworks from a human rights perspective and will participate in the three working groups established under the national plan of action: legal reform, prevention and awareness, and direct assistance to victims. OHCHR will share information with NGOs that will help develop the assistance programme. In collaboration with the UNMIBH human rights office, OHCHR will devise a new strategy detailing the role of the IPTF in relation to trafficking. OHCHR will be involved in training the State Border Service and local police and will work more directly with the international community and local NGOs on referral systems.

In 2002 OHCHR will continue to highlight the issue of discrimination in employment by raising awareness of the problem and offering advice to international organisations and relevant government agencies on how to integrate international human rights standards into economic and social legislation and policies. In collaboration with the American Refugee Committee, UNHCR and the Office of the High Representative, OHCHR will monitor the implementation of Entity labour laws. Problems identified in both Entities include: discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin, political affiliation or non-affiliation, or gender; employees working without a

contract and thus not entitled to social protection measures; and employers not recognising unions as social partners. OHCHR will provide advice on implementing labour legislation. In addition, OHCHR will work with partners to strengthen the legal framework to ensure that the rights of irregular migrants entering or transiting the country, particularly victims of trafficking, smuggled migrants and asylum seekers, are protected.

### **Beneficiaries**

Beneficiaries of OHCHR's activities include state institutions, governments of both Entities, NGOs working on human rights issues, returnees and potential returnees (including those wishing to return to Croatia), internally displaced persons and refugees, migrants and victims of trafficking, stakeholders in the national health system, and members of the international community.

### **Risks**

The protection of economic and social rights is sometimes viewed as impracticable and/or incompatible with the economic reforms taking place in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Guaranteeing respect for economic and social rights, especially for fair employment practices, is all the more important as returns increase.

### **Coordination**

The office works closely with other international organisations, national and international NGOs and with the Government to coordinate activities, to ensure that human rights are integrated into policies, programmes and legislation, and to avoid duplication of efforts. The office also works to promote dialogue and cooperation between NGOs and the Government. The office is part of the Country Group of Multilateral Agencies (CGMA) working on the Common Country Study (CCS) for Bosnia and Herzegovina. This initiative addresses the development needs of the country through close cooperation with and assistance to the Government. OHCHR has worked on developing the indicators for the CCS and plays a crucial role in ensuring that human rights and gender are integral parts of the process.

### **Structure of OHCHR's presence**

The Chief of office is responsible for the office's activities and for regional gender issues. Three other officers work on economic and social rights, migration and issues of internal displacement, support the mandate of the Special Representative and provide human rights expertise. In addition, a local lawyer works on human rights legal issues. Two consultants focus on the Municipal Assessment Programme

and one consultant handles trafficking issues in the context of a joint project between OHCHR and UNICEF, which is administered by UNDP.

### Lessons learned

Demands made upon OHCHR are great, not only in relation to regional issues, such as migration, trafficking and return, but also in the areas of economic and social rights. As OHCHR facilitates further dialogue between the Government and NGOs, progress is being made, yet the relationship between the Government and NGOs must be continually nurtured.

#### Budget in US\$

Staff costs	672,590
Experts/consultants' fees and travel	108,000
Travel:	
- OHCHR staff	40,000
- Commission members	0
- Representatives and other participants	0
Contractual services	90,000
General operating expenses	195,000
Supplies and acquisitions	80,000
Grants, contributions, fellowships and seminars	0
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>1,185,590</b>
Programme support costs	154,127
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,339,717</b>

## CROATIA

### Background

A technical cooperation agreement signed in May 1999 and a memorandum of understanding signed in June 2000 launched this project and regularized the legal status of OHCHR as a diplomatic mission in Croatia. Key human rights issues (e.g..refugee returns and reintegration, property restitution, tenancy or occupancy rights, rights of minorities, appropriate legislative changes, judicial reform, equal application of the rule of law, and impartial trials, especially for war crimes) are still not adequately addressed in Croatia. Ongoing land and property disputes, which form the majority of the more than one million cases pending adjudication in Croatia's judicial system, impede return, reintegration and, most important, reconciliation. Growing tension within and outside the ruling coalition over Croatia's

cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is another cause of concern.

## **Objectives**

OHCHR will continue to monitor human rights developments in 2002 and inform thematic rapporteurs and/or other human rights mechanisms on the systematic patterns of violations in Croatia. OHCHR will implement activities that focus on human rights monitoring and training and strengthen the capacity of national institutions to promote and protect human rights.

## **Activities in 2002**

### ***Monitoring***

The mandate of the Special Rapporteur in Croatia ended in mid-April 2001. However, in 2002 OHCHR will continue to monitor human rights developments in accordance with the MOD signed in June 2000. Activities will draw the attention of thematic rapporteurs and various human rights mechanisms to systematic patterns of violations in Croatia; complement the technical cooperation programme in Croatia; and ensure timely reports to OHCHR Geneva on the human rights situation in the country. Special attention will be paid to war crimes trials and to the independence and impartiality, or lack thereof, of the judiciary.

### ***Training***

OHCHR will:

- Implement training programmes for journalists, police and prison officials, judges, lawyers, prosecutors, and staff of NGOs on human rights standards appropriate to their professions. OHCHR will also provide advisory services and/or technical assistance to the Government.
- Promote and strengthen national human rights institutions through training, workshops, seminars, lectures, and documentation. These institutions include the Office of the Ombudsman, the National Parliament of Human Rights the National Minorities Committee, and the Committee on Legislation.
- Target human rights NGOs, teachers, journalists, concerned government officials, students, the Bar Association and community-based organisations to disseminate human rights culture, emphasising economic and social rights, human rights education, gender, multi-culturalism and children's rights.

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## ***Promotion***

The Office will disseminate information on various human rights topics relevant to Croatia and make available documents on human rights standards, works of prominent human rights defenders and academics, and national laws on minority rights. These documents will be held at the Human Rights Documentation and Training Centre, which was established in Zagreb by OHCHR in October 2000 in cooperation with the Government. The Centre is an independent institution, accessible to civil society organisations, academics, students and the general public, for promoting human rights awareness, studies and research; it also serves as a public resource for computers, databases and other human rights materials.

## ***Advocacy***

OHCHR will:

- Intensify efforts with the Government, in close cooperation with international and regional organisations and NGOs, to establish and implement an adequate legal framework to resolve problems that arise concerning the return of refugees and displaced persons, restitution and reconstruction of housing, citizenship, work, and social benefits. The Office will also work towards restoring trust and reconciliation among the different ethnic communities.
- Strengthen the legal framework by ensuring that all necessary human rights legislation, compatible with international standards, is adopted and implemented, in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice, parliament, other government bodies, international and regional organisations and NGOs.
- Promote better administration of justice by monitoring the independence of the judiciary and noninterference by the Executive, the recruitment of qualified judges, the training of judges, prosecutors, lawyers, police and prison personal, including training of trainers, cooperation with ICTY, and by monitoring local trials of international humanitarian law violations.
- Advise the Government, in cooperation with other international and regional organisations, on the implementation of the plan of action and resolutions adopted following the International Human Rights Conference, convened in Dubrovnik in October 2001.

## **Anticipated Results**

The capacity-building projects are expected to produce excellent

results in 2002, with participants continuing to benefit from the seminars and training programmes. The office will seek to assist the Government in its attempt to address human rights concerns and encourage a sense of partnership between the parties. Among many anticipated achievements, activities should increase NGO credibility and leverage with the Government and international organisations; reinforce local efforts to demand and defend human rights; contribute to the development of a sustainable human rights training capacity within the prison administration; and increase the visibility of the Ombudsman by strengthening its capacity and improving public understanding of the role and function of the office.

### **Beneficiaries**

Beneficiaries will include current and potential victims of violations of human rights; government offices (legislative, judicial, and executive, including the office of the Ombudsman); national human rights NGOs; academic institutions, including senior law and political science students and, in particular, the European Law Students' Association; and journalists. OHCHR will also continue to work with NGOs on minority rights and individual complaints. The NGOs will benefit from training sessions and seminars that will raise awareness of international human rights standards.

### **Coordination**

Activities are coordinated with government offices, academic institutions, human rights NGOs, and intergovernmental agencies, including UN agencies, which work in concert with OHCHR as implementing partners and as sources of information for human rights monitoring.

### **Structure of OHCHR's Presence**

The office in Zagreb comprises six local and two international staff, headed by the Chief of Mission.

### **Lessons Learned**

Given the human rights situation in Croatia, particularly with regard to unfair war crimes trials and the implementation of the return programme, and the fact that other international actors have ceased their monitoring programmes, if only temporarily, it is imperative that OHCHR continue its activities. In the coming year, OHCHR will focus on building both national capacity and local ownership of the Human Rights Documentation and Training Centre in order to shift responsibility for project training and monitoring activities in Croatia to local partners, thereby facilitating OHCHR's eventual departure.

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**Budget in US\$**


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Staff costs	390,590
Experts/consultants' fees and travel	7,500
Travel:	
- OHCHR staff	9,500
- Commission members	0
Representatives and other participants	90,000
Contractual services	81,000
General operating expenses	25,000
Supplies and acquisitions	62,000
Grants, contributions, fellowships and seminars	0
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>665,59</b>
Programme support costs	86,527
<b>Total</b>	<b>752,117</b>

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## THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

### Background

OHCHR's field mission in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) is governed by an agreement with the Government that grants a broad human rights monitoring, reporting and promotion mandate throughout the country. The human rights situation in FRY varies by region. Serbia is in the early stages of a post-Milosevic transition to democracy and is facing a number of significant challenges: addressing the consequences of Serbia's involvement in the Balkan wars (war crimes committed by Serbs; large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons; missing persons; and Kosovo Albanian political prisoners); changing constitutional norms and legislation to meet international standards; reforming highly politicized and inefficient State institutions, particularly the police and judiciary; implementing the terms of a settlement of ethnic conflict in southern Serbia; creating political structures that will protect the rights of and integrate minorities into political, social and economic life; and resolving the final status of Kosovo.

Montenegro's human rights situation has been relatively stable over the past two years, but the Government must develop legal norms and political structures to protect minorities, address organized crime and trafficking in humans, and reform governing norms and institutions to meet international standards. Much will depend on the outcome of a national referendum on independence that is likely to be held late in 2001. Kosovo, on the other hand, remains troubled by ethnic violence, particularly Albanian attacks on Serbs, Roma and other minorities,

political violence among Albanian groups, and a legal system whose norms and trials often fail to meet human rights standards. The conflict in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, meanwhile, has regional implications that directly affect stability in Kosovo and southern Serbia.

### **Objectives and Strategy**

- Provide continuous monitoring and reporting on human rights developments throughout FRY with a focus on providing early warning for human rights problems that might contribute to ethnic conflict.
- Obtain the release of all remaining persons illegally deprived of liberty, particularly Kosovo Albanians detained in Serbia.
- Increase the number and quality of human rights education and promotion activities in schools, civil society and by governing authorities, particularly through the creation of national human rights institutions in each region.
- Contribute to conflict reduction in southern Serbia.
- Support the mandate of the Special Representative.
- Assist FRY, Serbian and Montenegrin governments and authorities of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to bring all legislation and governing institutional norms and practices into accord with human rights standards. In particular, OHCHR will provide all necessary technical support to the relevant national authorities and NGOs in order to improve the quality of reporting to human rights treaty bodies to which FRY is a State Party.

### **Activities and Expected Results in 2002**

- The FRY field mission will play an important role in ensuring that international human rights standards are incorporated into legal and institutional reforms and development activities in the region. While European human rights and development organisations are active in FRY, OHCHR is the only agency that promotes UN human rights standards. OHCHR-FRY has established good working relationships with UNMIK, key FRY and Serbia ministries (judiciary, interior, national and ethnic communities) and the Government of Montenegro. OHCHR's advice is often solicited on legislative and institutional issues that have a human rights dimension. This advisory role will continue throughout 2002.
- During 2002 the National Institutions Team will continue to conduct assessment visits to national human rights institutions

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in FRY/Serbia. In particular, the National Institutions Team is preparing a support project for the Kosovo Ombudsperson's Office.

- As the sole human rights presence in southern Serbia, OHCHR will play a stabilising role as human rights monitoring, reporting, civil society- and confidence-building activities come into full operation. A staff member will be responsible for developing the informal human rights reporting network in the region and for exploring support strategies for the local human rights NGO community. These efforts will help shape a UN country team assessment of and recommendations for peace-building, within a human rights context, in southern Serbia.
- To date, OHCHR's human rights training study of the Kosovo Police Service has improved the police academy's curriculum, teaching methods and follow-up in-service training even before the study results have been published. OHCHR will continue its follow-up activities to improve human rights policing standards and community relations.
- OHCHR will continue to work with Albanian political prisoners in Serbia and support visits of the Special Envoy on Persons Deprived of Liberty. This should result in the release/return of all remaining prisoners by early 2002, which will, in turn, reduce tensions between Serbia and Kosovo. In 2001, this initiative led to the amnesty of 363 detainees.
- The Belgrade and Pristina offices will continue to work with FRY, UNMIK, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other actors to maintain the momentum of work regarding missing persons. This work involves hosting a bi-monthly information-sharing meeting in Belgrade of all concerned parties. OHCHR will continue to play a mediating role in 2002 to encourage all parties to move forward on this issue, which is a source of conflict between Kosovo and Serbia.
- OHCHR will support human rights education and promotion initiatives, including human rights campaigns, training sessions for university, school, and local officials, including police. These activities will increase awareness of human rights in the Government, schools, and civil society throughout FRY.

### **Beneficiaries**

Beneficiaries include ethnic Albanian prisoners detained in Serbia and their families, families of missing persons (when cooperative FRY-UNMIK efforts discover and identify the remains of missing individuals), local NGOs, government ministries, Albanian and Serb

ethnic communities in southern Serbia, residents of Kosovo, particularly minority groups, and students and young people.

### **Risks**

The principal risk to OHCHR-FRY operations is renewed ethnic violence in southern Serbia or Kosovo, or spillover violence as a result of a renewal of the conflict in Macedonia. This risk is minimized, however, by the likely regional nature of any violence, allowing one office to transfer staff and resources easily to another office (from southern Serbia to Belgrade, for example). In Montenegro, the ongoing political uncertainty over the Republic's relationship with Serbia and FRY impedes Government efforts to move forward on a concrete plan for legal and institutional reform. OHCHR-FRY is adjusting to this situation by increasing work with NGOs, the legal community and others on human rights education, training and promotion. As soon as the political future of Montenegro is clarified, OHCHR will have an important role to play in monitoring and supporting the Government's efforts to incorporate human rights into all institutional reforms.

### **Coordination**

OHCHR works with all UN bodies in the FRY including UNICEF, UNDP and UNHCR, and participates in weekly heads-of-agencies meetings and joint UN country team projects, such as south Serbia. The office coordinates regularly with OSCE, the EU and the Council of Europe and other international governmental organisations and NGOs. OHCHR has initiated a monthly meeting involving human rights actors, including UN bodies and OSCE, to discuss activities and improve coordination.

### **Implementing Arrangements**

All activities will be implemented by field mission personnel supplemented by the thematic teams, such as the National Institutions Team at headquarters, and consultants. OHCHR-FRY will carry out its activities through headquarters in Belgrade and field offices in Kosovo and Montenegro. The mission is led by a chief of mission based in Belgrade with heads of offices responsible for managing each sub-office.

The offices in Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo will work with relevant governing authorities, NGOs and other international organisations to assist in reforming legal norms and key institutions, such as the judiciary, police, and national human rights institutions, so they conform to international human rights standards. The offices in Serbia, Belgrade and Pristina will continue to work for the release of the remaining Albanian political prisoners, search for missing

persons, and extend confidence-building activities throughout southern Serbia. Offices in all three regions will work with local NGOs and education ministries on human rights capacity-building, education and promotion. The Belgrade office will continue to monitor developments in Macedonia and provide assessments and recommendations to OHCHR and other UN, regional and international mechanisms.

### Lessons Learned

OHCHR regional field presences can play an important role in conflict-reduction initiatives because of their ability to operate in all countries or provinces involved in conflict. OHCHR-FRY has been able to play such a role in the Kosovo-Serbia situation, providing independent monitoring and reporting on events in both entities and serving as a facilitator of discussions between Belgrade and Pristina on a range of crucial issues. The key to the success of this kind of operation is the field presence's ability to operate as a single organisation and move staff around the region as quickly as possible in response to emergencies or changing conditions.

#### Budget in US\$

Staff costs	1,064,870
Experts/consultants' fees and travel	50,000
Travel:	
- OHCHR staff	120,000
- Commission members	0
- Representatives and other participants	0
Contractual services	157,000
General operating expenses	175,000
Supplies and acquisitions	80,000
Grants, contributions, fellowships and seminars	0
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>2,186,870</b>
Programme support costs	284,293
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,471,163</b>

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