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Online Study Materials on  
**ARMS CONTROL AND  
DISARMAMENT**

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**UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE  
ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES**

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**Introduction**

This section contains selected papers from the formal proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues, held at Kyoto, Japan, from 19 to 22 April 1989. The Conference was convened by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, with co-operation and assistance from the Government of Japan. The United Nations Association of Japan and several other non-governmental organisations also provided support. In all, more than 100 diplomats and other governmental officials, academicians, specialists, and representatives of research institutes and non-governmental organisations participated in the Conference or attended as observers. The audience was welcomed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Sousuke Uno, and the Mayor of the City of Kyoto, Masahiko Imagawa, as well as by the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Yasushi Akashi.

Papers were presented by renowned analysts on five distinct topics, as follows:

- Non-Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Other Weapons;
- Nuclear-Test Ban and Verification;
- Openness, Transparency and Confidence-building Measures;
- Multilateral and Bilateral Approaches to Disarmament; and
- Security and Disarmament.

Each of these topics is reflected below, and open discussion was invited on the various points of view which the speakers put forward. The complete proceedings of the Conference have been issued separately

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by the Department for Disarmament Affairs, as a World Disarmament Campaign publication, entitled *United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues*.

The Kyoto Conference was one of the largest and most wide-ranging meetings of experts so far held on current issues in the context of the United Nations World Disarmament Campaign. The Campaign, mandated by the General Assembly, is designed to inform, to educate, and to generate public understanding of and support for the goals of the United Nations in the field of arms limitations and disarmament, and to do so in a balanced, factual and objective manner.

The intent of the Kyoto Conference as well as of other, comparable Campaign forums is to provide the five major target constituencies of the World Disarmament Campaign—elected representatives, the media, non-governmental organisations, educators and research institutes—with a forum for thought-provoking analyses and exchanges of opinion, through which they may, in turn, convey accurate, up-to-date information objectively to a wider, indeed a global, audience.

### **NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND OTHER WEAPONS**

The need to halt the spread of nuclear weapons has been evident to many people from the early days of the nuclear age. It is an issue which has not lost its importance and urgency through the passage of time. On the contrary, the danger of proliferation continues to be very real indeed. Due to the advanced and continuing development of nuclear knowledge and the spread in the past decades of such knowledge and of nuclear installations to different parts of the world, several non-nuclear weapon States have acquired the potential for a nuclear weapon programme. A number of non-nuclear weapon States today have more of a nuclear industrial base to produce atomic bombs than the United States had in the early days of its Manhattan Project, during the Second World War. The nuclear technology and the computers that built the first-generation nuclear weapons are now widely available in the commercial market. It is an additional concern that such weapons can now be built without testing.

It can, thus, be assumed with a high degree of certainty that the number of States actually possessing nuclear weapons is higher than that openly acknowledged. Furthermore, a number of countries actually have the capability—up to now unused—of producing nuclear weapons.

Most of the countries in question also have or could acquire a reasonably effective nuclear delivery capability. In sum this presents us with a rather grim picture.

Ever since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the code of non-use of nuclear weapons has been adhered to; this adherence has been despite periods of military conflict, high international tension and acute crises in Super-Power relations. We all have acquired a heavy stake in its perpetuation. Should anyone break the tradition on non-use by threatening to use or by actually using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear opponents, it could unleash a process of nuclear proliferation. In such a situation, non-nuclear weapon States could feel tempted to reassess their position. They could decide to take out their own nuclear insurance. Such a development might lead to withdrawals from the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). It would undoubtedly constitute a serious threat to the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime. Even limited use of nuclear weapons would have a devastating effect, not only in human casualties and material destruction, but also in moral and political terms.

Today, as in the past, it is of absolute importance that we pursue, with all the determination and vigour we can possibly muster, a consistent and all-inclusive policy of non-proliferation. It serves the interest of all of us to protect and to strengthen the existing non-proliferation regime as much as possible. This is particularly important now as we are approaching the fourth, and next to final, Review Conference of the NPT; a Review Conference which in part will highlight the weaknesses and deficiencies of the existing arrangements. We are about to determine the Treaty's future. Shall it be extended for a limited period of time only, or should it continue in force indefinitely? Should it be modified? Whatever the answers to questions like these, one thing must be absolutely clear: there is no alternative to the Treaty's survival.

If a continued and strengthened non-proliferation regime is our objective—and it should be—how do we achieve it? Apart from discouraging nuclear weapons development and the reliance on such weapons in the context of deterrence through the promotion of detente and peaceful co-existence in international relations, there are several basic requirements to be fulfilled:

- (i) Real progress in arms control and disarmament negotiations;
- (ii) The urgent conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty;

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- (iii) Strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and application of full-scope safeguards in all non-nuclear weapon States;
  - (iv) Establishment of a rigid trade system for supply of nuclear material and equipment.

The non-proliferation Treaty is unique in the sense that it prohibits the acquisition by an overwhelming majority of States of the most destructive weapons ever invented, while tolerating the retention of the same weapons by a few. However, the position of a number of the non-nuclear weapon States has been to consider the NPT perhaps not as an end in itself, but rather as a transitional measure aimed at facilitating nuclear disarmament. The unceasing nuclear arms race has given the opponents of the Treaty ammunition against it. In the eyes of many people, this has contributed to undermining the legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime. This is particularly the view of Third World countries, where such a regime is often seen as an imposition. There is a price to be paid for the continued integrity of the NPT. That price is a clear commitment and concrete action by the nuclear weapon States to reverse the nuclear arms race. In that respect, the recent INF agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union represents a promising beginning. The reduction in the total of the nuclear arsenals of the two Super-Powers as a consequence of that agreement might not be that impressive. However, the INF agreement represents a breakthrough in two very important areas: the acceptance of the principle of asymmetrical reductions and of that of comprehensive and stringent verification procedures. By eliminating an entire class of Soviet and United States nuclear weapons, it has also demonstrated the feasibility of a far more ambitious approach to arms control than was previously believed possible.

We live in a world of enormous inequities, a world where the citizens of a few privileged, rich countries enjoy unprecedented wealth, while the majority of mankind lives in poverty, a world where the few rich countries of the North consume a disproportionate share of the world's resources while the majority of nations do battle with obstacles to sustainable development. In this world, sharply divided between a few haves and many have-nots, can we expect continued and lasting legitimacy to be accorded to an order which is based on the proposition that nuclear weapons be reserved for a few rich countries in the North? It is unfortunate, furthermore, that possession of nuclear weapons coincides with permanent membership in the Security Council, as this

suggests a direct linkage between nuclear weapon status and the hierarchical order which prevails in international society.

The nuclear weapon States and their allies should perhaps pay more attention to the global dimensions and implications of their security arrangements. In this context, there would be a positive effect if the States of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty were to de-emphasise the role of nuclear weapons in their defence postures and strategies, implement substantial reductions in their nuclear weapons arsenals and introduce effective bans on nuclear weapon and missile tests. In an East-West context we are seeing some encouraging trends in this regard. However, the process of reconciling a minimalist approach to nuclear deterrence with the reassurance of allies in the East-West competition is at an early stage. The emerging pattern of a more interdependent security order in Europe, with a dynamic interplay of deterrence and co-operation, contains the seeds of a system of common security with a receding role for nuclear weapons.

It should also be emphasised that the Third World countries would not be serving their own interests by imitating the nuclear option taken by the northern States. Their own security could be impaired by triggering regional nuclear arms races and destabilising the prevailing world order. Nuclear proliferation is likely to hurt the security interests of the Third World rather than punish the nuclear weapon States for their failure to halt vertical proliferation.

One measure specified in the NPT itself, and generally considered to be a long overdue first step in the direction of qualitative limitation of nuclear arms, is a comprehensive nuclear-test ban (CTB). The importance of such a ban for non-proliferation purposes would lie in the practical obstacles it would erect for would-be proliferators. Moreover, a CTB would partly obliterate one of the politically sensitive aspects of the NPT—its differential treatment of two groups of States, those which are permitted to develop and test nuclear weapons, and those which are not.

It has been suggested that a comprehensive test ban could be achieved by amending and extending the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963. A proposal to that effect was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly last year. By now, it is clear that there will be a conference of the States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty to consider the matter. I do not question the integrity or the good intentions of the sponsors of the proposal. However, I do not believe that this is the

best way to proceed. I have serious concerns about the possible consequences for the Treaty itself from such an exercise. I am also concerned that it might be unhelpful in relation to the ongoing efforts to move forward on the CTB issue within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and the ongoing bilateral test-ban negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

According to article II of the partial test-ban Treaty, an amendment would become binding on all the present parties once it had been ratified by a majority, including the depositary Powers. However, it is rather unlikely that important States will accept far-reaching changes in their international obligations resulting from a majority vote. This would not likely be politically acceptable to them. There is a danger that what one might call "the target countries" would respond by withdrawing from the Treaty, thereby recovering the "freedom" to test even in the atmosphere. The end result could, thus, be a weakening of the Treaty and the test-ban regime in general.

In my opinion we need an additional multilateral treaty which would apply to underground nuclear tests. We should never cease working for this as a matter of the highest priority and urgency.

However, for a combination of political and military reasons, there is still some distance to travel before we can reach an agreement prohibiting *all* tests by *all* States, for *all* time in *all* environments. Consequently, for the time being, it is advisable to move along two parallel tracks which eventually could merge into one. Progress could be made if a series of agreements were concluded to reduce gradually the yield and number of nuclear explosions conducted annually. To be of significance, the initial agreement would have to limit the yield to a level considerably lower than that of 150 kilotons stipulated in the unratified 1974 United States-Soviet threshold test ban Treaty; in addition, the annual quota of permitted explosions would have to be considerably below the average number of tests conducted in recent years. It is generally accepted that it now is possible to monitor much lower yields. A threshold of 10 kilotons, for instance, would not require many more seismic stations beyond the number available in the present seismic network.

Since China and France have hitherto argued that a complete test ban at this stage would damage their security interests by consolidating the United States-Soviet nuclear weapon superiority, a gradual approach to the cessation of tests could be a way of inducing those nuclear

weapon States to participate in a future agreement. This could also change their attitude towards the non-proliferation Treaty.

Of importance for a CTB is the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions. A test-ban treaty permitting such explosions would hardly be worth negotiating. It would certainly not prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. However, the arguments against peaceful nuclear explosions would be more convincing if the nuclear weapon Powers decided to forgo them altogether. This would not be a great sacrifice, considering the limited value of explosions for engineering and other civilian purposes. It would also serve to remove yet another element in the unequal treatment of non-nuclear weapon States.

Another arms control measure directly connected to non-proliferation could be the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Such a cut-off, which has been an item on the United Nations agenda for many years, would contribute to curbing the “vertical” proliferation of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapon States. It would also impede the “horizontal” spread of these weapons to other States. For verification purposes it would require a clear separation of the civil and military nuclear sectors in nuclear weapon countries. This would facilitate the requirement to verify that no transfer of material was made from one sector to the other.

IAEA safeguards will always play an important role as verification and confidence-building measures in efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. The safeguards system can and should be improved upon. Incremental steps would not be enough. Only the application of full-scope, safeguards in all non-nuclear weapon States could block the most critical loopholes in the system. It is most disturbing that in several non-nuclear weapon countries today there are unsafeguarded plants in operation that can produce weapons-grade nuclear material. For this reason, supplier States should not export nuclear material and equipment to those non-nuclear weapon States that refuse to accept full-scope safeguards. They should be confronted with the following choice: stopping the development of power programmes or continuing them under comprehensive international control.

The NPT does contain some stipulations about the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but that should not make us lose sight of its main purpose, which is non-proliferation. All of its provisions must be seen in this light. This means that the supply of nuclear material and equipment must take place in a careful and orderly manner in keeping

with the letter as well as the spirit of the Treaty. A system of trade for such material must encourage and reward adherence to the NPT. It should thus, for instance, not allow the supply of sensitive material to non-parties, or to countries which do not accept the NPT safeguards. Non-Treaty exporters of nuclear plants and technology should be co-opted into the non-proliferation regime. They should join the established "London" guidelines, and require acceptance of IAEA safeguards on their nuclear exports.

One final point in connection with nuclear non-proliferation: two kinds of measures which play a role—even though of a more marginal character—in a discussion on nuclear weapons proliferation are the concepts of "negative" security assurances and the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones.

Assurances of the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States ("negative" assurances) are viewed by many as an important contribution to consolidate the non-proliferation regime. Up to now, conditional assurances have been given by the individual nuclear weapon States on different occasions, although China's assurances are generally viewed as unconditional. However, the search for unconditional guarantees has proved fruitless. Indeed, the latter would require fundamental changes in the postures and policies of the major Powers. Some of these changes would be equivalent to a non-first-use obligation with regard to any State, not just to a State not possessing nuclear weapons. In the meantime, however, before a general non-first-use agreement is reached, the qualified "negative" security assurances already given could perhaps be incorporated into a formal international document.

In the past decade or two there has been a lively international debate about the setting up of further nuclear weapon free zones. Widespread support for this idea is chiefly found in those parts of the world which are relatively "benign" from the point of view of nuclear weapons proliferation. In areas of conflict, which are crucial in this respect, the prospects for establishing such zones are not as good. In my view, the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones should primarily be considered as a confidence-building measure. They do not really remove the nuclear threat, but could soften the edge of that threat and contribute to non-proliferation. In some cases they could contribute to a process of more far-reaching denuclearisation. The following basic criteria should be fully met in connection with the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones:

- (i) The concept or idea of establishing a nuclear weapon free zone must be acceptable to all countries of the region. The initiative to establish such a zone must develop from inside the area;
- (ii) All important States in the region must participate;
- (iii) The establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone must not disturb existing security arrangements or upset the military balance in the region;
- (iv) There must be agreed verification measures;
- (v) Nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes cannot be allowed within the established zone.

As is apparent from what I have said so far, the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation is by no means a chapter of the past. It is still with us. However, certain recent developments should provide us with an opening for strengthening the non-proliferation regime. I have already made reference to the scheduled fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty and the question of its future. The considerable improvement in Super-Power relations, the smooth implementation of the INF agreement, the shared Soviet-American objective of concluding an agreement to cut their strategic nuclear forces in half, and the process of reconfiguring the nuclear forces in NATO, which resulted in substantial unilateral reductions, together constitute evidence of a transformation taking place with respect to the role of nuclear weapons in international relations. This represents a trend which—provided we do not experience undue delays or setbacks—should facilitate the preparatory work for the Review Conference; a trend which—if momentum is maintained—may make it possible for us to burn the Conference itself into an event mobilising increased support for a strengthened non-proliferation regime. This is what we should all be working for; this is the challenge now confronting us.

The negotiations just opened in Vienna on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE), as well as those on confidence- and security-building measures, are important building blocks in a comprehensive strategy in which our efforts in one field supplement and facilitate our work in the other areas. The agreed priority in Vienna with respect to conventional arms is to eliminate the most threatening elements of the armed forces which may be used for surprise attack and offensive military operations. The aim is to supplement the achievements in the political and human dimension with steps towards a Europe in which

each side maintains only those forces required for defensive purposes. If the parties to the negotiations succeed in this endeavour, they will have made a vital contribution to overcoming the East-West divide, which has dominated the European continent for more than four decades.

The Vienna negotiations concern conventional forces. But, we must not ignore the positive contribution they may make in a wider arms control context. Conventional parity and development towards more defensive force postures will also affect the nuclear element of the relationship of forces. By removing existing capabilities for surprise attack and large offensive operations, the countries concerned will be able to reduce dependence on nuclear weapons for their security. In this respect, the Vienna negotiations on conventional arms clearly support efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation.

I have just described a number of developments which could be helpful in preventing a further spread of nuclear weapons. However, there are trends in the present situation outside of the nuclear domain which could complicate things, trends which could constrain or even reverse the process of reducing dependence on nuclear deterrence and promoting nuclear non-proliferation. The large-scale use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war broke the taboo against the use of such weapons which had been generally heeded since the end of the First World War. Chemical weapons constitute weapons of mass destruction. They are largely indiscriminate weapons which harm the civilian population disproportionately. They are also relatively cheap and easy to produce. Expectations of possible use of chemical weapons by a potential adversary could cause nations to build up stocks for purposes of deterrence and retaliation.

The spread of chemical weapons could interact with the spread of nuclear weapons in dangerous ways. In the Middle East, perceived Israeli nuclear weapons programmes are likely to stimulate Arab incentives to procure chemical weapons for purposes of deterrence. On the other hand, such Arab programmes could serve to legitimise an overt nuclear weapons programme in Israel. A communique issued by the Council of the League of Arab States on 12 January of this year, just after the Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, held 7 to 11 January, bears out the point I wish to make. I quote:

“The Council affirms also that the safeguarding of international peace and security requires not only the prohibition of the possession and use of chemical weapons but also the prohibition of the

possession and use of other weapons of mass destruction throughout the world and in the region of the Middle East in particular.”

The communique goes on to restate the view expressed by the Arab countries at the Paris Conference “regarding the necessity of linking the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of chemical weapons”.

Such an interplay as I just referred to could be further stimulated by the proliferation of long-range missiles, including missiles of types which the Super-Powers have agreed to abolish. Such missiles could become carriers of chemical and nuclear munitions. In the Iran-Iraq war they were used in attacks on cities. The development, acquisition, and deployment of such weapons could exacerbate the problems of stemming the proliferation of both nuclear and chemical weapons. In addition, they could upset the current process of force reductions within the central balance of nuclear deterrence which is maintained by the Super-Powers. The territories or military installations of those Powers could be threatened by long-range ballistic missiles in Third World countries. Proliferation of such missiles could herald a new epoch of increased threat and instability both in relations among Third World countries and in their relations with the major Powers.

The continued proliferation of ballistic missiles and of missile technology increases the likelihood of conflict. Not enough is being done to stop the spread of these fearful weapons. A non-proliferation regime concerning ballistic missiles might be one avenue worth exploring. The Missile Technology Control Regime of 1987 could be strengthened and expanded. China and the Soviet Union could join that regime. Its members should fully observe the accord and take effective steps to restrict the export of controlled technology. Companies that violate those controls should be prosecuted.

Much has been said and written lately about chemical weapons proliferation. We have all seen numerous reports about countries that allegedly possess a chemical weapons capability, the kind of capability they have, the destructive force of that capability, and the military threat it represents, its political impact, etc. The reports and the information we receive differ greatly in scope and content, and I am not in a position to pass judgement on their accuracy or reliability. There is obviously ample opportunity for misinformation in such a public information process. A note of caution is appropriate as a variety of purposes may be served by propagating reports about chemical

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weapons proliferation. There is, for instance; a still expanding, competitive market for equipment for protection against chemical weapons which is employing the “aggressive” sales techniques of arms traders. The reports could also be meant to provide a rationale for developing one’s own retaliatory chemical weapons force.

To be sceptical about some of the reports is not tantamount to an across-the-board rejection of all of them. We have seen unquestionable evidence of an increased chemical weapons capability world-wide. We have seen evidence of proliferation of these weapons. Make no mistake about this. It is, in my view, at this stage not very productive to concentrate on the numbers game—whether it is 15 or 30 possessor States. It suffices for our purpose to recognise the fact that the chemical weapons genie is very much out of the bottle. It will stay out and grow if we do not take decisive action now. We must put the genie back in and cork the bottle!

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use in war of chemical and biological weapons. Recent experience should drive home to all of us in clear and unequivocal terms the message that the provisions of that Protocol are inadequate. We need much more than that instrument.

The reported proliferation of chemical weapons has led to countermeasures from a number of States in the form of special export controls: that is to say, these States require export licences on dual-purpose chemicals. The number of countries participating in these efforts has been steadily increasing. So has the number of chemicals which is subject to control. However, the counter-proliferation measures in the chemical field, as in the nuclear, rest on the proposition that the relevant technologies can be controlled by a relatively small number of Governments through export control policies. This is not necessarily so. Furthermore, these kinds of export control regimes are very difficult indeed to implement in a fully effective manner. They cannot substitute for a comprehensive, global and verifiable convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons: that is, a universal convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction—a convention which would be strictly enforced through an effective system of verification and control under the auspices of the United Nations.

The Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, already referred to, highlighted the importance of the prevention of any further proliferation and use of chemical weapons. The Conference

served as a vehicle to reaffirm the validity of, and rally stronger support for, the Geneva Protocol of 1925. It also issued a strong appeal to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to redouble its efforts in order to conclude, as a matter of urgency, a comprehensive chemical weapons convention.

As to the prospects for an early conclusion of such a convention, we continue to hear mixed signals. In my judgement, there is, unfortunately, reason to believe that the negotiations in Geneva are nowhere near the end. So far, the participating States have, *inter alia*, agreed that a chemical weapons convention should: (a) prohibit the acquisition, production, possession and use of chemical weapons; (b) eliminate present stocks and production facilities within a 10-year period; (c) control chemical facilities producing toxic chemicals for purposes not prohibited by the convention in order to ensure that no new chemical weapons are produced, while permitting the production of chemicals for non-hostile purposes (industrial, agricultural, research, medical, law enforcement or other peaceful purposes); and (d) set up a general conference to administer and control these undertakings, including verification and inspection.

Even though the Geneva negotiations have worked out general provisions covering many of the major elements of a convention, several very sensitive and complex problems remain to be solved. For instance, no final agreement has been reached on the lists of "super-toxic lethal chemicals" and "key precursors". The list of "chemicals produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical weapons purposes" also remains incomplete. For chemicals already on the list, possible cheating in a future convention cannot be excluded. The definition of chemical weapons is also one of the issues not yet agreed upon. Chemical weapons include toxic chemicals, munitions and related equipment. The Conference on Disarmament has so far failed to distinguish between super-toxic lethal chemicals produced for strictly commercial use and those suitable for military purposes.

Chemical weapons agents can also be characterised according to their intended use. Some participants want riot control agents to be included as chemical weapons; some States argue that certain military uses of chemicals such as tear gas and herbicides should be permitted. This question is unresolved. Similarly, there is no final view on how "dual-purpose" chemicals, usable for both peaceful and military purposes, should be covered. A variety of chemicals can be used not

only as chemical weapons but also in the chemical industry. Many ingredients of poison gases are essential in peaceful applications. Any nation capable of producing chemical pesticides can manufacture some form of poison gas, which means that most armies in the world could have at least crude chemical weapons if their Governments decided to produce them. Finally, the important question of verification remains unresolved, and it presents probably the most thorny problem with regard to chemical weapons. International verification of compliance with and of alleged violation of the chemical weapons convention would apply to four main areas: declaration of possession; elimination; development, acquisition, transfer, production and non-production; and use. It will obviously be very difficult indeed to verify the non-production, secret stockpiling or transfer of chemical weapons. Effective verification is really only possible in cases where declared production facilities and stockpiles are destroyed. Provisions for the verification of non-production will have to be less restrictive; States parties to the convention might have to accept less than totally reliable verification, and depend to a considerable extent on trust.

In my view, a less than perfect convention is better than no convention at all. Unrealistic demands on the verification procedures should not be used as a pretext for blocking final agreement.

In September of last year, the Geneva negotiators agreed that trial inspections should begin this year in several countries. Each nation was to conduct inspections of its own facilities. On this basis, guidelines would be prepared for subsequent international inspection. Brazil, Hungary, Italy, Sweden, the USSR and the United States have already conducted such inspections. We can only hope that the experience gained will generate forward movement on the issue of effective international verification procedures.

Pending the successful conclusion of the Geneva negotiations, the international community must do its utmost to contain the chemical genie through other measures:

- (i) States must exercise maximum self-restraint in the export of key precursors and equipment. They must adopt the tightest possible export controls and administer these controls in an efficient and vigorous manner. The purpose must be to make it impossible for any firm or citizen to collaborate in the construction and/or operation of a chemical weapons plant;
- (ii) Sanctions must be taken against any State that violates the

Geneva Protocol of 1925. The international community cannot, for moral, political and a host of other reasons, once more remain virtually inactive if confronted with extensive use of chemical weapons. Sanctions must be imposed on countries-using such weapons;

- (iii) The Secretary-General of the United Nations must be given the full authority and the necessary capacity to effectively investigate alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol.

Measures like these, if adopted and truly implemented, might give us some respite as we complete the negotiation of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. Such a convention represents the only fully satisfactory answer to the problem. There should be no misunderstanding on this point. Export control policies or other partial measures cannot substitute for a comprehensive, global and verifiable convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons. We should all bear this in mind at any given time and in relation to any given conference, meeting or other event. A case in point is the recent Australian-American initiative to convene an international conference in Australia later this year to consider the growing problem of international trade in chemicals, plants and equipment which can be used for chemical weapons purposes. It is essential that that conference does not in any way distract attention from or otherwise weaken the Geneva negotiations. Rather, its main purpose should be to stimulate those negotiations.

The accomplishment of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention remains our primary objective. If we allow chemical weapon proliferation to continue, if we allow more States to develop a chemical weapons capability, if we allow renewed use of chemical weapons without applying sanctions, it is bound to affect negatively the ongoing efforts to truly turn the arms race around. We cannot allow-let alone afford—this to happen.

### **NUCLEAR-TEST BAN AND VERIFICATION**

The positive developments of the most recent past give ground, despite any trends to the contrary, for speaking of turn-about in international relations from confrontation to detente. In the field of disarmament, these developments include, particularly:

- The conclusion and realisation of the Treaty between the USSR

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and the United States on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles;

- The successful conclusion of the Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and of the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting, as well as the beginning of negotiations on conventional armaments and further confidence-building measures in Europe;
- The consolidation of awareness that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, as well as the implementation of unparalleled norms of openness and control and a factor of confidence-building in the practice of relations among States.

This process is also being promoted by the most recent successes in the resolution of regional conflicts by political means, the relaxation of tensions and the growing support for a comprehensive approach to international peace and security.

Only a few days ago, the Foreign Ministers of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, at their Berlin meeting, reaffirmed their determination to continue pursuing a policy which is aimed at bringing about a fundamental improvement of the situation in Europe and the world at large. In this connection I wish to refer particularly to the Declaration on Tactical Nuclear Arms, which was adopted at that meeting. The reduction and final elimination of these weapons in Europe would be—after the agreement on the destruction of the Soviet and American intermediate- and shorter-range missiles—an essential contribution to the stabilisation of the situation on the continent. It would also further the objective of the complete and worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons. Relevant negotiations should be prepared in the course of specific consultations.

As a whole, there seem to exist at present favourable prerequisites in order to achieve, by further, far-reaching disarmament steps, a state of international relations which would reliably exclude a policy of confrontation and arms buildup.

The issue of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, however, has so far been affected only partially by these positive developments. Nuclear explosions are being continued despite several appeals by the United Nations General Assembly to halt them. In 1988 alone, 38 such explosions were carried out. Proposals for a comprehensive ban meet with persistent opposition on the part of some States. Now as before, the great majority

of countries believe that a comprehensive test ban would be an essential step towards the promotion of nuclear disarmament and universal confidence-building.

The States which have proposed the convening of a conference for the extension of the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 to cover also underground nuclear weapon tests have proceeded from this understanding. Indeed, all ways should be explored and used which would lead to the complete cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The continuation of such testing would have, particularly, the following negative consequences:

- First, one of the major channels for the development of nuclear weapons with new, destabilising characteristics would be left open. This goes especially for so-called “third-generation” nuclear weapons, which means weapons the effects of which would be enhanced in one or another direction. Such modifications could, for instance, lead to specific radiation or increased electromagnetic pulse effects. These developments are further stimulating the nuclear arms race and threaten to topple the military-strategic balance of forces. As is known, qualitatively new weapons systems in most cases lead to greater verification problems and for this reason also make future disarmament agreements more difficult to achieve.
- Secondly, strains would be put on existing agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Many sides are rightly pointing to the fact that the preamble of this Treaty—just like that of the partial test-ban Treaty—contains the commitment to seek the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons. Here, too, the point is that the strict fulfilment of obligations undertaken is an essential element for strengthening the authority of international law and for confidence-building.
- Thirdly, the refusal of some States to begin negotiations on a test-ban treaty prevents the Geneva Conference on Disarmament from tackling a task of high priority. A comprehensive test ban, however, is in its essence a multilateral task. Nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States alike would have to undertake obligations within its framework. A universal arrangement, in addition, would require a global verification

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system which can only be devised multilaterally if it is to ensure the necessary participation of States from all regions. A multilateral approach does not exclude specific bilateral activities on the part of the USSR and the United States as long as they are in accordance with the objective of the complete cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

The main reason why the advocates of nuclear deterrence and the continuation of nuclear weapon testing are adhering to their concept is alleged, in their own words, to be the necessity to have at their disposal modern nuclear weapons which are at any time ready for use in order to ensure their security. If one follows this logic, then nuclear tests could only be completely stopped when the last nuclear weapon would be destroyed. This would mean to turn away from an understanding of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests as a relatively independent task—the way it is reflected, for instance, in earlier treaties in the field and in basic United Nations documents. A topical task thus becomes a “long-term goal”, dependent on the development of new nuclear weapons. In parallel with the reduction of nuclear weapons, ever new and more destabilising systems, which would be increasingly difficult to control, would be developed, tested, produced and deployed.

In view of developments going on in the world—the increasing interdependence of States and the creation of weapons jeopardising the very existence of mankind—a new approach to the issues of war and peace and disarmament is necessary. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, in May 1987, when outlining the principles of their strictly defence-oriented military doctrine, pointed to the necessity of the renunciation of the concept of “nuclear deterrence”, the dominant version of which calls for the development of ever new weapons systems. Nuclear deterrence must be replaced by structures of common security which include:

- clearly defensive military doctrines;
- the liquidation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction as well as the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments to a level sufficient only for defence;
- openness in military matters;
- political security guarantees.

There is no doubt that the tests serve above all the modernisation and the further development of nuclear weapons. Sometimes those

advocating nuclear weapon tests refer to the alleged necessity of examining through them the reliability of stockpiled nuclear weapons. It appears to me that such a justification—also in view of the fact that in the past the smallest proportion of the tests have served that purpose—is for various incorrect reasons:

- According to available information, nuclear weapons are checked—including in the United States—for their reliability primarily by methods which do not require nuclear explosions. Such checking is carried out through dismantling and examining them and, if need be, replacing defective components. “Reliability tests” require high costs which are out of all proportion to their effectiveness;
- Since the mid-1970s no nuclear devices having a yield of more than 150 kilotons have been tested. Since a considerable share of warheads for strategic systems has a higher yield, it is obvious that enough technical means exist to dispel doubts as to the reliability of those systems;
- The USSR and the United States possess nuclear weapons arsenals which are capable of destroying the world several times over. This capability would not be lost if some of those weapons could not be examined because of a test ban. Furthermore, the consequences would be the same for both States; neither side could gain military advantages from an “aging” of the nuclear weapon stocks of the other side.

In case doubts could not be dispelled, it seems to be an interesting suggestion that an agreement might be reached for a limited transition period as to the carrying out, under strict mutual control, of a small number (one or two) of “reliability tests” per year.

During the past few years there have been several attempts to put into doubt the importance of a comprehensive test ban for arms limitation and disarmament. The great majority of States, however, stick to the idea of achieving, as soon as possible, the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests as an independent and priority task. The unilateral moratorium of the USSR on all nuclear explosions demonstrated the feasibility of such a step. The best way to solve the issue of nuclear weapon tests would be a general prohibition to be agreed upon immediately. It is in view of the well-known negative attitude of some nuclear weapon States *vis-a-vis* such a move that the idea of interim

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solutions has been developed. This could provide a way towards achieving progress if the intended agreements are to be conceived as part of a process leading to a comprehensive test ban.

A number of ideas proceeding from the interest in achieving practical progress deserve, in our opinion, to be considered more thoroughly:

- Japan's Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe, in 1984 proposed a step-by-step approach. The scope of corresponding threshold agreements would be determined by technical verification capabilities. Although it has become clear in the meantime that it has not been the lack of means of verification that has prevented the cessation of nuclear tests, we consider this proposal to be a constructive starting point for further consideration;
- Swedish representatives on several occasions have put forward the idea of combining interim solutions with an exactly defined phase-out period for nuclear-test explosions. Such a concept would very much comply with the desire of many countries to achieve quick progress;
- The establishment of a genuine parallelism between multilateral and bilateral negotiations could turn out to be rather productive. The elaboration of a test-ban treaty at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament would be carried out simultaneously with the reduction of the yield and number of nuclear explosions, as agreed upon between the USSR and the United States.

Many of the ideas, thus, expressed indeed offer good opportunities for achieving progress. Even a combination of some of them may prove feasible. Therefore, it appears to me that it is all the more worthwhile and important to begin with a businesslike and constructive discussion of these and other ideas in an appropriate forum, for instance, in a working body of the Conference on Disarmament.

For a long time, real or alleged verification issues have served as an argument against the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Here, however, the situation has changed fundamentally. These issues are no longer a subject of ideological confrontation. In businesslike deliberations and negotiations, co-operative solutions for unsettled questions are being sought. Nothing has made this more evident than the joint verification experiments within the framework of the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear testing. The businesslike character of the discussions on this issue adds to the weight of what has been

stated by experts to the effect that it is possible to reliably verify a nuclear-test ban. With the existing technical means at hand, no militarily significant explosion could go undetected. Major factors in this connection are:

- First, the increasing efficiency of technical verification means along with modern methods of data transfer and processing. There is rather broad agreement that nuclear tests with a yield of more than one kiloton can be detected from a distance of several thousand kilometres. In addition to that, it would be possible to make the network of seismic stations involved so tight that explosions of sub-kiloton yield would also be detected;
- Secondly, a new understanding of openness and verification has already manifested itself most clearly in the respective provisions of the INF Treaty. Since required verification standards for a comprehensive test ban might be less as compared with that Treaty, and taking into account that the necessary technical means do exist, it should be possible to reach an agreement.

The “Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear weapon Tests” submitted by a group of socialist countries to the Conference on Disarmament in 1987 provides for the following measures of verification:

- use of national technical means of verification consistent with the generally recognised norms of international law;
- an international seismic verification system, consisting of modern, standardised seismic stations to be operated with the participation of observers of an international inspectorate;
- international exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity;
- mandatory on-site inspections;
- as a matter of course, these verification mechanisms could be complemented, if necessary.

Important work has been done on the seismological aspects of such measures by the “*Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events”, in whose activities the German Democratic Republic has been actively involved. There exist still open questions with regard to the non-seismic elements of a CTB verification system, the interrelationship of its components, and its legal and organisational aspects. These could

be dealt with by a special group of experts which could be established. Of course, there are other possibilities, such as the recently suggested extension of the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts. It should be noted that a “zero option”, i.e. a comprehensive test ban, would also be the best basis for solid verification. At the same time, I am wholly convinced that the existing means and methods would suffice to verify interim solutions.

In March 1989, the German Democratic Republic submitted a working paper to the Conference on Disarmament. It contains a number of ideas on how a group of experts could contribute to advancing the idea of an international verification system for a nuclear-test ban. The task of such a group could be to provide the Conference with substantiated and co-ordinated recommendations on the structure and functions of a system to verify compliance with a nuclear-test-ban agreement. This would be in line with suggestions aimed at initiation of detailed investigations on non-seismic measures to verify compliance with such a treaty, including an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity. Such a group should take into account all pertaining proposals and suggestions on the issue. It should, *inter alia*, draw on the knowledge and experience gained during:

- the negotiations on the Treaties between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of nuclear weapon tests and on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes;
- the trilateral negotiations of 1977-1980;
- the activities of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group of the Conference on Disarmament on a nuclear-test ban in 1982 and 1983;
- the work carried out by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts;
- national efforts of member States of the Conference on Disarmament.

To conclude, in preparing a comprehensive verification system for a nuclear-test ban, the following issues seem to be of special importance:

(a) *Technical aspects of a verification system, including—*

(i) Technical means of verification

Attention should be focused on technical means which would be applied to enhance the degree of certainty that a future agreement is being complied with. Such means could be:

- seismological surveillance,
- atmospheric radioactivity surveillance, and

- other methods for the surveillance of the non-conduct of nuclear weapon tests (e.g. satellite remote sensing);
  - (ii) On-site inspections, including
    - methods and techniques to be applied during such inspections, as well as the elaboration of pertinent procedures; and
    - the elaboration of procedures to ensure the non-functioning of nuclear weapon test ranges; and
  - (iii) Relevant technical questions with regard to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes with a view to preventing the circumvention of a future agreement through the conduct of such explosions.
- (b) *Basic structure of a CTB verification system* —
- The main components of such a system could be, *inter alia*,
- seismological monitoring,
  - means of atmospheric radioactivity surveillance,
  - other technical means of verification (e.g. satellite remote sensing), and
  - means to be applied during on-site inspections. In this regard, in-depth consideration of the following issues would be useful:
    - (i) main components of the envisaged system; their functions, tasks and authorities;
    - (ii) interrelationships among the components (subordination, interaction); and
    - (iii) options for a step-by-step approach in establishing the verification system, providing the possibility of further refinement in accordance with experience gained during the establishment and operation of parts of the system due to pertinent developments in science and technology.
- (c) Consideration of *administrative and organisational questions*, which could include, *inter alia* —
- (i) Composition and organisation of work of the organ(s) to be established for the smooth functioning of the verification mechanism (including definition of competences, provisions for staffing and financing),
  - (ii) Establishment of designated channels for information to

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- be made available to all States parties to a future nuclear-test ban, including information obtained through national technical means,
- (iii) Establishment of a framework, providing all States parties to a future nuclear-test ban with the possibility of being regularly informed about pertinent developments in science and technology with a view to examining ways and means of improving and streamlining the verification system,
  - (iv) Investigation of possibilities for international co-operation in the development and production of the required technical equipment (hardware and software) for the establishment and operation of the envisaged system.
- (d) Preparation, implementation and evaluation of a possible experiment involving some or all elements of the proposed verification system, taking into account relevant experiences of the Group of Scientific Experts.

### **NUCLEAR-TEST BAN AND VERIFICATION**

The first nuclear device in human history was detonated in the desert of New Mexico on 16 July 1945. Thereafter, the members of the “nuclear club” increased rapidly. In the following ten years as many as 61 nuclear tests were conducted in the development of nuclear weapons. These tests all took place either in the atmosphere, or on the surface of the Earth or waters of the oceans.

Consequently, it became internationally recognised at an early stage that the continuation of unrestricted nuclear testing would contaminate the environment. In 1957, the United States started underground nuclear tests in order to confine radioactive fallout underneath the surface of the Earth. In 1963, the partial test-ban Treaty was concluded, which banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. One of the main reasons why this Treaty was concluded in a relatively short period of time was the simplicity of verifying the limitations on testing which it called for. For example, let us assume that a nuclear test of modest size had been conducted above the ground several thousands of kilometres away from Japan. Within two or three days after the explosion, the level of radioactivity in the floating dusts in the sky over Japan and also in rain water would increase perhaps about 100 times over the normal values. This indicates how important the technical capability for verification is in connection with a test ban.

Since then, all nuclear tests have been carried out under the ground, including, albeit more recently, those conducted by the countries which have not signed the partial test-ban Treaty. The verification of underground nuclear tests with sufficient confidence has now become a major issue in connection with the proposed total banning of nuclear tests. Such verification, however, is not as easy as it has proved to be in the case of tests conducted above the surface of the Earth. No consequence should be left above the surface of the ground, in principle, in the case of underground tests, in accordance with the 1963 Treaty. The only after-effect outside the test site is seismic waves generated by the explosions, which are propagated to distant parts of the Earth through the ground and on its surface. In this sense, underground nuclear explosions are nothing but artificial earthquakes, which can be detected and located in the same way as has been done for natural events for a long time before the appearance of nuclear devices.

In accordance with this knowledge, global seismic observation has been internationally accepted since the late 1950s as the most promising means of verifying a ban on underground nuclear tests. An *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events was established 13 years ago under the then Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The number of countries which send experts to this Group is currently about 25, and the Group meets regularly twice a year. I wish to present some problems as an individual expert, who has been working as a member of that Group.

According to our long discussions up to now, if global co-operative seismic observation were made in an objective way for verification and the results were properly analysed, seismic events corresponding to as low as a few kilotons of TNT could be detected and located. There are, however, still a number of points to be solved, and to do so we need political and administrative decisions.

A proposed global network will have to consist of about 50 sensitive, well-equipped seismic stations geographically distributed as uniformly as possible. Furthermore, the data from these stations must be exchanged openly and expeditiously on a routine basis. To satisfy these requirements, a practical system is now under study, making full use of modern computer and communication technology.

However, a mere desk plan is not convincing enough to enable a nuclear-test ban to materialise in the near future. Our Group

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unanimously realise the necessity of demonstrating the workability of the system by a series of test runs. In 1984, the first global test exercise was successfully conducted with the participation of 76 seismic stations in 37 countries. In this experiment, the exchanged data was limited to those similar, in case of human beings, for example, to height, weight, and colours of hair and eyes. Most seismic events can be identified as innocent by these data. But, if a seismic event is located in the region where both artificial and natural events may be expected, the exchange of waveform data, which corresponds, for instance, to a full-length photograph, is necessary for the final identification. The second, and more advanced, global test experiment is now being planned and some preliminary work towards it has already started. This experiment will require considerable manpower and financial resources. Even though the amount will be trivial compared with that devoted to nuclear armament, we need strong administrative support. This is one of the hurdles which have to be cleared before we can achieve our goal.

Our present efforts are mainly concentrated on how to detect and locate seismic events on a global scale and convey information on their characteristics expeditiously. The final and most important procedure, namely, identification of seismic events as natural or artificial, has been studied at the national level, and discussed in the Group to a certain extent. No practical proposal, however, has been made with regard to who would do this job and how they would do it under an international authorisation. This is another hurdle to be cleared.

Seismic means are very capable for verification of a nuclear-test ban, because they can detect, locate and identify seismic events on a global scale, the occurrence of which we do not know where and when in advance. But, they are not infallible.

First, if an explosion is very small, it would be very difficult even to detect the generated seismic event, unless we can set seismic instruments very close to an explosion site in advance. On the other hand, even nuclear weapons of very small size and explosive yield seem to have been developed.

Secondly, the size of seismic events caused by underground nuclear explosions can be estimated with a fair accuracy. But, the accuracy of estimating the size of the actual explosions is rather low, because different explosions even of the same size do not necessarily generate earthquakes of the same size. The size of seismic events can vary greatly, depending on the geological environment of test sites and propagation paths of

seismic waves. Therefore, it would perhaps be not realistic to move to a total test ban within a short time. If a step-by-step approach were pursued, the estimation of the size of the permitted explosions would become essential. For that purpose, seismic means cannot be fully depended upon.

The United States has developed a non-seismic method called CORRTEX, which directly measures the size of explosions. Unlike the seismic method, however, this measuring device has to be installed very close to an explosive device in advance of the test. The nation concerned would have to make its test plan known in advance, and provide sufficient notice.

In the case of underground nuclear tests, the consequence which reaches distant places is solely seismic waves. But, on the ground at the test site, there are necessarily certain activities or changes before and after a test. Cannot these phenomena be monitored by surveillance satellite? It is said that even automobile numbers can be read by the most advanced versions of such satellites. To do so, telescopic cameras of extremely long focal length must be used. In turn, the visual field becomes very small. It would be very difficult to scan from one corner to the others over a sufficiently large area. Target regions would have to be somehow specified beforehand.

If verification means were limited to one type, that would of course offer certain strengths, but would leave weaknesses as well. We will therefore have to employ multiple means of verification of different types, and do so in complementary ways. Some countries have taken up this point. But, one must still question whether the Conference on Disarmament has ever worked seriously on this problem.

Finally, Chairman, I would like to raise a question: How much confidence in the agreed means of verification is required to ensure compliance with a nuclear-test ban? If we could trust each other wholeheartedly, no verification would be necessary. On the contrary, if somebody were still inclined to try to carry out concealed tests under a ban, the confidence level must be very high. Accordingly, in the latter case verification requirements would become technically very difficult and financially expensive.

Once again, as an expert in the field of seismic verification, I would wish to listen to the candid opinions of the distinguished participants on the problems which I have mentioned.

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## OPENNESS, TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

The traditional concept of confidence-building measures is reflected in the often cited definition by Hoist and Melander (1977), which states that “confidence-building involves the communication of credible evidence of the absence of feared threats by reducing uncertainties and by constraining opportunities for exerting pressure through military activity.” In a subsequent refinement (1983), Hoist described confidence-building measures as “arrangements designed to enhance such assurance of mind and belief in the trustworthiness of States and the facts they create.”

An evolution in the scope of the definition of confidence-building measures is observable between the two definitions. Whereas the first definition is limited to reciprocal behaviour in the military and security domains, emphasising the need for clarification of intentions and avoidance of misperceptions, the latter definition ventures into the area of the overall need for trustworthiness among States and reaches out to the basic elements of the psychology of inter-State relations. The first definition addresses the need to contain the possibility of an outbreak of hostilities that neither side desires. The second moves away from this limited approach towards a larger appreciation of what constitutes confidence-building measures, envisaging them in terms not of potential damage containment but of the principles of healthy relations between States. It is the true appreciation of what constitutes confidence-building measures that concerns us here.

The early history of confidence-building measures was concerned with avoiding a clash between two military blocs armed on a scale never before seen. In modern times, especially in the post-Second World War era, concern over surprise attack determined contacts on confidence-building measures among the nuclear Powers. Again, after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, several agreements were entered into between the United States and the Soviet Union that aimed at reducing the risk of war through accident or miscalculation or failure of communication.

Even at the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which gave wider currency to the term “confidence-building measure”, the phrase was taken largely to mean mutual agreements between potential adversaries to reduce the risk of unintentional war and thereby the risk of surprise attack. In the context of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, measures sometimes referred to as

“first generation confidence-building measures” have an essentially military connotation and relate to the situation in Europe—the region of the world with the highest concentration of nuclear and conventional armaments and armed forces. The measures of the Final Act are related to exchanges of military information, and notification and observation of out-of-garrison military activities. They are overt measures undertaken on the basis of reciprocity to supplement national technical means of information gathering. Follow-up discussions and negotiations in the context of European security and co-operation have been concerned with second- or new-generation confidence-building measures, which are militarily more significant because they focus on restraint in military postures and in deployment of weapons.

In the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE), which resulted in the Stockholm Document of 1986, commitments were assumed that went well beyond the modest measures contained in the Final Act—such as constraining provisions and lower thresholds for notification of military activities. They are also politically binding, with adequate forms of verification. But, measures such as 42-day prior notification for movement of troops and tanks above a prescribed threshold, the exchange of annual forecasts of notifiable activities, on-site inspections etc., though registering an advance, are primarily an extension of confidence-building measures in the military context. The *sine qua non* of both categories of confidence-building measures is that they do not limit or reduce force levels and weaponry, but merely serve to diminish the role of military establishments in relations among States and to clear up misperceptions about them. The objective is stabilisation of the *status quo* between actual and potential adversaries. They do not address the level of militarisation or resolve conflicts, although they may improve the atmosphere, thereby facilitating arms control negotiations.

The last stage, or what could be described as the third generation of confidence-building measures, has arrived with the initiation, in March 1989 in Vienna, of two sets of negotiations, to be conducted simultaneously, on both confidence- and security-building measures and on conventional armed forces in Europe, the latter involving only the members of the military alliances. While the first set will deal with issues of openness, predictability and confidence-building that go beyond the Stockholm Document and apply to the zone that stretches from the Atlantic to the Urals, the second set will address the issue of

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asymmetries in conventional forces and mutual reductions.

It is with good reason that this development has been seen the world over as a watershed in the post-war era. A major difference in the substance and ambiance of the negotiations is now perceived, as earlier efforts did not address the issue of the reduction of hardware and troop levels and did not, of course, reflect the degree of relaxation of tension that currently exists between the two competing military or political and ideological camps. The term "a common European home" is now frequently heard. The sense of elemental change is underway in Europe and is a development of world significance, as Europe was the home of the cold war, which was carried to all parts of the globe, and a relaxation in Europe heralds relaxation in tensions in other parts of the globe as well. This is, therefore, an opportune time to consider evaluating the term "confidence-building measures" in a global context rather than in its hitherto largely European context.

In the wake of the evolution of the Helsinki process and of debates in various forums of the United Nations and in studies carried out by it, the understanding of confidence-building measures has broadened to include non-military aspects of reducing tension and risk of war, which embrace political, economic and social measures. The United Nations *Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures* states that "the final objective of confidence-building measures is to strengthen international peace and security and to contribute to the development of confidence, better understanding and more stable relations between nations, thus creating and improving the conditions for fruitful international co-operation."

Security has to be understood in a holistic or total sense, in terms not only of limitation of arms or prudent safeguards against their use but also of a function and consequence of the global political and economic environment and the degree of co-operation between States. Progress in the military area needs to be buttressed by an expansion of fruitful global endeavours in the economic, commercial, social and scientific spheres, so that confidence is built in the fulfilment of the vision of a common human home free of militarily or ideologically-based or economically inequitable divisions. Today, all nations are increasingly linked in a complex network of mutual dependency on trade, the availability and flow of resources, development, energy, raw materials, monetary exchanges and protection of the environment. Societies cannot retreat behind political borders and escape economic

stresses and other factors impinging on social well-being or on larger perceptions of national security. Solutions are attainable only through enlightened, intensified and multilateral efforts and a perception that the structure of international co-operation has to be restructured to the benefit and true security of all States.

Crucial considerations that go to the core of what constitutes the healthy growth of societies cannot be viewed as digressions from, or as being tangential to, the objectives of forming confidence-building measures. The concept of confidence-building measures, which initially addressed symptoms, must evolve politically until it can attack the roots of the malady, whether they exist in minds or in the hard facts of the total interrelationships of nations.

The study on confidence-building measures in Africa sponsored by UNIDIR states:

“Tensions and armed conflicts in the Third World have varied causes. Apart from historical, political and ideological causes, social and economic factors are important and are often the dominant causes of tensions and conflicts within and among States. The economic and social security of a State is as important as military security. A State that cannot deliver economic and social goods to its citizenry is as vulnerable as a State whose external defences are inadequate.... Conversely, a viable economy can be a source of stability and an incentive for co-operation in the region. Apart from the economic gains of regional co-operation, common endeavours can provide a framework and a forum for defusing discords, engendering mutual trust, and promoting regional security arrangements. Regional co-operation does, therefore, provide an opportunity for developing an array of military and non-military confidence-building measures.

The climate for progress on regional confidence-building measures will be affected by the global issues indicated above. Though the interdependence of the global and regional dimensions is inextricable, there is significant scope for regional initiatives, allowing for the different conditions and circumstances prevailing in each region and the peculiarities of each situation. It can be generally recognised that there are factors within regions which can make significant contributions towards confidence-building among the nations of the regions concerned. Regional arrangements, whether political, economic or technical, can contribute in different ways to the establishment of a favourable climate

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for mutually beneficial co-operation, on the basis of the principles governing durable confidence-building measures: refraining from the use or threat of use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention in internal affairs, adoption of a co-operative approach in resolving regional and international issues, sovereign equality, and fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law. Political systems that are free and open and characterised by the exercise of democracy by the people and by the rule of law provide a promising and co-operative setting for constructive regional interaction. However, it has to be recognised that regional specificity makes any attempt to establish a universal prescription impractical except in relation to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. A region's suitability for a specific measure depends primarily on the initiatives of the States concerned, the degree of prior consultation among them and the nature of the measure envisaged. An evaluation of its suitability will depend on the security perceptions of the States of the region and will take into account the scope and adequacy of the proposed measures. Progress in accordance with a region's specific requirements in confidence-building measures goes hand-in-hand with global talks on confidence-building among nations, as improvements at a regional level do have a benign impact on global security and stability.

Confidence-building measures are inseparable from prevailing military doctrines as these doctrines set the limit to the progress that can be achieved and to the meaningful and lasting reduction of tensions. A military doctrine based on the theory of deterrence, for instance, postulates the inevitability of hostile or adversarial relations. Within such a doctrine, confidence-building measures can be seen only in the context of potential damage containment, reduction of the risk of war by accident or miscalculation and limits to competitive rearmament. They cannot reach out to a new mode of peaceful coexistence in an essentially non-violent world order—which is the only guarantee of lasting peace. The theory of deterrence, even deterrence frozen at lower levels, still contains seeds of rearmament as it tries to manage the symptom and not the hostile nature of inter-State relations which gives rise to it.

To be truly curative, confidence-building measures need to address the causative situation and not merely its manifestations, although the latter approach is a useful starting-point in inducing a constructive attitude among potential belligerents. Confidence-building measures cannot be detached from the larger issues of military and security

philosophy, the concept of the freer movement of people and ideas, the rule of law, the universal principle of human rights, the spirit of coexistence within a plurality of social and political systems, equitable global economic management and a belief in the attainability of a common human home.

The destructive potential of human inventiveness has so far outpaced any evolution in our ethical or moral responsibility for our own good—or, indeed, self-preservation—that conventional restraints have become outmoded tools for the reconfiguration of a world order based on truly civilised values. Indeed, so deeply has cynicism seeped into our minds, it has become difficult to point to these redemptive prescriptions, which represent the antithesis of the destructive potential, without self-consciousness, embarrassment at appearing idealistic or fear of a charge of naivety. It is, therefore, refreshing to encounter a thinker not stricken by the poverty of ideas or one who presents “realistic” recipes as wise counsel. According to a recent *New York Times* review of the book *A Strategy for Peace—Human Values and the Threat of War* by Sissela Bok, the famous ethicist offers “moral constraint as a foundation for an effort to avert war”. Ms. Bok believes that a beginning can be made by cutting back on activities such as terrorism and cheating on arms agreements that clearly violate fundamental moral standards by encouraging policies that restore confidence between nations. According to the review, the author envisages confidence-building measures that go beyond the military definition of the term to embrace domestic policies aimed at safeguarding religious and political freedom. “Her thesis”, states the reviewer, “is that nations cannot hope to relax tensions internationally without relaxing tension internally.”

The primary responsibility of the United Nations, as the world organisation founded on an enlightened and universal Charter, is the maintenance of international peace and security and the development of friendly relations among nations. This responsibility coincides with the basic objective of confidence-building measures. Accordingly, the United Nations should have an important role to play in identification, promotion and implementation of confidence-building measures that have a global impact and are of universal concern, especially those relating to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In addition, an international verification capability and the development of a comprehensive data base could be useful aids in promoting confidence-building measures.

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At the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in June 1988, India put forward an action plan for ushering in a nuclear weapon free and non-violent world order. The plan addresses the disarmament challenge before the world in its totality and the interdependence of its various elements. It urges the world community to consider, in parallel with the disarmament process, the changes in doctrines, policies, attitudes and institutions that would be required to usher in and manage a non-violent world order free of nuclear weapons. The plan is comprehensive and, although within a suggested time-frame, takes a stage-by-stage approach, with every stage building up confidence towards a subsequent stage in the search for general and complete disarmament under verifiable international control. At each stage, a series of collateral measures are visualised that would serve to prepare the ground for concrete disarmament measures during subsequent stages. During the first stage, these include negotiation of a convention to outlaw the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons, development of guidelines in respect of new technologies with potential military applications, discussion on security doctrines and acceptance of the principle of an integrated multilateral verification system under the aegis of the United Nations.

In subsequent stages these are built upon and concretised in specific and binding agreements. In the final stage, it is possible to visualise a new structure of international relations based not on the outmoded concept of the balance of power but upon the principles of peaceful coexistence and the Charter of the United Nations and with institutional mechanisms necessary to establish and promote a comprehensive global security system. The action plan can be seen as the ultimate confidence-building measure on a global scale. The plan is based on the belief that humanity can thrive only through a vision and an acknowledgement of universal responsibility and participation. Otherwise, the divisions that have fractured our common human home may never be bridged. The plan is based upon optimism that the collective will of humanity can take the path of common salvation and reject that of despair. The palpable sense in the world, today, that many developments are taking place which show that wisdom and not self-destructiveness will prevail—hopefully augurs well for a universal vision.

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## MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL APPROACHES TO DISARMAMENT

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A truly multilateral approach to issues of disarmament is relatively recent. It coincided with the founding of the United Nations in 1945. A world emerging from the most devastating conflict in history realised deeply the need to prevent the recurrence of a general resort to arms and therefore the need also to control and regulate globally the possession and use of armaments so that humanity would never again suffer the tragedy of war. The atomic weapon came into being soon after the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations. The demonstration of its enormous destructive power in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States spurred the USSR to acquire a similar capability. This served only to reinforce the universal desire to conquer the destructive potential of this new and awesome weapon. The very first resolution adopted by the General Assembly related to the control of atomic weapons. An Atomic Energy Commission was established to channel nuclear power exclusively for peaceful purposes and the Commission considered several far-reaching proposals towards this end in the early years.

But, the two Powers which emerged dominant from the Second World War once again, sought to preserve their national security and extend their influence through the possession and development of armaments. The stage was thus set for a steadily escalating arms race.

Since the nuclear weapon, with its global threat to security, constitutes the single most important new reality of the post-war period, the non-aligned nations took the initiative to have convened in 1978 the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Uppermost in their minds was the question whether or not nations, with the development of the nuclear weapon, had the

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sovereign right to wage war in which it could possibly be used. The Final Document, adopted by consensus at that special session, represents the most far-reaching global consensus on arms control and disarmament ever achieved. This was epitomised in the following words: “Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation”.

The Final Document set the principles for Disarmament, thus fulfilling one of the aims of the Charter. It approved a programme of action, which was quite specific with regard to initial measures to be taken in the nuclear field and included objectives relating to other weapons of mass destruction as well as conventional weapons and armed forces. It established machinery for multilateral deliberations and negotiations. The Final Document further stated that the United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, had a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament and should play a more active role to encourage all disarmament measures—unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral—and should be kept duly informed of all disarmament matters outside its aegis without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

It is a matter of profound regret that the hope and promise embodied in the Final Document of that first special session has not been realised. Despite the ideals of disarmament proclaimed at the United Nations, the basic impulse for the policies of States, large and small, has continued to be provided by real or imagined threats to national security. The United Nations collective security system, which proved too fragile in the face of the East-West confrontation, has also contributed to this state of affairs. This has led to the popular belief that the United Nations has failed to make any meaningful contribution to arms control and disarmament.

Such an assessment, it should-be recognised, is only superficially true. Indeed the declarations, resolutions, programmes of action and decisions adopted by the General Assembly have created a whole new body of international norms regarding the arms race, particularly in its nuclear dimension. These norms have exercised, at the very least, a moral influence on the conduct of States, including major Powers. Today, even those Governments which adhere to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence acknowledge the desirability of eliminating nuclear weapons and preventing their use. No one denies that the global expenditure of some \$1000 billion annually on armaments and military forces, besides

lowering the threshold of war, seriously weakens the ability of the world to tackle and eliminate the hunger, disease and underdevelopment plaguing two thirds of mankind. Finally, debates in the United Nations have helped to clarify the security perceptions and policies of States and have thereby influenced the evolution of the agreements on arms control and disarmament achieved so far.

Yet, there is substance also in the assertion that, in concrete terms, bilateral and/or other restricted forums are providing more efficient mechanisms for concluding arms control and disarmament agreements. But, this should be neither unexpected nor disappointing. The multilateral approach is not in competition with the bilateral or vice versa. The one does not contradict the other. Nor are the two mutually exclusive. The multilateralism that the United Nations makes possible is the indispensable adjunct of bilateralism. There is, indeed, a complex interaction between them, which should lead to a mutually supportive relationship. In short, both are relevant since both respond to actual requirements. Both contribute to bringing about an environment from which the two approaches, together or separately, can derive benefit. Perhaps at one period in time the multilateral approach will have the greater relevance and at another the more restricted. But, each is necessary in view of the functions it fulfils.

This point becomes clear when placed in the context of specific weapons. Given, for example, the recent use of chemical weapons and the relative ease with which a chemical weapons capability can be acquired, the need for a universal ban on those weapons can only be negotiated in a multilateral forum. A restricted forum would not serve the purpose of a universally applicable prohibition. Similarly, while negotiations to limit, reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons initially may be profitably conducted in restricted forums, when the stage is reached where prohibitions are sought to be universally applied the restricted approach will have to give over to a multilateral approach. As another example, a nuclear test ban can only be negotiated multilaterally even though partial steps towards limiting the number of explosions or their yields may have been negotiated between some or all of the five nuclear weapon States. The verification regime for such a ban, to ensure universal compliance, can only be negotiated multilaterally.

Arms control and disarmament is a complex, complicated undertaking. To carry it forward requires, apart from great patience, a

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comprehensive, multi-faceted approach. Such an approach has to encompass the nuclear as well as the conventional weapons aspects of the arms race. It must traverse the regional path simultaneously with the global. Since there is no quick fix which will result in a nuclear-free or conflict-free world, it must grapple with managing in the interim the existence of armaments armed forces and conflict situations. It must follow the path of confidence-building, conflict resolution and reinforcement of confidence in the provisions of the Charter. All this cannot take place either exclusively multilaterally or exclusively bilaterally. The disarmament process has to be taken in hand at both levels and additionally through other available options apart from either the multilateral or the bilateral approaches.

At this point, the potential dynamics of a regional approach may be elaborated in somewhat greater detail, since up until now it has not received due attention. In addition to the global arms race, particularly its nuclear aspect which primarily involves the two major alliances, there are other races taking place in many regions of the globe. For a large number of States, perceived threats to their security emanate from within the region. The genesis of these threats lies in unresolved territorial disputes, ambitions for regional dominance, military intervention, etc. In fact, it lies in a great variety of factors, but most of them have primarily regional relevance. Many States have, thus, chosen to exercise the option to develop their own military strength in order to meet these threats. Given the fact that the primary impetus for the pursuit of a policy of military superiority comes from the real or perceived capabilities of neighbouring States or from situations, actual or potential, in the immediate geo-political area, it is the regional approach which offers the most realistic prospect for progress. The security concerns of States, and consequently the reasons for their acquisition of arms of course differ from situation to situation and from region to region. Only regional measures, therefore, can best reflect the specific conditions and particular requirements of different areas. In short, since the incentives for regional military buildups come largely from regional factors, agreements derived through regional approaches are well worth striving for. It might even be possible in some cases to achieve more far-reaching agreements on disarmament and related measures on a regional basis than could be obtained on a global scale.

To conclude, disarmament as we approach the twenty-first century has come to be universally accepted as a highly worthwhile objective.

This is so for a variety of reasons. Increased armaments do not lead to enhanced security, and, thus, they entail wasteful expenditures at the national level. At the global level, the present military expenditure of \$1000 billion annually serves to distort the global economy by weakening it structurally and at the same time taking scarce resources away from such urgent concerns as the alleviation of poverty, disease and illiteracy among two thirds of mankind. Reducing the expenditure on armaments through arms control and disarmament agreements is thus not only desirable but necessary. The bilateral approach is beginning to demonstrate renewed strength and dynamism. This is how it should be. The USSR and the United States, as the two largest military Powers, have the primary responsibility for moving towards disarmament. But, this does not pose any threat to the multilateral approach. In this regard, fears that, because the bilateral approach is beginning to produce results, multilateral forums may be rendered irrelevant are misplaced. The multilateral approach remains relevant and, in the final analysis, indispensable.

At the most recent special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, a determined effort was made to construct a comprehensive approach to disarmament issues. In such an approach, the bilateral and the multilateral negotiations would perform, as they must, mutually supportive roles. These would encompass nuclear as well as conventional weapons. Simultaneously, disarmament negotiations would be pursued also at the regional level. Concurrently, there would be equally determined efforts at conflict resolution, confidence-building and a host of other collateral measures, with a continued emphasis on the imperative need for States to adhere strictly to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations in the conduct of inter-State relations. Only a comprehensive package, it was widely felt at that session, could respond to the present complex challenges in the field of disarmament. At the conceptual level, the comprehensive approach did not have many detractors. However, the international community had not quite reached the point where a finely tuned, concrete, comprehensive package capable of commanding consensus could be assembled. But, time may not be far away when such a package will become possible.

We are on the threshold of a new chapter in history. We are witnessing a steady and irreversible approach of a new age. We cannot and must not fight this historical current. With the global trend towards easing of tensions we have a more stable, a more peaceful, a safer world within our grasp.

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## SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

We highly appreciate the fact that our seminar has been convened by the United Nations on Japanese soil, the country of the rising sun, famous for its cordiality and hospitality throughout the world. The Japanese people—for whom the horror of atomic bombing is not an abstract vision at all but a hard historical reality—make a great contribution to maintaining peace and strengthening the United Nations, and to the World Disarmament Campaign as a major factor conducive to the success of this forum.

Here, in a country which is in the thick of both world developments and rapid evolutionary processes that go on in the Asian-Pacific region, there exists a particularly keen awareness of the need for fresh conceptual and practical parameters of security adequate to the realities of today's interdependent and indivisible world and to the potential of joint creative work and co-development of States in the nuclear and space age. It is probably here, where ancient and modern times blend together, that the urgent need for a comprehensive approach to international peace and security manifests itself most graphically in all areas—military, political, environmental, economic and humanitarian. The establishment on this basis of a world order resting on the freedom of choice and the balance of interests would not only guarantee the survival of mankind in the third and all subsequent millennia, but also ensure the dynamic progress of civilisation. What is it that reinforces the growing belief of the world community that this is the right and realistic way to conduct world affairs and that a wide-ranging and non-confrontational dialogue on ways to build a safe, less armed and, later, a fully nuclear-free and non-violent world has a promising future? It is surely the level of the world community's intellectual, political, and humanitarian maturity, the level of internationalisation and manageability in international processes, the acuteness and urgency of global problems which threaten all peoples and, finally, it is the concrete, positive changes that are happening in world affairs right before our eyes.

What is the relationship between security and disarmament? Today, it is not so much an academic, but, increasingly, a practical question. In our interdependent world of today, disarmament, which helps maintain security in military terms, is no longer security's sole component, nor is it a universal guarantor of peace. Mankind's survival is also threatened by other—non-military—perils such as environmental degradation, famine, underdevelopment, and foreign debt crises, among

other things. At the same time, one is bound to see that the knot of security problems is tied so tightly that without enduring military security and peaceful coexistence of States all the other questions simply do not lend themselves to resolution either politically, psychologically or physically. Disarmament can provide both physical assurance of peace and a major source of prospective resources for international and national economic and social programmes.

Over recent years, new political thinking, the elimination of confrontational stereotypes and a search for a balance of interests have made it possible to enhance confidence, to improve the international situation and to make drastic progress in the strengthening of global security in its principal area, that of disarmament. The increasingly dynamic reductions in military arsenals have proved basic to the positive changes that have made it possible definitely to ward off the military threat and to redirect the course of world affairs away from confrontation and towards co-operation, understanding and negotiation.

In fact, we are all witness and party to a new security model that has just begun to be built, not through military buildup as has always been the case previously, but, and in contrast, through arms reductions on a mutually acceptable basis. The security through disarmament principle, that was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament, is gaining currency. The Soviet Union and the United States have concluded a historic treaty to eliminate their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and these two classes of nuclear weapons are being destroyed. The way has been cleared for a convention prohibiting and eliminating chemical weapons. All the necessary conditions are to be finalised now. A treaty on 50 per cent cuts in Soviet and United States strategic offensive arms, to be made in the context of preserving the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty, has reached an advanced stage of preparation. The initial outlines of common approaches are beginning to emerge at the negotiations on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe. Talks have started towards agreement on a new set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation between the two major military alliances.

As a result, a new historical reality is taking shape—a switch-over from overarmament to reasonable sufficiency, rendering the military doctrines of States defensive in scope and limiting their armed forces through clearly defined defence needs. What is important is that use

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should be made of all channels—multilateral and bilateral, mutual and unilateral—for restructuring the military component of the security of States. All barriers dividing multilateral and bilateral efforts should be removed and their constructive parallelism ensured.

Matching its words with deeds, the Soviet Union has undertaken a series of major unilateral steps to revise its military doctrine to render it unambiguously defensive. During 1989-1990, the Soviet armed forces will be reduced by 500,000 men, or 12 per cent of their present strength (including those in the Asian part of the country by 260,000 men). The USSR's military budget will be cut by 14.2 per cent, and the output of armaments and military equipment by 19.5 per cent. In addition to the large-scale cuts in the size of its armed forces, their structure will be changed, too. Among other things, the number of army divisions is to be almost halved, and the correlation between offensive and defensive systems is to be revised. At the same time, the Soviet Union is not engaged in modernising its tactical nuclear missiles, and it has plans to reduce the output of weapons-grade fissionable materials. In the near future it will publish data on its defense budget, which is a matter a new Supreme Soviet of the USSR is to deal with. Initial steps are being made in selectively converting military production in the USSR in order to use a part of it for civilian needs. The Soviet allies in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, too, will make substantial cuts in their armed forces, armaments and military spending. All these measures will provide an impetus to disarmament and offer great opportunities for extricating world politics from the fetters of hostility and militarism and for a switch-over from a weapons-making economy to a disarmament economy.

Of course, *perestroika* in world affairs cannot be divorced from the situation in the Asian-Pacific region, from the settlement of military conflicts there and the stage-by-stage development of co-operation, confidence-building and reduction of armed forces and armaments. Protecting the entire planet against nuclear catastrophe and turning Asia and the Pacific into a zone of peace are, so to say, the two sides of the same coin and two facets of the common interests of all of the neighbouring States in the region.

This is why, in his Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk speeches, Mikhail Gorbachev described a detailed conceptual programme including such matters of military security as curbing the buildup of nuclear weapons, reducing military confrontation in some areas through a freeze on,

and the equal reduction of, naval and air force levels, the limiting of naval and air activities, and the elaboration of accompanying confidence-building measures. I think that these considerations are in line with the national priorities of such States of Asia and the Pacific as Japan, China and the United States, the ASEAN member countries and all the other countries of the region. In the same context, Soviet leaders have offered ideas for co-operation in preserving and developing national traditions.

The foundation for these new types of relations in Asia and Europe should be centred on brand new bilateral relations. The Soviet Union regards complete normalisation of relations with China, transformation of our borders with it into a strip of friendship and good-neighbourliness and the reduction of military confrontation to mutually acceptable lowest levels as one such underpinning. And this should be done not to the detriment of the interests of third countries, but rather for the benefit of the entire world community. Pursuing the same goal, we announced, in agreement with the Government of Mongolia, that we would withdraw three-fourths of the Soviet troops stationed in that country.

The USSR seeks to maintain large-scale good neighbourly relations with Japan which would correspond to the potentials of our two countries and the aspirations of our two peoples. We are prepared to improve mutual understanding, pursue an active political dialogue and overcome the difficulties and differences inherited from the past for the sake of concluding a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty. We are highly appreciative of a permanent mechanism established to consider the matter of a peace treaty and of the agreement on making preparations for Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Japan. The time is now for us to turn to a new chapter in our relations in the interest of peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific region and the entire world.

Today, chaos and disorder lead us to a deadlock, whereas learning to shape and direct regional and international communal life jointly now means preserving our civilisation. The countries of the Asian and Pacific region may do much to improve the climate in this part of the world through interaction, negotiation and joint work. In order to take the first step in building new relations in the Asian and Pacific region and in establishing an appropriate negotiating mechanism, the Soviet Union proposed holding a meeting of ministers for foreign affairs from the States of the region. At the same time, the USSR naturally does not

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regard its set of initiatives as the final recipe for solving all of the problems arising in this region. At issue are the initiation of a far-reaching and unbiased dialogue and the collective adjustment of the balance of interests shared by all of regional participants.

On the whole, it is not an exaggeration to say that today all the efforts towards building positive security, based on political and legal instruments rather than military force for settling emerging problems, clearly flow together along a single path of universal human reason. International co-operation makes use of the potential of co-creativity through: internationalising the efforts made in disarmament; taking mutually complementary measures to reduce military arsenals, build confidence and establish verification; and enhancing the role and prestige of the United Nations in demilitarising planetary consciousness and life.

Undoubtedly, the United Nations has a central role to play in arranging all steps, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, into the single, indivisible progress that the united community of States and nations may make towards a safe and non-violent world. The current rebirth of the Organisation, which is manifested, above all, in the fruitful performance of its peace-making functions in settling regional conflicts, cannot bypass disarmament either. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar, has every reason to underline that the international community articulate its political consciousness through the United Nations and, therefore, "Not only the mathematics of the arms equation and its economic cost, but also the attitudes of the world beyond factors behind this process".

It is essential to consolidate these new trends, make them irreversible and maintain and increase the momentum of the negotiating mechanisms. We are prepared to enter into relations of partnership with the new United States Administration. We proceed from the evident need to ensure positive continuity in disarmament and to continue and expand our dialogue without any letup or backpedalling in all key matters relating to the limitation and reduction of military arsenals.

The Soviet Union, the United States, China and Japan as well as all other States, both nuclear and non-nuclear, big and small, are actively involved in efforts aimed at attaining understanding and searching for solutions, and they have gained significant experience in the area of bilateral and multilateral ties. The moral human factor in world politics has gained drastically in influence. The involvement of broad segments

of the public in running international affairs expands the scope of the internationalisation process. The massive support lent by peoples to security through disarmament efforts, with the active involvement of the concerned Japanese public—which has recently made itself felt with fresh vigour—inspires us with confidence that these efforts have a great future.

In the months and years ahead, the world will be facing many important issues, including questions of economics, finance and development, strengthening international political co-operation, and protection of the environment. But, among these is one great overarching issue, the preservation of peace and freedom. It is fitting, therefore, that security and arms control be the keystone at the top of the agenda at this Conference. Arms control and disarmament almost automatically come to mind when security policy is discussed. This is only natural.

Indeed, no issue in recent years has captured so much attention and so often been a focal point of hopes and fears as arms control. Yet, surely, history and common sense tell us that no one facet of foreign and security policy can either be the panacea for, or the cause of, all the world's ills. Arms control represents neither the devil's own handiwork nor the Holy Grail. It is an important element of that part of foreign policy whose objective is the maintenance of both peace and freedom. But, arms control cannot by itself lead to that objective. It cannot operate independently of the other elements of security policy.

The goal of stability, of peace in freedom, which the United States seeks from its security policy, must for the foreseeable future be founded on a credible deterrent and defence. That in turn requires the right amount of the right kind of arms fitted into a strategic and tactical doctrine which, along with public support, makes that goal attainable.

Arms control can reinforce deterrence and defence. It can help emphasise systems which increase stability over destabilising ones; it can help reduce the risk of crisis degenerating into war. But, it cannot by itself deter war or create a defence.

Nor can arms control and disarmament be expected to achieve the impossible. While arms control can help restrain the spread and development of nuclear weapons, it cannot disinvent them. Arms control and defence policy must therefore be based on the premise that nuclear weapons will either continue to exist or, at a minimum, be capable of being reintroduced into national arsenals. Arms control and defence/deterrence policy are not in opposition to one another, but rather are

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inextricably intertwined. From our perspective, both must and can be focused on the same result: maintaining peace and freedom. With a proper mix of arms control and defence initiatives, it is possible to continue to fashion a security policy that achieves that result.

Just as arms control properly applied can contribute towards the maintenance of stability and reinforce peace and freedom, so the failure to recognise its limitations can have the opposite effect. At a minimum, arms are at least in part a reflection of deeper political problems. Arms can intensify those problems, but as long as the problems remain unresolved, it is unlikely that arms control alone will resolve them or that the nations concerned will in fact disarm. Indeed, an argument can be made, based on empirical evidence, that the chances for arms control are low when tensions run high.

It is expecting too much of arms control to believe that agreements on weapons will of themselves change relationships among States. It is expecting too little of arms control, however, not to recognise that it can, in conjunction with defence policy, help make relations among States more manageable, more stable and less dangerous.

Last year we successfully completed the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). Those negotiations took six years. The INF issue itself was on the international agenda for many years before the actual negotiations began. It took time. But, patience, perseverance, realism and solidarity with our allies bore fruit.

Today, we have embarked on a new set of negotiations and will re-embark on others which we have been dealing with in recent years. Indeed, a full panoply of arms control negotiations, nuclear, chemical and conventional, along with the security and political issues which underlie them, await us.

Each of these negotiations will have its own features and will require its own solutions. But, there are some general principles which I believe can be applied to all of them:

- A treaty must be premised on an equal outcome between or among the parties. In this regard, what matters is not who reduces how much of what, but where the sides end up. An unequal outcome is inherently unstable. A party that later concludes that its interests have been damaged by a treaty will sooner or later seek to change the outcome;
- A treaty should deal only with the arms of the parties to the accord. It is not realistic to expect non-parties to a treaty to

accept or abide by its results nor to expect one of the parties to a treaty to consider the arms of a third party as if they were its own;

- An arms control agreement must take geography into account. Many modern arms are mobile and/or transportable. Accordingly-limiting such arms on a regional basis probably will not suffice to ensure a stable outcome. Moreover, shifting arms from one region to another can have a destabilising effect on the region to which the arms are shifted. Thus; with Japan and other Asian nations in mind, the United States, from the outset of the INF negotiations to the achievement of the zero outcome, insisted on a global solution;
- Effective verification is essential to the successful implementation of an agreement, and to ensuring that the process of implementation does not itself become a source of contention;
- Finally, and perhaps most importantly, an arms control treaty in its overall impact should enhance stability and security, and from the United States perspective, strengthen the ability to ensure its continued freedom.

The INF Treaty incorporates these principles in addition to others specific to the INF issue. As a result, I believe the Treaty has excellent prospects for proving itself to be sound and durable and in the interest not only of the two parties to it, and of our allies, but also of the world as a whole. Indeed, the early returns are very encouraging. The initial baseline inspection phase has been successfully completed with good co-operation from both sides. The elimination process is under way. Many short notice, on-site inspections have been conducted. So far so good.

But, we did not obtain these results easily. Here again there are some important lessons to consider. While I approach them from a United States perspective, they could also be more broadly applicable. They include:

- (a) Patience. The initial efforts to deal with the INF question in an arms control context go back to SALT I, almost two decades ago. The problem was not resolved at that stage. The phase of activity which ultimately led to the INF Treaty took about 12 years from the deployment of the first SS-20s to the entry into force of the Treaty;

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- (b) Clear goals. We need to understand what we want to accomplish and where we want to end up. We have to stick to our principles and steel ourselves to recognise that an agreement which does not meet our basic security needs as defined by those principles would not be sound and durable and would be worse than no treaty at all;
  - (c) Tactical flexibility. Within this principled framework, flexibility is essential for a successful outcome. The parties need to be ready for real give and take. The course of negotiation will not be smooth. There is no room for either euphoria or despair;
  - (d) There is no free lunch. We need to recognise the hard fact that we are unlikely to get something for nothing. Any unilateral gift horse needs to be looked over very carefully, especially when even after unilateral reductions a party continues to maintain a significant advantage;
  - (e) Beware of seemingly attractive quick fixes. The issues are technical and complex. For example, had we accepted a freeze in INF, it would not have led to the outcome we achieved. (Indeed, in a revealing interview earlier this year, Soviet arms control negotiator Victor Karpov claimed that former Chancellor Schmidt had suggested a freeze on INF missiles in the mid-1970s. Vice-Minister Karpov went on to characterise the Soviet reaction to that purported offer as follows: "Our conveyor belt was running. The stagnation period was at its height and we thought and acted out of inertia".) Thus, not only would the freeze have been a bad bargaining position for us, but its pursuit with the Soviets would have been a time-consuming dead end;
  - (f) Empathy. Try to understand the other side's limits and requirements. Again give and take and a truly equal outcome are essential to achieving a sound and durable result;
  - (g) Allies matter. Be aware of how a bilateral United States-Soviet agreement impacts on allies. Allied solidarity was crucial to the achievement of the INF Treaty;
  - (h) Understand where the negotiation fits in the overall environment. While tight linkage in my view is not, as a general rule, a useful way to proceed, we need to recognise that no single treaty, nor arms control *per se*, can be the all-encompassing focal point for relations between the United States and the Soviet Union or, for that matter, between States in general.

The final of the above points illustrates why, in considering a proper outcome for one area of arms control, the relationship of that area to other arms control negotiations and to overall defence posture needs to be borne in mind. That is why United States-Soviet summit and ministerial meetings have always had a multi-point agenda: arms control, regional issues, bilateral questions and human rights and, perhaps in the future, transnational issues, such as the environment.

Indeed, the INF negotiations did not take place in a vacuum. While we were completing our work in Geneva, changes were under way in the Soviet Union, changes which no doubt had their impact on the negotiations which in turn must have had an impact on those changes. During this same period, Western Europe, free and at peace, and beginning to discover its new economic and political strength, was moving towards greater unity. Japan, our host country for this Conference, was also developing greater economic strength and deeper recognition of the enhanced political role and responsibility which accompanies such strength.

All of these events are fruits of the success of the West's post-war policy. In combination they are, I think, ushering us into a new era.

In the area of security policy, a number of issues await resolution, both in terms of arms control and with regard to the size and composition of the forces we will need to retain in order to ensure freedom and peace. The successful conclusion of the INF Treaty holds promise as we enter this new era, that with patience, allied solidarity, strength of purpose and tangible evidence on the ground of our willingness to defend ourselves, we can reach agreements with the Soviet Union on other difficult and sensitive subjects.

Whether that promise will be fulfilled depends in part on developments in the Soviet Union. But, in the first instance, it depends on how we and our allies face up to the challenges before us, including how we adjust to the success of our post-war economic, political and security policies.

The greatest challenge we in the industrialised democracies face in this connection is to meet the test of perseverance and balance in a time of change. We must be able simultaneously to work productively for better relations without falling unthinkingly into a state of allowing our earnest desires for reducing, if not eliminating, tensions to become mistaken for the actual achievement of that goal.

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Thus, a strong deterrence and defence policy and a united Western approach will remain essential as we continue to pursue arms control. The INF experience has shown that a demonstration of political will, including moving ahead with new conventional and nuclear weapons systems, is not only necessary for maintaining military stability, but can also improve the prospects for arms control. Deterrence and defence policy must adapt to changes in the threat. It should also adapt to changes in the relative strength of Western nations.

Indeed, we are already urging a Western Europe which is growing stronger and more united as well as our Asian allies to share a greater part of the burden. It is also conceivable that successful negotiations in Vienna on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) could provide the framework for a further adaptation of the North Atlantic alliance to Europe's growing relative strength. We must expect, however, that if our European and Asian partners share more of that burden, as I believe they can and should, they will expect more of a voice in alliance and Western security deliberations.

Yes, success may sometimes be harder to live with than adversity. But, we ought not to fear this. We may differ with some of our allies some of the time on tactics, and occasionally on broad tactics. Nevertheless, I find it inconceivable that we and our allies will differ on fundamental goals—maintaining peace and freedom—or on the basic strategy for attaining those goals, which is a strong deterrence and defence coupled with a willingness to negotiate differences with the East.

But, I do see challenges. Not the least of these is taking account of the changes in the Soviet Union. On balance, I am encouraged by the recent developments in this regard. They hold the promise of a more open society in the Soviet Union and of a more stable relationship between that country and ours.

Nevertheless, the ultimate direction, the dimension, the durability of these changes or of those who are their leading advocates can only be speculated upon. Above all, the beginning of a process and the promise of further improvement must not be confused with the real thing. What is surely the case is that we in the West should not, indeed cannot, ignore the developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Despite the uncertainty, we must take account of what is happening here.

But, also importantly, we should set our own agenda: taking advantage where possible of these developments to strengthen the prospects for peace and freedom, and working to ensure that, regardless of the outcome of developments in the Soviet Union, we will have laid a sounder foundation for a more constructive relationship with that country and with Eastern Europe. In this regard, pressing hard for improved human rights and for arms control agreements which lead to equal outcomes at lower levels which will enhance security and stability come quickly to mind.

President Bush has noted: "Prudence and common sense dictate that we try to understand the full meaning of the change going on there, review our policies and proceed with caution." The President added: "The fundamental fact remains that the Soviet Union retains a very powerful military machine, in the service of objectives which are still too often in conflict with ours. So let us take the new openness seriously. Let us step forward to negotiate. But, let us also be realistic. And let us always be strong."

The Soviet leadership has captured wide attention through its statements claiming a willingness to remove its military advantages and to accept equal lower levels of armed forces. Those who seek to move Western opinion through the Western media should be held to the same rules of the game as Western leaders: words must be followed by deeds or credibility is lost. Thus, I favour putting the Soviets to the type of rigorous negotiating test which was at the heart of the INF talks. With the CFE negotiations now under way, a test of this kind will not be long in coming.

Our experience with the INF negotiations should be helpful in this regard. For example, over the past few months, the Soviet Union and some of the Eastern European nations have been responding positively, albeit thus far only verbally, to legitimate Western concerns over the Warsaw Treaty countries' vast preponderance in conventional forces in Europe, most particularly their ability to launch short notice attacks.

We have yet to see all the fine print, let alone the final results, but the announced cuts could be significant. However, they would not remove the large Soviet and Warsaw Treaty advantages in manpower and firepower.

The Soviet Union initially characterised these announced reductions as unilateral, and in keeping with the "correlation" of forces. They

also related them to the need to improve their economic situation. They specifically did not ask NATO to take similar unilateral steps. After making the announcements of unilateral reductions, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Treaty published their own data on the balance of forces between them and NATO. The publication of the data was in itself welcome. It followed years of Western efforts to persuade them to join NATO in making such data available. The Warsaw Treaty data showed that they had a preponderance in key areas of offensive weaponry—less than our figures indicated, but still significant. But, the Warsaw Treaty also attempted to show the existence of an overall rough equivalence.

While reaching that purported conclusion, but having also previously announced unilateral cuts (implicitly acknowledging Soviet and Warsaw Treaty advantages), and with the CFE negotiations soon to open, the Soviet and Warsaw Treaty side was constrained to shift ground lest they undermine their negotiating position. Thus, in an attempt to improve their opening bargaining position at the CFE talks, they began to call upon NATO also to take unilateral cuts.

This kind of manoeuvre is well known in negotiations. I mention it therefore only to show that we must look beyond rhetoric and to underscore that the arrival of *glasnost* and *perestroika* does not mark the departure of Soviet efforts to gain negotiating and security advantages.

It is after all up to us to apply the principles and lessons learned from INF. It is up to us not to allow clever public relations to focus our attention on the process of reductions (the “how much is each side cutting”) rather than on the end result (the “where do the sides end up”).

Of course, we should not churlishly dismiss unilateral cuts, especially if, when carried out, they could lead to a significant reduction of asymmetries. Indeed, the Soviet side should be held to them. After all, it benefited from the positive headlines when they were announced, thus it ought to produce the promised result on the promised unilateral premise.

But, the fact remains that in the absence of a concrete treaty, including solid verification provisions, we cannot be assured that what was promised has actually happened or that what was unilaterally offered will not be unilaterally rescinded. In short, until we have the fully detailed reductions and verification commitments signed and sealed

in treaty form and fully implemented, we do not really have them. And until we have them in hand, obviously via a negotiating process of real and mutual give and take, of bilateral concessions leading to an equal outcome, it would be foolhardy for us to make any unilateral concessions.

As the negotiations open on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, NATO must also face the related question of what to do about its aging shorter-range nuclear forces (SNF). With ranges below 500 kilometres (310 miles), SNF's main function is to deter war by offsetting Soviet conventional forces. Both sides agreed not to cover SNF in the INF Treaty. The Soviet Union has have been modernising its SNF and by its own account has an enormous preponderance in this area: 11.8 to 1 in short-range rocket and ballistic missile launchers.

It is widely agreed in NATO that a third zero solution covering SNF would not be in the alliance's interest since it would loosen the link between the United States and Europe and weaken the Organisation's ability to deter a conventional attack. But, moving to lower numbers of SNF—and despite Soviet preponderance in this area we have already removed some 2,400 nuclear weapons from Europe since 1979—and attaining enhanced security are compatible goals. A successful conventional arms control negotiation and the restructuring of NATO's SNF, resulting in a significant further reduction in the numbers of nuclear systems in Europe, could indeed produce such a result.

If and when recent Soviet words regarding cuts in military production and armed forces; willingness to accept equal, lower conventional force ceilings; promises to improve human rights; and calls for lowering regional tensions turn to deeds—as they have done in the case of INF and Afghanistan and, to some extent, on human rights—I expect we can make even further progress. We will need to move carefully and negotiate firmly—as we did in INF—but in such a climate we will be able to move.

So, there is a great deal to be done. We have to be cautious, realistic, and balanced in our approach. The results of the INF experience demonstrate that such an approach can achieve positive results for the United States, its allies and overall world security interests. INF also demonstrated that achieving a solid arms control agreement with the Soviet Union is a long and difficult process. But, INF demonstrated that it can done.

Thus, we should not fail to hope, but neither should we allow our hopes for the future to cloud our view of the reality we still face today. Indeed the best chance for making those hopes come true is to face the realities squarely and act accordingly.

The principles we applied to the INF negotiations, and the lessons we learned from that successful endeavour along with the determination to accept only an outcome which strengthens peace and freedom and the will to back that up with deployments on the ground, a sense of realism, and solidarity with our allies—all of these together—will help guide and underpin us as we set about the task of realising our hopes for a peaceful, free and truly democratic world.

# 11

## EFFECT OF PERESTROIKA ON DISARMAMENT STRATEGY

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A strategy for disarmament should be designed to outline the prospects for, and the main stages leading to, a reversal of the arms race and the reduction and elimination of means of waging war. It should mirror the character of society, its human and international values, and its desire to avoid the insane waste of resources, and it should find rational ways of achieving security by political means.

After April 1985, a number of quite new elements were incorporated into Soviet disarmament strategy. It became an integral part of the profound renewal of Soviet society and an expression of the philosophy, programme and practice of *perestroika*.

What effect has *perestroika* had on the strategy for disarmament, on the assessment of the possibilities, ways and means of implementing it and on the approaches to solving specific problems in this field? It should be said at the outset that intensive discussions on the main problems of security, defence and disarmament have become an indissoluble part of the reforms sweeping various sectors of Soviet society. Many representatives of the military, political and scientific communities are taking part in these discussions. An analysis of these discussions leads to two conclusions. First, Soviet policy is in the throes of a dynamic, creative search for concrete ways and means of building a new structure of international security based on the absence of threats and on fruitful co-operation among all members of the world community. Secondly, for all the nuances and divergences in the views expressed, it may be stated with confidence that there is a broad consensus in Soviet society with regard to the completely new elements introduced into the disarmament strategy during the period 1985-1990, which are reviewed below.

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## **Basic Means of Achieving Security**

Disarmament has taken a higher place in the scale of priorities concerning security policy. This naturally follows from the new political and military thinking and from the concept of universal security proposed by the USSR, which is characterised, among other things, by the following principles: political methods for achieving security should have unconditional priority; national security is integrally linked with the strengthening of global security; the security of some States cannot be achieved at the expense of others; security is universal in nature, embracing all regions of the world, and must be ensured through demilitarisation and the humanisation of international relations, based on the authority and capabilities of the United Nations; and the military component of security, which in present circumstances continues to retain its importance, must be confined to reasonable sufficiency for defence. The Soviet concept of security holds that, in the military field, the primary focus should be on ensuring genuine progress in limiting armaments and achieving disarmament and on ensuring continuity and consistency in the disarmament process, thereby providing truly substantial guarantees of security. Accordingly, the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, the country's highest organ of State power, declared in its message to the peoples of the world, adopted on 10 June 1989 at its first session, that the USSR intended in its foreign policy to adhere strictly to the principles based on the new political thinking.

The President of the USSR, M. S. Gorbachev, in his speech at the third special session of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR on 15 March 1990, was the first to express unconditional support for political methods of achieving security and to outline the country's defence policy based on the principles of reasonable sufficiency.

That expanded the basis for devising innovative approaches to lowering the level of military confrontation and to achieving disarmament. It thus became possible to begin taking certain unilateral measures for curbing arms, and also to put forward a set of proposals for the radical reduction and elimination of weapons on a reciprocal basis in the main areas of disarmament.

## **Principle of Cardinal Solutions**

Unlike those dating from the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, the new Soviet proposals are characterised by their emphasis on cardinal, rather than partial, solutions. Formerly, despite the USSR's official

pronouncements in favour of radical disarmament, its practical approach often provided for marginal, insignificant limitations and reductions.

In the period of *perestroika*, the Soviet Union has argued that separate agreements, however important, are not enough, and that there is a need to move on a broad front, consistently and vigorously, not hesitating to take bold steps to ban and eliminate whole classes of weapons. This principle is embodied in the comprehensive disarmament programme set forth in the statement by Gorbachev on 15 January 1986. This programme provides for the complete and universal elimination by the end of this century of nuclear and chemical weapons, the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons, and the lowering of States' military potential to the limits of reasonable sufficiency.

It also provides for new, radical measures to strengthen international confidence, ensure reliable security in Europe, Asia and elsewhere, and reduce military expenditure, with the reallocation of resources derived from disarmament to the solving of global problems and the raising of living standards. The statement of 15 January 1986 provides a stable, long-term basis for further initiatives in favour of disarmament and security. Yet, the statement is not a fixed dogma or peremptory directive; it is a general guide for moving towards the set goal. In the spirit called for by the new thinking, it has been corrected, supplemented and amended, with account being taken of realities and practical politics.

One example of these cardinal solutions was the USSR-United States Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), signed in Washington on 8 December 1987. For the first time, a mutual decision was taken actually to destroy weapons of mass destruction in significant numbers (a total of more than 2,500 missiles). Two classes of nuclear weapons are being completely struck out of the military balance. Unlike the weapons in former agreements, all of these weapons are being destroyed, a step which *ipso facto* removes the usual problems of monitoring established ceilings and regulating modernisation.

Also slated for destruction are the launchers and their ancillary equipment and structures. In future, no missiles of these classes will be produced. The principle of cardinal solutions is also reflected, *inter alia*, in the Soviet proposals for drastic cuts in Soviet and American strategic offensive weapons and their eventual elimination, for the universal banning of chemical weapons and for the speedy conclusion in the Conference on Disarmament of the drafting of the corresponding

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convention, as well as in the Soviet proposal for a programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world by the year 2000.

### **Taking Account of Mutual Concerns**

In the Soviet Union's latest approach to disarmament questions, special attention is given to ensuring that at no stage of disarmament will the danger arise where the security of either side is undermined. For example, the American side underscores its special concern about the existence in the Soviet nuclear arsenal of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), capable of delivering a "pre-emptive strike", i.e., of hitting missiles in silos. This concern is taken into account in the Soviet proposals for halving the number of strategic offensive weapons; for heavy ICBMs, an individual sub-level of 50 per cent has been established, so that they, too, will be reduced by 50 per cent (the limitations prescribed in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT I and SALT II) were merely to prevent an increase in the number of heavy ICBMs). Another example: the NATO countries point out that an obstacle to a significant reduction in the level of military confrontation in Europe lies in the existing imbalances and asymmetries in the various kinds of weapons deployed on the continent by the two sides; accordingly, the USSR and its allies under the Warsaw Treaty have agreed to begin the process of drastically cutting conventional forces and weapons in Europe precisely in order to identify and eliminate such imbalances and asymmetries, and to undertake unilateral steps to reduce them even before the relevant negotiations begin.

### **Eliminating the Threat of a World-Wide Nuclear Disaster**

The very heart of the Soviet Union's disarmament strategy is the goal of eliminating the threat of mankind's nuclear self-destruction posed by the stockpiling and refinement of nuclear weapons. The USSR believes that genuine equal security is best guaranteed at the present time by the lowest possible level of strategic balance, from which nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction must be excluded.

Since 1985, the USSR has been conducting negotiations with the United States on nuclear and space weapons which, according to a joint declaration by the two countries, should finally lead to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere. The step-by-step plan for the complete elimination—subject to strict international monitoring—of nuclear weapons throughout the world within the next 15 years, as contained in the 'statement of 15 January 1986, pursues that objective.

The USSR-United States INF Treaty was the first agreement on an actual reduction of nuclear weapons, under which major steps have already been taken to eliminate intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.

The conclusion of the INF Treaty was a concrete step which strengthens considerably the security of the United States and the USSR, as well as the security of their allies and the entire international community; the Treaty facilitates the movement to reduce nuclear weapon levels and to ensure greater stability in the area of armaments. The Soviet Union is determined to ensure that that process continues. Having solved one problem of nuclear disarmament, the INF Treaty placed the central issue of a sharp reduction in strategic offensive weapons on the agenda for the Soviet-American dialogue. At their meeting in Washington in December 1987, President Gorbachev and President Reagan reaffirmed earlier agreements on a 50 per cent reduction of such weapons, so that each side would have 1,600 delivery vehicles equipped with 6,000 warheads. In Washington those agreements were supplemented by a number of new developments.

After many years of fruitless efforts, the deadlock was finally broken on sea-launched cruise missiles, which the United States had stubbornly refused to include in an agreement. The two sides reached an agreement on the strict limitation of such missiles, and established ceilings for them in addition to the 6,000 warheads on the other delivery vehicles. Substantial progress was made in establishing the structure of a future agreement on a 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons. A ceiling of 4,900 as the total number of warheads on ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) was set as part of the total of 6,000 warheads. Rules for counting existing ballistic and air-launched cruise missiles were established. The two sides agreed to draw up strict monitoring measures. As a result of the summit meetings, which took place in 1988-1990, their respective positions have narrowed with regard to a number of aspects of the problem of reducing strategic offensive weapons, and an additional impetus has been given to negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

The USSR believes that, after achieving a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, it will be necessary to proceed to further radical reductions in nuclear weapons while strengthening strategic stability through the inclusion of other nuclear Powers in that process, as provided for in the Soviet nuclear-disarmament programme.

Soviet disarmament strategy accords paramount importance to ending the nuclear-arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament. That has been convincingly demonstrated by the following major Soviet initiatives and proposals in specific areas involving joint efforts: the readiness of the USSR to accept an immediate and universal ban on nuclear weapon tests and the major step it took by maintaining a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions between August 1985 and February 1987; the USSR's efforts to strengthen the regime governing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to support the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world; the Soviet initiatives concerning the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons (in 1989 the USSR unilaterally withdrew 500 tactical nuclear warheads from the territories of its allies and proposed that separate negotiations should begin on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and on the subsequent elimination of such weapons, including the complete elimination of sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons). Mention should also be made of the steps taken by the USSR to discontinue production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. On 7 April 1989 the USSR announced that it was discontinuing production of highly enriched uranium for military purposes and limiting the production of weapons-grade plutonium; in addition to the closure in 1987 of an industrial reactor, the Soviet Union decided to shut down two such reactors in 1989 and 1990 and not to replace them; and at the forty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly the USSR proposed that preparations commence for negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation and prohibition of the production of nuclear material for weapons purposes, a process which could make use of the monitoring activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

### **A Policy for a Drastic Reduction in Conventional Weapons**

The institution in 1987 of a new military doctrine based exclusively on defence and the corresponding start made in restructuring military policy have profoundly affected the Soviet Union's approach to conventional disarmament and its determination of the level of sufficiency and the composition of conventional military forces. Essentially, the country's defence needs have begun to be defined as the maintenance of a military potential which, while sufficient for reliable defence, i.e., for its protection against aggression, does not at the same time pose any real threat of aggression against other countries. The requirements of reasonable sufficiency for defence have already been

reflected in the solution of problems of determining the composition and structure of the armed forces and of the military establishment as a whole (in particular in such areas as giving the armed forces a non-aggressive structure, limiting strike systems within that structure, making changes in the distribution of troops (bearing in mind their use for strictly defensive purposes), and reducing production of armaments and military technology with a corresponding reassessment of military technology programmes).

Applying the principles of reasonable sufficiency for defence and endeavouring to provide a strong impetus for that process on an international scale, the Soviet Union has unilaterally begun to make considerable cut-backs in its armed forces and weapons. In that regard, it is fitting to mention the cut by 500,000 in the personnel of the Armed Forces (12 per cent of the total strength) and the significant reduction in the volume of conventional weapons in 1989 and 1990, the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from a number of Eastern European countries and Mongolia, and the change in the ratio between offensive and defensive means in favour of the latter. The Soviet proposals at the Vienna talks on the composition of the armed forces of the two military alliances in Europe after their reduction are in keeping with the requirements of reasonable sufficiency for defence. Those proposals provide for a drastic reduction in armed forces (a reduction by more than 1 million in the number of troops on each side and a threefold reduction in the number of tanks belonging to the Warsaw Treaty countries). In addition, a proposal has been made to transform the structure of the armed forces of the two sides into a purely defensive structure, one which would not provide opportunities for surprise attack or large-scale offensive operations.

The steps being taken by the USSR demonstrate that the Soviet leadership, while maintaining the country's defence capability at a level of reasonable and reliable sufficiency, is determined to broaden its co-operation with other members of the world community in order to demilitarize international relations and establish peace. That approach creates a more favourable atmosphere for negotiations and facilitates solutions in the area of arms limitation and disarmament at the regional and global levels.

### **Blocking Channels of the Arms Race Which Are Still Not Covered by Agreements**

Contemporary Soviet disarmament strategy attaches particular importance to the question of preventing the emergence of new areas

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in the arms race and to the urgent need for simultaneously winding down the arms race in all key areas and preventing it from spreading to fields of military activity not yet covered by agreements. The USSR is firmly opposed to undertaking disarmament in some areas while at the same time allowing the arms race to expand in others.

Preventing an arms race in outer space and observance of the 1972 anti-ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty are of particular importance for developing a new model for international security based on a balance of interests and mutual trust.

Consistently upholding this principle at the Soviet-United States negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, the USSR favours the adoption of effective measures to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space. It has called for a comprehensive approach to these problems covering both disarmament measures and the questions of monitoring, openness and trust, and for stepping up the multilateral consideration of these matters within the Conference on Disarmament. It has also stated that efforts to prevent such an arms race should be accompanied by a search for ways to co-operate in the peaceful exploration of outer space.

In connection with the growing importance of qualitative factors in the military balance, the impact of the military use of scientific and technological advances on international security cannot be ignored. The possibilities for such use may lead to the emergence of an entirely new class of weapons systems and have a destabilising effect on international security. The USSR advocates international prohibition of the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and co-ordinated action to prevent the use of the latest developments in science and technology to create weapons. On this basis, the Soviet Union supported the proposals by a number of countries to establish under the United Nations Secretary-General a panel to evaluate and forecast new technological developments. In response to the General Assembly's appeal, the Soviet Union has set up such an expert panel at the national level.

Exclusion from the disarmament process of the question of limiting and reducing naval weapons, which are a universal component of the military power of States, may also destabilize the general military strategic situation in the world. This would leave open a dangerous area of the arms race. It is therefore important to begin work on these problems, for example, by developing confidence-building measures

and security guarantees for shipping and by holding special consultations with the participation of all States concerned regarding mutual concerns in this field.

### **Key Element of the Disarmament Strategy**

The policy followed by the Soviet leadership to broaden *glasnost* and openness in all areas of Soviet society and promote *glasnost*, predictability and openness in the military field has had a far-reaching, positive impact on the development of contemporary disarmament strategy. This has made it possible not only to inform world public opinion more widely and fully about the intentions and objectives of the Soviet Union in the international arena, but also to bring about fundamental changes in our approach to the problem of monitoring compliance with disarmament obligations. Gorbachev formulated the Soviet position on this question in the following way: "Disarmament without monitoring is impossible, but monitoring without disarmament is senseless". The criteria for effective monitoring have been defined: "infallible, unquestionable, reliable and scrupulous means exist for ensuring complete confidence that weapons are being eliminated, obligations concerning remaining weapons and permitted military activities are being observed, and bans are not being circumvented".

The contemporary Soviet position is characterised by a broad approach to monitoring, not only as a means of verifying compliance with obligations under specific agreements, but also as an instrument for building and strengthening international trust and eliminating mutual apprehensions. The joint verification experiment (JVE) conducted in 1988 at Soviet and United States nuclear-test sites can serve as an example. The experiment demonstrated how openness in military matters can eliminate grounds for suspicion and apprehension, strengthen trust and help to consolidate mutual security.

The Soviet position concerning on-site inspections has radically changed. The USSR considers on-site inspections a major aspect of monitoring, the purpose of which is to remove doubts concerning compliance with disarmament agreements which cannot be removed by other verification means. The Soviet proposals to prohibit chemical weapons call for the legal strengthening of the principle of mandatory on-site inspections on request, whereby the party suspected of violations has no right to refuse permission for the conduct of such inspections.

The open and constructive approach of the Soviet Union to the question of monitoring and its readiness to proceed in matters relating

to verification as far as its negotiating partners are prepared to go have made it possible to find mutually acceptable solutions to problems that arise if the participants in the negotiations have the political will to achieve disarmament agreements. An example of this is the INF Treaty. Under that Treaty the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to conduct reciprocal inspections for 13 years in order to ensure verification of basic data and the elimination and non-production of missiles and to confirm the elimination of missile bases and support facilities.

### **Using the Authority and Potential of the United Nations**

The development of events in the field of security and disarmament has underscored the need to undertake disarmament efforts on an international basis. The importance of the multilateral aspects of the disarmament process, requiring collective action by a large number of States and effective use of the appropriate tools in order to advance this process, is becoming increasingly evident. In the spirit of the new political thinking, the Soviet Union has reassessed the potential of the United Nations as a centre for the collective search for solutions to specific international problems on the basis of observance of the balance of interests of all States. The Soviet Union has put forward the concept of strengthening international security by enhancing the authority and role of the United Nations. In his statement at the United Nations on 7 December 1988, Gorbachev set forth proposals aimed at increasing international co-operation in the field of disarmament on the basis of the authority and potential of the United Nations. The Soviet Union favours increasing the effectiveness of the multilateral disarmament mechanisms, first and foremost the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and making efficient use of the Conference's potential for work on the substance of all the items on its agenda. The Soviet Union believes that maximum use should be made of such mechanisms as the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission, the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, and IAEA. The USSR has advocated setting up international multilateral monitoring bodies, particularly an international surveillance and monitoring agency under United Nations auspices as well as a multilateral centre to provide assistance in the field of monitoring under the Secretary-General, and an international disarmament-for-development fund.

Greater United Nations involvement in the disarmament process was also the basis of the ideas put forward and supported by the USSR at recent sessions of the General Assembly with regard to reaching

multilateral agreement under United Nations auspices on limiting the spread of missile technology, the establishment in the United Nations of a register of sales and deliveries of conventional weapons, the development of general parameters for openness, and a broadening of the range of topics dealt with by United Nations forums (defence doctrines, conversion, and the use of scientific and technological advances for disarmament). It is obvious that carrying out the plan to build a nuclear-free, non-violent world presupposes a greater United Nations contribution to nuclear disarmament and the possibility of entrusting the Organisation with special powers to prevent possible violations of agreements on the elimination of nuclear weapons and to forestall attempts to acquire them in the future.

The strategy for real disarmament provides clear reference points for making consistent, steady and effective progress by drastically reducing the military strength of the opposing sides, strengthening strategic stability and mutual trust, demilitarising international relations and moving from an armament economy to a disarmament economy and a peaceful order. Decisive movement forward in this regard will radically improve the world situation, free mankind from the burden of weapons and eliminate the danger of its self-destruction. As regards the USSR, the steady reduction of the burden of military expenditures through disarmament will facilitate the vital tasks of radically reforming the Soviet economy, stepping up socio-economic, scientific and technological development and improving the living conditions of Soviet people and will serve as a further guarantee of the irreversibility of *perestroika*.

### **UNITED STATES STRATEGY IN A CHANGING WORLD**

Herman Kahn invented the phrase “thinking about the unthinkable” in thinking about nuclear strategy. To help him think about such things, he employed the device of “surprise free” foundations, which combined core themes with different variations. In this essay, I address several core themes in the future of United States strategic policy. But, I do so with some trepidation. Limitations of space forbid the elaboration of variations. And anyone projecting anything that rests on “surprise free” foundations amid the fundamental changes taking place in the world today must appear as utterly foolhardy, if not downright foolish. Let me state at the outset, therefore, the single-most important factor in determining the future of United States strategic policy: future actions by the Soviet Union.

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Among Western students of the cold war, there exists what John Lewis Gaddis has called “the post-revisionist synthesis.” Roughly speaking, the synthesis goes something like this. At the outset of the post-war era, the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a serious security dilemma that would have been difficult to manage under any circumstances. As a result, each undertook some offensive actions for what might have been legitimate defensive reasons; each undertook defensive actions that were misinterpreted by the other side as being offensive in character; and to some extent each simply behaved opportunistically, seeking to gain an advantage over the other. On the American side, the Baruch Plan for atomic power sharing, the Marshall Plan, the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the development of the hydrogen bomb all have been cited by scholars to illustrate one or another of these tendencies. But, all the same, as the distinguished British diplomatic historian Sir Michael Howard concluded: “One of the most remarkable aspects of this whole period is the astonishing *stupidity* of Soviet policy”.

The United States rapidly withdrew and demobilised its forces; it slashed its military expenditures; it rejected repeated entreaties by several Western European States to join them in bilateral alliances; and it pursued a strategy of “economic security”: providing the Europeans with the economic wherewithal to take care of their own security needs. Even George Kennan’s original concept of containment lacked any significant United States military dimension. Yet, and as if on cue, virtually every time the United States Government faced a critical decision on whether and how to alter its posture *vis-a-vis* Europe, moves by the Soviet Union hardened the American position: the Iranian crisis; the rigged elections in Poland; the Moscow Foreign Ministers meeting; the Czech *coup*; the Berlin blockade; the outbreak of the Korean War. By the time this cycle had run its course, NSC-68 defined United States strategy as one of containment, the United States was back in Europe, the United States defence budget had increased threefold—over serious doubts raised by the Department of Defense!—the part of Germany that was allied with the West was remilitarised, and foreign policy discourse in the United States became warped for a generation. In the world of a John Le Carre novel, Stalin’s leading foreign policy adviser no doubt would be cast as a Western mole, put in place by rabidly anti-communist, militarist elements from the hardest core of the American right.

In the era of Soviet “new thinking”, one would not expect such a pattern to repeat itself. In point of fact, recent reforms in the Soviet Union and the seismic changes that have swept through Eastern Europe

have made a reorientation of United States strategic policy possible. But, if progress is to continue, sooner rather than later, real reductions in nuclear and conventional forces will have to be successfully negotiated, Soviet tanks and large intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) will have to start rolling off the assembly lines in much smaller numbers, ways will have to be found to transport and house Soviet Warsaw Treaty troops back home, despite housing shortages and limited availability of rolling stock, and Soviet new thinking will have to reach places as far away as Cuba and Angola. Those, in brief, are some of the main parametric conditions of the "surprise free" developments discussed below. But, first a baseline.

### **The NATO Summit**

NATO has been the centre-piece of United States national security policy since 1949, consuming over half of the total United States military effort. The July 1990 NATO summit affords a glimpse of official United States and other Western thinking about the future of the Alliance. The future promises to be quite different from the past.

Of paramount importance are proposed changes in the two cornerstones of NATO doctrine: forward defence and flexible response. The reduced forward presence is to be coupled with the fielding of smaller, restructured, and increasingly multinationalised forces, and lead eventually to more limited conventional offensive capabilities altogether. The abandonment of flexible response reduces nuclear forces to "truly weapons of last resort", and is linked to "a significantly reduced" role for short-range nuclear forces.

The communique also contains several confidence-building measures. Chief among these are a proposed joint declaration of non-aggression with members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and a pledge that NATO members "will never in any circumstances be the first to use force". In addition, Soviet President Gorbachev and representatives of other Eastern and Central European countries were invited to address the NATO Council, and all members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation were encouraged to establish regular diplomatic liaisons with NATO countries and to intensify military-to-military contacts with NATO.

Specific measures to expand the role of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) were also proposed. These include more regular consultations among member Governments, more frequent review conferences, the creation of a secretariat, the establishment of a centre for the prevention of conflict, and an inter-parliamentary body.

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The conclusion by year's end of a treaty on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) was urged, along with a simultaneously negotiated package of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). Follow-up talks limiting military manpower levels were proposed and, significantly, the issue of a unified Germany's force levels was put on the table.

Finally, the purpose of NATO beyond the era of containment was alluded to: "...it must continue to provide for the common defense.... Yet our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continen...."

Politically, the summit was well received, not only in the Western countries, but also in the Soviet Union, President Gorbachev expressed interest in accepting NATO's invitation to have a dialogue with its Council. And Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, while cautioning that words always had to be corroborated by deeds, nevertheless felt that "the decisions adopted move in the right direction and pave the way to a safe future for the entire European continent". The future posture of the Soviet Union is not irrelevant to the question of whether these words will produce corresponding deeds.

The words assume a continued Soviet commitment to the path of reform and peaceful change. Beyond that, continued Soviet opposition to, or unacceptable conditions imposed on, the membership of united Germany in NATO is one factor that could derail progress. Another is the failure to reach a successful CFE accord this year. If nothing else, the continued erosion of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation as a military alliance makes the entire logic of alliance-to-alliance negotiations increasingly problematical. Any alternative that one can think of is infinitely more cumbersome, more time-consuming, and therefore more prone to failure than the present format.

But, translating the words of the NATO summit communique into deeds is potentially only the beginning of what could be a very far-reaching process indeed to undo the legacy of forty-five years of vicious cycles and to turn them into more virtuous ones. What is the outer range of the possible, as of now, in future United States strategic policy? A brief synopsis follows.

### **Further Possibilities**

Any comprehensive foreign policy design rests on a strategic concept. In the post-war era, the guiding concept for the West was containment. A new concept, or set of concepts, must now be evolved.

## *Europe*

The most attractive successor vision that has become possible for Europe is a united Europe—not some supranational federal scheme, which is impractical and which few want, but a Europe with overlapping political frameworks, economic institutions, and security structures, ensuring economic well-being together with political stability and peaceful change. This would be a Europe with a twenty-first century institutional architecture—not a Europe of the unpredictable and destructive shifts of traditional balance-of-power politics, nor of the frozen stability provided by fear of mutual annihilation.

This new Europe has the European Community (EC) as its undisputed anchor. A novel if modest form of political union will emerge within the EC before the end of the decade, and pan-European economic ties will emanate outward from the EC. The European Free Trade Area (EFTA) already forms a contiguous zone, and trade-related barriers between the two will continue to be removed. Numerous association agreements with countries beyond EFTA already exist, and there is nothing that the newly liberated Central and Eastern European countries want more than to be tied more closely to the EC.

If the twentieth century has taught us anything about collective security organisations, however; it is that one cannot simply jump from here to there; one cannot simply will them into existence, no matter how strong the will or how good the intentions. They have to be constructed step by step, even organically. And here the new NATO has a critical role to play.

The new NATO looks very much like the original NATO, the pre-Korean War NATO, whereby the United States provided a guarantee to European security efforts. And so it should be, because the conditions enabling the original design to work now exist, while the forces that undermined it have been swept into history's proverbial dustbin.

In the future, NATO conventional forces in a united Germany are likely to be dramatically reduced. The necessity of their presence to prevent invasion being dubious, they would come to be seen as an occupation force on German soil. The multinationalisation of NATO conventional forces announced at the NATO summit at least in part speaks to the same issue. Negotiations for overall national ceilings will be conceptually difficult but can claim success if they do little more than provide a forum with which united Germany can make multilateralised reductions. And the idea of non-offensive defensive

postures for the reduced conventional forces will continue to receive rhetorical and even moral support, though its practical configuration remains elusive and hence its significance unclear.

NATO nuclear forces in united Germany are sure to become an object of domestic political contestation there. Two options are available. First, such forces should become incorporated into a more Europeanised deterrent structure—presumably with France and the United Kingdom at its core, some form of German involvement, and a link to the United States. The other is a “third zero”—the mutually negotiated elimination of all short-range nuclear systems, not merely artillery shells. The former certainly would advance the cause of European integration, but the latter seems more plausible.

What would be expected of the United States in this scheme of things? Intelligence and communications facilities to provide early warning of any potential future attack on Western Europe; a network of bases and stockpiles that could be remobilised on relatively short notice; small numbers of ground forces—no more than 50,000-65,000 are required—to staff these and help provide highly mobile conventional support, especially in European peripheral areas; and a residual theatre nuclear deterrent, in the long run probably based largely on submarines.

There have been repeated suggestions, in both the United States and some Warsaw Treaty countries, that at least one or two of the latter, and perhaps the Soviet Union itself, at some point might be invited to join a revamped NATO. At this point that idea still seems far-fetched. Pan-European security ties are more likely to be created via the CSCE. Indeed, it will be a major accomplishment for the CSCE, even in the medium term, to realise the new roles recommended for it by the NATO summit, let alone to turn itself into a more fully fledged organisation for conflict resolution and dispute settlement.

Insisting that NATO be dissolved because the Warsaw Treaty Organisation is dissolving, and that both be replaced directly and immediately by a European security organisation, be it CSCE or some other mechanism, would leave Europe roughly where the creation of the League of Nations left the entire world in 1919—nowhere it should have wanted to be, as subsequent events showed.

### *Asia-Pacific*

The year 1989, and 1990 thus far, have belonged to Europe. However, President Gorbachev's hastily arranged June 1990 San Francisco meeting

with President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea reminded us that there exists another “theatre” in which the cold war drama has been played out, the Asia-Pacific region. And the story line in that theatre has not yet reached the point of suggesting happy endings.

In Asia-Pacific, there is no EC and no NATO to resolve the multitude of local security dilemmas—as has been accomplished in Europe with Franco-German relations, the source of so many past conflicts. There is not even an equivalent to the CSCE. The centre-piece of United States strategy in Asia-Pacific remains its defence treaty with Japan. United States troops stationed in the Republic of Korea, together with a string of military bases, of which those in the Philippines are the most critical, round out the infrastructure of United States extended deterrence in the region.

A complex of problems plagues this region. Chief among them is that the United States-Japan defence treaty has become so anachronistic that it provides but an artificial and therefore fragile stability. It continues to treat Japan as a client State at a time when Japan has become the world’s leading financial power, at a time of intensifying United States-Japanese economic disputes, indeed, when Japan’s military expenditures already are the third highest in the world. The precipitous dismantling of the United States-Japan defence treaty, however, most likely would trigger a series of arms races in the region, fuelled by a global weapons industry that is characterised by numerous new entrants and surplus capacity, leaving all in the region worse off than they are now. Thus, the treaty must be changed in a way that acknowledges Japan’s status without, at the same time, threatening its neighbours.

The Korean peninsula retains its place as a potential fuse of major conflict. United States policy changes have been marginal, Soviet signals have been mixed and confusing, and the ability of either to control its respective ally is much diminished. Elsewhere, the intractability of the Kampuchean conflict affects all of South-East Asia. China remains preoccupied with its coming succession struggle, so that anyone trying to play a China card today draws the joker in the deck. And if the cold war has ended in the North Pacific, the two Super-Powers have neglected to inform their respective navies.

In sum, whereas the potential clearly exists in Europe to move beyond balance-of-power politics, in Asia-Pacific a reasonably stable balance is the best one can hope to achieve. Even that will require restraint and imagination all around. A Helsinki-like process for the

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region is urgently needed. Given the complete absence of collective conflict management mechanisms in the history of the region, coupled with the presence of long-standing bilateral antipathies, the most logical place to start is with bilateral discussions of confidence-building measures by the United States and the Soviet Union. The mandate of and participants in such discussions gradually could be expanded. Confidence-building measures in time might lead to discussions of arms control and finally to restraints on forces.

### **Strategic Nuclear Forces**

Throughout the cold war, the United States strategic nuclear arsenal has stood behind these two regional containment frameworks as the ultimate deterrent against actual war. Today, the United States and the Soviet Union are lumbering towards a strategic arms reduction, or START, agreement. When the negotiations were first undertaken, the agreement portended an epoch-shaping event; now it will be an event only if it is not reached or, for some reason, fails to get ratified. One reason for the altered attitude is that the issue of strategic nuclear forces has been overshadowed by fundamental changes in the very geopolitical factors that were assumed to be constants. Another is that START will not deliver as much as was promised—and far less than it would be possible to achieve.

Below, I briefly address what may become possible down the road. In doing so, no attempt is made to review every scheme for the future of strategic nuclear weapons that has been advanced, including their outright abolition. I limit myself to three scenarios that certainly differ from the *status quo*, but also have the virtue of just possibly becoming “doable”.

START may be—and should be—the last Super-Power strategic arms control effort driven by concern with numbers. The average citizen seems to grasp much more firmly than many strategic specialists have done the existential irrelevance of whether the two sides can destroy each other ten, twenty, or thirty times over—and that a reduction from thirty to twenty, say, makes no one more secure. Future negotiations should be driven by doctrine, from which numbers-can then be derived.

*Sufficient deterrence.* One candidate for a central doctrinal role is the notion of “minimum deterrence”—though I would prefer a term like “sufficient deterrence”, because once this discussion reaches the public the term “minimum” is sure to be construed as “just barely

enough", in turn implying that more would be better—at which point we would be right back where we started from: with outcomes that range, in Stanley Hoffmann's apt description, "from mediocre to miserable". What does "minimum" or "sufficient" mean? Definitionally, it means the lowest level required for a secure retaliatory strike, thereby deterring any first strike. Views obviously differ as to precisely where that threshold lies. But, according to serious analysts who favour a move in this direction, its upper bounds seem to be somewhere around 3,000 warheads, assuming *no* change in current approaches to targeting. A mutual reduction to 3,000 warheads in itself would be radical; relaxing "efficiency" ratios assumed in current targeting strategies, or changing those strategies altogether, would bring the levels down further still.

At very low levels, a number of very big problems appear that do not matter much at the present levels, some of which are poorly understood. Force configuration and survivability are crucial; reliability is crucial. Precisely how any of them would work remains to be determined. It does seem clear that strategic defences would destroy any hope of moving toward "sufficient deterrence" at very low levels. And, insofar as utmost transparency and early warning would be the central nervous system of such an arrangement, anti-satellite weapons would undermine it. Finally, the levels of nuclear forces possessed by the secondary nuclear Powers presumably would become a factor at some point.

But, of paramount importance to the success of "sufficient deterrence" at very low levels is the ability of the two sides to believe one another. In part this is a technical problem, to be dealt with by necessarily intrusive verification mechanisms. In part it is also a confidence-building issue, of encouraging dialogue between strategic specialists and military planners on the two sides—much as the NATO summit encouraged diplomats and soldiers to do. In the final analysis, however, it comes down to reputation. Accordingly, if the Soviet Union wishes to encourage movement in this direction, the sooner any further treaty-violating radar installations, misplaced INF missiles, or mysterious outbreaks of anthrax are discovered, the better.

*Virtual Deployment.* A more ambitious doctrinal change, which has been proposed by a group of United States defence specialists, is for United States policy to move away from the deployment assumption, that is to say, the expectation that every research and development (R&D) programme will or should yield a deployable weapon system. The argument is made that the reduced international threat, the increase

in transparency and warning-time available, force reductions, and budgetary declines, all suggest that the intrinsic deterrent value of R&D itself be exploited more effectively. "Virtual" deployments consist of weapons programmes that are researched and developed to the point where the weapons systems *could* be deployed within some specified but significant period of time. The aim would be to deter not only attack from the other side, but also *deployments by* the other side, by demonstrating the capacity to match them, and thereby in principle preventing weapons systems from being built in the first place. A mix of deployed and virtually deployed systems is foreseen.

What makes this proposal worthy of consideration, apart from its intrinsic merit, is that economic necessity to some extent will push in its direction. The doctrinal change, then, becomes the self-conscious articulation of a virtue that necessity may produce.

*Co-operative Deterrence.* Finally, a still more far-reaching doctrinal change would be a move towards what Michael May has termed "co-operative deterrence." This also envisions United States deployments of a small number of highly survivable nuclear forces. But, here they would be exercised under the aegis of co-operative security structures. An example would be a European body to which the United States, Germany, and the Soviet Union, as well as other European nuclear and non-nuclear States, would belong. The criteria for membership would be a willingness to guarantee each other's borders, to set force levels by agreement, and a prior commitment to respond to aggression.

The most plausible locale for such a scheme would be in Europe, as May suggests. However, the nuclear forces that would most plausibly have fallen under the aegis of such an arrangement, in my view, would have been intermediate-range forces, which have been eliminated, and short-range forces, which I expect soon will be. The scheme seems much more difficult for strategic forces.

### **The United Nations**

The Soviet Union under President Gorbachev has discovered the United Nations. This inevitably raises the question whether the United States will rediscover it. The answer perforce is long and complicated. Here I limit myself to two brief remarks that relate to the subject of this paper.

From the vantage point of the United States security policy, probably the most important issue to which the United Nations could make a

contribution is in restraining the frightful proliferation of weapons in the developing world: increasingly unconventional "conventional" systems, chemical weapons, ballistic missiles with chemical warheads, and, of course, nuclear weapons. The United Nations system has aided substantially in some of these areas, especially in the form of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. By and large, the arms control—or rather the "disarmament"—efforts of the United Nations have been preoccupied with the Super-Powers, with weapons of mass destruction possessed by the so-called "first and second worlds", and even with the verification of arms control agreements between them. This is all well and good, and is said to express the moral concern of the international community. It should be noted, though, that the probability of the Super-Powers conducting a nuclear exchange, employing poison gas, engaging in the genocidal extermination of one another's—let alone their own—populations, or merely firing a shot at each other in anger, is infinitesimal compared to those same events occurring among and within developing countries—indeed, some of the more egregious of these offences already occur there. But, that fact seems somehow to evoke among the majority of the Members of the United Nations neither the moral concern nor the desire to involve the international community with even remotely comparable fervour. So long as the United Nations persists with this pattern, its utility and standing in the domain of global security, at least as viewed by the United States, will remain limited.

Secondly, only now that the cold war has unravelled do we appreciate fully how important institutional frameworks are to manage change. Recall the difference in this regard between Europe and Asia-Pacific. The United Nations could and should do more to enhance the prospects of regional security, not merely by missions by the Secretary-General before wars break out and by peace-keeping troops when they are over, but by helping to facilitate the emergence within regions of the institutional processes and mechanisms, confidence-building measures, and collective experiences that would make regional conflict management a more viable proposition in the future.

## CONCLUSION

An era in history is characterised not merely by the passage of time, but also by the distinguishing attributes that structure people's expectations and imbue daily events with meaning for the members of any given social collectivity. In that sense, an era has ended in

international relations. We cannot start entirely afresh; what comes before to some extent always shapes what follows. But, the ruptures we are experiencing do allow us to move in different directions, some of which would have been—literally—unthinkable only a few years ago. I have tried to sketch out some of the new possibilities that relate to the core of United States strategic policy. Among other consequences of recent changes is the gradual redefinition of the very concept of security itself, to encompass economic dimensions and to some extent also environmental manifestations. But, that will have to be a topic for another occasion.

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## DESTRUCTION OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS UNDER MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

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Generally, the multilateral arms control agreements negotiated prior to the late 1980s were designed to provide confidence that certain types of *activities* would not take place. Agreements such as the partial test-ban Treaty, the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and the agreement of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) are good examples. These agreements, however, have not required the *destruction of existing weapons*. (The biological weapons Convention is an exception.)

More recently, however, reduction of existing levels of armaments has become a central feature of multilateral arms control efforts. Consequently, physical destruction of armaments has become an important issue in major multilateral negotiations. Two such negotiations provide good examples of the problems that arise when destruction is a central element of a treaty agreement: the ongoing chemical weapons negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe, which concluded in November 1990.

The purpose of this paper is to review the approach taken to destruction of weapons in these two major multilateral negotiations. Recent bilateral arms control agreements such as the United States-USSR Treaty on their intermediate-range nuclear forces, which entered into force in 1988, also call for the destruction of existing weapons, but, because of the focus of this Conference and the need to keep this analysis to manageable proportions, this paper focuses on multilateral negotiations. Particular attention will be given to the environmental aspects of weapons destruction.

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## **Destruction of Chemical Weapons**

Destruction of existing chemical weapons has long been agreed to be one of the key requirements of a global chemical weapons ban. Thus, the multilateral chemical weapons convention being sought in the Conference on Disarmament negotiations will require the destruction of all existing chemical weapons, whether they are part of a current military stockpile or are relics of past wars. Tens of thousands of tons of nerve gas, mustard gas and other chemical warfare agents must be destroyed, along with the munitions and other containers in which they are stored.

The draft convention under negotiation contains detailed provisions on destruction, including the schedule for destruction and arrangements for verification. It specifies that chemical weapons must be destroyed in an irreversible manner that is safe both for people and the environment. Individual States are allowed to determine which specific destruction method will be used, except that, for environmental reasons, it is prohibited to dump chemical weapons in any body of water, to bury them on land, or to burn them in open pits. Destruction shall take place only at specifically designated and appropriately designed and equipped facilities. Confidence that the weapons have been destroyed will be provided through continuous on-site presence of international inspectors during destruction operations.

It is foreseen that chemical weapons will be destroyed during the first 10 years of the convention, beginning one year after entry into force. The approach to destruction is designed to take into account the interest of parties in undiminished security during the destruction period, to enhance confidence-building in the early part of the destruction stage, to encourage gradual acquisition of experience in the course of destroying chemical weapons, and to be applicable irrespective of the actual composition of the stockpiles and the methods chosen for the destruction of the chemical weapons. Given the likely divergence in stockpile sizes, the schedule of destruction is based on the principle of levelling out. Generally speaking, each possessor must destroy one ninth of its stocks annually.

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed, however, to destroy their stocks more rapidly than required under the draft multilateral convention. Under the bilateral Agreement signed in June 1990 by President Bush and President Gorbachev, the two sides will begin to destroy their stocks to the common level of 500 agent tons by

the eighth year of the multilateral convention, substantially lower than the level calculated under the general formula in the multilateral convention.

While the most extensive destruction requirements will fall on the United States and the Soviet Union, a number of other countries will be obligated to carry out destruction activities. Some of these countries possess chemical weapons stockpiles, although they have not yet acknowledged this officially. Others have quantities of chemical weapons on their territory that were abandoned by foreign forces during the World War II era.

The United States has had an active programme for destruction of chemical weapons for many years. The number one priority in this programme is safety and environmental protection. The original guidelines for the United States programme date back to a study in 1969 by the National Academy of Sciences, which assumed that all chemical agents and munitions would eventually require disposal. The Academy called for a more environmentally sound method of disposal than ocean dumping, which was the primary method used in the 1960s. It recommended that techniques similar to those used by the United States Atomic Energy Commission for disposing of radioactive wastes be adopted to ensure maximum public safety and protection of the environment. The Academy endorsed the incineration method for mustard and chemical neutralisation for nerve agents, but recommended further study to determine optimal methods.

Over the last two decades, the United States safely destroyed approximately 170,000 munitions and nearly 8,000 metric tons of chemical agent, principally by industrial-scale operations. The first operations on an industrial scale were conducted at Rocky Mountain Arsenal outside Denver, Colorado, during the period 1970 through 1976. Over 2,700 metric tons of mustard in ton containers were incinerated, and over 3,700 metric tons of nerve agent sarin in ton containers and various warheads were destroyed by chemical neutralisation.

Since 1979, the United States has been operating a test facility, the Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS), at Tooele, Utah. The purpose of CAMDS is to evaluate the equipment, processes and procedures which are being considered for use at future disposal facilities to determine their safety and ability to meet environmental standards.

Based on our previous disposal experience and successful tests at CAMDS, in 1984 the United States formally adopted direct incineration

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as the preferred destruction method for all of its chemical stocks. This determination was endorsed by the National Research Council, a body of the National Academy of Sciences. Destruction through direct incineration requires less time for completion, is non-reversible, and generates much less residue than chemical neutralisation.

The current United States Chemical Stockpile Disposal Programme consists of two operating facilities—CAMDS and the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS). The baseline technology developed in the pilot-scale facility at CAMDS is essentially the same process we have incorporated at JACADS in an integrated facility.

Johnston Atoll, which is the site of our first full-scale destruction facility, is located 717 nautical miles southwest of Honolulu, Hawaii. The purpose of JACADS is safely to destroy the lethal chemical weapons located on Johnston Island. Rocket destruction has been under way since July 1990. As of 1 April 1991, JACADS had destroyed over 7,500 sarin-filled M-55 rockets and incinerated over 35,000 kilograms of agent. Later, munitions containing the nerve agent VX or mustard will be destroyed.

Safety considerations have been paramount in the design, construction and operation of the JACADS facility. Already it has demonstrated the capability to meet very stringent criteria for protection of plant workers and the general population. The agent safety standards were established by the United States Surgeon General to provide maximum protection. In addition to these agent standards, there are general pollutant emission standards for all of the incinerators. The JACADS plant has demonstrated the capability to meet all of these environmental standards as well.

A second full-scale disposal facility is also under construction at Tooele, Utah, near the CAMDS test facility. It is scheduled to begin destruction operations in 1993. Eventually we plan to have a destruction facility at each of our nine stockpile sites.

To facilitate the implementation of the multilateral chemical weapons convention, the United States is prepared to share both its experience and its technology with others. We are already doing so bilaterally, with the Soviet Union.

There is ample evidence that the destruction of chemical weapons is technically demanding and politically sensitive. It is time-consuming and expensive. In planning their destruction programmes, States will need to take these realities into account.

States that will be required to destroy stocks under the convention should already be laying the political and technical foundation for their destruction activities, even though actual destruction may not be required for several years. A State that waits until the convention is signed to begin planning its destruction programme will probably have considerable difficulty in meeting the obligation under the convention to begin destruction one year after entry into force. Even under very optimistic assumptions, the design, construction and testing of a chemical weapons destruction facility require at least five years before the facility is ready for full-scale operations.

At times, alternative approaches have been suggested as short cuts for beginning destruction. One often-repeated idea is that the United States destruction facility at Johnston Island could be used to destroy stocks from other countries. This is not a possibility. The United States has assured countries in the region that the Johnston Island facility will not be used for such purposes. Another idea has been that conversion of a chemical warfare agent to a less toxic chemical could be considered as destruction, or at least as the “beginning” of destruction. This is also not acceptable to us. Conversion of a chemical warfare agent to another chemical that can, without great difficulty, be used again for chemical weapon agent production does not eliminate the threat.

Still another idea, suggested as an interim measure to be applied if States have difficulties in beginning destruction, is to disable munitions pending their destruction. This idea also has serious flaws. It can too easily become a substitute for destruction. As a practical matter, disabling millions of munitions in a way that would not complicate eventual destruction operations would be technically complex, dangerous, and expensive. It would be much better to focus resources on getting actual destruction under way.

Experience in the United States and elsewhere has also demonstrated that political problems associated with destruction can be just as daunting as the technical problems. These problems, of course, reflect concerns about safety and protection of the environment. Implementation of the convention’s provisions on destruction depends on successfully assuaging these concerns. While each country must deal with the concerns according to its own circumstances, our experience suggests that openness, extensive local involvement and making safety the highest priority are essential.

There seems to be increasing interest in the Conference on Disarmament in discussing how safety and protection of the environment

can be ensured during the implementation of the destruction provisions of the multilateral convention. The United States welcomes this development and is prepared to contribute actively to such discussions.

Unfortunately, only the United States and the Soviet Union have openly admitted their possession of chemical weapons. The lack of candour on the part of other States with chemical weapons is not only a concern in itself, but also a hindrance to serious multilateral discussion of safety and environmental protection.

In summary, the United States attaches the greatest importance to ensuring that destruction of chemical weapons is accomplished in a manner that is safe for people and for the environment. In implementing the provisions of the multilateral convention, this fundamental principle must be given the highest priority. International cooperation can play an important role towards that end.

### **Elimination of Conventional Armaments**

Our second example of a treaty involving the destruction of armaments with safety and environmental implications is the recently completed Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

In the CFE negotiation, the West proposed, in May 1989, that all armaments in excess of any agreed levels be destroyed. During the ensuing negotiation, the goal that equipment must be destroyed to meet the agreed limits was maintained; however, a cursory examination of the CFE Treaty text reveals that several other methods of accounting for equipment reductions were included in the document. As in any negotiation, many specialised and specific issues were uncovered that did not fit with the overall theme of reduction by destruction. In the CFE negotiation, as in any arms control negotiation, the approach taken to equipment reduction had to be tailored during the negotiating process to adjust the specifics of the proposal to the circumstances that apply for each participant. Within a multilateral negotiation, the tailoring and adjusting process is extremely difficult to accomplish.

#### ***Equipment Reduction Consideration in CFE***

The CFE negotiation faced some special circumstances that limited the options as to what could be considered as an acceptable outcome for the issue of equipment reduction. For the West, the primary factors of concern were:

1. Europe contained and still contains the highest concentration of armaments in the world. Without some means of limiting

arms transfers as a result of an arms reduction agreement, the armament floodgates of Europe could have opened, thus setting off a global arms race which could have destabilised regional balances of power in many areas;

2. It was understood that a successful CFE negotiation would likely undercut the public consensus for defence spending among the democratic countries in Europe. A CFE Treaty that allowed equipment to be moved out of Europe to the East, with the possibility of bringing it back into Europe at some later date, could create a potentially dangerous security situation;
3. The West did not want to fix the military balance in Europe at the expense of worsening the military balance in Asia through the movement of equipment out of the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area;
4. It was uncertain how long the window of opportunity would be open to negotiate and execute a conventional arms reduction agreement for Europe. Therefore, it was in the Western interest to be able to execute rapidly any arms reduction agreement before the military or the political situation changed.

For the West, these four factors created a set of implied limits on what type of agreement could be negotiated in the CFE forum. Any outcome to the negotiation had to limit the ability of the participants to sell or shift treaty-limited equipment out of the area, to ensure that the armament reductions occurred rapidly before Western countries had trimmed their defence spending a disproportionate amount, and to ensure that the agreed weapons systems limited by the treaty were, in fact, eliminated permanently.

For the East, a different set of factors were apparently at work—factors that often led to Eastern positions that fuelled Western concerns:

1. The East, with significantly higher equipment holdings in many categories, was looking at a massive work requirement to reduce its military equipment levels. This level of effort argued against trying to reduce armament levels too quickly;
2. The Soviet Union apparently had had some difficulty executing the unilateral force reductions that President Gorbachev announced at the United Nations in December 1988. This difficulty argued for a more lengthy draw-down period for CFE implementation;

3. The East had an equipment reduction process developed that it wanted to follow. While this process was slow, the East claimed that it represented an efficient means for gradually processing armaments into scrap metal for consumption by its steel industry. As a result, the East resisted proposals by the West to adopt destruction methods designed to eliminate the military capability of armaments rapidly, without necessarily contributing to the process of preparing that equipment for consumption as scrap metal by the steel industry;
4. The Soviet Union was apparently concerned about the political ramifications of simply destroying massive amounts of military equipment that its population had sacrificed so much for in terms of depressed living standards. It indicated a strong desire to convert some military equipment into items that could be used in the national economy.

The proposals made by both sides each supported their own objectives and naturally raised suspicions on each side that some ulterior motive might be behind the other's proposals. This conflict in objectives made the equipment reduction issue difficult to negotiate. The outcome of this can be seen in the CFE Treaty. In essence, the Western proposals for equipment destruction procedures dominate the destruction processes, while Eastern proposals provided much of the basis for the conversion procedures, use of equipment as targets, and accounting for losses by accident.

#### *CFE Destruction Procedures*

Within CFE, there are a number of different procedures that have been approved for use in destroying military equipment: severing, explosive demolition, deformation and smashing. Conversion is also authorised, but limited. Some equipment to be eliminated can be accounted for in limited amounts by disposition as targets used in training, as museum or static display pieces, or through destruction in accidents.

The CFE Treaty based its destruction requirements on the concept of requiring destruction of only those elements of the item that are critical for system operation and that are difficult to repair. The standard of measurement was to inflict sufficient damage, so that it would be about as expensive and time-consuming to repair the item of equipment as it would be to build a new item. For the most part, each method of destruction or conversion was aimed at damaging the same parts to prevent reconstruction of a system by mixing and matching parts from different equipment pieces.

For tanks, the key components judged to be important for destruction were the turret, the trunnion system (point where the main gun attaches to the turret), the breech system, the gun tube, and the hull. To destroy the hull, without taking the time to cut it into pieces completely, requires that the areas around the drive shaft opening (between the engine and the drive sprocket) be cut away. In addition, the turret aperture area and glacis plate (front armour) are also points where damage significantly degrades the military potential of the hull. In general, the hull should be attacked with the aim of weakening key stress areas or of warping the alignment of its track-system attachment points. All parts not specifically cited for destruction may be salvaged for reuse by the owning country.

Armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) are to be destroyed using the same general approach as that specified for tanks. The hull and turret/main gun (if so equipped) are the focal points for destruction.

Artillery, particularly self-propelled artillery, is also treated similarly to the tank-destruction specifications. For towed artillery, the upper carriage, particularly the trunnion mounts, are vulnerable areas that allow maximum damage to be inflicted with minimal effort.

For aircraft and helicopters, destruction of the main fuselage should be the primary objective of any destruction regime. For fixed-wing aircraft, the most vulnerable areas to focus the destruction effort upon are the area where the wing attaches to the fuselage and the area just in front of the cockpit. For helicopters, the primary stress of lifting the airframe is carried by the critical load path that ties the airframe to the main transmission, which is at the base of the rotor mast. The fuselage should be destroyed in such a way as to destroy and twist the critical lifting structural members in the fuselage. Again, components other than those specified for destruction are recoverable by the owning country.

The severing, or cutting, method of destruction is likely to be the most common method of destruction used to meet the CPE Treaty requirement. While this method is the most labour-intensive way of destroying equipment, it is based on widely available technology and usually contributes to the ultimate goal of reducing the item of equipment to pieces small enough to be melted at a steel mill (1 metre x 1 metre x 1.5 metres, or smaller).

For example, it usually requires 300 to 500 man-hours of labour to completely cut a tank into pieces that can be melted. Since steel is worth about \$130 a ton (on the east coast of the United States), and a

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tank's metal content will weigh about 25 to 40 tons (model dependent), the metal-salvage value of a typical tank might average \$4000. Whether a country has to pay any additional funds above the salvage value to have tanks eliminated depends on the labour costs in that country, any transportation fees, and the amount of materials used to prepare the metal for the mill. (Labour costs are usually the biggest factor.)

Explosive demolition is a fast and inexpensive method for eliminating armoured vehicles. For example, a tank can be destroyed with about two man-hours of labour and less than \$100 worth of explosives. Unfortunately, this method does not help solve the problem of disposing of the residual metal; however, it does provide a method for ensuring that each State can meet its reduction time-schedule in the event that an unexpected problem, such as a work interruption, delays the destruction effort.

The deformation method is essentially a crushing operation; a hydraulic press is used, or an object may even be run over with a heavy tracked vehicle. The damage that must be done with this method is specified in terms of a percentage of deformation from the original shape of the item.

The smashing method is based on a system that was developed in Poland to break up heavy steel plates for scrap metal. Essentially, the procedure uses an eight-ton wrecking ball dropped repeatedly from a height of 22 metres onto an object that is placed on a special anvil. Using this method, it takes about 30 to 40 hits of the ball to break a tank into pieces small enough to be melted. In many ways, this option might prove to be the most efficient and environmentally sound method available for destroying tanks.

Conversion is an attempt to modify military equipment into equipment with a non-combat application. While there are applications where this method is warranted, such as using tanks as fire-fighting vehicles for use in nuclear disasters, the expense of operating converted military equipment, coupled with repair parts availability issues, seems to limit the feasibility of eliminating military equipment on a large scale by this method. In addition, there is always the suspicion, whether warranted or not, that the converted equipment provides a means of avoiding the intent of the arms control treaty.

In the CFE Treaty, for ground equipment, the turret and gun-system components on equipment to be converted must still be destroyed. In addition, the hull being converted must have key pieces of armament removed to decrease its utility as a combat vehicle. For helicopters and

trainer aircraft, conversion involves the removal of all wiring and fire control components necessary for using the aircraft in advanced combat operations.

### *Environmental Considerations*

As noted earlier, the destruction of chemical weapons involves serious environmental and safety concerns. The various destruction options for eliminating conventional armaments under the CFE pose some environmental problems, problems that are within more easily manageable limits. For all methods of destruction, the various fluids used in the equipment to be destroyed must be drained and should be kept segregated. With regard to a tank, for example, it would not be uncommon to have it arrive at a destruction site with 350 to 700 litres of fluids on board. If these fluids are mixed when drained, they have to be treated as toxic waste in many countries. In addition, if these fluids are not drained and the explosive demolition method of destruction is used, it is possible that the equipment will be set on fire and will produce large volumes of hazardous smoke.

The severing method of destruction is the one other area that produces some environmental hazards. Armoured equipment is usually composed of alloy metals which produce toxic fumes when vaporised. Large-scale cutting operations can produce significant amounts of air pollution. In many countries, there are requirements for hoods and air scrubbers to be used during high-volume cutting operations that use some type of torch to melt metal.

### *Factors for Other Regional Negotiations*

While the CFE Treaty provides one example of how conventional armaments can be destroyed, it should not be viewed as the only acceptable way to approach the problem. As noted earlier, the CFE processes of destruction were developed on the basis of some special considerations that might not be issues in conventional arms negotiations in other areas of the world. In determining how armaments should be eliminated under future arms control agreements, the following considerations recommend themselves:

1. How fast must the armaments be reduced? As a practical matter, it is easier politically to develop a build-down reduction regime which allows the participating countries to shave a percentage of their holdings each year or two. For example, if country X owns 1000 tanks, and agrees to cut 100 tanks over a six-year period, that country could eliminate 16 or 17 of its oldest tanks

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each year and reach the new limit without much of the political pain that reductions during a shorter time-span might impose. If this approach is not acceptable, then other more drastic measures must be applied.

2. Are the amounts of armaments involved so large that their sale would cause problems in regional or global armament balances? If the amount is minor and the sale would just constitute a part of the continuing cycle of arms redistribution that occurs annually, it might be easier to allow the weapons to be sold, with an eye towards having fewer to sell in the future as armament inventories shrink. This is especially true where the countries involved are having economic difficulties and arms destruction would cause major political problems. The large inventory of armaments in Europe made this an unacceptable solution for CFE.
3. Can the countries use the spare parts from the items being eliminated? If so, a destruction regime that allows extensive salvaging of parts might be more acceptable. Most parties would likely realise some economic benefit from repair-parts cost savings.

## CONCLUSION

As arms control agreements increasingly call for physical destruction of armaments, questions such as the magnitude of the destruction task, the desired order and rate of destruction, the costs, and the impact on political, economic and environmental concerns come into interactive play. It would seem that the key to a successful armament reduction regime is taking the time to develop a detailed plan that makes as much political and economic sense as possible.

Experience to date with unilateral and internationally negotiated destruction of weapons suggests that proper destruction of chemical weapons is enormously costly, both absolutely and relative to the original cost of the weapons. Destruction of conventional weapons is much less costly and can conceivably finance itself through the value of the scrap and other salvage. The bulk of the difficulties and costs destruction of chemical weapons are caused by safety and environmental demands. Environmental questions are much more easily managed in destruction of conventional weapons. There is no relevant experience to date on destruction of nuclear weapons.

# 13

## **DISARMAMENT EDUCATION IN AFRICA: THE IAUP/UN COMMISSION EXPERIENCE**

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The International Association of University Presidents, together with the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, established in 1991 the IAUP/UN Commission on Disarmament Education. It consists of 200 scholars, university presidents, government officials, military officers, diplomats, and representatives of other professions, organised by teams. The Commission's mandate is to expand the teaching of peace and disarmament, especially in developing countries. The ultimate aim is to build constituencies for arms limitation throughout the Third World, as a prelude to economic and environmental improvement.

During 1991-1992, the first year of its existence, the Commission invited some 30 scholars from 25 universities in ten countries to address the status of academic arms control world wide. From these presentations we concluded that the teaching of disarmament was limited largely to the West. Even in the West, however, the material taught was obsolete, because it was based on a Super-Power confrontation which no longer existed. The Commission therefore decided to develop new curricula based on the current realities of regional conflict, and to seek the adaption of such curricula among Third World institutions.

After two years of assigning scholar teams, developing new educational material, and disseminating that material world wide, the Commission began in spring 1994 to work with 14 pilot institutions which soon grew to 36 universities in 21 developing countries. These institutions are committed to adapting the Commission's material to their own regional, cultural, and curricular needs. This effort now involves 16 mentor/scholars working as partners with almost 50 host professors from Asia, Africa and Latin America. So far, these partnerships have produced 42 new disarmament courses for 1300 students, with

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60 courses involving 1800 students projected for fall 1996. These numbers are conservative, because some of the “courses” are multi-course degree programmes, and some of the “institutions” are multi-member consortia.

The Commission’s activities have been funded by a variety of sources, including the Samuel Freeman Trust, the W. Alton Jones Foundation, international donors, the United States Institute for Peace (USIP), and the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). A recent second grant from USIP has permitted expansion of the Commission’s curricular efforts to the Middle East. For data on the Commission’s worldwide activities, including the countries involved, see Annex I.

### **Zambia: the Public System and “Surrogate Replication”**

The IAUP/UN Commission’s role in Africa is expanding rapidly. One of the leaders is Joseph Kalunga, President of Evelyn Hone College in Lusaka, Zambia. He is also Chairman of Zambia’s 16-member public college consortium. These institutions offer three-year diploma programmes in technical and vocational fields like business administration, engineering, nursing, and accounting, as well as more general programmes in the social and natural sciences.

Dr. Kalunga was one of twelve “students” at the September 1994 IAUP/UN International Seminar on Arms Control and Disarmament at Juniata College. Like the other students, he heard a presentation on the Commission’s curricular project, and received outlines and later the full curricula of the disarmament modules developed by the various Commission teams. He returned to Lusaka, digested these materials, transformed them to meet the needs and culture of his country, and then proposed that his government approve a common three-year programme in peace and disarmament for the entire 16-member public college system.

The Government not only approved, but joined Dr. Kalunga in planning a workshop for spring 1995, as a preparatory step toward introducing the programme the subsequent fall. The workshop was sponsored by the Government’s Department of Technical and Vocational Education, working jointly with the public system’s lead college, Evelyn Hone. This event brought together an impressive array of political leaders, military officers, human rights advocates, and educators, all of whom contributed to the development of a three-year required curriculum for all public college students regardless of academic major.

The three-year peace requirement will be in place throughout the 16-member public system by 1997.

A two-semester course entitled "Peace and Disarmament Studies", which comprises the first year of the sequence, has already been introduced. Its chief aim is to enable students to understand peace and security as a prerequisite for economic development. Among the topics included are: definition of peace and war; the relationship of peace to development; factors affecting regional peace, e.g., political climate, economy, international relations; Zambian and international politics, including international organisations and treaties; the nature of democracy, in theory and in Zambia; economic reform in Zambia and internationally; history of the cold war, including the arms race, nuclear proliferation, and arms transfers to the Third World; emergence of arms control and its current status; and conflict resolution, including applications to non-military conflict caused by trade unions, the church, and other pressure groups.

This course and the material to be introduced later in the second and third years of the public college curriculum replaces a former Marxist-oriented requirement. Given the leadership of Dr. Kalunga, who recently moved to the Zambian Education Department, it should be possible eventually to move parts of this sequence into other east African universities, especially in Kenya and Tanzania, where the Commission already has a foothold in medical schools. Zambia, thus, illustrates the Commission's initial efforts to achieve "surrogate replication"—that is, to move the "action center" away from the Commission and toward strategically located institutions in specific regions.

### **Kenya: Medical Schools and the Modular Approach**

By no means is Zambia the only African star in the Commission's firmament. Among the earliest institutions to get involved were Moi and Nairobi Universities in Kenya. In September 1995, Moi introduced disarmament material for its second and fourth year medical students. Each of the original classes had about 40 students, one of whom was assigned to attend the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) conference in Manila on children and war. Beginning in October 1995, Nairobi University integrated similar material into its teaching programme for behavioural sciences (first year) and psychology/psychiatry (third year). Each of the original classes averaged 100 students.

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In making these advances in medical education, these two African universities drew from the Commission's "Medicine and Peace" curriculum, developed by a team headed by Dr. Victor Sidel of Albert Einstein College of Medicine at Yeshiva University. Dr. Sidel is also President of IPPNW. This curriculum, appropriate for all types of health science colleges, features 18 modules (2-5 week units) which can stand alone, be inserted in other courses, or be sequenced to form one or more new courses or even a new programme.

Among these are modules on medical ethics and war, the role of health professionals in the prevention of war, and a sequence of four modules on nuclear weapons: nature and threat, short-term health effects, long term health problems of survivors, and environmental consequences. Other modules include health consequences of chemical, biological, and conventional weapons; psychological consequences of the arms race; and underdevelopment (poverty and hunger) as both consequence and cause of the arms trade. Each module contains a detailed substantive outline accompanied by extensive readings and issues for student discussion. For a sample of the Dr. Sidel modules, see Annex II.

The modular approach recognises that in academia, and especially in medical and other professional schools, the introduction of any new material is difficult, and likely to be opposed by the individual professor, his department, and/or a university curricular committee. This approach provides a psychological and "political" solution to such opposition. To start with the introduction of one or two modules into an already existing course is not threatening to the individual professor, and does not require departmental or committee approval.

In fact, the typical Commission "partner institution" begins with one or more orientation workshops for faculty, then cautiously integrates a few Commission modules into already existing courses. Once students are receptive and faculty comfortable, the institution moves more boldly toward a full-fledged course, created by linking interrelated Commission modules. At first this course is made elective, then later required. Ultimately, the more venturesome universities take the leap to multi-course degree programmes at the baccalaureate or master's level.

The merits of the modular concept are illustrated by Moi University in Kenya, where for some years a conventional medical course had been taught in "Injury and Trauma". After becoming a host professor for the Commission, Dr. Peter Nyarang'o, now Dean of the Medical

School, continued to maintain the title and broad outline of this course. But, he changed the substance dramatically by introducing IAUP/UN modules on the health impact of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

### **South Africa: Potchefstroom University and Course Evaluation**

The Commission soon expects to utilise the modular approach to introduce disarmament material into one or more of the medical schools at Cape Town, Witswatersrand, and Natal Universities. As elsewhere, the aim will be to adapt Dr. Sidel's disarmament material to regional, cultural, and curricular needs.

However, the Commission's main effort in South Africa has been in partnership with the political science or history departments at Rhodes, Potchefstroom, and Bophuthatswana Universities. Among these three institutions, during the period September 1994 through February 1996, five peace and disarmament courses have been developed and taught. The material for those courses has been drawn largely from a curriculum developed by a team headed by Professor Steven Spiegel of the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), a master teacher whose text, *World Politics in a New Era*, has been widely used both in the United States and abroad. In contrast to Dr. Sidel's assignment, Professor Spiegel's team developed new material linking peace studies with security studies, and intended for undergraduates in the social sciences.

The Spiegel curriculum, which is still evolving and in which UCLA graduate students played a significant role, contains 15 modules grouped around four themes: *causes and management of conflict* (peace studies and conflict resolution); *weapon systems* (nuclear arms, chemical/biological weapons control, conventional arms control); *regional activities* (Middle East, Latin America, south Asia, east Asia, Europe, and eventually Africa); and *arms limitation factors* (UN and other international institutions, domestic influences, impact of military on environment, economics of arms control, and arms transfers/trade). For a sample of the Spiegel modules, see Annex III. Given the space limitations in this journal, this sample includes only the first four pages of an eight-page module.

The experience at Potchefstroom University illustrates what can happen when the "chemistry" is right between the Commission-appointed mentor (in this case Dr. Spiegel himself) and the host professor abroad. Professor Johann Kirsten, a former South African commando

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officer in Angola, was one of twelve southern African scholars invited to the Commission's International Disarmament Seminar at Juniata College in Pennsylvania in September 1994. Inspired by that crash course in disarmament issues, he began planning a disarmament course upon return home. In May 1995, he was one of seven outstanding host professors invited to participate in a Commission Symposium on "Education for Global Security", in honour of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations. While in New York, he and Professor Spiegel held several one-on-one meetings, out of which came the "Kirsten Bibliography"—a list of the books most urgently needed to teach a quality disarmament course.

In August 1995, Professor Kirsten launched his twelve week undergraduate peace and disarmament course under the title "Conflict and Order in World Politics". He drew heavily from Dr. Spiegel's module "Arms Control and Nuclear Weapons", as well as modules on other weapons of mass destruction, origins of war, conflict management, and the role of the United Nations in addressing conflict. The course featured two examinations and a required paper analysing one recent war such as Vietnam or Iran/Iraq, the changed environment for the United Nations, or the recent French nuclear tests.

Each pair of mentor/host professors is asked to follow a 12-step process entitled *Guidelines for Partner Institutions*. Step 10 is the teaching of the course, and Step 11 is evaluation. In December 1995, Professor Kirsten submitted his and his students' evaluation of the course. Among the student comments were the following: "The problem of nuclear weapons becomes very real in [our] study of international politics—perhaps too real!" "I believe conflict management is one of the most important activities in today's world." "The United Nations has, in the absence of a bipolar world, played an important stabilising role in international relations."

In providing an evaluation to the Commission, the host professor is asked to identify weaknesses in the initial course, how on that basis he intends to revise the material, and his plans for further teaching at his own or a neighbouring institution. In Kirsten's case, the revisions will include more emphasis on conventional, chemical and biological weapons; economic consequences of arms control; the non-nuclear use of missiles; and especially Spiegel's module on "Arms Proliferation, Transfer, and Trade". Professor Kirsten will repeat the course, revised, in August 1996, and is considering an eight-week graduate course using Dr. Spiegel's modules "Peace Studies" and "Conventional Arms

Control". He also plans to exchange course material with other Commission partners in South Africa.

### **South Africa: Rhodes University and "Library Enhancement"**

The situation at Rhodes University is different. Unlike Professor Kirsten, the converted commando, the political studies faculty at Rhodes is sophisticated and experienced in the field of security and related studies. In 1995 they ran a full semester course in peace and conflict for master's and honors students, and are planning to offer a similar course in 1996. Their syllabus was well received, but in their own words, "our library resources in this area remain underdeveloped, largely due to financial restraints under which we operate".

For Rhodes and similar institutions, the IAUP/UN Commission has embarked on an ambitious "library enhancement" programme. It involves the xeroxing and mailing of articles by team leaders, the use of "suitcase libraries" by mentors as they visit overseas campuses, and modest cash grants to host professors, who can then purchase books and journals in their own country, directly from western publishers, or request Commission team leaders to make the purchases for shipment to them. In this latter case, the grant is expended in the United States, less costs for postage, shipments, and Fedex.

Meanwhile, the United Nations Library and Publications Division, together with the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs (UNCDA), has agreed to send relevant United Nations publications to our overseas scholars on a roughly quarterly basis. The first such shipment, on a pilot basis to twelve host professors, was made in early July 1995. It consisted of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*; three volumes on nuclear weapons, environment, and sustainable development; and two training manuals on peace-keeping and peacemaking.

The first UNCDA shipment, made in August 1995, included current and past copies of the Centre's *Newsletter*, the journal *Disarmament*, and a backlog of materials now filling CDA closets. Although such materials might be obsolete to a United Nations officer or western scholar, they are prized resources for most Third World professors. Moreover, such shipments open up a whole new audience of opinion-makers for the United Nations.

Similar arrangements have been made with the United Nations University in Tokyo, the Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO)

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Committee on Disarmament in New York, and ACDA in Washington. The latter is sending their quarterly *Readings*, four volumes on nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and their annual publication on the status of world armament. As of January 1996, all 50 host professors will begin receiving these materials.

In short, the Commission is moving vigorously to consolidate its gains by converting the current experimental disarmament courses to “permanent” offerings. To accomplish this conversion, we obviously seek to “strike a deal” with the various host professors and their department chairs or deans. In effect, we offer to make significant improvements in their library holdings in the disarmament field, if they in turn commit to formally evaluating the course or programme, revising it as necessary, including it in their catalogues, and offering it, at least in alternate years, for the next six years.

Given the considerable weakness of Third World campus libraries, this offer is being enthusiastically received. The enthusiasm will increase as we gradually turn toward technology, especially the Internet, to expedite these efforts and to deliver the materials in a more timely fashion.

### **Nigeria and Cameroon: Failure Vs. Success**

Africa reflects most of the problems involved in any attempt to introduce western-initiated disarmament education into the curricula of Third World universities. Among those problems are: communication difficulties such as non-working or non-existent fax machines; cultural differences, especially in the concept of timeliness; leadership transition—typically the retirement or removal of a supportive rector; inadequate resources of either faculty or library; lack of material relevance (e.g., in east Africa, land mines cause more anxiety than nuclear threats); and political instability, which often takes the form of civil war or military dictatorship.

Where the instability is lessening, as in South Africa, it can actually be a positive force. In the post-apartheid era, South Africa universities are now anxious to rejoin the world family, and free at last to pursue peace education and research. Where the instability is increasing, however, or is at or near its peak, conditions arise which make it almost impossible for the Commission to work with a partner institution. When faculty are intimidated and even fear for their lives, the atmosphere is not conducive to teaching peace and disarmament.

A tragic example here is the University of Ibadan in Nigeria, which originally intended to establish an interdisciplinary disarmament team from sociology, medicine, and political science. However, as communication with Ibadan has become impossible, we have placed the institution on hold, and have diverted our efforts to the International Relations Institute in more stable Cameroon (IRIC). The mentor for this latter project is Ivor Richard Fung, currently the United Nations Department of Political Affairs' political adviser to the peace processes in Mali and the Niger. Under Dr. Fung's guidance, and with the assistance of the IAUP/UN Commission, the IRIC hopes to explore relations with the nearby University of Yaounde and one or two other institutions in Chad or Gabon; improve its library holdings in the disarmament field; and develop a graduate seminar in peace and disarmament for diplomats from Central Africa.

Given the various problems in intercultural adaptation of disarmament education, no one would have thought that so much progress could have occurred so fast. Why are an increasing number of Third World faculty and students attracted to the Commission's material? There are many answers, but only a few are presented here. First, little could have been done without the financial help of foundations and agencies. The unprecedented grant of US\$100,000 from the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1994 vastly increased both the thrust and scope of the Commission's efforts. Second, curricula in developing universities are still in flux, providing considerable opportunity for academic innovation.

Also, unlike prior disarmament syllabi based on superpower confrontation, the IAUP/UN Commission material focuses on regional conflict, conventional arms, the arms trade, dangers of nuclear proliferation among small countries, emergence of biological and chemical weapons in the Third World, the health and environmental impact of such weapons, peace economics and defense conversion, relation of peace to economic and environmental improvement, civilian control of the military, peace-keeping techniques, preventive diplomacy, and confidence building.

These regional themes, taught to successive classes of students, can help build an academic, and then a political, military, and civilian constituency for arms limitations, which are the *sine qua non* for achieving social justice in developing countries. Small wonder then that Third World faculty and students regard the IAUP/UN curricula as an

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opportunity to positively influence the future course of their countries, and to improve the quality of life for their people.

### **Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe: The IAUP/UN Seminar**

Apart from the previously discussed modular approach, however, the chief factor in the Commission's curricular success to date has been the International Seminar on Arms Control and Disarmament (ISACD), conducted annually by Juniata College's Baker Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at its Williamsburg, Pennsylvania retreat center.

In return for free tuition, room/board, and even selective travel aid, scholars invited to the seminar are expected to return home and replicate what they have learned. Follow-up mechanisms help to assure that such expectations are realised. To appreciate how the Seminar works, let us look at the September 1994 session for young scholars from southern Africa.

Twelve scholars from six countries were invited to this session. The institutions represented were Evelyn Hone College from Zambia; the Institute of Graduate Studies from Mozambique; the University of Zimbabwe from that country; Chancellor College from Malawi; and Western Cape, Cape Town, Fort Hare, Bophuthatswana, Natal, and Potchefstroom Universities from South Africa. Also included as a regional "foil" was a scholar from the University of Annaba in Algeria, who later fled to Paris to escape terrorist danger in his own country.

These twelve academicians were almost evenly balanced between whites and blacks, with mixed pairs in each room. Among them were several former government officials and military officers, including a retired colonel who had commanded the Mozambique Air Force. Their academic fields ran the gambit from history to physics, and included mathematics, conflict resolution, peace economics, political science, war and strategic studies, international relations, law, commerce, military technology, and applied arts. One scholar, just returned from a sabbatical abroad at Cambridge University, was a research associate in economic planning for the African National Congress. He also represented the Military Research Group in Johannesburg, which was seeking to develop a structure and policies for the post-apartheid South African army.

The lectures and discussions conducted by a distinguished faculty included such general topics as the United Nations and other agency

effectiveness in arms control, major power roles in global security, international regimes banning weapons of mass destruction, alternative security measures, non-violent action and democratic culture, and “agreement building” —i.e., negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution. The programme also included topics especially relevant to Africa: the African nuclear weapon free zone; the disarming of private armies and criminal gangs; the role of Africa in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; the prospects for regional arms control in north Africa; the consequences of anti-personnel mines in Mozambique; the United Nations in southern Africa after the cold war; and political violence in South Africa.

All that took place in two weeks, plus simulation sessions, a presentation of the IAUP/UN curricular project, and a climactic panel discussion at the United Nations featuring the ISACD “graduates” discussing “Confidence-building measures in Africa”! Given this extreme mix of personalities, institutions, countries, and topics, one might assume that the September 1994 Juniata seminar was a tumultuous affair, involving much conflict, emotion, cultural cleavages, and heated disagreements. On the contrary, an admirable bond quickly evolved between whites and blacks, with general agreement on most African problems and solutions.

The impact of this seminar was enormous. It inspired the participants to return home and disseminate what they had learned, quite apart from any requirement to do so. Thus, within a year, a Mozambique scholar had introduced an arms control module in his “*Introduction to nuclear physics*” course; a South African scholar had taught a new course on “*Disarmament and global arms contracts in the nuclear age*”; and the participant from Zimbabwe had not only developed a new course in “*Military technology and arms control*”, but had changed the emphasis of a prior course from “*War Fighting*” to “*Peace and Conflict Management*”. The commendable results at Evelyn Hone College in Zambia and Potchefstroom University in South Africa have already been described. Out of seven non-medical Commission host professors in Africa, five are graduates of the September 1994 seminar.

As the UNESCO preamble urges, the IAUP/UN Commission on Disarmament Education seeks to educate for peace, so that today’s students, in Africa and elsewhere, will not need to fight tomorrow’s wars.

## ANNEX I

### IAUP/UN COMMISSION ON DISARMAMENT EDUCATION

#### Overview of "Curricular Replication" Efforts, as at November 1995 (Prepared by Leland Miles)

36 Partner universities <sup>a</sup>	16 Mentors (senior scholars)
21 Countries <sup>b</sup>	49 Host professors (overseas)
42 Recent/current/ scheduled courses <sup>c</sup>	260 Students
60 Estimated courses by fall 1996 <sup>d</sup>	1800 Students
68 Estimated courses by fall 1997 <sup>e</sup>	2000 Students

- a. One of these universities (University of the Valley of Mexico) heads an 11-member "federation". Two others are also consortia, namely the FLACSO consortium in Chile (4 members), and the Evelyn Hone public college consortium in Zambia (16 members).
- b. Argentina, Cameroon, Chile, China, Croatia, Egypt, Guatemala, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, El Salvador, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, and Zambia.
- c. Four of these "courses" are in fact diploma or degree programmes.
- d. Most of this increase results from the phasing in by January 1996 of a diploma programme at the remainder of the 16-member Zambia public college system. The lead college, Evelyn Hone, initiated the process in September 1995.
- e. This estimate assumes that at least eight schools will probably have courses running before or by fall 1997, e.g., Siam U. (Thailand), U. Nairobi (Kenya), Muhimibili U. (Tanzania), Southeast U. (China), Kanda U. (Japan), U. Ibadan (Nigeria), International Relations Institute (Cameroon), plus new institutional partners in Norway, Israel, Egypt, and Croatia.

## ANNEX II

### SAMPLE MODULE

#### Nuclear Weapons: Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War

##### *Overview*

This module reviews the potential climatic and environmental consequences of a nuclear war, including the impact of atmospheric soot and dust, depletion of stratospheric ozone, radioactive fallout, and chemical pollution. It explores climatic effects that might persist

for days or years, and ecological effects that might last decades more. The consequences of these stresses for organised agriculture and aquatic and terrestrial plant and animal life are estimated. The environmental consequences of nuclear weapons production, testing, storage and disassembly are covered in Module VI. Prepared for IAUP/UN Commission by Victor Sidel and colleagues.

### *Objectives*

After completing this module, students should be able to:

1. Describe basic atmospheric processes occurring under normal condition.
2. Describe possible climatic changes due to injected particulate matter.
3. Describe the possible subsequent impact on living organisms, including human beings.
4. Describe the basic sources of uncertainty in estimating these effects.

### *Topic outline*

- I. Normal atmospheric processes
  - A. Solar and infrared radiation: climate, seasons
  - B. Atmospheric transport: winds, weather, climate zones
- II. Nuclear war scenarios: principal considerations
  - A. Total yield of the warhead(s)
  - B. Targets (counterforce/countervalue, etc.)
  - C. Height of explosions
  - D. Season at onset of nuclear war
  - E. Fuel loading—estimating the amount and character of the materials that would be ignited and injected.
  - F. Other atmospheric injections—dust, nitrogen oxide
  - G. Uncertainties
- III. Physical and atmospheric consequences of a nuclear war
  - A. Atmospheric models
    1. One-dimensional vs. three-dimensional models
    2. Interactive vs. non-interactive models
  - B. Sources, properties and evolution of atmospheric injections

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1. Soot: origin, height of injection, microphysical processes, optical properties, resultant attenuation and evolution
  2. Dust: origin, height of injection, microphysical processes, optical properties, resultant attenuation and evolution
  3. Mechanisms of prompt and delays scavenging/removal
- C. Meteorological and climatic effects
1. Results and extrapolations from general circulation models with interactive soot and dust
    - (a) Meteorological and climatic effects—temperature, light attenuation, precipitation changes
    - (b) Regional variations in effect
    - (c) Observations of natural perturbations—volcanos, forest fires, duststorm
- D. Ozone depletion
1. Impact of fireball nitrogen oxides on stratospheric ozone
  2. Impact of soot heating and modifying transport and chemistry
  3. Ultraviolet light (UV-B) dose assessments
- E. Chemical pollutants
1. Polycyclic organic compounds, CO, hydrocarbons
  2. Acidic precipitation
  3. Industrial toxins
- F. Radioactivity
- IV. Agricultural and ecological effects of environmental perturbations
- A. Agricultural effects
1. Regional differences—northern temperate vs. subtropical
  2. Acute vs. chronic effects—duration of food stores
  3. Single crop analysis—wheat, barley, rice
  4. Impact on Southern Hemisphere
- B. Vulnerability of natural ecosystems

1. Temperate terrestrial
2. Estuarial
3. Marine
4. Fresh water aquatic
5. Tropical
6. Arid

#### V. Uncertainty

##### A. Sources

1. The nuclear war scenarios
2. The atmospheric models

##### B. Data base

1. Interface between field studies and models
2. Applicability of data from volcanos, fires, dust storms

##### C. Impliation on uncertainty

### **Readings**

Cassel C *et al.*, eds. *Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War: A Sourcebook for Health Professionals*. Newark: Praeger Publishers, 1984. (Chapter 8, appendix articles by Turco *et al.* and by Erlich *et al.*)

Solomon F. and Marston R; eds. *The Medical Implications of Nuclear War* (Part 1). Washington, DC: Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy Press, 1986.

– Turco, “Recent assessments of the environmental consequences of nuclear war.”

– Harwell and Harwell, “Nuclear famine: The indirect effects of nuclear war.”

– Carrier, “Nuclear winter: The state of the science.”

– Malone, “Atmospheric perturbations of a large-scale nuclear war.

– Birks and Stephens, “Possible toxic environments following a nuclear war.”

Turco, R.P., *et. al.* “Nuclear winter: Global consequences of multiple nuclear explosions.” *Science* 222: 1283-1292, 1983.

Turco, R.P., *et. al.* “Climate and Smoke: An Appraisal of Nuclear Winter. *Science.*” 247:166-176, 1990.

World Health Organisation. *Effects of Nuclear War on Health and Health Services*. Second Edition. Geneva: World Health Organisation, 1987 (Annexes 2 and 7).

### *Discussion Topics*

1. What effects do the long-term climatic and ecological consequences of nuclear war have on the possibility of surviving such a war?
2. What are the policy implications of long-term climatic and ecological effects of nuclear war? For deterrence? For considerations of arms control and disarmament? For deciding how much emphasis should be placed on non-proliferation?
3. Following a nuclear war, what foods would be available?
4. How should medical and other scientific conclusions about long-term ecological effects of nuclear war be translated into political action? What are the appropriate roles of physicians and other scientists in the political process?
5. Now that the cold war is over, how concerned should we be about the use of nuclear weapons? How should those concerns, if any, be translated into policy prescriptions?

### *Reference Material*

- Crutzen, P.J. and Birks J.W. "The atmosphere after a nuclear war: Twilight at noon." *Ambio* 11:114-125, 1982.
- Ehrlich, P. et al. *The Cold and the Dark: The World After Nuclear War*: New York: W.W. Norton, 1984.
- Golitsyn, G.S. and McCracken M.C. "Atmospheric and climatic consequences of a major nuclear war: Results of recent research." Geneva, World Meteorological Organisation, December 1987.
- Penner, J.E. "Uncertainties in the smoke source term for "nuclear winter studies." *Nature* 323:222-226, November 20, 1986.
- Peterson, J. ed. *The Aftermath, The Human and Ecological Consequences of Nuclear War*. New York, Pantheon Books, 1983.
- Pittock, A.B. *Beyond Darkness: Nuclear Winter in Australia and New Zealand*, Melbourne, Sun Books, 1987.
- Robbins, A. et al. *Radioactive Heaven and Earth: The Health and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons Testing In, On and Above the Earth*. New York: Apex Press, 1991.
- Sagan, C. "Nuclear war and climatic catastrophe: Some policy indications." *Foreign Affairs*. Winter 1983/84: 257-92.
- SCOPE Report, *Environment Consequences of Nuclear War*. Chichester, UK: John Wiley and Sons, 1986.
- Thompson, S.L. and Schneider, S.H. "Nuclear winter reappraised" *Foreign Affairs* 64:981-1005, Summer, 1986.

### ANNEX III

#### SAMPLE MODULE

**The Economics of Arms Control (only pages 1-4 of the syllabus are reproduced below)**

Prepared by the Undergraduate Prototype Committee, IAUP/ UN Commission on Arms Control Education. Steven L. Spiegel, Chair.

#### *Overview and Objectives*

This course examines the economic aspects of arms control. This course will present the impetus behind the proliferation of arms. The relationship between arms control and proliferation is one in which the desire for arms control measures must be balanced with the economic impact of selling weapons. Thus, the economic incentives for the arms trade will also be discussed. Finally, the limitations and restrictions of converting defense industry to civilian industry will be addressed. This syllabus is designed to assist in teaching a module on this subject designed for a three week course, two classes a week, organised in the following way:

#### *Course Outline*

- I. The economics of defense
  - A. National security and economic conditions
  - B. Post-cold war economic conditions
  - C. The economics of arms control in developing countries
- II. Proliferation
  - A. Incentives for proliferation
  - B. Politics of proliferation
  - C. Economics of proliferation
- III. Arms Trade and Transfer
  - A. Introduction
  - B. Economics of the arms trade
  - C. The arms trade after the cold war
  - D. Case studies
    1. China
    2. European Union
    3. Russia
    4. United States
- IV. Defense Conversion

## *Syllabus*

### *I. The economics of Defense*

This section presents the relationship between national security and economic stability. Nations must balance the need for security with the need for social programmes. The end of the cold war has changed the landscape of international relations and thus the relationship between national security needs and social needs. In addition, the economic conditions in developing countries create special circumstances within which these countries must balance security and social needs.

#### *A. National Security and Economic Conditions*

##### *Reading*

Friedberg, Aaron L. "The changing relationship between economics and national security". *Political Science Quarterly*. Summer 1991, (vol. 106, no.2), 265-276.

Gertcher, Frank L. and William J. Weida (eds.). *Beyond Deterrence: The Political Economy of Nuclear Weapons*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990. Chapters 8, 12, and 16.

Mosley, Hugh G. "The Arms Race: Economic and Social Consequences". Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1985. Chapters 4, 5, and 6.

Samuels, Richard J. "Reinventing security: Japan since Meiji". Vernon, Raymond and Ethan B. Kapstein (eds.), *Defence and Dependence in a Global Economy*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1992.

Sutherland, Ronald G. "The economic consequences of chemical weapons disarmament" in Sur, Serge (ed.), *Disarmament Agreements and Negotiations: The Economic Dimensions*. Dartmouth: UNIDIR, 1991.

Vernon, Raymond and Ethan B. Kapstein. "National needs, global resources" in Vernon, Raymond and Ethan B. Kapstein (eds.), *Defense and Dependence in a Global Economy*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1992.

##### *Additional Reading*

Bremer, Stuart A. and Barry B. Hughes. "Disarmament and development: a design for the future?" New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1990. Chapter 2.

Chan, Steve, and Alex Mintz. *Defense, Welfare, and Growth*. London: Routledge, 1992.

Mintz, Alex (ed.). "The political economy of military spending in the United States". London: Routledge, 1992.

Dumas, Lloyd J. "National security, non-contributive activity and macroeconomic analysis: theoretical, empirical and methodological issues" in Bischak, Gregory A. (ed.), *Towards a Peace Economy in the United States*:

*Essays on Military Industry, Disarmament and Economic Conversion*. London: MacMillan, 1991.

### ***B. Post-Cold War Economic Conditions***

#### ***Readings***

Renner Michael. "Budgeting for disarmament: the costs of war and peace". Worldwatch Institute: Worldwatch Paper 122, November 1994.

Klein, Lawrence R., Fu-chen Lo, and Warwick J. McKibbin (eds.). *Arms Reduction: Economic Implications of the Post Cold War Era*. Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press, 1995.

Payne, James E. and Anandi P. Sahu (eds.)- *Defense Spending and Economic Growth*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.

### ***C. The Economics of Arms Control in Developing Countries***

#### ***Readings***

Adams, F. Gerard, Jere R. Behrman and Michael Boldin. "Defense Spending and Economic Growth in the LDCs: The Cross-Section Perspective" in Adams, F. Gerard (ed), *The Macroeconomic Dimensions of Arms Reduction*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

Adams, F. Gerard, Roberto S. Mariano, and Innwon Park. "Defense expenditures and economic growth in the Philippines: a macrosimulation analysis" in Adams, F. Gerard (ed), *The Macroeconomic Dimensions of Arms Reduction*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

Deger, Saadet "Economic and security consequences of the east-west arms control process on the Third World" in Sur, Serge, *Disarmament Agreements and Negotiations: The Economic Dimension*. Dartmouth: UNIDIR, 1991.

Fontanel, Jacques. "Effects for developing countries of the east-west disarmament process" in Sur, Serge, *Disarmament Agreements and Negotiations: The Economic Dimension*. Dartmouth: UNIDIR, 1991.

#### ***Study Questions***

1. How does concern about the economic condition affect world leaders' decisions on arms control issues?
2. How does the end of the cold war affect the relationship between economic conditions and national security?
3. How are the conditions in developing countries with respect to defense issues different than those of developed countries?

## ***II. Proliferation***

This section presents the issues relating to the proliferation of weapons. Proliferation occurs when States that did not formerly possess certain weapons acquire them. The reasons behind a nation's decision

to acquire weapons will be addressed. In addition, the political issues within countries that choose to sell or distribute weapons will be explored. Finally, the economic incentives of weapons proliferation will be discussed.

### *A. Incentives for Proliferation*

#### *Readings*

- Morgan, M. Granger and Mitchel B. Wallerstein. "Controlling the High-Technology Militarisation of the Developing World" in Wander, W. Thomas and Eric H. Arnett (eds.), *The Proliferation of Advanced Weaponry: Technology, Motivations, and Responses*. Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1992.
- Quester, George H. "Unilateral Self-Restraint on Nuclear Proliferation: Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, and Germany" in Ramberg, Bennett (ed.), *Arms Control Without Negotiation: From the cold war to the New World Order*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993.
- Wander, W. Thomas. "The Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles: Motives, Technologies, and Threats" in Wander, W. Thomas and Eric H. Arnett (eds.), *The Proliferation of Advanced Weaponry: Technology, Motivations, and Responses*. Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1992.
- Zimmerman, Peter D. "Proliferation: Bronze Medal Technology is Enough". *Orbis*. Winter 1994, 67-82.

#### *Additional Reading*

- Freedman, Lawrence. "The 'proliferation problem' and the new world order" in Karsh, Efraim, Martin S. Navias, and Philip Sabin (eds.), *Non Conventional-Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East: Tackling the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Capabilities*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
- McFate, Patricia A. and Sidney N. Graybeal. "A new proliferation threat from space?" in Wander, W. Thomas and Eric H. Arnett (eds.), *The Proliferation of Advanced Weaponry: Technology, Motivations, and Responses*. Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1992.
- Sims, Jennifer. "The intelligence requirements for a non-proliferation policy" in Wander, W. Thomas and Eric H. Arnett (eds.), *The Proliferation of Advanced Weaponry: Technology, Motivations, and Responses*. Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1992.
- Squassoni, Sharon A. "Arms control, confidence building, and other regional responses" in Wander, W. Thomas and Eric H. Arnett (eds.), *The Proliferation of Advanced Weaponry: Technology, Motivations, and Responses*. Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1992.

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# 14

## ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF DISARMAMENT

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*Following the adoption by the general assembly, at its fourteenth session, of general and complete disarmament as a goal of the Organisation, another aspect of disarmament was considered at the fifteenth session. Resolution 1516 (XV), which was adopted by the Assembly on 15 December 1960, requested the Secretary-General to examine:*

- (a) The national economic and social consequences of disarmament in countries with different economic systems and at different stages of economic development, including, in particular, the problems of replacing military expenditures with alternative private and public civil expenditures so as to maintain effective demand and to absorb the human and material resources released from military uses;
- (b) The possible development of structural imbalances in national economies as a result of the cessation of capital investment in armaments industries, and the adoption of possible corrective measures to prevent such imbalances, including expanded capital assistance to the under-developed countries;
- (c) The impact of disarmament on international economic relations, including its effect on world trade and especially on the trade of under-developed countries;
- (d) The utilisation of resources released by disarmament for the purpose of economic and social development, in particular of the under-developed countries.

### **Consultative Group's Report**

The Secretary-General appointed a group of ten experts drawn from countries with different economic systems and at different stages

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of economic development. The experts' report,<sup>1</sup> agreed on unanimously, was submitted by the Secretary-General to the Economic and Social Council on 28 February 1962. The consultative group reported that:

The world is spending roughly \$120 billion annually on military account at the present time. This figure is equivalent to about 8-9 per cent of the world's annual output of all goods and services; it is at least two-thirds of—and according to some estimates may be of the same order of magnitude as—the entire national income of all the under-developed countries. It is close to the value of the world's annual exports of all commodities and it corresponds to about one-half the total resources set aside each year for gross capital formation throughout the world.... The total of all persons in the armed forces and in all productive activities resulting from military expenditure may amount to well over 50 million.

Although sufficient data were not available to make precise comparisons of the military burdens among countries, the group determined that military expenditures accounted for 1 to 5 per cent of the gross domestic product of many countries, while in others, particularly in some of the larger countries, the range was between 5 and 10 per cent. The report noted that about 85 per cent of the world's military outlays is accounted for by seven countries—Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In its conclusion, the consultative group stated that it was unanimously of the opinion that:

All the problems and difficulties of transition connected with disarmament could be met by appropriate national and international measures. There should thus be no doubt that the diversion to peaceful purposes of the resources now in military use could be accomplished to the benefit of all countries and lead to the improvement of world economic and social conditions. The achievement of general and complete disarmament would be an unqualified blessing to all mankind.

Having considered the report, the Economic and Social Council, on 26 July 1962, adopted resolution 891 (XXXIV), which, in part, requested the Secretary-General to make the report available to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and also to take measures to give the report wide publicity and dissemination.

### **Conversion to Peaceful Needs of the Resources Released by Disarmament**

At its seventeenth session, the General Assembly, on 18 December 1962, adopted resolution 1837 (XVII), entitled "Declaration on the conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament", in which the Assembly expressed appreciation for the expert group's report and endorsed its conclusion. Resolution 1837 (XVII) reads in part as follows:

1. *Solemnly urges* the Governments of all States to multiply their efforts for a prompt achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

2. *Declares* that it firmly believes in the triumph of the principles of reason and justice, in the establishment of such conditions in the world as would forever banish wars from the life of human society, and replace the arms race, which consumes enormous resources of funds, by broad and fruitful co-operation among nations in bettering life on earth;

3. *Takes into account* the important role of the United Nations in organising international aid to the less developed countries and in making studies of the economic and social consequences of disarmament;...

6. *Concurs* in Economic and Social Council resolution 891 (XXXIV) of 26 July 1962 and endorses the request in paragraph 6 thereof that Member States, particularly those which are significantly involved in or affected by current military programmes should devote further attention to, and conduct any necessary studies of, the detailed aspects of the economic and social consequences of disarmament, with a view to developing needed information, plans and policies for making necessary economic and social adjustments in the event of disarmament and in the successive stages towards the achievement of complete disarmament, bearing in mind the imperative needs of the developing countries;...

8. *Invites* the Secretary-General and the Governments of developing countries to intensify their efforts to establish and implement soundly conceived projects and well integrated development plans of a national and regional character, as indicated in General Assembly resolution 1708 (XVI) of 19 December 1961, the implementation of which may be accelerated as part of an economic programme for disarmament at

such time as additional resources are released following an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and requests the Secretary-General to present his preliminary report on this matter to the Assembly...

On 2 August 1963, the Economic and Social Council adopted resolution 982 (XXXVI), which: (1) expressed the hope that Member States would pursue studies and activities relating to the economic and social consequences of disarmament; (2) recommended that the regional economic commissions and other subsidiary bodies of the Council do all they could to advance any studies which the competent organs of the United Nations and the Secretary-General request them to undertake in this field; (3) invited the specialised agencies to cooperate with the Secretary-General in advancing their studies and activities designed to contribute to international action for dealing with those economic and social problems that would be involved in the reconversion process; and (4) requested the Secretary-General to make an adequate survey of the possibilities for undertaking an international study of the problems that might arise in relation to primary commodities for which the demand would be significantly affected during and immediately following the transition period.

The General Assembly, on 11 December 1963, adopted resolution 1931 (XVIII), which asked the Economic and Social Council to consider all relevant aspects of the question of the conversion to peaceful uses of resources released by disarmament, including the possibility of establishing an *ad hoc* group to accelerate studies in this field, and also endorsed the work programme of the Secretary-General.

A report by the Secretary-General,<sup>2</sup> which was submitted first to the Economic and Social Council's mid-1964 session, reviewed national and international studies and activities in relation to: (1) the over-all planning of conversion of military expenditures to peaceful uses; (2) the promotion of necessary economic and social readjustments during the period of conversion; (3) the longer-term uses of liberated resources for accelerating economic and social development within national economies; and (4) the longer-term uses of liberated resources for expanding the total flow and improving the effectiveness of financial aid and technical assistance to developing countries.

The report indicated that Governments were generally in agreement with the view that advance planning was required if full advantage was to be taken of the opportunities disarmament would afford to

promote economic and social progress throughout the world. Some of the States most heavily involved in military expenditures were reported to have established research programmes relating to the conversion of such expenditures to peaceful uses.

Having considered the Secretary-General's report, the Economic and Social Council unanimously adopted, on 11 August 1964, resolution 1026 (XXXVII), in which it: stated the need for having the activities of the United Nations family relating to the economic and social consequences of disarmament continued and accelerated as far as possible; welcomed the arrangement by the Advisory Committee on Co-ordination to coordinate those activities, including the decision to establish an Inter-Agency Committee; and recognised that it might be advantageous at a later time to set up the kind of *ad hoc* group envisaged in General Assembly resolution 1931 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963.

The Inter-Agency Committee, which met in October 1964 and again in March 1965, decided to concentrate initially on two problems: (a) the assumptions that might most realistically be made with regard to the nature and pace of the disarmament process; and (b) the various methods that might be adopted to carry out meaningful studies of the national and international impact of arms reductions.

In a report to the Economic and Social Council in mid-1966,<sup>3</sup> the Secretary-General noted that the replies received from Governments up to 7 May "reconfirm the conviction that whatever the transitory problems that might accompany it, disarmament would in the longer run be of incalculable benefit to all nations and people. As far as the reconversion problems are concerned, the replies indicate that there is a widespread awareness not only of the nature of the economic and social difficulties that might be occasioned by disarmament, but also of their magnitude". The Secretary-General further observed that "the facts that the Governments chiefly concerned are committed to the maintenance of high levels of employment and high rates of growth, that they are alert to the need to meet the problems that disarmament may cause and that many of them find it difficult to furnish the sort of data that would be required for international studies of a comparative or quantitative nature suggest that the role to be played by the United Nations in this field may be due for a re-examination". (*Sec also* "Reduction of military budgets," page 143.)

The Secretary-General's report was discussed in the Economic and Social Council, at its 1966 summer session, and later in the year in the

General Assembly. There was widespread agreement on two basic points: (a) that great material benefits for mankind would flow from disarmament, and (b) that the changes in employment and use of resources that the process of disarmament would involve could, by advance planning, be accommodated without undue dislocation. It was indicated, however, that in the absence of concrete disarmament measures and until national studies under preparation, both on a general basis and in relation to specific situations growing out of changes in weapons and military facilities, were completed, there was no way of estimating the nature or volume of the resources that might become available. In these circumstances, the Economic and Social Council recommended that the subject be reviewed only on a biennial basis. This recommendation was endorsed by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session in resolution 2171 (XXI).

At the same session of the Assembly, a draft resolution was introduced by Iran, the Ivory Coast, Morocco, Tunisia and the United Republic of Tanzania, as part of the question of general and complete disarmament but was not put to a vote. By this proposal, the General Assembly would: (1) urge the Governments of all States to intensify their efforts to achieve agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control in order to hasten realisation of the benefits to mankind called for by the "Declaration on the conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament" contained in General Assembly resolution 1837 (XVII); (2) appeal to the Governments of all States to give consideration to allocating a small proportion of their annual military expenditures to the campaign against world illiteracy under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) within the framework of the United Nations Development Decade; (3) invite the Governments of all States to study the possibility, as a first step towards general and complete disarmament under international control, of undertaking to forego any increase of military expenditures beyond their present level and thereafter to reduce them by a stated amount of percentage each year, with a view to allocating the annual savings therefrom to the objectives of the United Nations Development Decade; (4) invite the Governments of the developed countries to conduct the necessary studies of the detailed aspect of the economic consequences of collateral and partial measures of disarmament, with a view to developing the information, plans and policies for the diversion of the savings from such measures to the support of the United Nations Development

Programme, bearing in mind the imperative needs of the developing countries; (5) request the Secretary-General to transmit this resolution to the world conference on disarmament for inclusion in its agenda when it met pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2030 (XX) endorsing the convening of such a conference; and (6) request the United Nations Member States to provide information to the Secretary-General on action taken by them on the recommendation contained in this resolution and request the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session in 1967.

Support for the ideas contained in this draft resolution was expressed by a number of delegations, but other delegations had reservations. Ultimately, the sponsors of the draft resolution agreed not to press it to the vote.

In pursuance of resolution 2171 (XXI), mentioned above, the Secretary-General submitted in 1968 a new report<sup>5</sup> on the conversion to peaceful uses of the resources released by disarmament, which was discussed at the forty-fifth session of the Economic and Social Council in 1968 and at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly. By resolution 2387 (XXIII), the General Assembly, after reiterating that general and complete disarmament should be the final goal of all disarmament efforts, and recognising the importance of partial disarmament measures as a way of achieving progress in disarmament and releasing resources, both financial and human, for social and economic development, requested the Secretary-General, when inviting Member States to submit national studies on the conversion to peaceful uses of the resources released by disarmament, to suggest that they might wish to embody, in some of their studies, consideration on the anticipated effects of "important partial disarmament measures". This was done in an invitation issued by the Secretary-General in 1969.

At its twenty-fourth session, the General Assembly did not discuss this subject directly, but considered a related matter under the agenda item "One day of war for peace", on which action had been postponed from the 1968 session, pursuant to a decision of the General Assembly in resolution 2418 (XXIII). Under this item, the Assembly envisaged an appeal to Governments to devote one day's military expenditure under their annual budgets "to easing the suffering of mankind". After some discussion, the Assembly adopted resolution 2526 (XXIV) on the subject, inviting "Member States to designate each year a 'peace day' devoted to the study of the effects that any disarmament measures might have

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on economic and social development” and requesting them “to consider on that occasion, in the event that effective disarmament measures do release additional resources, the possibility of using those resources in the light of the objectives of the Second United Nations Development Decade”. Comments on the expected results of studies in connection with such a “peace day” are to be included in Governments’ reports on the economic and social consequences of disarmament to be submitted to the Secretary-General in 1970.

#### REFERENCES

1. *Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament. Report of the Secretary-General Transmitting the Report of his Consultative Group (E/3593/Rev.1).*
2. *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Thirty-seventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 8, document E/3898.*
3. *Ibid., Forty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 6, document E/4169.*
4. *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session Annexes, agenda item 27, document A/6529.*
5. *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-fifth Session, Annexes, documents E/4494 and Add.1.*

# 15

## DISARMAMENT

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Several months after the Second World War ended with the fires of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the General Assembly adopted its first resolution: it was on disarmament, on ensuring the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and it recommended that the Security Council formulate the necessary measures for the regulation and reduction of armaments. As Judge Manfred Lachs of Poland observed:

*“At San Francisco we believed we were setting two objectives on the road to peace: decolonisation and disarmament. We thought that decolonisation would take at least 50 years, while disarmament could be achieved in a decade. In fact, it turned out to be exactly the other way around.”*

It was in the expectation that disarmament would rapidly advance that the General Assembly was, under the United Nations Charter, empowered to consider “principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments” and to recommend action by Member States, while the Security Council was given specific responsibility for formulating plans for establishing “a system for the regulation of armaments”. Since then, initiatives on disarmament have been undertaken mainly by the General Assembly and its subsidiary organs rather than by the Security Council.

For four decades since that first Assembly resolution, the subject has received continuous attention at the United Nations; yet little progress in regard to actual disarmament has been made. While there has been some progress on arms limitation, the arms race has spiralled swiftly upwards, producing ever more efficient, numerous and deadly weapons. A single modern nuclear submarine possesses warheads with more explosive power than all the munitions used in the Second World War. It is estimated that there are now over 50,000 nuclear warheads

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in the world, the accumulated destructive potential of which is about one million times that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima or the equivalent of about three tons of T.N.T. for every man, woman and child on earth. If even a portion of that were used, it would spell cataclysmic destruction and perhaps extinguish human life altogether.

Besides the prospect of total annihilation, the colossal waste of manpower and resources for military purposes is a travesty of sane priorities for humanity. Estimated world military expenditures of approximately one trillion dollars a year is many times more than the amount spent globally on health, education and economic development. Since the end of the Second World War, many millions of people have been killed with conventional weapons in some 150 wars, most of them fought in the developing areas of the world.

That picture represents the framework within which the debate in the General Assembly's First Committee takes place every year. While the Committee has not been able to reverse or even halt the arms race, it has kept a constant focus on what is perhaps the single most important problem facing the world. Moreover, it has stimulated a series of partial measures of disarmament, always bearing in mind that, as proclaimed by the United Nations in 1959, the ultimate aim is general and complete disarmament—of both nuclear and conventional weapons—under effective international control. The annual debates in the Assembly bring urgent and new problems to the forefront of attention; United Nations studies outline dangers and point out possible options. In view of the seriousness of the problem, this is, of course, inadequate, but it is nevertheless a helpful contribution for the international community.

The magnitude of power represented by the nuclear arsenals of the world is beyond anything that the world has experienced. In its efforts to alert world opinion to the growing danger of nuclear war, the United Nations system has sought to explain in human terms the significance of that destructive potential. The World Health Organisation (WHO), for instance, has studied the effects of nuclear war on health. Estimating that, in an all-out nuclear conflict, about 10,000 megatons of explosive power could be used (90 per cent in Europe, North America and Asia, 10 per cent in Latin America, Africa and Oceania), it projects immediate death for about 1.15 billion people and traumatic injury for another 1.1 billion. The remaining half of the world's population would fall victim more slowly, dying of radiation sickness, cold temperatures,

starvation and assorted uncontrolled diseases. All services, including medical, would be drastically affected, either rendered entirely unavailable or reduced to basic subsistence levels.

The power to bring on Armageddon is bought with a mere one fifth of the global military expenditure. It is clear from United Nations studies that military expenditures are a major drain on world resources, with some 50 million people directly or indirectly engaged in military activities world-wide in 1980. This included some 20 per cent of the world's qualified scientists and engineers and about one quarter of all research expenditures. It is estimated that the world spends on arms and armed forces in less than three hours the money WHO committed to wiping out smallpox; in four hours it goes through the amount UNICEF uses to help needy children in a year; half a day's worth would be enough to eradicate malaria, a disease endemic in 66 countries.

Though all Governments have professed their desire to unburden the world's people of the crushing weight of arms expenditures, disarmament has not been possible during the last 40 years because no nation has felt secure enough to undertake disarmament. It is not hard to understand why: the period since the Second World War has been a turbulent one, with great empires fading in the face of resurgent nationalisms and new and old ideologies in clear opposition. During such vast changes in relative power, the framework of collective security offered by the United Nations would have been invaluable but, as we have seen, was not given an adequate chance. Only in exceptional cases have countries resorted to the United Nations to gain or protect national objectives; for the most part they have felt it necessary to depend on armed strength.

It is probably symptomatic that while the Assembly, since 1980, has called for creation of an *ad hoc* group specifically to consider means of halting the nuclear arms race, no agreement has proved possible on the mandate for that body.

However, over the years, some progress has been made towards resolving one problem that had inhibited even partial agreements for a quarter of a century, that of effective international verification. The two Treaties on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I and II) have their verification procedures based on highly developed "national technical means" as opposed to the controversial issue of on-site inspection by non-nationals. These national monitoring procedures include photo reconnaissance and other types of satellites

and monitoring of test signals and provide a glimmer of hope in the use of scientific development in the service of arms regulation. Verification of SALT II, a treaty which not only limited the initial aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles to 2,400 each for the Soviet Union and the United States but actually reduced that number to 2,250 by the end of 1981, is coupled with a Standing Consultative Commission of the two countries involved. While SALT II, signed on 18 June 1979, has not been ratified, both parties have declared their intention of adhering to its provisions as long as the other does so.

But the verification problem has not yet been solved with regard to a comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons, a ban which the Assembly has viewed as being of the highest priority. It is widely accepted that a comprehensive test ban would inhibit both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons—it would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the nuclear weapon States to develop new designs for such weapons and would place constraints on the refinement of existing ones.

In his 1985 report to the General Assembly, Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cullar stated that:

*“a clear and vital signal of humanity’s willingness to confront the nuclear challenge would be through agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Impeding as it would the ceaseless technological refinement of nuclear weapons, its adoption would help to break the sequence that threatens our very existence.”*

He also suggested that the United Nations might be able to assist in other ways on verification and compliance arrangements:

*“The International Atomic Energy Agency has unique experience in monitoring non-proliferation compliance and ensuring the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This expertise could be built on and expanded to provide a monitoring capability for nuclear-arms agreements. Suggestions have also been made, and should be further considered, for the United Nations to verify compliance through seismic stations, through on-site inspection or through satellite observation.”*

The General Assembly has repeatedly demanded that substantive work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty begin and has also declared, although never unanimously, that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter and a crime against humanity. A United Nations report has stressed that a ban on all nuclear testing is the first and most urgent step in halting the nuclear arms race, and the experts who drew up the report concluded that the problem of verifying underground testing no longer seemed to be an obstacle to agreement.

In the meantime, there is the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water—called the Partial Test Ban Treaty because it does not include a ban on underground testing. An estimated 1,440 nuclear explosives were detonated between 16 July 1945 and 31 December 1983: 729 by the United States, 527 by the Soviet Union, 120 by France, 36 by the United Kingdom and 27 by China. Since the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, extensive underground tests have been carried out, particularly by the United States (398) and the Soviet Union (363). In 1974 India exploded a nuclear device underground, stating that the explosion was strictly for peaceful purposes.

The Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom have ratified the Partial Test Ban Treaty. While France and China have not accepted it, the former announced that it would discontinue atmospheric testing in 1974, and China has not conducted any atmospheric tests since 1980.

By the end of 1984, the Partial Test Ban Treaty had been ratified by 112 countries. It is the first international agreement to regulate nuclear arms world-wide and has been an important instrument in reducing international tensions and decreasing radioactive pollution. It also helped create a climate in which negotiations on other nuclear arms limitation agreements, notably the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon, were able to take place. In addition, it gave the stimulus to two bilateral treaties between the Soviet Union and the United States in 1974 and 1976 on limiting underground nuclear testing above a certain magnitude and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

### **Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

Concern by United Nations Members about the dangerous consequences of proliferation of nuclear weapons has been expressed since 1959 by the General Assembly, which has called for an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States. In August 1967, negotiations among the main nuclear Powers and their allies, both inside and outside United Nations forums, resulted in the tabling of identical treaties by the Soviet Union and the United States, which, after several revisions agreed on in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, were submitted to the Assembly in May 1968.

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The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force in 1970; by the end of 1984, it had been ratified by 124 countries, including the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. France, while not signing the Treaty, has said it would behave exactly as did States adhering to it. China has criticised the Treaty (as have several other States in regard to a perceived perpetuation of nuclear monopoly, not only for weapons purposes but also for peaceful means) but has repeatedly stated that it did not advocate or encourage proliferation nor did it help other States develop nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapon States ratifying the Treaty made a commitment not to transfer to other countries any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The non-nuclear States undertook not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. At the same time, parties to the Treaty agreed to facilitate the fullest exchange of equipment and information for the peaceful uses of atomic energy and to ensure that the benefits of any peaceful application of nuclear explosions are made available to non-nuclear weapon States at the lowest cost.

The Treaty also gave a particular role to the United Nations family, since the non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty agreed to accept safeguards in separate agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify compliance. By the end of 1984, 78 such States with significant nuclear industries had concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA. The safeguards system provides for IAEA international inspection of all nuclear plants and is the first attempt by the international community to exercise control over an industry of strategic importance.

Nevertheless, the results of the Non-Proliferation Treaty have not been as great as had been hoped. For one thing, a significant number of countries believed to be capable, or soon capable, of creating nuclear weapons have not adhered to the Treaty. Non-nuclear weapon States accepting the Treaty have expressed disillusionment over the non-implementation of article VI of the Treaty, which refers to the commitment of the parties to pursue in good faith negotiations towards halting the nuclear arms race and towards nuclear disarmament. Any new addition to the "nuclear club", however, would inevitably lead to a weakening of the non-proliferation regime, which might eventually render the Treaty meaningless.

Since conclusion of the Treaty, the non-nuclear weapon States have repeatedly insisted that their promise not to acquire nuclear weapons

should be met with an assurance that nuclear weapons would not, under any circumstances, be used against them. Responding partially to this demand, the Security Council, in 1968, recognised that aggression using nuclear weapons, or the threat of doing so, against a non-nuclear weapon State party to the Treaty would warrant immediate action by the Council and its nuclear weapon State permanent members. At the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, in 1978, the five nuclear weapon States (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States) individually declared their intention not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States. Since then, the Assembly has called for security assurances that would provide effective guarantees to non-nuclear States.

### **Nuclear Weapon Free Zones**

In the meantime, the non-nuclear States have taken several initiatives to strengthen their security against nuclear weapons, most notably by the creation of nuclear weapon free zones. Such zones have long been considered one of the most practical means of preventing horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The first such agreement to prevent nuclear weapons from being brought into a specific area was the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which, by the end of 1984, had been signed by 32 States. The first treaty establishing a nuclear weapon free zone in a densely populated area was the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). It was also the first agreement to establish a system of international control and a permanent supervisory organ—the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (known by its Spanish acronym OPANAL). All five nuclear weapon States have signed a protocol pledging to respect fully the status of denuclearisation in Latin America and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the Treaty.

The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) also creates a nuclear-free zone by prohibiting objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other weapon of mass destruction in orbit around the earth, or installation of those weapons on celestial bodies or their stationing in outer space. Similarly, the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof covers the sea-bed beyond the outer limit of the 12-mile coastal zone.

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Proposals for nuclear weapon free zones in several other regions have been discussed in recent years in the Assembly. While they have concerned a number of geographic zones, including the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Northern Europe and the South Pacific, most recent formal plans and proposals have dealt with Central Europe, the African continent, the Middle East and South Asia.

The Assembly has endorsed the 1964 Declaration of the Organisation of African Unity to make Africa a denuclearised zone and has itself adopted a Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

In recent years, the Assembly has continued its efforts for the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. It has called for a freeze on nuclear weapons by all nuclear weapon States, particularly the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In other areas it has urged conclusion of conventions on prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical and radiological weapons and on their destruction, as well as agreements on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

### **Disarmament and Development**

The Assembly has also, as in the past, called for the reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. A 1981 United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and development pointed out that the world can either continue to pursue the arms race or it can move towards a more sustainable international economic and political order. It cannot do both.

The 1985 General Assembly, the fortieth anniversary session, will have on its agenda the question of reallocation and conversion of resources, freed by disarmament, from military to civilian purposes. This item was placed on the 1985 agenda by the 1982 Assembly session, which also recommended that the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, an autonomous body based in Geneva, investigate ways for setting up a disarmament fund for development. An international conference on the relationship between disarmament

and development, decided on by the 1984 Assembly, was scheduled to take place in Paris in 1986.

The relationship between disarmament and development takes on a further dimension when it is considered that while three quarters of world military expenses are in a few developed nations, the use of conventional weaponry has been confined, in the period since 1945, almost entirely to developing countries. Europe and North America, though heavily armed, have been at peace; in Africa, Asia and Latin America, border disputes and a range of ethnic and religious rivalries have fuelled conflict. Moreover, developing countries spend on arms imports, in absolute terms, about twice what developed countries do. As a 1985 United Nations study on conventional disarmament puts it:

*“The global expenditure on arms and armed forces represents a massive consumption of resources for potentially destructive purposes in stark contrast to the urgent need for social and economic development, for which many of these resources might otherwise have been used. In a world in which hundreds of millions suffer from hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy and ill-health, the consumption of resources on such a scale for accumulation of arms runs counter to the objectives of promoting social progress and better standards of life set out in the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations.”*

With national security conceived mainly in terms of military strength, nations have been involved since the Second World War in the swiftest and most deadly arms race in history. The United States and the Soviet Union possess some 95 per cent of the world's nuclear arms, and they are involved in an endless competition to increase the quantity and improve the quality of weapons, trying to gain advantage one over the other. This spiral of action and reaction, which is said to increase national security, more often decreases it by destabilising the tense global and regional balance. Neither this nor the general recognition that nuclear war today would be so destructive that it would have neither winner nor loser has slowed the competition.

### **Consultation and Negotiation Mechanisms**

The United Nations has attempted, over the years, to provide a variety of consultation and negotiation mechanisms. The original bodies established by the Security Council to study and recommend proposals for disarmament were the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. In 1952 the General Assembly replaced these with the Disarmament Commission, which two years later created a negotiating sub-committee consisting of Canada, France,

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the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Commission was active mainly in the 1950s. Although no concrete progress towards disarmament was made prior to 1959, the efforts undertaken during the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s contributed to the measures later achieved. In 1959 the General Assembly declared “general and complete disarmament under effective international control” as a goal for the international community. This remains the ultimate aim of United Nations disarmament efforts, based on the expectation that each specific agreement will lead to another, increasing mutual confidence at each stage.

In 1961 the General Assembly unanimously welcomed a joint statement of principles agreed on by the Soviet Union and the United States as a basis for negotiations towards complete disarmament, and it endorsed an agreement between the two countries on the setting up of a new negotiating body to be called the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The Committee, which began functioning in 1962, autonomous of the United Nations, was renamed the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in 1969 and was eventually enlarged to 31 members. After the 1978 special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, the CCD met as the Committee on Disarmament (CD), with an enlarged (40-nation) membership to ensure better representation of different regions and viewpoints; a special representative of the Secretary-General served as its Secretary. As the world’s only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, the CD managed to bring together all the nuclear weapon States for the first time: France became an active participant in 1979 and China in 1980. In 1984 it was renamed the Conference on Disarmament.

In an effort to broaden public understanding of the issues involved and to focus governmental attention on the urgent need to slow and reverse the world-wide arms race, the General Assembly in 1969 proclaimed the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade. Governments were urged to intensify their concerted efforts for effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction. By 1976, the Assembly, deploring the “meagre achievements” of the Decade in terms of truly effective disarmament and arms limitation agreements, decided to hold a special session in 1978 on disarmament. The tenth special session of the General Assembly, held from 23 May to 1 July 1978, was the first to be devoted entirely to disarmament. It was the largest, most representative meeting of nations ever convened on the topic. It was

also the first at which the views of the public were heard, through representatives of non-governmental organisations. Petitions against the arms race signed by millions of people were delivered to United Nations Headquarters during the session.

The Final Document adopted by the session embodied a consensus agreement on a comprehensive disarmament strategy. The Document consisted of four parts: an introduction, a declaration, a programme of action, and machinery. The declaration stated, among other things, that:

- the “increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it”;
- “enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces”;
- as the “process of disarmament affects the vital security of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute” to disarmament measures;
- in a world of finite resources “there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development”;
- disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the strengthening of international peace and security are all directly related; “progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others”;
- non-proliferation is of universal concern but is not to affect the inalienable right of States to the peaceful use of nuclear energy;
- “negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control”;

- “qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race.”

The programme of action contained a statement of priorities and measures, the former succinctly expressed:

*“Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces.”*

As for the measures, a wide range of topics having to do with both nuclear and conventional armaments, including chemical and radiological weapons, was covered but was expressed in carefully negotiated language meant to carry compromises. On the crucial matter of ending nuclear tests, even this was not possible: the document reflected the disagreement between the non-nuclear countries, on the one hand, and “some” nuclear weapon States, on the other. The former thought the tests should end right away; the latter wanted to wait until a formal treaty was agreed upon.

The Final Document called for an end to the production and further improvement of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Countries were asked to stop making fissionable material and to agree when feasible on a phased programme to get rid of stockpiles of nuclear weapons. However, efforts to adopt more specific language which would commit nuclear weapon States to actual negotiations failed to reach consensus. On the “non-use of nuclear weapons”, considered an important disarmament measure by non-nuclear weapon States, the language of the Final Document was minimal. On preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, the Programme reflected compromise language. While the nuclear Powers were in favour of non-proliferation, non-nuclear countries objected to what they saw as an attempt to impose obligations and restrictions on them “without the nuclear weapon States themselves assuming any obligation in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-use of nuclear weapons”.

To carry out the work outlined in the Final Document, the special session agreed on the re-establishment of the Disarmament Commission, with all Members of the United Nations represented. It was to be a deliberative body, with a mandate to cover the same ground as the Assembly itself. To revitalise multilateral negotiations on disarmament, the Assembly entered into a new relationship with the Committee on Disarmament.

At the end of the first special session on disarmament, hopes were high that something substantial had been achieved: that agreement on a framework for negotiations and on priorities, a historic first, would lead to real progress. As it turned out, those hopes have not been realised.

### **World Disarmament Campaign**

In 1979 the Assembly declared the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, and in 1982 it convened another special session on disarmament. The session was held at United Nations Headquarters from 7 June to 10 July 1982. On the opening day, a World Disarmament Campaign was launched, reflecting the widely-held belief that an informed public opinion is crucial to the success of disarmament efforts. To signify the growing international concern with the problem, 18 Heads of State and 44 Foreign Ministers attended the session. Altogether, more than 140 States took part, putting forward their positions on questions of disarmament, peace and security and expressing concern over the lack of progress on those questions. Over 3,000 representatives from 450 non-governmental organisations in 47 countries around the world also attended the session. The representatives of 53 nongovernmental organisations and 22 research institutions made statements. In addition, thousands of communications, petitions and appeals with many millions of signatures were received by the United Nations from organisations, groups and individuals all over the world. During the period of the special session, there were numerous popular demonstrations around the world. It was all to little avail. Despite intensive negotiations, the special session was unable to agree on a comprehensive programme of disarmament or on any specific action to halt and reverse the arms race. It expressed its profound preoccupation over the danger of nuclear war and urged Member States to consider as soon as possible proposals to avoid it. While ending in disappointment, the session reaffirmed the validity of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament.

The most tangible programme to result from the session, the World Disarmament Campaign, has sought to stimulate public interest and educate opinion, attempting to create what the Assembly termed an "international conscience". The success of the Campaign depends on the co-operation and participation of all Member States, the active involvement of nongovernmental organisations world-wide, and unimpeded access by all sectors of the world public to a broad range of ideas opinions and facts.

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**MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS**


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<i>Treaty or Convention</i>	<i>Provisions</i>
Antarctic Treaty (1959)	The first treaty to put into practice the concept of the nuclear weapon free zone, it prohibits in the Antarctic region (south of 60° lat.) any military manoeuvres, weapon tests, building of installations or the disposal of radioactive wastes produced by military activities.
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963)	Called the Partial Test Ban Treaty because it bans all but underground tests. The General Assembly has repeatedly urged conclusion of a comprehensive treaty banning all tests, whether in outer space, in the atmosphere, under water or underground.
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) (1967)	The Treaty bans nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from being placed in orbit around the earth, prohibits the military use of celestial bodies or the placing of nuclear weapons on those bodies and bars the stationing of weapons in outer space, but it does not prevent nuclear weapons missiles or weapons satellites from moving through outer space, the use of space-based platforms for launching ballistic missiles or the use of satellites to control and operate nuclear weapons.
Treaty, for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (1967)	The Treaty created the first nuclear weapon-free zone in a densely populated area and is the first arms-control agreement whose implementation is verified by an international organisation.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty) (1968)	The Treaty aims at limiting the spread of nuclear weapons from States possessing them to those that do not. It also aims at beginning the process of disarmament by the nuclear weapon States and at guaranteeing all countries access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (1971)	The Treaty bans the placement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and facilities for such weapons, on or under the seabed outside a 12-mile coastal zone around each country, but does not mention conventional weapons or restrict military use of the oceans.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (1971)	The Convention was the first general international agreement providing for genuine disarmament—that is, the destruction of existing weapons.

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Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (1976)	The Convention prohibits techniques that would have widespread, long-lasting or severe effects in causing such phenomena as earthquakes, tidal waves and changes in weather and climate patterns.
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (1980)	The Convention and its three protocols are the first international arms regulation agreements that have been negotiated exclusively at a United Nations Conference. They provide new rules for the protection of civilians and civilian objects from attacks by means of incendiary (flame or heat) weapons, land mines, booby traps and fragments that cannot readily be detected in the human body.

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Agreements such as those listed in the table, and other measures such as the unilateral declaration by some Member States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, have helped to prevent the arms race from entering into some new and dangerous areas, but the measures adopted are more in the nature of arms limitation than disarmament, regulating competition or proscribing certain developments deemed particularly destabilising. They are essentially piecemeal measures, an incomplete response to the urgent need to halt and reverse both the nuclear and the conventional arms race. Negotiations on such crucial issues as a total prohibition of chemical weapons, protection of non-nuclear weapon States from nuclear attacks and other major disarmament concerns have dragged on for years without comprehensive agreements. New potentials for mass destruction fuelled by new technological developments in the military domain have increased concern.

Disarmament cannot be pursued in a political vacuum and Governments must make tough political decisions if negotiations within the United Nations (or outside it) are to be successful. Recent developments, however, give no cause for comfort. In the fortieth anniversary year of the United Nations, the world finds itself in a situation in which nuclear-tipped missiles are poised just a few minutes flight time from their target areas and military leaders continue to speak of security in terms of the deterrent value of the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction.

Last year, in a special appeal to the General Assembly, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar asked Member States how the value of a humane and civilised society could be considered with the threat to bring about the indiscriminate death of millions of our fellow men and women. The future of humanity, he said, was jeopardized:

*"Today's decisions affect not only the present, they also put at risk succeeding generations. Like supreme arbiters, with our disputes of the moment we threaten to cut off the future and extinguish the lives of the innocent millions as yet unborn. There can be no greater arrogance. At the same time, the lives of all who lived before us may be rendered meaningless. For we have the power to dissolve in a conflict of hours or minutes the entire work of civilisation, with all the brilliant cultural heritage of mankind."*

Governments will not make these tough political decisions without the urging of their peoples. As the Secretary-General concluded:

*"Every person on this earth has a stake in disarmament. In the nuclear age, decisions affecting war and peace cannot be left to military strategists or even to Governments. They are indeed the responsibility of every man and woman."*

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# 16

## UN AND DISARMAMENT: EVOLUTION OF MACHINERY AND APPROACHES TILL 1970

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The founding members of the United Nations, meeting in The Charter San Francisco on 26 June 1945 to sign the Charter, solemnly committed themselves to the purposes and principles of the Organisation, the primary purpose being “to maintain international peace and security” (Article 1). In order to promote this purpose “with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources” (Article 26), they conferred specific responsibilities in connexion with disarmament and the regulation of armaments on the Security Council and the General Assembly.

The Security Council was made responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee (Article 47), “plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments” (Article 26). The General Assembly was empowered to consider “the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments” and to make “recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both” (Article 11).

Only days after the signing of the Charter, the first atomic weapons were exploded. This confronted the United Nations with unprecedented military and political problems. The Charter had envisaged disarmament and the regulation of armaments as elements in the progressive establishment of an international security system. However, the possibility that the new weapons of mass destruction might again be used gave disarmament greater immediacy and an enhanced place in the sphere of international politics and security.

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The United Nations reacted promptly to this new turn of events. The General Assembly's first resolution (resolution 1 (I)), adopted on 24 January 1946, established an Atomic Energy Commission with the urgent task of making specific proposals for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons of mass destruction. Later that year, in resolution 41 (I), adopted on 14 December 1946, the General Assembly recognised the central role of disarmament in relation to peace and security.

Since that time, the question of disarmament has been discussed in the Security Council, at every session, of the General Assembly and in numerous subsidiary bodies. In the search for disarmament, the United Nations has been confronted with a complex and difficult task. In seeking to discharge its responsibilities in (the course of more than two decades, the United Nations has used a variety of methods, techniques and approaches.

### **Negotiating Machinery**

The various diplomatic instruments and techniques to which the Members of the United Nations have resorted range from direct exchanges through diplomatic channels, to the annual review by the General Assembly of discussions and negotiations taking place in smaller bodies specifically established to consider the many political and technical problems that make up the question of disarmament.

Discussions through diplomatic channels, including meetings of Heads of Government (such as the Geneva "summit" meeting of July 1955) and of Ministers for Foreign Affairs (starting with the Moscow meeting in December 1945), play an important role in disarmament negotiations. However, as the Charter envisaged a multilateral system for the regulation of armaments and ultimately disarmaments, the traditional methods of diplomacy have been superseded to a large extent by new negotiating machinery.

The main responsibility for disarmament naturally falls on the great Powers, and this responsibility has extended to their recommending the most appropriate forum for negotiations. The relationship of a particular disarmament conference to the United Nations has largely depended on the policies of the major Powers and on the circumstances prevailing at the time of its establishment. It has also been affected by the increase in the membership of the Organisation from 51 in 1945 to 122 at the end of 1966.

The varying needs and stresses of each period resulted in particular deliberating or negotiating machinery. Thus, in the course of the years, the main initiative on disarmament has moved from the Security Council, or bodies under it, to the General Assembly and subsidiary organs of the Assembly. The growing influence of the non-aligned countries has also given them a new role in disarmament, a role which the Secretary-General has described as “an important element exercising a moderating and catalytic influence in helping to bridge the gap between extreme positions of either side”.

From the very beginning, it was not the lack of machinery that stood in the way of disarmament agreements. Over the years, numerous bodies with a variety of flexible procedures have been established to deal with the problem of disarmament and their composition has varied from two to the full membership of the United Nations. These bodies have held thousands of meetings and their proceedings are recorded in an immense documentation.

The setting up of the Atomic Energy Commission was, as stated above, the first act of the General Assembly. The Commission for Conventional Armaments was established by the Security Council at the beginning of 1947.

In 1952, these two Commissions were merged by the General Assembly into the Disarmament Commission, which, like its predecessors, was composed of the members of the Security Council and Canada. This was the main subsidiary disarmament body until the end of 1957. However, the Disarmament Commission itself, again acting on the suggestion of the General Assembly, established a five-Power Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, consisting of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. This Sub-Committee met in private from 1954 to 1957, reporting periodically both to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly.

In subsequent years, the Disarmament Commission played a less prominent role in disarmament negotiations, notwithstanding the decision of the Assembly in 1957 (by which time the membership of the United Nations had risen from 51 to 82) to increase the Commission's size by the addition of fourteen members and, in 1958, to enlarge it again to include all the Members of the United Nations. Since then, it has held only two sessions—in 1960 and in 1965.

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During this period, the major Powers found it useful to establish conference machinery, on an *ad hoc* basis, linked to but not an integral part of the United Nations. The composition of the new bodies as a rule reflected the claim of the Soviet Union, asserted with increasing vigour at that time, for parity of representation with the West. The Secretary-General was represented at all of these conferences by a Personal Representative.

Thus, in July 1958, following an exchange of views between the Heads of Government of the USSR and the United States, a conference of experts from four Western countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada) and four Eastern European countries (the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania) to study the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement on suspension of nuclear weapon tests was convened in Geneva. It agreed on a unanimous report that was submitted to the respective Governments and to the United Nations.

Later in the year, a tripartite conference of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom began work in Geneva on a treaty on the suspension of nuclear weapon tests, on the basis of the findings of the conference of experts. The work of this Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, which began in October 1958 and ended in 1962, was reviewed each year by the General Assembly and was the subject of resolutions and recommendations by the Assembly.

Again on the basis of an understanding between the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, a conference of experts to study possible measures which might be helpful in preventing surprise attack also took place in Geneva in 1958. It was attended by experts of five Western countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada and Italy) and five Eastern European countries (the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Albania). Its report was also submitted to the respective Governments and to the United Nations.

The two-sided East-West pattern of representation was continued in the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which was established by a decision of the Foreign Ministers of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States in 1959. The ten participating countries were: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the USSR on one side, and Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States on the other.

It was during this conference, in 1960, that the Secretary-General of the United Nations found it necessary to raise some of the questions resulting from the conduct of negotiations outside the formal framework of the United Nations, even though the Organisation's ultimate responsibility for disarmament was at all times recognised by the major Powers.

On a related subject, the Secretary-General, pursuant to a request of the General Assembly in 1960, appointed a group of expert consultants to assist him in a study of the economic and social consequences of disarmament. Acting in their personal capacities but drawing, *inter alia*, upon replies from Governments to a request for information by the Secretary-General, the experts produced, in 1962, a comprehensive unanimous report in an area of importance for progress towards disarmament.

The next development in the conference machinery was the 1961 agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, endorsed by the General Assembly that same year, to establish the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which added to the original ten countries of the 1960 conference eight Members of the United Nations not belonging to either of the two major military alliances in Europe. The eight new non-aligned members were: Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic. The Committee has met in almost continuous sessions since 1962, except when its work was being reviewed by the General Assembly. The Government of France decided not to participate in it.

At its twentieth session, the General Assembly attempted to open a new chapter in the machinery for disarmament negotiations when it endorsed the idea of holding a World Disarmament Conference to which all countries would be invited. Many of the countries supporting this idea explicitly stated that it was their hope that, while the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament continued, a new forum for deliberations would be created which would permit the participation of, among others, the People's Republic of China. Though the members of the General Assembly ruled out any direct link between the United Nations and the World Disarmament Conference, so as to make universal participation possible, the resolution recognised the continuing interest and responsibility of the United Nations in connexion with the solution of the disarmament problem.

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## Changing Approaches to Disarmament

Although the need for and the basic objectives of the regulation of armaments and of disarmament have remained constant through the years, the approach to the subject and the scope of the negotiations have changed almost as often as the forum for the conduct of the negotiations themselves. Here, too, the changes have tended to reflect the requirements and policies of the major Powers. The technical problems related to disarmament have also changed along with the technological and scientific advances in armaments.

At the outset, the scope of the negotiations was very broad. The terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments called for immediate plans to ensure that atomic energy would be used only for peaceful purposes and that armaments and armed forces would be generally regulated and reduced under an international system of control and inspection.

During the period 1952-1955, the objective was the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armaments in a co-ordinated comprehensive programme by stages. Beginning in 1955, contradictions developed between that long-range objective and proposals for immediate, partial measures to be implemented prior to reaching agreement on a comprehensive plan.

Between 1958 and 1962, the *ad hoc* conferences gave impetus to the partial approach which was commended to the negotiators by the General Assembly in the hope that some first, though limited, steps would increase confidence and thereby create a more favourable atmosphere for comprehensive agreements.

The adoption by the fourteenth General Assembly, in 1959, of general and complete disarmament as a goal to be actively sought, and to be agreed upon in the shortest possible time, again increased the scope of the negotiations. Agreement on partial disarmament measures continued, however, to be pursued concurrently with the elaboration of plans for general and complete disarmament, as it was still felt that by devoting parallel and, at times, even primary attention to measures designed to reduce tension and build up confidence, the complex task of achieving general and complete disarmament would be facilitated. The immediate hopes and expectations of the great majority of nations were centered on two collateral measures—the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons.

The acceptance of general and complete disarmament as a goal of the United Nations has, in a way, helped to eliminate some of the contradictions that have existed in the past between short and long-range objectives, and collateral measures of disarmament that command broad support are now viewed as integral parts in the process of attaining that goal. In this perspective, the concrete progress in 1963 and 1964—the partial test ban treaty, the Assembly resolution banning nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from outer space, the cut-back in the production of fissile material for military purposes by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States and the establishment of a direct communications link between Washington and Moscow—all represent limited steps in preparation for more significant progress. The 1963 Assembly resolution, for example, was formalised in December 1966 in a treaty banning nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from outer space.

In a similar manner, a closer and more useful relationship has been established through the years between the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, the aligned and the non aligned, in disarmament negotiations. Over the years, the smaller and the non-aligned countries have taken a growing interest in all aspects of the problem.

The story of disarmament in the United Nations must, of course, concentrate on the Organisation's role as a forum for negotiations, as a source of recommendations and directives to the Powers concerned and as a focal point for efforts to achieve disarmament. In addition, the Secretary-General has been relied on for authoritative studies: in 1960-1962 for the study on the economic and social consequences of disarmament mentioned above and most recently, in December 1966, for a report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons. There is, however, another aspect of the story—that of the place envisaged for the Organisation in the implementation of disarmament measures, especially in connexion with the problems of control and of the maintenance of peace. This as well as the other aspects of the question are dealt with in the next chapter.

# 17

## GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT, 1959-1970

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Towards the end of 1959, decisions were taken both within and outside the Organisation leading to the resumption of negotiations on disarmament. The General Assembly, at its fourteenth session, declared general and complete disarmament to be the basic goal of the United Nations in this field. On the eve of the Assembly's session, the Foreign Ministers of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, meeting to consider the Berlin problem, decided to create a new Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee outside of but linked to the United Nations.

### **Soviet Proposals**

The new item "General and complete disarmament" was included in the agenda of the Assembly's fourteenth session at the request of the Soviet Union,<sup>1</sup> on whose behalf Premier Khrushchev, addressing the Assembly on 18 September,<sup>2</sup> proposed a new disarmament programme in three stages aimed at eliminating within four years and under international control all armed forces and armaments. A revised detailed version of the programme was submitted to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee which convened in Geneva in March 1960.

The new plan, Khrushchev said, was the best means of solving the disarmament problem because it would completely eliminate the possibility of a State gaining military advantages of any kind. It was designed to overcome all the obstacles regarding control that had arisen in connexion with partial disarmament, by the institution of universal and complete control over complete disarmament.

Khrushchev also declared that, should there be no readiness on the part of the Western Powers to embark upon general and complete

disarmament, the Soviet Union would agree to appropriate partial measures for disarmament and security, the following of which it considered to be the most important:

1. The establishment of a control and inspection zone, and the reduction of foreign troops in the territories of the Western European countries concerned;
2. The establishment of an "atom-free" zone in Central Europe;
3. The withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of European States and the abolition of military bases on the territories of foreign States;
4. The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the member States of NATO and the member States of the Warsaw Treaty;
5. The conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of surprise attack by one State upon another.

The General Assembly also had before it a three-stage plan for comprehensive disarmament submitted on 17 September 1959 by Selwyn Lloyd, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom.<sup>3</sup> The plan, which was based on the principle of balanced stages towards the abolition of all nuclear weapons and the reduction of all other weapons to levels which would rule out the possibility of aggressive war, was the basis for the subsequent Western plan submitted to the Ten-Nation Committee.

France proposed<sup>4</sup> that, in any disarmament programme, high priority be given to measures prohibiting first the development and then the manufacture and possession of all vehicles for the delivery of nuclear devices: satellites, rockets, supersonic or long-range aircraft, submarines, aircraft carriers and launching pads.

The United States representative declared<sup>5</sup> that his Government unreservedly supported the greatest possible amount of controlled disarmament and welcomed in particular Soviet willingness to seek progress through limited steps, expressing a preference for work on the prevention of surprise attack and agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. As to the goal of complete disarmament, the United States suggested that the following questions might perhaps be considered by the Disarmament Commission:

1. What type of international police force should be established to preserve international peace and security?

2. What principles of international law should govern the use of such a force?
3. What internal security forces, in precise terms, would be required by the nations of the world if existing armaments were abolished?

The General Assembly, on 20 November, unanimously adopted resolution 1378 (XIV), which reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Moved* by the desire to save the present and succeeding generations from the danger of a new and disastrous war.

*Striving* to put an end completely and forever to the armaments race which places a heavy burden on mankind, and to use resources thus released for the benefit of mankind,

Desiring to promote the creation of relations of trust and peaceful co-operation between States,

*Mindful* of the resolution of the United Nations Disarmament Commission of 10 September 1959,

*Being convinced* that any progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will contribute to the achievement of these high aims,

*Considering* that the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today,

1. *Calls upon* Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem;

2. *Transmits* to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and requests the Secretary-General to make available to the ten-nation disarmament committee for thorough consideration the declaration of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 17 September 1959 and the declaration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 18 September 1959, and the other proposals or suggestions made, as well as the records of the plenary meetings and the meetings of the First Committee at which the question of general and complete disarmament was discussed;

3. *Expresses* the hope that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time.

### **Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament**

When the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament convened in Geneva in March 1960, the two sides at first tended to view their task differently. Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States stressed primarily the directive of the Foreign Ministers' meeting which had instructed the new Committee to explore possible progress towards agreement on such limitations and reductions under effective international controls of all types of armaments and armed forces as might in the first instance be of particular relevance to the countries participating in the deliberations.<sup>6</sup> Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the USSR emphasised the resolution of the General Assembly on general and complete disarmament.

On 2 June, the Soviet Union proposed a treaty<sup>7</sup> which provided that, in a first stage of not more than one and a half years: all means of delivery of nuclear weapons would be destroyed and their manufacture prohibited; all foreign military bases would be eliminated and all troops would be withdrawn from foreign territories; all rockets launched for peaceful purposes would be subject to inspection; and dissemination of nuclear weapons or information for their manufacture would be prohibited. The control organisation would have the right to carry out inspections without hindrance.

In the second stage, there would be a complete prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction under on-site inspection, reduction of armed forces to a level of 1.7 million men for the United States and the Soviet Union and joint studies on measures to maintain peace and security in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

The third stage would complete the process of general and complete disarmament. Measures for preserving peace and security would be carried out under the United Nations Charter with the Security Council having contingents of militia at its disposal.

The five-Power Western plan of 16 March<sup>8</sup> provided, in the first stage, for the establishment of an international disarmament organisation to carry out studies designed to ensure observance of such second-stage measures as a ban on placing weapons of mass destruction in outer space, an agreement to stop production of fissionable material for use in weapons, and measures to prevent surprise attack. In addition, the level of armed forces for the United States and the Soviet Union would, for the second stage, be set at 2.1 million men. Subsequent reductions were to take place in the third stage as international

organisations for the maintenance of peace were established. In a subsequent document,<sup>9</sup> the Western Powers specifically proclaimed general and complete disarmament to be the final goal.

The United States proposed its own "Programme for general and complete disarmament under effective international control"<sup>10</sup> on 27 June 1960, immediately after the five Eastern European Powers had withdrawn from the Conference. Under the United States programme, the first stage would include: a ban on placing in orbit vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction; zones of inspection against surprise attack; initial reductions of armed forces to 2.5 million men along with corresponding reductions in armaments; and the cut-off of production of fissionable material. The second-stage level would include: reduction of armed forces to 1.7 million men; reduction of all weapons including atomic; and creation of an international peace force within the United Nations. The third stage would complete reductions to force levels required for maintaining internal order and for the international peace force.

### **Role of the United Nations in Disarmament**

One of the issues raised in the course of the Ten-Nation United Nations Conference concerned the role of the United Nations in disarmament. The Foreign Ministers had explicitly recognised that the establishment of the new committee in no way diminished or encroached on the ultimate responsibility of the United Nations for disarmament measures. Indeed, they expressed the hope that the results achieved would provide a useful basis for considering disarmament in the United Nations.<sup>11</sup> The Disarmament Commission had welcomed the development and had requested the Secretary-General to provide appropriate facilities for the new committee. The General Assembly, in turn, transmitted to the ten-nation group the disarmament programmes proposed by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.

The first Western plan provided for a study of the relationship of the proposed international disarmament organisation to the United Nations, taking into account previous experience in this field. The statement of principles placed the proposed organisation "within the framework of the United Nations". The principles submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the USSR made no reference to the United Nations in connexion with the control organ, but provided explicitly for submission of any violation to the Security Council and the General Assembly for measures to be taken in accordance with the

Charter. On the more general question of the maintenance of peace, the Western plan provided for the establishment of an international organisation to preserve world peace as an organ of, or linked to, the United Nations, and for strengthened peace-keeping machinery within the United Nations.

The Soviet Union and the other Eastern European Powers contended that the Western plan sought to supplant the United Nations in the field of peace and security, as well as to oppose the United Nations by the immediate establishment of an international disarmament organisation with extremely varied and broad functions.

The Western Powers insisted that these new bodies would be within the framework of the United Nations and that, in any event, that question would be subject to study and agreement by the parties. They further stressed the importance of peace machinery which could not be frustrated and rendered impotent by the actions of a single Power or group of Powers. Poland and the USSR questioned the emphasis on armed coercion in a disarmed world with widespread controls.

On 28 April 1960, the Secretary-General addressed the Ten-Nation Conference on this subject.<sup>12</sup> Policies on disarmament, pacific settlement of disputes, and action in view of breaches of the peace, he observed, were inseparable and integrated elements of the policies of Member Governments within the framework of and through the United Nations. Recognising that the conferences were bound to reach a point where a study of the use of the United Nations in support of disarmament would be necessary, he contended that the ten-nation body, was not an organ of the United Nations:

The consideration of the functioning of the Organisation obviously primarily belongs to the Organisation itself and to all its Member Governments alike. I would, thus, assume that the study that at some stage will have to be made of those matters which are covered by Chapter VII of the Charter and which would become of crucial significance in case of progressive or complete disarmament, will be made by the United Nations with a view to such possible decisions by the Organisation as may be indicated in order to give it the necessary efficiency.

Likewise, a question will arise for you how to fit the control activities which will be called for into the organisational framework of the United Nations. The technical nature of this question is bound to make it a subject of your study but the relationship which links together the various elements of a policy for the preservation of peace to which I have already

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referred, and the specific experience and knowledge of the administrative and political problems arising for and within the United Nations, renders it necessary for the Organisation to provide you in this connexion with its full assistance, if we are to arrive at the best possible, result. It would, in my view, be entirely premature at this stage to discuss this question. Be it enough to say that—as shown by the fifteen years of its history—the Organisation has such possibilities of development and such flexibility that I do not foresee any difficulties in fitting an activity of this type into the United Nations framework in a way which would fully safeguard all legitimate interests involved.

The United Nations, like other international organisations, of course reflects only the political realities of the moment. Important though organisational arrangements are, they are subordinated in the sense that they do not change realities; what at a given time politically is attainable on one organisational basis, is equally attainable on another one. Essential difficulties encountered within the United Nations are based on realities and not on the specific constitution of the Organisation. In the work for achieving and maintaining disarmament they would not be experienced with less force were an attempt to be made to start, so to say, all over again; time will be gained and better results achieved if our efforts are developed with respect for what has been achieved so far and for the necessity of organic adaptation of these achievements to new needs within the framework of new possibilities’.

### **Termination of the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee**

The Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament ended on 27 June 1960 on the withdrawal of the five Conference Eastern European delegations in the aftermath of the U-2 incident and the crisis atmosphere resulting from the abortive Ten-Nation summit meeting scheduled for Paris in June. The Eastern European Powers charged that the Western Powers were avoiding the question of general and complete disarmament, and the Western Powers charged that the Eastern European Powers were avoiding the question of preliminary measures and control. The consideration of the disarmament plans, which presaged the current draft treaties for general and complete disarmament, was left incomplete.

### **Disarmament Commission 1960**

At its fourteenth session, in 1959, the General Assembly had decided, in resolution 1403 (XIV), that the Disarmament Commission should continue to be composed of all Members of the United Nations. Following

the collapse of the ten-nation talks, the Commission convened at the request of the United States to review the situation. In the course of the discussion, the United States proposed the reciprocal transfer of 30,000 kilogrammes of weapons-grade fissionable material to peaceful purposes and the reciprocal shutting down of major plants producing enriched uranium and plutonium. The representative of the Soviet Union called for a reaffirmation of general and complete disarmament, contending that the United States proposals were not practicable without a prohibition of nuclear weapons.

The Commission unanimously adopted, on 18 August 1960, a resolution calling for the earliest possible resumption of negotiations.<sup>13</sup>

### **Consideration by the General Assembly 1960-1961**

On the eve of the General Assembly's fifteenth session, the Secretary-General, in the introduction to his Annual Report on the work of the Organisation for 1959-1960, discussed the relationship between initial steps and complete disarmament.<sup>14</sup>

There is no contradiction between this application to the disarmament problem of the philosophy and practices successfully tried by the United Nations in specific conflicts and the view that there can be no solution to the disarmament problem short of the acceptance of total disarmament under satisfactory control by both sides. The pragmatic approach and the, so to say, global one are not at variance, for it is obvious that efforts to avoid a widening of the field of conflict and to reduce the area in which concrete agreement for the moment is impossible should at all events be integrated into a wider, more far-reaching plan under which the security interests of the parties can be balanced out against each other in ways that will make it possible for the parties to reach the ideal target of total disarmament.

It is certainly not productive to approach the disarmament problem solely on a pragmatic basis, without integration of the steps taken into a plan ultimately aiming at full disarmament. Likewise, however, it seems unrealistic to approach the total problem oblivious of the fact that all political experience and all previous negotiation show that the road to progress lies in the direction of efforts to contain and reduce the area of disagreement by mobilising such common interests as may exist and as may override other and special interests tending in the opposite direction.

Many Heads of Government attended the 1960 session of the General Assembly, which led to private consultations between the United States

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and the Soviet Union for the purpose of finding a new basis for negotiations on disarmament.

The inability of the First Committee to agree on a disarmament resolution during the first part of the fifteenth session resulted from basic differences as to the principles and directives for future negotiations. The Western Powers were, for the most part, willing to resume talks in the Ten-Nation Committee on the basis of the situation that existed at the end of June 1960. The Soviet Union and its allies, however, were firmly of the opinion that a resumption of negotiations would be desirable only if there were a precise directive from the Assembly to draft a treaty or programme for general and complete disarmament based on principles to be set forth in a resolution.

Three draft resolutions were submitted—one by the Soviet Union, another by Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, and the third an attempt at compromise sponsored by Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, Nepal, the United Arab Republic, Venezuela and Yugoslavia<sup>15</sup>—but none of the drafts was able to command the support of all the principal Powers.

In March 1961, at the second part of the Assembly's fifteenth session, the United States proposed that, inasmuch as consultations were taking place with the Soviet Union, the resumed consideration of the disarmament question be deferred until some later stage. The First Committee so decided on 21 March.<sup>16</sup>

The Soviet position was that it was necessary to agree on directives for disarmament negotiations and on a broader composition for the body to conduct these negotiations. The United States said that it was intensively studying its disarmament policies in the light of developing political, technical and scientific trends and would be ready for fruitful negotiations by the end of July.

The Soviet Union and the United States further declared that an understanding had been reached between their Governments to continue an exchange of views, during June and July 1961, on questions relating to disarmament and a resumption of negotiations in an appropriate body whose composition was to be agreed upon, and to inform the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, later in 1961, of the progress made. The Soviet Union and the United States jointly submitted a draft resolution whereby the General Assembly would take note of the statements made during the fifteenth session on the question of disarmament and would decide to take up for consideration the problem

of disarmament, and all pending proposals relating to it, at its sixteenth session.

### **Soviet Union United States Statement of Agreed Principles**

The General Assembly unanimously adopted this proposal as resolution 1617 (XV) on 21 April 1961. A statement containing agreed principles as a basis for multilateral negotiations on disarmament was issued jointly by the Soviet Union and the United States on 20 September 1961 for circulation to all Members of the United Nations at the sixteenth session.<sup>17</sup> The statement followed an exchange of views between the representatives of the two Governments—at meetings held in Washington, Moscow and New York in June, July and September 1961—on questions relating to disarmament and to the resumption of negotiations on disarmament in an appropriate body.

In the joint statement, the Soviet Union and the United States recommended the following principles as a basis for new negotiations:

1. The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure:
  - (a) That disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and
  - (b) That such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. The programme for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that States will have at their disposal only such non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.
3. To this end, the programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:
  - (a) The disbanding of armed forces, the dismantling of military establishments, including bases, the cessation of the

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production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;

- (b) The elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction, and the cessation of the production of such weapons;
- (c) The elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;
- (d) The abolition of organisations and institutions designed to organise the military effort of States, the cessation of military training, and the closing of all military training institutions;

(e) The discontinuance of military expenditures.

4. The disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages, until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate.
5. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.
6. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. To implement control over the inspection of disarmament, an international disarmament organisation including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This international disarmament organisation and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without

veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

7. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
8. States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme.

On 20 September 1961, John J. McCloy and V. A. Zorin, who had represented the United States and the USSR, respectively, in the exchange of views on disarmament, exchanged letters on the question of control. The United States representative stated that, in the view of his Government, it was "implicit in the entire joint statement of agreed principles that whenever an agreement stipulates that at a certain point certain levels of forces and armaments may be retained, the verification machinery must have all the rights and powers necessary to ensure that those levels are not exceeded". The USSR representative stated that, "while strongly advocating effective control over disarmament and wishing to facilitate as much as possible the achievement of agreement on this control, the Soviet Union is at the same time resolutely opposed to the establishment of control over armaments".

After the report on the exchange of views between them and their joint statement of principles had been issued, the Soviet Union and the

United States also circulated to Assembly members the documents they had submitted in the course of their bilateral negotiations. The two countries reported that they had not been able to reach agreement on the composition of a negotiating body prior to the sixteenth session.<sup>18</sup>

On 25 September, the United States submitted a proposal entitled "Declaration on disarmament: the United States programme for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world".<sup>19</sup> The following day, the Soviet Union submitted a memorandum on "Measures to ease international tension, strengthen confidence among States and contribute to general and complete disarmament"<sup>20</sup>

India submitted a draft resolution,<sup>21</sup> later sponsored also by Ghana and the United Arab Republic, whereby the General Assembly would: (1) urge the Soviet Union and the United States to reach agreement on the composition of a negotiating body which both they and the rest of the world could regard as satisfactory; (2) express the hope that negotiations would be started without delay and lead to an agreed recommendation to the Assembly; and (3) request the two Governments to report to the Assembly on the results of such negotiations before the end of the sixteenth session. This text was unanimously approved by the Assembly as resolution 1660 (XVI).

### **Establishment of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament**

On 13 December 1961, in response to this request by the Assembly, the Soviet Union and the United States jointly submitted a two-part draft resolution in the First Committee. The joint draft was unanimously approved by the Assembly on 20 December as resolution 1722 (XVI). It reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Noting with concern* that the continuing arms race is a heavy burden for humanity and is fraught with dangers for the cause of world peace,

*Conscious* of its responsibilities, under the Charter of the United Nations, for disarmament,

*Recalling* its resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959, in which it called upon Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament and expressed the hope that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective

international control would be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time,

*Being deeply concerned* that the objectives of that resolution be achieved as early as possible,

## I

*Noting with satisfaction* the report submitted to the General Assembly by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America following their exchange of views on questions relating to disarmament and to the resumption of negotiations in an appropriate body,

1. *Welcomes* the joint statement of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations included in that report;
2. *Recommends* that negotiations on general and complete disarmament should be based upon those principles;

## II

*Deeming* it essential that negotiations on general and complete disarmament under effective international control be resumed at the earliest possible time,

*Recognising* that all States have a deep interest in disarmament negotiations,

1. *Endorses* the agreement that has been reached on the composition of a Disarmament Committee, whose membership will be: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America;
2. *Recommends* that the Committee, as a matter of the utmost urgency, should undertake negotiations with a view to reaching, on the basis of the joint statement of agreed principles and taking into account, *inter alia*, paragraph 8 of those principles, agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control;
3. *Requests* that the Committee submit to the General Assembly a report on such agreement as soon as it has been reached, and in any case submit to the Disarmament Commission, not later than 1 June 1962, a report on the progress achieved;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and provide the necessary services to the Committee.

The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament opened in Geneva on 15 March 1962 at the Foreign Ministers' level. One member of the Committee, France, decided not to participate, explaining that it hoped it might be possible later for the disarmament problem to be discussed among the Powers that could contribute effectively to its solution. At the outset, the Foreign Ministers decided to organise the Conference so as to permit simultaneous work on general and complete disarmament, confidence-building (collateral) measures, and the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

### **Draft Treaties of the Soviet Union and the United States on General and Complete Disarmament**

The major documents before the Conference during the first session in 1962 were the "Draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control", submitted by the Soviet Union on 15 March<sup>22</sup> and the United States "Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world" submitted on 18 April.<sup>23</sup> These documents, as amended from time to time in the course of the following three years, remain the basis of discussions at Geneva on general and complete disarmament. [For *the texts of the two documents, see appendices II and III.*]

During discussion in the Conference, the following points of view emerged on the various questions at issue.

### **Approach to the Principle of Balance**

The main emphasis of the Soviet plan was on the completion of the disarmament process within a fixed, short period of time as an essential means of ensuring military equality in the course of disarmament; the more quickly nuclear delivery vehicles were eliminated, the sooner would equality, and hence balance, be achieved. The original Soviet plan provided for the complete elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles by the end of the first stage.

The United States plan was designed to keep the relative military positions and the pattern of armaments within each military establishment similar as far as possible to what they were at the beginning of the process. To this end, disarmament, beginning with a freeze, was to be gradual; as confidence developed, the military establishment would, by progressive reductions, shrink to zero.

In the course of the Conference, India held that the present pattern of armaments was not a requirement of balance but, rather, that the pattern should change as a result of the early elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Sweden considered that balance might be achieved more easily if, in the first stage, the United States carried out a greater reduction of nuclear weapons and carriers and the Soviet Union carried out a greater reduction of conventional armaments. The United Arab Republic observed that a percentage reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles might upset the retaliatory capability of the country that begins with the smaller absolute number of vehicles.

### **Stages and Time-Limits, Transition and Entry into Force**

Both drafts envisaged a disarmament process which would take place in three stages. The Soviet Union proposed a four year programme, with fifteen months for each of the first two stages. The United States draft provided for two stages of three years each, to be followed by a third stage, the duration of which would be fixed at the time the treaty was signed.

During 1962, the Soviet Union agreed to extend the period for implementing the whole programme from four to five years, and extended the first stage to two years. The United Kingdom, observing that nine years might be more adequate for giving effect to the whole programme, suggested that the duration of the first stage should be determined after the measures to be carried out during that stage had been agreed upon. Sweden considered that the first stage should be longer than in the USSR draft, but that the second and third stages should be shorter than in the United States draft. India supported a period of four or five years for the whole programme. Both plans made the transition from one stage to the next dependent on the completion of previous disarmament measures and the readiness of inspection machinery for the subsequent measures. The United States plan also contained the requirements that all "other militarily significant States" would have to adhere to the treaty before the second stage and that, before the third stage, certain rules of international conduct would have to be adopted.

The Soviet treaty would come into force upon ratification by all permanent Members of the Security Council and their allies; the treaty proposed by the United States would enter into force on ratification by the Soviet Union and the United States and "such other States as might be agreed".

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## **Conventional Armaments and Armed Forces**

The United States provided for a reduction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States to 2.1 million and 1.05 million in the first and second stages, respectively, with a 30 per cent reduction of all major armaments, nuclear as well as conventional, by categories and types of weapons, in the first stage and a 35 per cent reduction in each of the second and third stages. Subsequently, it amended its proposal to prohibit the production of certain major armaments in the first stage except for replacement purposes, in order to ensure that the 30 per cent reduction would in fact reduce both the quantity and quality of all armaments covered by the reduction. A reduction of agreed military bases would take place in the second stage, but the United States opposed any distinction between foreign and domestic bases.

The Soviet draft originally provided for the reduction of Soviet and United States armed forces to the level of 1.7 million and 1 million men in the first and second stages, respectively. Subsequently, in 1962, the Soviet Union proposed a compromise first-stage level of 1.9 million men. The revised treaty provided for reductions of 30 per cent, 35 per cent and 35 per cent of conventional armaments in each successive stage, and for a reduction in the production of conventional armaments parallel to the reductions of armed forces, through the elimination of factories engaged in such production. The total elimination of all foreign military bases would take place in the first stage, starting with the liquidation of all foreign bases located in Europe. The elimination of foreign bases was linked by the Soviet Union to the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles.

## **Nuclear Disarmament**

Both drafts envisaged comparable first-stage obligations for the nuclear Powers not to transfer control of nuclear weapons or information on their production to non-nuclear Powers. In all other respects they differed.

In order to prevent a threat of nuclear war at the outset of the disarmament process, the original USSR draft provided for the complete elimination of vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons and the cessation of the production of such vehicles in the first stage. Subsequently, the Soviet Union amended its proposal to permit it and the United States to retain, on their own territories, a limited number of intercontinental, antimissile and anti-aircraft missiles until the end of the third stage. The total elimination of nuclear weapons and fissionable material for

weapons purposes and the discontinuance of their production would take place during the second stage.

The United States plan provided in the first stage for ending production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and for transferring, for peaceful uses, agreed quantities of weapon-grade uranium-235 already produced and stockpiled. The number of vehicles capable of carrying nuclear weapons would be reduced by 30 per cent in the second stage, while stocks of nuclear weapons would be reduced by an agreed percentage, and the production of nuclear weapons would be subject to agreed limitations. The total elimination of such weapons would take place in the third stage.

Some members of the Committee offered compromise solutions: Nigeria suggested that 50 to 60 per cent of nuclear delivery vehicles be eliminated during the first stage, while India and the United Arab Republic suggested a mixed approach combining the percentage and fixed-figure methods of reducing armaments.

### **Controls**

The plans of the Soviet Union and the United States differed on some aspects of inspection and control. Both sides agreed on the need to verify what was being reduced, destroyed or converted to peaceful uses, as well as to control the cessation of production of armaments. In addition, the United States stressed the need to verify remaining quantities of armaments and forces and to ensure that undisclosed, clandestine forces, weapons or production facilities did not exist. To meet these requirements, the United States suggested a system of progressive zonal inspection whereby the amount of unhindered mobile inspections in any country's territory would be related to the amount of disarmament undertaken and to the degree of risk arising from possible clandestine activities.

The Soviet Union opposed, for security reasons, the inspection of remaining stocks of armaments and criticised the zonal system in particular, as it would disclose the defence system of a country. It was, however, willing to consider indirect systems of inspection, such as budgetary controls.

Burma and Nigeria maintained that inspection to ascertain that agreed levels of armaments had not been exceeded would become important only when a significant percentage of armaments was destroyed. They suggested that the United States accept the USSR

proposal on control for the first stage of disarmament and that the Soviet Union accept the control proposal of the United States for the second stage as part of a new programme which would rearrange the phasing of disarmament measures. Brazil considered that the zonal inspection proposal should be studied, as well as other technical problems of control. India proposed as an alternative that parties to the treaty invite inspectors of the proposed international disarmament organisation to visit increasingly larger areas of their countries. Sweden doubted the advisability of introducing the zonal system during an early stage of disarmament because of the risk of divulging military secrets, and suggested, for the early phase, indirect control measures, such as budgetary controls, and the furnishing of related economic and demographic data, such as the labour market and industrial production statistics.

The United Kingdom also stressed the need to discuss the technical problems of control, whereas Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the USSR were of the opinion that consideration of technical problems would be possible only after agreement had been reached on the scope and priority of disarmament measures.

### **Peace-keeping**

The United States draft proposed a number of measures to keep and reinforce peace during and after the disarmament process, and stressed that no agreement on general and complete disarmament could be reached without prior agreement on peace-keeping machinery as a means to fill the gap created by disarmament. In the first stage of the United States plan, a United Nations peace observation corps would be established. At the start of the second stage, a United Nations peace force would come into existence, and during the remainder of that stage, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice would become compulsory for legal disputes, and measures would be adopted against indirect aggression and subversion. The question of whether the peace force, which was to be fully developed in the third stage, should be equipped with nuclear weapons was to be left open for future decision.

The USSR draft provided that in the course of and following the disarmament process, contingents with non-nuclear weapons would be made available to the Security Council, under Article 43 of the Charter. The Soviet Union opposed the United States approach to peace-keeping on the ground that it created supra-national institutions contrary to the United Nations Charter. It also objected strongly to any possibility

of providing the United Nations peace force with nuclear weapons, a view which was also supported by India.

### **Role of the United Nations**

The USSR plan would establish an international disarmament organisation “within the framework of the United Nations”. The organisation would report to the Security Council and the General Assembly as part of the procedure of transition from one stage to the next. The organisation’s council, which would include the five permanent members of the Security Council, would from the first stage “maintain constant touch with the United Nations Security Council as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; periodically inform it of the progress achieved in the implementation of general and complete disarmament, and promptly notify it of any infringement by the States parties to the Treaty of their disarmament obligations under the... Treaty”.

The United States plan also placed the proposed international disarmament organisation “within the framework of the United Nations”. The organisation would conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations and would maintain close working arrangements with the United Nations, and its administrator would consult with the Secretary-General on matters of mutual interest. The control council of the organisation would transmit annual and other reports to the United Nations, and “principal organs of the United Nations” could make recommendations to it. In transition from one stage to the next, the Security Council would be the organ of last resort for decision in the event of a dispute as to whether the required conditions for transition had been met. This was subsequently amended to provide for the decision to be taken by the control council with the affirmative votes of the United States, the Soviet Union and other States to be agreed upon.

The proposed organisation could request advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice, subject to a general authorisation of this power by the General Assembly. The United States plan specified that its provisions did not cover “all the possible details or aspects of the relationships” between the organisation and the United Nations.

With regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, the USSR plan reaffirmed United Nations Charter obligations and procedures for the settlement of international disputes. To ensure the

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capability of the United Nations to deal with threats to or breaches of the peace, all States parties to the treaty would, between the signing of the treaty and its entry into force, conclude agreements with the Security Council by which they would undertake to make available armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, as provided for in Article 43 of the Charter. The armed forces provided under these agreements would be part of the national armed forces of the States and would be stationed within their territories. When employed by the Security Council under Article 42 of the Charter, the forces would be commanded by the military authorities of the corresponding States.

At the end of the disarmament process, States would maintain in immediate readiness that part of their police (militia) contingents that were, under Article 43 of the Charter, to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council at its request. The size of the units, as well as the areas where they would be stationed, would be specified in agreements to be concluded with the Security Council by the States parties to the treaty. The command of the units would be made up of the representatives of the three principal groups of States. The Security Council would be responsible for all preventive and enforcement measures in accordance with its powers under the Charter.

As part of the first stage of the United States plan, parties would refrain from use of force of any type contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter, and would settle disputes in accordance with Charter procedures. Disputes based on conflicting interpretations of the disarmament treaty which were not settled by negotiation might be referred by any party to the International Court of Justice. Parties would agree on the following measures within the United Nations:

- (a) Examination of United Nations experience leading to a further strengthening of United Nations forces for keeping the peace;
- (b) Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the Charter;
- (c) Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a United Nations peace force in stage two.

The parties would also support the establishment within the United Nations of a peace observation corps with a standing cadre of observers which might either be dispatched to investigate any situation or be stationed in selected areas throughout the world.

In stage two, parties would accept without reservation the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, under Article 36, paragraph 1, of its Statute, to decide international legal disputes. The United Nations peace force would then also come into being.

### **Consideration by the General Assembly 1962**

The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament recessed for the seventeenth session of the General Assembly. At that session, the Assembly reviewed the progress achieved, the participants restating their basic positions, and the Soviet Union submitted a revised version of its draft treaty<sup>24</sup> by which the Soviet Union and the United States would be able to retain, but only on their own territory, a strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles of the ground-to-air variety, until the end of the second stage of disarmament.

Acting on the basis of a 33-Power draft resolution, the Assembly, in resolution 1767 (XVII) of 21 November 1962, unanimously reaffirmed the need for the conclusion, at the earliest possible date, of an agreement on general and complete disarmament and called upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume its Geneva negotiations and report periodically to the Assembly. The resolution also recommended that urgent attention should be given "to various collateral measures intended to decrease tension and to facilitate general and complete disarmament."

### **Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament 1963**

When it reconvened in Geneva on 12 February 1963, the ENDC concentrated on the new Soviet proposal for the retention of nuclear delivery vehicles until the end of the second stage. The USSR explained that the number of retained missiles would have to be so small as to prevent the possibility of a nuclear war being waged and that the measure would have to be regarded as an exception to the principle of elimination of all nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage. It would, moreover, have to be implemented simultaneously with the elimination of foreign military bases, and both measures would be carried out under international control.

The Western delegations raised questions regarding the ranges of numbers and categories of armaments involved, the method of reduction to agreed levels, and means of verification. The United Kingdom

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regarded the new Soviet proposal as a step in the right direction, but preferred to have it related not to the second but to the third stage, when the international-peace-keeping forces would be built up.

The United States pressed for acceptance of its own nuclear disarmament proposals: (a) cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; (b) transfer of fissionable material to peaceful purposes; (c) non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; and (d) conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. The United States expressed readiness to consider a transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses larger than that which would be requested of the Soviet Union—for example, 60,000 kilogrammes as against 40,000. The cut-off and the transfer, as a combined step, as well as the test ban, would not need to await agreement on the first stage of general and complete disarmament for their implementation.

The Soviet Union rejected the United States proposal for the cut-off of production of fissionable material and transfer of some quantities to peaceful uses as not contributing to either the elimination or reduction of the danger of nuclear war, by leaving intact nuclear weapon stockpiles which could even increase as a result of further production of weapons from accumulated stocks of fissionable material. The Soviet Union reiterated the need for radical nuclear disarmament measures, and offered to shift the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the second stage of its plan to the first.

As to foreign military bases, the Soviet Union argued that while their defensive role was negligible, they could be used for aggressive purposes including surprise attack, they jeopardised the security of the host countries and they constituted interference in the internal affairs of other States and served neo-colonialist policies.

The United States and its allies maintained that all bases, whether domestic or foreign, and wherever located, were set up at the will of the host countries concerned, that they had a defensive character and that they would eventually be liquidated through the progressive reduction of armaments as provided in the United States disarmament plan. They also contended that the elimination of Western alliance bases in the first stage would upset the military balance between East and West, would give a unilateral advantage to the Soviet Union because of geographical and political dissimilarities between the two military alliances and would leave the individual Western European countries vulnerable to the preponderant Soviet military strength. They rejected

the Soviet proposal both as a separate measure and as a measure linked to the first-stage elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles.

### **Consideration by the General Assembly 1963**

At the Assembly's eighteenth session, in 1963, the Foreign by the Minister of the USSR, A. Gromyko, on 19 September, submitted a revised Soviet plan whereby the USSR and the United States would retain on their own territories limited contingents of intercontinental, anti-missile and anti-aircraft missiles, not only until the end of the second stage as previously proposed, but until the end of the third stage of general and complete disarmament. Under the revised plan, measures for eliminating nuclear weapons at the second stage would make an exception for nuclear warheads for the rockets to be retained until the end of the third stage. From the very outset of the second stage, control would be instituted over the remaining rockets as well as over their nuclear warheads. It was stressed that the number of delivery vehicles to be retained would be minimal so as to prevent their use as a means of waging war or carrying out aggression.

Resolution 1908 (XVIII), which was adopted by acclamation on 27 November 1963, recommended to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament renewed attempts to achieve agreement on general and complete disarmament, though its main thrust was towards collateral measures.

### **Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament 1964**

During 196-1, discussion of nuclear delivery vehicles in the ENDC was spurred by suggestions that the question be the subject of a detailed study in an appropriate working body, now that it was agreed that the "nuclear umbrella" should be retained until the end of the third stage. The Soviet Union, supported by its allies, proposed that the working group should carry out its studies on the premises that: (1) all means of nuclear delivery, except those of the "nuclear umbrella", must be eliminated at the earliest stage of disarmament; and (2) the agreed number of missiles to be retained until the third stage of disarmament must be strictly limited, i.e., minimal. The Soviet Union simultaneously stated that while it was ready to consider within the working group any proposal or suggestion leading to implementation of the "nuclear umbrella" concept, it strongly opposed discussion of the percentage reduction plan of elimination, as proposed by the United States, because such a plan would not meet the requirements of early radical disarmament.

The United States, supported by its allies, was willing to accept the Soviet “nuclear umbrella” concept as one of the bases for discussion, and argued that the working group should consider all relevant proposals, including the United States proposal for percentage reductions in each stage. The United States was willing to have the Soviet “nuclear umbrella” proposal discussed first but suggested the following-terms of reference: to examine the retention of agreed levels of nuclear delivery vehicles throughout the disarmament process with elimination of all other nuclear delivery vehicles at the earliest practicable time, consistent with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. The United States maintained that the Soviet terms of reference for the working group amounted to supporting the Soviet Union’s position on nuclear delivery vehicles and thus were objectionable; the United States proposal was procedural in character.

The non-aligned members of the ENDC, and, in particular, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic, favoured flexible but clear terms of reference. India proposed that the working group should be established to consider proposals for the reduction of existing stocks of nuclear delivery vehicles to the lowest agreed levels at an early stage of the disarmament process, leading to total elimination and the destruction of all stocks. The working group would be free to discuss all proposals on the methods of reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles. The eight non-aligned countries presented separate memoranda<sup>25</sup> containing a brief resume of the suggestions and proposals on general and complete disarmament which had been discussed during 1964.

After thorough consideration, the Committee agreed that the differences were basic, and no study group or working group was established.

[Owing to the special circumstances prevailing at the General Assembly’s nineteenth session, in 1964, as a result of the dispute over the application of Article 19 of the Charter, no action was taken on disarmament or related questions.]

### **Disarmament Commission 1965**

When the Disarmament Commission met from 21 April to 16 June 1965, at the request of the Soviet Union, it undertook a review of the negotiations in the ENDC. The Soviet Union spoke of the need to continue the discussion of general and complete disarmament. The United States said it was determined to work for general and complete disarmament as part of the common long-term effort. However, the resolution adopted

by the Commission<sup>26</sup> accorded priority to a comprehensive test ban and an agreement on non-proliferation, though it also recommended urgent efforts to develop a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective inter-national control.

### **Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament 1965**

When the ENDC convened briefly in 1965, the Soviet Union and its allies emphasised that work on a treaty on general and complete disarmament was the main task of the ENDC, and accused the Western Powers of departing from this objective and of paying only minimal attention to the problem.

The United States and its allies reiterated their commitment to general and complete disarmament, while expressing a preference for discussion of more urgent issues promising more rapid solution. Nevertheless, Italy stressed the desirability of discussing the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles within a working group set up without any preconditions as to its terms of reference.

ALL of the non-aligned countries reaffirmed their commitment to the goal of general and complete disarmament, although, in view of the priority accorded by the Disarmament Commission to a comprehensive test ban and to non-proliferation, they were reluctant to devote the brief ENDC session to a discussion of general and complete disarmament.

### **Consideration by the General Assembly 1965**

At the twentieth session of the General Assembly, in 1965, the item "General and complete disarmament" was considered by the First Committee at only three meetings. In addition to the two reports of the ENDC to the nineteenth and twentieth sessions, the Committee had before it two draft resolutions: one submitted by Malta<sup>27</sup> whereby the General Assembly would invite the ENDC to consider the question of transfers between States, whether by way of trade or otherwise, of arms, ammunition and implements of war, with a view to submitting to the Assembly proposals for the establishment of a system of publicity through the United Nations; and the other submitted by Cyprus<sup>28</sup> whereby the General Assembly would request the ENDC to continue its efforts towards making substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control as well as on other collateral matters contained in the reports of the ENDC.

The draft resolution of Malta, which did not deal with general disarmament, was rejected in the First Committee by 19 votes to 18, with 39 abstentions.

The USSR representative observed that in the previous two years no agreements had been reached contributing to the solution of the problem of disarmament, while outside the ENDC there was a constantly accelerating armaments race and an exacerbation of international tensions, in particular the military preparations connected with the war in Viet-Nam.

The United States contended that it had been responding in Viet-Nam to aggression from the North, and reaffirmed interest in a treaty on general and complete disarmament, though the first objective should be measures to halt the nuclear arms race.

The Cyprus draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by the Assembly on 3 December as resolution 2031 (XX) by 102 votes to none, with 6 abstentions (Albania, Algeria, France, Guinea, Mali and the United Republic of Tanzania).

### **World Disarmament Conference Proposed**

In some of the early plans for general disarmament, provision was made for a world disarmament conference to consider the agreement reached by the principal Powers. In 1964, the idea arose in a new context. Meeting in Cairo in October, the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries proposed such a conference and stressed the desirability of having all countries participate.

The Disarmament Commission, during 1965, considered a 36-Power draft resolution<sup>29</sup> affirming the idea of a world conference and recommending that the twentieth session of the Assembly give the proposal urgent consideration. While considerable support was expressed for the idea, questions were raised on the need for: (a) adequate preparatory work; (b) agreement on the countries to be invited; (c) proper timing in relation to the international situation; (d) preliminary agreement among the nuclear Powers; (e) participation of all nuclear Powers; (f) agreement on the agenda; and (g) establishing a proper relationship with the United Nations.

By a vote of 89 to none, with 16 abstentions, the Disarmament Commission adopted the following resolution<sup>30</sup> on 11 June 1965:

### *The Disarmament Commission*

*Recognising* the paramount importance of disarmament as one of the basic problems of the contemporary world and that its solution should be sought in a world-wide framework.

*Convinced* that a world disarmament conference as proposed by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries would provide powerful support for the efforts which are being made to set in motion the process of disarmament and for securing the further and steady development of this process, with a view to speeding up general and complete disarmament under effective international control and thus contributing to the relaxation of international tension,

1. *Welcomes* the proposal adopted at the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in October 1964 for the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited;
2. *Recommends* that the General Assembly give urgent consideration to the above-mentioned proposal at its twentieth session.

In accordance with the resolution, the item was placed on the agenda of the General Assembly's twentieth session. A 43-Power draft resolution endorsed the proposal and urged that the necessary consultations be concluded with all countries for the purpose of establishing a widely representative preparatory committee which would take appropriate steps for the convening of a world disarmament conference not later than 1967.

In the course of the debate on the question, such problems as the purpose of the conference, its task, conditions for success, participation, role of the United Nations, relations with the ENDC, organisation and task of the preparatory committee, date and site were discussed. There was general agreement that the Assembly was not in a position to lay down concrete tasks for a world conference.

The participation of all countries, and, especially, significant military Powers, was stressed, particularly that of the People's Republic of China. The representative of Albania stated with respect to the People's Republic of China that "it is understandable that that Government cannot take part in any international conference convened by the United Nations, or held under its auspices, as long as its rights as the sole representative of China and all of the Chinese people are not restored".

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In order to ensure universality, it was argued by, among others, Albania, Czechoslovakia and the USSR that the world conference should not be convened under the aegis of the United Nations. Nigeria defined the dilemma as follows: "how to associate the United Nations with the world conference and yet avoid any firm link between the two, so as not to alienate non-member States". The resolution as finally adopted contained an additional paragraph urging that all countries be kept informed as appropriate of the results achieved by the preparatory committee. In addition, the preamble of the resolution began by recognising the "continuing interest and responsibility of the United Nations in connexion with the solution of the disarmament problem".

Some of the sponsors of the resolution stressed that participants at the Cairo Conference had not conceived the world disarmament conference as a substitute for the ENDC. The United States, however, was among those who feared that regardless of intentions, the world conference might in fact hamper the work of the ENDC.

The idea of establishing a widely representative preparatory committee was generally accepted, but some countries criticised the vagueness of the second operative paragraph of the resolution. Saudi Arabia proposed an amendment whereby the five major nuclear Powers would be called upon to explore possible areas of agreement as a prelude to convening a world disarmament conference. Though the United States declared its willingness to participate in a preliminary group composed of the nuclear Powers and of States having major peaceful nuclear programmes, as well as several which developed the idea of the world conference, the sponsors of the draft expressed doubts as to the feasibility of such proposals. The Saudi Arabian amendment was withdrawn. The United Arab Republic said that the preparatory committee might be established by consultations undertaken through diplomatic channels.

Among the tasks mentioned for the preparatory committee were the questions of agenda, procedure and financing. The United States stated that until these questions, as well as the question of participation had been settled, it would reserve its position regarding its own participation. The Soviet Union warned against the transfer of previous negotiating procedures to the world conference, since the aim of the conference was to try out and test bold new approaches and ideas. Some countries felt that the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for disarmament negotiations of 1961 should be the basis for the work of the conference.

Resolution 2030 (XX), adopted by the General Assembly on 29 November 1965, by 112 votes to none, with 1 abstention (France), reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Mindful* of the continuing interest and responsibility of the United Nations in connexion with the solution of the disarmament problem,

*Reaffirming* the paramount importance of disarmament for the contemporary world and the urgent need for the achievement of this goal,

*Believing* that it is imperative to exert further efforts towards reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament with effective international control, with a view to securing lasting peace in the world,

*Convinced* that all countries should contribute towards the accomplishment of disarmament and co-operate in taking immediate steps with a view to achieving progress in this field,

*Convinced also* that a world disarmament conference would promote the realisation of general and complete disarmament,

*Reaffirming* the resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 11 June 1965,

1. *Endorses* the proposal adopted at the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in 1964, on the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited;
2. *Urges* that the necessary consultations be conducted with all countries for the purpose of establishing a widely representative preparatory committee which will take appropriate steps for the convening of a world disarmament conference not later than 1967;
3. *Urges further* that all countries be kept informed, as appropriate, of the results achieved by the preparatory committee in accordance with paragraph 2 above.

After the vote, the Secretary-General expressed his gratification that the resolution created an opportunity to include all countries that wished to participate in a disarmament conference, and he stated that, if at any time, the preparatory committee or the conference itself should decide that the assistance or facilities of the Secretariat might be helpful to them in their work, he would endeavour to meet any appropriate request to the full extent of the Secretariat's capability.

In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organisation for 1965-66, the Secretary-General reported that little progress had been made towards preparing the ground for holding a world disarmament conference. Shortly thereafter, the preparatory steps came to a complete standstill.

### **Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament 1966**

In the report of its 1966 session,<sup>31</sup> the ENDC continued to regard a treaty on general and complete disarmament as, the primary goal of its future work. It added, however, that “in order to achieve the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date”, the Committee had continued consideration of such measures as could be agreed to prior to the achievement of this goal, in particular the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.

### **Consideration by the General Assembly 1966**

The priority subjects of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the suspension of nuclear weapon tests were discussed under their own separate agenda items at the General Assembly's twenty-first session. Even under the item “Question of general and complete disarmament”, attention was centered primarily on less comprehensive approaches, such as the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the question of a study of the effects of nuclear weapons (*discussed separately below*). While general and complete disarmament continued to be considered the final goal of all disarmament efforts, resolution 2162 C (XXI) adopted by the General Assembly in the matter, requested the ENDC to pursue new efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement not only on this question but also on collateral measures, and in particular on an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and on the completion of a test ban treaty to cover underground tests. This resolution reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Having received* the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

*Recalling* its resolutions 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959, 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1967 (XVII) of 21 November 1962 1908 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963 and 2031 (XX) of 3 December 1965,

*Conscious* of its responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for disarmament and the preservation of peace,

*Firmly believing* that it is imperative to make further efforts to achieve early progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

1. *Requests* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to pursue new efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as on collateral measures, and in particular on an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and on the completion of the test ban treaty so as to cover underground nuclear weapon tests;

2. *Decides* to refer to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament all documents and records of the meetings of the First Committee concerning all matters related to the disarmament question;

3. *Requests* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume its work as early as possible and to report to the General Assembly, as appropriate, on the progress achieved.

### **Consideration by the General Assembly 1967**

As a result of growing emphasis on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, consideration of disarmament, both in the ENDC and the General Assembly, was dominated by this question until mid-1968, when a non-proliferation treaty was finally endorsed by the Assembly. In its report for 1967<sup>32</sup> the ENDC specifically noted that it had not been able to devote sufficient time to the question of general and complete disarmament. General and complete disarmament continued to be recognised as the ultimate goal, however, and the twenty-second Assembly adopted by 92 votes to none, with 2 abstentions, resolution 2342 B (XXII), calling on the ENDC to resume consideration of this question in accordance with resolution 2162 C (XXI). This resolution reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Having received* the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

*Recalling* its resolutions 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959, 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1767 (XVII) of 21 November 1962, 1908 (XVIII)

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of 27 November 1963, 2031 (XX) of 3 December 1965 and 2162 C (XXI) of 5 December 1966,

*Noting* that since then the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has not been able to devote sufficient time to the consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament,

*Reaffirming its conviction* of the necessity of continuing to exert new efforts, for the purpose of ensuring tangible progress towards the achievement of an agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament,

1. *Requests* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume at the earliest possible date consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2162 C (XXI);
2. *Decides* to transmit to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament all the documents and records of the meetings of the First Committees, as well as those of the plenary meetings of the General Assembly pertaining to this item;
3. *Requests* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to report on the progress achieved on the question of general and complete disarmament to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session.

In the Assembly's discussions, the principal criticism continued to be directed at the slow progress towards nuclear disarmament.

### **Expert Study of the Effects and Implications of Nuclear Weapons**

As noted above, the twenty-first session of the General Assembly gave particular attention to the question of a study on the effects of nuclear weapons. In the introduction to his report on the work of the Organisation for the year 1965-66, the Secretary-General had stated the following:<sup>33</sup>

During its twenty-one years of existence, the United Nations — born and raised in the nuclear age—has devoted a great deal of time and discussion to disarmament. The results so far are extremely meagre—so meagre that it is natural to question to what extent Governments and people really understand the effects of the nuclear arms race. In all this time no organ of the United Nations has ever carried out a comprehensive study of the consequences of the

invention of nuclear weapons. Since they were used for the first and only time on actual targets over twenty years ago, their destructive power, their quantities in stockpile, the manner of their use, and the amount of human and material resources devoted to their manufacture and potential delivery have expanded far beyond the comprehension of most people and, I suspect, of many Governments. I believe that the time has come for an appropriate body of the United Nations to explore and weigh the impact and implications of all aspects of nuclear weapons, including problems of a military, political, economic and social nature relating to the manufacture, acquisition, deployment and development of these weapons and their possible use. To know the true nature of the danger we face may be a most important first step towards averting it.

Acting on this suggestion, the Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 2162 A (XXI), originally submitted by Canada, India, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, and later sponsored by a total of thirty-three Powers, which reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Considering* that one of the main purposes of the United Nations is to save mankind from the scourge of war,

*Convinced* that the armaments race, in particular the nuclear arms race, constitutes a threat to peace,

*Believing* that the peoples of the world should be made fully aware of this threat,

*Noting* the interest in a report on various aspects of the problem of nuclear weapons which has been expressed by many Governments, as well as by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report for 1965-1966 and on other occasions,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare a concise report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons;
2. *Recommends* that the report should be based on accessible material and prepared with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by the Secretary-General;

3. *Requests* that the report be published and transmitted to the Governments of Member States in time to permit its consideration at the twenty-second session of the General Assembly;

4. *Recommends* that the Governments of all Member States should give the report wide distribution in their respective languages, through various media of communication, so as to acquaint public opinion with its contents.

In accordance with this resolution, the group of consultant experts appointed by the Secretary-General prepared and submitted to the Secretary-General a unanimous report entitled "Effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons".<sup>34</sup> The consultant experts agreed on the following general conclusions to their detailed findings on the subject:

Since the sense of insecurity on the part of nations is the cause of the arms race, which in turn enhances that very insecurity, and in so far as nuclear armaments are the end of a spectrum which begins with conventional weapons, the problem of reversing the trend of a rapidly worsening world situation calls for a basic re-appraisal of all interrelated factors. The solution of the problem of ensuring security cannot be found in an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons or, indeed, in the retention of nuclear weapons by the Powers currently possessing them. An agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as recommended by the United Nations, freely negotiated and genuinely observed, would therefore be a powerful step in the right direction, as would also an agreement on the reduction of existing nuclear arsenals. Security for all countries of the world must be sought through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use, by way of general and complete disarmament.

A comprehensive test ban treaty, prohibiting the underground testing of nuclear devices, would also contribute to the objectives of non-proliferation and would clearly help to slow down the nuclear arms race. So would effective measures safeguarding the security of non-nuclear countries. Nuclear weapon free zones additional to those of Antarctica and Latin America, covering the maximum geographical extent possible and taking into account other measures of arms control and disarmament, would equally be of major assistance.

These measures are mentioned neither to argue the case for them nor to set them in any order of priority. What the analysis of the whole problem shows is that any of them, or any combination of them, could help inhibit the further multiplication of nuclear weapons Powers or the further elaboration of existing nuclear arsenals and so help to ensure national and world security. But it must be realised that these measures of arms limitation, however desirable, cannot of themselves eliminate the threat of nuclear conflict. They should be regarded not as ends sufficient in themselves but only as measures which could lead to the reduction of the level of nuclear armaments and the lessening of tension in the world and the eventual elimination of nuclear armaments. All countries have a clear interest in the evolution of a world which allows of peaceful and stable coexistence. Non-nuclear weapon countries, as well as those which possess nuclear weapons, need to work in concert, creating conditions in which there should be free access to materials, equipment and information for achieving all the peaceful benefits of atomic energy, and for promoting international security.

This report gives the bare outline of the disasters which could be associated with the use of nuclear weapons. It discusses the nature and variety of the economic burden they impose. And it unhesitatingly concludes from the considerations that have been set out that whatever the path to national and international security in the future, it is certainly not to be found in the further spread and elaboration of nuclear weapons. The threat of the immeasurable disaster which could befall mankind were nuclear war ever to erupt, whether by miscalculation or by mad intent, is so real that informed people the world over understandably become impatient for measures of disarmament additional to the few measures of arms limitation that have already been agreed to—the limited ban on testing, the prohibition of nuclear weapons in outer space, and the nuclear-free zone of Latin America.

International agreement against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and agreements on measures of arms control and disarmament will promote the security of all countries. The United Nations has the overriding responsibility in this field. The more effective it becomes in action, the more powerful its authority, the greater becomes the assurance for man's future. And the longer the world waits, the more nuclear arsenals grow, the greater and more difficult becomes the eventual task.

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The Secretary-General accepted this report in its entirety and transmitted it to the General Assembly on 10 October 1967. In a "Foreword" to the report, the Secretary-General made the following comment:

The consultant experts have approached their task in the spirit of the resolution of the General Assembly and it gives me very great satisfaction that they were able through co-operation and understanding to come up with a unanimous report. What makes the report particularly valuable is the fact that, in trying to reach unanimity, the expert consultants have not avoided sensitive or even controversial issues. This is extremely significant because the value of the report lies in its clear and fair exposition of the problem. I am very pleased to be able to endorse their findings.

The discussion of the report at the General Assembly's twenty-second session showed virtually unanimous approval of the representative composition of the expert panel, the unanimity of its views and the cogent language of the report. There was also general agreement on the general findings of the report and on the need for publicising it widely. On 19 December 1967, the Assembly adopted, by 113 votes to none, with 1 abstention, resolution 2342 A (XXII), which reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 2162 A (XXI) of 5 December 1966, in which the Secretary-General was requested to prepare a concise report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons,

*Noting* that the report has been completed and is available,

*Convinced* that the wide dissemination of the report would contribute to a better understanding of the threat presented by nuclear weapons and encourage speedy progress in the prevention of their spread, as well as in other measures of nuclear disarmament,

1. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the Secretary-General's report as an authoritative statement on the effects of nuclear weapons and on the implications of their acquisition and further development;
2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Secretary-General and to the consultant experts who assisted him for the prompt and effective manner in which the report was prepared;

3. *Notes* the conclusions of the report and expresses the hope that all the parties concerned will consider them carefully;
4. *Recommends* that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should take into account the report and the conclusions thereof in its efforts towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to arrange for the reproduction of the full report as a United Nations publication and, making full use of all the facilities of the United Nations Office of Public-Information, to publicize the report in as many languages as is considered desirable and practicable;
6. *Recommends* to all Governments the wide distribution of the report and its publication in their respective languages, as appropriate, so as to acquaint public opinion with its contents;
7. *Invites* regional intergovernmental organisations, the specialised agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and national and international non-governmental organisations to use all the facilities available to them to make the report widely known.

### **Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament 1968**

At the second part of the ENDC's 1968 session, held in July and August after the General Assembly's endorsement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Committee adopted a provisional agenda for its future work, reading as follows:

1. Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

Under this heading members may wish to discuss measures dealing with the cessation of testing, the non-use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons use, the cessation of manufacture of weapons, and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles, nuclear free zones, etc.

2. Non-nuclear measures.

Under this heading, members may wish to discuss chemical and bacteriological warfare, regional arms limitations, etc.

3. Other collateral measures.

Under this heading, members may wish to discuss prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, etc.

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#### 4. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective International control.

In its report to the General Assembly on this session,<sup>35</sup> the Committee noted that the agenda had been recommended and adopted “in recognition of the views expressed by the members of the Committee and in response to recommendations of the General Assembly, taking into account the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and also the agreement announced on 1 July 1968 for bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitations of strategic nuclear arms”. The Committee also noted the recognised right of any delegation to raise and discuss any disarmament subject at any time. With specific reference to the question of general and complete disarmament, the Committee reported that, in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions and taking into account the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of possible use of nuclear weapons, members of the Committee had exchanged views on this question and emphasised the importance of resuming its consideration.

#### **Consideration by the General Assembly 1968**

At the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, the principal subjects of discussion were a comprehensive nuclear test ban, bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear arms, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, and a study of the effects of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons (*all treated separately below*). General and complete disarmament continued, however, to be described as the final goal of all disarmament efforts. By a nearly unanimous vote, the Assembly adopted resolution 2454 B (XXIII) requesting the ENDC to pursue renewed efforts towards an agreement on general and complete disarmament and to analyse all plans for progress on disarmament, including collateral measures, and to report to the General Assembly. The resolution reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Considering* that one of the main purposes of the United Nations is to save mankind from the scourge of war,

*Convinced* that the armaments race, in particular the nuclear arms race, constitutes a threat to peace,

*Believing* that it is imperative to exert further efforts towards reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

*Noting with satisfaction* the agreement of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America to enter into bilateral discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles,

*Having received* the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, to which are annexed documents presented by the delegations of the eight non-aligned members of the Committee and by Italy, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,

*Noting* the memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dated 1 July 1968 concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament and other proposals for collateral measures which have been submitted at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

*Recalling* its resolutions 1767 (XVII) of 21 November 1962, 1908 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, 2031 (XX) of 3 December 1965, 2162 C (XXI) of 5 December 1966 and 2344 (XXII) and 2342 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967,

1. *Requests* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to make renewed efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and urgently to analyse the plans already under consideration and others that might be put forward to see how in particular rapid progress could be made in the field of nuclear disarmament;
2. *Further requests* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue its urgent efforts to negotiate collateral measures of disarmament;
3. *Decides* to refer to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament all documents and records of the meetings of the First Committee concerning all matters related to the disarmament question;
4. *Requests* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume its work as early as possible and to report to the General Assembly, as appropriate, on the progress achieved.

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### **Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament 1969**

When the ENDC reconvened for its 1969 session, on 18 March, the discussion continued to be dominated by important collateral measures, in particular, a comprehensive nuclear test ban, the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed. In its report,<sup>36</sup> however, the Committee stressed that it had kept in mind the relationship between these measures, as well as those already achieved, and the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. In the Committee's discussion, considerable support was also expressed for a more explicit organisation of the Committee's work on partial measures within the over-all framework of plans for general and complete disarmament. Specific recommendations for further work on the question of general and complete disarmament were made by the representatives of Sweden, India and Poland; Italy submitted to the Committee two working papers<sup>37</sup> advocating the adoption of an "organic disarmament programme"; and Romania suggested that consideration be given to proclamation of a "United Nations Disarmament Decade 1970-1980".

### **Consideration by the General Assembly 1969**

At the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, primary emphasis continued to be placed on the need for effective measures to halt the nuclear arms race and for achieving nuclear disarmament within the framework of general and complete disarmament. The questions of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the question of a treaty banning weapons of mass destruction from the sea-bed were given intensive consideration at this session, and the former subject was considered under a separate agenda item. Under the specific item of general and complete disarmament, the Assembly adopted six resolutions. In addition to resolutions pertaining to a sea-bed treaty, to a moratorium on the further testing and deployment of strategic nuclear arms, and to the expansion of membership of the ENDC, these six resolutions included a major resolution pertaining directly to general and complete disarmament and declaring a "Disarmament Decade" for the 1970s, as well as two resolutions on relatively new subjects.

The discussion on the broad aspects of general and complete disarmament at this session of the General Assembly was more extensive than at several previous sessions, with considerable criticism of the slow progress being made in the Committee on Disarmament towards

this final goal. Much of this discussion took place in the context of proposals to declare the decade of the 1970s as a "Disarmament Decade." There was widespread agreement that efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament should be increased, but little agreement on how this might best be accomplished. While some countries believed that progress on partial measures was not conducive to progress towards general disarmament, others stressed the importance of such measures as steps towards the final objective.

### **Declaration of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade**

In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organisation for 1963-1969, the Secretary-General, after deploring the continuing spiral of military expenditures and stockpiling of both nuclear and conventional armaments, had made the following statement:<sup>38</sup>

The diversion of enormous resources and energy, both human and physical, from peaceful economic and social pursuits to unproductive and uneconomic military purposes was an important factor in the failure to make greater progress in the advancement of the developing countries during the First United Nations Development Decade.

The world now stands at a most critical crossroads. It can pursue the arms race at a terrible price to the security and progress of the peoples of the world, or it can move ahead towards the goal of general and complete disarmament, a goal that was set in 1969 by a unanimous decision of the General Assembly on the eve of the decade of the 1960s. If it should choose the latter road, the security, the economic well-being and the progress not only of the developing countries, but also of the developed countries and of the entire world, would be tremendously enhanced.

I would accordingly propose that the Members of the United Nations decide to dedicate the decade of the 1970s, which has already been designated as the Second United Nations Development Decade, as a Disarmament Decade. I would hope that the members of the General Assembly could establish a specific programme and timetable for dealing with all aspects of the problem of arms control and disarmament. Useful guidelines already exist in the provisional agenda, adopted on 15 August 1968 by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and in resolution C adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in September 1968.

A concerted and concentrated effort during this Disarmament Decade to limit and reduce nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction,

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to reduce conventional weapons and to deal with all the related problems of disarmament and security, could produce concrete, measurable progress towards general and complete disarmament by the end of the decade of the seventies.

In the new decade, an enlarged Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,, which henceforth will be known as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, will be grappling with the problems of arms limitation and disarmament with the benefit of the fresh approaches brought by the new members. Hopefully, the bilateral missile talks will be under way and their early success will open new vistas for progress.

In this connexion, I would regard it of the highest importance that serious attempts be made to associate in one way or another all five nuclear Powers with the negotiations for disarmament. The full participation of all the nuclear Powers in all efforts to contain the nuclear arms race and to reduce and eliminate armaments would not only be beneficial, but is indeed indispensable for a full measure of success.

The nations of the world have what may be a last opportunity to mobilise their energies and resources, supported by the public opinion of all the peoples of the world, to tackle anew the complicated but not insuperable problems of disarmament. Given sufficient dedication, the political will and the requisite planning of specific objectives, I am confident that they can succeed.

This proposal of the Secretary-General was widely welcomed at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly. The Assembly, in a resolution concerning the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations (resolution 2499 (XXIV)), endorsed the call of the Secretary-General for the proclamation of a Disarmament Decade which would coincide with the Second United Nations Development Decade, and entrusted "the competent bodies of the Organisation with the task of presenting concrete proposals to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session".

The link between the proposed Disarmament Decade and the United Nations Development Decade, particularly with regard to the availability of resources for achieving the purposes of the latter, was especially emphasised in the General Assembly. The need for elaborating a long-term programme, or a strategy of disarmament for the next decade, was also stressed by a number of countries, including Brazil, Ghana,

Romania and Yugoslavia. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union expressed reservations regarding the idea of a fixed time-table, and the Soviet Union had even doubts that the proclamation of a Disarmament Decade by the General Assembly would not serve the objectives of disarmament.

On the other hand, a number of countries urged, in connexion with the proposed Disarmament Decade, the elaboration by the Committee on Disarmament of a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of cessation of the arms race. Italy, Ireland and Japan submitted a draft resolution on the general subject, which, after incorporating amendments by Cyprus and Ghana, and by Brazil, Burma, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan and Sweden,<sup>39</sup> was adopted by the Assembly on 16 December 1969, by 104 votes to none, with thirteen abstentions, as resolution 2602 E (XXIV). It reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Reaffirming* its resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959, in which it considered that the question of general and complete disarmament was the most Important one facing the world today,

*Reaffirming further* the responsibility of the United Nations in the attainment of disarmament,

*Recalling* its resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, by which it welcomed the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations submitted on 20 September 1961 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, and reaffirming the recommendation that further disarmament negotiations be based on those principles,

*Recalling* its resolution 2454 B (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, whereby it requested the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to make renewed efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and to continue its urgent efforts to negotiate collateral measures of disarmament,

*Convinced* that the process of disarmament would be encouraged and stimulated by the entry into force at the earliest possible stage and the strengthening of multilateral international instruments in the field of disarmament,

*Convinced* that the participation of all nuclear Powers in the efforts to contain the nuclear arms race and to reduce and eliminate all

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armaments is indispensable for a full measure of success in in these efforts,

*Convinced* that pence and security in the world, like development, are indivisible, and recognising the universal responsibilities and obligations in this regard,

*Further convinced* of the need to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

*Having received* the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,

*Bearing in mind* the grave dangers involved in the development of new nuclear weapons through a spiralling nuclear arms race,

*Believing* that the diversion of enormous resources and energy, human and material, from peaceful economic and social pursuits to an unproductive and wasteful arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, places a great burden on both the developing and the developed countries,

*Believing* that the security and the economic and social well-being of all countries would be enhanced as progress is made towards the goal of general and complete disarmament,

*Reaffirming* its resolution 2499 A (XXIV) of 31 October 1969, and in particular paragraph 9, in which the General Assembly endorsed the call of the Secretary-General for the proclamation of a Disarmament Decade, and paragraph 17, in which the Assembly appealed to all Member States to consider the possibility of signing or ratifying the multilateral international instruments in the field of disarmament,

1. *Declares* the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade;
2. *Calls upon* Governments to intensify without delay their concerted and concentrated efforts for effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction, and for a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control;

3. *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to resume its work as early as possible, bearing in mind that the ultimate goal is general and complete disarmament;
4. *Further requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, while continuing intensive negotiations with a view to reaching the widest possible agreement on collateral measures, to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session;
5. *Decides* to this effect to draw the attention of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to all pertinent proposals and suggestions formulated during the debates on disarmament, referring to the Conference all documents and records of the meetings of the First Committee relating to the items on disarmament;
6. *Recommends further* that consideration be given to channelling a substantial part of the resources freed by measures in the field of disarmament to promote the economic development of developing countries and, in particular, their scientific and technological progress;
7. *Requests* the Secretary-General and Governments to publicize the Disarmament Decade by all appropriate means at their disposal in order to acquaint public opinion with its purposes and objectives and with the negotiations and developments related thereto;
8. *Requests*, the Secretary-General to provide all appropriate facilities and assistance with a view to furthering the fullest implementation of the present resolution.

In the final vote on resolution 2602 E (XXIV), the United States and its allies, with the exception of France, voted in favour, while the Soviet Union and its allies, with the exception of Romania, abstained. France explained that its abstention was prompted by its dissatisfaction with the lack of progress on measures of real disarmament rather than by any opposition to the idea of a Disarmament Decade.

The two resolutions on relatively new subjects were submitted by Malta and, as finally amended, invited the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (this being the name adopted for the enlarged ENDC)

to consider, without prejudice to existing priorities, (1) effective methods of control against the use of radiological methods of warfare and nuclear weapons that maximise radioactive effect and (2) the implications of the possible military applications of laser technology. The Soviet Union maintained it would be sufficient to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all records of the Assembly's discussion of the matters, without any recommendations. The United Kingdom also urged Malta not to press the two draft resolutions to a vote, since the applications of radiological warfare and laser technology did not pose an immediate military threat. On 16 December, the Assembly adopted, by 79 votes to none with 37 abstentions, resolution 2602 C (XXIV) on the subject of radiological warfare, which reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Noting with grave concern that among the possible effects of radiological warfare could be the destruction of mankind,*

*Aware that radiological warfare may be conducted both by maximising the radioactive effects of nuclear explosions and through the use of radioactive agents independently of nuclear explosions,*

1. *Invites* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to consider, without prejudice to existing priorities, effective methods of control against the use of radiological methods of warfare conducted independently of nuclear explosions;

2. *Recommends* that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament consider, in the context of nuclear arms control negotiations, the need for effective methods of control of nuclear weapons that maximise radioactive effects;

3. *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to inform the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session of the results of its consideration of this subject.

On the same date, the Assembly adopted, by 72 votes to none with 44 abstentions, resolution 2602 D (XXIV) on the subject of laser technology, reading as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Noting that continued scientific and technological advancement creates new opportunities for the application of science and technology both for peaceful and for military purposes,*

*Noting the rapid development of laser technology, which is becoming increasingly important in many civilian and military fields,*

*Concerned at the possible military applications of laser technology,*

*Recommends* that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament give consideration, without prejudice to existing priorities, to the implications of the possible military applications of laser technology.

### **Enlargement of the ENDC and Change of Name to CCD 1969**

At the 1969 session of the ENDC, the two Co-Chairmen of the Committee, the Soviet Union and the United States, engaged in discussions with other members regarding the possibility of a limited enlargement of the Committee's membership in view of the desire expressed by many countries to participate in the Committee's work (*for the Committee's original membership*). In carrying out the expansion, the declared objective of the Co-Chairmen was to ensure that geographic and political balance were maintained and, at the same time, to preserve the Committee as an effective negotiating body. As a result of this action, representatives of Japan and Mongolia joined the Committee on 3 July 1969, and they were followed on 7 August by the representatives of Argentina, Hungary, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia, thus enlarging the membership from eighteen to twenty-six. After the enlargement of the Committee, it was decided to change the name of the Conference to "The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament".

There was considerable criticism, both in the Committee meetings and later at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, with regard to the procedure followed in carrying out this enlargement, particularly as regards the lack of adequate consultation of other members by the Co-Chairmen and the fact that the matter was not submitted to the General Assembly for prior endorsement, as had been done when the Committee was created. Some African countries also felt that geographical balance had not been adequately observed, particularly with regard to African States south of the Sahara. In general, however, the enlargement of the Committee, and in particular, the choice of the eight new members, was warmly welcomed.

On 16 December 1968 the General Assembly adopted resolution 2602 B (XXIV) by 113 votes to none, with 6 abstentions, endorsing the agreements which had been reached on the title and composition of the Conference and welcoming the eight new members, but expressing the Assembly's conviction that, in effecting future changes in the composition of the Committee, the procedure followed at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly should be observed. This resolution reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 1660 (XVI) of 28 November 1961 on the question of disarmament,

*Recalling further* its resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 on the same question by which the General Assembly endorsed the agreement reached on the composition of a Disarmament Committee, the membership of which was as follows: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America,

*Bearing in mind* that in the debates of the First Committee during the twenty-third session, attention was drawn to the convenience of enlarging the composition of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in order to make it more representative of the international community,

*Noting* that the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have reached agreement on the inclusion of eight additional members, who have already been participating in the deliberations of the Committee,

*Recognising* that all States have a deep interest in disarmament negotiations,

1. *Endorses* the agreement that has been reached on the title and on the following composition of the "Conference of the Committee on Disarmament": Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia;
2. *Welcomes* the eight new members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament;
3. *Expresses* its conviction that to effect any change in the composition of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament specified in paragraph 1 above, the procedure followed at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly should be observed;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to render the necessary assistance and provide the necessary services to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

## REFERENCES

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2. *Ibid.*, *Plenary Meetings*, 799th meeting.
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4. *Ibid.*, document A/C.1/821.
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6. *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1959*, document DC/114.
7. *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 67, 86, 69 and 73, document A/4374/Rev.1.
8. Document TNCD/3.
9. Document TNCD/5.
10. *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1960*, document DC/154.
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12. Document TNCD/PV.31.
13. *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1960*, document DC/182.
14. *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 1A*.
15. *Ibid.*, *Annexes*, agenda items 67, 86, 69 and 73, documents A/C.1/L.249, A/C.1/L.250 and A/C.1/L.259 and Add. 2.
16. *Ibid.*, *Fifteenth Session, Part II, First Committee*, 1136th meeting.
17. *Ibid.*, *Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.
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19. *Ibid.*, document A/4891.
20. *Ibid.*, document A/4892.
21. *Ibid.*, document A/4980, para. 6.
22. *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962*, document DC/203, annex 1, section C (ENDC/2).
23. *Ibid.*, section F (ENDC/30).
24. *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 90, document A/C.1/867.

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25. *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1964*, document DC/209, annex 1, section N (ENDC/144).
  26. *Ibid.*, *Supplement for January to December 1965*, document DC/225.
  27. *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 28, document A/C.1/L.347.
  28. *Ibid.*, document A/6129, para. 4 (A/C.1/L.348).
  29. *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965*, document DC/221 and Add.1.
  30. *Ibid.*, document DC/224.
  31. *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966*, document DC/229.
  32. *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 28, document DC/229.
  33. *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 1A* (A/6301/Add.1).
  34. *Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons* (A/6858).
  35. *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231.
  36. Document DC/232.
  37. *Ibid.*, annex C, ENDC/245 and ENDC/263.
  38. Document A/7601/Add.1.
  39. Document A/7902, para. 7.

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**COLLATERAL MEASURES  
OF DISARMAMENT**

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In disarmament conferences before 1961, differences had frequently arisen as to whether general disarmament should always be given absolute priority or whether partial measures could be considered initially as steps towards the broader goal. Prior to the creation of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, in 1961, the Soviet Union, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and eight other Powers had reached agreement on an important partial measure, the Antarctic Treaty, signed 1 December 1959 and providing, among other things, for the demilitarisation of Antarctica (*for text of the Treaty, see appendix IV*). In the joint statement of principles agreed between the Soviet Union and the United States in 1961, the question was partially resolved by the final principle, stating that “efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures will facilitate and form part of that programme”.

Similarly, one of the procedural innovations of the ENDC was the decision that “concurrently with the elaboration of agreement on general and complete disarmament in the plenary committee, and not to the detriment of this elaboration, a committee of the whole would be set up for the consideration of various proposals on the implementation of measures aimed at lessening international tension, consolidating confidence among States, and facilitating general and complete disarmament.”<sup>1</sup> In fact, in the course of its meetings between 1962 and 1970, the ENDC devoted a larger part of its efforts to partial and confidence-building—or collateral measures of disarmament, as they are usually called—than to general and complete disarmament.

Of these collateral measures, three emerged as major issues before the United Nations and are therefore dealt with separately in Parts Four, Five and Six. These are, respectively, the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, and the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

For a number of years, the Soviet Union and the United States have each had their own preferred collateral measures which they have put forward sometimes singly and sometimes grouped, with varying degrees of emphasis.

Among the measures favoured by the Soviet Union and its allies have been: reduction in military budgets, a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact Powers, prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, nuclear-free zones, withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries, culmination of foreign military bases, and the reduction of the total number of armed forces of States. These, as well as some other collateral measures summarised below and the two major issues—non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the nuclear test ban—were contained in the two memoranda on collateral measures submitted by the Soviet Union in the course of 1964—one to the ENDC on 28 January, and the other to the General Assembly on 7 December.<sup>2</sup> Largely those two documents covered the same ground. Most of the previously favoured measures were also put forward in the “Memorandum on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament”, of 1 July 1968, submitted to the General Assembly on 5 July 1968 and to the ENDC on 16 July 1968.<sup>3</sup> The memorandum also stressed several new items, including the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the prohibition of military use of the sea-bed.

For its part, the United States, with its allies, has stressed the importance of partial measures and initial steps, and has given priority to the cessation (cut-off) or limitation (cut-back) in the production of fissionable material for military purposes, the transfer of agreed stocks to peaceful uses, a freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the reduction of bombers, measures to reduce the risk of war by surprise attack, accident or miscalculation and regional disarmament. They, too, singled out the question of non-proliferation and of the test ban for most urgent consideration.

During 1963-1964, the Soviet Union and the United States carried out some measures—under what is called the “policy of mutual example”

or “reciprocal unilateral action” —which had the effect of reducing or slowing down the arms race, although the measures did not result from negotiation or agreement. Such unilateral actions were taken with respect to the reduction of military budgets and the cut-back in the production of fissionable material for military uses.

### **Declaration against War Propaganda**

During 1962, the ENDC, meeting in the Committee of the Whole, decided to consider first an item proposed by the Soviet Union, namely, the cessation of war propaganda. On 25 May, the Committee of the Whole unanimously adopted a declaration against war propaganda<sup>4</sup> as recommended by the co-chairmen—the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States. The declaration condemned incitement to war and to the use of force in the settlement of disputes and called upon States to adopt, within the limits of their constitutional systems, appropriate, practical measures against such action. When the ENDC considered the declaration in plenary meeting, however, the Soviet Union stated that it could not accept it in its previously approved form and proposed some revisions which did not mod with general approval. The discussion of the subject was then adjourned and was never reopened.

In subsequent years, the Committee of the Whole did not meet and the various collateral measures were dealt with in plenary, alternating with the-subject of general and complete disarmament.

### **Reduction of the Possibty of War by Accident**

Among the collateral measures proposed during 1962 by the United States in the ENDC was that of reducing the possibility of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communication. As one means of accomplishing that objective, the establishment of rapid communications between Heads of State was proposed. Though the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in principle on the usefulness of the establishment of rapid communications and of advance notification of troop movements, the Soviet Union also proposed a prohibition of joint manoeuvres of two or more States. This was unacceptable to the Western participants.

### **Agreement on a Direct Communications Link between the Soviet Union and United States**

During the 1963 session of the ENDC, the Soviet Union announced its readiness to accept, outside the framework of general and complete

disarmament, the United States proposal for a direct communications link between the Governments of the two countries for use in time of emergency. This proposal had been put before the ENDC, on 12 December 1962, in a United States working paper on the reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication.<sup>5</sup> Subsequently, the United States and the Soviet Union held a number of meetings on the question in Geneva and, as a result of these negotiations, representatives of the two countries signed at the Palais des Nations, on 20 June 1963, a Memorandum of Understanding by which they agreed to establish, as soon as technically feasible, a direct communications link between the two Governments, (*for text of the memorandum, see appendix V*). The system became operational in October 1963.

### **Observation Posts and Surprise Attack**

Subsequent to the 1958 Conference of experts for the study of measures to prevent surprise attack, the Western Powers continued to propose consideration of such measures, as in the five-Power plan of March 1960, and the programme of general and complete disarmament proposed by the United States in June 1960. Premier Khrushchev of the Soviet Union, in his address to the fourteenth session of the Assembly in 1959, also included an agreement to prevent surprise attack among five partial measures which the Soviet Union favoured.

In 1964, a measure designed to reduce the danger of war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack was the subject of some support in principle by both the Soviet Union and the United States as regards the concept of the establishment of a network of observation posts in the territories of the parties to NATO and to the Warsaw Treaty. In a message to the ENDC on 21 January 1964,<sup>6</sup> the President of the United States stressed the need for reduction of the danger of war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack and stated that the United States would be prepared to discuss, in consultation with its allies, proposals to create a system of observation posts. In its memorandum on collateral measures, submitted to the ENDC on 28 January 1964, the Soviet Union declared that it continued to favour effective measures to prevent surprise attack but believed that a proposal to create a network of observation posts in the territories of the two groups of States must be accompanied by certain other measures, such as the reduction of foreign troops in European countries and an undertaking not to station nuclear weapons in the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.<sup>7</sup>

In March 1964, the United Kingdom submitted a working paper<sup>8</sup> outlining a system of observation posts to prevent war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack. The posts would be established at main railway junctions, road networks, selected airfields and main airports, with arrangements for collating information from regional posts to facilitate comparison and checking of reports. The plan further envisaged an organisation, in which both sides would be represented, for supervising the operation of the observation posts and for ensuring the effective gathering and unimpeded transmission of information. Manning would be initially organised on an “adversary” basis and, as progress developed towards disarmament, might include international observers.

The widely different approaches of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on the matter proved to be an obstacle to an understanding on the subject, and the matter was not actively pursued after 1964.

### **Ban on Overflights of Aircraft Carrying Nuclear Weapons**

On 17 February 1966, the Soviet Union submitted to the ENDC the text of an aide-memoire it had previously addressed to the United States, proposing the immediate discontinuance of flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond the limits of national borders.<sup>9</sup> In taking this initiative, the Soviet Union referred to an accident to a United States bomber over the Spanish coast, as a result of which nuclear weapons had fallen on Spanish territory and its Mediterranean coastal waters, and maintained that such exposure of the atmosphere and the sea to radioactive contamination was, among other things, at variance with the obligations assumed by the United States under the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union also accused the United States of failing to heed its own concern over the dangers of a war resulting from accident or miscalculation.

The Soviet Union had simultaneously communicated the same aide-memoire to the Security Council. The United States replied to the charges in the form of an aide-memoire, communicated to the Security Council on 26 February and to the ENDC on 28 February,<sup>10</sup> stating that the accident in question had involved no nuclear explosion and no radioactive pollution, and accusing the Soviet Union of advancing purely propaganda objectives.

At the ensuing twenty-first session of the General Assembly, Poland and the Ukrainian SSR introduced a draft resolution calling upon all States to refrain from sending beyond national frontiers aircraft carrying

nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.<sup>11</sup> The sponsors did not press the proposal to a vote, however, stating that they would return to the matter in the future.

In its memorandum on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament, of 1 July 1968, the Soviet Union combined this subject with a related measure. It called for an immediate ban on the flights of aircraft with nuclear weapons aboard beyond national borders, as well as for consideration of an agreement to prohibit the patrolling of submarines carrying nuclear missiles in areas from which such missiles could reach the frontiers of other Parties to the agreement. Neither subject was subsequently discussed in detail, however, either in the Assembly or in the ENDC.

### **Destruction of Bomber Aircraft**

In the course of 1964, both the Soviet Union and the United States submitted proposals concerning the reduction or elimination of bomber aircraft. The USSR proposal called for the elimination of all bomber aircraft.<sup>12</sup> The United States proposed that the two countries should destroy their B-47 and TU-16 aircraft, at the rate of twenty aircraft a month over a period of two years.

The Soviet Union noted that it was essential first to agree in principle on the destruction of all bomber aircraft within a limited period, after which details could be considered on the sequence of destruction by types of aircraft. Although its proposal would apply to all States, the process of destruction could be initiated by the major Powers, with the smaller Powers joining in at a later stage. The agreement would also provide for the cessation of production of bombers.

The United States opposed the USSR proposal on the grounds that the destruction of all bombers would be destabilising, except as a part of general disarmament, as it would weigh heavily on one type of armament and would, therefore, disturb the military balance. The United States proposal, on the other hand, would provide a tangible reduction in an important category of weapons and, in conjunction with a freeze on the production of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, would mean a freeze on delivery vehicles at an even lower level. The destruction, which would take place at designated airports or depots in the United States and the Soviet Union under the direction of the host country by its personnel and at its expense, would be verified by inspectors from the other side and by observers designated by the non-aligned members of the ENDC and by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The Soviet Union criticised the United States proposal on the ground that it did not constitute a measure of disarmament, but was designed to replace obsolete weapons already being phased out by new types and would thus result in acceleration of the arms race. The United Kingdom was of the view that the limited proposal by the United States was not inconsistent with the broader proposal of the Soviet Union, and might even be regarded as a first step, with the advantage that it was immediately applicable, met the requirements of balance and involved a minimum degree of verification. Burma, India, Mexico, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic were of the opinion that the two proposals could be linked by enlarging on the types and number of bombers to be immediately destroyed, differentiating as to the countries to be affected, and by including some missiles in the process. The subject was not actively pursued after 1964.

### **Reduction of Military Budgets**

On several occasions, through the years, the General Assembly has called upon its Members to promote the establishment and maintenance of International peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, and to take concrete steps for the reduction of the burden of military expenditures. An early example is provided by General Assembly resolution 380 (V), adopted on 17 November 1950, under the item "Peace through deeds", by which the Assembly determined that "for the realisation of lasting peace and security it is indispensable... to reduce to a minimum the diversion for armaments of its human and economic resources and to strive towards the development of such resources for the general welfare, with due regard to the needs of the under-developed areas of the world".

Proposals for freezing or reducing military budgets were put forth by several Members of the United Nations at different times, but particularly during the decade from 1954 to 1964, when by far the largest number of proposals was recorded.

During that time, the Soviet Union repeatedly addressed itself to this problem, either in the context of a disarmament treaty or as a separate measure. The Western Powers, as a rule, considered that the question of reduction of military budgets should be examined in the context of a disarmament agreement. They usually opposed independent budgetary reductions on the grounds that figures relating to military expenditures in national budgets were not comparable and that

budgetary reductions should be brought about by agreement on concrete disarmament measures. They considered that budgetary reductions might provide an additional means of control over the implementation of such measures. Nevertheless, as it has been noted above, during 1963-1964 the Soviet Union and the United States followed a policy of "mutual example" or "reciprocal unilateral action", which, although not based on any disarmament agreement, had the result of reducing the military budgets of the two Powers.

The various other proposals, on the other hand, failed to achieve their main purpose. In many cases, discussion did not go beyond the preliminary stages. However, mention is made hereafter of a number of these proposals in order to give an idea of their wide range.

On 21 May 1954, the United Kingdom suggested in a memorandum<sup>13</sup> submitted to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission that a freeze or standstill agreement in regard to military expenditures might be considered among the first steps of a disarmament programme, and added that "as the disarmament programme proceeds it may well be found that budgetary control provides one of the most effective safeguards". On 11 June 1954, the Soviet Union submitted a proposal providing for a reduction of military expenditures within one year by no less than one-third of the 1953-1954 level of expenditure.

On 18 March 1955, still in the Sub-Committee, the Soviet Union proposed<sup>15</sup> that a treaty on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction be concluded, providing, *inter alia*, for substantial reduction of expenditures and armaments to agreed levels to be carried out in two stages in equal amounts. Furthermore, States parties to the treaty would pledge themselves, as a first step, to freeze their military expenditures at the level for 1955. Similar provisions were found in a subsequent declaration<sup>16</sup> by the Soviet Union of 10 May 1955, which also proposed that part of the savings be devoted to the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

At the Geneva Summit Conference of July 1955, the Heads of Government of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States considered, *inter alia*, a French memorandum<sup>17</sup> on disarmament proposing that the resources made available by reductions in military budgets should be used in whole or in part to assist underdeveloped countries. In the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, on 29 August 1955, France followed up this proposal with a draft agreement on the financial supervision' of disarmament

and the allocation for peaceful purposes of the funds made available. The General Assembly, at its tenth session, that same year, included in its resolution 914 (X) a suggestion that account should be taken of the proposals of France for exchanging and publishing information regarding military expenditures and budgets, as well as a call upon the States concerned, and especially those on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, to study the proposals of France for the allocation of funds resulting from disarmament for improving the standards of living throughout the world and, in particular, in the less developed countries. Similar calls were repeated by the General Assembly in subsequent years.<sup>18</sup>

On 27 March 1956, the Soviet Union proposed<sup>19</sup> that the funds made available by reduction of military expenditures be channeled to a special fund for assistance to under-developed countries, to be established within the framework of the United Nations. Yugoslavia, considering that a limited initial agreement had become possible in the field of disarmament and could be put into effect without being made conditional upon subsequent measures, urged<sup>20</sup> the Sub-Committee to seek an early agreement on such initial disarmament measures, including a reduction of military expenditure. India, in a note verbale<sup>21</sup> to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, proposed that the military budgets of all countries should be reduced "even if the reductions are initially small". It further suggested that there should be voluntary submission to the United Nations of details of armament expenditure "so that such information could be internationally held".

In 1957, again in the Sub-Committee, the United States<sup>22</sup> said that reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments would affect different Governments in different ways financially; therefore part of the problem would have to be dealt with by technical people with budgetary and military qualifications. However, a target for a cut in military expenditures in the range of ten per cent might be envisaged for the first stage of a disarmament agreement. The United States stressed that a reduction of military expenditures, as a consequence of reductions of armed forces and armaments, should not present any difficult negotiating problem and might be even greater than those which had been proposed as a first step; the main question would probably be the method by which the budgetary and financial records would be reviewed in such a first step partial agreement. Jointly, Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States made a proposal<sup>23</sup> for partial

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measures of disarmament, which provided that, in order to verify compliance with reductions of armaments and armed forces, and looking forward to the reductions of military expenditures, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States would make available to an international control organisation information about their military budgets and expenditures.

At the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution<sup>24</sup> recommending that France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States reduce their military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent and that part of the savings be allocated to a fund for assistance to under-developed countries. The draft resolution was rejected by a vote of 39 to 10, with 32 abstentions.

Provisions on reduction and/or control of military budgets were found, of course, in the disarmament programmes which were formulated between 1959 and 1962, following the adoption of the goal of general and complete disarmament, in particular in the "Draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control" by the Soviet Union and the "Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world" by the United States.

In addition, the Soviet Union, in its memorandum on measures to ease international tension of 26 January 1961 proposed that, without awaiting the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, a ceiling should be established for military expenditures in the budgets of States at a level not to exceed their military appropriations as of 1 January 1961.

In 1963 in the ENDC, Brazil and Sweden suggested technical studies of the problem of reduction of military budgets. India and Nigeria stressed the usefulness of a freeze of military expenditure.

In its memorandum of 28 January 1964, the Soviet Union drew attention to unilateral reductions that had been recently carried out by the Soviet Union and the United States, thereby creating conditions in which an agreement could be reached to reduce the military budgets of all States by 10 to 15 per cent. The United States maintained that, while the proposal looked simple, it was in fact one of the most complex matters before the ENDC, and that, before any action could be taken, more must be known about military expenditures and how they could be verified.

Sweden suggested that a technical working group could consider the comparability of budgets of various countries and the question of verifying expenditures. The United Arab Republic proposed that the ENDC appeal to all the major Powers to reduce their budgets on the basis of reciprocity and that they be used as a sort of clearing-house for statements of intention. Nigeria supported a freeze and reduction of military budgets as a realistic approach to slowing down the arms race, and was confident that an expert body could solve the problem of verification. Burma, Ethiopia, India and Mexico also sought priority for a package of such measures.

During 1964, Brazil submitted a working paper calling for an agreement on the use of savings on military budgets for assisting under-developed countries. It recommended that: (1) all Governments should reduce their military budgets along the lines of reduction effected by the Soviet Union and the United States; (2) a sum—of not less than 20 per cent of the reductions so effected by all countries—should be credited to an international conversion and economic development fund; and (3) a working group should be established immediately to study the problem and to make recommendations about the proposed conversion and development fund. In 1965, the Disarmament Commission recommended<sup>28</sup> that the ENDC keep in mind the principle embodied in the Brazilian document. In subsequent years, however, the subject was not actively pursued either in the General Assembly or in the ENDC. In 1970, however, Romania proposed in the CCD a series of disarmament measures which included a proposal for the early freezing and subsequent reduction of the military budgets of all States.

### **Non-Aggression Pact**

The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the member States of NATO and the member States of the Warsaw Pact was among five measures of partial disarmament proposed by Premier Khrushchev in an address to the General Assembly in 1959.

Subsequently, the Soviet Union, with the support of its allies proposed a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to NATO by which the two sides would undertake to refrain from aggression, as well as from the threat or use of force, in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. They would further undertake to resolve all disputes that might arise by peaceful means only, through negotiations

between them, or by using other means for the pacific settlement of international disputes as provided by the United Nations Charter.

On 20 February 1963, the Soviet Union submitted the draft of such an agreement to the ENDC. The Soviet Union and its allies contended that such a pact would become a turning point in East-West relations by setting up a framework for peaceful solution of conflicts between the two sides and would help to stabilize the situation in Europe. The Western Powers, however, opposed consideration of the draft in the ENDC on the grounds that it not only had a predominantly political character, but it also was related to European regional security matters and many of the countries directly concerned were not represented at the Conference. In consultation with its allies, during 1963 and 1964, the United States elicited strong reservations which were transmitted to the Soviet Government.

In its memorandum of 28 January 1964, as well as in the one of 7 December 1964, the Soviet Union prominently listed this proposal once again, maintaining that the time had come to discuss the matter in a businesslike way and to reach an agreement. It also reminded the Western Powers that such action had been called for in a joint communique of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom on 25 July 1963. The general view of the Soviet Union was that differences over the form of a non-aggression pact could be solved without any particular difficulty. After 1964, the matter was not actively pursued.

### **Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from the Territories of Other Countries and Elimination of Foreign Military Bases**

Two of five partial measures proposed by Premier Khrushchev in his address to the fourteenth General Assembly in 1959 were (1) the establishment of a control and inspection zone, and the reduction of foreign troops in the territories of the Western European countries concerned and (2) the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of European States and the abolition of military bases on the territories of foreign States. On 12 February 1963, the Soviet Union submitted a draft declaration<sup>30</sup> whereby States would renounce the use of foreign territories for stationing strategic nuclear delivery systems. The Soviet Union maintained that the declaration, if adopted, would constitute a first step towards the elimination of all military bases on foreign territories and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Western Powers rejected the Soviet proposal as one-sided; the

elimination of military bases, they argued, could be achieved only through general and complete disarmament.

In its memorandum on collateral measures of 26 January 1964, the Soviet Union proposed an immediate agreement on the number of armed forces in foreign territories that should be reduced on a basis of reciprocity, the long-range objective being the complete withdrawal of foreign troops. The Soviet Union stated that it was prepared to start reducing its troops in the territory of the German Democratic Republic and other European States, if the Western Powers would reduce the number of their troops in the Federal Republic of Germany and other countries. In the same memorandum, the Soviet Union also suggested that an agreement be reached on a substantial reduction of the total number of armed forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union on a reciprocal basis, without waiting for a start on the programme of general and complete disarmament.

A Soviet draft resolution before the Disarmament Commission in 1965 proposed that the Commission call upon all States maintaining military bases in other countries to liquidate them forthwith and refrain henceforth from establishing new ones, and also to agree on the withdrawal of all foreign troops. This draft was not put to the vote.

At the 1966 session of the ENDC, the Soviet Union continued to stress the need for the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries.<sup>31</sup> At the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, an item on the question of elimination of foreign military bases in Asia, Africa, and Latin America was placed on the agenda at the Soviet Union's request, and the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution<sup>32</sup> inviting States with bases in these areas to eliminate them immediately. The Soviet Union said it had long favoured liquidation of all foreign bases but that the proposal was designed to take into account the Western Powers' strong opposition to the withdrawal of troops from Europe. The United States and its allies regarded the Soviet Union's proposal primarily as propaganda to justify so-called "wars of national liberation". A number of countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America objected to the exclusion of Europe and other areas from the proposed resolution and drew a distinction between foreign bases maintained in a country against its will and those expressly desired by the host country. After considerable discussion, the General Assembly, by 94 votes to none, with 10 abstentions, adopted resolution 2165 (XXI), originally submitted by

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India, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia, referring the matter to the ENDC for further consideration and report to the next General Assembly; at the same time, the General Assembly decided not to vote on the USSR draft resolution.

At the ENDC, the subject received little attention; but the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, in 1967, discussed the item again along lines similar to those of the previous discussions. To its previous arguments, the United States added the view that the item was not an arms control measure, that it had produced only profitless debate, and that it was therefore not a matter for urgent discussion in the ENDC.

The General Assembly adopted resolution 2344 (XXII), noting that the ENDC had not been able, in 1967, to give sufficient consideration to the question and requesting it to resume consideration and report back to the next Assembly.

The ENDC did not give close attention to the matter in 1968 and made no direct mention of it in its 1968 reports or in its provisional agenda; but the item was on the agenda of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly on the basis of the previous resolution. The subject was also listed in the Soviet Union's memorandum on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament of 1 July 1968, which was also a separate agenda item. The matter was not widely mentioned in the discussion at this session, however, and no resolution was proposed directly on the subject or on the subject of the Soviet Union's memorandum.

The question was not discussed in detail at the 1969 session of the ENDC, although the USSR and Bulgaria reminded the Committee that the General Assembly had asked it to consider the question, and Romania stated that all military bases located on the territory of other States should be eliminated and that all foreign troops should be withdrawn. The item was not on the agenda of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly as a separate item, but Romania again spoke on the subject, supporting the liquidation of the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, beginning with the dismantling of foreign bases and the withdrawal of all foreign troops within their national boundaries.

### **Regional Disarmament**

The subject of regional disarmament, other than in the context of nuclear-free zones or the elimination of foreign bases, was for many

years raised primarily in the form of proposals for European disarmament, which were discussed in the broader context of the problem of general and complete disarmament or European security. In recent years, however, the general subject of regional disarmament has been increasingly discussed as a separate collateral measure, sometimes in the context of a limitation of trade in conventional arms.

In a message to the ENDC in 1966,<sup>33</sup> the President of the United States suggested in a seven-point programme that countries, on a regional basis and on their own initiative, explore ways' to limit competition among themselves for costly weapons; and this suggestion was repeated by the United States at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly. At an emergency session of the General Assembly in 1967, Canada suggested that the permanent members of the Security Council explore an agreement to control the flow of arms to the Middle East.

The Soviet Union's memorandum on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament, of 1 July 1968, contained a statement under the topic "measures of regional disarmament" to the effect that the Soviet Union supported proposals concerning the implementation of measures for regional disarmament and for the reduction of armaments in various parts of the world, including the Middle East, "subject to the elimination of the consequences of Israel's aggression against Arab countries". In its provisional agenda of 1968, the ENDC noted that the question of "regional arms limitation" might be discussed under the main item of "non-nuclear measures".

### **Limitation of Trade in Conventional Arms**

At the twentieth session of the General Assembly in 1965, Malta proposed that the ENDC consider the question of transfers of arms between States (*see page 102*), but the Assembly failed to take up this matter.

The Secretary-General, in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organisation for 1965-1966, noted that the acquisition and dissemination of conventional weapons were still leading to increased tensions and that wars fought with conventional weapons might escalate into nuclear wars.

At the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, Denmark, Iceland, Malta and Norway sponsored a draft resolution,<sup>34</sup> which Denmark had first suggested at the previous session, requesting the Secretary-General to ascertain the position of Governments on

undertaking an obligation to register with the Secretary-General all trade in arms. This proposal was directly supported by Canada, which favoured the revival of the League of Nations concept of an international register of arms, and by the United States. Belgium, Finland and Sweden also expressed general support for regional arms arrangements, while Pakistan and Tunisia expressed interest in containing the conventional arms race. In the face of opposition from Argentina, India, the United Arab Republic, Syria and the Byelorussian SSR, however, the sponsors did not press the resolution to a vote on the understanding that the item was included in the General Assembly's resolution on general and complete disarmament.

### **Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons**

Throughout the twenty-five years of disarmament negotiations, beginning with the Atomic Energy Commission, the idea of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons was nearly always under consideration, on the initiative of the USSR, both as part of general disarmament plans and as a collateral measure.

At the sixteenth session, the General Assembly discussed a draft resolution<sup>35</sup> submitted by Ethiopia, together with eleven other African and Asian countries—Ceylon, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Tunisia—calling for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and requesting the Secretary-General to conduct an inquiry into the possibility of convening a conference to sign a convention on the prohibition of the use of these weapons. Ethiopia maintained that implementation of the draft resolution would lead towards a final prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Italy submitted a number of amendments<sup>36</sup> to the twelve Power text providing, in effect, for the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons only when "contrary to the Charter of the United Nations" and for the Secretary-General's inquiry to be directed to the possibility of convening a conference "to consider the means of prohibiting the use" of such weapons "for war purposes contrary to the Charter" (rather than convening a conference "for signing a convention on the prohibition of the use" of such weapons).

The United States opposed the draft resolution on the ground that its aim could only be achieved by complete and controlled disarmament and that it sanctioned, by implication, other means of warfare. The United Kingdom stated that an uncontrolled ban on the use of nuclear

and thermonuclear weapons would be no more effective than the uncontrolled moratorium on nuclear testing. Both the United States and the United Kingdom further maintained that the right of individual and collective self-defence, including the right to determine the degree of force necessary to repel aggression, could not be abrogated. The Soviet Union considered that the declaration would provide a good basis for the solution of the problem of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and that it would facilitate the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

After rejecting the Italian amendments, the Assembly, on 24 November 1961, adopted the draft resolution by 55 votes to 20, with 26 abstentions, as resolution 1653 (XVI). The resolution reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Mindful* of its responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as in the consideration of principles governing disarmament,

*Gravely concerned* that, while negotiations on disarmament have not so far achieved satisfactory results, the armaments race, particularly in the nuclear and thermonuclear fields, has reached a dangerous stage requiring all possible precautionary measures to protect humanity and civilisation from the hazard of nuclear and thermonuclear catastrophe,

*Recalling* that the use of weapons of mass destruction, causing unnecessary human suffering, was in the past prohibited as being contrary to the laws of humanity and to the principles of international law, by international declarations and binding agreements, such as the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868, the Declaration of the Brussels Conference of 1874, the Conventions of The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, to which the majority of nations are still parties,

*Considering* that the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would bring about indiscriminate suffering and destruction to mankind and civilisation to an even greater extent than the use of those weapons declared by the aforementioned international declarations and agreements to be contrary to the laws of humanity and a crime under international law,

*Believing* that the use of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, is a direct negation of the high ideals

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and objectives which the United Nations has been established to achieve through the protection of succeeding generations from the scourge of war and through the preservation and promotion of their cultures,

1. *Declares* that:

(a) The use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) The use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would exceed even the scope of war and cause indiscriminate suffering and destruction to mankind and civilisation and, as such, is contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity;

(c) The use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is a war directed not against an enemy or enemies alone but also against mankind in general, since the peoples of the world not involved in such a war will be subjected to all the evils generated by the use of such weapons;

(d) Any State using nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilisation;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to consult the Governments of Member States to ascertain their views on the possibility of convening a special conference for signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons for war purposes and to report on the results of such consultation to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session.

In accordance with this resolution, the Secretary-General, on 2 January 1962, requested Member Governments to state their views on the possibility of convening a special conference. In April, he submitted a report transmitting the views of fifty-eight Member Governments<sup>37</sup> and, in September and December, two supplementary reports giving the views of four more Member Governments.<sup>38</sup>

These reports showed that thirty-three Governments had expressed favourable views about the possibility of convening a special conference for signing the proposed convention; twenty-six Governments had expressed negative views or had some doubts about the proposed

course of action at the time; and three Governments had indicated a preference for awaiting the results of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament before submitting their views.

The item was included in the agenda of the General Assembly's seventeenth session. A draft resolution<sup>39</sup> submitted by twenty-one non-aligned countries requested the Secretary-General to "consult further the Governments ... to ascertain their views on the possibility of convening a special conference for signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons for war purposes, and to report on the results of such consultation to the... Assembly".

On 14 December 1962, the draft was adopted by the General Assembly by 33 votes to none, with 25 abstentions, as resolution 1801 (XVII). The United States explained that it had abstained in the vote because a convention against the use of nuclear weapons, not accompanied by other measures leading to general and complete disarmament, could actually increase the danger of aggression; it had not voted against the draft resolution owing to its procedural character. The Soviet Union rejected the implication that those who voted in favour of the resolution thereby indicated less concern about general and complete disarmament, and said that the proposed convention would be one of the important partial measures.

In September 1963, the Secretary-General submitted a report<sup>40</sup> to the General Assembly on the results of his further consultations, conveying the replies of twelve Governments. The Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons" was again considered at the Assembly's eighteenth session. In resolution 1909 (XVIII), adopted on 27 November 1963, by 64 votes to 18, with 25 abstentions, the Assembly referred the matter to the ENDC for urgent consideration. The Soviet Union voted in favour of the resolution; France, the United Kingdom and the United States voted against it.

In the ENDC, Ethiopia expressed the view that a convention would be a precautionary measure to protect humanity from a nuclear catastrophe at a time when nuclear stockpiles were being increased and perfected and when efforts were still being made to cope with the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Ethiopia urged that the ENDC recommend to the General Assembly that it convene the proposed international conference.

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The United States position was that nuclear war could not be prevented by a declaration of intention alone; a convention might even create a false sense of security as it would give the impression that an act of aggression could be committed without the risk of nuclear war. The United States could not, therefore, agree to the holding of the conference. The Soviet Union stated that, although the convention in itself could not prevent a nuclear war, it could reduce the possibility of such a war.

India, noting the objections of the Western Powers, stated that, in spite of its own progress in nuclear science and technology, it had taken a firm decision neither to produce nor to acquire any nuclear weapons, irrespective of any action that any other country might take. In reply to the views of the United States and others that a convention of the nature proposed might create the false impression that an act of aggression could be committed without the risk of a nuclear war, Nigeria suggested that the convention might be linked to measures to reduce the risk of war and to a non-aggression pact. Mexico, while in favour of the ultimate signing of the convention, did not consider the time opportune to hold the conference.

During the 1965 session of the Disarmament Commission, the Soviet Union introduced a draft resolution calling upon all States to bring about the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons not later than the first half of 1966, and in the meantime inviting States possessing nuclear weapons to declare that they would not be the first to use them. A number of countries supported this approach, but others contended that the question must be dealt with in the context of balanced general disarmament. The Soviet Union did not press for a vote on its draft resolution.

At its twentieth session, in 1965, the General Assembly decided to refer the item on the question of convening a conference to sign a convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons to the ENDC for further study and postponed its consideration to the twenty-first session.<sup>41</sup>

Because of its preoccupation with the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons from 1966 to mid-1968, the ENDC was not able to consider other disarmament matters to the same extent as in previous years. At the Committee's 1966 session, however, the Soviet Union stressed the importance it attached to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and, as a first step, to a declaration by States that they would not be the first to use them.<sup>42</sup>

At the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, the question of convening a conference to sign a convention on the subject was again on the agenda, and a draft resolution was submitted by Ethiopia, India, Mexico, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia, requesting that "the forthcoming world disarmament conference" give serious consideration to tin's matter. In supporting the resolution, Pakistan stated that no effective disarmament measure could be taken without the support of all nuclear Powers, including the People's Republic of China, while Albania referred to a proposal of the People's Republic of China that the question of complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons be dealt with at a world conference. France and Ireland expressed doubt that a purely declaratory agreement to prohibit the use of nuclear arms could be effective, while Canada thought the prospects of success of a world disarmament conference would not be enhanced by the referral of this matter to it. On 5 December 1966, the General Assembly, by a vote of 80 to none, with 23 abstentions, adopted the five-Power proposal as resolution 2164 (XXI). The text reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* the declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons contained in its resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961,

*Cognizant of* the fact that the consultations carried out by the Secretary-General, pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961 and 1801 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, with the Governments of Member States to ascertain their views on the possibility of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons have not been conclusive,

*Recalling* that, by General Assembly resolution 1909 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was requested to give urgent consideration to this question,

*Believing* that the signing of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would greatly facilitate negotiations on general and complete disarmament under effective international control and give further impetus to the search for a solution of the urgent problem of nuclear disarmament,

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*Believing further* that the widest possible attendance at a conference for the purpose of signing such a convention is of vital importance for the effective and universal observance of its provisions,

*Requests* that the forthcoming world disarmament conference give serious consideration to the question of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

At the request of the Soviet Union, the question of concluding a convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons was placed on the agenda of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly as an urgent matter.<sup>43</sup> Attached to the Soviet Union's request was a draft convention under which the contracting parties would undertake (1) to refrain from using, or from threatening to use, nuclear weapons and from inciting other States to use them; and (2) to reach early agreement on ceasing production and destroying stockpiles of nuclear weapons, in conformity with a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In an explanatory memorandum, the Soviet Union deplored the fact that, despite long. consideration of this matter in the United Nations and the positive attitude of many Governments, such an important convention had not yet been concluded. The question had now assumed special urgency, the Soviet Union maintained, as a result of the accumulation of huge nuclear weapons stocks and the aggressive action of certain States. In the ensuing discussion, the Soviet Union also stressed the close link between the proposed convention and the General Assembly's declaration of 24 November 1961.

Among those supporting the idea of such a convention, Afghanistan, Ghana, India and the United Arab Republic stressed the view that, to be effective, the agreement would require the support of all nuclear Powers, which, Ghana specifically stated, should include the People's Republic of China. Nepal favoured the holding of a world disarmament conference for the purpose of concluding such a convention. The United States opposed any ban on the use of nuclear weapons in self-defence, and maintained that agreements with verification provisions must first limit and later reduce and fully eliminate nuclear weapons, in the context of general and complete disarmament under strict international control. France also thought measures which, by their very nature, could not be verified were neither realistic nor desirable as first steps in a programme of disarmament. Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom believed such a ban could best be dealt with in the context of general and complete disarmament, while Italy thought

the proposed ban might reduce the incentive to seek this goal. On the other hand, Poland, Yugoslavia, Algeria and Ethiopia not only supported the proposed measure but believed it would facilitate negotiation towards general and complete disarmament.

On 8 December 1967, the Assembly adopted, by 77 votes to none, with 29 abstentions, resolution 2289 (XXII), which reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, contained in its resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961,

*Reaffirming its conviction*, expressed in resolution 2164 (XXI) of 5 December 1966, that the signing of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would greatly facilitate negotiations on general and complete disarmament under effective international control and give further impetus to the search for a solution of the urgent problem of nuclear disarmament,

*Considering* that it is necessary, in view of the present international situation, to make new efforts aimed at expediting the solution of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons,

1. *Expresses its conviction* that it is essential to continue urgently the examination of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and of the conclusion of an appropriate international convention;

2. *Urges* all States, in this connexion, to examine in the light of the Declaration adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 1653 (XVI) the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics<sup>10</sup> and such other proposals as may be made on this question, and to undertake negotiations concerning the conclusion of an appropriate convention through the convening of an international conference, by the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, or directly between States;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to all States Members of the United Nations and to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the records of the meetings of the First

Committee relating to the discussion of the item entitled "Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons".

In the provisional agenda for the Committee's future work adopted by the ENDC at the latter part of its 1968 session,<sup>44</sup> the Committee noted that members might discuss the non-use of nuclear weapons under the priority agenda item relating to nuclear disarmament. At the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, the item was not on the agenda, as in the past, but was listed in the Soviet Union's memorandum on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament of 1 July 1968, which was placed on the agenda as a special item at the request of the Soviet Union. The memorandum proposed that the ENDC discuss the Soviet Union's draft convention as a matter of high priority and exchange opinions on the convening of an international conference to sign an appropriate convention. The general position of the Soviet Union and its allies on the subject was supported in the debate by Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, India, Madagascar, Pakistan, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia. India thought such a ban, as other declaratory prohibitions in the past, would have a considerable moral and psychological effect. Ireland, on the other hand, stressed its reservations on negotiating a convention which might develop a false sense of security and lead States to reduce their efforts to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons, while China considered it futile to conclude such a ban before the total elimination of nuclear weapons had been achieved. The Assembly adopted no resolution either directly on the subject or on the subject of the Soviet Union's memorandum.

At the 1969 session of the ENDC, there was little discussion of the subject, although the Soviet Union renewed its call for agreement on a draft convention. The subject was not placed on the agenda of the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly as a separate item.

### **Cut-off of Production of Fissile Material for Weapons Purpose**

On 21 January 1964, the United States submitted proposals<sup>45</sup> on the cut-off of fissile material production for military purposes and the transfer of stocks of such material to peaceful uses. For about five years prior to the beginning of the Conference of the ENDC, the United States had been proposing, as a first step towards nuclear disarmament, the cut-off in the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. This measure figured prominently in its list of collateral measures that might be agreed upon by the ENDC outside the framework of general

and complete disarmament. When, on 20 April 1964, the United States and the Soviet Union announced unilateral decisions to reduce the production of fissile material for use in weapons, participants in the ENDC called for a further effort to reach agreement. Many participants considered the moment ripe for a special effort to reach a firm agreement on the subject.

The United States explained that its unilateral curtailment of production of fissile material—to be carried out over a period of four years — when added to previous reductions, would represent over-all decreases of 20 per cent in the production of plutonium and 40 per cent in the output of enriched uranium. The Soviet Union announced decisions to stop forthwith the construction of two new large atomic reactors for the production of plutonium, to reduce substantially during the next few years the production of uranium-235 for nuclear weapons and to allocate more fissionable materials for peaceful uses. The United Kingdom explained that it had pursued a policy along the same lines, noting that it had earlier announced that the production of uranium-235 had ceased and that of plutonium gradually way ending.

The United States declared that it was prepared to advance from the announced cut-backs, through verified plant-by-plant shut-downs, to a complete cut-off of production with verification, and proposed that the nuclear Powers should agree: to halt, prohibit and prevent all production of fissile material for use in weapons; to refrain from assisting any country for the production anywhere of such material; and to accept appropriate inspection. In a working paper submitted on 25 June 1964,<sup>46</sup> the United States noted that there would be three kinds of inspection required: (a) to check that shut-down plants did not resume operation; (b) to guard against over-fulfilment or diversion of production at declared operating plants; and (c) to ensure that no undeclared plants were engaged in clandestine production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. There would only be three types of plants inspected: (1) uranium-235 separation plants; (2) nuclear reactors which also produced fissionable material; and (3) chemical separation plants which isolated products of reactor operations. There would be no inspection of mines, refineries or nuclear stockpiles.

As to the conversion of fissionable materials to peaceful uses, the United States reaffirmed its readiness to transfer 60,000 kilogrammes as against 40,000 kilogrammes by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union contended that the United States proposal amounted to control without disarmament, and criticised its inspection

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system, particularly the requirement that the parties would have to submit data on the location and output of all plants producing uranium-235 and plutonium. Such inspection would not only disclose the present volume of production of military fissile materials but also the volume of existing stocks, their sources and complete technology of production of materials on which a nation's security was based. It doubted whether an agreement on cut-off was possible outside of general disarmament.

During the General Assembly's twentieth session, the United States proposed the demonstrated destruction of a substantial number of nuclear weapons from the respective stocks of the Soviet Union and the United States for the purpose of transferring weapons-grade fissionable material to peaceful uses.

This proposal for the "dismantling" of nuclear weapons was elaborated by the United States at the 1966 session of the ENDC in documentary form,<sup>47</sup> but there was no detailed discussion of the matter at that session.

At the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, the United States urged a verified halt in the production of fissionable material for use in weapons, accompanied by a transfer of substantial quantities of such materials to peaceful uses; or, if other States could not agree to such an immediate cut-off, a step-by-step reduction in fissionable material output by shutting down equivalent facilities on a plant-by-plant basis under effective controls. This proposal attracted relatively little attention, however, at this and subsequent sessions of the General Assembly, or at the 1968 session of the ENDC.

At the 1969 session of the ENDC, however, the United States again stressed the urgency of the question, modifying its previous proposals by suggesting that the cessation of production be safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) rather than by "adversary inspection."<sup>48</sup> The United States maintained that such verification by the IAEA would apply the same system to nuclear States as that applied to non-nuclear States under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and that the proposed agreement would constitute an important measure towards stopping the nuclear arms race, pursuant to the commitment in the Treaty (article VI). Canada, Sweden and Ethiopia also specifically stressed the importance of such a measure and called for the preparation of an agreement by the ENDC; Italy, the United Kingdom, Burma, India and Mexico also expressed interest; and the allies of the United States, as well as Burma, India and Sweden,

welcomed the proposal for IAEA safeguards. The Soviet Union repeated its argument that such measures did not contribute to the reduction of existing nuclear arsenals and noted the possibility that some nuclear Powers might fail to agree to it. The Soviet Union also replied to the United States proposal by stressing the importance of a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles.

The United States repeated its proposal at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, attracting a measure of support similar to that in the ENDC, but no specific action was proposed in the matter.

### **Cessation of Manufacture of Nuclear Weapons and Reduction and Destruction of Stockpiles**

In 1966, the Soviet Union proposed, among other things, the destruction, under appropriate international control, of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of their manufacture, as well as the destruction of their delivery vehicles and a ban on the production of such vehicles.<sup>49</sup> The following year, the Soviet Union's draft convention to ban the use of nuclear weapons included an article whereby the contracting parties would undertake to reach early agreement on the cessation of production, and the destruction of stockpiles, of nuclear weapons in conformity with a treaty on general and complete disarmament. An item entitled "Measures for stopping the manufacture of nuclear weapons and for reducing and destroying stockpiles" also appeared in the Soviet Union's memorandum on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race of 1 July 1968, with the proposal that all nuclear Powers should enter into immediate negotiations on the subject. In the endc's provisional agenda of 1968, the item was listed as one which members might wish to discuss under the priority subject of nuclear disarmament. At the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, however, there was little discussion of this specific point.

In a message to the ENDC in 1969,<sup>50</sup> the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, A. Kosygin, called special attention, among other things, to the need for a solution of this problem and confirmed the Soviet Union's willingness to enter into negotiations on the subject. The discussion of the matter was not extensive at this session. Burma, Italy and Mexico noted the close relationship between this measure and that of the United States on the cut-off of production of fissionable materials. Italy also thought a cut-off of production of fissile materials should be the first step towards the cessation of

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production of weapons, while Canada thought the cessation of weapons production should be approached by means of agreements on both a comprehensive test ban and a cut-off of production of fissile materials. The subject was not discussed in any detail at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

### **Verified Freeze on Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles**

The limitation, reduction, or elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles was an important concept in proposals for general and complete disarmament put forward over the years.

In 1964, the United States proposed as a separate collateral measure, a verified freeze on the number and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the immediate purpose of which was to limit the quantities of strategic nuclear vehicles held by the East and the West to their existing levels and to prevent the development and deployment of strategic delivery vehicles of a significantly new type.

The United States proposed<sup>51</sup> that the freeze should apply to: (1) ground-based surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 5,000 kilometres or more with launching facilities, and sea-based surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 100 kilometres or more with their launchers; (2) strategic bombers with an empty weight of 40,000 kilogrammes or more, together with their associated air-to-surface missiles with a range of 100 kilometres or more; (3) ground-based surface-to-surface missiles with a range of between 1,000 and 5,000 kilometres with their launching facilities; (4) strategic bombers with an empty weight of between 25,000 and 40,000 kilogrammes with any associated air-to-surface missiles with a range of 100 kilometres or more; and (5) strategic anti-missile systems with associated launching facilities. A workable and acceptable definition of "anti-missile systems" would be formulated after further technical discussions.

Production of new types of armaments within these groups would be prohibited. Allowance would be made for the production of missiles as replacements for those used for peaceful purposes and for testing.

Verification would be less onerous than that for general disarmament, concentrating only on the monitoring of critical production steps, replacement and launching. An adequate verification system should include: continuing inspection of declared facilities; a specified number of inspections per year to check undeclared locations for possible

prohibited activities; stationing of observers to verify all space launchings and all allowed missile firings; and observation of destruction of vehicles and of launchers being replaced. Inspection would not, however, extend to verification of levels of deployment of existing armaments.

Initially, only the United States and the Soviet Union needed to participate in the treaty for the freeze, although other countries, if they so wished, could also become original parties to it. The treaty would provide for right of withdrawal under specified conditions.

The Soviet Union opposed the proposal for a freeze, arguing that it was not a disarmament measure, but provided control without disarmament. The proposal allowed the retention of all existing delivery means and the present "over-kill" capacity of the United States. It did not prevent further production of Polaris missiles or the establishment of the proposed NATO multilateral nuclear force (MLF). It would not halt all production of strategic missiles or of tactical nuclear weapons, nor of modern bombers, chemical and bacterial weapons and conventional arms. Furthermore, the freeze would apply only to strategic weapons, thus allowing the United States to perfect its tactical weapons. As it would only apply to the United States and the Soviet Union, it would therefore leave the United Kingdom, France and West Germany free to continue to engage in the arms race. On the other hand, it would, among other things, allow the United States to complete announced plans to increase its strategic forces, enable it, while freezing the number of its intercontinental ballistic missiles (of which there was an over-supply), to increase its potential in short and medium-range missiles, especially mobile rockets, which, together with the Polaris missile, could become the basis of future United States strategy and provide control. without disarmament.

The non-aligned members of the ENDC sought to reconcile differences in approach between the United States and the Soviet Union and to link the proposal for a freeze with some other collateral measures before the ENDC, such as non-proliferation and a freeze, or cut-off, of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.

In the course of the general debate at the General Assembly's twentieth session, in 1965, the United States announced that if progress were made on a freeze, it would be willing to explore the possibility of significant reductions in the number of delivery vehicles.

At the 1966 session of the ENDC, the United States again urged, among other things, a freeze on offensive and defensive strategic bombers

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and missiles designed to carry nuclear weapons, to be followed by reduction in the number of such delivery vehicles.<sup>52</sup>

At the same session, the Soviet Union also urged, among other things, the destruction, under appropriate international control, of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons, the destruction of their delivery vehicles and a ban on the production of such weapons and delivery vehicles.

No specific proposals were put forward, however, with respect to these measures, and the question of a freeze on nuclear delivery vehicles evolved in the direction of proposals for bilateral strategic arms limitation talks (the so-called “SALT”) between the Soviet Union and the United States, as described hereafter.

### **Bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)**

On 1 July 1968, the day that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was opened for signature, an agreement was announced by the Soviet Union and the United States to enter, in the nearest future, into bilateral discussions on the “limitation and reduction of both offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles”.

On the same day, the USSR made public its memorandum on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament which, among other things, proposed that an agreement be reached on definite steps for the limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union maintained that the destruction of the whole arsenal of strategic means of delivery, or at any rate the reduction of that arsenal to the absolute minimum, with the retention—and that only temporarily—of no more than a strictly limited number of such means of delivery, would be a measure conducive to the elimination of the threat of nuclear war.

The President of the United States, in a message to the ENDC on 16 July 1968,<sup>53</sup> referred to the previously announced agreement to enter into negotiations on this subject and stressed the need to halt the strategic arms race and the special responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union in that regard. He also stated that if progress on limiting strategic delivery systems could be made, the United States would be prepared to consider reductions of existing systems. He added that progress on limiting strategic delivery systems would facilitate the achievement of various related measures of nuclear arms control and disarmament.

All members of the ENDC welcomed the announced agreement to enter into negotiations on the subject and expressed the hope that the talks would take place in the near future and would be fruitful.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organisation for 1967-1968, expressed the following views:<sup>54</sup>

As regards nuclear delivery vehicles, the willingness on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union to open talks aimed at limiting and reducing both offensive nuclear weapons and defensive anti-missile systems is an encouraging step forward. It would not be realistic, however, to under-estimate the difficulties that will have to be overcome before agreement is reached on this very complicated question. Having this in mind, I strongly feel that the testing and development of new nuclear weapon systems should be halted while the talks are going on. This would, in my opinion, facilitate the difficult task that the two major nuclear Powers will have to face.

Meanwhile, the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, held at Geneva in September 1968, adopted a resolution urging the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States to enter at an early date into the agreed bilateral discussions. In introducing the resolution, Pakistan stated that not only had such discussions not yet commenced, but that recent developments appeared to point to the start of a new strategic nuclear arms race.

At the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, in reviewing the work of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, the Assembly considered a draft resolution submitted by Pakistan, together with twelve other States, relating to the bilateral talks. It was adopted on 20 December 1968 by 108 votes to none, with 9 abstentions, as resolution 2456 D (XXIII).

On 18 March 1969,<sup>55</sup> the President of the United States said that the United States hoped the international political situation would evolve in a way which would permit the bilateral talks on the limitation of strategic arms to begin in the near future.

In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organisation for 1968-1969, the Secretary-General, after noting that despite the relevant resolutions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States and the General Assembly, the Soviet Union and the

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United States had not yet found it possible to announce a date for the opening of their talks, commented as follows:<sup>56</sup>

Far from making progress towards limiting and reducing the threat of nuclear weapons, the world seems poised on the verge of a massive new escalation in the field of nuclear weaponry. Plans being discussed at present for anti-missile defensive systems and for missiles with multiple warheads generate a renewed sense of fear, insecurity and frustration. The product of the awful alphabet and arithmetic of ABMs (anti-ballistic missiles) and MIRVs (multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles) can only be the acceleration of what has been described as the "mad momentum" of the nuclear arms race. The development of such new weapons would greatly magnify and complicate the problems of verification and control of any measures to halt the nuclear arms race. The notion of "superiority" in such a race is an illusion, as that notion can only lead to an endless competition in which each side steps up its nuclear capabilities in an effort to match, or exceed, the other side until the race ends in unmitigated disaster for all. As the spiral of the nuclear arms race goes up, the spiral of security goes down. On the other hand the opportunities, as well as the need for halting the nuclear arms race have never been greater than at the present time. There now exists a rough balance between the Soviet Union and the United States where each is capable of virtually destroying the other and neither is capable, if nuclear war should ever break out, of preventing or escaping the holocaust. The present situation of relative stability could disappear, even if only temporarily, if new generations of nuclear weapons systems were developed and deployed. This upsetting of the balance, or "Destabilisation", would create unknown temptations and pressures and greatly increase the danger of possible miscalculation. Hence, there may never be a better time to put a stop to the nuclear arms race, nor a more favourable opportunity to take advantage of the possibilities. I have never been able to understand why, given this rough balance, the major nuclear Powers could not assume the calculable and manageable risks of freezing that balance and then reducing it to lower and safer levels, rather than assume the incalculable and unmanageable risks of pursuing a race which may end in disaster for all mankind. Surely, every conceivable national security interest would be protected and even enhanced by agreeing to preserve the balance at progressively reduced levels.

I accordingly appeal to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to begin immediately their bilateral talks to limit and reduce offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapons. In the meantime, pending progress in these talks, it would be helpful if they stopped all further work on the development of new offensive and defensive strategic systems, whether by agreement or by a unilateral moratorium declared by both sides. Little or nothing would be lost by postponing decisions to embark on the development and deployment of new nuclear weapon systems in order to explore thoroughly the possibilities of agreement: a very great deal might be lost by failure or refusal to do so. I am sure that the peoples of the world would breathe a sigh of relief if the Governments of these two States were to avoid taking any decisions which might prove to be irreversible and which might further escalate the nuclear arms race. Such a pause for reflection and the exercise of restraint while the bilateral talks were being undertaken might well become a historic decision which would be a blessing for all mankind.

At the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, considerable attention was paid to the question of the bilateral strategic arms limitation talks. Following the announcement, on 25 October 1969, that the Soviet Union and the United States would open preliminary talks on 17 November 1969, in Helsinki, the two Powers made statements in the General Assembly. The United States stressed that it attached extraordinary importance to the talks, which would serve to increase the mutual security of the two participants and could, at the same time, provide impetus in other arms control areas, in particular, a comprehensive nuclear test ban, a cut-off in the production of weapon-grade fissile materials and the transfer of some of the existing stockpiles to peaceful uses. In talks, the United States would be guided by the concept of "sufficiency" in forces to protect itself and its allies. The Soviet Union said that a positive outcome of the bilateral negotiations would contribute to ending the nuclear and missile arms and strengthening peace in the world. The Soviet Union would endeavour to obtain such results.

The announcement of the early beginning of the talks was welcomed in the General Assembly. Some members considered the talks as one of the most important events in the field disarmament since the end of the Second World War. The hope was also expressed that the talks would have a beneficial effect on disarmament negotiations in the

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Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and that the Committee would be kept informed by the Co-Chairmen on the progress of the negotiations.

Mexico introduced a draft resolution co-sponsored by the other eleven "non-aligned" members of the CCD, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia, which was subsequently also co-sponsored by Ireland, Cyprus and Mali,<sup>57</sup> whereby the General Assembly would appeal to the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States to agree, as an urgent preliminary measure, on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new strategic nuclear weapon systems. Mexico emphasised the moral duty of the General Assembly to address the proposed appeal to the nuclear Powers, even though the scope and duration of the suggested moratorium would be decided by the two negotiating Powers.

Amendments to the fifteen-Power draft were submitted by Canada, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom,<sup>58</sup> which would replace the original draft with provisions whereby the General Assembly would (1) express hope that the bilateral talks would lead to substantial agreement on the limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic armaments; and (2) call upon the Soviet Union and the United States to refrain from any action which might be prejudicial to that aim. The sponsors of the amendments maintained that it would be undesirable to make any specific recommendations related to the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States, and that the General Assembly should not adopt any resolution which might prejudice the future course of the lateral negotiations.

The Soviet Union and the United States also stated that any interference in the strategic arms limitation talks might hamper their successful development, and that it would not be helpful if the General Assembly tried to set the path which the negotiations should follow. The Soviet Union specifically stated that the adoption of the fifteen-Power draft resolution could have a negative effect on the bilateral talks.

The five-Power amendments were rejected in the First Committee by 50 votes to 40, with 16 abstentions. On 16 December 1969, the fifteen-Power draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly, by a vote of 82 to none, with 37 abstentions, as resolution 2602 A (XXIV). The resolution reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 2456 D (XXIII) of 20 December 1968,

*Noting* with satisfaction that, on 17 November 1969, the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America initiated bilateral negotiations on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapon systems,

*Expressing* the hope that these negotiations will bring about early and positive results which would pave the way for further efforts in I the field of nuclear disarmament,

*Convinced* of the necessity for creating the most favourable conditions for the achievement of that aim,

*Appeals* to the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to agree, as an urgent preliminary measure, on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapon systems.

A preliminary discussion of questions relating to bilateral negotiations on curbing the strategic arms race took place in Helsinki from 17 November to 22 December 1969. In a joint communique issued at the end of the Helsinki meeting, it was stated that as a result of the useful exchange of views, each side had been able to understand better the views of the other side in regard to the problems under consideration. An understanding had been reached on the general range of questions which would be the subject of further exchanges of opinions between the Soviet Union and the United States. The bilateral negotiations would be resumed in Vienna on 16 April 1970.

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  57. Document A/7902, para. 7(a).
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## POSTSCRIPT

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The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session provided a wide basis for further endeavours and advances in the field of disarmament in 1970, the year marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, as well as the first year of the Disarmament Decade, declared by the General Assembly in resolution 2602 E (XXIV).

### **Statement by Secretary-General at CCD**

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) resumed its work in Geneva, on 17 February 1970. In addressing General the Conference in person, the Secretary-General, after stating at CCD that the resumed session provided an appropriate occasion to launch the Disarmament Decade, recalled that the General Assembly had requested the Conference to work out a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament, under effective international control, which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations.

Elements of such a programme, the Secretary-General said, already existed in the two draft treaties for general and complete disarmament presented in 1962 by the Soviet Union and the United States in the provisional agenda adopted by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in August 1968, and in resolution C, adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in September 1968.

The Secretary-General also recalled that the CCD was seized of draft treaties or conventions on three questions of major and immediate concern: on the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and ocean floor; on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling

of chemical and biological weapons; and on banning underground nuclear weapon tests.

The Secretary-General further stated:

...I believe we can look forward this year to an agreed draft treaty for the denuclearisation of the sea-bed and ocean floor. There are good possibilities for further ratifications and accessions to the 'Geneva Protocol of 1925 and for advancing the cause of the elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. Progress can also be made towards facilitating a comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban. While I am fully conscious of the difficulties involved in working out a comprehensive programme relating to the Disarmament Decade, I am fully confident that, if the members of the Conference apply themselves urgently to this task, they will be able to report an agreed programme to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

Referring to the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on strategic arms limitation, the Secretary-General said:

It has been said that the bilateral strategic arms limitation talks are the most important international negotiations since the Second World War. Progress in these talks will undoubtedly have a most important bearing on all of the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

After recalling the appeal of the General Assembly, concerning a moratorium on the future testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapon systems, the Secretary-General concluded by stressing the close inter-relationship and inter-action among the bilateral talks, the CCD negotiations and the work of the General Assembly, as well as the need to obtain the participation of all the nuclear Powers in the pursuit of disarmament.

### **Non-Proliferation Treaty-Enters into Force**

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force on 5 March 1970 (*see page 302*). This, of course, means giving practical implementation to all the provisions of the Treaty, including the establishment of a safeguard system under the iaea, as envisaged in article III of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In this connexion, the Board of Governors of the iaea, meeting in Vienna early in April 1970, decided to set up a safeguards committee on which any of the Member States of the IAEA might be represented to advise as an urgent matter on the Agency's responsibilities in relation to safeguards in connection with the Treaty.

Concerning another related question, that of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, dealt with in article V of the Treaty, technical talks were held between the Soviet Union and the United States, in Moscow, in February 1970. At these talks the two nuclear Powers exchanged views and data on the possibility of the effective application of nuclear explosions to a number of peaceful projects, including extraction of oil and gas, construction of underground cavities, water reservoirs, digging of canals, etc. The two countries envisaged a further exchange of scientific and technological data at further talks, and expressed their intention also to continue studies within the framework of the IAEA, in the light of the Agency's important role in this field, in the future. For its part, the IAEA further considered its responsibilities to provide services in connexion with nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, particularly in the light of the request made by the General Assembly, in resolution 2605 B (XXIV), to submit a special report to the Secretary-General, not later than 1 October 1970, on the progress of its further studies and activities in this field. A panel on peaceful nuclear explosions organised by the IAEA was held in Vienna, at the Agency's Headquarters, in March 1970. In addition to reviewing the available information on experiments with peaceful nuclear explosions, the participants gave considerable attention to future activities of the Agency.

On 30 April, the CCD concluded its first session for 1970 and decided to reconvene on 16 June. Before the Conference went into recess on 23 April, the Soviet Union and the United States submitted a new revised draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor (*appendix X*), incorporating several suggestions made at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly and in the CCD. Although the new draft treaty was discussed only in a preliminary way before the Conference went into recess, it appeared that the points of dissent had been reduced and that the chances for agreement had improved considerably.

Speaking first, the representative of the Soviet Union stressed the urgency of excluding the great area of the sea-bed from the arms race and of taking the first step of excluding nuclear weapons so that peaceful exploration might proceed in this environment. He maintained that the new revised draft took account of the suggestions and proposals made by a large number of States both in the CCD and at the 24th session of the General Assembly, formally and informally. Since all

the members of the Committee had taken part in the elaboration of the draft treaty this document was the result of collective effort. It was stressed that the co-sponsors of the draft treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union, had introduced into the text a number of changes relating to four major provisions of the treaty: control, the area covered by the treaty, the relationship of the obligations assumed under the treaty and other international obligations of the States parties to the treaty and the relation of the treaty to international agreements concerning the establishment of nuclear-free zones. The detailed verification procedure in conjunction with the right of every party to the treaty under article III to refer to the Security Council the question of activities on the sea-bed by this or that State constituted, in the view of the Soviet Union, a clear-cut and flexible system of control over compliance with the obligations assumed under the treaty. It was also noted that if consultations were not desired or possible, verification matters could be referred directly to the Security Council. It was pointed out that new language had been introduced in articles I and II of the revised draft sea-bed treaty in order to reconcile the differences. Accordingly the width of the sea-bed zone for the purposes of the treaty was defined in accordance with the proposals made by Argentina. The hope was expressed in this connexion that the revised texts of these articles would meet with the approval of other participants.

The Soviet representative stressed that the treaty was not called upon to settle numerous issues of maritime law, to confirm or nullify the obligations assumed by States under other international agreements or to anticipate any solutions that might possibly emerge in this field in the future. Concluding, he expressed the view that with the inclusion of the above amendments there existed every condition for the final adoption of the draft treaty as soon as possible.

The United States noted that the progress on the draft seabed treaty illustrated a spirit of compromise and accommodation and that numerous suggestions had been taken into account by the United States and the Soviet Union in their new draft. It specifically called attention to the fact

- (1) that Article I of the new draft was now substantially identical with the Argentine proposal;
- (2) that the reference to the 1958 Geneva Convention was now utilised only in Article II as an instrument in the solution of the difficult baseline problem;

- (3) that specific reference was now made in Article II to the 12-mile outer limit of the "sea-bed zone" as suggested by several countries;
- (4) that the new Article III contained almost all the suggestions of Canada;
- (5) that the "disclaimer clause" had now become a separate article, and in the exact language of the Argentine proposal to that effect; and
- (6) that the Mexican proposal for a new article (providing that the treaty did not in any way affect the obligations of States parties under any nuclear-free-zone agreement) had been incorporated as a new article. The United States also noted that the concept of a "sea-bed zone", now incorporated in the treaty, would be applicable to the treaty only and not be related to any other legal questions of the law of the sea; and that the right of any State to apply directly to the Security Council in accordance with the Charter would not be affected in any way by the proposed Article III verification procedures.

At the same time, it stated that not all suggestions had been incorporated into the revised draft, despite careful study, notably the proposed Swedish amendment for a commitment in the body of the treaty towards further negotiations on additional measures to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed. This was because the United States considered the correct approach was to adopt a measure which was realistic in the light of present technology and existing verification capabilities and to review that measure as capabilities changed. In this connexion Article VI on the review conference after five years provided the treaty would be reviewed to ensure that the purposes of the preamble were being realised, as well as the purposes of the treaty provisions. The new text was not perfect but it represented a delicate and fair balance among various interests, and the CCD should carefully consider how to accomplish the aims of the treaty without impairing the balance achieved. The United States believed the CCD could complete work on the draft treaty in good time for the next General Assembly.

Canada called the draft a further constructive step in the negotiation of a sea-bed treaty, which went some distance to meet the criterion of general acceptability and encouraged the belief that a widely acceptable draft could be submitted to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session. However, the new draft, Canada said, contained an important

omission by not providing recourse to appropriate international machinery or to good offices, including those of the Secretary-General. Canada would have preferred some reference to such international procedures and hoped the Soviet Union and the United States would give further consideration to making explicit in the treaty a right which was implicit and inherent in United Nations membership under the Charter and international usage. Italy associated itself with the remarks of Canada.

Brazil, in preliminary observations, said the Brazilian position on a sea-bed treaty, which had been presented to the General Assembly in a draft amendment related to the interests of coastal States, had not been met in the new revised draft. Brazil would study the draft in the light of its desire to co-operate and its irrevocable concern for the interests of coastal States, and would present its full views after the recess. It was confident the CCD would then engage in speedy negotiations which would protect the substantial interests of smaller maritime countries.

Discussion in the CCD on the subject of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons confirmed the existence of strong differences in the approach to the question. The Eastern and most of the non-aligned members of the Committee held that the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons was a matter of high priority and that it should cover simultaneously all chemical and biological weapons. They strongly supported the 1925 Geneva Protocol and called for the universal adherence to the Protocol. Japan and Morocco, members of the CCD, stated that they would ratify the protocol in the near future.

The Western members, on the other hand, insisted that, in view of the complexities involved in the verification of a ban on chemical weapons, it was more practical to proceed first with a ban on biological weapons. A proposal was made by Poland, Hungary and Mongolia to supplement the verification procedures of the 9-Power draft Convention. This proposal—essentially specifying the right of recourse to the Security Council in the case of suspected violations—was accepted by all the sponsors of the draft Convention which were members of the CCD. It did not appear to remove, however, the opposition of the Western Powers to a joint ban on chemical and biological weapons, or to meet their requirements for verification as regards chemical weapons.

Despite widespread support in the CCD for early action towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and the belief that useful discussions

on this matter could be held simultaneously with the bilateral strategic arms limitation talks between the Soviet Union and the United States, in practice, the CCD refrained from giving detailed consideration to this matter during its first session of 1970, on the understanding that it might better await initial developments in its bilateral talks and the submission of the information gathered by the Secretary-General in the context of the creation of a world-wide exchange of seismological data, as envisaged by General Assembly resolution 2604 A (XXIV).

The CCD also gave attention to the question of general and complete disarmament as well as to elaborating a comprehensive disarmament programme in the context of the Disarmament Decade. Italy suggested that, at first, consideration of the matter be carried out informally, preferably by means of a working group, but that subsequently the matter be considered by the full Committee in time to permit the submission of an agreed programme to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session.

During the debates in the CCD the Soviet Union stressed that the Committee should continue its efforts with a view to settling the problem of general and complete disarmament, since its solution would meet the basic interests of nations and ensure the peace and security of all states.

Referring to the statements of many delegations in connexion with General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) which requests the countries to work on general and complete disarmament the representative of the United States expressed the hope that this problem would be one of the principal tasks of the CCD after its recess.

A number of countries called on the Soviet Union and the United States to update their draft treaties on general and complete disarmament of 1962.

### **Statement by the Secretary-General on 22 May, 1970**

In a statement on the "Politics of Disarmament: Proposals for the 1970s" on 22 May 1970; the Secretary-General considered several important aspects of the disarmament questions. He stressed:

Progress in all fields of human endeavour, but particularly in the field of disarmament, because of its complex nature and the still existing suspicion and mistrust between nations can be achieved only if there is a strong political will on all sides to undertake the policies and measures that could lead to agreements and if discussions and negotiations are

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conducted with determination to achieve specific objectives. If we are to make real progress towards disarmament, Governments must approach this subject in a new spirit....

It was with these considerations in mind that I proposed last September that the United Nations dedicate the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade....

The Secretary-General further stated that:

...any comprehensive programme for disarmament must begin with a halt or "freeze" or limitation of the armaments race, above all the nuclear arms race; thereafter, measures must be taken to turn the spiral downwards by reducing and finally eliminating nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. A comprehensive programme must of course be balanced and flexible rather than rigid. It must also provide for the limitation and reduction of military budgets and of conventional armaments...

In his view,

...progress during the Disarmament Decade will, to a very large extent, depend upon two developments—firstly, the full implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to halt the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, and secondly, the making of substantial headway in limiting the offensive and defensive strategic nuclear armaments, that is, in halting the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Unless success is achieved in both these fields, it is difficult to conceive of much real progress in other significant disarmament or arms control measures.

It would also seem to me to be equally clear that a condition for the achievement of far-reaching measures of disarmament during the decade is the finding of ways and means of associating all nuclear Powers, including France and the People's Republic of China, with the negotiations.

Furthermore the Secretary-General made a number of other specific suggestions relating to different aspects of disarmament. He stressed, in particular, the need for greater publicity concerning both armaments and disarmament so that knowledge concerning these matters can penetrate the conscience of the people, and proposed that a comprehensive study be undertaken of the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and of massive military budgets. Such a study would complement the 1962 study on the economic and social consequences of disarmament.

In conclusion of his statement the Secretary-General said:

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If the peoples of the world, the Member States of the United Nations, and in particular the nuclear Powers, dedicate themselves to speeding up the momentum of the agreements achieved during the decade of the 1960s, if they organise their efforts to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the Disarmament Decade and if they resolve to move ahead towards the goal of general and complete disarmament, the security, the welfare and the progress not only of the developing countries, but also of the developed countries and of the entire world would be tremendously enhanced.

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## THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT: THE SINGLE MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATING BODY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (JULY, 1986)

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### **Predecessors of the Conference on Disarmament**

The United Nations role in disarmament was established by its Charter, expressing the determination of all Members of the world Organisation to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. In order to achieve that purpose, the United Nations has been involved in disarmament negotiations since its very establishment in 1945, and has used a variety of methods, techniques and approaches.

By its very first resolution, resolution 1 (I), adopted on 24 January 1946, the General Assembly established the Atomic Energy Commission, composed of States represented on the Security Council and Canada, with the urgent task of making specific proposals for the elimination, from national armaments of atomic weapons and all major weapons of mass destruction. On the basis of that mandate, the Commission carried out initial negotiations, which came to a halt in 1949. In 1947, to complement that body, the Commission for Conventional Armaments was established, and following preliminary work, it decided that the regulation and reduction of all armaments and armed forces except those concerning atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction fell within its jurisdiction. It did not meet after 1950. In 1952, as a result of resolution 502 (VI), both bodies were dissolved and the Disarmament Commission, with a similarly, limited membership, was established.

Through the remainder of the 1950s, the Disarmament Commission was the main subsidiary body of the General Assembly for disarmament negotiations. It established a five-Power sub-committee, consisting of Canada, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, which assembled in closed meetings from 1954 to 1957 and reported regularly to both the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly. Thus, it negotiated for four years in the search for agreement on a comprehensive and co-ordinated plan of disarmament. Also in 1957, the Assembly expanded the membership of the Disarmament Commission by 14 States. In 1958, in the light of growing concern, particularly about nuclear testing, it decided that, for 1959 and thereafter on an *ad hoc* basis, the Commission would be composed of all the Members of the United Nations. But, agreement to convene the Commission regularly could not be reached—it subsequently met only twice, in 1960 and in 1965. It was in effect displaced, briefly, by the bilateral Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament of 1960 (consisting of five members from each of the two major alliances and created outside of, but linked to, the United Nations) and subsequently by the multilateral negotiating body of limited size, which evolved as discussed below.

As those early efforts to deal with the question of disarmament on a comprehensive basis faced growing difficulties, the General Assembly, on 20 November 1959, adopted resolution 1378 (XIV), in which, for the first time, it expressly stated its hope for the early achievement of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The goal formulated in that resolution has been considered since then as the ultimate disarmament objective of the United Nations. Thereafter, in the early 1960s, there were several concerted initiatives which attempted to deal with disarmament through various stages or phases, leading to the goal. The Soviet Union and the United States in fact agreed, in a joint statement issued on 20 September 1961, on a set of eight principles as a basis for future disarmament negotiations aimed towards that ultimate objective.

The same year, by its resolution 1722 (XVI), the General Assembly endorsed a further agreement reached between the Soviet Union and the United States on the composition of a disarmament committee which would undertake negotiations towards general and complete disarmament, bearing in mind the eight principles mentioned. The composition of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), as it was called, was: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada,

Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom and United States. France decided not to participate, explaining that it might be possible later for the disarmament problem to be discussed among the Powers that could contribute effectively to its solution. At the outset, it was decided to organize the Committee so as to permit simultaneous work, on confidence-building (collateral) measures and on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, which was considered a priority measure. The first Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament convened in Geneva in March 1962.

Initiatives put forward during the period called for disarmament to be achieved in defined stages under strict and effective international control, sometimes within a specific number of years, A draft treaty covering the process was submitted by the Soviet Union, and an outline of such a treaty by the United States. Both drafts took into account such requirements as stable relative security among States and adequate measures to ensure international control throughout the whole disarmament process. They also outlined a final status for armed forces and armaments, including their peace-keeping role in a disarmed world. Procedures for implementation of actual measures in the first stage of such a process, however, could not be agreed upon, and gradually the concept of achieving disarmament through an all-inclusive instrument was combined with efforts to deal first with partial measures which offered greater promise of near-term results. Among problems which received priority attention besides the cessation of nuclear weapon testing, were those of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, later, the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons.

The ENDC was enlarged in 1969 by the addition of eight countries and its name was changed to the "Conference of the Committee on Disarmament" (CCD). The new members were: Argentina, Hungary, Japan, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia. In 1975, it was further enlarged with the addition of the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iran, Peru and Zaire.

In the period from 1962 to 1978, the multilateral negotiating body contributed to setting the 'stage for what later became the *Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water* (partial test-ban Treaty) of 1963, and the *Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies* (outer space Treaty) of 1967. It had a

decisive role in the drafting and conclusion of four other multilateral agreements: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (non-proliferation Treaty) of 1968; the *Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof* (sea-bed Treaty) of 1971; the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction* (biological weapons Convention) of 1972; and the *Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques* (ENMOD Convention) of 1977.

### **The Conference on Disarmament**

At the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978, the Assembly reaffirmed in the Final Document of that session, adopted by consensus, that the United Nations “has a central role and primary responsibility” in the field of disarmament, a responsibility reflecting the vital interests of all the peoples of the world. It also agreed that the role of the United Nations should be strengthened, among other ways, by making the disarmament deliberative and negotiating bodies more effective.

In that connection it recognised that, although the decisive factor for achieving real measures of disarmament was the political will of States, and especially of those possessing nuclear weapons, a significant role could also be played by the effective functioning of appropriate international disarmament machinery designed to deal with the problems of disarmament in its various aspects.

According to the Final Document, since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitation which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security. The Final Document specifically stated that agreements or other measures should be pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening international peace and security. It was the Assembly’s view that all the Members of the United Nations should be represented on deliberative disarmament bodies, but that negotiating bodies, while representative in character, should, for the sake of convenience, have a relatively small membership.

Concerning deliberative disarmament bodies, it was decided at the special session that the General Assembly should remain the chief

deliberative organ of the United Nations on disarmament; that the First Committee of the Assembly should deal in the future solely with disarmament and related international security questions; and that the revived Disarmament Commission should act as an inter-sessional subsidiary deliberative organ of the Assembly. These three deliberative organs are open to all Members of the United Nations.

And a single multilateral negotiating body emerged from the decisions of the 1978 special session on disarmament, namely, the Committee on Disarmament, whose name was changed to "Conference on Disarmament", effective 7 February 1984.

The Conference on Disarmament, in the language of the Final Document of the special session, is the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum" of the international community. Its membership of 40 specifically includes the 5 nuclear weapon States and 35 other States. The new forum started its session in 1979 carrying forward the negotiating efforts of previous multilateral negotiating bodies.

The Conference on Disarmament has a unique relationship with the United Nations. It defines its own rules of procedure and develops its own agenda, taking into account the recommendations made by the General Assembly. It also reports to the General Assembly annually or more frequently, as may be appropriate. The budget of the Conference on Disarmament is included in that of the United Nations, and the Conference holds its meetings on United Nations premises and is serviced by United Nations personnel, namely, the Geneva Branch of the Department for Disarmament Affairs. The Secretary-General of the Conference is appointed directly by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in consultation with the Conference's members, and acts as his personal representative.

The Conference is entrusted with the responsibility of negotiating multilateral agreements on disarmament measures. This role is extremely complex, because it virtually amounts to attempting to reverse an arms race which has been going on in its present form for the past 40 years. Since its establishment, the Conference has worked on two levels. On the one hand, it has been engaged in a negotiating process on, *inter alia*, a ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction; new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, radiological weapons; effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and a comprehensive

programme of disarmament. On the other hand, it has been engaged in exploratory discussions that precede negotiations, such as identification of issues, clarification of objectives, examination of legal and security aspects and exposition of differences of perception and approach in a variety of important disarmament issues, including the question of prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The members of the Conference on Disarmament are: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire. All are Members of the United Nations. The composition reflects all the main political and geographical groups.

Twenty-one of the members are non-aligned or neutral nations. Ten others belong to the Western group of countries and eight to the socialist group. China is also a member. Most of the militarily significant States are members of the Conference.

The relationship between the United Nations and the negotiating body has evolved through the years. The Atomic Energy Commission, the Commission for Conventional Armaments and the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission were organs of the United Nations. The Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the ENDC and the CCD, strictly speaking, were not, even though they were closely tied to the United Nations system by a series of arrangements similar to those which now apply to the Conference on Disarmament. The multilateral disarmament negotiating body, even though not having the status of a United Nations forum for the last 25 years or so, has continued to operate within the framework of the United Nations system. This has been necessary, not only because disarmament is a primary concern and responsibility of the United Nations, but also because the arrangement ensures that United Nations deliberations on disarmament are related to negotiations in a meaningful way.

The negotiating body, as constituted following the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, resulted from a deeply felt need to revitalize the disarmament machinery and the belief that it would be appropriate to provide it with a more representative character, including the five nuclear weapon States, to better enable it

to continue the considerable, urgent work which remained to be accomplished in the field of disarmament. The expanded, 40-nation body developed its rules of procedure—no systematic set of rules had been in force in the ENDC or the CCD—and agreed to conduct its work on the basis of an annual agenda, a practice which had not been followed by the two earlier bodies. In addition, it was decided that non-member States might submit written proposals or working documents and might, upon invitation, participate in the discussions on substantive items on the agenda. The chairmanship was to rotate among all the members on a monthly basis. Participation of non-members and the rotating chairmanship represented a major change from the practice of the ENDC and CCD, which had not envisaged the involvement of non-members and had operated under the co-chairmanship of the Soviet Union and the United States. When the negotiating body was redesignated the “Conference on Disarmament” in 1984, these arrangements were maintained, with the position of “Chairman” being replaced by that of “President”.

### **Methods of Work Since 1979**

At its initial session, in 1979, the negotiating body agreed, taking into account the documents of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to deal with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:

- (i) Nuclear weapons in all aspects.
- (ii) Chemical weapons.
- (iii) Other weapons of mass destruction.
- (iv) Conventional weapons.
- (v) Reduction of military budgets.
- (vi) Reduction of armed forces.
- (vii) Disarmament and development.
- (viii) Disarmament and international security.
- (ix) Collateral measures; confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned.
- (x) Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

From this so-called decalogue, the negotiating body chooses its annual agenda and fixes its programme of work for each year. The substantive annual agenda for 1986 included the following:

1. Nuclear test ban.
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
4. Chemical weapons.
5. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
6. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
7. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
8. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.

The negotiating body has conducted its work in plenary meetings and in working groups and *ad hoc* committees, or under any arrangements agreed upon. It meets annually at Geneva for approximately six months, usually when the General Assembly is not in session. Its expansion has been under consideration for some time. The decision has been taken to enlarge it by four States, but there is no consensus on which States they should be and on the procedure for their selection.

The negotiating body works under the rule of consensus. Since its objective is to negotiate treaties that have a bearing on national — and indeed international — security, it is felt that it would be undesirable to take decisions by a vote. It is believed that a treaty formulated by a majority decision cannot achieve its purpose. In practice, consensus is interpreted as unanimity or, at any rate, as the absence of opposition. Some non-aligned members have proposed that the consensus rule be applied to substantive questions, and that procedural and organisational issues be settled by voting. That proposal has not been accepted by all, and so the consensus rule has prevailed through every phase of its work.

### **Status of Work**

In its new designation, the Conference on Disarmament has been constantly labouring on different fronts and addressing a number of subjects that have been on the disarmament agenda for many years. It

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has been strenuously endeavouring, in the real world in which it is functioning, to find ways to negotiate on critical issues and to raise the consideration of different problems to a higher level. The Conference has played a useful role in maintaining continuity in disarmament negotiations and keeping the dialogue on security and disarmament in the foreground.

Over the years, progress has been achieved on a variety of important disarmament negotiating issues, such as the item entitled *Chemical weapons*. The scope of the convention under negotiation provides for the prohibition of the production, development, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons, and for their destruction. Moreover, the structure of the future convention has been agreed upon. Progress has also been made on the question of defining a chemical weapon. Preliminary drafting of some provisions has begun. A large measure of common ground has been achieved on the elimination of stockpiles of chemical weapons. However, a number of issues still remain to be solved, and these are related to the problems of verification of compliance with the future convention, as well as those relating to chemical weapons production facilities and the non-production of chemical weapons in the civilian chemical industry.

The creation in 1985 of an *ad hoc* committee dealing with the *Prevention of an arms race in outer space*, with the mandate "to examine, as a first step at this stage, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space... [taking] into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives", marked a step forward towards a dialogue on this important item. Although the Committee's mandate in 1985 was not a negotiating mandate, it provided a basis for multilateral consideration of the question. While there is general agreement on the importance and urgency of the subject and on the need to continue substantive work, clearly there are divergent views on various aspects, including the appropriateness of undertaking negotiations in the Conference at this time.

A sharp difference of view exists on the degree of priority to be assigned to the question of a comprehensive *Nuclear test ban*. Some members consider it to be a long-term goal, which should be preceded by deep reductions in nuclear arsenals and solved within the framework of the process of nuclear disarmament. The dominant view, however, is that a treaty on cessation of tests should be negotiated and concluded as the highest priority. In 1982 and 1983 subsidiary bodies were set up

on the item and dealt mainly with issues of verification and compliance. Since that time the consideration of the item has taken place in plenary meetings and various proposals have been submitted. In addition, the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, first established in 1976, has prepared various progress reports and three major reports concerning modalities of an international system for the exchange of seismic data as a contribution to verification of a nuclear test-ban treaty.

Views are also divided with regard to the *Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament*. Some members of the Conference feel that bilateral negotiations between the two major Powers provide the best means for achieving progress in halting and reversing the nuclear arms race and therefore do not favour at this time holding multilateral negotiations on this item in the Conference. The other members consider that the Conference would play a very useful role in this respect as well and have consequently advanced proposals to start multilateral negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament measures.

In respect of the *Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters*, there is a conceptual difference in approach. While some member countries are of the view that the subject must be seen in the context of the prevention of war in general and that the question at issue is the enhancement of conditions for international peace and security in the nuclear age, the other members of the Conference consider the prevention of nuclear war as having the highest priority and are in favour of initiating negotiations on what they see as concrete, practical measures, to be taken without any delay, to prevent such war.

The item *New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons* consists of two distinct parts. As regards the first part, many members, notably socialist and a number of non-aligned, favour the conclusion of a general agreement of a comprehensive character (which would not exclude the conclusion of separate agreements on particular types of weapons), by which new types of weapons of mass destruction would be outlawed. Other members, particularly Western, hold that it would be more appropriate to negotiate agreements to ban potential new weapons of mass destruction only on a case-by-case basis, as such weapons may be identified, since a general agreement would not permit clear definitions or appropriate verification measures in the case of specific weapons. The second part, namely, radiological weapons, relates to two different substantive issues: one

is the prohibition of radiological weapons and the other the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. There are differences of approach to the question of whether these two issues should be linked. The Conference has before it a draft treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons, submitted jointly in 1979 by the USSR and the United States, and proposals for parts of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons and the release or dissemination of radioactive material for hostile purposes, presented in 1984 by Sweden. Those initiatives continue to be considered by the Conference's subsidiary body, which is set up each year with a view to elaborating an agreement or agreements on the two aspects of the radiological weapons question.

The item *Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons* has been of particular concern to non-nuclear weapon States. While they are seeking effective and unconditional international guarantees, preferably embodied in an international convention, some of the nuclear weapon States continue to favour the present approach consisting of unilateral declarations or assurances under certain conditions relating to their own security concerns. Some non-aligned countries have expressed serious doubts as to the real value of those unilateral assurances.

The last substantive item is the *Comprehensive programme of disarmament*, on which an *ad hoc* committee has now been working for a number of years. Although progress has been made, the draft still reflects many differences, particularly with respect to disarmament measures to be included and their stages of implementation, including the question of time frames.

### **Effective Functioning of the Conference**

Various member States believe that the Conference on Disarmament, apart from continuing its role of expanding areas of agreement and bridging substantial differences of policy, could enhance its effectiveness in the years to come. In this connection, the following questions have been raised:

- How to strengthen its negotiating role and accelerate the negotiating process on items on which negotiations have started, such as chemical weapons, radiological weapons, security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States and a comprehensive programme of disarmament;
- How to increase its effectiveness in the field of nuclear disarmament, prevention of nuclear war and prevention of an

arms race in outer space, given the substantial differences of view existing at present as to the proper role of the Conference in those fields;

- How to improve its functioning so as to avoid having procedural questions reduce its ability to concentrate on substantive aspects of the various issues before it;
- How to relate multilateral to bilateral disarmament negotiations so as to ensure that efforts at both levels will complement and reinforce each other. The work of the Conference should not be reduced to marking time while awaiting the outcome of corresponding bilateral work.

Divergent approaches to questions of international relations and to security policies have prevented the Conference so far from making more meaningful progress. Lack of trust and fear arising from perceived or actual hostile intentions are deeply rooted. In general, there are no easy answers to problems involving security

- in spite of the universally acknowledged common interest in avoiding war, in particular nuclear war, which transcends ideological and other differences.

For that reason, multilateral negotiations cannot be treated in isolation from the general international environment. Indeed, they share the destiny of negotiations in general and cannot be immune to adverse developments in other areas of international life. Beyond that, the multilateral approach faces more difficulties because it has to take into account a diversity of components and interests as well as the global concern for security.

In spite of the modest results it has achieved, the Conference has served the international community in a variety of ways. It has done so, for example, by setting in motion negotiations on certain key questions, by contributing to the understanding of each other's views and security concerns, and by keeping the debate in the public domain. One cannot, therefore, judge the activities of the Conference on a day-to-day basis; its impact is often indirect and cumulative, stimulating a broad international dialogue, widening the areas of consensus and increasing public awareness of the necessity of disarmament, thus generating in Governments the necessary political will to overcome their differences through mutual accommodation and compromise. Bearing this in mind, one can say that the Conference on Disarmament,

like its predecessors, has certainly contributed also to broadening the vision of international relations and security concerns and promoting the cause of disarmament.

“As the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body of the international community, the Conference on Disarmament has a major role in the completion of the practical disarmament agreements which are so badly needed. It is the appropriate and competent forum where the positive developments which have recently emerged should also find expression in specific agreements. Numerous resolutions of the fortieth session of the General Assembly, in requesting you to endeavour to achieve concrete results on arms limitation and disarmament, give recognition to the unique potential of this Conference. Your agenda encompasses major areas of international concern which impinge on the future of humanity.”

- From the message of Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Conference on Disarmament, A February 1986.

# 21

## THE UNITED NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT (1945-1995)

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### INTRODUCTION

The founding of the United Nations at San Francisco, during the final months of the Second World War, in the summer of 1945, symbolised the beginning of a new era in international relations. The Charter of the United Nations embodied principles and provided a forum to discourage war as an instrument of policy between nations. The first of those principles was the commitment to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. Moreover, within the framework of the Charter, the world organisation offered opportunities for Member States to develop new forums, methods and international machinery of cooperation for international peace and security. To help achieve that goal, the Charter entrusted the General Assembly and the Security Council with the responsibility for dealing with questions of arms limitation and disarmament.

Only days after the signing of the Charter, the world entered into a dramatic new era—the nuclear age—which, as it turned out, gave a completely new dimension to all human endeavours. The newly formed United Nations was, thus, confronted with unprecedented military and political problems. The Charter had envisaged arms limitation and disarmament as elements in the progressive establishment of an international security system. However, the revolutionary changes brought about by the discovery of nuclear energy gave significant additional emphasis to disarmament in international politics and security.

A few months after the first atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United Nations General Assembly adopted its first resolution: it was on disarmament, and specifically on the

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establishment of a commission—the Atomic Energy Commission—whose terms of reference were designed to ensure the elimination of atomic and all other weapons of mass destruction and the use of atomic energy only for peaceful purposes. The General Assembly also underlined, later that year in resolution 41 (I), the connection between the questions of disarmament and of peace and security.

Since that time, the United Nations has, over the years, dealt with disarmament questions using a variety of bodies, methods, techniques and approaches. The problems involved are complex and are often seen to affect the vital security interests of States. The political compromises necessary to solve them have therefore often been difficult to reach, and the results achieved have often been characterised as modest.

In recent years, the General Assembly, its First Committee and the Disarmament Commission have been the main United Nations deliberative bodies in the field of disarmament. The General Assembly sometimes also establishes *ad hoc* committees to deal with specific disarmament matters. In addition, since 1962 a multilateral disarmament negotiating forum with a limited membership—now known as the Conference on Disarmament—has been in place in Geneva. It has a unique relationship with the United Nations: while it defines its own rules of procedure and develops its own agenda, it takes into account the recommendations made by the General Assembly and reports to the Assembly annually or, as appropriate, more frequently.

### CHANGING APPROACHES TO DISARMAMENT

The needs and the basic objectives of disarmament have remained constant through the years, but the approach to the subject and the scope of negotiations have changed, as a reflection of varying political realities and international conditions. The technical problems related to disarmament have also changed along with the rapid technological and scientific advances that have been made.

At the outset, the scope of negotiation; was very broad. The Atomic Energy Commission and another body—the Commission for Conventional Armaments (established in 1947)—envisaged immediate plans to ensure that atomic energy would be used only for peaceful purposes and that all armaments and armed forces would be regulated and reduced under an international system of control and inspection. In fact, up until the early 1950s the objective was the regulation, limitation

and balanced reduction by stages of all armed forces and armaments in a coordinated, comprehensive programme.

With little progress towards agreement on a coordinated, comprehensive programme, more impetus was given in the late 1950s to a “partial approach”. It was hoped that the achievement of some first, though limited, steps would increase confidence and create a more favourable atmosphere for comprehensive agreements.

Although in 1959, the General Assembly stressed general and complete disarmament under effective international control as a goal to be actively sought, partial disarmament measures continued to be pursued as well. It was felt that devoting parallel and, at times, even primary attention to “collateral” measures—designed to reduce tension and build confidence—would facilitate the complex task of achieving general and complete disarmament. The immediate hopes and expectations of the great majority of nations centred on two such measures—the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons.

By the mid-1960s, it became widely accepted, however, that general and complete disarmament was not an attainable goal in any short or specific period. For the next fifteen years, the tendency was, therefore, to regard general disarmament as the ultimate goal and to concentrate increasingly on partial objectives.

In terms of concrete multilateral achievements, the period of 1963 to 1978 was productive. Nevertheless, the measures achieved, although significant, were not adequate to curb the arms race or to alleviate the nuclear threat. They proscribed certain particularly undesirable developments, but did not in most cases result in substantial reductions of any of the major weapons systems.

In reaction to what they called inadequate progress on those central issues, non-aligned States took an initiative that led to the convening of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978. That session adopted a Final Document setting out agreed goals, principles and priorities in arms limitation and disarmament. It stressed that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the field and specified measures intended to strengthen the international and multilateral machinery that deals with disarmament issues within the United Nations system. Subsequently, the Assembly convened two more special sessions, in 1982 and 1988. At neither session was it possible to reach agreement on a final document

although, in the case of the 1988 session, tensions between East and West had begun to diminish.

In the 1990s, with the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and profound political changes in Eastern Europe, more than forty years of ideological and military competition between East and West came to an end. This has created unprecedented opportunities for progress in disarmament, as evidenced by reductions under way in the nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States, by certain unilateral measures undertaken by other nuclear weapon States, and by conclusion of a ban on chemical weapons.

The end of the cold war has been marked, however, by potential regional arms races and the accumulation of ever more destructive weaponry by a growing number of countries. Regional instabilities, the emergence of ethnic and religious tensions and the continuing and heightened risk of proliferation of both weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons have created serious challenges and rendered disarmament, now more than ever before, an urgent and necessary element of the system of international peace and security.

### DISARMAMENT IN THE 1990s

In his report entitled *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era*, the Secretary-General set forth his vision of the new opportunities and challenges of the 1990s. He saw the following issues as being of primary importance.

*Integration: disarmament in the new international environment.* "There is... a constructive parallel between conflict resolution and disarmament: the two go hand in hand."

*Globalisation: enhancing the multilateral approach.* "The goal is to extend disarmament efforts to include not only bilateral agreements but also multilateral arrangements in a world-wide process involving all States."

*Revitalisation: building on past achievements.* Four areas of endeavour stand out: weapons of mass destruction, proliferation control, arms transfers, and transparency in arms and other confidence-building measures.

Some of the main events in the field of arms limitation and disarmament that have occurred in the first half of the decade are noted below. In the case of treaties, a brief description is given in the annex.

## **Chronology: 1990-1995**

### **1990**

*20 August-14 September.* The Fourth Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty ends without agreement on a final declaration.

*17 November.* A new set of confidence- and security-building measures is adopted in Vienna by the 34 States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

*19 November.* The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is signed in Paris by 22 States.

### **1991**

*8-17 January.* The Amendment Conference of the States parties to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty is convened in New York, upon the request of more than one third of the parties, in an effort to advance prospects for conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

*3 April.* The Security Council adopts resolution 687 (1991), under which a Special Commission is established to carry out on-site inspection of and the destruction or rendering harmless of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is requested to carry out similar action with respect to Iraq's nuclear capabilities.

*1 July.* The members of the Warsaw Treaty agree to terminate the validity of the Treaty.

*31 July* The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) is signed in Moscow by the USSR and the United States.

*9-27 September.* The Third Review Conference of the parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, meeting in Geneva, expresses its determination to strengthen the Convention. It further develops a set of confidence-building measures and agrees to examine potential verification measures.

*9 December.* The General Assembly adopts resolution 46/36 L, "Transparency in armaments", by which it establishes the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Member States are called upon to provide relevant data and information on imports and exports of arms in seven categories of major conventional weapons systems and are invited to provide information on their national holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies.

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**1992**

*31 January.* The Security Council meets for the first time at the level of heads of State and Government. The President makes a statement on behalf of the members in which they reaffirm the crucial contribution which progress in the fields of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation can make to the maintenance of international peace and security and in which they declare that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

*23 May.* The Lisbon Protocol to START I is signed in Lisbon by four successor States to the former USSR—Belarus, Kazakstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine—and by the United States.

*17 June.* The Secretary-General issues his report “An Agenda for Peace”, in which he addresses the role of the United Nations in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping.

*14-18 September.* The Second Review Conference of the parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD Convention) meets in Geneva and adopt by consensus a Final Declaration.

*27 October.* The Secretary-General issues his report “New Dimensions, of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era”.

**1993**

*3 January.* The second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) is signed in Moscow by the Russian Federation and the United States.

*13-15 January.* The Chemical Weapons Convention is signed in Paris by 130 States.

*10 August.* The Conference on Disarmament decides to undertake negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, beginning in 1994.

*16 December.* The General Assembly adopts without a vote resolution 48/75 L, by which it recommends the negotiation in the most appropriate international forum of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

**1994**

*25 January.* The Conference on Disarmament begins negotiation of a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

*19-30 September.* The Special Conference of the parties to the Biological Weapons Convention meeting in Geneva underlines the need for a gradual approach towards establishing a regime to enhance the effectiveness of, and improve compliance with, the Convention and takes action to consider measures, including possible verification measures, to strengthen the Convention.

*September.* A Non-Aggression Pact between Central African States is initialled by a majority of those States in Yaounde, Cameroon.

### **1995**

*5-6 April.* The five nuclear weapon States issue unilateral declarations in which they affirm that they will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (in the case of France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States) and to parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or any comparable internationally binding commitment (in the case of China).

*11 April.* The Security Council adopts resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in which it recognises that the Council will act immediately in the event that such a State is the victim of an act or object of a threat of aggression involving nuclear weapons.

*17 April-12 May.* The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the 178 parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty meets in New York to review the operation of the Treaty and to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. The Conference does not agree on a final declaration with respect to the operation of the Treaty, but it adopts without a vote three documents: (a) "Strengthening the review process for the Treaty"; (b) "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" (the text of which is reproduced in annex II, page 27); and (c) a decision on extension, to the effect that the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely. In addition, it adopts a resolution on the Middle East.

*24-28 June.* The heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity adopt the text of the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). Later, in December, the General Assembly of the United Nations welcomes the adoption of the Treaty.

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*23 September-13 October.* The Review Conference of the parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons meets in Vienna to consider ways in which to strengthen the Convention. It adopts a new protocol (Protocol IV), regulating blinding laser weapons. It also considers how to strengthen the prohibition against land-mines (Protocol II).

*15 December.* The Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty is initialled in Bangkok, Thailand, at a summit meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

### **Looking Ahead**

It is clear, at this mid-way point in the decade of the 1990s, that there is great potential in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. At the same time, there can be no room for complacency. Ways must be found to consolidate progress and to sustain the momentum in a systematic way. At the same time, it is becoming increasingly evident that disarmament cannot be pursued in isolation from broader concerns of international security and that these broader concerns are themselves inextricably linked to economic and social issues.

The decisions taken at the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference have laid the foundation for progress in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament to be evaluated against a set of agreed principles and objectives. Among them are: universal adherence to the Treaty, early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons. It is hoped that the regional nuclear measures now covering a large part of the globe—Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Africa and Southeast Asia—will be brought into effect where that is not yet the case and implemented as expeditiously as possible.

Two other achievements pertaining to weapons of mass destruction await further action by the international community before their benefits can be fully realised: conclusion of provisions to verify compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention and entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

As countries seek to develop, their need for access to high technology will become more and more acute. Strenuous efforts will have to be made to balance this need with the need to prevent the proliferation of sensitive technology for weapons purposes. In the coming years, will

it be possible to reach a compromise, with regulatory measures negotiated and applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis?

Although considerable progress has been made with respect to weapons of mass destruction and the steps forward have been outlined in general terms by the international community, much less has been accomplished in the conventional field. Nevertheless, recent events have highlighted the urgency of addressing the problem of excessive accumulations of conventional arms and unrestrained and illegal arms transfers that have resulted in suffering and misery for hundreds of thousands of people, particularly in the developing world.

Openness and transparency in military matters have a great potential for contributing to confidence-building and security among States. Further development of the global Register of Conventional Arms and wider participation in it, as well as the establishment of regional and subregional complementary mechanisms, would exploit this potential.

A new trend is emerging: internal conflicts are becoming more frequent and inter-State conflicts are becoming comparatively rare. The ready availability of small weapons exacerbates situations of religious and ethnic tension, destabilising States and destroying the very fabric of their societies. It seems likely that, in the years ahead, “micro-disarmament” will grow in prominence, as States intensify their efforts to curb the illicit arms trade, to place more stringent restrictions on or ban altogether certain small arms such as land-mines, and the United Nations continues to assist Governments, at their request, in addressing problems of domestic security and social and economic development that underlie internal conflict.

The objectives of arms limitation and disarmament pursued at the United Nations cannot be achieved without the political will of Member States and their determined collective effort. It is fundamental, therefore, that, in the search for meaningful measures of arms limitation and disarmament, the legitimate security interests of each State be fully respected. No State can hope to attain security for itself if it entails lowering or undermining the security—real or perceived—of other States; the goal is thus to enhance security through fewer arms.

The United Nations is an instrument that the international community voluntarily devised to deal with issues that affect humanity. The extent to which this tool is used to good effect lies with the Member States. In the field of disarmament, the potential of this unique and universal organisation has yet to be fully realised.

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## ANNEX I

### Agreements

Since the beginning of the United Nations, the combined efforts of Governments at global, regional and bilateral levels have led to a body of important agreements, treaties and conventions committing their parties to various arms limitation and disarmament measures. The legal instruments concluded so far are listed below:

The process of achieving a treaty usually goes through several phases. It often begins with a resolution of the General Assembly, sponsored by a number of Member States, calling upon the Secretary-General to carry out an in-depth *study* of a particular subject. The Secretary-General thereupon appoints a small group of experts to clarify the issues involved, to identify problems and suggest alternative approaches. The process then moves to a wider, *deliberative* stage, clearing the way for a consensus among States that may lead to active *negotiations*. If successful, the negotiations culminate in the *conclusion* of an agreement.

After an agreement has been concluded, it is *signed* by States wishing to indicate their intention to adhere to it; subsequently, it is *ratified* by their respective legislatures and they become *parties*. A treaty *enters into force* after certain conditions set out in it—for example, ratification by a specific number of States—have been met. The agreement is then *implemented*. Here the initial institutional arrangements for such measures as reductions and data exchanges are carried out. This stage involves *monitoring* and the *verification of compliance*. Problems which arise may be dealt with through *consultation* among parties and, if violations have occurred, the Security Council may be called upon by the parties to undertake measures to *enforce compliance* and to prevent further breaches. Finally, an agreement may be modified, amended, or extended, based on the findings of *periodic reviews* of the operation and implementation of its provisions.

### Global Multilateral Treaties

- The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol) of 1925. *In force*.
- The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (Partial Test-Ban Treaty) of 1963 prohibits all nuclear explosions, military or peaceful, in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. It is a partial

measure in that it does not ban underground tests. The General Assembly has repeatedly urged conclusion of a comprehensive treaty banning all tests by all States, including those conducted underground. *In force.*

- The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) of 1967 bans the placing of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Earth orbit, or the stationing of such weapons in outer space or on celestial bodies. It also forbids the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapon and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies. *In force.*
- The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty) of 1968 aims at the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon countries, at promoting the process of nuclear disarmament and at facilitating access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all parties to the Treaty. *In force.*
- The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-Bed Treaty) of 1971 bans the placement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and facilities for such weapons on or under the sea-bed anywhere outside a 12-mile limit from the coastal line. *In force.*
- The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention) of 1972 bans and eliminates all forms of biological weapons. It is the first international agreement providing for a genuine measure of disarmament, in the sense that it not only prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and acquisition of biological (bacteriological) agents or toxins and of weapons and means of delivery for such agents for hostile purposes, but also mandates their destruction or conversion to peaceful purposes. *In force.*
- The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques of 1977

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prohibits the use of techniques that would have widespread, long-lasting or severe effects through deliberate manipulation of natural processes and cause such phenomena as earthquakes, tidal waves and changes in climate and in weather patterns. *In force.*

- The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Agreement on Celestial Bodies) of 1979 complements the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. It prohibits, *inter alia*, the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies for military purposes. *In force.*
- The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons) of 1981 restricts or prohibits the use of any weapon which injures by fragments non-detectable in the human body (Protocol I), mines and booby traps (Protocol II) and incendiary weapons (Protocol III). These rules range from a complete ban on the use of such weapons to restrictions on their use in conditions that would cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects. *In force.*
- The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention) of 1993. This agreement, which bans an entire category of weapons of mass destruction and provides for the destruction of existing stocks, incorporates a complex, intrusive verification system. *Not yet in force.*
- Additional Protocol to the Convention Certain Conventional Weapons (Protocol IV) of 1995 prohibits the employment of laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or one of their functions, to cause permanent blindness to the naked eye and the transfer of such weapons. *Not yet in force.*

### **Regional Multilateral Treaties**

- The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 provides for demilitarisation of Antarctica and is the first treaty to into practice the concept of a nuclear weapon free zone. It prohibits in the Antarctic region any type of military activity, including the testing of any kind

of weapon, a nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioact wastes. *In force.*

- The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty Tlatelolco) of 1967 creates the first nuclear weapon free zone in a densely populated area. It commits parties the Treaty not to test, produce or acquire nuclear weapons themselves or to permit any other Power to so or to deploy such weapons in the zone. It was the first arms limitation agreement to provide for verification an international organisation. Two Protocols are integral parts of the Treaty. According to those Protocol respectively, States outside the region with international responsibility there would undertake to apply the Treaty's provisions to those territories and all nuclear weapon States would undertake not to use or threaten use nuclear weapons against parties to the Treaty. *Inforce for each Government individually.*
- The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) of 1985 forbids its parties to manufacture, acquire, possess or control any nuclear explosive device inside or outside the zone. It also prohibits its parties from carrying out nuclear testing and commits them to refrain from and prevent the dumping of nuclear materials at sea anywhere within the zone. Three Protocols are integral parts of the Treaty, by which, respectively, States that are internationally responsible for territories in the zone would undertake to apply provisions of the Treaty to those territories; all nuclear weapon States would commit themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any party to the Treaty; all nuclear weapon States would commit themselves to refrain from the testing of nuclear explosive devices anywhere within the zone. *In force,*
- The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 1990, negotiated between member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO), seeks to establish a stable and secure balance of conventional forces at lower levels, to eliminate disparities in forces and the capability to launch a surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations. The Treaty puts equal ceilings and sub-ceilings for the two sides on tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. It also sets up an elaborate system of verification, including data

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exchange, on-site inspection, challenge inspection and on-site monitoring of the destruction of military equipment to be reduced. *In force.*

- The Treaty on Open Skies of 1992, negotiated between member States of NATO and the WTO, establishes a regime for the conduct of observation flights by States parties over the territories of other States parties. *Not yet in force.*
- The Non-Aggression Pact among States members of the Economic Community of Central African States of 1994 commits parties to refrain in their mutual relations from the threat or use of force or aggression or from encouraging or supporting acts of hostility or aggression. *Not yet in force.*
- The African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) of 1995 commits parties to renounce nuclear explosive devices and to declare, dismantle and destroy any that they possess, prohibits the stationing and testing of such devices, prohibits the dumping of radioactive waste and promotes the peaceful use of nuclear science and technology. Three Protocols are attached to the Treaty, by which, respectively, the nuclear weapon States would undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties and not to test nuclear weapons within the zone, and States outside the zone with international responsibility for territories within it would undertake to apply the Treaty's provisions to those territories. *Not yet in force.*
- The Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty of 1995 commits its parties not to acquire, develop, test, use or allow the stationing of nuclear weapons within the zone and prohibits the dumping of radioactive waste. *Not yet in force.*

### **Bilateral Treaties**

Negotiations between the two major nuclear Powers, the former USSR/Russian Federation and the United States, have produced a number of bilateral agreements, including:

- The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) of 1972 restricts in general the development of sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based ABM systems and specifically limits deployment of ABM systems to two sites with no more than 100 launchers each. By a Protocol of 1974, the deployment of ABM systems is further limited to a single area, with no more than 100 launchers.

- The Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 1972 (SALT I) established limitations for a five-year period, which could be extended, on the number of launchers of strategic weapons.
- The Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War of 1973, under which the two parties agree to make the removal of the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons an objective of their policies and to make all efforts towards guaranteeing stability and peace. *In force.*
- The Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test-Ban Treaty) of 1974 establishes a nuclear “threshold” by prohibiting underground nuclear weapon tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. *In force since 1990 following the conclusion of a protocol on verification.*
- The Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty) of 1976 prohibits the carrying out of any individual nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons, or any group explosion with an aggregate yield exceeding 1,50 kilo tons. *In force since 1990 following the conclusion of a protocol on verification.*
- The Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 1979 (SALT II) established limits on the number and types of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. *Never entered into force.*
- The Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of 1987 establishes centres in Washington and Moscow to be used for exchanging data and providing notifications as require under certain current agreements, including the INF Treaty. *In force.*
- The Treaty on the Elimination of The INF Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) of 1987 provides for the elimination of all United States and Soviet ground-launched intermediate-range (1,000-5,500 km) and shorter-range (500-1,000 km) missiles, their launchers and all their support equipment. A notable aspect of the Treaty is found in its verification provisions, which include on-site inspection, inspection by challenge, and national technical means of verification (satellite observation). *In force.*
- The Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine launched Ballistic Missiles of

1988 stipulates 24 hour advance notification of the date, launch area and area c impact of missile launches. *In force.*

- The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty/START I) of 1991 stipulates that each side will be limited to a ceiling of 1,600 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles—intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and their launchers, and heavy bombers—and to 6,000 “accountable” warheads deployed on these systems. The Treaty, which is the first agreement to actually reduce strategic nuclear weapons, will do so by approximately 30 per cent over 7 years under very stringent verification. *In force.*
- The Lisbon Protocol of 1992, signed by the four successor States to the former USSR and by the United States, commits the four States to undertake to make such arrangements among themselves as necessary to implement START I, and Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine undertake to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States in the shortest possible time. *In force.*
- The Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty/START II) of 1993 provides for the elimination of the most destabilising strategic weapons—heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and all other multiple-warhead ICBMs and for the reduction of the total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both sides by two thirds. Reductions are to be carried out in two phases. *Not yet in force.*

## ANNEX II

### **Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament**

*The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,*

*Reaffirming* the preamble and articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

*Welcoming* the end of the cold war, the ensuing easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

*Desiring* a set of principles and objectives in accordance with which nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and international

cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be vigorously pursued and progress, achievements and shortcomings evaluated periodically within the review process provided for in article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, the enhancement and strengthening of which is welcomed,

*Reiterating* the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

*The Conference affirms* the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realisation and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and accordingly adopts the following principles and objectives:

### **Universality**

1. Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Every effort should be made by all States parties to achieve this objective.

### **Non-proliferation**

2. The proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has a vital role to play in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.

### **Nuclear Disarmament**

3. Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus be fulfilled with determination. In this regard, the nuclear weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

4. The achievement of the following measure important in the full realisation and effective implementation of article VI, including the programme action as reflected below:

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- (a) The completion by the Conference Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear weapon States should exercise utmost restraint;
  - (b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein;
  - (c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

### **Nuclear Weapon Free Zones**

5. The conviction that the establishment of internationally recognised nuclear weapon free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security is reaffirmed.

6. The development of nuclear weapon free zones, especially in regions of tension, such as in the Middle East, as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction, should be encouraged as a matter of priority, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region. The establishment of additional nuclear weapon free zones by the time of the Review Conference in the year 2000 would be welcome.

7. The cooperation of all the nuclear weapon States and their respect and support for the relevant protocols is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such nuclear weapon free zones and the relevant protocols.

### **Security Assurances**

8. Noting United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which was adopted unanimously on 11 April 1995, as well as the declarations of the nuclear weapon States concerning both negative

and positive security assurances, further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

### **Safeguards**

9. The International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority responsible to verify and assure, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.

10. All States parties required by article III of the Treaty to sign and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and which have not yet done so should do so without delay.

11. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards should be regularly assessed and evaluated. Decisions adopted by its Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness of Agency safeguards should be supported and implemented and the Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities should be increased. Also, States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be urged to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency.

12. New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

13. Nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities should, as soon as practicable, be placed under Agency

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safeguards in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear weapon States. Safeguards should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

### **Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy**

14. Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II as well as III of the Treaty.

15. Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented.

16. In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries particularly into account.

17. Transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty.

18. All States should, through rigorous national measures and international cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety, including in waste management, and observe standards and guide-lines in nuclear materials accounting, physical protection and transport of nuclear materials.

19. Every effort should be made to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the financial and human resources necessary to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. The Agency should also be encouraged to intensify its efforts aimed at finding ways and means for funding technical assistance through predictable and assured resources.

20. Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

*The Conference requests that the President of the Conference bring the present decision, the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the decision on the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to the attention of the heads of State or Government of all States and seek their full cooperation on these documents and in the furtherance of the goals of the Treaty.*

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# 22

## NEW WEAPONS, NEW TOOLS

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“Two categories of weapon are of special concern to the United Nations: small arms and light weapons, because they currently kill most people in most wars; and nuclear weapons, because of their continuing terrifying potential for mass destruction.”

*Secretary-General Kofi Annan in the Millennium Report*

### **Introduction**

Alfred Nobel, who invented dynamite and other explosives, was also the man who introduced the Nobel Prizes. In a letter to Baroness Bertha von Suttner, a writer and well-known peace activist, he once said, “I do more for peace with my guns than you do with your disarmament lectures.”

Nobel was a pacifist. He was convinced that the destructive power of his explosives would bring an end to war. He was wrong. Years later, in another letter, he noted that armaments would bring about the elimination of war only when they were powerful enough to destroy not only the military forces but the civilian population as well. Within a few decades after Nobel’s death, the world reached that stage. It gained the capacity to destroy itself not just once but many times over.

The world was radically changed in August 1945 when it entered the age of nuclear warfare. On 6 August, the first atomic bomb was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, immediately killing more than 78,000 people and wounding another 40,000. Half the city was destroyed. Three days later, a second bomb completely destroyed Nagasaki, killing 40,000 people.

### **Weapons vs. the United Nations**

Weapons of mass destruction and the United Nations belong to the same generation. The former represent the single greatest threat to

the survival of mankind; the latter our strongest defence against that threat.

The Charter of the United Nations was written in the first half of 1945 by the representatives of 50 nations gathered in San Francisco. One of its fundamental goals was to save “succeeding generations from the scourge of war”, Two and a half months after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were levelled by nuclear blasts, the Charter came into force, formally establishing the United Nations. It was designed to be a new tool for building a system of international law and maintaining international peace and security.

### VITAL STATISTICS

- In 1945, only one nation possessed a nuclear bomb. Today, there are five officially recognised nuclear weapon States, and three nuclear weapons-capable States.
- World military expenditures peaked at over \$1 trillion in 1989. After a period of decline, they have begun to rise, reaching \$780 billion in 1999.
- More than 35,000 nuclear warheads are still stockpiled, many on high alert, ready to be launched on warning.
- Today, 80 per cent of the world’s spending on armaments is on conventional weapons and weapons systems.
- Industrialised countries account for about 80 per cent of global military expenditures.
- The United States accounts for almost half of the world’s total arms production: France and the United Kingdom for 10 per cent each; and Germany, Russia and Japan for roughly 4 per cent each.
- Arms transfers to developing countries are estimated at some \$30 billion a year.
- The countries affected by landmines are the least able to deal with the situation because of socio-economic difficulties.
- About 500 million small arms are in circulation worldwide.

Hope for a peaceful world after the Second World War was soon replaced by fear. Deteriorating relations among States, and particularly among the Security Council’s permanent members, undermined the system of collective security outlined in the Charter. During this period,

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better known as the years of “cold war”, progress for arms reduction was painfully slow.

In the 1990s, with the “cold war” finally over, the world was past the rivalry between the East and the West. This helped achieve significant gains in the area of disarmament: a comprehensive nuclear test-ban-treaty was concluded; and a convention banning landmines and another convention banning production, use or stockpiling of chemical weapons went into force. Numbers of nuclear weapons almost halved; and world military expenditure declined by some 30 per cent between 1990 and 1998.

Much of this was possible because of the efforts of the United Nations.

Regrettably, our world still remains a dangerous place. Dozens of wars are still fought at local levels; weapons stockpiles continue to grow; more people train for war every day; and the costs of the arms race remain prohibitively high.

### **What Would Happen if We Had a Major Nuclear War?**

Yumiko Yamamoto was only 10, a fifth-grade pupil at Yagami Elementary School in Nagasaki, when the bombing took place. Eleven years later, at the age of 21, she was worried. A son was born two years later and a daughter the following year.

Junko Mine, her daughter, began to suffer bleeding in the nose after finishing elementary school. In April 1974, she died of leukaemia. Eleven years later Yumiko lost her son, too. Like Junko, he suffered from chronic nosebleeds and died of leukaemia. The date was 6 August 1975, the thirtieth anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.

What would happen if two thirds of the world’s nuclear weapons were used, half of them exploding over cities?

Experts involved in a 1987-1988 UN study concluded that nuclear war on this scale would immediately kill over 1 billion people. As many people might be injured, and more affected in the subsequent months. It would also entail a high risk of environmental disruption. Smoke and dust in the atmosphere would reduce sunlight and warmth reaching Earth’s surface; temperatures would be so low that they could affect crop growth. The protective layer of ozone in the atmosphere would also be depleted, leaving Earth vulnerable to increased ultraviolet radiation. The suffering of the survivors would be unparalleled.

## **Weapons of Mass Destruction and Conventional Weapons**

The devastation of nuclear weapons is rivalled by the death and destruction possible with chemical, bacteriological and conventional weapons. Like nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons are considered weapons of mass destruction.

**Chemical weapons**, such as nerve gas, can cause almost instantaneous death. Binary weapons, which consist of two chemical agents that are not highly toxic independently but become so in combination, are also lethal.

**Biological weapons**, based on microbial or other living organisms or toxins, can cause slow, painful death to thousands if used in densely populated areas.

**Conventional weapons** include “traditional” weapons used on land and sea and in the air. The world arsenal of conventional weapons was recently estimated at 140,000 main battle tanks; 35,000 combat aircraft; 21,000 helicopters; 1,000 major surface warships; and 900 attack submarines. Over 80 per cent of all military expenditure is spent on conventional weapons and forces.

## **Small Arms and Light Weapons: Big Threats**

Small arms are weapons designed for personal use, while light weapons are designed for use by several persons serving as a crew. Examples of small arms include revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns. Light weapons include heavy machine guns, some types of grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, and portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems. These weapons now present a greater danger than ever before.

“In terms of the carnage they cause, small arms indeed could well be described as ‘weapons of mass destruction’,” said Annan.

While the United Nations has helped negotiate agreed measures to control nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, currently there are no such measures on controlling small arms and light weapons. This is one reason that States represented in the UN General Assembly decided in December 1999 to convene the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

## Landmines

Every 20 minutes someone is either killed or maimed by a landmine. At the beginning of the twentieth century, nearly 80 per cent of landmine victims were military personnel. Today, nearly 80 per cent of landmine victims are civilians.

“A landmine is a perfect soldier. Ever courageous, never sleeps, never misses.” Once laid, an anti-personnel mine can remain active for as long as 50 years. And clearing them is no easy task. It’s a laborious, expensive process. A landmine may cost as little as \$3 but could cost between \$300 and \$1,000 a day to clear. Landmine devices like the “butterfly” lure children—who think they are picking up toys—with their attractive appearance.

“In Cambodia, I saw first-hand the effects of landmine use. I did not see opposition armies diverted or land held by the particular army in situ. What I saw were young children on crutches or blind, and young mothers with no legs, stripped of their ability to raise their children or find productive work. I saw from helicopters huge swathes of fertile land that would be left uncultivated for years to come because of the presence of mines.”

*Yasushi Akashi, former UN Under-Secretary-General  
(He supervised Cambodia’s transition to multiparty democracy.)*

## Why Disarmament?

Take a minute to count from 1 to 60. By the time you finish, the world has lost about 30 children to malnutrition, hunger and curable diseases. During the same time, the world has also spent \$1.7 million for military purposes.

Countries’ preoccupation with security has fuelled the arms race. Military spending reduces the limited resources available for promoting economic and social development in many societies. Various estimates have been made of the economic and social costs of the arms race. Consider the following:

- It costs as much to arm and train one soldier as it does to educate 80 children; to build one modern bomber as it did to wipe out smallpox over a 10-year period; to build the latest nuclear-missile submarine as it does to build 450,000 homes.
- At the current rate, the entire UN system could run for two centuries on one year’s outlay of the world’s military spending.

- To build 11 radar-evading bombers, the world needs about \$24 billion. With the same amount of money, it could provide four years of primary education for the 135 million children currently not in school.

Arms accumulation and economic development both require large-scale human and material resources. But, since resources are limited, pursuit of either process tends to be at the expense of the other. There is a growing consensus that, in the long run, the world can either continue to pursue the arms race or achieve and sustain social and economic development for the benefit of all. It cannot do both.

Armed conflicts are not the only threats to a country's security. Today, hunger, malnutrition and disease kill as many people in two days as the Hiroshima bomb. Even if only a fraction of military spending was redirected to peaceful purposes, living standards and economic and social development would significantly improve.

### **Disarmament for Development**

Broadly understood, "disarmament" is a process of reducing the size of and expenditures on armed forces, dismantling and destroying weapons, progressively eliminating the capacity to produce new weapons, and releasing military personnel and integrating them into civilian life. "Development" refers to social and economic changes in society, which improve the quality of life for all.

Policy-makers in some countries oppose the use of the word "disarmament", partly because it is assumed to mean discarding weapons altogether, and partly because they view it as too narrow a term. They prefer the expression "arms control": a regime regulating, constraining or reducing weapons and military activities according to the terms of specific policies or agreements. Other countries have maintained that "arms control" does not necessarily imply a commitment to limit and reduce arms, and favour the term "disarmament".

"Security" is a condition in which States feel protected against actual, potential or perceived threats to their independence, sovereignty and political institutions. In the absence of an effective guarantee of their security, nations continue to seek security in military terms by exercising their inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.

Growing global interdependence may lead to a new, non-military perception of security. Poor or negative economic growth and social development, large-scale unemployment, scarcity of resources, threats

to food and energy supplies and severe environmental degradation can jeopardize both national and international security.

Disarmament may actually enhance security. It is widely recognised that a State's military strength cannot go beyond its economic base, and that a widening gap between the two is a serious security problem. Besides, no State can ultimately ensure its own security at the cost of another State's security, real or perceived. Joint actions by States to tackle non-military threats to security, coupled with efforts towards disarmament, improve prospects for a more secure world. Also, arms limitation agreements, at both the regional and global levels, would cost little in comparison with the continuation of the arms race.

### **The United Nations as a Forum for Disarmament**

General and complete disarmament under effective international control remains a main goal of the United Nations. Its immediate objectives are to eliminate the danger of war, particularly nuclear war, and to implement measures to halt and reverse the arms race, clearing the path towards lasting peace.

The **General Assembly**, the UN's main deliberative body, considers all international security and disarmament questions. In recent years, the Assembly has adopted some 60 resolutions per year on such issues. The General Assembly has devoted three special sessions to the question of disarmament. The **Disarmament Commission**, a subsidiary body of the Assembly consisting of all Member States, provides an annual forum for discussion of specific disarmament issues. The Conference on Disarmament *is* the international community's single multilateral forum for negotiating agreements. Sixty-six States are members of the Conference.

Within the UN Secretariat, the **Department for Disarmament Affairs** provides substantive and organisational support to the bodies concerned with disarmament and to expert groups carrying out specific studies; it also prepares reports and undertakes research. It implements a disarmament information programme launched in 1982 to promote worldwide support and understanding for arms limitation and disarmament; it is also responsible for three regional centres for peace and disarmament in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

An autonomous **United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research at Geneva**, financed by voluntary contributions, carries out independent research on disarmament and related problems, particularly international security issues.

### **Signs of Progress: UN Action in the Field of Disarmament**

The United Nations has played a role, as either negotiating forum or catalyst, in the conclusion of a number of arms control or disarmament agreements.

**The Antarctic Treaty (1959)** prohibits in the Antarctic zone any military manoeuvres, weapons tests, building of military installations or disposal of radioactive wastes produced by military activities. The Treaty represented the first practical expression of the concept of the “nuclear-free zone” later applied to other treaties established in various regions.

**The Partial Test-Ban Treaty (1963)** prohibits nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

**The Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967)** establishes a nuclear weapons-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean.

**The Outer Space Treaty (1967)** mandates that outer space be used for peaceful purposes only and that nuclear weapons not be placed or tested in outer space.

**The Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968)** (NPT) prohibits the spread of nuclear weapons from nuclear to non-nuclear countries while facilitating the exchange of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and commits the nuclear weapon States to negotiating measures to end the nuclear-arms race. With 187 States parties, the Treaty has become the most universally recognised international security treaty in history. In 1995, States parties to the treaty decided to extend its provisions indefinitely.

**The Seabed Treaty (1971)** bans the placement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on or under the seabed, outside a 12-mile coastal zone around each country.

**The Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons (1972)** is considered the first international agreement providing for genuine disarmament—that is, banning an entire category of weapons of mass destruction.

**The Treaty of Rarotonga (1985)** establishes a nuclear weapons-free zone in the South Pacific.

**The Chemical Weapons Convention**, signed in 1993 and effective since 1997, outlaws an entire class of weapons of mass destruction

**The Bangkok Treaty (1995)** establishes a nuclear weapons-free zone in South East Asia.

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**The Pelindaba Treaty (1996)** established a nuclear weapons-free zone for Africa.

**The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (1996)** bans nuclear-test explosions in all environments (atmosphere, outer space, under water and underground).

**The Mine-ban Convention (1997)** completely bans the production, export and use of landmines.

In 1996, **the International Court of Justice** issued an advisory opinion to the effect that States were under obligation to pursue and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict international supervision.

### **Twin Challenges**

Fifty-nine years ago, President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States spoke of his vision of four essential freedoms. The freedom from fear was fourth on his list. This goal was “no vision of a distant millennium,” President Roosevelt said. “It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation.”

In his Millennium Report, issued in advance of the Millennium Summit of the UN General Assembly (6-8 September 2000), Secretary-General Kofi Annan invokes Roosevelt’s words to challenge the world leaders to ensure the freedom from fear for all living beings. To this end, he identifies two areas for priority action: eliminating nuclear weapons and banning illicit trade in small arms.

**Nuclear weapons:** The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty marks a milestone in the history of efforts in favour of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It enjoys wide international support and is expected to have a complex control regime in place by the time it enters into force. As of 26 July 2000, 155 countries have signed the treaty, 60 of which have also ratified it.

However, when in 1998 India and Pakistan exploded nuclear devices, global nuclear disarmament efforts suffered a serious setback. Both countries—along with Israel and Cuba—continue to remain outside the non-proliferation treaty. Over a dozen of the 44 countries required to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force have yet to ratify the treaty, including two nuclear weapon States (China and the United States). Bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation on reduction of nuclear arsenals have also

slowed down. The United States plan to deploy a national missile defence system has caused serious concern, as it may undermine the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

To reverse the current trend, the Secretary-General has suggested three things:

- Reaffirmation of political commitment at the highest levels on nuclear disarmament;
- Convening a major international conference to help identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers;
- Agreement with all concerned parties before any missile defence system is deployed.

The 2000 Review Conference of the NPT took some practical steps towards nuclear disarmament. The nuclear weapon States agreed to an “unequivocal” undertaking “to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament”. To that end, those States agreed on the following: to make further efforts to reduce their arsenals unilaterally, to increase transparency with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities, to further reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons, to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems, to diminish the role for nuclear weapons in security policies and, as soon as appropriate, to engage together in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

**Small arms:** Small arms and light weapons are the “weapons of choice” in today’s predominantly internal conflicts—relatively cheap, lethal, portable and concealable, long-lasting and so easy to operate that children as young as 10 have carried them into combat. They are being increasingly used in civil wars, often among armed groups within a country. Africa, where many of the world’s deadliest wars are being fought, has become a dumping ground for much of the world’s surplus small arms, in such countries as Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone. They are the tools of combat in other parts of the world, such as Afghanistan in Asia, Colombia in Latin America and Chechnya in Europe. Even if internal conflicts grind to a halt, small arms still remain a threat to civil society because they are used by such criminals as drug traffickers and terrorists or illicitly trafficked by these groups to other States. *In parts of Africa, one could buy a deadly assault rifle for the price of a chicken or a bag of maize.*

About half the world’s trade in small arms is legal; the other half illegal. In many instances, States exporting small arms legally to other

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States are unable to ensure that their exports reach the intended destination. Other States are unable to maintain governmental control over their weapons stockpiles; sometimes unscrupulous officials are even involved in selling or diverting arms from depots. States affected by proliferation of small arms are unable to prevent traffickers from running illicit small arms through their porous borders.

As the United Nations considers that controlling the illicit trade is a necessary first step in combating the proliferation of small arms, it will convene a major UN conference to discuss the illicit trade in small arms in all its aspects in 2001. The Secretary-General has urged Member States to take advantage of the 2001 conference to start taking serious actions that will curtail the illicit traffic in small arms.

Even if we stop illicit arms trade, what would happen to many millions of small arms currently in circulation? The Secretary-General's suggestion: use market incentives to secure them back. In return for weapons, individuals may receive tools, such as sewing machines, bicycles, hoes and construction materials. Such non-monetary reimbursement schemes have worked in such countries as Albania, El Salvador, Mozambique and Panama.

Arms transfers to developing countries are estimated at some \$30 billion a year. About 500 million small arms are in circulation worldwide.

### **A New Disarmament Agenda**

As the world enters a new millennium, the United Nations is slowly putting in place a new arms control and disarmament regime. Jayantha Dhanapala, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, has spelled out the various elements of this new agenda in the following terms:

1. Deeper cuts in existing nuclear arsenals;
2. Preventing arms race in outer space;
3. Eliminating battlefield nuclear weapons, and encouraging all nuclear weapon countries to endorse a no-first-use policy;
4. Halting the production of all unsafeguarded weapons-usable nuclear materials;
5. Ensuring universal membership in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

6. Promoting “disarmament for development”;
7. Pursuing a “culture of prevention” rather than a “culture of reaction”;
8. Strengthening the United Nations to promote peace and security;
9. Promoting greater transparency of data about military expenditure and arms trade.

Yet, as advisable as all of these initiatives may be, they still fall short of what is needed. In fact, disarmament alone will not erase the threat of war or ensure peace. As Julius Nyerere, Tanzania’s former President, said:

“War is not caused by weapons; these are simply implements used in war. Real and sustainable peace is therefore not obtained simply by abolishing armaments. For the basis of war is injustice; and the foundation of real peace is justice and equality.”

By providing a mechanism for preventing and defusing international conflicts, and promoting economic and social development and respect for human rights, the United Nations works towards establishing the conditions that make disarmament and peace possible.

### **SUGGESTED ACTIVITIES FOR STUDENTS**

1. Being safe and feeling safe are both individual and collective needs. In order to address that need, Governments design security provisions, which range from decisions to develop and stockpile weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological and chemical weapons), conventional weapons (planes, ships, tanks, artillery etc.), landmines, and small arms and handguns. Choose a country and research the security/defence decisions made by the Government. How are resources allocated? How do these allocations compare to expenditures for social programmes such as health care and education?
2. Choose one of the ranges of armaments listed above (for example nuclear weapons, biological weapons, conventional weapons etc.) and research the countries most involved in the production and distribution of this kind of weapon. Consider also the following:
  - Who is involved in the production: which industries produce what?

- What is needed for production? From where is this material obtained?
- How are arms transferred: are there legitimate/illegitimate transfers? (A report on this topic is available on <http://www.basicint.org>.)
- How can production be monitored? By whom?
- When weapons are confiscated or destroyed, what replaces them?
- Who has/can have access to weapons?
- How can distribution of weapons be monitored? Are any efforts being made by the Government to monitor or control distribution?

Useful for this research will be the web site for the United Nations (<http://www.un.org>). If you click onto "Peace and Security" and then onto "Disarmament" you will be able to access the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs web pages, including reportage on the First Committee, the link to the Conference on Disarmament, the one multilateral negotiating body that negotiated the Chemical Weapons convention, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the link to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. Links are also available to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) site and the Demining database. The web site of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is <http://www.iaea.org>. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation is <http://www.ctbto.org>. Helpful as well is the NGO Committee on Disarmament web site, <http://www.peacenet.org/disarm>.

3. Efforts to provide security can be offered by regional security organisations in place of individual country efforts. Who belongs to such regional security organisations as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Organisation of African Unity, the Organisation of South-East Asian Nations and the Organisation of American States. Is membership open to all the countries in the area? Do provisions exist for peacekeeping operations? What kind of a regional organisation could help with security issues in the Middle East, South Asia or North-East Asia? Does any such organisation exist?
4. Choose either your own or another country and find out the requirements for military service for males and females. Do

alternative provisions exist for service in peacekeeping and mediation corps? If so, what are the steps involved for participating in such alternatives? If not, why not? You may wish to draft a letter to elected officials regarding your ideas on this issue.

### SELECTED RESOURCES

#### **On the World Wide Web**

*<http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/index.html>*

*<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine>*

*<http://www.un.org/Pubs/CyberSchool Bus/peaceflag/results/index.html>*

#### **Publications**

*The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook (Vol. 4: 1998), United Nations, New York*  
*Disarmament Study Series: Small Arms, United Nations, New York, 1999*  
*Basic Facts about the United Nations, United Nations, 1999.*

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## PRINCIPLES, APPROACHES AND MEASURES OF DISARMAMENT

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### **Introduction**

The basic principles which should guide the efforts of States in the pursuit of conventional disarmament can be found in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament. This study contains and extends those principles. The Final Document identifies priorities for negotiations on disarmament, as described in paragraph 8 (h) of this study. The Final Document also stresses the relationship between disarmament efforts and efforts to strengthen international peace and security and build confidence among States, as well as efforts to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

The Final Document places conventional disarmament efforts in the context of general and complete disarmament. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control will permit States to have at their disposal only those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and in order that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force. This is the objective and status of conventional disarmament. This implies that conventional disarmament should be pursued as a global process, including efforts at multilateral, bilateral or regional levels.

At each stage of the disarmament process the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces, so that at no stage does any State or group of States

gain any unilateral military advantage and so that security is assured equally for all States. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of States with the largest military arsenals. There should also be negotiations on the limitation of international transfer of conventional weapons, based, in particular on the same principle of undiminished security of the parties and taking into account the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, as well as the need of recipient States to protect their security.

### **Types of Approaches to Conventional Disarmament**

*General Perspective:* As long as States have to rely primarily on their armed forces (either alone or with those of their allies) as the ultimate means for defending their interests and for protecting their security, disarmament is bound to be considered very cautiously or even seen by some States as a process fraught with dangers and uncertainties. Therefore it is important that at no stage should any State or group of States gain unilateral advantage and that security should be ensured equally for all States. When contemplating a specific disarmament measure each State has to weigh carefully, on the one hand, the benefits to be derived from it, and, on the other, the risks inherent in the limitations which the adoption of that measure would impose on its ability to resort to force if all else fails. Other parties will view that same measure in essentially similar terms, but, when security is perceived as dependent primarily on military strength *vis-a-vis* potential enemies, what seems beneficial for the security of one party may be perceived as a security risk by others and vice versa. It is for this reason that it is so difficult to design measures of disarmament which all the parties concerned will regard as compatible with their security requirements. The achievement of disarmament objectives greatly strengthen international peace and security, as has been recognised by all States.

But the process of disarmament is composed of measures each of which, if it is militarily significant, tends to be viewed with uncertainty and even apprehension by participants—the more so, the more acceptable

it is to others. The disarmament process must overcome these doubts and measures must be designed with this aim in view so that greater trust and confidence is continuously built among States. The failure to do so has been one of the important reasons why disarmament, so persistently called for and so long pursued, has progressed so little.

The universal recognition that disarmament would strengthen international security is thus of little avail when a workable disarmament programme is to be drawn up. In that endeavour the key problem is how to design a programme and its individual steps and how to combine these steps with simultaneous measures in other fields in such a way that each of the States concerned will regard each step as being, on balance, beneficial from the point of view of its own and mutual security. This is the requirement referred to in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, as "the principle of undiminished security of the parties" (para. 22) or as the need "to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage" (para. 29).

While recognising the right and need of each State to security, it is important to stress that undiminished security of States is an essential requirement of disarmament negotiations. It is not possible, however, to keep wholly apart the strengthening of international security which is, ultimately, the purpose of disarmament, and the strengthening of national security which is its prerequisite. Developments throughout the world have become narrowly interconnected. This is particularly true at the most basic level: with the advent of nuclear weapons survival cannot be taken for granted and disarmament has become a task in which States can only succeed together or fail together. The maintenance of international peace and security has become essential for the security of each State and, conversely, without adequate security for each, there is no security of the whole. These various aspects have been discussed in the report of the Secretary-General on *The Relationship between Disarmament and International Security*.

The appropriate approach would be to provide security through collective arrangements such as the system contained in the Charter of the United Nations, in which the Security Council has responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and is mandated to take enforcement action if need be. If the collective security system set out in the Charter of the United Nations could be fully implemented so as to provide a reliable basis for the security of States, disarmament would be much simpler to achieve.

A number of other approaches have also been pursued with the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. These comprise efforts to settle disputes by peaceful means, efforts to strengthen detente and co-operation and build confidence among States and efforts, at all levels, to reduce the incidence of armed conflict. These endeavours are of the utmost importance in their own right and as ways to eliminate some of the underlying causes of the arms race. They can be both supplements to and incentives for disarmament measures. But they cannot be substitutes for disarmament.

As it is, States can be expected to take the approach of relying on their own forces throughout most or all of the disarmament process. In this situation States are bound to demand that each step in the process of arms limitation and disarmament be based on reciprocity and on a careful balance of obligations in the disarmament process itself. In this perspective disarmament measures may seem attractive to some States only when they are completely sure that all others will comply with them. Where mutual trust and confidence is lacking the importance of verification provisions in disarmament agreements increases. In this situation every effort should be made to develop appropriate verification methods and procedures. These should be non-discriminatory, should not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development, and should be satisfactory to all parties concerned.

A difficulty with this approach is that the security of the parties is highly sensitive to perceived or existing imbalances, sometimes stemming from possession by one party of types of forces or weapons not possessed by another, in particular nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. To create a basis of greater security in which competitive arms acquisition can be avoided and force levels can be reduced, it is therefore important in disarmament efforts to pay particular attention to those weapon systems and those components of the military force postures which are perceived as particularly threatening and which therefore contribute most to overall insecurity.

*Effective Use of International Machinery in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations:* A corner-stone of the international machinery for settling disputes and maintaining international peace and security is the system of collective security embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular the powers vested in the Security Council with its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security

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and its mandate for taking enforcement action if need be. In fact, the concept of maintaining or restoring international peace and security by military means, embodied in Chapter VII of the Charter, has not been applied in practice, in some conflict situations peace-keeping operations have been agreed upon with the parties concerned to maintain or promote peaceful conditions which offer the possibility of political settlement. Under the Charter States have an obligation to settle their disputes by peaceful means and this principle has been elaborated in detail in the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes adopted by the General Assembly at the thirty-seventh session in 1982 (resolution 37/10). However, in practice they have felt it necessary to retain the means for self-defence as an ultimate recourse.

As regards the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the more effective use of the international machinery available as established by the Charter for this purpose, it has long been recognised that it has a vital role to play in the disarmament process. It is, in fact, implicit in the Charter. Similarly, as stated in the joint American-Soviet Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of 1961 and also in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, held in 1978, each step in the disarmament process should be accompanied by measures designed to strengthen institutions to maintain peace and to settle international disputes by peaceful means.

In this regard, it is appropriate also to draw attention to the request to the Security Council by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session (resolution 37/119) to study as a matter of high priority the question of the implementation of the collective security provisions of the Charter with a view to strengthening international peace and security.

Together with increased efforts towards the timely and peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts, greater efforts are needed to alleviate or remove the underlying causes of conflicts. In contributing to a climate of trust and a pattern of mutually beneficial relations among States such efforts would facilitate progress in disarmament and would improve the prospects for the effective functioning of the system for the maintenance of international peace and security of the Charter of the United Nations. These tasks lend themselves to global as well as regional efforts in varying combinations. They include the consolidation and expansion of detente, the strengthening of international co-operation in all its aspects, effective steps towards the elimination of

underdevelopment and of oppression in all its forms, and the establishment of international relations on a more equitable basis. These have been central endeavours of the United Nations so far and there have been important achievements in several of these areas.

The elaboration of international law in specific functional spheres and the development of norms for the international conduct of States, both of which have also been enduring endeavours of the United Nations, are an integral part of the development of international trust and co-operation. In fact, such agreements and norms of conduct, and general confidence that they will be respected, are the bases on which a lasting detente can be built.

*Multilateral and Bilateral Negotiations, Parallel Actions by Mutual Example, Unilateral Initiatives:* Conventional, disarmament negotiations do not have the same features as negotiations on nuclear disarmament. In most cases disarmament negotiations on conventional weapons and armed forces demand a multilateral context. Whether to conduct such negotiations bilaterally or multilaterally and whether to pursue them in a regional or in a global framework will depend, among other things, on the nature of the subject-matter, including its political and technical characteristics. The definitive solution to the major problems of conventional disarmament has to be found in a global context, as implied in the goal of general and complete disarmament, but on the way to this goal substantive negotiations should also be envisaged as appropriate in bilateral, regional or other contexts that are not global in scope.

Regarding the participation of States in negotiations the primary considerations should be the character and scope of the measures envisaged, and the States to which they should apply. Some measures would apply to all States. Others might apply to particular groups of States, such as the Soviet Union and the United States, the member States of the two major alliances or the States with the largest military arsenals and other militarily significant States, in these cases, whereas only a limited number of countries are directly affected, the measures might nevertheless have global implications. In other cases, measures might be applicable to the States of a given region, the most heavily armed States in a critical area, or two or more neighbouring States. In the latter instances the primary effects of the measures would be regional and, under certain conditions, they may also have effects at the global level. Where an issue is of direct concern to a number of countries multilateral negotiations between them might sometimes be combined

with bilateral negotiations. Furthermore, in some cases, multilateral negotiations may require simultaneous bilateral or multilateral consultations between certain interested States, in others, negotiations might be initiated between some States and later be extended to an increasing number of countries. Generally, the need to involve more countries will tend to become more pronounced as advances are made towards general and complete disarmament. In this context, the role of the Conference on Disarmament is of the greatest and unique significance. While States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions, the ultimate success of the effort to halt, reverse and abolish the arms race would depend on the active involvement of all States.

One should not underestimate the potential value for conventional disarmament of actions other than negotiations and formal agreements, such as parallel actions based on a policy of mutual example as well as unilateral initiatives, as contributions to the process of achieving agreed disarmament measures. Such steps may be particularly valuable for easing tensions, initiating the resumption of stalled negotiations, preventing the further deterioration of a military situation, testing each other's interest in negotiations and, generally, for improving the environment for negotiations for arms limitation and disarmament.

*Regional Approaches and their Relation to Global Aspects of Conventional Disarmament:* It is generally recognised that within the purview of global disarmament efforts there is considerable scope for regional initiatives and for Practical action on a regional basis. In fact, the fundamental concept of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session as regards disarmament approaches and disarmament machinery is that of diversity of means and unity of purpose, with the United Nations having a central role and a primary responsibility, and facilitating and encouraging all disarmament measures, be they unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral (para. 114). The study of the Secretary-General on *All aspects of Regional Disarmament*, while stressing the need for harmony between regional efforts and global programmes and priorities, noted that the inclusion of a regional aspect in the approach to disarmament is of particular importance as regards the cessation of the conventional arms race. It stated that "the ubiquity of conventional weapons and armed forces, their technical and functional diversity and the central role of conventional forces in the security perception of the countries in a region make the question of conventional disarmament highly complex and the possible approaches highly dependent on regional conditions".

Conventional disarmament, the study found, is a field in which the scope for regional initiatives is virtually unlimited.

A regional approach to disarmament, far from being inconsistent with global efforts, can supplement and assist them if pursued with the wider aims fully in mind. While it should be stressed that disarmament assumes a particular urgency in some regions, there is a need in all regions for measures of disarmament which would both strengthen regional security and improve the prospects for progress in disarmament at the global level, provided certain conditions are present. In some regions, the continued arms build-up is a major factor endangering international peace and security. In other regions, where the level of armaments is less, the existence of tension and conflict may nevertheless constitute a serious threat to international peace and security. The establishment and reinforcement of military bases and/or foreign military presence forcibly imposed on colonial and other territories, the persistence of colonialism as well as attempts by States to deny the rights of peoples freely to determine their own future as well as their systems of social and economic development constitute a source of danger for the regions concerned and are incompatible with regional disarmament measures, in the context of general and complete disarmament. Priority should therefore be given, *inter alia*, to the eradication of these factors, to the settlement of disputes by peaceful means through negotiations, and to the promotion of self-determination and respect for territorial integrity of States. Such factors would be taken fully into account in a regional approach. Furthermore, it might be possible in some cases to reach agreement on a regional basis on measures more far-reaching than those which could be implemented at that time on a global basis. In other cases, initiatives taken in one region, suitably modified, might be valid models for other regions or give impetus to global efforts along similar lines.

In some cases, efforts have been or are being made to develop and/or adopt measures conducive to keeping regions from becoming involved in confrontations originating outside them. In that context, and without prejudice to the inherent right of States to individual or collective self-defence, particularly in situations of tension, mention has been made of: arms limitation and reduction; non-introduction or withdrawal of certain types of weapons; non-introduction or withdrawal of foreign military advisers and other forms of military assistance or presence; refraining from the staging of military manoeuvres and shows of force; non-establishment of new bases, withdrawal or non-reinforcement of

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existing bases; avoidance of either the threat of or recourse to covert or overt interventions; avoidance of attempts to foment or exploit internal difficulties of individual countries or regions.

The importance of the regional dimension in conventional disarmament derives above all from the fact that the security concerns of States, and to some extent even their concepts of security, differ from region to region although certain concepts for resolving political differences and achieving disarmament may be applicable to all regions; military stability and the relative strength of opposing forces are of major concern in some regions. This is particularly true in Europe where there is the largest accumulation of weapons and where the two major alliances directly confront each other. Negotiations on disarmament questions in Europe have pursued the achievement of a more stable situation in Europe at a lower level of military potential on the basis of approximate equality and parity, as well as on the basis of undiminished security of the parties. The ongoing negotiations on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe have encountered significant difficulties but are continuing. This approach may be of assistance in other regions. However, the approach to disarmament which has been tried in this situation may not be completely applicable or may not be the most effective in other regions due to, *inter alia*, factors listed in paragraph 124. In some cases, initial efforts might perhaps more usefully focus on regional co-operation and all types of confidence-building measures, while in other areas such efforts might focus on the settlement of disputes by peaceful means in order to enhance regional co-operation and all types of confidence-building measures. In all cases, efforts should focus on measures to keep the region from becoming involved in confrontations originating outside the region. All such efforts might enhance prospects for disarmament.

It is evident that disarmament efforts in individual regions of the world should be consistent with efforts towards general and complete disarmament. Moreover, if disarmament was approached solely in a regional context in total disregard of conditions and developments in other regions and globally, it might not even serve its immediate purpose of enhancing security in that region itself. It might also entail a risk of losing sight of global priorities and of the special responsibility of States with the largest military arsenals in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions. In many regions, it would be difficult to conceive that major steps relating to disarmament or security

might be taken without the active co-operation or the tacit accord of outside powers that have a significant influence on the security situations in the respective regions. This in itself would ensure the insertion of regional disarmament measures into a wider context, In accordance with this, all regional measures which have been adopted so far including the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the Declaration on the Denuclearisation of Africa, and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe—although the latter is not in itself a measure in the field of disarmament—have, as a matter of course, been designed not only with regional purposes in mind but also as contributions to global security and as means to promote disarmament in a wider framework through partial, geographically limited measures.

*Mutual and Verifiable Arms Limitations and Reductions:* Disarmament through agreed limitations and reductions, based on reciprocity and adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, is the approach which has been most consistently pursued in the past by various groups of States. As disarmament achieved in this way presupposes the consent of all the parties concerned, it may be safely assumed that any disarmament measure actually adopted will meet the requirement of ensuring security for each party—at the minimum, undiminished security and, if possible, strengthened and even enhanced security, In practice, efforts towards mutual and verifiable arms limitations and reductions have always been aimed at some sort of approximate equality, equality in the reductions or limitations imposed, or equality in the military force that each is allowed to retain. Negotiated mutual limitations and reductions can then lead to a more stable situation at a lower level of military potential, characterised by approximate equality and parity. The core concept of this approach is that of preserving peace and security through a carefully designed balance of military forces at substantially lower levels and adequately verified. Effective verification of disarmament agreements assumes particular importance in this context because of the need for each party to have confidence that commitments under the respective agreements are being observed by all parties. What is needed are appropriate methods and procedures of verification which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development.

The concept of a balance of forces implies that mutual and verifiable arms limitations and reductions are most readily applicable in a context

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involving two States or two groups of associated States. In multilateral contexts it is more difficult to devise a set of force levels which could represent a military balance acceptable to all parties concerned. Sometimes negotiations, could be facilitated by being limited to a particular geographical area. Thus far, multilateral negotiations have more often dealt not with quantitative limitations and reductions but rather with qualitative limitation, i.e. with the complete abolition of specified types of weapons, either globally, as in the case of chemical and biological weapons, or regionally, as a step towards global prohibition, as in the case of nuclear weapons in Latin America. In the case of conventional weapons and armed forces, such qualitative limitations might take the form of global or regional agreements to prohibit certain types of weapons altogether, or they might consist in limitations on the technical performance and mission capability of weapons and forces. Such qualitative restrictions will be considered later.

Negotiations on mutual and verifiable limitations and reductions in conventional weapons and forces aimed at a more stable situation at a lower level of military potential on the basis of approximate equality and parity, as well as on the basis of undiminished security of all States, is a feasible approach, particularly in the context of East-West relations. In any such negotiations the security interests and independence of third parties need to be fully respected and taken into account. The application of the same or similar approaches to conventional arms limitations and disarmament could be considered by countries in other parts of the world.

Negotiations to establish a more stable situation at lower levels of military potential can, however, meet with difficulties which must be openly recognised if they are to be overcome. They arise from the fact that to translate equality, parity or balance into numerical ratios of forces and armaments in concrete situations, a variety of factors relating to the composition of the forces and the characteristics of the armaments of the different parties, to geography and so forth have to be taken into account. Thus, in any negotiation on limiting or reducing specific categories of weapons or forces, the military significance of such categories cannot be viewed outside the context of these factors, in particular the overall military capabilities of the States involved. These factors are often difficult to assess in an objective way and the negotiating parties are likely in many cases to assess them differently. Such differences in assessments might result in further complications.

Negotiations on arms limitations and reductions could also meet with problems arising from the great disparities in military potential between various States, for example between nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States, or even between the nuclear weapon States themselves. These disparities give rise to differing security concerns and would emphasize the need for all these factors to be taken into account in the resolute pursuit of the disarmament process.

### **Enhancement of International Stability and Security; Military Aspects**

Under present circumstances, in the midst of an ongoing arms race and an unfavourable international climate, disarmament is particularly necessary, though difficult. In order to stimulate the disarmament process, attention should be given to all its aspects, including approaches which would enhance international stability by diminishing the risk of war and reducing mutual fears, thus promoting the security of States. In this context it is useful to explore approaches which address security-related elements such as military postures, activities and force deployments which other States could consider as being particularly threatening. In analysing these elements one should, of course, bear in mind that military and technical capabilities must be seen in the context of political decisions, military strategies and doctrines. These, in turn, are based on national conceptions of security interests, some of which may not be compatible with the security interests of other States and international stability. In this context, the particular problems posed by the existence of nuclear weapons must also be taken into account, in particular the basic disparity in military capability between nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States. Those problems, as well as the political aspects of security problems, are, however, considered elsewhere in the study and what is dealt with here is primarily the military aspects of international stability and security in so far as conventional forces and armaments are concerned.

In this regard it would be highly advisable if States, in exercising their legitimate right to protect their security, on their own or together with allies, sought to avoid military activities, deployments and procurement decisions which others might regard with apprehension and perceive as adversely affecting their security and which could prompt them to a military build-up. Thus States might seek to put greater emphasis in their overall military posture on forces which in terms of equipment and deployment would be perceived as defensive.

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This could be accomplished in several ways. It could be done on a purely national basis or through attempts to promote restraint by mutual example. In either case it would mean exercising self-restraint in the production and modernisation of conventional weapons and in manpower programmes and selecting among alternative ways of satisfying security requirements those that would appear least provocative to others. The most effective approach, however, would be through negotiated agreements on a bilateral, multilateral or regional basis. This approach would appear to be particularly applicable in the case of attempts to reduce existing military capabilities. It is therefore important that States engaged in conventional disarmament negotiations examine the possibility of dealing first with those elements of their overall military postures or with those weapon systems which might cause most concern to the parties. Initial consultations on these issues by interested parties, undertaken in the context of specific regions or situations, may focus on identifying such elements and thereby stimulate negotiations and facilitate agreement on the most effective steps for reducing the level of conventional forces while enhancing stability.

Stability and security in the purely military sense considered here do not, of course, require exact equality in every type of conventional weapons and forces between the States concerned or exact parallelism in their force structures. What is required is rather an overall force balance which gives a feeling to each party that its defence capabilities are sufficient to oppose any attack and which thus enhances stability. Such an overall balance would be promoted by reducing those weapons perceived by the parties concerned as the most threatening. This would facilitate a lowering by the parties of their defence requirements and could lead to a sustained disarmament process involving significant reductions in the levels of armaments.

It would be difficult if not impossible to categorize in a general way and in all cases different types of conventional forces and armaments as being in and of themselves threatening or non-threatening, more destabilising or less destabilising, offensive or defensive since the military effectiveness of any characteristics but also on the specific military and geographic context in which they are deployed. Therefore, any discussions of reductions in the levels of particularly threatening force elements and weapon systems can only be undertaken within the framework of the relevant specific military with due regard for geographical and other factors.

Consultations and negotiations on various types of disarmament measures can be based on such an approach. For example, preliminary consultations and negotiations on quantitative reductions of armed forces and armaments on this basis could lead to agreements according to which different parties would not necessarily reduce the same types of weapon. As regards qualitative limitations, initial discussions about the character of existing or projected weapon systems in specific situations or regions could substantially assist in negotiations on deployments of forces or armament could also utilize this approach so that agreed restrictions or greater can benefit if the parties focus discussions on the military activities of various types of forces perceived by them as particularly threatening.

*Modalities of Limitations and Reductions (Quantitative/ Qualitative, Weapons/ Forces:* The limitation and reduction of conventional arms and armed forces can be either quantitative or qualitative or both and these can relate either to weapons or manpower or the deployment of weapon and force, or all of them. Although in the long-term the effort to limit and reduce must lead to substantial disarmament, and ultimately to general and complete disarmament, short-term efforts can be directed towards breaking the momentum of the arms race or, at a minimum, towards easing political tensions and lowering the danger of conflict. In general the modality adopted as a short-term measure at a particular time, or with respect to a particular region must be influenced by the characteristics of the military situations and by the principal factors responsible for raising the danger of war or the level of political tensions. The adoption of particular modality may also or with respect to a particular region. While the choice of approach may be determined earlier should be attempted. Briefly, a particular modality may be taken up only as a short-term measure which in time must be supplemented by other modalities. It is in this perspective that the usefulness of particular modalities may be discussed.

Together with attempts to halt the quantitative growth of arsenals and armed forces through agreement on ceilings and reductions, there is a need to deal with the qualitative aspects of the conventional arms race. Indeed, the rapid pace of technological innovation and the rapid dissemination of the latest types of military equipment, while they reflect the sense of insecurity prevailing in the world today, also constitute a major factor further aggravating the apprehensions of States about their security and inducing them to ever renewed military efforts. Qualitative limitations of armaments, including new potentially

threatening types developed on the basis of modern technology, must therefore be a central feature of efforts to halt the global arms race, although qualitative and quantitative limitations will have to be further integrated if the arms race is to be effectively curbed.

Quantitative limitations and reductions can either relate to only one or several categories of weapons or forces. Qualitative restrictions, too, can either relate to only one or several categories of weapons or forces, but the restrictions introduced can vary according to the criteria adopted. Qualitative restrictions can also relate to weapons with certain capabilities or characteristics which may not currently exist but which are being developed. In addition, qualitative restrictions could either relate to the production and/or deployment of certain weapons, or even to their testing and development. A qualitative restriction that extends to the testing and development of certain weapons would be a significant way of also controlling the R and D process. With regard to personnel, quantitative restrictions could apply either in terms of a ceiling on the overall size of regular forces or in terms of limits on the deployment of specific military formations. Other modalities which could be of significance, especially from the standpoint of reducing the danger of war and facilitating regional disarmament efforts are the establishment of demilitarised zones along the frontiers of neighbouring States, limited disengagement of forces in areas of tension, the withdrawal of weapons or forces perceived to be threatening from frontier regions in such areas, and mutually agreed restrictions on land, naval and air deployments in specified areas. Other measures of importance would be the renunciation of all policies which represent, or are perceived to represent, a serious threat to efforts aimed at the reduction of the danger of war and the promotion of regional disarmament such as: the threat or use of force in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations, the search for spheres of influence, policies of military intervention or invasion and territorial expansion, the deployment of forces in foreign territories without the consent of the States involved, the establishment of foreign military bases and/or foreign military presence forcibly imposed on colonial and other territories and the denial of peoples' rights to self-determination.

### **Possible Concrete Measures**

*General Perspective:* The process of halting and reversing the arms race is a complex one, involving many interrelated steps. But it is important that this process as a whole be conceived in terms of the

goal of general and complete disarmament. It should be an integrated process based on a step-by-step approach; thus, it would not be a collection of isolated measures. Such measures, if they remain isolated, would offer little hope of effectively stemming the arms race. This would be even more the case if some States were to use those measures to seek advantage over others, or through their actions, perpetuate ongoing arms competition in some areas of military activity.

Progress in curbing the nuclear *arms* race would “Facilitate the conventional disarmament effort—directly and indirectly—for example, by improving relations among the nuclear weapon States. In the absence of tangible progress in dealing with the nuclear arms race, several States, both nuclear and, might hesitate to move far in the direction of conventional disarmament. It is evident that there is a relationship between progress in reducing conventional weapons and armed forces among nuclear weapon States and other States in the regions concerned, taking into account the special responsibility of States with the largest military arsenals, and progress in the limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. This underlines the importance of implementing the Programme of Action laid down in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session.

One important step towards conventional disarmament could be for the States with the largest military arsenals to initiate negotiations with a view to agreeing, depending on the specific situation, not to increase their armed forces and conventional armaments or to reduce those forces and armaments, either in general or in specified areas, whether in terms of quantity or quality, or to contain them within agreed ceilings. Such agreements, together with such agreed verification procedures as may be required, could provide the basis for further negotiations on reductions in personnel and conventional weapons. Agreements should, in every case, be so designed that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage and that the security of States be enhanced.

Agreements of this type should be urgently sought and could be concluded at the global level and also on a regional or a bilateral basis. They would be of great significance in reducing international tension and the risk of war, especially in regions where there may be a high degree of tension. The nuclear weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, and other militarily significant States should facilitate the attainment of such

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understandings and should also refrain from actions that might hamper progress towards that objective.

Furthermore, agreements not to increase armed forces and conventional armaments or agreements to reduce those forces and armaments may be restricted to specific types of armed forces and/or specific types of weapons or they may be applied simultaneously to all armed forces and all types of weapons. In some cases, the disbanding of whole military units together with their equipment and weapons might be a practicable way of making progress in conventional disarmament.

A process of universal relaxation of tension is indispensable to the process of disarmament, including conventional disarmament. Progress towards universal detente and progress in disarmament are of fundamental significance and would mutually complement and strengthen each other. All States and regions should "be encompassed in a process of universal detente and should contribute to that process.

*Reductions in Military Materiel:* Reductions in military *materiel* in all areas of the world where there are major concentrations of forces and armaments could offer substantial benefits to the States concerned, and indeed to all States, and therefore are a matter of urgency. Reductions in military *materiel* by the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies in NATO and in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation are particularly important. Meaningful reductions by these States could enhance security in Europe and elsewhere and might also encourage reductions by other States in other regions of the world. Negotiations should include consideration of numerical reductions in specified categories of major weapons such as armour, artillery, aircraft or warships, depending on the circumstances. An agreed figure of weapons to be reduced from agreed categories of weapon-types could either leave open to each side the exact mix of weapon-types to be reduced, or exact figures of each weapon-type could be predetermined, though the former method would seem to be an easier approach. Initial agreements could be substantial or modest but they should serve two purposes; first, they should be so designed as to increase confidence on both sides and to facilitate the next effort, and second, they should give impetus to efforts to curb the arms race in its other aspects.

States, particularly the States with the largest military arsenals, could begin consultations bilaterally or multilaterally and within their respective regions, together with extra-regional States when necessary,

on ways of limiting and reducing their arsenals of conventional weapons. Wherever applicable in such consultations, proper attention should be given to the problem of how to deal with military materiel which is conventional in nature but is being used or has the potential for being used in connection with nuclear weapons. A process of limitation and reduction may also be initiated through parallel actions based on a policy of mutual example. In view of existing differences in the size of military arsenals, force structures and other factors, including particularly the characteristics of geographical location, it may be appropriate in the process of those consultations to examine and discuss the question of establishing agreed ratios, which could be the subject of negotiations among interested States, for determining the proportions of limitations and reductions to be made by them.

*Seductions in Personnel:* Limitations and reductions in armed forces is an important aspect of conventional disarmament. It may be achieved through agreed ceilings or reductions in overall personnel figures or by the disbanding of a number of military units. In practice, a variety of complex factors have to be taken into account if the agreed measures are to achieve their objective, such as the definition of military personnel, the possible role of forces stationed in areas not covered by the agreement and the possible role of reinforcements in cases where the agreement does not deal with limitations in weapons and equipment or with the repositioning of military *materiel*.

Reductions in armed forces derive their importance from the broad relationships such measures have with many others. As much as perceptions of conventional threat may be derived from the numbers and operational availability of weapons, it is often the numbers of personnel serving in the armed forces, both combat and support, which give rise to apprehension and suspicion between States. Reductions in armed forces could result in reduced deployments, reduced ability to take large-scale offensive action, reduced overall military effectiveness, and reduced military budgets. The extent of the effects of reductions would depend on factors such as the military training and reserve programmes, rapid mobilisation capabilities and the equipment that the units of the parties to agreements would be allowed to retain.

As in other areas of disarmament, a particular responsibility for achieving substantial reductions in personnel falls on the States with the largest military arsenals. Even so, personnel reductions could be applicable to other countries as well, particularly those with the largest

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armed forces and those in regions where dangerously explosive situations may exist or where there may be large concentrations of forces and armaments. Concrete results in the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe could prompt further progress in Europe and would be a truly significant development in the field of disarmament. Initiatives aimed at reductions of armed forces and armaments elsewhere would also be a great contribution to disarmament.

*Reductions in Military Expenditure:* The reduction of the military budgets of States, especially those States with the largest military expenditures, has for long been the subject of deliberations and proposals at the United Nations. In 1973, for the first time the question was inscribed as a specific item on the agenda of the General Assembly and subsequently various approaches have been suggested and developed but none of them has so far found sufficient support for effective implementation. Proposals have included a reduction by 10 per cent- or reductions in absolute terms, in the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council and for utilisation of a part of the funds thus saved for economic assistance to developing - countries. Another proposal has been to measure and compare military budgets as a basis for negotiating agreements for their reduction. A third approach suggested has been parallel actions by mutual example.

The benefits of reductions in military expenditures are twofold-, on one hand, they could lead to worthwhile measures of arms limitation and encourage the maintenance of international security at lower levels of military capability? on the other hand, reductions in military expenditures could have far-reaching beneficial effects on domestic, social and economic conditions and on the global economic situation. The transfer of funds and conversion of resources ensuing from reductions in military expenditures could improve the prospects for development and healthy economic growth in the countries concerned, and contribute to bridging the economic gap between developed and developing countries.

Reductions in military expenditures could be implemented through agreements, directly negotiated between the parties concerned, to cut expenditures by certain amounts or in certain proportions. The approach according to which reductions could take the form of parallel actions by mutual example has been put forward with the intention, *inter alia*, to obviate various technical difficulties involved in measuring and comparing military expenditures and their reduction.

The problems involved in negotiating agreements on reductions in military expenditures have been studied by the United Nations in a series of expert studies (see A/S-12/7 and earlier documents). These have highlighted the difficulties of interpretation, measurement and comparison of data on military expenditures and have led to the development of a standardised reporting instrument based on a breakdown into different types of expenditures which could become comparable. The studies have also pointed out that these difficulties stem from both the lack, in some cases, of sufficient information and the difficulty in verifying such information and have stressed that serious efforts should be made to reduce these problems.

### **Reductions and Restrictions on Military Deployments**

In the context of conventional arms limitation and reductions, military deployments should be understood in their widest sense, including manoeuvres, installations, bases and the different types of geographical disposition of forces. Restrictions and reductions on military deployments are only a partial and preliminary measure, but they can contribute significantly to confidence-building and to conventional disarmament efforts. Especially in cases where the military situation is tense, these measures may prove to be valuable steps towards diminishing the instabilities inherent therein, in reducing the risk of war and in contributing towards curbing the arms race. Such measures could also promote a situation conducive to reinforcing respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, restrictions on the deployment of existing weapons could make it easier to forestall the deployment of additional types, currently deployed in other areas or under development.

Alongside other attempts to curb the arms race, efforts could be directed at reaching agreements on restrictions on such military deployments as are perceived to be particularly threatening by those concerned. Restrictions could be imposed either on all forces so perceived or on a proportion of them sufficient to ease tension and to enhance stability in the present military situation significantly. Restrictions could also take the form of an agreement on limits on the types and numbers of armed force components to be deployed in specified areas. Particular attention should be given to those forces, be they ground, air or naval, and/or weapons systems that might be perceived as being particularly threatening as possible means in the early stages of an attack. Which particular forces belong in this category would have to be negotiated among the countries concerned. Restrictions could also take the form

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of demilitarised or partly demilitarised zones established in areas where States have territorial or other disputes that might lead to armed confrontation and conflict.

Particular attention should be given to armed forces deployed in foreign territories. Consideration of possible arrangements for restricting and reducing military deployments should take due account, as factors contributing to instability, tensions and the arms race, of the negative effects arising from the existence of military deployments which support foreign occupation, colonial domination, denial of the right of peoples to self-determination, violation of territorial integrity and the perpetuation of racism. Furthermore, depending on the conditions in each region, States may in certain cases commit themselves not to enter into arrangements involving the establishment of foreign bases and the deployment of foreign forces on their territories and not to join existing or future alliances. However, it has to be recognised that in the view of some States such a commitment would significantly limit their options in regard to the right of individual and collective self-defence and that it may not be acceptable to those States, except in the context of wider agreements or guarantees.

The applicability of the above approaches in particular situations or regions, the specific modalities to be adopted and the measures to be undertaken would, of course, depend on the character of the problems peculiar to that situation or region, including concrete political, military and geographical aspects:

In Europe, where there is a vast accumulation of military force and where the two major alliances directly confront each other, agreements on reductions and restrictions on military deployments, by diminishing the possibilities of a surprise attack, could contribute to confidence and enhanced military stability, thus diminishing the risk of the outbreak of a conflict.

Also in other situations or regions where the level of armaments is very high, reductions and restrictions on military deployments could greatly contribute to confidence and to diminishing the risk of the outbreak of hostilities.

In some other situations or areas, where the level of armaments is less but where tensions may be high and a potential for conflict may exist, the existence of tension and conflict would also constitute a serious threat to international peace and security, in these cases as well, measures of reduction and restrictions on military deployments

by States in the region and, where they are involved, by extraregional States could contribute to strengthening confidence and international peace and security.

### **Restraints on Militarily-relevant Research, Development and Testing**

There has been for many years a growing emphasis on the qualitative aspects of the arms race. In this connection, much attention has been given to the fact that a substantial proportion of all research and development resources in the world has been allocated to military purposes. Thus it might be considered that restraints on the military use of research and development could constitute an essential aspect of the effort to curb the arms race.

In this context, the General Assembly, in its resolution 37/99 J of 13 December 1982, *inter alia*, being aware of the fundamental importance of research and development for peaceful purposes and of the inalienable right of all States to develop, also in co-operation with other States, their research and development for such purposes, requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts to carry out a comprehensive study on the scope, role and direction of the military use of research and development, the mechanisms involved, its role in the overall arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and its impact on arms limitation and disarmament, particularly in relation to major weapons systems, such as nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, with a view to preventing a qualitative arms race and to ensuring that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, it is hoped that meaningful and concrete measures of restraint in this area would be greatly facilitated by that study.

### **Supplier and/or Recipient Agreements on Reductions of International Arms Transfers**

In considering possible measures that might limit or reduce any kind of international conventional arms transfers, it is necessary to bear in mind the reasons why the attempts made in the past have been unsuccessful and to recognize the sensitivities that exist, for it is these failures and sensitivities that underlie the difficulties in reaching agreements on this matter.

Experience has shown that for any proposed measure concerning arms transfers to receive serious consideration, several concerns must be met. First, all countries must be satisfied that the proposals are not

discriminatory: this entails even-handedness for arms suppliers and arms recipients' alike; it also may necessitate discussion of all aspects of arms transfers and production, including as appropriate arrangements such as co-production, standardisation, technological co-operation, off-set cost arrangements and other relevant financial agreements within or outside military alliances. Secondly, as stated in paragraph 85 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, consultations should be based in particular on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. Thirdly, there are also concerns, on the one hand, about the sufficiency of data on the production and transfer of arms and, on the other, about the security aspects of providing such information.

As the Soviet Union and the United States account for the larger part of arms transfers, they could consider the question of reopening their talks on the limitation of conventional arms transfers.

Possible agreements to restrain the transfer of arms, in the first place between major suppliers and recipients, would have to give particular attention to those weapon systems the characteristics and quantities of which are perceived as threatening to the security of other countries. Various proposals aimed at establishing an effective basis for such arrangements that have already been put forward in previous years could be taken into account. It would be necessary to ensure that supplier countries which may not join in such arrangements would not simply expand their transfers to fill any "vacuum" arising from agreed restraints in arms transfers. That objective would be best served by participation of both suppliers and recipients in agreements on arms transfer restraints.

Separately, recipient countries could negotiate local agreements on arms-import restrictions. Appropriately fashioned, such agreements could enhance, *inter alia*, by reducing the involvement by extraregional States, the security situation in the respective regions. Such actions are applicable in varying degrees to almost all areas of the world but would be particularly appropriate in areas of tension or regions in which there is already a high concentration of weapons. In addition,

agreements between recipients could be strengthened by corresponding agreements with or between suppliers.

### **Confidence-building Measures**

Although confidence-building measures, whether military or non-military, cannot serve as a substitute for concrete disarmament measures, they can play an important role in progress towards disarmament in that they can encourage a climate of trust and international co-operation, whether they are taken unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally. By assisting in the development of an improved climate of international relations, they can help to create conditions conducive to the adoption of measures of limitation of conventional arms and armed forces and disarmament. Confidence-building measures were the subject of a comprehensive study submitted by the Secretary-General in 1981. The study showed that there is a wide range of measures which could be implemented with a view to strengthening international peace and security and building confidence among States. It stressed in particular that security conditions differ between regions and the importance of taking this into account in considering confidence-building measures.

These measures can be grouped into several broad categories: political, military, economic, social, cultural, legal and other types of measures designed to enhance respect for the principles laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, to enhance co-operation, to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Being defined in terms of aims that are closely related or mutually reinforcing, the boundaries between these different categories are not always sharp. There is also overlap between confidence-building measures and arms limitation measures and other measures in the field of disarmament and between confidence-building measures and concrete measures in the field of strengthening detente and co-operation among States.

An important category of confidence-building measures consists of measures relating to the military aspects of security. These include exchange of information and communication, notification and mutual observation of military activities, measures to facilitate verification and other similar measures. A related group consists of measures which constrain military activities in certain respects in order to alleviate fear and remove sources of tension and in particular to diminish the possibility of surprise attack. This category does not differ in principle from disarmament measures involving constraints on deployment.

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Certain confidence-building measures relating to the military aspects of security have been implemented in Europe since 1975, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). These include prior notification of military manoeuvres, exchange of observers, etc. At the same time the participants declared that they would duly take into account and respect their common objective of confidence-building when conducting their military activities.

The Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which commenced at Stockholm on 17 January 1984 according to the decision taken at the CSCE follow-up meeting at Madrid aims at undertaking, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations. Thus the Conference will begin a process the first stage of which will be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe.

In other regions as well, there is scope for adopting measures to build confidence among States and enhance regional security, In some cases, the measures adopted or envisaged in Europe, suitably modified to reflect the different security conditions, might constitute an example. In other cases the adoption of measures relating to political, economic or other aspects of security might be a more urgent task. It follows from the nature of the confidence-building process itself that measures designed for one region will not necessarily serve a useful purpose in others and that they may differ, depending on the situations existing in respective regions.

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## DISARMAMENT AND PEACE-BUILDING PROCESS

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### **Introduction**

Since 1988, the international community has witnessed tremendous developments in the field of peace-keeping. The number of peace-keeping operations and their size are an indication of the expanding harmony between the major Powers and their desire to solve conflicts, and also of the increasing need to cope with conflicts at various levels.

In this article an attempt is made to outline some ideas on means to respond to the new requirements of United Nations peace-keeping in a more flexible way, thereby avoiding “peacekeeping fatigue” among Member States. It also discusses ways that peace-keeping and disarmament might facilitate regional peace-building processes.

### **Development of the Peace-Keeping Instrument**

Peace-keeping operations, as now carried out by the United Nations, were not foreseen by the founders of the organisation and are not mentioned at all in the Charter. They were conceived and developed by the United Nations at the beginning of the cold war, mainly because disagreement among the permanent members of the Security Council had rendered the United Nations collective security system, outlined in Chapter VII of the Charter, unworkable. Thus, peace-keeping operations became a practical mechanism for containing conflicts and facilitating their settlement. Former Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson and former Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold introduced and promoted the idea of using a multinational force to control and supervise a negotiated cease-fire between hostile States, thus preventing an escalation of conflict while

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keeping the peace. Their ideas were based primarily on two principles: that a United Nations peacekeeping operation should take place only with the consent of the States concerned; and that force should not be applied to end a conflict.

From 1948 to 1985, some thirteen peace-keeping operations were established. In general, each was organised as a military observer mission, as a peace-keeping force or as a combination of the two. Each operation was provided with a mandate outlining the means to be used to assist in the control and resolution of conflicts between hostile States; or, as in Cyprus, between hostile communities within a single State, each backed by an outside Power.

United Nations efforts in the maintenance of peace have passed through four development phases. The first period, between 1948 and 1956, was an experimental phase, in which the United Nations introduced an international observation and reporting system with a view to maintaining fragile cease-fires. From this period, there are two important missions which are still in existence: the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) with headquarters in Jerusalem, and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in Jammu and Kashmir. These missions were initiated by the Security Council and financed from the regular budget.

The next ten years—1956 to 1967—were characterised by escalating tension between the two Super-Powers. Increasing rivalry for hegemony in the Third World fuelled conflicts, which, in some regions, tended to escalate out of control. In order to help achieve the cease-fire and maintain international peace in this political climate, the first peace-keeping force, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), was launched in the Sinai in 1956, and became the first example of a valuable mechanism for constraining hostilities and thus to make possible conditions necessary for negotiations and/or mediation towards the peaceful settlement of conflicts—in other words, peace-making. In addition to UNEF I, two new forces—ONUC in the Congo and UNFICYP in Cyprus—were established by the Security Council, as well as four observer missions. The international community began to realize that peace-keeping operations, combined with the mutual deterrence of nuclear power, produced a new type of security—negative stability.

As the peace-keeping instrument was further refined and sharpened, terms such as “buffer zone”, “interposition” and “multidimensional”

were used for the first time. In the beginning, great expectations were placed on the United Nations, but the deteriorating East-West political climate, the impaired financial situation of the United Nations, and the 1967 war in the Middle East hampered the further use and development of the peace-keeping mechanism. Peacekeepers thus entered what might be called the “dormant” period. During these years (1967-1973), no new operations were initiated and only three remained in effect. The cold war effectively prevented any positive approach towards international peace under the auspices of the United Nations. In 1973, when the Yom Kippur War threatened to escalate into an all-out Super-Power confrontation, the usefulness of United Nations peace-keeping was re-discovered as a practical means for dealing with the situation. Consequently, peace-keeping was encouraged and revitalised as the world community became familiar with the new operations in Sinai (UNEF II), Lebanon (UNIFIL) and on the Golan Heights (UNDOF). However, tension between the Super-Powers remained, and the rearmament continued, at tremendous cost. Even though other conflicts surfaced which threatened international peace and security, the political rivalry between the major Powers and the lack of financial resources remained major hindrances to the creation of additional peace-keeping operations.

Up to the present time, peace-keeping operations have been initiated only with the consent of the parties involved, and until the mid-1980s utilised as contributors of troops small countries that were neutral to the conflict. Peace-keeping worked as a mechanism for reassurance, brought an end to the hostilities in the areas concerned and simultaneously provided some measures for confidence-building.

In these years, the peace process focused primarily on peace-keeping, and to a lesser extent on peace-making, but peace-building was almost wholly neglected. Consequently, disarmament, which was foreseen by the founders of the United Nations as one of the major pillars of the peace process, was not developed as an integral part of the process.

In the last five years, the decreased tension between the two Super-Powers created a new political environment, which provided the basis for the developments in Central and Eastern Europe. The harmony that followed the end of the cold war contributed to unity and the process of consultation in the Security Council, as well as to its capability for solving longstanding conflicts. Consequently, the United Nations was inundated with requests for peace-keeping operations.

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Another development at this time was the increased use of civilians in the new peace-keeping operations. Although the United Nations Military Observer Group in Iran-Iraq (UNIIMOG) was still a traditional operation, others were less traditional. In the operations in Namibia, as well as in Central America, we witnessed a new type of peace-keeping, which had a more complex structure and a more comprehensive mission. Here, the United Nations was asked to advance international peace and security on a wider scale by promoting a sound political and legal constitutional system. Such comprehensive and challenging goals required combining traditional peacekeeping with some novel methods such as upholding basic legal standards, monitoring by police, supervision of elections, and humanitarian assistance.

In the recent crisis in the Persian Gulf, we saw the United Nations performing in the role envisaged by its founders. For the first time (excluding the United Nations-sponsored action in Korea), the enforcement measures in Chapter VII were authorised and the international community involved undertook massive intervention by a coalition force—operating within the framework of international law and the United Nations Charter and with the consensus and authorisation of the Security Council. This activity was encouraging in that it enabled the United Nations to embark on a system of collective security. Another pioneer action taken during the Gulf crisis—an action which is still in effect—was the disarmament and verification mission in Iraq to ensure the destruction of nuclear, chemical, biological and missile weapons and certain stockpiles of arms.

Within the last ten years, the world has seen a variety of arrangements for meeting threats to international peace and security. It has witnessed traditional and experienced peacekeeping operations; multidimensional operations; and the enforcement action in the Gulf. What will the future security system be like?

### **Future Development**

Even though the international political climate has changed and improved, the changes have brought to the surface other kinds of conflicts.

Ethnic, religious, economic and social conflicts have become more apparent, and border disputes have again become an issue. Autocratic regimes contribute to domestic and intraState conflicts, resulting in insurgency, civil war and subversive warfare. Thus, there is an indication

of the need in the future for various kinds of national, regional and international security arrangements which must have the capacity to cope with conflicts at various levels. In order to promote these measures, practical arrangements are required to deal with demobilisation, including disarmament and arms control, election and human rights monitoring, and humanitarian assistance. Although the United Nations has been involved in the practical implementation of conflict management in terms of peace-keeping, little has been achieved in terms of peace-building.

Within this context, disarmament has been discussed for decades. However, the new political climate has also changed the prospects for it. The establishment of imposed disarmament and verification mechanisms within the United Nations framework in the case of Iraq, although based on enforcement action to reverse aggression, may provide some precedents, ultimately leading to machinery for multilateral arms control and verification.

It is likely that future peace-keeping activities—broadly defined—will include a number of new operations, some of which fall outside the traditional field of peace-keeping.

The Gulf crisis has indicated that there is a new era of political and military cooperation in which collective security actions are feasible through the United Nations. However, although the war in the Gulf provided a number of lessons, the question still remains whether the United Nations will have, or should have, the capacity to deal with the full range of such local, regional and international conflicts. In addition, we must bear in mind that since 1988 the United Nations has established 12 new operations, of which those in Yugoslavia and Cambodia are the most extensive. Both operations are huge and may involve up to 34,000 men and women working in different parts of the world at tremendous expense. Consequently, one must consider whether Member States are willing to contribute greater financial, human and material resources to conflicts in remote areas when the value for their own political, economic and strategic environment is not readily apparent to their people.

It seems obvious that the current situation and its future development call for a new collective security system, one in which national and regional security arrangements assume more responsibility within their own areas. Such a system must take into consideration the new

environment, which is no longer under the mantle of the “negative stability” of the cold war—a fact that has left a vacuum in regional security arrangements. This vacuum must be filled, because regions must deal with a broad spectrum of conflict management, requiring new thinking in terms of capacity and responsibility. Local or regional threats need to be met with a flexible response, corresponding to each particular situation and local conditions. Even though the Charter provides for a peace-making role for regional organisations—a fact which has been emphasised by the Secretary-General, as well as at the recent summit meeting of the Security Council—very little has been achieved in terms of implementing the concept.

### **Security Arrangements at Various Levels**

If all of these ideas are to be put into effect, the responsibility may be shared on five different levels.

It is clear that the United Nations must continue to take the responsibility for international peace and security in the future. But, a security arrangement of this kind must be flexible, adapting its action to the nature of the conflict, and must not only involve the United Nations and the international community, but, whenever useful and/or possible, must also utilize regional and national security systems. Within this framework, the following arrangements might be considered for ensuring global security at several levels.

#### ***First Level: National***

Many Governments are already prepared for the twenty-first century, while others are still in the process of nation-building, including the forming of national security arrangements. A national government must be responsible for its own security. Armed forces must be the insurance against foreign intervention as well as against domestic insurgency, civil war or subversive warfare.

At the same time, the armed forces of the developing countries could also play a more sophisticated role by participating in building the national infrastructure of their countries, an area in which military knowledge and capacity in engineering and transport will be essential. Finally, as a member of a regional security organisation and of the United Nations, a nation must be prepared to participate in the maintenance of international peace and security. Thus, national forces are the first and basic level in global security: a nation must deal with

its own security, but should also be prepared to participate in regional or international security arrangements. Therefore, national forces must be trained to participate, not only in national defence, but also in regional and international peace activities which may involve regional or international peace-keeping, and which may involve disarmament activities.

### ***Second Level: Regional***

The second level would involve the regional organisations, which must support the development of regional security systems as part of global security arrangements. Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter provides, particularly in its Article 52, for such arrangements, assuming that they are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Although some “regional agencies” embody agreements in specific issue-areas—such as international law and economic integration—there are very few regional organisations with an institutional mechanism for handling violent conflicts. However, there are examples of the settlement of disputes in which regional bodies have been involved. The Organisation of American States (OAS), the League of Arab States and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) all have in common the purpose of promoting regional security. Although these organisations may have the institutional mechanisms for dealing with regional conflicts, they do not necessarily have the knowledge, experience and understanding required to implement practical peace-keeping and other arrangements. For the successful management of a conflict it is essential to incorporate not only political considerations but also a practical or operational dimension in which political arrangements will be implemented. Such an instrument now exists at the international level (the peace-keeping forces) but does not yet exist in the various regional arenas.

Apart from the ongoing operations in Yugoslavia and Cambodia, it is not certain whether such large and costly peacekeeping operations will be repeated in the future. These types of operations will probably be too expensive for the United Nations, as well as for the contributing States. It is to be hoped that serious disputes of such proportions will be handled at an earlier stage at the regional level, assuming that the constitutional and operational resources exist or can be mobilised.

In order to be able to implement the practical or operational security arrangements that must follow a political decision, each regional

organisation would have to develop a centre from which to deal with these regional questions. Such a centre should be able to deal with all the means of implementing traditional peace-keeping, but also with the newer aspects, such as disarmament and verification, the monitoring of elections, human rights, and humanitarian assistance. Since the new political climate has fundamentally enhanced the prospects for the implementation of confidence-building arrangements, it is possible today to provide the machinery for bilateral or multilateral arms control verification. Regional peace-keeping centres must, therefore, be related and coordinated with existing or future disarmament centres, not only to promote peace-keeping and peace-building activities, but also to relate theory and practice in a natural way.

Regional disarmament and peace-keeping centres should explore the theoretical and practical processes of ending hostilities, and of enhancing the capacity of regional organisations to conduct regional peace-keeping/peace-building operations, and when required, to contribute to the international peace process. In the more practical aspects of such a mandate, a peace-keeping centre should provide the framework and coordination necessary to establish a regional stand-by peacekeeping force. This force should consist of 5,000 to 10,000 troops and be equipped and trained to operate on short notice, both regionally and globally. The centre should also have the capacity to provide the necessary tools (“verifiers”) for some peace-building activities, for example verification of regional or bilateral disarmament and arms limitation treaties. In its peace-building efforts, the centre would also develop other practical mechanisms for resolving disputes in a non-violent manner, and in such a way as to promote and develop military integration in the region.

In order to facilitate regional peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building activities, the United Nations could assist regional organisations by giving them supplementary funding and some logistical support. It would also be useful— and more far-reaching—for the United Nations to be represented in the regional organisations.

### *Third Level: Regional and International Combined*

The third level will be a combination of regional and international security arrangements. If a conflict occurs in which the regional organisation decides to establish a regional peace-keeping force, such a force must carry out its mandate in an effective and impartial manner.

In some cases the conflict might be so complex, particularly when the roots of the conflict are of ethnic origin, that the impartiality of the force would be questioned. In such cases, the United Nations Security Council would need to authorize the Secretary-General to provide, with the consent of the parties, and in coordination with the regional organisation, an international body of observers who, under his command, would ensure the objectivity of the regional peacekeeping efforts.

However, this impartial body should not only ensure objectivity; it should also provide the United Nations with the capacity to promote the peace process by using these observers as monitors of human rights, elections and the verification of arms limitation.

#### ***Fourth Level: International***

International peace-keeping should be the fourth level in the global security structure. In some cases, international peace and security are threatened in ways that call for a truly international response, requiring peace-keeping units from the international community and the various regions. Peace-keeping units which are trained and prepared in the region and which are efficient and impartial would be provided to the United Nations in order to carry out the peace-keeping task, either in a traditional role or in a wider and more multifaceted way. The recent changes on the international scene have introduced some new elements into international peace-keeping, which make it feasible to use peace-keeping forces in new areas of peace and security, including the third component in the peace process—peace-building.

Peace-keepers have been used to monitor elections, human rights, demobilisation and other activities that have promoted peace and stability in a given area. So far, we have seen the peace-keepers monitor and supervise the demobilisation in Central America; it is hoped that they will do the same in Cambodia, demobilising up to 70 per cent of the existing forces.

But, peace-keeping could be expanded even further. For example, it should be explored whether it is possible to use peace-keepers to supervise economic sanctions, or to use them in a situation relating to an environmental disaster resulting from violent conflict. But, again, perhaps it is most important to use international peace-keepers for verification of multilateral disarmament and arms limitation agreements and treaties, thereby giving the United Nations an accurate and practical

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instrument with the knowledge and capacity to carry out ad hoc investigations of arms limitation or disarmament. The feasibility of naval peace-keeping has also been discussed, and of verification of sea-based cruise missiles. The technical and practical arrangements are difficult to foresee, as yet, but should be explored.

### *Fifth Level: Enforcement*

The fifth and last level in global security is enforcement action, in which a coalition could use force in order to impose a decision by the international community under the authority of the Security Council. As this step is within the purview of global security and accepted as the last resort in crisis management, it must be sanctioned and decided by the United Nations. It is very important that the United Nations should assume the responsibility for peace-building activities as soon as possible after the imposition of such a violent solution. In order to build confidence in the area, enforcement action, as well as peace-keeping, should involve peace-building steps to be implemented immediately after the conflict has ended. Moreover, disarmament must be one of a number of measures necessary for the achievement of peace and development in the area.

### **Preventive Measures**

So far we have examined methods for limiting a conflict. We must now explore the possibilities of preventing a conflict. Some have suggested the idea of using peace-keepers in preventive efforts, that is, using a peace-keeping force at the request of a single State or group of States threatened with an attack. In this respect, the force—whether a peace-keeping force or military observers—would serve as a “trip-wire” to warn an aggressor against attacking. A back-up force could be deployed behind the “trip-wire”, to act if the peace-keepers are overrun; although this idea seems feasible, it would be best if preventive activities could be implemented at an earlier stage.

Almost all Governments use a number of resources to collect information about the international situation. The most common and acceptable means of obtaining knowledge about countries is through embassies. Ambassadors act on behalf of their national Governments to collect information that is important to their own country’s foreign policy. As a rule, the information may be taken as reliable and reasonably objective, providing national Governments with data on which they can base decisions concerning foreign policy. The United Nations should

use the same system. United Nations officials should be appointed as United Nations ambassadors to critical areas in order to provide the Secretary-General with objective and non-filtered information about the actual situation. If required, these special representatives or ambassadors might be authorised to act as mediators and to carry out the Secretary-General's good offices with a view to preventing a threatened conflict. If an emergency occurs, they could act as the Secretary-General's focal point for various emergency actions relating to peace-keeping, disaster relief, or other activities that require coordination at the highest level. United Nations representatives should not work only in areas of crisis management; they could also facilitate the peace-building process, implementing various confidence-building measures.

### **Conclusion**

As indicated, the peace-keeping of today and tomorrow is a rather complex and multifaceted undertaking. The international climate requires not only temporary problem-solving measures, but also a variety of tools for promoting lasting peace and security. Peace-keeping is one of the means that has proved workable. However, peace-keeping is only one fragment of the peace process. The complexity of the international situation requires a combination of available instruments and a flexible response to various types of conflicts.

Moreover, disputes must be identified before they have escalated into conflicts. Peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building are the pillars of the peace process: peacekeeping forces and negotiators/mediators are the natural mechanisms for both peace-keeping and peace-making, just as disarmament activities are among the mechanisms for peace-building. Each of these three tools has a far better chance of success if the three are approached as an integrated entity.

## **DISARMAMENT AND THE PEACE PROCESS IN CENTRAL AMERICA**

### **Background**

The decade of the 1980s in Central America was the period of the twentieth century's most conflict-ridden areas on the globe. Confrontations, especially militaristic, the dominance of powerful groups over economic and political affairs (oligarchy), the absence of democracy

in political systems, together with intolerable economic conditions such as widespread poverty and economic reform the benefits of which never reached all groups of society provoked many crises. At the same time, crises were exacerbated by the activities of many countries which saw their dominance at stake (the United States in particular) and others which, owing to propinquity, realised the need to act because of the potential danger to their national security (those which originally constituted the Contadora Group), or those which sought to influence the political processes by expanding their network of allies (Cuba and the Soviet Union). Accordingly, when the crises erupted in 1979 and 1980, the unrest soon spread to other countries and acquired the character of geopolitical confrontation. The first conflict, which emerged from national confrontation involving three countries (Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador) developed into an international conflict. Thus, unprecedented militarisation broke out in the region as is demonstrated by the increased troop strength after 1980.

Another new element in Central America was the presence of foreign forces, which participated in the arms race and added to the military personnel: the United States stationed troops and carried out military manoeuvres in Honduras; the United States Military Group was established in El Salvador in 1980; Cuba incorporated military advisers in Nicaragua in 1981 (who withdrew in 1990); and the Soviet Union provided military aid to Nicaragua.

By way of cooperation, many countries rendered economic aid to Central America and urged *detente*. The first peace effort that won strong support from the international community was the work of the *Contadora Group*. Contadora was established on 9 January 1983 by Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela. Contadora focused its work on an effort to bring about a dialogue between the five Governments involved in the conflict (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) and suggested that a peace pact be signed which would include many provisions designed to promote *detente* between the Governments, the reduction of armies, the expulsion of foreign military forces, integration of the guerrillas into civilian life by widening political opportunities, and the like. The Contadora Agreement was not signed. A last effort was made on 7 June 1986. Nevertheless, the effort of the Contadora Group was not in vain, for several reasons: first, the dialogue between the Governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, with Nicaragua succeeded; secondly, it prevented a military

clash between Honduras and Nicaragua; and thirdly, it prevented military intervention by the United States in Nicaragua.

The Peace Agreement of the Contadora Group was not signed owing to the fact that, because of the internal conditions, the five Central American countries were not ready for peaceful co-existence inasmuch as both the Governments and the insurgent movements placed their trust in military strategies: (a) the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) versus the army of El Salvador; (b) the National Revolutionary Union of Guatemala (URNG) versus the Guatemalan army; and (c) the counter-revolutionaries versus the army of Nicaragua. To this was added the United States "containment of communism" strategy against the Government of Nicaragua and the guerrillas of El Salvador and Guatemala, known as a "war of low intensity".

The crisis in Central America can thus be divided into the following periods: Period of regional militarisation (1979-1987); period of civil war in Nicaragua (1978-1990), El Salvador (1981-1992) and Guatemala (1979-...); period of regional *detente* (1987 onwards); and period of implementation of the national peace processes (1987 onwards).

## Esquipulas II

On 7 August 1987, the historic document entitled "Procedure for the Establishment of a Strong and Lasting Peace in Central America", known as Esquipulas II, was signed in Guatemala. The peace process initiated in Esquipulas brought about regional *detente*. The process carried out by the Contadora Group was noteworthy because the Central American Governments agreed among themselves that there was a need to eliminate the tensions, mainly as regards Nicaragua, and to implement the mechanisms appropriate for that purpose. The International Verification and Follow-up Commission (CIVS) for the peace process in which representatives of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the Organisation of American States and members of the Contadora Group participated, was established. Similarly, amnesties were decreed for the rebel groups and it was proposed that national dialogues on peace should be initiated by the Governments with the guerrillas.

At this first stage, mediation was internal: in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua mediation was initiated by the Catholic church, and the institutions established for that purpose in the three countries as a

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result of the signing of Esquipulas II were named the *National Reconciliation Commission*.

Another result of Esquipulas II was the establishment of a regional consultation mechanism at the presidential level: the summit meetings of Central American presidents. They began with the first Esquipulas meeting on 24 and 25 May 1986. In 1991, Panama joined in the tenth presidential meeting, held at San Salvador from 15 to 17 July. At the presidential summits the process of economic integration and cooperation for development was then discussed. These presidential meetings were the most important indicators of the new climate of *detente* prevailing in the region. There was a giant leap from that regional effort to “nationalisation” of the peace.

### **Peace and Demilitarisation in Nicaragua**

In Nicaragua the peace and demilitarisation process was more rapid. The Sandinist Government (19 July 1979-25 April 1990) was faced with the war waged by the counter-revolutionaries at a very high cost. The country was completely militarised, both politically and economically. From 1985 to 1989 over 50 per cent of the Government’s budget was assigned to defence, the political struggle was reduced to a “state of emergency”, and the Government received direct advisory assistance from Cuba (estimated to consist of about 200 military advisers) and technology from the Soviet Union. The counter-revolutionaries received full support from the United States Government (including covert action) and its strategy against the Sandinist Government consisted of destroying the country’s economic infrastructure. For that reason Nicaragua became the most heavily indebted country in the entire Third World (more than \$10 billion for a population of 3 million, or \$3,300 per capita). The United States made \$447,690,000 available for the counterrevolution between 1982 and 1990. The exact amount of Cuban and Soviet aid to Nicaragua is unknown. The Nicaraguan Government calculated the economic cost of the war to be \$9 billion.

The counter-revolutionaries used sophisticated anti-air weapons (SAM-7) and the Government used Soviet high-technology helicopters against the Contras. In 1989, in the period of maximum mobilisation for the war, the Sandinist army is estimated to have had 120,000 reservists and 60,000 regulars.

The peace process developed along with two elements: democratisation and demilitarisation. After the signing of Esquipulas

II, the first step taken by the Nicaraguan Government was to establish the National Reconciliation Commission headed by Cardinal Obando y Bravo in August 1987. In September of the same year an amnesty was decreed and in October a national dialogue was convened, with 11 political parties of the opposition. On 23 March 1988, the first partial agreement with the counter-revolutionaries was signed: the "Sapoa Agreement", whereby the forces agreed not to engage in offensive military activities. This first achievement was frustrated by the counter-revolutionaries in June. In February 1989, a change of date was announced for the presidential elections; the National Assembly, municipalities and governors of the autonomous region on the Atlantic coast rescheduled it from November to February 1990.

In March 1989, an amnesty was announced for 1,894 members of the Somoza National Guard and, in August, the Government signed an agreement with the opposition parties guaranteeing impartiality in the elections. In December, nine opposition parties formed the National Opposition Union (UNO), and Violeta Chamorro was nominated to the presidency. In February 1990, Chamorro won the elections and became President on 25 April 1990. Demobilisation of the counter-revolutionaries was completed between April and June of 1990, and they were granted political and civil guarantees and given a piece of land, bringing the peace process to a successful end in July. The demobilisation included 22,000 counter-revolutionaries, of whom, as the International Support and Verification Commission of the Organisation of American States pointed out, fewer than 10,000 were combatants.

The demilitarisation process took place at the same time as the change of government and the demobilisation of the counter-revolutionaries. The Sandinist army decreased from more than 100,000 men (regulars and reservists) at the beginning of 1990 to 20,000 at the end of 1991, the largest reduction in the entire Central American region (not including Panama, where, as a result of the United States military intervention in December 1989, the army was disbanded). In budgetary terms, the demobilisation was very important because economic resources were then assigned to other priorities such as health and education.

### **Peace and Demilitarisation in El Salvador**

The civil war of El Salvador, which began in January 1981, was the military process with the largest geopolitical repercussions in the region

after the conflict in Nicaragua had ended. The fighting between the army and the FMLN began to have great repercussions. It can be said that the regional process of Esquipulas II was not successful in the case of El Salvador. Moreover, in El Salvador, unlike Nicaragua and Guatemala, the National Reconciliation Commission was not effective. The casualties—dead and wounded—in the civil war amounted to an average of 4,000 per year for the two armies (44,000 *guerrilleros* and servicemen killed or wounded between 1981 and 1991), and over 70,000 civilian victims of repression and of the fighting. The highest peak of military warfare was during the guerrilla offensive of November 1989 in San Salvador, the capital of the country. Among other negative events, the governmental army murdered six Jesuit priests, accusing them of being “intellectual originators” of the guerrilla offensive.

Unlike the fighting in Guatemala and Nicaragua, according to most analysts, the civil war between the FMLN and the army was a tie, because the negotiation for ending the war had been determined by a balance struck between the forces and it had not been easy for the Government to ask the guerrillas to surrender. Furthermore, the country was bound by a strong effort on the part of the United States to prevent a “communist regime” from winning, an effort in which more than \$6 billion were invested. From the war in Vietnam to the war in the Persian Gulf, it was the highest investment of the United States in the Third World.

“Since 1981, policy makers believed instead that victory in El Salvador could be won by influencing the regime to do what was necessary to win its people’s hearts and minds; and the United States believed that the \$6 billion in support it provided brought considerable leverage in that effort. But, the Salvadorans had America trapped. They realised that the United States was involved in their war for its own national security interests.”

The peace efforts were initiated in 1984. From 1981 to 1984 the FMLN tried to contact the Government without success. On 15 October 1984, the President of El Salvador, Jose N. Duarte, offered the FMLN a peace proposal, inviting it to participate in the political process in exchange for delivering the arms. This proposal was carried out one month later, at the second dialogue. By 1987, the talks came to a stop, when the third dialogue was held at the seat of the Apostolic Nuncio in San Salvador, on 4 and 5 December 1987. Later, in January 1989, the FMLN agreed, for the first time in the course of the war, to participate

in the electoral process and abide by the legislation in force. After the change of government in June 1989, the new President, Alfredo Cristiani, formed a delegation for dialogue with the FMLN, a delegation that met in September and October 1989. In that delegation the possibility was mentioned that the guerrillas might comply with legality if they handed in their weapons. At the same time the repression against the trade-unionists increased. The Catholic church was the mediator at all these meetings, but its mediation was suspended because of the murder of the Jesuits on 16 November 1989.

In 1990, the need for a new mediating and negotiating body became felt. Finally, the guerrillas and the Government admitted that the United Nations should participate in the negotiations, as from 4 April 1990, when the "Geneva Agreement" was signed. Beginning with the United Nations mediation, the final stage of the war began and it ended on 16 January 1992.

The peace process lasted for 12 months. The two peace commissions held 23 meetings with the United Nations delegation. Of these meetings, 13 were held in Mexico City, 4 in Costa Rica, 2 in Caracas, 3 in New York and 1 in Geneva. Before the final peace act was signed, five partial agreements were signed, which led to progress in the talks: (1) the "Geneva Agreement", whereby the commitment to mediation was signed; (2) the "Agenda" and the "Timetable" of the peace process, signed in Caracas on 21 May 1990; (3) the "Agreement on Human Rights", signed on 26 July 1990 in Costa Rica; (4) the "Agreement on Constitutional Reforms", signed on 27 April 1991 in Mexico City; and (5) the "New York Agreement", signed on 25 September 1991 in New York. Moreover, as part of the final process, the "Act of New York" was signed on 31 December 1991, with a view to the signing of the comprehensive peace document.

In the peace process the fact that a balance of military forces existed was very important. The mutual surrender of principles occurred basically as follows: the guerrillas agreed to be incorporated in the existing political process and to hand over their weapons, and the Government promised to make fundamental changes in the armed forces and security squads. Moreover, the United Nations Observer Mission (ONUSAL) was established as well as a national body in which all the political parties, the Government and the FMLN participated: the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ).

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In order to achieve the foregoing it was necessary, as observed by Marcel Merle, for the parties gradually to initiate “a process for moderating their positions and cooling their passions”, as well as to form a mediation body that would have legitimacy for the parties and for the international protagonists having influence on the conflict. Similarly, in the case of El Salvador, the “stabilising” concept of the negotiation process carried weight and, through the United Nations, good use was made of experience, because “the art of negotiation, which is not very susceptible to systematic treatment, is the fruit of talent, experience of the world and the thoughtful perusal of earlier negotiations”. This important and favourable United Nations mediation had the firm support of four countries: Colombia, Mexico, Spain and Venezuela, known as the “Group of Friends of the Secretary-General” and, at its final stage, the United States gave decisive signals in favour of negotiation from September to December 1991.

The peace agreement indicates that the peace process is to begin on 1 February 1992 and end on 31 October 1992. Reducing the army personnel of El Salvador is very important. The Government pledges to reduce the present complement of 53,000 armed forces and to disband all the security squads and paramilitaries. In addition, a new national civil police force is to be established. Similarly, the FMLN is to be disbanded gradually from 1 February to 31 October 1992 to become a political party. The balance of this peace process is very favourable. In fact, according to many analysts, the signing of the Act of Peace was a great triumph on the part of the civilians of El Salvador and of the international community, and a disadvantage only for those who had benefited from 12 years of war.

### **SLOW AND INCONCLUSIVE PEACE PROCESS IN GUATEMALA**

From 1954 onwards, when the *coup d'état* overthrew a democratic government, until 1986, when the civilian Vinicio Cerezo became President, the political process in Guatemala was dominated by the military. It was the country with the highest record of human rights violations in Latin America. In this context, since the 1960s there has been a guerrilla movement which has had many ups and downs in its military activity, but the counter-insurgency strategies used by the army have been unable to rout it. From the late 1970s onwards the guerrillas had the strong backing of the indigenous maya-quiche people.

For this reason the guerrilla war became better organised and more intensive. In 1981 the four existing guerrilla groups, partly imitating the unity of the El Salvador guerrillas, were unified and the National Revolutionary Union of Guatemala (URNG) was established. The Government launched a vast military counter-insurgent campaign and managed to prevent an expansion of the guerrilla movement. The combination of forces therefore favoured the army but it lacked the capacity to rout the guerrillas, so that the only way of overcoming a state of civil war was through a pact of peace.

The process of dialogue between the URNG and the Government began in Madrid on 9 October 1987, after which the National Reconciliation Commission was established, by the Esquipulas II process, with the mediation of the Catholic church. Subsequently, the National Reconciliation Commission met with the guerrillas several times and consecutive peace talks were held between the Government and the URNG: in Oslo, Norway, on 26 to 30 March 1990; in El Escorial, Spain, from 27 May to 1 June 1990; in Metepec, Mexico, from 25 to 30 October 1990; and in Mexico City, where, on 27 April 1991, the "Mexico City Agreement" was signed to prevent breaking the continuity of the talks.

Early in 1991, when the presidency changed, the new president, Jorge Serrano, announced a "Total Peace" plan, stating that during his administration peace with the guerrillas would be signed. The talks continued without favourable results until late in 1991. Actually the signing of the peace in El Salvador may have had a positive effect in Guatemala.

Guatemala is the place in Central America where the dialogue process is slowest. The government position is that peace can be achieved only if the guerrilla movement hands over its arms and becomes a political party. The guerrillas state that the following must be guaranteed: the processes for reducing the army and the elimination of the security system and security police, which are responsible for the human rights violations. No partial agreement between the two parties has been achieved, for which reason the transition in the peace-making process, from dialogue to negotiation, is not taking place. Thus, the Guatemalan situation is the last redoubt of the cold war which exists in Central America and which affects a comprehensive process for disarmament and demilitarisation throughout the region.

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## Concluding Remarks

*Detente* in Central America is a process that goes hand in hand with the consolidation of democracy, the reduction of armies, and the establishment of confidence-building measures between the various Governments. It has a favourable effect on the credibility and subsequent ability of the international organisations which have participated as mediators, such as the United Nations and the Organisation of American States. Moreover, the support of many Governments in the peace process has brought about whatever success there has been in Nicaragua and El Salvador. The establishment of peace is a long, drawn-out effort in Central America. It began with the work of the Contadora Group, was then internalised by the Central American Governments through the signing of Esquipulas II, and has counted on the successful mediation of the Organisation of American States in Nicaragua and of the United Nations in El Salvador. In Guatemala, the most heavily populated and industrialised country in the region, it is necessary to expedite a signed peace which is favourable for the parties and which involves reducing the army, disarming the guerrilla movement and transforming it into a political party (or parties), and disbanding the security squads. In all of the Central American countries it is clear that without peace no one can speak of democracy, and peace is a *sine qua non* for consolidating *detente*.

In Central America it is essential that the armies be transformed into armies based exclusively on doctrines of defence, that the national security doctrine of the Cold-War Era be eliminated, and that they no longer constitute a burden on their Governments. It is obvious that high-technology armaments are not necessary in the region and that they only generate tension between governments. In this connection, those countries of the region which have not lived through civil wars, such as Honduras, must also realize that demilitarisation and the reduction of their armed forces are a necessity. Costa Rica, which has no army (but does have security personnel), is an eVolume 2.

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