

**Online Study Materials on
CONVENTIONAL WARS AND WEAPONS
SYSTEMS MITIGATION AND MANAGEMENT**

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**CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS EFFORTS TO LIMIT
AND REDUCE THEM (APRIL, 1991)**

Introduction

Over the years it has become increasingly apparent that the goal of arms limitation and disarmament needs to be pursued, not only in the field of weapons of mass destruction, but also in that of conventional weapons. The category of weapons of mass destruction, as defined by the United Nations, comprises all nuclear weapons as well as radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any other weapons which might have characteristics comparable in their destructive effects. Conventional weapons have been understood within the United Nations to mean all weapons other than weapons of mass destruction.

The importance of pursuing disarmament with respect to weapons of mass destruction should in no way make us forget, in the words of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, “the need to deal squarely with the mounting toll of death, destruction and human suffering inflicted by the use of conventional weapons in conflicts around the world”. It is enough to recall that since 1945 well over 150 conflicts have been fought with conventional weapons and that they have caused over 20 million deaths. Moreover, in the course of the past two decades there has been a steady increase in the accuracy and destructive potential of conventional weapons, and ever more sophisticated—and costly—conventional weapons have been transferred into the arsenals of countries in developing regions. While the militarily significant industrialised States are still the biggest weapon-producing and exporting States, some developing countries are also building their own armaments industries and exporting weapons as well to other developing countries. Today conventional weapons and armed forces account for more than

four fifths of global military expenditures, representing a massive consumption of resources for potentially destructive purposes, in stark contrast to the urgent need for social and economic development, for which many of these resources might otherwise be used. These factors have contributed to a willingness on the part of States from all geographical and political groupings to deal with the question of controlling the conventional arms race.

The need to address nuclear and conventional weapons concurrently has increasingly been recognised. By acknowledging at their Geneva summit meeting in 1985 that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought, General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan also underlined the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. With the improvement in the international climate, progress in several areas of arms limitation and disarmament both between the USSR and the United States and between the members of the two major alliances has been achieved, particularly since the second half of the 1980s.

The conclusion of the INF Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States (on the elimination of their intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles), the prospects of further reductions in their nuclear arsenals (START agreement), and the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe at the summit of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in November 1990 have increased the hopes of the international community for meaningful arms limitation and disarmament.

At the United Nations, discussion of the issue of conventional disarmament has focused on four aspects, namely: (a) conventional weapons *per se* and efforts to limit and reduce them; (b) international arms transfers; (c) the regional approach; and (d) the 1980 Convention on inhumane weapons. (For the last-mentioned, see Disarmament Facts 71.)

Conventional weapons *per se* and efforts to limit and reduce them

Member States of the United Nations have always agreed in principle that arms limitation and disarmament should apply not only to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, but also to conventional weapons. Thus, after adopting a resolution dealing with the new security problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and its application for military purposes—the very first resolution it adopted (resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946)—the General Assembly later that year adopted

another resolution to address the question of achieving an early general regulation and reduction of all conventional armaments and armed forces (resolution 41 (I) of 14 December 1946).

Again in 1952, when the General Assembly established the Disarmament Commission, it directed the Commission to develop plans for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, and for the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.

At the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978, a Final Document setting out an international disarmament strategy was unanimously adopted. The Document recognised the need to have, together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations on the balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security (para. 22). While stressing that “effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority” (para. 20), Member States further agreed that priorities in disarmament negotiations would be: “nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces” (para. 45) and that “nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently” (para. 46). Moreover, the Document stated: “Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions” (para. 81).

However, in spite of those agreements in principle, the deliberations by the United Nations on disarmament before the mid-1980s focused mainly on nuclear disarmament, and only a limited number of Member States consistently supported measures towards conventional disarmament. In the meantime, the quantitative and qualitative advance in the development, production, use and transfer of conventional weapons continued unabated.

In 1981, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish an expert group to carry out a study on conventional disarmament. The study was completed in 1984. It helped to identify practical approaches and realistic measures that could lead to the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces. The study stressed that reductions in military *materiel* in all areas of the world where there were major concentrations of armaments could offer substantial benefits, as would reductions in personnel, to be achieved through agreed ceilings, through reductions in overall personnel figures or by the disbanding of a number of military units. Reductions and restrictions on military deployments were only a partial and preliminary measure, but they could contribute significantly to confidence-building and to conventional disarmament efforts. Restrictions on forces perceived to be particularly threatening or agreements on limits on the types and numbers of armed force components to be deployed in specified areas could be especially valuable. The study further suggested that particular attention should be given to armed forces deployed in foreign territories.

Other areas which the study believed could be considered were: restraint on militarily relevant research, development and testing; agreements on reductions of international arms transfers; confidence-building measures; and the promotion of an enlightened and determined commitment by the public in all countries to the achievement of effective measures of disarmament. In the context of public information, the United Nations was to provide accurate information on the armaments race and disarmament, to promote a sound understanding of the issues involved and of the different points of view, and to make the public aware of the approaches and measures by which conventional disarmament might be achieved.

The study suggested that, depending on the circumstances, deliberations and negotiations could take place in connection with or outside the United Nations; actions might be taken unilaterally, bilaterally, regionally or multilaterally, between individual States or groups of States. In view of their significant roles in world affairs, action by the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States to improve their mutual relationship would facilitate practical steps of conventional arms limitation and disarmament, not only between themselves and their allies, but also to some extent in other regions of the world. While some States had a special responsibility, the study declared that there was an urgent need for all States to explore what each one of them might be able to do in the way of initiating or facilitating

efforts aimed at conventional arms limitation and disarmament. In addition to negotiations, parallel actions by mutual example and/or unilateral initiatives might be impulses towards progress in disarmament efforts and should be considered where conditions permitted.

Consideration by the United Nations of the question of conventional disarmament, especially in recent years, has revealed an increased awareness among Member States that, without diverting priority efforts from nuclear matters, concern about the continuing arms race in conventional weapons is justified. There seems to be a growing recognition in the international community of the need for significant reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces in various parts of the world, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region, as essential elements of the disarmament process. Member States are now more aware of the fact that international peace and security cannot be achieved unless the question of the qualitative development, production and use, as well as transfer, of conventional weapons is also addressed.

Following the completion of the United Nations expert study on conventional disarmament, the General Assembly has, since 1985, included in its agenda an item entitled "Conventional disarmament". In 1986, the Assembly requested the Disarmament Commission to consider that question on the basis of the 1984 study, a task which it completed at its substantive session in 1990.

For a number of years the General Assembly has adopted further resolutions on the subject, addressing, *inter alia*, the issue of conventional disarmament on a regional scale. It has also urged the countries with the largest military arsenals and members of the two major military alliances to continue their negotiations on conventional armaments with a view to reaching agreement on the establishment of a stable and secure balance at lower levels under effective international control.

At the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1988, the debate on conventional disarmament was extensive. It touched upon such questions as the spread of ever more sophisticated conventional weapons throughout the world; the tragic losses of life and property in conventional warfare since the end of the Second World War; the increasing threat posed by conventional forces and weapons world-wide; the tendency to underestimate the danger of conventional arms proliferation and use by focusing on the threat posed by nuclear war; the expanding arms trade and international transfer in conventional weapons; the rising level of armaments and

the persistence of conventional wars in developing countries; the need for phased conventional disarmament on the basis of the concept of sufficiency, in regional and subregional areas; and the problems created by new technologies as applied to conventional weapons. The debate made clear that if the international community wanted to curb the arms race, it must in the future—much more than it had done in the past—place greater emphasis on conventional weapons at global, regional and subregional levels. A number of working papers were submitted from various sides, with a view to expanding the area of consensus on the subject.

The debate at both the 1989 and 1990 sessions of the General Assembly and the 1990 session of the Disarmament Commission clearly reflected the changes in the international climate brought about by the accelerating pace of events in Europe and by the results achieved in the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures and on conventional arms reduction. Hope was expressed that the European experience might inspire change in other regions as well. The broad objectives of arms limitation and disarmament, it was generally felt, now appeared practicable and achievable, but tangible progress towards them was necessary to lend permanence to the change. In May 1990, the Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus recommendations on conventional disarmament, which are reproduced in the annex.

International Arms Transfers

At the United Nations the question of the arms trade and, in general, international arms transfers presented from the very beginning numerous problems for which there were no easy solutions. In fact, the General Assembly was unable to adopt any resolution on the subject until 1988, exactly twenty years after the first attempt had been made to give the United Nations a role in restraining arms transfers between States, whether by trade or otherwise.

In the discussions, several Western countries point to the transfer of arms and, in particular, their importation as a main cause of the conventional arms race. On the other hand, a large number of Members, mostly developing countries, treat the question of transfers in conjunction with that of arms production, and most of them hold that the ever-increasing qualitative and quantitative arms traffic is promoted by the producers and suppliers in order to maximise their commercial and foreign policy advantages. In calling for the simultaneous regulation of the production and transfer of conventional weapons, many emphasise

that the industrialised countries' development and production of increasingly sophisticated and destructive types of such weapons tend in some cases to blur the difference between nuclear and conventional arms and thus to add anew and dangerous dimension to the already disconcerting overall situation in the armaments field. Although they recognise that a special responsibility rests with the suppliers, some supplier States, in particular the United Kingdom and the United States, stress the ineffectiveness of the unilateral approach by suppliers to curbing arms transfers.

A number of concrete suggestions aimed at curbing the international transfer of arms have been made, including (a) the prevention of all forms of illegal trade in arms; (b) international registration of arms sales and transfers; and (c) an expert study as a first step towards examining the conventional arms race and the growth of international arms transfers.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the regional approach to the regulation and reduction of arms transfers received increasing attention. In general, the concept was supported by countries with different geographical, political and socio-economic backgrounds.

Regional measures were seen as important supplements to other approaches, including bilateral and global initiatives. It was frequently stressed that conventional arms restraint was vital for both economic and security reasons, especially for developing and small and medium-sized countries, for the following reasons: the conventional arms race accounted for the largest portion of military expenditures; conventional weapons were being used in conflicts; conventional weapons were becoming increasingly lethal; and dual-purpose technology was being developed.

At the bilateral level, the USSR and the United States were engaged in talks on the limitation of conventional arms transfers in the late 1970s. However, they were unable to reach concrete agreement and the talks were suspended.

At the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1988, a number of Member States focused on the question of arms transfers. Addressing that issue, the Secretary-General of the United Nations said that the innocuous-sounding phrase "arms transfers" should not make one forget the devastating effect of the supply of weapons in local conflicts. He then added: "To my mind, the fact that the arms component is a growing factor in the export figures

of many countries, including developing countries, is a very sad commentary on the present state of affairs. With modern technology, not only nuclear war but, increasingly, conventional war as well, has acquired a dimension of destructiveness that it did not have in any earlier age. It is therefore necessary to restrict the spread of the most dangerous types of conventional weapons and, ultimately, to eliminate them altogether." One of the imperatives flowing from this, the Secretary-General stressed, was that there must be a greater awareness on the part of the international community of the incalculable dangers of the conventional arms race and of arms transfers.

Later in 1988, the General Assembly was finally able to adopt a substantive resolution on the subject (resolution 43/751), by which it expressed its conviction that arms transfers in all their aspects deserved serious consideration by the international community, *inter alia*, because of: (a) their potential effects in areas where tension and regional conflict threatened international peace and security and national security; (b) their known and potential negative effects on the process of the peaceful social and economic development of all peoples; and (c) increasing illicit and covert arms trafficking. It requested Member States to consider such measures as: reinforcement of their national systems of control and vigilance concerning production and transport of arms; examination of ways and means of refraining from acquiring arms additional to those needed for legitimate national security requirements, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region; and examination of the ways and means of providing for more openness and transparency with regard to world-wide arms transfers. By the same resolution, the Secretary-General was requested to carry out, with the assistance of governmental experts, a study on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, taking into consideration the views of Member States as well as other relevant information, including that on the problem of illicit arms trade. The study report of the group of experts will be submitted to the General Assembly in 1991.

Generally speaking, resolution 43/751 provides a significant indication of the international community's more positive approach to the question of international arms transfers. Indeed, it marks a turning-point in the multilateral approach to the issue. Although the perspectives of States on possible solutions are still different, as they reflect different national security perceptions and requirements, the way should now be open for the United Nations to develop a consensus on multilateral action

with a view to restraining international arms transfers. This is especially important at this juncture, now that an East-West agreement on reductions of conventional arms has been reached (November 1990, see below). All efforts should be made to ensure that weapons earmarked for destruction do not find their way into the international arms market.

The Regional Approach

While stressing the need for harmony between regional efforts and global programmes and priorities, the 1981 United Nations study on all aspects of regional disarmament noted that the inclusion of a regional aspect in the approach to disarmament is of particular importance as regards the cessation of the conventional arms race. It stated that the ubiquity of conventional weapons and armed forces, their technical and functional diversity and the central role of conventional forces in the security perceptions of countries of a region make the question of conventional disarmament highly complex and the possible approaches highly dependent on regional conditions.

As has been noted, the urgency of regional disarmament stems both from the importance of enhancing security in the different regions of the world and from the impetus which the adoption of measures in one region can give to efforts in other regions or globally. Effective measures of disarmament are particularly needed in those regions where there is a large accumulation of weapons and/or where situations persist which might endanger peace and security.

The regional approach to disarmament is by no means new. Several important initiatives since the Second World War have been regional in scope; a good number have been taken in the nuclear field. It is enough to refer in this connection to proposals and agreements relating to nuclear weapon free zones, such as the Treaty of Treaty of, or to nuclear free zones, such as the Treaty of Rarotonga, and to zones of peace. Others cover both nuclear and conventional weapons. This is the case, for instance, of the Antarctic Treaty, an international agreement providing for the complete demilitarisation of a sizeable geographical region. Still others may focus exclusively on conventional weapons.

Measures of disarmament can, of course, be taken unilaterally, either as an end in themselves or as a means of creating an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence and, in general, promoting bilateral or multilateral negotiations on disarmament. A number of such steps have been taken in the past years. Europe, for example, is the region most affected by unilaterally measures of arms reduction. In December

1988, General Secretary Gorbachev underscored in the General Assembly the need to turn from the principle of overarmament to the principle of reasonable defensive sufficient. Specifically, he announced plans for the reduction of the Soviet armed forces by 500,000 men within the next two years and that by 1991, 50,000 Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Eastern Europe. The total reduction in the European part of the USSR and in the territory of its allies would comprise 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft. Early in 1989 other member States of the Warsaw Treaty also announced unilateral reductions in their armaments.

Against the backdrop of dramatic developments in Eastern European countries later in 1989 and in 1990, additional reductions were announced and implemented. Agreements were reached between Hungary and the Soviet Union as well as between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union regarding the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territories of those States. By a treaty signed in October 1990 between Germany and the Soviet Union, Soviet troops stationed on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic would be completely withdrawn by 1994.

Europe has been the focus of considerable multilateral effort as well. Throughout 1988, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) worked to establish a new forum for negotiations to supersede the unsuccessful Talks on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe, which had been conducted since 1973. The new forum, the "Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe" (CFE), in which 16 member States of NATO and initially 7 member States of the WTO participated, opened in March 1989 in Vienna. The negotiations were established within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. In the new, more promising political atmosphere, these negotiations became the main focus of attention in the field of conventional disarmament, both in a general sense and as a regional initiative of crucial importance, involving the world's most heavily armed continent.

During the negotiation period several of the premises under which the participants entered the negotiations changed significantly, requiring considerable flexibility by negotiators. Finally, the 22 member States of the two military alliances agreed on a text for limiting, conventional armaments in Europe. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed by the 22 States at the summit meeting of the

Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held in Paris in November 1990. At that meeting, an additional set of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), complementing those agreed on in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the Stockholm Document of 1986, was also adopted by the 34 participating States, together with a "Charter of Paris for a New Europe". The adoption of those documents is a tremendous achievement in that it contributes to strengthening stability and security in Europe through, *inter alia*, a stable and secure balance of conventional weapons at lower levels, and an increase in the level of confidence and trust among the States participating in the CSCE process.

Outside Europe, efforts to reduce tension and lower the level of armed forces are being undertaken as well, particularly in Central America. In 1987, at the talks held among Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, the President of Costa Rica suggested that the five Central American States begin "negotiations for the control and reduction of current stocks of weapons and on the number of troops under arms". Such negotiations should also cover measures for the disarming of irregular forces operating in the region. Negotiations have continued, and in July 1990 the Security Commission, set up by the five Central American Presidents, agreed upon a series of objectives, among them, that the armed forces in the region be of a defensive character, that they be balanced so as not to pose a threat to neighbouring States, and that a mechanism for verification and control be established. At a further meeting, in November 1990, the Commission agreed in principle on elements for the establishment of a reasonable, proportionate balance of forces in the region, and approved the proposal of its Technical Sub-Commission for a model to monitor the levels and inventories of military installations, equipment and armaments in Central America.

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)

The CFE Treaty and its various protocols are of historic importance. Seeking to establish a stable and secure balance of conventional forces at lower levels, to eliminate disparities in forces and the capability to launch a surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations, the Treaty has been hailed as the most ambitious arms- and force-limitation agreement ever concluded.

The CFE Treaty puts equal ceilings and sub-ceilings for the two sides on tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, requiring verified destruction of excess equipment, during a three-year period (or, in a few cases, conversion for civilian

purposes). It also sets up an elaborate system of verification, including data exchange, on-site inspection, challenge inspection and on-site monitoring of the destruction of military equipment to be reduced. The sub-ceilings set limits on the quantity of different kinds of military ground equipment permitted within major categories (for instance armoured personnel carriers, armoured infantry fighting vehicles), and on how much of it may be stationed in each of four sub-zones of the area from the Atlantic to the Urals. Another agreed sub-ceiling, referred to as the “sufficiency rule”, sets a limit on the proportion of the total permitted to each side that can be held by any single country (about one third).

The following restrictions/limitations have been agreed upon:

<i>Treaty-limited items</i>	<i>per side</i>	<i>Ceilings in any one country</i>
Tanks	20000	13300
Armoured combat vehicles	30000	20000
Artillery	20000	13700
Combat aircraft	6800	5150
Attack helicopters	2000	1500

The CFE Treaty also commits its parties to follow-on negotiations, with the same basic mandate, in which they are expected to seek agreement on, among other things, manpower levels. The parties also agreed not to increase existing levels during the new round of negotiations.

While most of the difficult questions concerning definitions were resolved in agreed language within the Treaty, the question of land-based naval aircraft was resolved by a commitment outside the Treaty to limit them to 430 on each side.

On the occasion of the signing of the CFE Treaty, the parties to the Treaty issued a joint declaration:

1. The signatories solemnly declare that, in the new era of European relations which is beginning, they are no longer adversaries, will build new partnerships and extend to each other the hand of friendship.
2. They recall their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirm all of their commitments under the Helsinki Final Act. They stress that all of the ten Helsinki Principles are of primary significance and that, accordingly, they will be equally

and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others. In that context, they affirm their obligation and commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State, from seeking to change existing borders by threat or use of force, and from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the principles and purposes of those documents. None of their weapons will ever be used except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

3. They recognise that security is indivisible and that the security of each of their countries is inextricably linked to the security of all the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.
4. They undertake to maintain only such military capabilities as are necessary to prevent war and provide for effective defence. They will bear in mind the relationship between military capabilities and doctrines.
5. They reaffirm that every State has the right to be or not to be a party to a treaty of alliance.
6. They note with approval the intensification of political and military contacts among them to promote mutual understanding and confidence. They welcome in this context the positive responses made to recent proposals for new regular diplomatic liaison.
7. They declare their determination to contribute actively to conventional, nuclear and chemical arms control and disarmament agreements which enhance security and stability for all. In particular, they call for the early entry into force of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and commit themselves to continue the process of strengthening peace in Europe through conventional arms control within the framework of the CSCE. They welcome the prospect of new negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of their short-range nuclear forces.
8. They welcome the contribution that confidence- and security-building measures have made to lessening tensions and fully support the further development of such measures. They reaffirm the importance of the Open Skies initiative and their determination to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion as soon as possible.

9. They pledge to work together with the other CSCE participating States to strengthen the CSCE process so that it can make an even greater contribution to security and stability in Europe. They recognise in particular the need to enhance political consultations among CSCE participants and to develop other CSCE mechanisms. They are convinced that the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and agreement on a substantial new set of CSBMs, together with new patterns of co-operation in the framework of the CSCE, will lead to increased security and thus to enduring peace and stability in Europe.
10. They believe that the preceding points reflect the deep longing of their peoples for close co-operation and mutual understanding and declare that they will work steadily for the further development of their relations in accordance with the present Declaration as well as with the principles set forth in the Helsinki Final Act.

The Vienna Document of 1990 on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe

The Vienna Document of 1990 integrates a set of substantially new confidence- and security-building measures with measures adopted in the Stockholm Document of 1986 in a way that further develops those provisions in the light of the experience gained. The main text of the Vienna Document deals with annual exchanges of information in an agreed format on the command-organisation and deployment of military forces and weapon systems, on plans for future deployment, and on military budgets giving itemised defence expenditures on the basis of the categories set out in the United Nations instrument for standardised international reporting on military expenditures.

In a section on risk reduction, the Document of 1990 specifies mechanisms for consultation and co-operation regarding unusual military activities and hazardous military incidents. It also delineates procedures for military contacts and visits to air bases, and extends the arrangements made earlier regarding prior notification of certain military activities and regarding verification of compliance, including inspection on request. It provides for a network of direct communications between the capitals of the participating States and for annual implementation-assessment meetings. In adopting the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the 34 signatories pledge their common efforts to consolidate respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law and to strengthen peace and promote unity in Europe. To achieve those goals, a new quality of

political dialogue and co-operation and the development of new structures in the CSCE are necessary. To this end the parties decided in establish various mechanisms, such as regular meetings of the heads of State or Government of the CSCE participants, regular meetings of the Council of CSCE Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the setting up of a CSCE Secretariat in Prague as well as of a Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna. An office for Free Elections will be established in Warsaw.

Conclusion

The trend beginning in the mid-1980s towards increasing emphasis on the conventional aspect of the arms race is encouraging. In view of the very large number of armed conflicts since the end of the Second World War, it is important that negotiations for limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued.

The new co-operative spirit which has been highlighted by the conclusion of important agreements may open vast possibilities for further progress in the field of conventional arms limitation and disarmament, both in Europe and beyond. It may also encourage change in political, social and economic fields.

The accumulation and increasing sophistication of conventional arms occur world-wide, with different implications for various regions. There is an urgent need for the international community to explore what can be done to promote conventional arms limitation and disarmament and restraint in international arms transfers. The problem of curbing the conventional arms race and transfers of weapons is not only regional: it is an integral part of the global problem of security.

ANNEX

At its 1990 session, the Disarmament Commission continued its consideration of issues related to conventional disarmament with a view to facilitating possible measures in the field of conventional arms reduction and disarmament as well as on the issue of international arms transfers. At the end of the session, the following text was adopted by consensus:

1. The Working Group recalled the priorities in disarmament established by the General Assembly in the Final Document of its Tenth Special Session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, as stated in paragraph 45, namely, nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical

weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces. As stated in paragraph 46 of the Final Document, nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently. The Group took into account the principles derived from the Final Document which provided the perspective on and addressed the subjects of the conventional arms race and conventional disarmament as identified in paragraph 8 of the Study on Conventional Disarmament (A/39/348).

2. In dealing with the subject-matter before it in the context established in paragraph 1 above, the Group recalled that since the Second World War there has been a large number of armed conflicts fought with conventional weapons. It was noted that certain conflicts continue and pose a threat to regional and global peace and security. The Group, however, took account of the recent overall amelioration in the international situation and the trend towards the peaceful settlement of various regional conflicts, the important role played in that regard by the United Nations and the possible positive implications of these developments for efforts related to disarmament.
3. Attention was given to recent developments in relation to Europe, which has the highest concentration of arms and armed forces. The successful conclusion in January 1989 of the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna led to further negotiations in the field of confidence- and security-building measures as well as the new Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, both within the framework of the CSCE process. The Group, recalling General Assembly resolutions 41/86 L, 43/75 P and 44/1161, welcomed the progress made and considered that positive results in these negotiations would serve to improve security and develop co-operation in Europe, thereby contributing to international peace and security in the world as a whole.
4. Attention was also given to the agreement in 1987 between Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador on a procedure for the establishment of a firm and lasting peace in Central America and subsequent declarations and agreements, which include important steps towards disarmament. The Group welcomed these declarations and agreements, which would serve to promote security and develop

co-operation in the region. They constitute an important contribution to international peace and security.

5. The Group identified a number of issues and possible measures in the field of conventional arms reductions and disarmament, which are set out below.
6. The accumulation and increasing sophistication of conventional arms in various regions of the world, particularly by those States with the largest military arsenals, have grave implications for international peace and security. Agreements or other measures in the field of conventional disarmament therefore should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis, due account being taken of paragraph 83 of the Final Document. Whereas States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional disarmament, it is incumbent upon all States, while taking into account the need to protect their security and maintain necessary defensive capabilities, to intensify their efforts and take, either on their own or by agreement, appropriate steps in the field of conventional disarmament that would enhance peace and security in their regions as well as globally and contribute to overall progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament.
7. The limitation and reduction of conventional arms and armed forces could relate to weapons and manpower, and include their deployment. The objective of conventional disarmament measures should be undiminished or increased security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces. Weapons and equipment which are the subject of conventional forces reductions agreements should not be transferred, directly or indirectly, to States not party to the agreement in question. The principal method of dealing with such reductions should be destruction.
8. The States members of two major military alliances have made progress towards an early agreement on substantial reduction of their conventional armed forces in Europe; they are urged to continue their intensive efforts to this end in order to fulfil the mandate of their negotiations, which is to achieve increased security at lower levels offerees and to eliminate the capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action.

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9. In relation to negotiations on conventional disarmament, conscious of paragraph 83 of the Final Document of SSOD I, States should take into account a number of factors, such as: circumstances prevailing in a particular region; the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the forces which are the subject of negotiations; the importance of a basis of comparable data; asymmetries that might exist among various countries as a result of historical, geographical and other factors; the need to eliminate military asymmetries which are prejudicial to security; the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence and the right of peoples to self-determination and independence; the various significant implications of military strategies; the need to take steps to eliminate the capability for surprise attack and offensive action; and the implications of arms transfers.
 10. Although negotiations should be undertaken to facilitate and achieve substantial disarmament, and ultimately general and complete disarmament, unilateral measures could be taken in order to enhance regional and global peace and security.
 11. Taking into consideration the progress accomplished in the field of conventional disarmament, the important role of efforts at disarmament on a regional scale must be recognised. The regional approach to disarmament is one of the essential elements in global efforts. Regional disarmament measures should be taken at the initiative and with the participation of States concerned and must take into account the specific characteristics of each region. In regions where tensions may be high and a potential for conflict may exist, measures aimed at reducing tensions could lead to reductions and restrictions on military deployments by all States concerned and thus contribute to strengthening confidence and international peace and security.
 12. Although confidence-building measures, whether military or non-military, cannot serve as a substitute for concrete disarmament measures, they can play an important role in facilitating progress towards disarmament in that they alleviate mistrust and thus enhance international co-operation and security, whether they are taken unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally. Consequently, the value of such measures was emphasised, it being understood that they should always be so designed as to take into account the specific situation in and characteristics of the region in question.

13. Conventional disarmament agreements must provide for adequate and effective measures for their verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and to ensure that the agreements are being observed. The Group noted that the Secretary-General, upon the request of the General Assembly and with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, is undertaking an in-depth study of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification.
14. As appropriate, negotiations on measures of conventional disarmament should also cover such types of conventional weapons as encompass radically new techniques arising from qualitative technological advances.
15. The global expenditure on arms and armed forces, by far the largest part of which is attributable to conventional arms and armed forces, represents a massive consumption of resources for potentially destructive purposes in a stark contrast to the urgent need for social and economic development and for increased international co-operation in those fields. Reduction in military expenditure by releasing resources could, therefore, entail benefits both in the social and economic fields as well as in the political field.
16. Arms transfers can have serious implications for conventional disarmament, as recalled in the Final Document. Arms transfers should be addressed in conjunction with the questions of maintaining international peace and security, reducing international tension, enhancing confidence, and promoting disarmament as well as social and economic development. Restraint and greater openness can help in this respect and contribute to the promotion of international peace and security. In this context, the grave consequences of illicit traffic in arms deserve substantive consideration. The Group noted that the Secretary-General, upon the request of the General Assembly and with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, is undertaking an in-depth study of ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms on a universal and non-discriminatory basis.
17. Taking into account the priorities in disarmament set out in the Final Document, the subject of conventional disarmament should continue to be actively pursued in the United Nations as one significant contribution to the endeavours of the

international community towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In addition to deliberations by the Disarmament Commission on how to facilitate the process of conventional disarmament, it would be welcome if the Conference on Disarmament were to address the issue of conventional disarmament when practicable. The United Nations should be kept duly informed of developments in disarmament efforts outside its aegis, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

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THE COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments

When the first session of the General Assembly reconvened in New York in the latter part of 1946, it took up, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, the question of the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. The Soviet Union proposed¹ the establishment of two commissions : one “for the control of the execution of the decision regarding the reduction of armaments” and the other “for the control of the execution of the decision regarding the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes”. The prohibition of the production and use of atomic weapons was proposed as the first step of a programme for general disarmament.

Some countries maintained that the first step towards a general regulation and reduction of armaments should be to negotiate the special arrangements envisaged by Article 43 of the Charter, which would make available to the Security Council, on its call, the armed forces, assistance and facilities necessary for maintaining international peace and security.

A draft resolution submitted by the United States recommended that the work of the Atomic Energy Commission be continued while the Security Council worked on the general regulation and reduction of armaments with practical and effective safeguards by way of inspection. The Soviet Union accepted the draft as a basis for discussion.

The unanimous resolution of the Assembly that emerged provided for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces with an international system of control and inspection within the framework of the Security Council; recognised the close connexion

between the problem of security and disarmament; and recommended the progressive and balanced withdrawal of armed forces stationed in ex-enemy territories as well as those stationed in the territories of Members without their consent. Resolution 41 (I), adopted unanimously on 14 December 1946, reads as follows:

1. In pursuance of Article 11 of the Charter and with a view to strengthening international peace and security in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

The General Assembly

Recognises the necessity of an early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

2. *Accordingly,*

The General Assembly

Recommends that the Security Council give prompt consideration to formulating the practical measures, according to their priority, which are essential to provide for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and to assure that such regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces will be generally observed by all participants and not unilaterally by only some of the participants. The plans formulated by the Security Council shall be submitted by the Secretary-General to the Members of the United Nations for consideration at a special session of the General Assembly. The treaties or conventions approved by the General Assembly shall be submitted to the signatory States for ratification in accordance with Article 26 of the Charter.

3. As an essential step towards the urgent objective of prohibiting and eliminating from national armaments atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass destruction, and the early establishment of international control of atomic energy and other modern scientific discoveries and technical developments to ensure their use only for peaceful purposes,

The General Assembly

Urges the expeditious fulfilment by the Atomic Energy Commission of its terms of reference as set forth in section 5 of the General Assembly resolution of 24 January 1946.

4. In order to ensure that the general prohibition, regulation and reduction of armaments are directed towards the major weapons of modern warfare and not merely towards the minor weapons.

The General Assembly

Recommends that the Security Council expedite consideration of the reports which the Atomic Energy Commission will make to the Security Council and that it facilitate the work of that Commission, and also that the Security Council expedite consideration of a draft convention or conventions for the creation of an international system of control and inspection, these conventions to include the prohibition of atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass destruction and the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes.

5. *The General Assembly*

Further recognises that essential to the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, is the provision of practical and effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.

Accordingly,

The General Assembly

Recommends to the Security Council that it give prompt consideration to the working out of proposals to provide such practical and effective safeguards in connexion with the control of atomic energy and the general regulation and reduction of armaments.

6. To ensure the adoption of measures for the early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, for the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes and the elimination from national armaments of atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now or in the future to mass destruction, and for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes,

There shall be established, within the framework of the Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, an international system, as mentioned in paragraph 4, operating through special organs, which organs shall derive their powers and status from the convention or conventions under which they are established.

7. *The General Assembly,*

Regarding the problem of security as closely connected with that of disarmament,

Recommends the Security Council to accelerate as much as possible the placing at its disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter;

Recommends the Members to undertake the progressive and balanced withdrawal, taking into account the needs of occupation, of their armed forces stationed in ex-enemy territories, and the withdrawal without delay of their armed forces stationed in the territories of Members without their consent freely and publicly expressed in treaties or agreements consistent with the Charter and not contradicting international agreements;

Further recommends a corresponding reduction of national armed forces, and a general progressive and balanced reduction of national armed forces.

8. Nothing herein contained shall alter or limit the resolution of the General Assembly passed on 24 January 1946, creating the Atomic Energy Commission.

9. *The General Assembly*

Calls upon all Members of the United Nations to render every possible assistance to the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and collective security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources.

Information on Armed Forces

Another USSR item on the General Assembly's agenda concerned information on armed forces in non-enemy territories. This was broadened by the United Kingdom to include armed forces at home as well, and in turn by the Soviet Union to include also information on the armaments of forces on home territory. On 14 December 1946, the General Assembly adopted, by a vote of 36 to 6, with 4 abstentions, resolution 42(I), which called on the Security Council to determine the information that should be furnished.

Establishment of the Commission for Conventional Armaments

The Commission for Conventional Armaments was established by the Security Council on 13 February 1947, with the same composition as the Council.² It was instructed to submit to the Council, within three months, proposals: (a) for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces; and (b) for practical and effective

safeguards in connexion with the general regulation and reduction of armaments. Matters which fell within the competence of the Atomic Energy Commission were excluded from the terms of reference of the new Commission.

Work of the Commission 1947-1948

A working committee of the whole was established by the Commission to carry on the day-to-day detailed discussions on the basis of working papers from its members.³ In August 1948, the Commission adopted two resolutions and a progress report⁴ by a vote of 9 to 2 (Ukrainian SSR and USSR). The first resolution advised the Security Council that the Commission considered "that all armaments and armed forces, except atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction, fall within its jurisdiction and that weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above".

The second resolution embodied the following general principles to govern the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces:

1. A system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces should provide for the adherence of all States. Initially it must include at least all States having substantial military resources.

2. A system of regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces can only be put into effect in an atmosphere of international confidence and security. Measures for the regulation and reduction of armaments which would follow the establishment of the necessary degree of confidence might in turn be expected to increase confidence and so justify further measures of regulation and reduction.

3. Examples of conditions essential to such confidence and security are:

- (a) The establishment of an adequate system of agreements under Article 43 of the Charter. Until the agreed forces are pledged to the Security Council, an essential step in establishing a system of collective security will not have been taken.
- (b) The establishment of international control of atomic energy. It is a basic assumption of the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments that the Atomic Energy Commission

will make specific proposals for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

- (c) The conclusion of the peace settlements with Germany and Japan. Conditions of international peace and security will not be fully established until measures have been agreed upon which will prevent these States from undertaking aggressive action in the future.

4. A system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, in order to make possible the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources pursuant to Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, must limit armaments and armed forces to those which are consistent with and indispensable to the maintenance of international peace and security. Such armaments and armed forces should not exceed those necessary for the implementation of Members' obligations and the protection of their rights under the Charter of the United Nations.

5. A system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces must include an adequate system of safeguards, which by including an agreed system of international supervision will ensure the observance of the provisions of the treaty or convention by all parties thereto. A system of safeguards cannot be adequate unless it possesses the following characteristics:

- (a) It is technically feasible and practical;
- (b) It is capable of detecting promptly the occurrence of violations;
- (c) It causes the minimum interference with, and imposes the minimum burdens on, any aspect of the life of individual nations.

6. Provision must be made for effective enforcement action in the event of violations.

The USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, opposing the resolutions, maintained that by excluding atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from its purview, the Commission contravened resolution 41(I) which, in their opinion, treated the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces as a single indivisible question and required the Commission to formulate practical measures not merely for the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments but also for the prohibition of the use and manufacture of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and for destruction of existing stocks of such weapons. They also maintained that the Commission should have formulated promptly practical measures for the general regulation

and reduction of armaments and armed forces, there being no conditions or prerequisites for the formulation or implementation of such practical measures. Finally, they said, the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces must necessarily provide for the complete prohibition of atomic weapons as well as of other weapons adaptable to mass destruction. The opposition of the United States and the United Kingdom to the prohibition of atomic weapons, it was argued, prevented any progress towards a general reduction of armaments and armed forces.

Consideration by the General Assembly 1948

The report of the Commission was transmitted to the Security Council which in turn placed it before the General Assembly in 1948. The Soviet Union introduced a draft resolution⁵ recommending that, as a first step in the reduction of armaments and armed forces, the permanent members of the Security Council reduce by one-third, during one year, all land, naval and air forces; that atomic weapons be prohibited as weapons of aggression but not of defence; and that an international control body be established within the framework of the Security Council for the supervision of and control over the implementation of the measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces, as well as those for the prohibition of atomic weapons.

A draft resolution,⁶ based on a French proposal amended by Belgium, expressed the hope that the Commission would devote its main attention to formulating proposals for the receipt, checking and publication by a control organ of full information to be supplied by Member States with regard to the level of their armed forces and conventional armaments.

The Soviet Union and its supporters criticised the Belgian proposal, in part because it endorsed the theory that security must precede disarmament, which was deemed a militaristic thesis. The United States argued that an atmosphere of international confidence was a prerequisite of armaments reduction, and that that atmosphere could not be established until the threat of communist aggression ceased.

After rejecting the USSR draft resolution by 39 votes to 6, with 6 abstentions, the General Assembly, on 19 November 1948, adopted the Belgian proposal as resolution 192 (III), by a vote of 43 to 6, with 1 abstention. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Desiring to establish relations of confident collaboration between the States within the framework of the Charter and to make possible a

general reduction of armaments in order that humanity may in future be spared the horrors of war and that the peoples may not be overwhelmed by the continually increasing burden of military expenditure,

Considering that no agreement is attainable on any proposal for the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces so long as each State lacks exact and authenticated information concerning the conventional armaments and armed forces of other States, so long as no convention has been concluded regarding the types of military forces to which such reduction would apply, and so long as no organ of control has been established,

Considering that the aim of the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces can only be attained in an atmosphere of real and lasting improvement in international relations, which implies in particular the application of control of atomic energy involving the prohibition of the atomic weapon,

But *noting* on the other hand that this renewal of confidence would be greatly encouraged if States were placed in possession of precise and verified data as to the level of their respective conventional armaments and armed forces,

Recommends the Security Council to pursue the study of the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces through the agency of the Commission for Conventional Armaments in order to obtain concrete results as soon as possible;

Trusts that the Commission for Conventional Armaments, in carrying out its plan of work, will devote its first attention to formulating proposals for the receipt, checking and publication, by an international organ of control within the framework of the Security Council, of full information to be supplied by Member States with regard to their effectives and their conventional armaments;

Invites the Security Council to report to the Assembly no later than its next regular session on the effect given to the present recommendation, with a view to enabling it to continue its activity with regard to the regulation of armaments in accordance with the purposes and principles defined by the Charter;

Invites all nations in the Commission for Conventional Armaments to co-operate to the utmost of their power in the attainment of the above-mentioned objectives.

Work of the Commission 1949

In 1949, the Commission had before it a USSR proposal similar to the one rejected by the Assembly the previous year, and a new French working paper⁷ which formulated a plan for a census and verification of information on armed forces and conventional armaments but excluding atomic weapons. The plan provided for a central control authority to be “directly subordinated to the Security Council”. The Ukrainian SSR and the USSR opposed the French plan on the grounds that it imposed preliminary conditions on the reduction of armaments and armed forces and, moreover, avoided the question of the collection of information in the atomic field. The French working paper was adopted by the Commission on 1 August and was transmitted to the Security Council.

When, in October 1949, the Security Council considered the proposals forwarded by the Commission on the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces,⁸ the French proposal received 8 votes in favour and 2 against, with 1 abstention, but was not adopted because of the negative vote of the USSR; the Soviet proposal, whereby the Council would recognise as essential the submission by States of information both on armed forces and conventional armaments and on atomic weapons, was rejected by 3 votes in favour and 1 against, with 7 abstentions. The Council then decided to transmit the records to the General Assembly for its information.

Consideration by the General Assembly 1949

By a vote of 44 to 5, with 5 abstentions, the General Assembly, on 5 December 1949, approved the proposals formulated by the Commission for the submission of information on conventional armaments and armed forces, and its verification.⁹ Resolution 300 (IV) reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 192. (III) of 19 November 1948, and in particular its recommendation that the Commission for Conventional Armaments, in carrying out its plan of work, devote its first attention to the formulation of proposals for the receipt, checking and publication, by an international organ of control within the framework of the Security Council, of full information to be supplied by Member States with regard to their effectives and their conventional armaments,

Having examined the records of the discussions in the Security Council and in the Commission for Conventional Armaments regarding the implementation of the above-mentioned recommendation,

1. *Approves* the proposals formulated by the Commission for Conventional Armaments for the submission by Member States of full information on their conventional armaments and armed forces and the verification thereof, as constituting the necessary basis for the implementation of the above-mentioned recommendation;
2. *Considers* that the early submission of this information would constitute an essential step towards a substantial reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces and that, on the other hand, no agreement is likely to be reached on this matter so long as each State lacks exact and authenticated information concerning the conventional armaments and armed forces of other States;
3. Notes that unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council, which is essential for the implementation of the above-mentioned proposals, has not yet been achieved;
4. *Recommends* therefore that the Security Council, despite the lack of unanimity among its permanent members on this essential feature of its work, continue its study of the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces through the agency of the Commission for Conventional Armaments in accordance with its plan of work, in order to make such progress as may be possible;
5. *Calls upon* all members of the Security Council to co-operate to this end.

A Soviet proposal calling upon the Assembly to declare it essential that the States submit information both on armed forces and conventional armaments and on atomic weapons was rejected by a vote of 39 to 6, with 9 abstentions.¹⁰

Final Work of the Commission 1950

When the Commission reconvened in April 1950, the representative of the USSR submitted a formal proposal¹¹ to the effect that the representative of China, whom he termed "the representative of the Kuomintang group", be excluded from membership of the Commission. His proposal having been rejected, the USSR representative stated that his delegation would not take part in the work of the Commission so long as the "Kuomintang group" was permitted to remain in the Commission, and would not recognise as lawful and valid any decision taken with the participation of its representative.

The Commission then decided to transmit to its Working Committee Assembly resolution 300 (IV), of 5 December 1949, with instructions to resume work 'on practical and effective safeguards to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.

The report of the Working Committee,¹² which was forwarded by the Commission to the Security Council in 1950, included annexes on: (1) French proposals concerning study of an international system for control of conventional armaments; (2) United States views on safeguards; (3) United States views on the nature and relationship to the United Nations of the international agency which would supervise the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces; (4) United States views on the nature and scope of military safeguards; and (5) United States views on the nature and scope of industrial safeguards. The Security Council took no action on the report.

The Commission did not meet again. It was dissolved by the Security Council in February 1952 in accordance with the recommendation of the General Assembly in resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January that year (see page 41).

REFERENCES

1. Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Part II, First Committee, Summary Record of Meetings, annex 9e.
2. Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1947, resolution 18 (1947) of 13 February 1947 (S/268/Rev.1/Corr.1).
3. Document S/C.3/32/Rev.1.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Part I, Plenary Meetings. Annexes, document A/723.
6. *Ibid.*, document A/722. para. 11 (A/C.1/393).
7. Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Supplement for September, October, November and December 1949, document S/1372 (S/C.3/40).
8. *Ibid.*, Fourth Year, Nos. 46-48, 450th-452nd meetings.
9. Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Plenary Meetings, 268th meeting.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Document S/C.3/42.
12. Document S/1690.

REGISTER OF THE TRADE IN MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WITH INDUSTRIALIZED AND THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, 1989

This appendix lists major weapons on order or under delivery during 1989. The column 'Year(s) of deliveries' includes aggregates of all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. The sources and methods for the data collection, and the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms used, are explained in appendix 7D. The entries are made alphabetically, by recipient and supplier.

<i>Recipient</i>	<i>Supplier</i>	<i>No. ordered</i>	<i>Weapon designation</i>	<i>Weapon description</i>	<i>Year of order</i>	<i>Year(s) of deliveries</i>	<i>No. delivered</i>	<i>Comments</i>
I. Industrialised countries								
Australia	Canada	15	LAV-25	APC	1989		2500	Total cost US\$ 33 m
	France	5	Falcon-900	Trpt aircraft	1988	1988-89	(4)	For VIP use
	Italy	(10)	HSS-1	Surveillance radar	1986	1988-89	(4)	Deal worth \$20 m
	South Africa	1	Buffel	Armoured car	1989	1989	1	For Australian UN forces in Maibia
	UK	—	Rapier	Landmob SAM	1975	1978-89	(520)	
		1	Appleleaf Class	Tanker	1989	1989	1	Ex-Fleet auxiliary leased to Australia
	USA	8	SH-60B Seahawk	Helicopter	1985	1989	8	
		8	SH-60B Seahawk	Helicopter	1986			In addition to 8 ordered 1985
		14	UH-60 Blackhawk	Helicopter	1985	1989	14	
		24	UH-60 Blackhawk	Helicopter	1985			In addition to previous order for 30 Blackhawk/Seahawks

		15	LAV-25	APC	1989	1989	15	Deal worth \$18.7 m
		2	RGM-84A Launch	ShShM launcher	1983	1989	1	Arming FFG-7 frigates produced under licence
		2	RIM-66A Launcher	ShAM launcher	1985	1989	1	Arming FFG-7 frigates produced under licence
		—	AIM-7F Sparrow	Air-to-air missile	1984	1986-89	(400)	Arming F/A-18 Hornet fighters
		—	AIM-9M	Air-to-Air missile	1984	1986-89	(880)	Arming F/A-18 Hornet fighters
		(22)	RGM-84A Harpoon	ShShM	1987			Arming FFG-7 Class frigates and Oberon Class submarines
		(65)	RIM-67C/SM-2	ShAM/ShShM	(1987)	1989	(10)	Deal worth \$50 m
Austria	Sweden	24	J-35 Draken	Fighter	1985	1988-89	24	Offsets worth 130%
		300	RBS-56 Bill	Anti-lank missile	1989			Deal worth \$77 m
	USA	36	M-109-A2 155mm	SPH	1988	1989	(12)	Deal worth \$36 m; brings total ordered to 109
Belgium	France	(530)	Magic-2	Air-to-air missile	(1985)	1988-89	(212)	Arming Mirage-5 fighters
		714	Mistral	Portable SAM	1988			Deal worth \$93 m incl 118 launchers; offsets worth 75%
	Italy	46	A-109	Helicopter	1988			28 to be armed with TOW missiles; deal worth \$317 m incl TOW missiles, offsets worth 73%
	Sweden	28	Helitow	Fire control system	1988			To equip A-109 helicopters
	USA	—	AGM-65C	ASM	1989			Arming F-16 fighters
		545	AIM-9M	Air-to-air missile	1988	1989	(180)	Arming F-16 fighters
		940	AIM-9M	Air-to-air missile	1989			Deal worth \$80 m
		(224)	BGM-71A TOW	Anti-tank missile	(1989)			Arming 28 A-109A Mk-2 helicopters
Bulgaria	USSR	—	SA-13 Launcher	AAV(M)	(1984)	1985-88	(16)	
		—	ZSU-23-4 Shilka	AAV	(1984)	1985-88	(48)	
		—	SA-13 Gopher	Landmob SAM	(1984)	1985-88	(768)	
Canada	France	10000	Eryx	Anti-lank missile	(1987)			Programme suspended
	Italy	—	EH-101	Helicopter	1988			Status uncertain
		10	Skyguard	Air defence radar	1986	1989	(3)	Part of ADATS contract

	Sweden	12	Giraffe	Fire control radar	(1985)	1988	2	For City Class destroyers
	Switzerland	36	ADATS	SAM system	1986	1989	(10)	Deal worth \$1 b incl SAMs, AA guns and fire control radars
	UK	(35)	EH-101	Helicopter	(1987)			
		7	S500	Surveillance radar	1987	1988-89	(6)	
		1	Oberon Class	Submarine	1989	1989	1	For use as a static training centre
	USA	28	F/A-18Homet	Fighter	1989			Attrition replacements
		3	P-3C Update 3	Maritime patrol	1989			
		6	Phalanx	CIWS	1986	1988	(2)	Arming City Class frigates
		4	Phalanx	CIWS	1987	1988-89	(3)	Arming Tribal Class frigates
		6	ROM 84A Launcher	ShShM launcher	(1984)	1988-89	(2)	Arming City Class frigates
		6	Seasparrow VLS	ShAM/PDMlauncher	1984	1988-89	(2)	Arming City Class frigates, deal worth \$75 m incl modifications to missiles
		4	Seasparrow VLS	ShAM/PDMlauncher	1986	1988-89	(3)	Arming Tribal Class frigates; for delivery 1988-90
		184	AIM-7M Sparrow	Air-to-air missile	1985	1987-89	(184)	Arming F/A-18 fighters
		96	AIM-7M Sparrow	Air-to-air missile	(1987)			Arming F/A-18 fighters; deal worth \$31 m incl 24 Mk 48 torpedoes
		100	AIM-9M	Air-to-air missile	1988	1989	(50)	Deal worth \$21 m
		—	RGM-84A Harpoon	ShShM	1984	1988-89	(16)	Arming City Class frigates
		29	RGM-84A Harpoon	ShShM	1988			Deal worth \$47 m incl spares, training and support
		74	RIM-66C/SM02	ShAM/ShShM	1988	1988-89	(45)	Arming Tribal Class frigates; deal worth \$48 m
		22	RIM-67C/SM-2	ShAM/ShShM	1987	1988-89	(22)	Arming Tribal Class frigates
		168	Seasparrow	ShAM	1984	1988-89	(56)	Arming City Class frigates; deal worth \$75 m
		(128)	Seasparrow	ShAM	1986	1988-89	(96)	Arming 4 Tribal Class frigates
	USSR	1	Su-7 Filler	Fighter	1989	1989	1	For air museum
China	Canada	2	Challenger 601	Trpt aircraft	1988	1988-89	2	Follow order for 3
	France	8	SA-342L Gazelle	Helicopter	1987	1988-89	(8)	Deal worth \$29.7 m
		(96)	HOT 2	Ann tank missile	1987	1988-89	(96)	Arming SA 342L Gazelle helicopters

	USA	6	CH-47DChinook	Helicopter	1989			Deliveries suspended in June 1989
		4	AN/TPQ-37	Tracking radar	(1987)	1988	2	Deliveries suspended in June 1989 with deliveries of avionics, 4 Mk 46 torpedoes and 155 mm howitzer ammunition
Cyprus	France	6	SA 342L Gazelle	Helicopter	1987	1987-89	6	Armed with HOT anti tank missiles
		36	AMX-30 B2	Main battle tank	1989	1989	12	Deal worth \$115 m, in addition to 16 supplied earlier
		36	VAB	APC	1987	1989	(18)	Armed with HOT anti tank missiles
		—	HOT 2	Anti tank missile	1987	1987-89	(234)	Arming SA 342 helicopters and VAB APCs; total deal worth \$250 m
	—	Mistral	Portable SAM	(1988)	1989	(180)	Arming VAB APCs and infantry version	
	Greece	6	Artemis 30mm	Mobile radar	1988			
	Italy	30	Skyguard	Air defence radar	1987	1988-89	12	Fire control for new 35 mm AAGs
	Switzerland	2	PC-9	Trainer	1987	1989	2	
Czechoslovakia	USSR	—	Mi 17 Hip H	Helicopter	(1985)	1985-88	(48)	Replacing Mi 4s
		(60)	Su-25 Frogfoot	Fighter/grd attack	(1984)	1984-89	(60)	Replacing MiG 17s
		—	2S1 122mm	SPH	(1979)	1980-89	(360)	May be from Poland
		—	2S4 240mm	SPM	(1985)	1986-89	(36)	
		—	2S7 203mm	SPG	(1987)	1988-89	(48)	First WTO country to deploy
		—	BRDM-2 Gaskin	AAV(M)	1979	1980-89	(100)	
		—	D 30 122mm	Towed howitzer	(1980)	1985-89	(400)	
		—	SA-13 Launcher	AAV(M)	(1984)	1984-89	(30)	
		(24)	SA 8 SAMS	Mobile SAM system	(1986)	1987-89	(24)	
		—	AT-4 Spigot	Anti tank missile	1979	1980-89	(2400)	
		—	SA-13 Gopher	LandmobSAM	(1984)	1984-89	(395)	
		—	SA 8 Gecko	LandmobSAM	(1986)	1987-89	(96)	
		—	SA-9 Gaskin	Landmob SAM	1979	1980-89	(1 600)	
Denmark	France	12	AS-350 Ecureuil	Helicopter	1987			Deal worth \$67 m incl Helitow sight system and TOW-2 missiles
	Germany, FR	—	RAM	ShAM/PDM	(1985)			Arming 3 Niels Juel Class frigates
	Norway	3	Type-207	Submarine	1985			
	Sweden	12	Helitow	Fire control	1987			

	UK	6	S-723 Martello	3-D radar	(1984)	1985-89	(6)	
	USA	8	F-16A	Fighter	1985	1987-89	(8)	Deal worth \$210 m incl spares
		12	F-16A	Fighter	1988			
		162	AGM-65D	ASM	1989			Arming F-16 fighters; deal worth \$24 m
		(196)	BGM-71D TOW-2	Anti-tank missile	1987			Arming 12 AS-350 Ecureuil helicopters
		840	FIM-92A Stinger	Portable SAM	1988			Deal worth \$61 m incl 336 launchers
		—	Seasparrow	ShAM	1989			For delivery from Seasparrow Consortium
Finland	France	(20)	Crotale SAMS	Mobile SAM system	1988			Deal worth \$230 m
		(6)	TRS-2230/15	Air defence radar	1988			Part of Crotale air defence system
		(360)	Mistral	Portable SAM	1989			Arming Helsinki-2 Class FACs
		(240)	R-440 Crotale	Landmob SAM	1988			
	Sweden	(4)	Giraffe	Fire control radar	(1987)			For Helsinki-2 Class FACs
		—	Giraffe	Fire control radar	(1987)	1988	(5)	Mounted in Finnish-2 Class PACs
		4	RBS-15 Launcher	ShShM launcher	1987			Arming Helsinki-2 Class FACs
		64	RBS-15	ShAm/ShShM	(1987)			Arming Helsinki-2 Class FACs
	UK	50	Hawk	Jet trainer	1977	1978-89	(50)	
		12	Hawk	jet trainer	1989			
		4	Watchman	Surveillance radar	1988	1989	(2)	Second order; deliveries to begin 1989
	USSR	20	BMP-2	MICV	1988	1988-89	(20)	Deal reported to be worth \$17.6 m incl AT-4 Spigot ATMs
		(100)	MT-LB	APC	(1986)	1986-89	(40)	
		(60)	T-72	Main battle tank	(1986)	1986-89	(40)	For delivery 1986-90
		—	AT-4 Spigot	Anti-lank missile	(1986)	1986-89	(240)	Part of \$400 m 5-year agreement incl T-72 tanks and MT-LB APCs
		(40)	AT-5 Spandrel	Anti-lank missile	(1988)	1988-89	(40)	Arming BMP-2 APCs
		(90)	SA-16	Portable SAM	(1987)	1987-89	(90)	
France	Nigeria	(14)	SA-330 Puma	Helicopter	1989	1989	(4)	
	Spain	5	C-212-300	Trpi aircraft	1987	1988-89	5	Offset by Spanish order for AS-332 helicopters

		2	CN-235	Trpi aircraft	1988			Initial order of 8 with option for 7 scaled down to 2 with option for 4
	USA	4	C-130H-30	Trpi aircraft	1988	1989	4	Follows order for 6 C-130s in 1987
		4	E-3A Sentry	AWACS	1987			130% offsets in aerospace
		2	RIM-67A Launcher	ShAM launcher	1985	1988	1	Arming Cassard Class frigates
		80	RIM-67A/SM-1	ShAM/ShShM	1985	1988	(40)	Arming Cassard Class frigates
German DR	Bulgaria	—	MT-LB	APC	(1982)	1984-89	(150)	Unconfirmed
	USSR	—	MiG-29	Fighter	(1987)	1988-89	(28)	
		—	2S1 122mm	SPH	(1979)	1980-89	(230)	
		—	2S6	AAV(M)	1988			
		—	BMP-2	MICV	(1978)	1982-89	(800)	May be from Czechoslovak production
		—	BRDM-2 Spandrel	TD(M)	1978	1980-89	(450)	
		—	BTR-70	APC	(1982)	1983-89	(1000)	Also designated SPW-70
		—	SA-13 Launcher	AAV(M)	(1984)	1985-89	(25)	Unconfirmed
		—	T-72	Main battle tank	(1978)	1979-89	(385)	May be from Poland or Czechoslovakia
		—	AT-4 Spigot	Anti-lank missile	1978	1979-89	(4200)	
		—	AT-5 Spandrel	Anti-lank missile	1978	1980-89	(11200)	Arming BMP-2 and BRDM-2 APCs
		—	SA-13 Gopher	Landmob SAM	(1984)	1985-89	(300)	Unconfirmed
Germany, FR	France	23	TRS-3050	Surveillance radar	1987	1987-89	7	Improved fire control radar for Type 148 FACs
	Netherlands	5	Smart	Fire control radar	1989			Fire control radar for Type 123 frigate
	UK	5	Lynx	Helicopter	1986	1988-89	(5)	For Type 122 Bremen Class frigates; offsets worth 30%
	USA	(100)	Sea Skua	Anti-ship missile	1986	1988-89	(100)	Arming Sea King Mk 41 helicopters
		12	P-3G	Maritime patrol	1989			Deliveries planned from 1996
		3	AN/FPS-117	Air defence radar	1988			
		28	Patriot battery	Mobile SAM system	(1983)	1989	3	14 units on loan from USA, 14 purchased through FMS
		2	RGM-84A Launcher	ShShM launcher	(1986)	1988-89	2	Arming Type 122 Bremen Class frigates
		(2)	Seasparrow Launcher	ShAM/PDM launcher	1986	1988-89	2	Arming Type 122 Bremen Class frigates

		100	AGM-65A	ASM	1988	1989	(12)	
		300	AGM-65D	ASM	(1988)	1989	(36)	
		1200	AGM-65G	ASM	(1988)	1989	(150)	
		1182	AGM-88 Harm	ARM	1987	1988-89	(368)	Arming Tornado fighters
		804	MIM-104 Patriot	SAM	1984	1989	(150)	
		(32)	RGM-84A Harpoon	ShShM	(1986)	1988-89	(32)	Arming Type 122 Bremen Class frigates
		48	Seasparrow	ShAM	(1986)	1988-89	(48)	Arming Type 122 Bremen Class frigates
Greece	France	40	Mirage-2000	Fighter	1985	1988-89	36	36 fighters and 4 trainers
		—	Stentor	Surveillance radar	(1987)	1988	(2)	Prior to licensed production
		(240)	Mgaic-2	Air-to-air missile	(1986)	1988-89	(220)	Arming Mirage-2000 fighters
		4000	Milan	Anti-tank missile	1987	1988-89	(2000)	Deal worth \$54 m incl 100 launchers
	Germany, FR	75	Leopard-1-A3	Main battle tank	1988	1988-89	(75)	Gift as offset for Greek order of 4 Meko-200 frigates
		4	MPDR	Surveillance radar	1988	1989	(2)	Deal worth \$11.7 m; financed by NATO military aid
		(96)	NATO Seasparrow	ShAM/ShShM	(1988)			Arming Meko-200 Class frigates
		1	Meko-200 Type	Frigate	1988			Deal worth \$1.2 b incl 3 to be built under licence; offsets worth \$250m
	Italy	25	A-109	Helicopter	(1987)			Negotiating
	Netherlands	4	Smart	Fire control radar	1989			For Greek Meko-200 Class
	USA	40	F-16C	Fighter	1985	1989	(24)	Includes 6 F-16D versions
		50	F-4E Phantom	Fighter	1988	1988-89	(40)	From US stocks
		19	F-4G Wild Weasel	Fighter	1988	1989	(9)	Part of military aid package with 50 F-4E fighters from US stocks
		300	M-48-A5	Main battle tank	1986	1988-89	(200)	Deal worth \$103 m; 250 financed by FMS; from US stocks
		60	M-48-A5	Main battle tank	1989			Deal worth \$26 m; refurbished; from US stocks
		2	HADR	Air defence radar	1985	1988-89	(2)	Part of NADGE air defence system
		4	Phalanx	CIWS	(1987)			Arming Meko-200 Class frigates
		(4)	RGM-84A launcher	ShShM launcher	1989			Arming Meko-200 Class frigates
		(4)	Seasparrow VLS	ShAM/PDM launcher	1988			Arming Meko-200 Class frigates

		(152)	AGM-45A Shrike	ARM	1988	1989	(76)	Arming F-4G Wild Weasels
		80	AIM-7F Sparrow	Air-to-air missile	(1987)	1988-89	(60)	Arming 40 F-4E fighters
		80	AIM-9F	Air-to-air missile	(1987)	1988-89	(60)	Arming 40 F-4E fighters
		1000	FIM-92A Stinger	Prtable SAM	1988	1989	(250)	Deal worth \$124 m incl 500 launchers
		16	RGM-84A Harpoon	ShShM	1989			Arming first of 4 Meko-200 Class frigates; deal worth \$19 m
		(64)	Seasparrow	ShAM	(1988)			Arming Meko-200 Class frigates
Hungary	USSR	—	Mi-17 Hip-H	Helicopter	1988			
		—	MiG-29	Fighter	(1988)			
Italy	France	1	Falcom-50	Trpt aircraft	19881	1989	1	In addition to 2 delivered 1986
	Germany, FR	—	Kormoran-2	Anti-ship missile	(1986)	1988-89	30	Arming Tornado fighters
	Portugal	4	Boeing-707	Trpt aircraft	1988	1989	4	
	UK	(12)	Sea Karrier	Fighter	1989			Order number may be up to 18
	USA	20	MLRS 227 mm	MRL	1985	1989	(4)	
		2	HADR	Air defence radar	1985	1988	(1)	Part of NADGE system
		6629	BGM-71C 1-TOW	Anti-tank missile	1984	1986-89	(6629)	Deal worth \$67 m incl 1239 practice missiles
		(3900)	BGM 71 D TOW-2	Ann lank missile	1987	1987-89	(1 800)	Arming A-129 Mangusta helicopters
		(16)	UGM 84A Harpoon	SuShM	(1986)			Arming Sauro Class submarines
Japan	France	2	Falcon-900	Trpt aircraft	1987	1989		2
	Italy	3	Sparviero Class	Hydrofoil FAC	(1988)			Deal worth S 170m
	UK	3	BAe-125-800	Utility jet	1989			
	USA	3	C-1 30H Hercules	Trpi aircraft	1987	1988-89	3	
		2	C-130H 30	Trpt aircraft	1988	1989	2	Deal worth \$60 m
		5	E-2C Hawkeye	AEW	1988	1989	3	In addition to 8 previously delivered
		3	E 2C Hawkeye	AEW	1989			Deal worth \$214 m incl spates
		6	Learjet-35A	Maritime patrol	1985	1985-89	(6)	1 target tug, 5 for recce training
		6	MH-53E	Helicopter	(1987)	-1989	4	
		1	Patriot battery	Mobile SAM system	1984	1989	1	To be followed by co production

		(28)	Phalanx	CIWS	1985	1987-89	16	Arming Asagiri Class and second batch of Hatsuyuki Class
		(8)	Phalanx	CIWS	1988			Part of Aegis air defence system arming new class of Japanese destroyer
		...	RGM-84A Launcher	ShShM launcher	(1979)	1980-89	(41)	Arming various Japanese escorts and Yuushio Class submarines
		(4)	RGM-84A Launcher	ShShM launcher	1988			Part of Aegis air defence system arming new class of Japanese destroyer
		..	Seasparrow Launcher	ShAM/PDM launcher	1980	1981-89	(20)	Arming various classes of Japanese escort
		(8)	Seasparrow VLS	ShAM/PDM launcher		1988		Part of Aegis air defence system arming new class of Japanese destroyer
		55	AGM 84A Harpoon	Anti-ship missile	(1987)	1988-89	(36)	Deal worth \$80 m. mix of air sea and submarine-launched versions unclear
		..	FIM 92A Stinger	Portable SAM	(1988)			
		20	MIM 104 Patriot	SAM	1984	1989	20	Arming various Japanese destroyers,
		..	RGM-84A Harpoon	ShShM	(1979)	1980-89	(953)	frigates and submarines
		(64)	RGM-84A Harpoon	ShShM	1988	1988	(16)	Part of Aegis air defence system arming new class of Japanese destroyer
		99	RGM 84A Harpoon	ShShM	1989			Deal worth \$ 173m
		(350)	RIM 66C/SM-2	ShAM/ShShM	1988			Part of Aegis air defence system arming new class of Japanese destroyer
		..	Seasparrow	ShAM	1980	1981-89	(312)	Arming various Japanese built frigates and destroyers
Nrtherlands	France	14	Crotale SAMS	Mobile SAM system	1989			Option on further 7; status uncertain
		(168)	R-440 Crotale	LandmobSAM	1989			

	Switzerland	10	PC-7	Trainer	1988	1989	10	
	USA	21	MLRS 227mm	MRL	1986	1989	(10)	Deal worth \$192 m incl 2700 rockets
		46	MLRS 227mm	MRL	1987			
		4	AN/TPQ37	Tracking radar	1986	1988-89	4	
		4	Palnol battery	Mobile SAM system	1984	1989	3	Deal worth \$200 m
		4	Patriot battery	Mobile SAM system	(1988)			
		8	RGM-84A Launcher	ShShM launcher	1985	1987-89	(3)	Arming 8 M Class frigates
		(40)	AGM-84A Harpoon	Anti- ship missile	1988			
		900	AIM-9L	Air 10 air missile	1983	1985-89	(900)	Arming F 16 fighters, deal worth \$78 m
		290	AIM-9M	Air-to-air missile	1988			Arming F-16 fighters, deal worth \$27 m
		5 285	FGM-77 Dragon	Ann lank missile	1978	1978-89	5 285	Deal mcl 437 launchers
		160	MIM-104 Patriot	SAM	1983	1989	(120)	
		256	MIM-104 Patriot	SAM	(1988)			
		(128)	RGM-84A Harpoon	ShShM	1988	1989	(32)	Includes unspecified mix of air-launched Harpoon missiles, arming M Class frigates
New Zetland	Australia	24	Hamel 105mm	Towed gun	1986	1987-89	24	
		1	ASI-315	Patrol craft	(1985)	1989	1	For Cook Islands under Pacific Patrol Boat Programme
		2	Meko 200 Class	Frigate	1989			Option on 2 more to be built in Australia deal worth \$ 554 7 m without sonars or helicopters
	Italy	16	MB 339K	Fighter/trainer	1989			
	USA	..	AGM 65B	ASM	1988	1989	(60)	Arming 22 A-4 Skyhawk fighters
		..	AIM-9P	Air-to-air missile	1988	1989	51	Deal worth \$120 m, option on 2 more
Norway	Germany FR	6	Type 210	Submarine	1983	1989	1	
	Sweden	8	Ersta 120mm	Coastal gun	1986	1986-89	(8)	For coastal defence
		..	Giraffe	Fire control radar	1985	1986-89	(40)	Final assembly in Norway
		(9)	Giraffe 50	Surveillance radar	1989	1989	2	Deal worth \$90 m
		..	RBS-70	Portable SAM	1985	1987-89	(290)	Deal worth \$90 m, fifth order
		(360)	RBS 70	Portable SAM		1989		Deal worth \$80 m, offsets worth 45%, sixth order

	UK	1	SH 3D Sea King	Helicopter	1989			Deal worth \$18 m including upgrade of Norwegian Sea King fleet
	USA	6	F 16	Fighter	1983	1989	2	Attrition replacements
		4	A F 16A	Fighter	1989			Deal worth \$125 m, option on 4 more
		2	F 16B	Fighter/trainer	1986	1988-89	2	
		18	Model 412	Helicopter	1986	1987-89	(18)	
		4	P 3C Orion	Maritime patrol	1986	1988-89	8	
		16	M 113 A2	APC	(1986)	1988-89	(16)	
		36	M-48 A5	Main battle tank	1986	1987-89	(36)	Deal worth \$26 m
		44	M 901 TOW	Tank destroyer	(1986)	1988-89	(44)	
		2	HADR	Air defence radar	1989	1989	1	In addition to 3 supplied in 1985
		..	AIM 120A AMRAAM	Air to-air missile	1989			86, deal worth \$ 45 m
	7612	BGM-71D TOW-2	Anti-tank missile	1985	1987-89	(2000)	Deal worth \$126 m incl 300 launchers and spares	
Poland	USSR	MiG-29	Fighter	(1988)	1989		11	7MiG 29A and 4 B versions
		Su 22 Filler J	Fighter/grd attack	(1986)	1986-89		(80)	
		BMP 2	MICV	(1988)				Eventual requirement may reach 200
		5 SA N 5 Launcher	ShAM launcher	(1985)				Arming 5 Tarantui Class corvettes, status uncertain
		.. AA 10 Alamo	Air to-air missile	(1988)	1989		(36)	Arming MiG 29 fighters
		.. AA 11 Archer	Air to air missile	(1988)	1989		(36)	Arming MiG 29 fighters
		.. AA 8 Aphid	Air to air missile	(1988)	1989		(96)	Arming Mi 24 Hind helicopters
		.. AA 8 Aphid	Air to air missile	(1988)	1989		(36)	Arming MiG 29 fighters
		AS 7 Kerry	ASM	(1985)	1986-89		(640)	
		(60) SAN 5	ShAM	(1985)				Arming 5 Tarantui Class corvettes
		(60) SSN 2 Styx	ShShM	(1985)				Arming 5 Tarantui Class corvette
		(4) Kilo Class	Submarine	(1984)	1986		1	Replacing Whiskey Class submarine
		(5) Tarantul Class	Corvette	1985				Order number may be up to 8
Portugal	France	2	Falcon 50	Trpt aircraft	1989			May be for civilian use
		18	TB 30 Epsilon	Trainer	1987	1989	(3)	Deal worth \$17 m

		(700)	Milan 2	Ann tank missile	(1988)	1989	(350)	Partial funding from NATO military fund
Germany, FR		3	Meko 200 Type	Fngale	1986			Deal worth \$700 m, 60% funding from NATO military fund
Italy		24	Aspide	SAM/ShAM	1986			Arming 3 Meko 200 frigates
UK		2	Watchman	Surveillance radar	1988			Deal worth \$9 m incl 2 AN/TPS-44 funded by NATO military assistance
USA		20	F 16A	Fighter	(1989)			Ex USAF, to be funded with up to \$227 m grant assistance
		..	Model 205 UH 1A	Helicopter	1989			In return for US base rights in the Azores, ex USAF
		..	Model 209 AH 1G	Helicopter	1989			
		5	SH 2F Seasprite	Helicopter	1989			Deal worth 569 m, equipping Meko 200 type frigates
		..	SH-60B Seahawk	Helicopter	1989			
		(34)	M-163 Vulcan	AAV	(1987)	1987-89	(34)	
		2	AN/TPS-44	Surveillance radar	1988			
		3	HADR	Air defence radar	1985	1988	1	Part of NADGE air defence system
		1	Hawk SAMS	Mobile SAM system	1989			Ex. USAF
		3	Phalanx	CIWS	1986			Aiming 3 Meko-200 Type frigates
		3	RGM-84A Launch	ShShM launcher	1986			Arming 3 Meko-200 Type frigates
		3	Seasparrow VLS	ShAM/PDM launcher		1986		Arming 3 Meko 200 Type frigates
		..	BGM-7 ID TOW-2	Anti-tank missile	(1988)			
		24	RGM 84A Harper	ShShM	1986			Arming 3 Meko-200 Type frigates
		17	Seasparrow	ShAM	1988			Arming 3 Meko 200 Type frigates
Romania	USSR	..	MiG-23MF	Fighter/interceptor	(1980)	1981-88	(46)	
		..	AT-4 Spigot	Anti-lank missile	(1984)	1985-89	(250)	Arming Romanian APCs
Spain	Canada	(8)	CL-215	Amphibian	1989			
	France	18	AMX-30 Roland	AAV(M)	1984	1988-89	(18)	Deal worth \$182 4 m incl 414 Roland-2 SAMs, offsets worth 50%
		(2000)	HOT	Anti-tank missile	1984	1986-89	(1750)	Incl 150 launchers
		(3500)	Milan-2	Anti-lank missile	1984	1986-88	(3000)	Incl 250 launchers
		3000	Mistral	Portable SAM	1988			
	Italy	6	Skyguard Launches	Mobile SAM system	1985	1987-89	(6)	28 launch units in 6 btys

		504	Aspide	SAM/ShAM	1985	1987-89	(504)	Deal worth \$129 m incl 28 Aspide/ Spada launch systems, offsets worth 40%
Norway		5	P 3B Orion	Maritime patrol	1988	1988-89	5	Refurbished in USA, deal worth 4m pesetas
USA		72	F/A-18Homet	Fighter	1983	1986-89	(64)	60 F/A-18A fighters and 12 F/A 18B trainers
		8	RF-4C Phantom	Fighter/recce	(1988)	1989	8	Deal worth S20 3 m, ex US National Guard
		4	SH 60B Seahawk	Helicopter	(1988)			In addition to 6 previously ordered, equipping FFG-7 Class frigates
		2	AN/TPQ-36	Tracking radar	(1987)	1988	(1)	Follow-on order for 3 more expected
		96	M54 Chaparral	Mobile SAM system	1981	1985-89	(96)	
		4	RGM 84A Launcher	ShShM launcher	1988			Coastal defence version
		1	RIM 67A Launcher	ShAM launcher	(1986)	1989	1	Arming fourth FFG-7 Class frigate, dual purpose launcher for Harpoon ShShMs and Seasparrow SAMs
		250	AGM-65D	ASM	1989			Deal worth S48 m
		250	AGM 65F	Ann ship missile	1989			Aiming F/A 18 Homet fighters, mix of F and G versions
		(70)	AGM-84A Harper	Anil ship missile	(1987)			Arming F/A 18 fighters
		80	AGM-88 Harm	ARM	1987			Arming F7A 18 fighters
		(400)	BGM-71D TOW-2	Ann lank missile	1987			
		50	MIM-23B Hawk	Landmob SAM	(1987)			Deal worth S22 m incl spares and support
		1760	MIM-72F	SAM/ShAM	1981	1985-89	(1760)	Deal worth S272 m incl 96 M54 Chaparral launchers
		20	RGM-84A Harpoon	ShShM	1987			Arming fourth FFG 7 Class frigate
		16	RGM 84A Harpoon	ShShM	1989			Arming coastal defence bty
		(64)	RIM 67A/SM 1	ShAM/ShShM	(1986)			Arming fourth FFG-7 Class frigate
		(60)	Seasparrow	ShAM	1989			Arming 5 Baleares Class frigates
Sweden	France	12	AS-332	Helicopter	1987	1988-89	(6)	Deal worth S106 m, for Navy
	USA	(1 000)	BGM 7 ID TOW-2	Ann lank missile	1984	1988-89	(1000)	

Switzerland	France	12	AS-332	Helicopter	1989			Deal worth \$190 m, offsets worth 100%
	UK	1	Hawk	Jet trainer	1987	1989		1 Delivery of 1 from UK prior to Swiss Co. production of 19
	USA	34	F/A-18Homet	Fighter	1988			Deal worth \$1 9 b incl 26 C and 8 D versions, offsets worth 100%
		108	M 109 A2 155m	SPH	1989			Swiss designation PZH88
		54	M 548	APC	1989			Swiss designation RT 68
		..	AIM-120A AMRAAM	Air-to-air missile	1988			Arming F/A-18 Homet fighters
		204	AIM -7M Sparrow	Air-to-air missile	1988			Arming F/A-18 Homet fighters
		(272)	A1M-9L	Air-to-air missile	(1988)			Arming F/A-18 Homet fighters
12000	BGM-71D TOW-2	Anti-lank missile	(1985)	1988	(1 000)	Deal worth \$209 m incl 400 launchers and night vision sights		
	3500	FIM-92A Stinger	Portable SAM	1988			Licensed production under discussion	
Turkey	France	4	SA-330LPuma	Helicopter	(1988)	1989	4	
		5	Slentor	Surveillance radar	1987	1988-89	(2)	
		1	TRS-2230/15	Air defence radar	1987			Air defence package incl surveillance radars and command posts; designation uncertain
	Germany, FR	150	F-104G	Fighter	1980	1980-89	150	
		8	Leopard	ARV	1988			Part of deal worth \$346 m
		(150)	Leopard-I	Main battle tank	1986	1988-89	(150)	
		100	Leopard-I-A4	Main battle tank	(1987)			
		1	Koeln Class	Frigate	1989	1989	1	In addition to 3 transferred in 1983-84
	Italy	4	Seaguard	CIWS	(1985)	1987-89	(4)	Arming 4 Meko-200 Type frigates
		2	Seaguard	CIWS	1989			Arming 2 Meko-200 Type frigates
(96)		Aspide	SAM/ShAM	(1986)	1987-89	(96)	Arming 4 Meko-200 Type frigates	
	(48)	Aspide	SAM/ShAM	(1989)			Arming 2 Meko-200 Type frigates	
Netherlands	46	F-5A	Fighter	1987	1989	26	Additional 24 will probably be sold to Turkey at very reduced cost	

Spain		33	F-4C Phantom	Fighter	1988	1989	33	
		4	RF-4C Phantom	Fighter/recce	1988	1989	4	
UK		40	Shorland S-35	APC	1988			
USA		40	F-4E Phantom	Fighter	1987	1987-89	(40)	Ex-USAF
		15	Model 205 UH-1H	Helicopter	1988			Brings total UH-1H Huey orders to 183 (including 96 from Italy)
		6	UH-60 Blackhawk	Helicopter	1988	1989	6	Deal worth \$40 m
		12	MLRS 227mm	MRL	1988	1988-89	12	Part of \$1 b deal; 168 more to be co-produced
		6	AN/TPQ-36	Tracking radar	(1986)	1988-89	(2)	
		3	HADR	Air defence radar	1985			Part of NADGE air defence system
		2	RGM-84A Launcher	ShShM launcher	1989			Arming 2 Meko-200 Type frigates
		2	Seasparrow VLS	ShAM/PDM launcher	1989			
		80	AIM-7F Sparrow	Air-to-air missile	1987			Arming 40 F-4E fighters
		(320)	AIM-7M Sparrow	Air-to-air missile	(1983)	1986-88	(225)	
		80	AIM-9F	Air-to-air missile	1987			Arming 40 F-4E fighters
		(48)	RGM-84A Harpoon	ShShM	1983	1987-89	(48)	Arming 4 Meko-200 Type frigates
		2	Brooke Class	Frigate	1989			Leased from US Navy
		2	Garcia Class	Frigate	1989			Leased from US Navy
UK	Netherlands	9	Goalkeeper	CIWS	1985	1987-88	6	Arming Invincible Class aircraft carriers 130% offsets
	USA	6	E-3A Sentry	AWACS	(1987)			Deal worth \$120 m with offsets of 130%; option on 8th AWACS declined July 1989
		1	E-3A Sentry	AWACS	1987			
		8	S-76 Spirit	Helicopter	1989			Deal worth \$54 m; for Hong Kong
		24	Phalanx	CIWS	(1985)	1985-89	(24)	Arming Type-42 destroyers
		(11)	RGM-84A Launcher	ShShM launcher	1984	1985-89	(8)	Arming Type-22 and Type-23 frigates
		(330)	AIM-120A AMRAAM	Air-to-air missile	(1988)			Status uncertain
		(72)	Trident-2 D-5	SLBM	(1983)			Arming 4 Vanguard submarines

USA	Canada	(154)	LAV-25	APC	(1987)				
		2	LAV-AD	AAV(M)	1988				Air defence versions
	China	(6)	F-4	Fighter	(1988)	1988-89	(6)		For training
		(6)	F-6	Fighter	(1988)	1988-89	(6)		For training
		(12)	F-7	Fighter	(1988)	1988-89	(12)		For training
	France	(1)	Romeo-2	Fire control radar	(1989)	1989	1		For evaluation
	Germany. FR	7	Wicse	Scout car	1988	1989	7		For evaluation as robotic armoured vehicles
	Israel	100	Hwe Nap	AGM	(1988)	1989	6		May involve US production
	Kuwait	(29)	A-4M Skyhawk-2	Fighter/bomber	1988				
	Norway	(212)	Paguin-3	Anti-ship missile	(1986)	1989	6		
	Spain	3	P-3A Orion	Maritime patrol	(1988)	1989	3		
	Switzerland	4	ADATS	SAM system	1987	1989	4		
	UK	1	Amhip	AEW	1987	1989	1		Prototype AEW/communications relay
		6	BAC-125-800	Utility jet	1988	1989	(1)		US designation C-29A
		6	Mdog-125	Trainer	1988	1989	6		Flight inspection aircraft
10		Skrpa	Trpt aircraft	1988				In addition 10 18 previously crroered	
53		L119 105mm gun	Towed gun	1987	1988-89	(53)		Pan of deal worth \$161 m; to be followed by US co-production of 489	
1		Watchman	Surveillance radar	1988	1989	1		Deal worth \$3.1m	
USSR	Czechoslovakia	..	L-39 Albatross	Jet trainer	(1972)	1974-89	(1120)		
		.	BMP-1	MICV	(1972)	1972-88	(5100)	70% of Czechoslovak BMP production	
	Poland	..	Ht-2 Hoplile	Helicopter	1965	1965-89	(2250)	Deliveries started 1965 and continue at approx 90 per year	
Romania	..	Yak-52	Trainer	(1980)	1981-89	(1 650)	About 200 per year produced for USSR		
Yugoslavia	USA	(3)	C-130H Hercules	Ttpl aircraft	(1989)				
	USSR	36	MiG-29	Fighter	(1987)	1988-89	(24)		
		(216)	AA-7 Apex	Air-lo-air missile	(1987)	1988-89	(144)		Arming MiG-29 fighters
		(216)	AA-8 Aphid	Air-lo-air missile	(1987)	1988-89	(144)		Arming MiG-29 fighters

..	AT-3 Sagger	Anti-tank missile	(1971)	1971-89	(1900)	Arming Mi-8 helicopters armoured vehicles and field launchers
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II. Third World Countries

Afghanistan	China	..	Type-63 107mm	MRL	(1982)	1982-89	(350)	For Mujahideen; 122-mm rockets without launchers supplied from Feb. 1988
	Egypt	..	Hong Ying-5	Portable SAM	(1982)	1982-89	(850)	SA-7 copy; for Mujahideen
		..	Sakr-18122mm	MRL	(1988)	1988-89	(20)	For Mujahideen; with large quantities of artillery rockets
	USA	..	SA-7 Grail	Portable SAM	(1984)	1985-89	(250)	For Mujahideen; unconfirmed
		..	BGM-71A TOW	Anti-tank missile	(1988)	1988-89	(80)	For Mujahideen
		..	FIM-92A Stinger	Portable SAM	1989	1989	(100)	In addition to 900 supplied earlier
	USSR	..	An-12Cub-A	Trpt aircraft	(1989)	1989	12	
		..	Mi-24 Hind-D	Helicopter	(1984)	1984-89	(51)	
		..	MiG-23	FighterAnterceptor	(1988)	1988-89	(30)	
		..	Su-22 Fitter-J	Fighter/grd attack	(1979)	1979-W	(50)	
		..	Su-25 Frogfoot	Fighler/grd attack	(1986)	1986-89	(50)	
		..	2S5 152mm	SPG	1989	1989	(12)	First export of this system
		..	BM-27 220mm	MRL	1989	1989	(12)	
		..	BMP-1	MICV	(1979)	1979-89	(206)	May include Czechoslovak-built BMPs
		..	BTR-70	APC	(1988)	1988-89	(180)	
		..	D-30 122mm	Towed howitzer	(1978)	1978-89	(408)	
		..	M-1976 152mm	Towed gun	(1987)	1988-89	(72)	May be D-1 152-mm
		..	M-46 130mm	Towed gun	(1979)	1979-89	(136)	
		..	T-62	Main battle tank	(1979)	1979-89	(105)	
		..	Scud-B Launcher	Mobile SSM system	(1988)	1988	(3)	
		..	AA-8 Aphid	Air-to-air missile	(1979)	1979-89	(300)	Anning Su-22 fighters
		..	Scud-B	SSM	(1988)	1988-89	(800)	
Algeria	Czechoslovakia	16	L-39 Albatross	Jet trainer	1987	1988-89	(16)	
	USSR	4	11-76 Candid	Trpt aircraft	(1988)	1989	4	
Angola	Spain	(3)	Cormoran Class	FAC	1989			
	USA		FIM-92A Stinger	Portable SAM	1989	1989	(10)	For UNITA

	USSR	..	Mi-8 Hip	Helicopter	(1982)	1983-88	(64)	
		..	MiG-23	RghierAnterceptor	(1986)	1986-88	(48)	Follow-on and attrition replacements
		..	BRDM-2	Seoul car	(1985)	1986-89	(100)	
		..	D-30 122mm	Towed howitzer	(1985)	1986-89	(160)	D-44 85-rnm guns also delivered
		..	M-46 130mm	Towed gun	(1986)	1986-89	(72)	
		..	T-55	Main battle tank	(1987)	1987-88	(200)	Supplier unconfirmed
		..	T-62	Main battle lank	(1987)	1987-88	(100)	
		..	Barlock	Tracking radar	(1985)	1987-88	(7)	
		..	Flat Face	Tracking radar	(1980)	1981-88	(16)	
		..	SA-6 SAMS	Mobile SAM system	(1979)	1980-88	(68)	
		..	SA-8 SAMS	Mobile SAM system	(1983)	4984-88	(48)	
		..	Side Ncl	Heighlfinding radar	(1979)	1980-88	(25)	
		..	Spoon Rest P-13	Early warning radar	(1979)	(1987)	(16)	
		..	SA-14 Gremlin	Portable SAM	1980-88	1987	((300)	Revealed when captured
		..	SA-6 Gainful	Landmob SAM	(1979)	1980-88	(735)	
		..	SA-8 Gecko	Landmob SAM	(1983)	1984-88	(768)	
		..	SA-9 Gaskin	Landmob SAM	(1986)	1987-88	(192)	
Argentina	Brazil	10	HB-355M	Helicopter	1987	1980	10	
	France	6	Esquito MM-40 Launcher	ShShM launcher	1980	1984-89	(6)	Arming 6 Meko-140 frigates
		48	MM-40 Exocet	ShShM/SShM	1980	1984-89	(48)	Arming 6 Meko-140 frigates
	Israel	(120)	Shafrir-2	Air-lo-air missile	(1986)	1988-89	(120)	Arming A-4 Skyhawk fighters
	Italy	4	A-109	Helicopter	1987	1989	(4)	Deal worth \$7 m
	Span	3	C-212-300	Trpt aircraft	1988	1989	3	Deal worth \$35 m
Bahrain	USA	12	F-16C	Fighter	(1987)			Partly financed by Saudi Arabia; with electronic counlenneasures
		4	F-16C	Fighter	1988			Follows 1987 order for 12
		80	M-113-A2	APC	1989			Deal worth \$33 m
		(24)	AGM-65D	ASM	(1987)			Arming F-16 fighters
		(48)	AIM-7M Sparrow	Air-lo-air missile	(1987)			Arming F-16 fighters
		(96)	AIM-9L	Air-lo-air missile	(1987)			Arming F-16 fighters

Bangladesh	China	16	F-7	Fighler	(1989)	1989	(16)	To be phased out by Pakistan
	Denmark	2	693 Class	Landing craft	1986			
	Pakistan	40	F-6	Fighler	1989			
Benin	France	10	VBL-M11	Armoured car	(1986)	1987-89	10	
		2	VLRA	Scout car	(1988)	1989	2	
		3	VLRA	Scout car	1989	1989	3	
Bolivia	USA	6	C-130B Hercules	Trpt aircraft	(1988)	1988	3	
Botswana	Canada	5	Model 412	Helicopter	(1987)	1988-89	5	Part of \$4 m MAP Deal wonh \$8 m inci 20-mm lowed anti-aircraft guns
	USA	..	M-167 Vulcan	Mobile radar	1989			
		..	BGM-71C I-TOW	Anti-tank missile	1989			
Brazil	Canada	11	S2F-1	Fighler/ASW	(1987)	1989	(5)	Upgraded with new PT-6 Turboprops ASW electronics package
	France	15	AS-332	Helicopter	1987	1988-89	(10)	For Navy Part of deal worth \$249 m Arming refurbished Mirage-3 fighter
		26	AS-365F	Helicopter	1988	1989	10	
			Magic-2	Air-to-air missile	1988	1989	(36)	
	Indonesia	4	CN-212	Trpt aircraft	1989			Deal worth \$67 m inci 3 F-5F versions
		23	F-5E Tiger-2	Fighler	1988	1988-89	(23)	
	USA	3	F-5F Tiger-2	Jet trainer	1988			Arming 4 Niteroi Class frigates and 4 Inhauma Class corvettes; deal worth \$63 m Leased from US Navy
		2	KC-135	Tanker/upl aircraft	(1988)	1989	2	
		4	Model 208	Lightplane	(1987)	1987-89	4	
8		Phalanx	CIWS	1988	1989	(2)		
4		Garcia Class	Frigate	1989	1989	4		
Brunei	France	24	VAB	APC	1988	198 89	(24)	Arming Vigilance Class corvettes Arming Vigilance Class corvettes Arming 16 Hawk-100 fighters
		3	MM-40 Launcher	ShShM launcher	1989			
		(48)	MM-40 Exocet	ShShM/SShM	1989			
	Germany, FR	(96)	AIM-9L	Air-to-air missile	1989			

	Indonesia	(3)	CN-235	Trpt aircraft	1989			
	Italy	4	SF-260TP	Trainer	(1989)			
	UK	16	Hawk-100	jet trainer	1989			Part of deal worth 400 m incl 3 corvettes
		..	Vigilance Class	Corvette	1989			Armed with MM-40 exocet; 76-mm gun; 2 40-mm guns
Cameroon	Canada	2	Model206L	Helicopter	1989			
	France	4	Super Magister	Jet trainer	1989	1989	4	
	UK	1	Peacock Class	OPV	1988			
Chile	France	4	AS-365F	Helicopter	1987			To be deployed on County Class frigates; first export of ASW versio
		2	Falcon-200	Maritime patrol	1988			Part of \$210 m deal
		(32)	AM-39 Exocet	Anti-ship missile	1987			Arming 4 helicopters for County Class destroyer
	Germany, FR	(16)	AM-39 Exocet	Anti-ship missile	(1988)	1988-89	(12)	Arming 4 AS-332 Super Pumas
		(30)	Bo-105CB	Helicopter	1985	1986-89	7	
	Indonesia	4	AS-332	Helicopter				3 Part of deal worth \$210 m incl 4 SA-365Fs from France
	Israel	6	CN-235	Trpt aircraft	1988			
		(8)	Barak Launcher	ShAM launcher	1988	1989		For refit to Chilean frigates
		2	Gabriel L	ShShM launcher	1988	1989	2	Arming SAAR-3 FACs
		2	Phalcon	AEW&C radar	(1989)			Mounted in 707 airframes; deal worth \$500 m incl 4B-707s
(256)		Barak	ShAM/SAM/PDM	1989				
	8	Gabriel-2	ShShM	1988	1989	8	Arming 2 Saar-3 Class FACs	
	2	Saar-3 Class	FAC	1988	1989	2	Armed with Gabriel-11 anti-ship missiles	
	USA	15	Model 280FX	Helicopter	(1988)	1988-89	(15)	
Colombia	Argentina	2	1A-58B Pucara	COIN	1989			
	Israel	13	Kfir-C7	Fighter/bomber	1988	1989	11	Includes 2 trainers; partial payment in commodities; deal worth \$220 m
	Barak Launcher	ShAM launcher	1989			Arming F-1500 Type

	Spain	3	C-212-300	Trpt aircraft	1988	1989	1	
	USA	8	A-37A	COIN	1989	1989	8	
		2	C-130H Hercules	Trpt aircraft	1989	1989	2	Delivered along with jeeps, ambulances, grenade launchers, small arms and communications equipment
		3	UH-60 Blackha-k	Helicopter	1988	1989	3	Deal worth \$26 m; second order
		5	UH-60Blackhawk	Helicopter	1989	1989	5	Deal worth \$36 m; third order
Cole d'Ivoire	Netherlands	2	F-100	Trpt aircraft	(1988)	1989	2	
Cuba	USSR	..	MiG-29	Fighter	(1989)	1989	(6)	
Djibouti	Iraq	..	Type 59/1 130mm	Towed gun	1989			Captured from Iran and sold to Djibouti along with mortars
Dominican Republic	USA	5	Model 337	Trainer	(1988)	1988—89	5	
Ecuador	Brazil	10	EMB-312Tucano	Trainer	1988			Deal worth \$19 m
	Spain	2	CN-235	Trpt aircraft	1988	1989		2 CN-235 M version
	Piranh Class		Patrol craft	1989				Some to be built in Ecuador
Egypt	Argentina	50	IA-58C Pucara	COIN	(1988)			
	France	20	Mirage-2000	Fighter	1988			
	UK	1	Oberon Class	Submarine	1989			May be fitted with SU-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles and towed array sonars
		1	Porpoise Class	Submarine	1989			
	USA	6	Commotr-1900	Trpt aircraft	1985	1988-89	6	Deal wonh \$73 m; incl spares and training
		2	E-2C Hiwkeye	AEW	1989			
		40	F-16C	Fighter	(1987)			Third order of 40; incl 4 F-16D version
		1	F-16D	Fighter/trainer	1988			Deal worth \$21 m incl spare parts; attrition replacement

		3	KC-135	Tanker/lrpt aircraft	1989				
		2	UH-60Blackhawk	Helicopter	1988				For evaluation
		15	M-1Abrams	Main battle tank	1988				Part of \$2 b deal inci 540 to be co-produced
		69	M-113-A2	APC	1988				Deal worth \$19 m
		..	M-60-A3	Main battle tank	(1988)				Status uncertain
		2	RGM-84A Launch	ShShM launcher	(1988)				Status uncertain
		144	AGM-65D	ASM	1988				Arming F-16 fighters; deal worth \$27 m inci training missiles, parts and electronic countermeasure pods
		282	AIM-7M Sparrow	Air-to-air missile	(1987)				Arming F-16 fighters; deal worth \$42 m
		560	A1M-9L	Air-to-air missile	(1986)	1987-89	(560)		Arming F-16 fighters; deal worth \$42 m
		7511	BGM-71D TOW-2	Anti-lank missile	1988	1989	(200)		Includes 180 launchers and 504 night vision sights as well as spare parts
		(170)	MIM-23B Hawk	Landmob SAM	1988	1989	(150)		Deal worth \$51 m
		(32)	RGM-84A Harpoon	ShShM	(1988)				Unconfirmed; modernizing 2 Chinese frigates
		514	R1M-7M Sparrow	SAM	(1984)	1985-89	(514)		Deal worth \$190 m; part of Skyguard airdefence system
Ethiopia	Czechoslovakia	..	T-55	Main battle tank	(1985)	1985-89	(380)		May be Soviet-supplied
	German DR	210	T-55	Main battle tank	1989	1989	152		Ex-Nationale Volksarmee; supplies stopped end-1989
	USSR	..	BM-21 122mm	MRL	(1984)	1984-89	(80)		May be North Korean BM-11
		..	BRDM-1	Seoul car	(1985)	1985-88	(120)		
		..	BRDM-2	Scout car	1985	1986-89	(80)		
		..	BTR-60P	APC	(1985)	1985-89	(360)		
		..	D-30 122mm	Towed howitzer	1985	1985-89	(180)		
		..	M-46 130mm	Towed gun	1985	1985-89	(80)		
		..	AT-3 Sagger	Anti-lank missile	1985	1986-89	(320)		
		..	AT-5 Spandrel	Anti-lank missile	1985				

Fiji	Australia	(4)	ASI-315	Patrol craft	1985	1987	(2)	Status of programme unclear after military coup
Gabon	France	1	ATR-42	Trpt aircraft	1989	1989	1	
Guatemala	Italy	2	G-222L	Trpt aircraft	1989			Deal worth \$36.3 m
Guinea	USSR	1	Matka Class	Hydrofoil FAC	(1988)	1989	1	
Honduras	USA	12	F-5ETiger-2	Fighter	1987	1987-89	10	From USAF stocks; deal worth \$75 m inci 2 F-5F versions
India	Korea, South	7	Sukanya Class	OPV	(1987)	1989	1	
	Netherlands	(40)	Flycalcher	Mobile radar	1987	1989	(40)	Licensed production of 212 to follow
	Poland	4	Polnocny Class	Landing ship	(1985)	1989	1	Possibly for licensed production; in addition to 8 in service
	Sweden	410	FH-77 155mm	Towed howitzer	1986	1986-89	(410)	Deal worthl 1300m
	UK	1	Sea Hairier T-4	Fighter/trainer	1986	1989	1	
		26	Sea King HAS-5	Helicopter	1983	1989	(20)	Deal worth \$900 m inci Sea Eagle anti-ship missiles; 20 B versions and 6 C versions
		21	Westland 30	Helicopter	1986	1988-89	(21)	
		(156)	Sea Skua	Anti-ship missile	(1985)	1987-89	(54)	Arming Navy and Coast Guard Do-228 aircraft
	USSR	24	11-76 Candid	Trpt aircraft	1984	1985-89	(24)	Order increased from 20 to 24 in 1987
		(8)	Ka-27 Helix	Helicopter	(1985)	1985-88	(4)	8-18 ordered; on Kashin Class destroyers
		(100)	Mi-17 Hip-H	Helicopter	(1984)	1984-89	(100)	Replacing Mi-8s
		10	Mi-26 Halo	Helicopter	1988			Second order
	..	Mi-28 Havoc	Helicopter	(1988)			Indian request; Soviet response unknown	
	20	Mi-35	Helicopter	1988	1989	20	EW systems derived from Mi-28 Havoc; deal worth \$172 m incl spares and support equipment	
	(15)	MiG-29	Fighter	1988	1989	15	Order number may be 20	
	8	Tu-142 Bear	Reconnaissance plane		1984	1988-89	8 For Navy	

		..	SA-11 SAMS	Mobile SAM system	(1984)	1987-88	(40)	
		..	SA-8 SAMS	Mobile SAM system	(1982)	1984-89	(48)	
		6	SA-N-1 Launcher	ShAM launcher	1982	1986-89	(5)	Arming Kashin Class destroyers
		..	SA-N-5 Launcher	ShAM launcher	(1983)	1986-89	(4)	Arming Khukri Class corvettes
		3	SSN-2 Styx L	ShShM launcher	1982	1986-88	(2)	Arming Kashin Class destroyers
		..	SSN-2 Styx L	ShShM launcher	(1983)	1986-89	(4)	Arming Khukri Class corvette
		..	SA-8 Gecko	Landmob SAM	(1982)	1984-89	(768)	Reportedly operational early in 1984
		(72)	SA-N-1	ShAM	1982	1986-87	(48)	Arming Kashin Class destroyers
		..	SA-N-5	ShAM	(1983)	1986-89	(80)	Arming Khukri Class corvette
		(36)	SSN-2 Styx	ShShM	1982	1986-88	(24)	Arming Kashin Class destroyers
		..	SSN-2 Styx	ShShM	(1983)	1986-89	(48)	Arming Khukri Class corvette
		(24)	1 SSN-2 Styx	ShShM	(1985)			Arming Tarantui Class corvettes
		1	Charlie-1 Class	SSN	(1985)	1988	1	Leased submarine to be replaced because of concerns about radiation leakages
		3	Kashin Class	Destroyer	1982	1986-88	2	In addition to 3 previously delivered
		8	Kilo Class	Submarine	(1984)	1986-89	7	
		6	NaryaClass	MSO	1982	1986-89	(6)	In addition to 6 delivered 1978-80
		6	Yevgenia Class	MSC	(1985)			In addition to 6 in service
Indonesia	France	(2)	MM-38 Launcher	ShShM launcher	(1978)	1981	(1)	Arming 2 Yugoslavian frigates
		(24)	MM-38 Exocel	ShShM	(1978)	1981	(12)	Arming 2 Yugoslavian frigates
	Netherlands	2	V. Speijk Class	Frigate	1989	1989	2	In addition to 4 supplied 1986-88
	UK	14	AR-325	Surveillance radar	1989			
		(20)	Rapier SAMS	Mobile SAM system	1985			Deal worth \$100 m inci missiles
		(10)	Rapier SAMS	Mobile SAM system	1986			Deal worth \$60 m
		(240)	Improved Rapier	Landmob SAM	1985			
		(120)	Improved Rapier	Landmob SAM	1986			
	USA	10	C-130H-30	Trpt aircraft	1989			
		8	F-16A	Fighter	(1986)			Deal worth \$336 m inci 4 F-16Bs; offsets worth \$52 m

		4	F-16B	Fighter/trainer	1986	1989	3	Deal worth \$337 m inci 8 F-16A fighters Arming F-16 fighters; status uncertain Arming F-16 fighters
		(48)	AGM-65D	ASM	1987			
		(96)	AIM-9P	Air-to-air missile	(1986)			
Iran	Brazil	(50)	EMB-312Tucano	Trainer	1988	1989	(15)	Deal worth \$15 m
	China	T-59	Main battle tank	(1986)	1987-88	(240)		
		..	Type 501	APC	1986	1986-88	(300)	
		..	Type-63 107mm	MRL	(1982)	1983-88	(900)	
		(2)	HQ-2B	SAM system	(1989)			
		..	Hai Ying-2 L	ShShM launcher	(1986)	1987-88	(8)	
		(48)	Hai Ying-2	HQ-2B	SAM	1989		For coastal air defence btys US allegation; unconfirmed
		..	Hai Ying-2	ShShM/SShM	1989			
		..	Hong Jian-73	Anti-tank missile	(1982)	1982-88	(6500)	
		..	Hong Ying-5	Portable SAM	(1985)	1985-88	(600)	
	Czechoslovakia	..	BMP-1	MICV	(1986)	1986-89	(400)	
		..	BTR-60P	APC	(1986)	1986089	(160)	Supplier uncertain
		(90)	T-54	Main battle tank	1989	1989	(90)	Deal incl assistance wih anti-tank missile construction
	German DR		MiG-21F	Fighier	(1988)	1989	(25)	According to GDR Secretary for Defence
		(90)	T-55	Main battle tank	1989	1989	(90)	
	Hungary	..	SA-7 Grail	Portable SAM	1989			
	Korea, North	..	T-62	Main battle tank	(1983)	1984-88	(150)	
		..	Type 59/1 130mm	Towed gun	1983-88	(480)		Deliveries inci some Soviet M-46s
		..	Hai Ying-2 Launcher	ShShM launcher	(1987)	1988	1	
		..	Hai Ying-2	ShShM/SShM	(1987)	1988	6	May be retransferred from China
	Romania	..	Orao	Fighter/grd attack	1989			Uni cost reported to be \$10m
		150	T-55	Main battle tank	1989			Ordered with an unspecified number of tank transporters
		(200)	TAB-77	APC	1989	1989	(100)	
	UK	6	AR-3D	3-D radar	(1988)			Old Deal reopened after cease-fire
	USSR	(300)	T-72	Main battle lank	1989			

Iraq	Brazil	..	Astros-II SS-30	MRL	(1983)	1984-89	(78)	
		..	Asiros-11 SS-60	MRL	(1985)	1987-88	(20)	
		250	EE-9 Cascavel	MRL	(1983)	1984-89	(78)	
		..	Aslros Guidance	MRL	(1985)	1987-88	(250)	Some with 25-mm AA cannon Fire control system for Astros MRI
	China	..	SS-60	SSM	(1985)	1987-89	(960)	
		..	T-59	Main battle tank	(1981)	1982-88	(700)	
		..	T-69	Main battle tank	(1982)	1983-88	(600)	1000-2000 ordered in early 1980s
		..	Type 531	APC	(1981)	1982-88	(650)	
		..	Type 59/1 130mm	Towed gun	(1981)	1982-88	(720)	
	Czechoslovakia Egypti	..	BMP-1	MICV	(1981)	1981-89	(1000)	
		95	EMB-312Tucano	Trainer	1983	1985-88	(80)	Option for 45 more
		..	D-30 122mm	Towed howitzer	(1985)	1985-89	(120)	Supplier uncertain
	France	..	Sakr-30 122mm	MRL	(1987)	1987-89	(300)	Egyptian version of BM-21 MRS
		..	SakrEye	Portable SAM	(1987)			Unspecified number
		6	AS-332	Helicopter	1988	1989	(3)	
		6	AS-365N	Helicopter	1989			To be delivered from 1991
		(136)	AMX-30 Roland	AAV(M)	1981	1982-88	(105)	
		..	Tiger	Point defence radar	(1987)	1988-89	(10)	Trailer-mounted versions supplied; some modified as airborne early- warning radar
		(36)	AM-39 Exocel	Anti-ship missile	1989	1989	18	Arming AS-332 Super Puma helicopters
		..	Armat	ARM	(1983)	1983-89	(700)	Up to 75% of French Annal production
		(48)	AS-15TT	Anti-ship missile	1989			Arming SA-365 Dauphin helicopter
		586	AS-30L	ASM	(1984)	1986-88	(180)	Arming Mirage F-1s
Germany, FR	..	HOT	Anti-tank missile	(1981)	1981-88	(1600)		
	..	Milan	Anti-tank missile	(1981)	1981-88	(4800)		
	..	Roland-2	LandmobSAM	1981	1982-88	(1 050)		
	16	BK-117	Helicopter	1989	1989	(4)		
	Italy	(10)	Aspide/Albalros	ShAM/ShShM launcher	(1981)			Arming Lupo Class frigates and Wadi Class corvettes; delivery prevented by war with Iran

		(10)	Olomal-2 Launcher	ShShM launcher	(1981)				Arming Lupo Class frigates and Wadi Class corvettes; delivery prevented by war with Iran
		(224)	Aspide	SAM/ShAM	(1981)				Arming Lupo Class frigates and Wadi Class corvettes; delivery prevented by war with Iran
		(60)	Olomat-2	ShShM	(1981)				Arming Lupo Class frigates and Wadi Class corvettes; delivery prevented by war with Iran
		4	Lupo Class	Frigate	1981				Order incl Wadi Class corvettes and Stromboli Class Support ship
		6	Wadi Class	Corvette	1981				
	USSR	..	2S1 122mm	SPH	(1986)	1987-88	(80)		Part of deal worth \$3 b
		..	2S3 152mm	SPG	(1986)	1987-88	(80)		Mix of 152- and 122-mm guns unknown
		..	BM-21 122mm	MRL	(1986)	1986-88	(360)		Part of deal worth \$3 b
		..	MT-LB	APC	(1982)	1983-88	(800)		Modified in Iraq to carry Egyptian 120-mm mortar
		..	T-62	Main battle tank	(1982)	1982-89	(1000)		
		..	T-72	Main battle tank	(1985)	1985-88	(700)		Modified in Iraq; eventual goal full Iraqi production
		..	AS-14Kedge	ASM	(1988)	1988-89	(40)		
		..	Scud-B	SSM	(1985)	1986-88	(350)		
Israel	Germany, FR	(2)	Dolphin	Submarine	(1988),				Deal worth \$570 m; to be paid for with US FMS funding
	USA	16	AH-64 Apache	Helicopter	1989				Status uncertain; first export order for Apache
		5	F-15D Eagle	jet trainer	1988				Deal worth \$265 m
		(60)	F-16C	Fighter	1988				Order may be up to 75
		4	OH-58A Kiowa	Helicopter	1988				Deal worth \$39 m
		(20)	SA-365N	Helicopter	1988	1988-89	(20)		To equip Saar-5 Class corvetes
		12	UH-60 Blackhawk	Helicopter	1989			12	Supplied on 'free lease' arrangement
		3	RGM-84A Launch	ShShM launcher	(1988)				Arming Saar-5 Class corvetes
		(192)	AGM-114A	ASM/ATM	1989				Arming 16 AH-64 Apache helicopters
		(48)	RGM-84A Harpon	ShShM	(1988)				Arming Class-5 Class corvetes

		3	Sar-5 Class	Corvette	1988			Built in USA to Israeli design; financed with FMS credits worth \$300 m
Jordan	France	12	Mirage-2000	Fighter	1988			Deal worth \$1 b incl Super 530 and Magic-2 missiles and Durandal bombs
		10	AS-30L	ASM	1988			Arming Mirage 2000 fighters
		(192)	Magic-2	Air-to-air missile	1988			Arming Mirage 2000 fighters
		(96)	Super-530	Air-to air-missile	1988			Arming Mirage 2000 fighters
	Spain	8	C-101 Aviojet	fcT trainer	1989			In addition to 16 supplied in 1988
	UK	3	Constitucion Class	Paliol craft	1987			
	USA	(2)	AN/TPQ-37	Tracking radar	(1986)	1989	(1)	
	USSR	..	SA-13 Gopher	Landmob Sam	(1986)	1987-89	(240)	
Kampuchea	USSR	(10)	BM-14-17 140mm	MRL	(1989)	1989	(10)	
		(10)	BM-21 122mm	MRL	1989	1989	(10)	Shipped with several hundred tonnes of small arms and ammunition
		(15)	M-1955 100mm	Towed gun	1989	1989	(15)	
		(15)	M-46 130mm	Towed gun	(1989)	1989	(15)	
	VietNam	100	T-55	Main battle tank	1988	1989	100	Together with large quantities of small arms
Kenya	Frauo	37	AML-60	Armoured car	1988	1989	37	Part of deal worth \$60 m incl 30 AML-90s and spare parts
		30	AML-90	Annoured car	1988	1989	30	Part of deal worth \$60 m incl 37 AML 60s and equipment
	UK	12	EMB-312Tucano	Trainer	1988	1989	1	
		12	Hawk-200	Fighter	1989			Negotiating
Korea, North	China	(100)	F-6	Fighter	(1986)	1988-89	(48)	
	USSR	(150)	M1G-21MF	Fighter	(1988)	1989	(50)	
		60	MiG-2	Fighter/interceptor	(1984)	1985-89	(60)	
		25	MiG-29	Fighter	(1987)	1988-89	15	
		(20)	Su-25 Frogfoot	Fighler/grd attack	(1987)	1988-89	12	
		..	BMP-1	MICV	(1984)	1985-89	(82)	Locally modified design
		(24)	SA-5 SAMS	Mobile SAM system	(1984)	1988-89	(24)	2 regiments

		(12)	SSN-2 Styx L	ShShM launcher	(1979)	1980-89	(12)	Arming Soju Class FACs
		..	AA-7 Apex	Air-to-air missile	(1987)	1988-89	(120)	Arming MiG-29 fighters: may be AA-10 Alamos
		..	AA-8 Aphid	Air-to-air missile	(1987)	1988-89	(360)	Arming MiG-29 Fighters, Su-25 Fighters and other Soviet supplied aircraft
		(351)	SA-5 Gammon	SAM	1984	1987-89	(351)	
		..	SSN-2 Styx	ShShM	(1979)	1980-89	(100)	Arming Soju Class FACs
Korea, South	Germany, FR	1	Type-209/3	Submarine	1987			Deal worth \$600 m incl licensed production of 2 vessels in S. Korea
	UK	12	Lynx	Helicopter	1988			Part of deal worth \$200 m incl Sea Skua missiles; follow-on order for 20 likely
		1	MBT-3 BL	Bridge layer	1988			For delivery in 1990
		..	ST-1802	Naval fire control radars	1989			Fire control radars for Javelin portable SAMs; pan of deal worth \$144 m
		(48)	Sea Skua	Anti-ship missile	1988			Arming Lynx helicopters
	USA	(6)	C-130H-30	Trpt aircraft	(1987)	1988-89	6	
		30	F-16C	Fighter	1981	1987-89	(30)	Cost incl 6 F-16Ds: \$931 m; plans for total of 156
		4	F-16D	Fighter/trainer	1988	1989	4	Deal worth \$102 m; in addition to 36 delivered previously
		24	F-4E Phantom	Fighter	1988	1988-89	24	Deal worth \$246 m inci 6 C versions, spare pans and support
		24	F-4E Phantom	Fighter	1989			
		48	F/A-18Hornet	Fighter	1989			Prior to licensed production of 72
		50	Model 205 UH-1H	Helicopter	1986	1987-89	(50)	Deal worth \$115 m incl 60 engines
		70	Model 209 AH-1S	Helicopter	1986	1988-89	(40)	Deal worth \$260 m incl TOW missiles
		..	AIM-7E Sparrow	Air-to air missile	(1987)	1988-89	72	Arming F-4D Phantom fighters
		76	A1M-7F Sparrow	Air-to-air missile	1988	1988-89	(76)	
		500	AIM-9P	Air to-air missile missile	1989			Arming F-4E fighters; deal worth \$54 m
		(672)	BGM-71D TOW-2	Anti-tank missile	1986	1988-89	(640)	Arming Model-209 helicopters

		704	BGM-71D TOW-2	Anti-tank missile	1987				
		..	RGM-84A Harpoon	ShShM	(1985)	1985-88	(64)	Arming Ulsan Class frigates	
		52	RGM-84A Harpoon	ShShM	1988			Filling reserve stocks	
Kuwait	Egypt	100	Fahd	APC	1988	1989	(40)	Part of \$ 50 m deal incl Amoun air defence system	
		..	Sakr Eye	Portable SAM	1987	1989	(24)		
	UK	16	EMB-312Tucano	Trainer	1989				
		2	Valkyr	APC	1988	1989	2	First export order	
	USA	42	F/A-18Hornet	Fighter	1988			Deal worth \$1.9 b inci Sidewinder. Harpoon, Sparrow and Maverick missiles	
		300	AGM-65G	ASM	1988			Anti-ship version; arming F/A-18 Hornet fighters	
		40	AGM-84A Harpoon	Anti-ship missile	1988			Arming F/A-18 Hornet fighters	
		200	A1M-7F Sparrow	Air-to-air missile	1988			Arming F/A-18 Hornet fighters	
		120	AIM-9L missile	Air to-air missile	1988			Arming F/A-18 Hornet fighters	
	USSR	245	BMP-2	MICV	1988	1989	(50)	Deal worth \$300 m incl anti-tank missiles	
		..	T-72	Main battle tank	1989			Deal worth \$700 m, paid partly in oil	
		..	SA-8 SAMS	Mobile SAM system	1988			Deal inci BMP-2 APCs	
		(1 220)	AT-5 Spandrel	Anti-lank missile	1988	1989	(240)	Arming BMP-2 APCs	
		..	SA-8 Gecko	Landmob SAM	1988				
	Yugoslavia	200	M-84 155-mm	Towed howitzer	1989				
		230	T-74	Main battle lank	(1989)			200 tanks, 15 command vehicles and 15 recovery vehicles; part of deal \$800 m inci 200 152-mm howitzers	
Laos	Romania	144	SA-7 Grail	Portable SAM	1989	1989	144	Part of shipment inci 5000 rockets mortars and grenades	

Lebanon	Iraq	120	T-55	Main battle tank	1988	1988-89	(120)	For Christian Forces Shipped from Iraq to Christian militia but never delivered
		6	FROG Launcher	Mobile SSM system	1989			
		..	FROG-7	Landmob SSM	1989			
Lesotho	Spain	2	C-212A Aviocar	Trpt aircraft	(1988)	1989	2	
	USA	1	Model 182	Lightplane	(1989)	1989	1	
Libya	France	2	Mirage F-1A	Fighler/grd attack	1986	1989	1	Part of SA-5 air defence system Arming Su-24 Fencers
		2	Mirage-5	Fighter	1986			
	USSR	1	Il-76 Candid	Trpi aircraft	(1988)	1989	1	
		(15)	Su-24 Fencer	Fighter/bomber	(1988)	1989	(12)	
	..	SA-5 SAMS	Mobile SAM system	1989				
	..	Square Pair	Tracking radar	(1988)				
	..	AS-14 Kedge	ASM	1989				
	..	SA-5 Gammon	SAM	(1988)				
Yugoslavia	4	Koncar Class	FAC	1985				
Malaysia	France	1	Falcon-900	Trpt aircraft	1988	1989	1	For VIP use
	Italy	4	Skyguard	Air defence radar	(1987)	1988-89	(4)	
	Netherlands	1	Flycatcher	Mobile radar	1988	1989	1	Fire control for 1 bty of 35-mm anti aircraft guns from Switzerland
	UK	8	Tornado IDS	MRCA	1989			Deal inci artillery, SAMs, radar and 1 submarine subject to final negotiation
		6	Wasp	Helicopter	1988	1989	6	Second order
	(24)	30	FH-70 155mm	Towed howitzer	1988	1989	9	
		12	LI 19 105mm gun	Towed gun	1988			
		12	DN-181 Rapier	Mobile SAM system	1988			
		2	S-723 Manello	3-D radar	(1988)			Part of deal worth \$1.4 b
	USA	20	Improved Rapier	Landmob SAM	1988			
40		Javelin	Portable SAM	1988				
(1)		Oberon Class	Submarine	(1988)				
		48	A4E Skyhawk	Fighter/bomber	1986	1986	48	Held in store as a spare parts reservoir

Mali	USSR	(8)	MiG-21UTI	Jet trainer	(1988)	1989	(2)	
Mauritius	France	2	Batral Class	Landing craft	(1986)	1989	2	Delivered Aug. 1989
Mexico	USA	1	AN/TPS-43	3-D radar	1988	1989	1	
		2	AN/TPS-63	Surveillance radar	(1988)	1988-89	2	W-630 version
Morocco	Denmark	2	Osprey-55 Class	OPV	1989			In addition to 2 delivered in 1988
	Egypt	..	Sakr-30 122mm	MRL	(1984)	1984-88	(50)	
	France	108	AMX-10RC	Scout car	1978	1982-88	(80)	Deliveries halted Jan. 1989 for financial reasons
	Spain	7	CN-235	Trpt aircraft	1989			Deal worth \$94 m
		6	Lazaga Class	Patrol craft	1985	1988-89	6	Second order; also called Vigilance Class and Type P-200
	USA	2	F-5E Tiger-2	Fighter	1989	1989	2	
		100	M-48-A5	Main battle tank	1987	1988-89	(100)	Deal worth \$68 m incl ammunition and communications equipment
Mozambique	Indonesia	..	CN-212	Trpt aircraft	1988			
		..	CN-235	Trpi aircraft	1988			
	USA	1	Gulfstream-2	Trpt aircraft	1989	1989	1	For VIP transport
Nicaragua	USSR	2	An-32 Cline	Trpi aircraft	1988	1989	2	
		(10)	Mi-17 Hip-H	Helicopter	1988	1989	(10)	
		..	Mi-24 Hind-E	Helicopter	(1988)	1989	(3)	Delivered via Cuba
		..	BTR-60P	APC	(1981)	1984-88	(205)	
		..	D-30 122mm	Towed howitzer	(1981)	1981-88	(96)	According to US DOD
Nigeria	France	12	AS-332	Helicopter	1985	1989		2 Remaining 10 cancelled because of lack of funds
	India	48	HTT-34	Trainer	(1987)			Payment in commodities
Oman	Egypt	..	Fahd	APC	1989			
	France	4	VAB Mephisto	APC7TD	(1988)	1989	4	Armed with HOT anti-tank missiles; deal worth FFr 100 m
	(48)	HOT	Anti-tank missile	(1988)	1989	(48)		Arming 4 VAB APCs

	Switzerland	2	AS-202 Bravo	Trainer	1988	1989	2	
	UK	(19)	Hawk-200	Fighter	1989			
		2	S-723 Manello	3-D radar	1985	1988-89	2	Deal worth \$67 m
		..	Javelin	Portable SAM	1989			
		1	Province Class	FAC	1986	1989	1	In addition to 3 in service; armed with MM-40 Exocel missiles, 76-mm and 40-mm guns
Pakistan	China	75	F-7	Fighter	1983	1986-89	60	
		75	F-7	Fighter	1989			
		..	T-59	Main battle tank	(1975)	1978-89	(900)	
		..	Hong Ying-5	Portable SAM	(1988)	1988-89	(200)	Arming M-113 APCs
		2	Romeo Class	Submarine	(1988)			For final assembly in Pakistan
	France	6	Rasil-3190B	Surveillance radar	1988	1989	(2)	Ordered unspecified ground-based military radars of advanced design
	UK	1	SH-3D Sea King	Helicopter	1989	1989	1	Attrition replacement
	USA	11	F-16A	Fighter	1988			Second order; deal worth \$256 m; attrition replacements
		60	F-16A	Fighter	1989			Deal incl 10 F-100 engines but no air lo-surface armaments; to be funded by Saudi Arabia
		3	P-3C Updale-2	Maritime patrol	1988			Deal worth \$240 m inci spares, training and services; financed with FMS credit
		6	SH-2F Seasprite	Helicopter	1989	1989	3	Inci 3 SH-2F versions and 3 SH-2Gs
		88	M-109-A2 155mm	SPH	(1985)	1986-89	(88)	Deal worth \$78 m
		(20)	M-109-A2 155mm	SPH	1988			Deal worth \$40 m inci M-198 howitzers and support equipment
		400	M-113-A2	APC	1989			Possible final assembly in Pakistan
		(20)	M-198 155mm	Towed howitzer	1988			Deal worth \$40 m inci M-109-A2 howitzers and support equipment
		5	AN/TPQ-36	Tracking radar	1988	1989	5	
		4	AN/TPQ-37	Tracking radar	(1985)	1987-89	(3)	
		4	Phalanx	CIWS	1989			Arming Brooke Class vessels leased from the US Navy

		(4)	RIM-67A Launch	ShAM launcher	1988	1989	4	Arming 4 Brooke class frigates leased from the US Navy; deal worth \$40 m inci 64 Mk-46 torpedoes
		200	AIM-7F Sparrow	Air-to-air missile	1988			Arming F-16 fighters
		360	AIM-9L	Air-to-air missile	1988	1989	(60)	Arming F-16 fighters
		2030	BGM-71C I-TOW	Anti-tank missile	1986	1987-89	(1200)	Deal worth \$20 m
		2386	BGM-71D TOW-2	Anti-tank missile	1987			First Pakistani TOW-2 order; with 144 launchers
		..	RGM-84A Harpoon	ShShM	1988	1989	(8)	Arming Agosta Class submarines
		64	RIM-67A/SM-1	ShAM/ShShM	1988	1989	64	Arming 4 Brooke Class frigates leased from the US Navy
		4	Brooke Class	Frigate	1988	1989	4	Mix of Brooke and Garcia Class frigates and 1 repair ship to be leased for \$6.3 m annually
		4	Garcia Class	Frigate	1988	1989	4	
Panama	Chile	6	T-35 Pillan	Trainer	1988	1989	6	In addition to 4 delivered earlier
	Spain	1	CN-235	Trpt aircraft	1987	1989	1	
Papua	Australia	4	Model 205 UH-1D	Helicopter	1989			Part of MAP worth \$1.13 m
New Guinea		4	ASI-315	Patrol craft	1985	1987-89	(4)	
Peru	Germany, FR	2	BK-117	Helicopter	1989			Part of deal worth \$25-30 m incl 6 BK-117 helicopters
		6	Bo-105	Helicopter	1989			Deal worth \$25-30 m hid 2 Bk-117 helicopters
	USSR	18	Mi-17 Hip-H	Helicopter	1989			
Philippines	Australia	6	N-24A Nomad	Trpt aircraft	1989			Part of deal worth \$ 25-30 m incl 6
	Italy	18	S-211	Trainer	1988	1989	4	
	USA	15	Bromon BR-200	Trpt aircraft	1988			
		4	F-5A	Fighter	1988	1989	4	
		20	Model 500D	Helicopter	1988	1989	(10)	Funded by S25 m of MAP
		(45)	V-150 Commando	APC	1987	1988-89	4	

Qatar	France	4	Mirage F-1C	Fighter/interceptor	1987				
		6	TRS-2201	Air defence radar	(1986)	1986-89	(4)		
		(128)	AS-30L	ASM	(1987)	1988-89	(128)	Arming Mirage F-1 fighters	
		(128)	Magic-2	Air to air missile	(1987)	1988-89	(128)	Arming Mirage F-1 fighters	
		(128)	R-530	Air to air missile	(1987)	1988-89	(128)	Arming Mirage F-1 fighters	
Saudi Arabia	Austria	50	CHN-45 155 mm	Towed howitzer	1989			Order signed July 1989	
	Brazil	..	Astros-II SS-30	MRL	1987	1988	(10)	Part of \$500 m deal	
		..	Astros-II SS-40	MRL	1987	1987-88	(30)	Part of \$500 m deal	
	France	..	Astros Guidance	Fire control radar	1987	1987-88	(4)	Part of \$500 m deal	
		12	AS-332	Helicopter	1988	1989	12	Armed with Exocet missiles; deal worth \$430 m incl 20 speed boats armed with 20-mm cannon	
			2	Atlanlic-2	Maritime patrol	(1987)			
			(56)	AMX-30 Shahine	AAV(M)	1984	1986-89	(42)	Improved version developed with Saudi financial assistance
			48	Shahine-2 Launcher	Mobile SAM system	1984	1986-89	(42)	
			..	AM-39 Exocet	Anti-ship missile	1988	1989	(24)	Arming 6 of 12 Super Pumas
			600	Mistral	Portable SAM	1989			Order may be for up to 1000
			4000	Shahine-2	Landmob SAM	1984	1986-89	(800)	Total value of AlThakeb deal: \$4.1
			(2)	F-2000 Class	Frigate	1989			Deal worth \$1.2 b incl Mistral anti-aircraft missiles
		Italy	(32)	Olomal-2	ShShM	1988			Arming 4 F-2000 frigates
		UK	12	BAe-125-800	Utility jet	1988	1988-89	4	Part of 1988 Tornado deal; for VIP use
			(4)	BAe-146	Trpt aircraft	1988			Part of 1988 Tornado deal
			30	Hawk	Jet trainer	1985	1987-89	(30)	Pan of 1985 Tornado deal
		60	Hawk	Jet trainer	1988			Part of 1988 Tornado deal	
		20	Hawk-200	Fighter	1988			Pan of 1988 Tornado deal	
		24	Tornado ADV	MRCA	1985	1989	8	1985 Tornado deal Al Yamamah I; incl 72 Tornadoes, 30 Hawks, 30 PC-9s, missiles, training and facilities; deal worth \$ 7 b	
		36	Tornado ADV	MRCA	1988	1988		Tornado deal Al Yamamah D; incl 48 Tornadoes, 60 Hawks, 12 BAe-125s, 4 BAe-146s, minehunters, missiles	

							training and facilities; deal worth \$17 b	
		48	Tornado IDS	MRCA	1985	1986-89	(30)	Pan of 1985 Tornado deal
		12	Tornado IDS	MRCA	1988			Pan of 1988 Tornado deal
		..	WS-70	Helicopter	1988			Part of 1988 Tornado deal
		40	Shorland S-55	APC	1988			For gendarmerie
		(60)	Transac GS	APC	(1988)			Unconfumed
		(480)	ALARM	ARM	1986			Arming Tornado IDS fighters; status uncertain
		(480)	Sea Eagle	Anti-ship missile	1985			Arming Tornado IDS fighters
		(560)	Sky Rash	Air-to-air missile	(1986)			Arming Tornado ADV fighters
		6	Sandown Class	Minehunter	1988			
USA		12	F-15C Eagle	Fighter	1987			Deal worth \$1 b; attrition replacements delivered at same rate as aircraft losses
		15	Model 406CS	Helicopter	1989			Deal worth \$84 m; armed with TOW missiles
		13	UH-60 Blackhawk	Helicopter	1989			Part of deal worth \$400 m; 1 for VJP use
		315	M-1 Abrams	Main battle tank	1989			Deal worth \$1.5 b
		200	M-2 Bradley	MICV	1988	1989		2 Deal worth \$550 m incl anti-tank missile and training
		30	M-88-A1	ARV	1989			Part of a total deal worth \$ 3b; inc heavy trucks spares and s'Mpport
		(4)	AN/TPQ-37	Tracking radar	1985	1988-89	(4)	
		(6)	AN/TPS-43	3-D radar	1985	'1987-89	(3)	
		(6)	AN/TPS-70	Air defence radar	1989			
		671	A1M-9P	Air-lo-air missile	1986	1989	(200)	
		..	BGM-71A TOW	Anti-tank missile	1988			Aiming WS-70 Blackhawk
		2538	BGM-71C I-TOW	Anti-tank missile	1983	1986-89	(1800)	Deal worth \$26 m
		4460	BGM-71D TOW-2	Anti-tank missile	1988			
		100	RGM-84A Harpoon	ShShM	1986	1988-89	(40)	
Singapore	USA	5	F-5E Tiger-2	Fighter	1988	1988-89	5	
		20	Model 406CS	Helicopter	1989			For limited local assembly

		3	AN/TPQ-37	Tracking radar	1989				Deal worth \$31 m
		6	Phalanx	CIWS	(1986)	1988	1		Arming 6 Type 62-001 corvettes
		6	RGM-84A Launcher	ShShM launcher	(1986)	1988	1		Arming Type 62-001 corvette
		(6)	RGM-84A Launcher	ShShM launcher	(1987)	1988-89	(2)		Arming TNC45 FACs
		(96)	RGM-84A Harpoon	ShShM	(1986)	1988	(16)		Arming Type 62-001 corvettes
		(48)	RGM-84A Harpoon	ShShM	(1987)	1988-89	(16)		Arming refilled TNC-45 FACs
Souh Africa	Spain	3	C-212-200	Trpt aircraft	(1986)	1988-89	3		For Bophulhatswana Air Force
Sri Lanka	China	2	Y-8	Trpt aircraft	(1987)	1989	2		
	Israel	(2)	Dvora Class	FAC	1987				
	UK	9	Strikem aster	Trainer/COIN	1987				Deal worth \$11 m; ex-Kuwaiti Air Force
Sudan	Egypt	..	Fahd	APC	1989				
	Ethiopia	..	SA-7 Grail	Portable SAM	(1986)	1987-88	(80)		Used by SPLA rebels
	Iraq	..	Ababil	MRL	(1989)				Package incl undisclosed items captured from Iran
	Libya	..	MiG-23	Fighter/inlerceptor	(1987)	1987-88	8		May be Libyan-operated
	USA	9	V-150 Commando	APC	1988				In addition to about 80 previously ordered
Syria	USSR	(8)	MiG-25 Foxhound	Fighter	(1989)				
		..	BMP-1	MICV	1977	1977-89	(2300)		May be from Czechoslovakia
		..	T-72	Main battle tank	1980	1980-89	(1300)		May be from Czechoslovakia or Poland
		..	SA-8 SAMS	Mobile SAM system	(1982)	1982-88	(42)		
		..	AT-4 Spigol	Anti-tank missile	(1980)	1981-89	(900)		
		..	AT-5 Spandrel	Anti-tank missile	(1984)	1984-87	(400)		Unconfirmed
		..	SA-14 Gremlin	Portable SAM	(1985)	1987-89	(210)		Replaces SA-7 Grail
		..	SA-8 Gecko	Landmob SAM	1982	1982-89	(744)		
		3	Kilo Class	Submarine	(1987)				
		4	Nanuchka Class	Corvette	(1984)				

Taiwan	USA	12	Commuter-1900	Trpt aircraft	1989	1989	10		
		12	SH-60B Seahawk	Helicopter	1989			Deal worth \$74 m	
		6	Phalanx	CIWS	(1989)	1989	1	Arming Gearing Class frigates; deal worth \$15 m	
		14	RIM-67A Launcher	ShAM launcher	1988	1989	(1)	Arming FFG-7 Class frigates to be under licence	
		..	AIM-7M Sparrow	Air-to-air missile	1989			Aiming upgraded F-104 and Ching Kuo fighter aircraft	
		(360)	RIM-67A/SM-1	ShAM/ShShM	1988			Arming 8 FFG-7 Class frigates to be built under licence	
		60	RIM-67A/SM-1	ShAM/ShShM	(1989)	1989	(10)	Arming Gearing Class frigates	
Thailand	China	(24)	F-7	Fighter	1988				
		23	T-69	Main battle tank	1988	1989	(23)	Pan of deal worth \$47 mln APCs	
		30	T 69	Main battle tank	1988	1989	(7)	Second 1988 order, upgraded version with 105-mm gun	
		360	Type 531	APC	1988			Part of deal worth \$47 m	
		800	Type 531	APC	1988			Second 1988 order; supplied at friendship price	
		55	Type-69 Spaag	AAV(G)	1987	1989	(25)		
		4	Type-74 284mm	MRL	1988				
		..	Type-83 130mm	MRL	(1988)	1988-89	(20)	Seen at 1988 Army Day parades	
		1	HQ-2B	SAM system	1988			Part of deal worth \$47 m	
		(12)	HQ-2B	SAM	1988				
		2	Jiangdong Class	Frigate	1988			Deal worth \$272 m inci 2 Jianghu Class to be refilled before deliver	
		2	Jianghu Class	Frigate	1988			Part of deal worth \$272 m	
		2	Jianghu Class	Frigate	1989			In addition to 2 ordered 1988	
			Germany, FR	(3)	Romeo Class	Submarine	(1986)		
		(4)		M-40Type	MSC/PC	1986			In addition to 2 ordered 1984; order may be for 6
	Israel	40	Python-3	Air-to-air missile	1989				
	Italy	(1)	RAT-3 IS	Surveillance radar	(1988)	1989	(1)	Deal worth \$10 m inci data processing and communications equipment	

Netherlands USA		1	Skyguard	Air defence radar	1986	1989	1	
		(1)	Flycalchr	Mobile radar	1986	1989	(1)	Fire control for Aspide SAM system
		1	Boeing-737-200L	Trpt aircraft	(1987)	1989	1	For VIP use
		(3)	C-130H-30	Trpt aircraft	1988	1988-89	(3)	
		4	CH4t7DChinook	Helicopter	1988	1989	4	
		6	F-16A	Fighter	1987			Second order
		25	Model205UH-1A	Helicopter	1989			
		4	Model 209 AH-1G	Helicopter	1988	1989	(2)	To be armed with TOW missiles
		24	Model300C	Helicopter	1988	1989	24	
		3	P-3B Orion	Maritime patrol	1989			Armed with Harpoon anti-ship missiles
		4	S-70C	Helicopter	1989			
		17	M-109 155mm	SPH	1988			Part of deal worth \$63 m
		17	M-113-A2	APC	1988			Part of deal worth \$63 m
		40	M-48-A5	Main battle tank	1989			
		11	M-577-A2	CPC	1988			Deal worth \$63 m inci 20 M-981
		20	M-981	Support vehicle	1988			Deal worth \$63 m inci M-577-A2
		108	Stingray	Light tank	1987	1987-89	(58)	2 trial systems delivered 1987; part of \$300 m deal incl 6 F-16s and 40 M18-A5s
		2	AN/FPS-117	Air defence radar	1989			Deal worth \$43 m
		(16)	AGM65D	ASM	(1987)			Arming F-16 fighters
		6	AGM-84A Harpoon	Anti-ship missile	1987	1989	6	Arming 3 F-27 maritime patrol aircraft
	(12)	AGM-84A Harpoon	Anti-ship missile	1989			Arming 3 P-3 Orion aircraft	
	(48)	AIM-9P	Air-to-air missile	(1987)			Arming F-16 lighters	
	(48)	BGM-71D TOW-2	Anti-tank missile	(1988)	1989	(24)	Arming 4 Model-209 helicopters	
Tonga	Australia	3	ASI-315	Patrol craft	1988	1989	1	
Tunisia	USA	4	F-5E Tiger-2	Fighter	1989	1989	4	
		57	M-198 155mm	Towed howitzer	1986	1988-89	(57)	Deal worth \$60 m incl 70 lorries, spares, ammunition and support equipment
Ugmda	Italy	5	AB-412 Griffon	Helicopter	1982	1985-89	(5)	
		6	SF-260Wairior	Trainer/CODM	1987	1988	6	

United Arab Emirates	France	..	AS-365F	Helicopter	1988				
		18	Mirage-2000	Fighter	1983	1989	18	For Abu Dhabi; incl 3 recce versions and 3 2-seat trainers	
		18	Mirage-2000	Fighter	1985	1989	18	For Abu Dhabi; 22 E versions, 8 recce versions and 6 trainers	
		2	Croiale Naval Launcher	ShAM launcher	1986				
		2	MM-40 Launcher	ShShM launcher	1986			Arming 2 FRG-built Type 62-001 corvettes	
		(50)	Crotale Naval	ShAM	1986			Arming 2 Type 62-001 corvettes	
		(24)	MM-40 Exocet	ShShM/SShM	1986			Arming 2 Type 62-001 corvettes	
		(16)	MM-40 Exocel	ShShM/SShM	(1987)	1988	(5)	Arming TNC-45 Class FA&	
		(208)	Magic-2	Air-to-air missile	1988			Arming Mirage-5 fighters	
		(120)	Mistral	Portable SAM	1988			Arming 2 Type 62-001 corvettes; deal incl 2 Sadral launchers	
		(80)	R-440 Crotale	LandmobSAM	1988				
		(72)	Super-530	Air-to-air missile	(1983)	1989	(72)	Arming Mirage-2000 fighters	
		(72)	Super-530	Air-to-air missile	(1985)	1989	(72)	Arming Mirage-2000 fighters	
		Gennany,FR	2	Type 62-001	Corvette	1986			For Abu Dhabi
		Italy	3	AB-412 Griffon	Helicopter	1989			ForDubai
		Netherlands	2	Goalkeeper	CIWS	1986			Arming 2 Type 62-001 corvettes
Singapore	2	Jananah Class	Landing craft	1986	1989	2			
UK	12	Hawk	Jet trainer	1989			For Abu Dhabi		
	12	Hawk-100	Jet trainer	1989			For Abu Dhabi; pan of deal wort \$340 m incl 12 Hawk trainers		
USA	8	AT-105 Saxon	APC	(1988)	1989	8			
	5	I-Hawk SAMS	Mobile SAM system	1989			Deal worth \$168 m incl 45 missiles		
	40	AGM-65D	ASM	(1987)			For Bahrain		
	(108)	AIM-9P	Air-to-air missile	1983			Arming Mirage-2000 fighters		
	(108)	AIM-9P	Air-to-air missile	(1985)			Arming second batch of 18 Mirage 2000 fighters		
	(45)	MIM-23BHawk	Landmob SAM	1989			Contract signed June 1989; together with 5 launcher units deal worth \$185 m		

Uruguay	France	1	Riviere Class	Frigate	1988	1989	1	Delivered without Exocet missile launcher
Venezuela	Brazil	6	EMB-312Tucano	Trainer	1988	1988-89	6	Attrition replacement
		100	EE-IIUrutu	APC	1988	1989	(30)	
	France	8	AS-332	Helicopter	1988	1989	8	Deal worth \$85 m
		11	AS-350 Ecureuil	Helicopter	1989	1989	11	Deal incl modernization of existing Mirage fleet Deal worth FFr 200 m
		12	Mirage-50	Fighter/bomber	1988			
		31	AMX-13-90	Light tank	1989			
	(10)	Rassur	Surveillance radar	1988			Arming Mirage-50 aircraft Arming Mirage fighters; deal worth approx \$30 m	
	(50)	AM-39 Exocet	Anti-ship missile	(1988)				
	(100)	Magic-2	Air-to-air missile	1988	1989	(20)		
		Indonesia	16	Model 412	Helicopter	1988		
	Israel	2	IAI-202 Arava	Irpt aircraft	1987	1989	2	Attrition replacements from Israeli stocks
	Netherlands	..	Flycalcher	Mobile radar	1988			
	Spain	4	Cormoran Class	FAC	1987			
	Sweden	70	RBS-70	Portable SAM	1989			
	UK	84	Scorpion 90	Light tank	1988	1989	(10)	Deal worth \$85 m incl support equipment, ammunition and training
	USA	18	RGM-84A Harpoon	ShShM	1989			Deal worth \$50 m; arming Constitution Class FACs
Viet Nam	USSR	..	Malka Class	Hydrofoil FAC	1989	1989	2	First known export of this class; armed with 1 76-mm gun and 1 30-mm gun
Yemen, North	China	..	F-7	Fighter	(1988)	1989	6	
Zaire	Egypt	12	Fahd	APC	1989			Inci Creusot-Loire turrets
	France	13	AMX-13	Light tank	1989			
Zimbabwe	China	..	F-7	Fighter	(1988)	1989	(12)	Second order
	Spain	6	C-212-200	Trpt aircraft	1987	1989 1987-88	(5)	

REGISTER OF LICENSED PRODUCTION OF MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED AND THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, 1989

This appendix lists licensed production of major weapons for which either the licence was bought, production was under way, or production was completed during 1989. The column 'Year(s) of deliveries' includes aggregates of all licensed production since the beginning of the contract. The sources and methods for the data collection, and the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms used, are explained in appendix 7D. The entries are made alphabetically, by recipient and licensor.

<i>Recipient</i>	<i>Supplier</i>	<i>No. ordered</i>	<i>Weapon designation</i>	<i>Weapon description</i>	<i>Year of order</i>	<i>Year(s) of deliveries</i>	<i>No. delivered</i>	<i>Comments</i>
I. Industrialized Countries								
Australia	Germany, FR	10	Meko-200 Class	Frigate	1989			8 for Australia. 2 for New-Zealand; option for 2 more; incl US weapon system and Swedish electronics
	Sweden	6	Type-471	Submarine	1987			Agreement involves 70% Australian industry involvement; option for 2 more likely to be exercised
	Switzerland	65	PC-9	Trainer	1986	1987-89	22	In addition to 2 delivered direct; 17 for assembly and 48 for production
	UK	105	Hamel 105mm	Towed gun	(1982)	1988-89	(52) Reserve	Deal worth \$112 m; 46 for Army

	USA	73	F/A-18Hornet	Fighter	1981	1985-89	66	Deal worth \$4.8 b incl 2 delivered direct and 18 F/A-18B trainers
		2	FFG-7 Class	Frigate	1983	1989	1	
Belgium	Israel	21	El/M-2310	Battlefield radar	1989			Refitted to M-113APCs
	USA	44	F-16A	Fighter	1983	1988-89	(23)	Follows 116 F-16s previously ordered; deal worth \$625 m; offsets worth 80%
Bulgaria	USSR	..	MT-LB	APC	(1980)	1982-88	(130)	
Canada	Germany, FR	..	BK-117	Helicopter	(1986)			Civilian and military versions
	USA	..	Bo-105LS	Helicopter	(1981)	1987-88	(10)	Air defence version in low-rate production
		..	LAV-25	APC	1982	1983-89	(958)	
		..	LAV-AD	AAV(M)	1988	1989	10	
China	France 50	11	AS-365N	Helicopter	1980	, 1984-89	(50)	Local production continues
			Super Frelon	Helicopter	(1981)	1986-89	(11)	
Czechoslovakia	USSR	..	BMP-1	MICV	1971	1971-89	(9100)	70% exported back to USSR
		..	BMP-1 Spigot	TD(M)	1979	1980-89	(236)	Many exported to USSR and GDR; small quantities in service in Czechoslovakia
		..	BMP-2	MICV	1978	1983-89	(275)	
		..	T-72'	Main battle tank	1978	1981-89	(710)	
France	USA	100	MLRS 227mm	MRL	1985	1989	(10)	
Germany, FR	USA	202	MLRS 227mm	MRL	1985	1989	(20)	Production to begin 1992 For delivery 1981-89 Domier/Diehl (FRG) main contractor
		..	AIM-120A AMRAAM	Air-lo-air missile	1989			
		..	A1M-9L	Air-to-air missile	1978	1988-89	(14965)	
		10000 (10000)	FIM-92 Slinger	Portable SAM	1983			
			RAM	ShAM/PDM	1985			
Greece	Austria	292	Steyr 7FA	APC	1986	1987-89	(292)	Follows 300 ordered 1981
		324	Sleyr 4K 7FA	APC	1987			Third order signed Dec. 1987

	Denmark	2	PC-55 Class	Patrol craft	1988				First of projected 10
	Germany, FR	3	Meko-200Type	Frigate	1988				In addition to 1 frigate delivered direct; deal worth \$1.2 b; financial aid from FRG and USA
Italy	France	..	Aster	SAM	1988				
		23000	Milan	Anti-tank missile	1984	1985-89	6351		
			5000	Mistral	SAM	(1988)			To be built by Italmissile consortium
	Switzerland	..	Fledennaus 11	Mobile radar	(1970)	1973-89	(170)		
	USA	..	AB-206B	Helicopter	1972	1978-89	(600)		Jelranger-3 version available from
		..	AB-212	Helicopter	1970	1971-89	(175)		In production 1971-92
		..	AB-212ASW	Helicopter	1975	1975-89	(150)		
		..	AB 412 Griffon	Helicopter	1980	1982-89	(54)		Military version of Bell Model 412;
		..	CH47C Chinook	Helicopter	1968	1972-89	(182)		Italy holds marketing rights
		50	Model 500E	Helicopter	1987	1987-89	(11)		Helicopter trainers
		..	SH-3D Sea King	Helicopter	1965	1969-89	(98)		In production since 1969
		20	Patriot battery	Mobile SAM system	1988				Part of \$2.9 b deal inci 1280 missiles; USA to buy Italian equipment as offset
		(1100)	AGM-65D	ASM	1988			Italy probable supplier of Spanish and Turkish AGM-65 requirements	
		(1280)	MIM-104 Patriot	SAM	1988			Arming 20 Patriot btys	
Japan	UK	(375)	FH-70 155mm	Towed howitzer	1984	1989	(33)		Following direct delivery of 197
	USA	..	CH17D Chinook	Helicopter	(1984)	1988-89	14		
		1	EP-3C Orion	Elint	1988				Follow-on orders expected
		14	F-15DJ	Fighter/trainer	1987	1988-89	(14)		
		55	F15JEagle	Fighler/inlceptor	1985	1988-89	23		MOU signed Dec. 1984
		(130)	FS-X	Fighter	19088				
		KV-107/2A	Helicopter	1982	1984-89		(23)		In addition to 61 [produced earlier
		..	Model 205 UH-1H	Helicopter	1972	1973-89	(124)		US firms guaranteed 42% of work In addition to 61 produced earlier
			(73)	Model 209 AH-IS	Helicopter	1982	1984-89	(47)	
			100	OH-6D	Helicopter	1977	1982-89	(90)	
		50	P-3C Orion	Maritime patrol	1985	1987-89	50		MOD signed Oct. 1985

		83	SH-3B	Helicopter	1979	1981-89	(80)	
		24	SH-60J Seahawk	Helicopter	1988	1989	12	
		40	UH-60J	Helicopter	1987	1988-89	8	
		25	Patriot battery	Mobile SAM system	(1984)	1988-89	20	Part of \$2800 m deal inci 980 missiles
		..	AIM-9L	Air-lo-air missile	(1982)	1983-89	(3841)	
		..	BGM-71C I-TOW	Anti-tank missile	(1983)	1985-89	2359	Total requirement: up to 10 000
		980	MIM-104Pamol	LandmobSAM	1984	1989	89	
		..	MIM-23B Hawk	Landmob SAM	1978	1978-89	(2793)	
Netherlands	USA	53	F-16A	Fighter	1983	1987-89		
		10	F-16A	Fighter	1989		(15)	Fourth order Deal worth \$116 m inci 10 engines
		14	F-16B	Fighter/trainer	1983	1989	(14)	
Poland	USSR	..	An-2	Lightplane	1960	1960-89	(1500)	In production since 1960; over 11 000 built; most for civilian use
		..	Mi-2 Hoplile	Helicopter	1965	1965-89	(3000)	hi production since 1965; most for export
		..	2S1 122mm	SPH	(1980)	1982-89	(460)	Some built for export
		..	MT-LB	APC	(1980)	1980-89	(185)	
		(1900)	T-72	Main battle tank	(1978)	1981-89	(735)	
Portugal	Belgium	100	Jet Squalus	Jet trainer	1989			30 for Portuguese Air Force, 15 for civiian use and 55 for export markets
Romania	France	..	SA-316B	Helicopter	1971	1977-89	(230)	
	USSR	..	Ka-126	Helicopter	(1989)			
		..	Yak-52	Trainer	(1979)	1980-88	(650)	Two-seat piston -engined primary trainer
		..	Tab-77	APC	(1975)	1977-89	(1 620)	Romanian version of Soviet BTR-70
		..	A-90	Air-to-air missile	(1980)	1983-89	(820)	Arming MiG-21 fighters
		..	A-91	Air-to- air missile	(1980)	1983-89	(290)	Arming MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighters
		..	A-911	Air-lo-air missile	(1980)	1983-89	(140)	Arming MiG-23 fighters
.Spain	France	18	AS-332	Helicopter	1986	1988-89	(6)	
	Gennany.FR	..	BO-105CB	Helicopter	(1978)	1981-89	(87)	In addition to 10 purchased direct

	UK USA	5 1	Sandown Class FFG-7 Class	Minehunter Frigate	(1988) 1986			
Sweden	USA	700	AGM-114A	ASM/ATM	1987			Coastal defence version
Switzerland	Gennany. FR	345	Leopard-2	Main battle tank	1983	1987-89	(146)	Deal worth \$1400 m inci 35 delivered direct; final deliveries due 1993
	UK	19	Hawk	Trainer	1987	1989	(2)	Deal worth \$150 m inci Iraining and logistics
Turkey	Gennany, FR	4	Meko-200Type	Frigate	1983	1988-89	2	In addition to 2 built in FRG
		2	Type-209/3	Submarine	1987			Option on 4 more
	Span	72	CN-235	Trpt aircraft	1989			In addition to 20 for civilian use
	USA	152	F-16C	Fighter	1984	1987-89	25	Pan of deal worth \$4 b inci 24 D
			1698	AIFV	MICV	1988	1988-89	(260)
		168	MLRS 227mm	MRL	1988			Deal wonh\$600mfor 180 MLRS; 168 co-produced and 12 delivered direct
		..	FIM-92A Stinger	Portable SAM	1989			Manufacture to begin 1991
UK	Brazil	128	EMB-312Tucano	Trainer	1985	1987-89	(41)	Deal worth \$ 145-150 m; option on 15 more
	France	..	Milan	Anti-lank missile	1976	1977-89	(5 969)	
	USA	67	MLRS 227mm	MRL	1985	1989	(10)	
		223	AIM-120A AMRAAM	Air-to-air missile	1988			Licensed production by Euraam (BAe, MBB, AEG and Marconi)
		..	BGM-71ATOW	Anti-tank missile	1980	1982-89	(19318)	
USA	Israel	..	EL/2106	Point defence radar	(1983)	1985-89	(50)	US designation AN/UPS-3; in production but quantities unknown
			Have Nap	ASM	1987			For co-production with Martin Marietta

	Italy	17	Lerici Plus	MCM	1986			Enlarged version of Italian Irici Class; funding inc. \$197.2 m in FY 1989
	Switzerland	160	ADATS	SAM system	1987	1989	(3)	Eventual requirement may reach 56
	UK	302	T-45 Hawk	Jet trainer	1986	1988	2	
		391	M-119 105mm	Towed gun	1987			
Yugodi	USSR	(350)	T-74	Main battle tank	1977	1983-89	(350)	Yugoslavian designation M-84; includes local modifications
II. Third World Countries								
Argentina	Brazil	20	CBA-123	Trpt aircraft	1989			Order for 36; 16 for civilian users Armed with MM-40 Exocel ShShMs: last 2 will be available for export In addition to 2 delivered direct Deal worth \$120 m
	Germany, FR	6	Meko-MOType	Frigate	1980	1985-88	4	
		4	Type TR-1700	Submarine	1977			
	Italy	..	A-109 Hinnido	Helicopter	1988			
Brazil	Austria	..	CHN-45 155mm	Towed howitzer	(1985)			Production expected from early 1990s In addition to 39 previously produce Part of \$249 m deal For future development by IKL of FRG In addition to I delivered direct
	France	16	HB-350M Esquilo	Helicopter	1988	1989	(5)	
		10	HB-365F	Helicopter	1988			
	Germany, FR	..	SNAC.1	SSN	1989			
		(3)	Type-209/3	Submarine	1982			
Chile	South Africa	(400)	G-5 155 mm	Towed howitzer	1989			
	Switzerland		Piranha	APC	1980	1981-89	(201)	
	USA	..	Model 206	Helicopter	(1988)	1989	1	
		..	T-35 Pillan	Trainer	1980	1985-89	(130)	
Egypti	Brazil	125	EMB-312Tucano	Trainer	1983	1985-89	(125)	In addition to 10 delivered direct; 30 for Egypt, 95 for Iraq; option for 7 more (45 for Iraq) Second order; status uncertain Integration of Egyptian weapon systems with French fire control system
	France	15	Alpha Jet	Jet trainer	1985			
		..	Sinai 23	Mobile SAM system	1988			

	UK	..	Swingfire	Anti-tank missile	1977	1979-89	(5 430)	
	USA	540	M-1 Abrams	Main battle tank	1988			Following delivery of 15; deal worth S2b
		34	AN/TPS-63	Surveillance radar	1986	1988-89	(9)	Deal worth \$ 190m
India	France	..	SA-316B Chaak	Helicopter	(1962)	1964-89	(200)	Also for civilian use
		5	TRS-2230	3-D radar	(1983)	1988-89	(3)	In addition to 4 supplied direct
		(42000)	Milan	Anti-tank missile	1982	1985-89	(22 577)	First missile completed 1985
	Germany, FR	50	Do-228	Trpt aircraft	1983	1987-89	(18)	Part of deal worth \$440 m for production of 110 civil and military versions
		2	Type-1500	Submarine	1981	1989	1	In addition to 2 delivered direct; second due in the mid-1990s
	Netherlands	212	Flycatcher	Mobile radar	(1987)	1988-89	(14)	In addition to direct deliveries
	UK	46	Jaguar	Fighter	1982	1988-89	(16)	
	USSR	(165)	MiG-27	Fighter/grd attack	1983	1987-89	(60)	First flight 1987 after lengthy delay
		..	BMP-2	APCfICV	1983	1987-89	(40)	
	(1000)	T-72	Main battle tank	(1980)	1987-89	(300)		
	..	AA-8 Aphid	Air-to-air missile	(1986)			Unconfirmed	
Indonesia	France		AS-332	Helicopter	190	1985-89	(12)	Production switched from Puma to Super Puma 1983
		..	Super Etendard	Fighter	(1988)			French offer under consideration
	Germany, FR	(100)	BK-117	Helicopter	1912	1986-89	(8)	Total production schedule: 100; 2 pre-production aircraft delivered 1984
		(80)	NBo-105	Helicopter	1987	1988-89	(8)	Follow-on licensed production of 80-100 to include export orders
	Netherlands	(2)	A&im-Class	Minehunter	(1988)			Up to 10 may eventually be built
Spain	(80)	CN-212	Trpt aircraft	1976	1978-89	(28)		
USA	(20)	Modd412	Helicopter	19(2)	1986-89	(14)	Others for civilian customers	
Iran	China	..	Oghab	SSM	1985	1986-89	(700)	
Iraq	USSR	..	Saddan 122mm	Towed howitzer	(1989)	1989	(50)	
Jordan	USA	100	Modd300C	Helicopter	1989			For civilian and military customers

Korea, North	China	..	Hai Ying-2	SSLM	1976	1977-89	(156)	Including production for export
	USSR	..	T-62	Main battle tank	(1988)	1980-89	(622)	
		..	AT-3 Sagger	Anti-tank missile	1975	1976-89	(1400)	
		..	SA-7 Grail	Portable SAM	(1985)	1986-89	(400)	
		..	Scud-B	SSM	(1977)	1987-89	(136)	
Korea, South	Germany, FR	2	Type-209/3	Submarine	1987			In addition to 1 purchased direct from HDW; follow on order for 3 more likely
	Italy	6	Type 6614 Lena Class	APC Minehunter	1976	1977-89	(355)	
	USA	72	F/A-18Hornet	Fighter	(1986)	1988	1	Class may ultimately be of 10 ships In addition to 48 delivered direct
		(150)	H-76 Eagle	Helicopter				
		..	ModdSOOMD	Helicopter	1976	1978-89	(167)	
		272	M-1W-A2 155mm	SPH	1983	1985-89	(250)	
242	M-1W-A2 155mm	SPH	1989					
Malaysia	UK	..	Harinuu	Scout car	1988			Version of Ferret scout car
Mexico	USA	..	DN-3Caballo	Scout car	(1985)	1988	17	
Nigeria	Austria	(200)	Sleyr-4K 7FA	APC	(1981)			Status uncertain due to financial problems Version of US RV-6
	USA	..	Air Beetle	Trainer	1988			
Pakistan	China	..	T-69	Main battle tank	(1989)			
		..	Red Anow-8	Anti-tank missile	1989			
	Sweden	(180)	Suppaner	Trainer	1974	1977-89	(162)	
Philippines	Germany, FR	..	Bo-105C	Helicopter	1974	1976-89	(13)	Others built for civilian customers
	UK	..	BN-2A Islander	Lightplane	1974	1974-89	(30)	
Singapore	Germany, FR	5	Type 62-001	Corvette	1985			

South Africa	Israel	(96)	Gabriel-2	ShShM	(1984)	1986-88	(36)	Unclear whether licence-produced, reverse-engineered or imported direct; South African designation Skorpioen
		(12)	Reshrf Class	FAC	1974	1978-86	6	In addition to 3 delivered direct
Taiwan	Israel	..	Gabriel Launch	ShShM/SShM launcher	(1978)	1980-89	(77)	
		..	Gabrid-2	ShShM/SShM	(1978)	1980-89	(465)	Taiwanese designation Hsiung Feng
	Singapore	(22)	Suikiang Class	FAC	(1983)	1986-88	(9)	Armed with Hsiung Feng ShShMs
	USA	470	M-60-H	Main battle lank	1984	1985-89	(470)	M-60 chassis, M-48 turret, advanced Fire control system
		8	FFG-7 Class	Frigate	1988			Order number reduced from 12
Thailand	France	2	PS-700 Class	Landing ship	(1985)	1988	1	
	Germany, FR	45	Fan trainer	Trainer	1983	1986-89	(38)	In addition to 2 delivered direct
	UK	3	Province Class	FAC	1987			To be armed with 30-mm guns and carry a light helicopter
		1	Province Class	FAC	1989			In addition to 3 under construction

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**COMPOSITE TABLE OF REPLIES OF
GOVERNMENTS FOR THE REGISTER OF
CONVENTIONAL ARMS: 1994**

<i>State</i>	<i>Data on imports</i>	<i>Data on exports</i>	<i>Explanation submitted in note verbale</i>	<i>Background information</i>
Argentina	yes	nil		yes
Armenia	nil	nil		yes
Australia	yes	nil		yes
Austria	yes	nil	yes	yes
Bahamas	nil	nil		no
Barbados	nil	nil		no
Belarus		yes		no
Belgium	nil	yes		yes
Belize	nil	nil		no
Benin	nil	nil		no
Bhutan	nil	nil		no
Brazil	yes	nil		yes
Bulgaria		yes		yes
Burkina Faso	nil	nil		no
Cameroon	nil	nil		no
Canada	yes	yes		yes
Chad	nil	nil		no
Chile	yes	nil		no
China	yes	yes		no
Croatia	nil	nil	yes	no
Cuba	nil	nil		no
Cyprus	yes	nil		
Czech Republic	nil	yes		yes
Denmark	yes'	nil		yes

Dominica	nil	nil		no
Ecuador	nil	nil		no
El Salvador				yes
Estonia	yes	nil		no
Fiji	nil	nil		no
Finland	yes	yes		no
France	yes	yes		yes
Georgia	nil	nil		no
Germany	yes	yes		yes
Greece	yes			yes
Grenada	nil	nil		no
Guyana	nil	nil		no
Hungary	yes			no
Iceland	nil	nil		no
India	yes	nil		no
Indonesia	yes			no
Iran (Islamic)				
Republic of)	yes	nil		no
Ireland	yes	nil		no
Israel	yes	yes		no
Italy	yes	yes		yes
Jamaica	nil	nil	yes	yes
Japan	yes	nil		yes
Kazakstan	nil	nil		no
Libyan Arab				
Jamahiriya	nil	nil	yes	no
Liechtenstein	nil	nil		no
Luxembourg		nil		no
Malaysia	yes	nil		no
Maldives	nil	nil		no
Malta	nil	nil		yes
Marshall Islands	nil	nil		yes
Mauritania	nil	nil		no
Mexico	yes	nil		yes
Mongolia	nil	nil		no
Nepal	nil	nil		no
Netherlands	yes	yes		yes
New Zealand	yes	nil		yes
Niger	nil	nil		yes
Norway	nil	nil		no
Pakistan	yes	nil		no
Panama	nil	nil	yes	no

Papua New Guinea	nil	nil	yes	no
Paraguay				yes
Peru	yes	nil		no
Philippines	yes			no
Poland	nil	yes		yes
Portugal	yes	nil		yes
Republic of Korea	yes	yes		yes
Republic of Moldova	yes	yes		no
Romania	yes	yes		no
Russian Federation	nil	yes		no
Saint Lucia	nil	nil		no
Samoa	nil	nil		no
Singapore	yes	nil		no
Slovakia	yes	yes		no
Slovenia	nil	nil		no
Solomon Islands	nil	nil		no
South Africa	nil	yes		yes
Spain	yes	nil		yes
Sweden	yes	nil		yes
Switzerland	nil	nil		yes
Tajikistan	nil	nil		no
Thailand	yes	nil		no
Turkey	yes	nil		no
Ukraine	nil	yes		no
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	yes	yes		yes
United Republic of Tanzania	nil	nil		no
United States of America	yes	yes	yes	yes
Viet Nam	nil			no
Yugoslavia	nil	nil	yes	no

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REGULATION, LIMITATION AND BALANCED REDUCTION OF ALL ARMED FORCES AND ALL ARMAMENTS, 1951-1958

The impasse in the two commissions by 1950 was an important factor in bringing about their consolidation into a single Disarmament Commission. The period of 1950-1951 was described by the Secretary-General as a time of “serious danger to the peace of the world and to the continued existence of the organisation.”¹ The work of the United Nations was affected by the Korean War and by a stalemate on many outstanding post-war issues.

In June 1950, the Secretary-General submitted a twenty-year ten-point peace programme² which included a call for “a new approach to the problem of bringing the armaments race under control, not only in the field of atomic weapons but in any other weapons of mass destruction and in conventional armaments”. He stated that while disarmament required an atmosphere of confidence, any progress towards agreement on the regulation of armaments would help reduce tension and thus assist in the adjustment of political disputes.

The General Assembly, at its fifth session, in 1950, decided by resolution 496 (V) to establish a Committee of Twelve with the same composition as the Security Council, together with Canada, to consider “ways and means whereby the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments might be co-ordinated, and the advisability of their functions being merged and placed under a new and consolidated disarmament commission”. The following year, the Committee of Twelve recommended³ the establishment of a new commission under the Security Council to carry forward the tasks that had been assigned to the Atomic Energy

Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, both of which, the Committee proposed, should be dissolved.^A

Tripartite Western Proposals

At its sixth session, the General Assembly considered concurrently the report of the Committee of Twelve⁴ and the item “Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments”, which had been placed on its agenda at the joint request of France, the United Kingdom and the United States.⁵ In their explanatory memorandum,⁶ the three Western Powers included the text of a tripartite statement which said, among other things, that in any programme of disarmament, the first and indispensable step was disclosure and verification. The system of verification and disclosure must be on a continuing basis and reveal in successive stages all armed forces—including para-military, security and police forces—and all armaments, including atomic. There must also be effective international inspection to verify the adequacy and accuracy of the information.

The three Governments believed that a workable programme should include criteria according to which the size of all armed forces would be limited., the portion of national production which could be used for military purposes would be restricted, and mutually agreed national military programmes would be arrived at within the prescribed limits and restrictions. They further believed that the United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should continue to serve as the basis for the atomic energy aspects of any general programme, unless and until a better and more effective plan could be devised.

The three Governments stated that discussion of the programme should begin forthwith, but pointed out that a general programme could not be put into effect while United Nations forces were resisting aggression in Korea, and that the major political issues dividing the world could and must be settled concurrently with the coming into effect of the] programme.

The three Governments submitted a draft resolution⁷ whereby the General Assembly would establish a new Disarmament Commission

A. In the course of 1951, the Committee of Twelve also proposed the following studies: *Historical Survey of the Activities of the League of Nations Regarding the Question of Disarmament, 1920-1937* (A/AC.50/2); *The Organisation and Scheme of Work of the League of Nations in the Matter of Disarmament*; *Treatment of the Question of Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare in the League of Nations*; *The Exchange of Information on Armaments Under the League of Nations* (A/AC.50/3).

which would be directed to prepare a draft treaty for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, based on the principles outlined above.

Soviet Proposals

Soviet amendments⁸ were submitted to the tripartite draft resolution which would have recognised as the most important task “the unconditional prohibition of the production of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this prohibition and also the reduction by one-third of the other types of armaments and armed forces of the five Powers—the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Soviet Union—within one year of the adoption of the relevant decision by the General Assembly and on the basis of the level of armaments and armed forces at the time the aforesaid decision is taken”.

In the course of the debate, in the First Committee, the Soviet Union asked the sponsors of the three-Power draft resolution six questions which, together with the answers by the Western Powers, illustrate the differences between the two sides, especially on the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons:⁹

Question 1: Would the three Powers agree that the General Assembly should declare itself in favour of an unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict International control over the enforcement of that prohibition?

Answer: The adoption of the three-Power draft resolution by the General Assembly would clearly be a declaration in favour of the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons enforced by strict international control.

If the nations of the world were to proceed seriously to the task of disarmament they must not only make promises and enter into treaties, but must also ensure that all nations and all peoples would know that what was being promised was actually being carried out.

Question 2: Would they agree that the General Assembly should instruct the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments to draw up and submit to the Security Council, not later than 1 February 1952, an appropriate draft convention on that subject?

Answer; The three Powers had included in their proposed resolution instructions to the new commission to start work promptly on proposals for a draft treaty or treaties.

If the Soviet Union was genuinely prepared to move forward on the basis of the United Nations plan for atomic energy, or some no less effective plan, there was no reason why there should be any long delay. However, the suggested date of 1 February 1952 appeared unrealistic because it was not practical.

Question 3: Would they agree that the draft convention should provide for measures which would ensure the implementation of General Assembly decisions on the prohibition of the atomic weapon, the cessation of its production and the utilisation of atomic energy for civilian purposes only, and should provide for the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of the convention?

Answer: The tripartite proposals went further. The three Powers agreed that the manufacture, possession and use of atomic weapons would be prohibited; that, to ensure such prohibition, and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only, an international control organ would take charge of all stocks of fissionable material and all facilities for its manufacture; that moreover there would be continuous inspection.

The United Nations had repeatedly recognised that prohibition could only be made effective by such measures of control.

Question 4: Would they agree that the General Assembly should recognise that any sincere plan for a substantial reduction of all armed forces, and armaments must include the establishment, within the framework of the Security Council, of an international organ of control?

Answer: The three Powers agreed that the General Assembly should recognise that any sincere plan for the substantial reduction of all armed forces and armaments must include the establishment of an international organ of control.

Whether the international control organ would be within the framework of the Security Council would depend on the terms of the treaty which established it and defined its functions and powers and its relationship to the United Nations.

If by the phrase "within the framework of the Security Council" [the USSR representative] had in mind a plan under which the whole operation of the control system could be paralysed by the veto, that would, of course, be unacceptable.

Question 5: Would they agree that international control organ should be responsible for control of the reduction of all types of armaments

and armed forces, and for control of the enforcement of the prohibition of all kinds of atomic weapons, so that such prohibition should be carried out with meticulousness and in good faith; that international control organ should obtain information on all armed forces, including para-military forces, security and police forces; that it should obtain and disclose information on all arms including atomic weapons and that effective international inspection should be envisaged under the instructions of the above-mentioned international control organ?

Answer: The international control organ which would be established under the tripartite plan would certainly do all the things which [the USSR representative] suggested in [his] question.

Question 6; Would they agree that the international control organ for the prohibition of atomic weapons should carry out, immediately after the conclusion of the convention for the prohibition of the atomic weapon, an inspection of all establishments for the production and stockpiling of atomic weapons for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the above-mentioned convention?

Answer: The three Powers proposed that the control organ, immediately after the conclusion of a convention or treaty, would proceed with the inspection and verification on a continuing basis of all aspects of atomic energy, as well as all armaments and armed forces, in accordance with the successive stages agreed upon in the convention or treaty...

As... had already [been] stated in the answer to question 3,... such inspection and verification would not of themselves be sufficient to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons.

Establishment of the Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly sought to reconcile the divergent positions through a Sub-Committee of the First Committee consisting of the President of the Assembly and the representatives of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the Commission United States. The report of the Sub-Committee¹⁰ showed that the disagreements had to do with matters of major importance, such as the specific means of obtaining the general objectives. Resolution 502 (VI), which created the Disarmament Commission and laid down the future task for negotiations, was based on the amended Western draft resolution. It was adopted on 11 January 1952 by 42 votes to 5, with 7 abstentions, the Soviet Union voting against.¹¹ Resolution 502 (VI) reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Moved by anxiety at the general lack of confidence plaguing the world and leading to the burden of increasing armaments and the fear of war,

Desiring to lift from the peoples of the world this burden and this fear, and thus to liberate new energies and resources for positive programmes of reconstruction and development,

Reaffirming its desire that the United Nations develop an effective collective security system to maintain the peace and that the armed forces and armaments of the world be progressively reduced in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter,

Believing that a necessary means to this end is the development by the United Nations of comprehensive and co-ordinated plans, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only,

Recognising that a genuine system for disarmament must include all kinds of armed forces and armaments, must be accepted by all nations whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system, and must include safeguards that will ensure the compliance of all such nations,

Noting the recommendation of the Committee of Twelve established by resolution 496 (V) that the General Assembly should establish a new commission to carry forward the tasks originally assigned to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments,

1. *Establishes* under the Security Council a Disarmament Commission. This Commission shall have the same membership as the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and shall function under the rules of procedure of the Atomic Energy Commission with such modifications as the Commission shall deem necessary;

2. *Dissolves* the Atomic Energy Commission and recommends to the Security Council that it dissolve the Commission for Conventional Armaments;

3. *Directs* the Disarmament Commission to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty (or treaties) for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. The Commission shall be guided by the following principles:

- (a) In a system of guaranteed disarmament there must be progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces—including para-military, security and police forces — and nil armaments including atomic;
- (b) Such verification must be based on effective international inspection to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the information disclosed; this inspection to be carried out in accordance with the decisions of the international control organ (or organs) to be established:
- (c) The Commission shall be ready to consider any proposals or plans for control that may be put forward involving either conventional armaments or atomic energy. Unless a better or no less effective system is devised, the United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should continue to serve as the basis for the international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only:
- (d) There must be an adequate system of safeguards to ensure observance of the disarmament programme, so as to provide for the prompt detection of violations while at the same time causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country;
- (e) The treaty (or treaties) shall specifically be open to all States for signature and ratification or adherence. The treaty (or treaties) shall provide what States must become parties thereto before the treaty (or treaties) shall enter into force;

4. *Directs* the Commission, when preparing the proposals referred to in the preceding paragraph, to formulate plans for the establishment, within the framework of the Security Council, of an international control organ (or organs) to ensure the implementation of the treaty (or treaties).

The functions and powers of the control organ (or organs) shall be defined in the treaty which establishes it;

5. Directs the Commission, in preparing the proposals referred to in paragraph 3 above, to consider from the outset plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the implementation of which is recognised as a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament programme envisaged in the present resolution;

6. Directs the Commission, in working out plans for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments:

(a) To determine how over-all limits and restrictions on all armed forces and all armaments can be calculated and fixed;

(b) To consider methods according to which States can agree by negotiation among themselves, under the auspices of the Commission, concerning the determination of the over-all limits and restrictions referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above and the allocation within their respective national military establishments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments;

7. *Directs* the Commission to commence its work not later than thirty days from the adoption of the present resolution and to report periodically, for information, to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, or to the Members of the United Nations when the General Assembly is not in session. The Commission shall submit its first report not later than 1 June 1952;

8. *Declares* that a conference of all States should be convened to consider the proposals for a draft treaty (or treaties) prepared by the Commission as soon as the work of the Commission shall have progressed to a point where in the judgment of the Commission any part of its programme is ready for submission to governments;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to convene such a conference when so advised by the Commission;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to furnish such experts, staff and facilities as the Commission may consider necessary for the effective accomplishment of the purposes of the present resolution.

Additional Soviet Proposals

At its sixth session, the Assembly also Considered disarmament proposals by the Soviet Union contained in a draft resolution entitled

“Measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among nations.”¹² These proposals would, among other measures: (a) condemn participation in the “Atlantic bloc” and the establishment by the United States of bases in foreign territories; (b) deem essential the withdrawal of troops from Korea; and (c) call on the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Soviet Union to conclude a peace pact.

Five paragraphs of the draft proposal (paras. 3 to 7) concerned atomic and conventional armaments and the directives to be given to the Disarmament Commission. They provided that the Assembly would:

1. state that the use of atomic weapons as weapons of aggression and of mass destruction was incompatible with membership of the United Nations, and accordingly proclaim the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over its enforcement, the prohibition and the control to be put into effect simultaneously, and instruct the Disarmament Commission to submit to the Security Council, not later than 1 June 1952, a draft convention providing measures to ensure the implementation of the prohibition of atomic weapons, the cessation of their production and the use of already manufactured atomic bombs exclusively for civilian purposes, and the establishment of strict international control over the observance of the proposed convention;
2. recommend that the permanent members of the Security Council reduce their armaments and armed forces by one-third within one year;
3. recommend that all States forthwith and in any case not later than one month after the adoption of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the one-third reduction of the armaments and armed forces of the permanent members, submit complete official data on all armaments, armed forces land atomic weapons and on military bases on foreign territories;
4. recommend the establishment of an international control organ within the framework of the Security Council to supervise the implementation of the decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces and to verify the data submitted by States on their armaments and armed forces—an appropriate system of guarantees being assured by granting to the organ the right to conduct inspection

on a continuing basis, but not to interfere in the domestic affairs of States;

5. recommend that a world conference should be convened not later than 15 July 1952, of all States, Members and non-members, to consider a substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments and practical measures for prohibiting atomic weapons and establishing international control over such prohibition.

On 19 January, the General Assembly, in resolution 504 (VI), decided to refer to the Disarmament Commission the proposals contained in these five paragraphs of the Soviet proposals and the relevant documents of the discussions.

Plan of Work of the Commission

The Disarmament Commission held its first meeting on 4 Plan of Won February 1952, and after adopting provisional rules of procedure,¹³ approved, by 11 votes to 1 (USSR), a French plan of work¹⁴ which was offered as a compromise between United States and Soviet plans¹⁵ based on these countries' different orders of priority.

The plan of work was as follows:

- A. Disclosure and verification of all armaments, including atomic armaments, and of all armed forces.
- B. Regulation of all armaments and armed forces, including:
 1. Elimination of atomic weapons and control of atomic energy with a view to ensuring their elimination;
 2. Elimination of weapons of mass destruction and control with a view to ensuring their elimination;
 3. Limitation and balanced reduction of all other armaments and of all armed forces, and control of this limitation and reduction.
- C. Procedure and time-table for giving effect to the disarmament programme.

Points A and B to be studied concurrently in the first stage of the Commission's work.

Intermittently, the Commission discussed Soviet charges of the use by the United States forces of bacterial weapons in China and Korea, charges which were denied by the United States and the countries

supplying forces to the United Nations Command in Korea. The Commission, on 27 August 1952, approved a proposal by Chile, France and Turkey to amend the plan of work to read “weapons of mass destruction, including bacterial weapons”.

During the first two years of the Commission’s work, the basic differences between the two sides continued, though the elaboration of the positions prepared the way for a synthesis of approaches following the end of the Korean War.

In April 1952, the United States submitted a working paper¹⁶ setting forth “proposals for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments” for which priority was claimed on the basis of the Assembly’s decision. In its working paper, the United States proposed a plan for disclosure and verification of information in five stages in a manner to ensure that the system would be continuing, progressive and complex for all armed forces and armaments, including atomic weapons. The machinery for receiving and checking information was to be established by the United Nations. The Commission also had before it the Soviet proposals that had been submitted to the Assembly’s sixth session and a United States¹⁷ proposal concerning “essential principles for a disarmament programme”.

Western Proposals for Numerical Force Ceilings

In a working paper submitted in May 1952,¹⁸ France, the United Kingdom and the United States proposed over-all numerical limitations on the size of armed forces as part of a comprehensive plan for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments. The working paper suggested that numerical ceilings for China, the USSR and the United States should be fixed at between 1 million and 1.5 million men and for France and the United Kingdom at between 700,000 and 800,000. The working paper further suggested that for other States having substantial armed forces, ceilings should be fixed with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power. They would normally be less than 1 per cent of the population and less than existing levels, except in very special circumstances.

In criticising the three-Power proposals, the Soviet Union said that the question of armed forces had been separated artificially from the main issue—the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments—and that the proposals did not really offer a reduction in armed forces, but only the arbitrary imposition of ceilings. The Soviet Union produced data to demonstrate an enormous increase in the

army, navy and air forces and armaments of France, the United Kingdom and, particularly, the United States.

On 12 August, the United States, on behalf of the three Western Governments, introduced a supplement¹⁹ to the three-Power working paper. The supplement provided that if the proposals for fixing numerical limitations on all armed forces were accepted, a conference of the five permanent members of the Security Council could be arranged with a view to reaching a tentative agreement on the distribution by principal categories of their forces within the agreed ceilings, the types and quantities of armaments for their support, the elimination of all other armed forces and armaments (expressly including all weapons of mass destruction) and the effective international control of atomic energy. Then, under the auspices of the Commission, there would be regional conferences of all Governments and authorities having substantial military forces in the respective regions, with a view to negotiating similar tentative agreements. The tentative agreements would be incorporated into a draft treaty encompassing all the reductions and eliminations of all armaments and forces and bringing them into balanced relationship by progressive synchronised steps. However, the programme could only be put into effect after safeguards to ensure its execution and observance had been agreed upon and an international control authority had been established.

The Soviet Union emphasised that both the initial and the supplementary proposals failed to meet the Soviet point of view on questions of the prohibition of the atomic weapon, the nature of the controlling agency, the methods of disclosure and verification and the question of bacterial weapons. The Soviet Union said that the problems before the Commission could be solved only on the basis of the Soviet proposals calling for the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the one-third reduction of all armaments and armed forces. Even after such reduction, the Soviet Union stated, the military preponderance of the three Western Powers over the USSR would remain, while all would abandon the use of the atomic weapon. Both the initial and the supplementary proposals, the Soviet Union said, advocated disclosure and verification instead of the reduction of armaments.

Consideration by the General Assembly in 1953

At its seventh session, the General Assembly, having considered the reports of the Disarmament Commission,²⁰ consisting of the texts of proposals and a summary of the discussion, adopted, on 8 April

1953, resolution 704 (VII) by 52 votes to 5, with 3 abstentions. In this resolution, the Assembly reaffirmed the previous resolutions and requested the Commission to continue to develop comprehensive and co-ordinated plans for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments. The Soviet Union reintroduced its proposals, emphasising the reduction of armaments and the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, bacterial weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet draft resolution was rejected by 41 votes to 5, with 13 abstentions.

During 1953, the Disarmament Commission held only one meeting, but for the first time it adopted a unanimous report which expressed the hope that recent international events [the end of the Korean War and changes in the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union] would create a more propitious atmosphere for the reconsideration of the disarmament question.²¹

At its eighth session, the General Assembly, on 28 November 1953, by 54 votes to none, with 5 abstentions, adopted resolution 715 (VIII), which reaffirmed previously declared objectives and suggested that the Commission consider the establishment of a sub-committee of the Powers principally involved to seek in private an acceptable solution of the disarmament question. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the responsibility of the United Nations for considering the problem of disarmament and affirming the need of providing for:

- (a) The regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments,
- (b) The elimination and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction,
- (c) The effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only,

the whole programme to be carried out under effective international control and in such a way that no State would have cause to fear that its security was endangered,

Believing that the continued development of weapons of mass destruction such as atomic and hydrogen bombs has given additional urgency to efforts to bring about effectively controlled disarmament

throughout the world, as the existence of civilisation itself may be at stake,

Mindful that progress in the settlement of existing international disputes and the resulting re-establishment of confidence are vital to the attainment of peace and disarmament and that efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive and co-ordinated disarmament programme with adequate safeguards should be made concurrently with progress in the settlement of international disputes,

Believing that progress in either field would contribute to progress in the other,

Realising that competition in the development of armaments and armed forces beyond what is necessary for the individual or collective security of Member States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations is not only economically unsound but is in itself a grave danger to peace,

Conscious of the continuing desire of all nations, by lightening the burden of armaments, to release more of the world's human and economic resources for peace,

Having received the third report of the Disarmament Commission of 20 August 1953, submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 704 (VII) of 8 April 1953.

Endorsing the Commission's hope that recent international events will create a more propitious atmosphere for reconsideration of the disarmament question, the capital importance of which, in conjunction with other questions affecting the maintenance of peace, is recognised by all,

1. *Recognises* the general wish and affirms its earnest desire to reach agreement as early as possible on a comprehensive and co-ordinated plan, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, bacterial, chemical and all such other weapons of war and mass destruction, and for the attainment of these ends through effective measures;

2. *Recognises* that, whatever the weapons used, aggression is contrary to the conscience and honour of the peoples and incompatible with membership in the United Nations and is the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world;

3. *Takes note* of the third report of the Disarmament Commission;

4. *Requests* the Commission to continue its efforts to reach agreement on the problems with which it is concerned, taking into consideration proposals made at the eighth session of the General Assembly, and to report again to the General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than 1 September 1954;

5. *Calls on* all Member States, and particularly the major Powers, to intensify their efforts to assist the Disarmament Commission in its tasks and to submit to the Commission any proposals which they have to make in the field of disarmament;

6. *Suggests* that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of establishing a sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Powers principally involved, which should seek in private an acceptable solution and report to the Disarmament Commission as soon as possible, in order that the Commission may study and report on such a solution to the General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than 1 September 1954;

7. *Further suggests* to the Disarmament Commission, in order to facilitate the progress of its work, to arrange for the subcommittee, when established, to hold its private meetings as appropriate in the different countries most concerned with the problem.

Soviet proposals were introduced in connexion with its agenda item "Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations."²² In addition to the earlier proposals, the new draft resolution asked the General Assembly to recommend to the Security Council that it take steps to ensure the elimination of military bases in the territories of other States; the draft also asked the General Assembly to condemn war propaganda. The Soviet draft resolution was rejected on 26 November 1953, in the First Committee.

United States Atoms for Peace Proposal

On 8 December 1953. President Eisenhower, speaking in the General Assembly, proposed that the Governments principally involved should begin to make joint contributions from the stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency to be set up under the aegis of the United Nations. The working out of the details of the arrangements would be within the scope of the private talks referred to in resolution 715 (VIII). While initial and early contributions to the plan would be small, the President of the United States said, the proposal had the virtue that it would avoid the problems

that would be involved in setting up a World-Wide system of inspection and control. The agency, he continued, would be responsible for the impounding, storage and protection of the contributed materials and would devise methods for their allocation and peaceful uses. The United States proposal subsequently led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Establishment of the Five-Power Sub-Committee

On 19 April 1954, the Disarmament Commission, by a vote of 9 to 1, with 2 abstentions, created a Sub-Committee consisting of Canada, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. A Soviet proposal to add the People's Republic of China, Czechoslovakia and India was rejected by 10 votes to 1, with 1 abstention.²³

The search for agreement on a comprehensive and co-ordinated plan of disarmament was thereafter the task of the five-Power Sub-Committee, which convened in London in May 1954 and, between then and September 1957, held 157 meetings. At the outset, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted documents elaborating and exemplifying previous positions. The United States put forward a working paper on "Methods of implementing and enforcing disarmament programmes: the establishment of international control organs with appropriate rights, powers and functions".²⁴ The Soviet Union submitted a proposal entitled "Basic provisions of a draft international convention for the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, for a substantial reduction in armaments and armed forces, and for the establishment of international control over the observance of the convention".²⁵

French-British Plan of 11 June 1954

On 11 June 1954, France and the United Kingdom submitted a joint proposal²⁶ "as a possible basis for compromise" which in fact was subsequently accepted as such by the Soviet Union. France explained that the plan was based on three principles: (1) that the various measures of reduction, of prohibition, and of disclosure and verification had to be linked together in order to increase the security of all parties at all stages; (2) that the transitions from one stage to the next should be automatic, subject to the competence of the control organ to verify the next stage; and (3) that the measures prohibiting weapons of mass destruction should be subdivided among use, manufacture and

possession and should take effect at different stages. At the outset, the nuclear Powers would regard themselves as prohibited, in accordance with the terms of the Charter, from the use of nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression.

The proposed programme and sequence of measures was as follows:

After the constitution and positioning of the control organ, which shall be carried out within a specified time, and as soon as the control organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into effect:

- (a) Over-all military manpower shall be limited to 31 December 1953 levels.
- (b) Over-all military expenditure, both atomic and non-atomic, shall be limited to amounts spent in the year ending 31 December 1953.

As soon as the control organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into effect:

- (a) One-half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces shall take effect.
- (b) On completion of (a) the manufacture of all kinds of nuclear weapons and all other prohibited weapons shall cease.

As soon as the control organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into effect:

- (a) The second half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces shall take effect;
- (b) On completion of (a):
 - (i) The total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes shall be carried out;
 - (ii) The total prohibition and elimination of all other prohibited weapons shall be carried out.

Consideration by the General Assembly in 1954

At the ninth session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union, on 30 September 1954, proposed a draft international convention²⁷ based on the joint French-British proposals of 11 Assembly June, but with amendments. The Soviet draft proposed a first stage in which States would carry out one-half of the agreed reductions in their armaments,

armed forces and military appropriations within six to twelve months. A temporary international control commission under the Security Council would have the right to request the necessary information from States on the reduction of their armaments and armed forces and would be empowered to undertake necessary steps to supervise observance of commitments.

After the completion of these measures, States would, in the second stage, carry out the remaining half of the agreed reductions within six months (or a year). Simultaneously with the second half of the reductions, there would come into force a total prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction with a cessation of their manufacture and their total elimination from national armaments. The cessation of manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons was to be effected with the commencement of the second 50 per cent cut of armaments and armed forces, and the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons would be accomplished on the completion of the second-stage reductions. The Soviet proposal included a provision for the establishment, at the second stage, of a permanent international organ authorised to exercise control, including inspection on a continuing basis to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the convention by all States.

During the debate, the Soviet Union observed that the French-British proposals, with certain amendments, were not inconsistent with the principles the USSR advocated; for example, the principle of reducing to the agreed level in two equal steps was common to both plans. But whereas specific time-limits were proposed in the Soviet plan, in the French-British plan they were made contingent on the findings of the control organ. The Western position on the prohibition of atomic weapons was unclear, whereas the Soviet Union proposed that they be prohibited by the end of the second stage. With regard to the timing of controls, the Soviet Union sought to set up the control organ simultaneously with the prohibition of atomic weapons. The French-British proposal for the conditional prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons "except in defence against aggression" might sanction the use of atomic weapons on the pretext of defence.

The Soviet Union further observed that it had maintained, ever since 1946, that the veto had nothing to do with the work of the control commission and could not be used to hamper inspection. In cases referred by the control organ to the Security Council, the Council would function in accordance with the Charter. The powers of punitive action

proposed for the control organ in the United States working paper could not be granted as these were solely within the power of the Security Council. The Soviet Union had no intention of accepting those proposals; however, it had accepted the French-British plan as a basis in the hope of achieving agreed solutions.

The United States said that on only one important matter had the Soviet Union taken an unambiguous stand which narrowed the differences: it had accepted that half of the agreed reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments might take place before any action to prohibit nuclear weapons. As to the proposal for inspection on a permanent basis, the United States stressed that a control organ with adequate powers clearly needed to have the full run of a country. The United States further objected that the USSR concept continued to be that punishment for violations must be subject to the veto power:

The General Assembly, on 4 November 1954, adopted resolution 808 (IX), which had been sponsored by the five members of the Subcommittee and which called on the Subcommittee to make a further effort to reach agreement on comprehensive and co-ordinated proposals.²⁸ Resolution 808 (IX) reads as follows:

A

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the responsibility of the United Nations for seeking a solution of the disarmament problem,

Conscious that the continuing development of armaments increases the urgency of the need for such a solution,

Having considered the fourth report of the Disarmament Commission of 29 July 1954 and the documents annexed thereto, and the draft resolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction,

1. *Concludes* that a further effort should be made to reach agreement on comprehensive and co-ordinated proposals to be embodied in a draft international disarmament convention providing for:

- (a) The regulation, limitation and major reduction of all armed forces and all conventional armaments;
- (b) The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together

with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes;

- (c) The establishment of effective international control, through a control organ with rights, powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed reductions of all armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and to ensure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only;

The whole programme to be such that no State would have cause to fear that its security was endangered;

2. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to seek an acceptable solution of the disarmament problem, taking into account the various proposals referred to in the preamble of the present resolution and any other proposals within the Commission's terms of reference;

3. *Suggests* that the Disarmament Commission reconvene the Subcommittee established in accordance with paragraphs 6 and 7 of General Assembly resolution 715 (VIII) of 28 November 1953;

4. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to report to the Security Council and to the General Assembly as soon as sufficient progress has been made.

B

The General Assembly

1. *Refers to* the Disarmament Commission for appropriate consideration the draft resolution of India contained in document A/C.1/L.100/Rev.1;

2. *Decides also* to transmit to the Disarmament Commission for Its Information the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which this draft resolution was discussed.

C

The General Assembly

1. *Refers to* the Disarmament Commission for its consideration the draft resolution submitted by Australia and the Philippines contained in document A/C.1/L.101/Rev.1;

2. *Decides* to transmit to the Disarmament Commission for its Information the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which items 20 and 68 of the agenda of the ninth session of the General Assembly were considered.

Western Proposals in 1955

When the Sub-Committee reconvened in 1955, Canada and the United States joined France and the United Kingdom in submitting a memorandum in March which repeated in general terms the French-British plan of 11 June 1954. France and the United Kingdom further proposed that the ceilings for the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the United States and China be from 1 million to 1.5 million men each and that those of the United Kingdom and France be 650,000 men each. The armed forces permitted to other States were in all cases to be considerably lower than the levels established for the five permanent members of the Security Council. A second French-British memorandum in April²⁹ provided that the total prohibition of nuclear weapons was to be effected not at the end of the disarmament programme, as proposed earlier, but when 75 per cent of the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces had been completed. One of the essential conditions was that an effective system of control operate throughout the whole disarmament programme.

Soviet Plan of 10 May 1955

On 10 May 1955, the Soviet Union submitted its most comprehensive and detailed programme up to that time.³⁰ The main features of the plan, which called for two stages corresponding to the years 1956 and 1957, were: (1) acceptance of the specific ceilings proposed by France and the United Kingdom; (2) the postponement of the prohibition of nuclear weapons until after 75 per cent of the reduction of armed forces had been carried out; and (3) a detailed proposal on controls.

In the first stage, the five Powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom and France—would reduce their armed forces and armaments by 50 per cent of the difference between the levels at the end of 1954 and the ceilings of 1 million to 1.5 million men and 650,000 men, respectively. A world conference would establish ceilings for the other countries. Simultaneously with carrying out the 50 per cent of the agreed reduction of armed forces. States possessing nuclear weapons would undertake to discontinue tests of nuclear weapons and assume obligations not to use them except for purposes of defence against aggression when a decision to that effect was taken by the Security Council. Finally, some of the military bases in the territories of other States would be eliminated.

During the second stage, the second half of the reductions would be carried out. When 75 per cent of the total reduction had been

completed, a complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would come into force. These weapons would be destroyed simultaneously with the last 25 per cent of the reduction of armed forces.

A separate section of the Soviet plan, dealing with international control, stressed that mistrust was a barrier to inspection and that the control of nuclear weapons was technically difficult. Because the very nature of peaceful atomic production provided possibilities for evading control, security could not be guaranteed since the possibility would be open to a potential aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a surprise atomic attack. The Soviet Union therefore proposed that, during the first stage, a control agency would install in the territories of all States concerned, on a basis of reciprocity, control posts at major ports, at railway junctions, on main highways and at airfields. The control agency would have the right to request from States necessary information on the implementation of measures of reduction of armaments and armed forces, as well as the right of unhindered access to documents pertaining to budgetary appropriations for military purposes. The functions of the international control agency would be extended, and it would enjoy the right and power to exercise control, including inspection, on a permanent basis on a scale necessary to ensure the implementation of the disarmament programme. The control agency could make recommendations to the Security Council on measures of prevention and suppression of violations.

Geneva Summit Conference 1955

In July 1955, the Heads of Government of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States met in Geneva to discuss European security, Germany and disarmament; the Disarmament Sub-Committee recessed until August.

At the meeting, the Heads of Government discussed, *inter alia*: a Soviet proposal for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons modelled on the Soviet plan of 10 May; a United States proposal for reciprocal aerial photography and the exchange of military blueprints; a British memorandum on joint inspection of forces confronting each other in Europe; and a French memorandum on disarmament proposing that resources made available by reductions in military budgets should be used in whole or in part to assist underdeveloped countries.

The Geneva Conference adopted a directive to the four Foreign Ministers, who were to continue the discussion in November; the

directive also contained proposals regarding the work of the Sub-Committee. The section on disarmament reads as follows:

The Four Heads of Government,
Desirous of removing the threat of war and lessening the burden of armaments,
Convinced of the necessity, for secure peace and for the welfare of mankind, of achieving a system for the control and reduction of all armaments and armed forces under effective safeguards,
Recognising that achievements in this field would release vast material resources to be devoted to the peaceful economic development of nations, for raising their well-being, as well as for assistance to under-developed countries,

Agree:

1. for these purposes to work together to develop an acceptable system for disarmament through the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission;
2. to instruct their representatives in the Sub-Committee in the discharge of their mandate from the United Nations to take account in their work of the views and proposals advanced by the Heads of Government at this Conference;
3. to propose that the next meeting of the Sub-Committee be held on August 29, 1955, at New York;
4. to instruct the Foreign Ministers to take note of the proceedings in the Disarmament Commission, to take account of the views and proposals advanced by the Heads of Government at this Conference and to consider whether the four Governments can take any further useful initiative in the field of disarmament.

Sub-Committee Reconvenes

The Sub-Committee reconvened at United Nations Headquarters in August. The United States presented a plan³¹ based on President Eisenhower's aerial inspection proposal to meet the possibility of large-scale surprise attacks. Under the proposed plan, the United States and the Soviet Union were to exchange information about the strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces, as well as a complete list of military plants, facilities and installations, with their positions. Verification of information was to be accompanied by ground observers as well as unrestricted, but monitored, aerial reconnaissance.

Emphasising that an effective method of inspection and control was the first requirement of an armaments agreement, the United States placed a reservation on all of its “pre-Geneva substantive positions” taken in the Sub-Committee or in the Disarmament Commission or in the United Nations pending the outcome of the study, jointly or separately, of inspection methods.

The Soviet Union introduced Chairman Bulgarian’s proposal³² that, as a preliminary step, the nuclear Powers assume the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Aerial photography without regard for the need to reduce armaments and to prohibit atomic weapons was held to be less effective than the Soviet preference for a system of ground control posts together with arms reduction and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

France submitted Prime Minister Faure’s plan³³ for the financial supervision of disarmament and the allocation for peaceful purposes of the resulting funds. The United Kingdom submitted a memorandum³⁴ containing a speech by Prime Minister Eden in which he had proposed the establishment of joint inspection of forces on either side of the line dividing Eastern and Western Europe, both as a practical test of inspection and as a means of increasing mutual confidence.

Consideration by the General Assembly in 1953

All proposals submitted during 1955 were transmitted to the tenth session of the General Assembly, which included in its agenda an item, based on the report of the Disarmament Commission, entitled “Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments...” and one submitted by the Soviet Union³⁵ entitled “Measures for the further relaxation of international tension and development of international co-operation”.

The Soviet draft resolution, which was subsequently withdrawn, singled out for consideration the proposals made by the Heads of Government with a view to removing the threat of a new war and seeking a further improvement of relations and the strengthening of confidence among States. Among such measures advanced by the Soviet Union during the session was an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests as a first step towards the total prohibition of nuclear weapons.

The United States also Stressed a less comprehensive approach, recalling that the main purpose of President Eisenhower’s proposal

was to convince the world that the United States and the Soviet Union were acting together to provide against the possibility of large-scale surprise attacks, thus helping to lessen the danger of war and to relax tension and to facilitate the attainment of a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament. As to nuclear testing, if agreement could be reached to eliminate or limit nuclear weapons within an effective system of disarmament under proper safeguards, the United States would agree to corresponding restrictions on the testing of such weapons.

A joint draft resolution by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States³⁶ proposed that there be instituted at once and simultaneously whatever steps could be taken to establish controllable disarmament and to revive confidence by eliminating every possibility of surprise attack by conventional weapons. It urged the States concerned to continue to seek agreement on a comprehensive disarmament plan but to give priority to early implementation of the Geneva proposals of President Eisenhower and Chairman Bulgarian and to early agreement on such measures of an adequately safeguarded disarmament plan as were then feasible.

The Soviet Union noted that the four-power draft resolution contained no recommendation concerning the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons and did not even mention the necessity for prohibiting such weapons. In existing circumstances. President Eisenhower's proposal would only increase international mistrust and tension, even though it might be considered as one means of control during the final stage of the application of measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. The Soviet Union preferred to have the Sub-Committee draw up the terms of an agreement on the principal points which were acceptable to both sides, or on which the area of disagreement had considerably narrowed, including ceilings for the armed forces of the five great Powers, the question of the order in which the measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons should be applied and the question of international control.

Resolution 914 (X), based on the four-Power draft resolution, was adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1955 by 56 votes to 7.³⁷ It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 808 (IX) of 4 November 1954, which established the conclusion that a further effort should be made to reach agreement

on comprehensive and co-ordinated proposals to be embodied in a draft international disarmament convention providing for;

- (a) The regulation, limitation and major reduction of all armed forces and all conventional armaments,
- (b) The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes,
- (c) The establishment of effective international control, through a control organ with rights, powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed reductions of all armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and to ensure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only,

the whole programme to be such that no State would have cause to fear that its security was endangered,

Expressing the hope that efforts to relax international tensions, to promote mutual confidence and to develop co-operation among States, such as the Geneva Conference of the Heads of Government of the four Powers, the Bandung Conference of African and Asian countries and the United Nations tenth anniversary commemorative meeting at San Francisco, will prove effective in promoting world peace,

Desirous of contributing to the lowering of international tensions, the strengthening of confidence between States, the removal of the threat of war and the reduction of the burden of armaments,

Convinced, therefore, of the need to continue to seek agreement on a comprehensive programme for disarmament which will promote international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Welcoming the progress which has been made towards agreement on objectives during the meetings in 1955 of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission,

Noting that agreement has not yet been reached on the rights, powers and functions of a control system, which is the keystone of any disarmament agreement, nor on other essential matters set out in General Assembly resolution 808 (IX),

Noting also that special technical difficulties have arisen in regard to the detection and control of nuclear weapons material,

Recognising further that inspection and control of disarmament can best be achieved in an atmosphere which is free of fear and suspicion,

1. *Urges* that the States concerned' and particularly those on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission:

- (a) Should continue their endeavours to reach agreement on a comprehensive disarmament plan in accordance with the goals set out in General Assembly resolution 808 (IX);
- (b) Should, as initial steps, give priority to early agreement on and implementation of:
 - (i) Such confidence-building measures as the plan of Mr. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, for exchanging military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection, and the plan of Mr. Bulgarian, Prime Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for establishing control posts at strategic centres,
 - (ii) All such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible;

2. *Suggests* that account should also be taken of the proposals of the Prime Minister of France for exchanging and publishing information regarding military expenditures and budgets, of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for seeking practical experience in the problems of inspection and control, and of the Government of India regarding the suspension of experimental explosions of nuclear weapons and an "armaments truce"

3. *Calls upon* the States concerned, and especially those on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, to study the proposal of the Prime Minister of France for the allocation of funds resulting from disarmament for improving the standards of living throughout the world and, in particular, in the less-developed countries;

4. *Recommends further* that scientific search should be continued by each State, with appropriate consultation between Governments, for methods that would make possible thoroughly effective inspection and control of nuclear weapons material, having as its aim to facilitate the solution of the problem of comprehensive disarmament;

5. *Suggests* that the Disarmament Commission reconvene its Sub-Committee and that both pursue their efforts to attain the above objectives;

6. *Decides* to transmit to the Disarmament Commission, for its information, the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which the disarmament problem was discussed during the tenth session of the General Assembly, and requests the Disarmament Commission and the Sub-Committee to give careful and early consideration to the views expressed in those documents.

Partial Disarmament Proposals of 1956

In the course of 1956, both sides submitted new proposals based on the premise that limited measures of disarmament might be implemented prior to agreement on a co-ordinated and comprehensive programme. Simultaneously, proposals were made by the Western Powers for the creation of special international disarmament organs outside the United Nations both to negotiate and to implement disarmament agreements.

When the Sub-Committee reconvened in London in 1956, the Soviet delegation proposed three different partial disarmament approaches: (1) the limitation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces (not linked to nuclear disarmament) to the level of 1 million to 1.5 million men for the United States, the Soviet Union and China and 650,000 for France and the United Kingdom, within two years, with an international control organ to be established and to be in position to carry out inspections before reductions commenced; (2) a European zone of limitation and inspection of armaments; (3) discontinuance of tests of thermonuclear weapons, independently of disarmament; banning of atomic weapons on German soil; and a 15 per cent reduction of military budgets.³⁸

The United States position in the Sub-Committee was based on the premise that an immediate beginning might be made by concentrating on the first phase of a disarmament programme and by reducing the force levels of the United States and the Soviet Union to 2.5 million men; comprehensive disarmament, it was stated, could only be carried out safely as parallel progress was made in the solution of important political issues.³⁹

Further impetus to the partial approach was derived from the discussions in the Disarmament Commission in July. On 3 July the four Western Powers submitted a draft resolution⁴⁰ which affirmed "the importance of making further efforts to reach agreement on a developing programme of disarmament which should begin without delay...", and laid down guiding principles based on their proposals in

the Sub-Committee. The USSR, after criticising the Western principle according to which comprehensive disarmament would be dependent upon the solution of political problems, accepted the 2.5 million ceiling for armed forces as a first step, called for reciprocal unilateral reductions similar to those announced by the Soviet Government in 1955 and 1956 (demobilisation of 640,000 men followed by 1.2 million men) and proposed an immediate undertaking not to use nuclear weapons. In general, the Soviet Union announced that it would “support a proposal for disposing of the disarmament problem in parts”.

India and Yugoslavia introduced separate draft resolutions which emphasised initial disarmament measures, especially the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, reduction of military budgets and the reduction of forces. All draft resolutions were forwarded to the Sub-Committee for consideration.

Consideration by the General Assembly during 1956-57

The eleventh session of the Assembly, 1956-57, which was occupied mainly with the questions of Suez and Hungary, unanimously adopted, on 14 February 1957, resolution 1011 (XI) calling upon the Sub-Committee to reconvene and continue its deliberations, taking into account the comprehensive as well as the partial proposals. In the course of the deliberations on the disarmament items, the question of nuclear weapon tests received increased attention. Resolution 1011 (XI) reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 808 (IX) of 4 November 1954,

Recognising that the achievement of an agreement on the problem of disarmament would contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Welcoming the progress made on certain aspects of the disarmament problem by the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee since the tenth session of the General Assembly,

1. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to reconvene its Sub-Committee at an early date;

2. *Recommends* that the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee give prompt attention to the various proposals that have been submitted to the United Nations including the proposal of Canada, Japan and Norway of 18 January 1957, the comprehensive proposals of France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 11 June 1954, 19 March 1956 and 3 May 1956; the proposals of the

United States of America made under date of 14 January 1957; the proposals of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics made under date of 10 May 1955, 27 March 1956, 12 July 1956, 17 November 1956, 14 January 1957 and 24 January 1957; the proposals of the Government of India made under date of 25 July 1956; and the proposals of Yugoslavia of 10 July 1956; and give continued consideration to the plan of Mr. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, for exchanging military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection, and the plan of Mr. Bulgarian, Prime Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for establishing control posts at strategic centres;

3. *Recommends further* that the Disarmament Commission request its Sub-Committee to prepare a progress report for consideration by the Commission not later than 1 August 1957;

4. *Transmits* to the Disarmament Commission the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which the problem of disarmament was discussed, with the request that the Commission and its Sub-Committee give careful and early consideration to the views expressed in those documents;

5. *Invites* the Disarmament Commission to consider the advisability of recommending that a special session of the General Assembly or a general disarmament conference be convened at the appropriate time.

Last Session of the Sub-Committee 1957

The 1957 session of the Sub-Committee, which proved to be its last, constituted the most sustained and intensive effort by its members to find common ground on partial measures through serious and extensive negotiations.

Soviet Partial Disarmament Proposals of 30 April and 14 June 1957

The Soviet Union, on 30 April 1957, stated that since the Western Powers were not yet prepared to conclude an agreement on a comprehensive disarmament programme, it was submitting a new set of proposals which included partial disarmament measures as well as a two-stage general disarmament plan.⁴¹

- (a) a two-stage reduction of armed forces: for the United States and the Soviet Union, reductions to 2.5 million men each in the first stage and to 1 million to 1.5 million men each in the second stage; for the United Kingdom and France, reductions to 750,000 men each in the first stage, and to 650,000 men each in the second stage;

- (b) a first-stage reduction of conventional armaments and military budgets by 15 per cent;
- (c) during the first stage: a control organ which would function within the framework of the Security Council; control posts would be established on the territory of States, on a basis of reciprocity, at large ports, at railway junctions and on main motor highways; during the second stage: control posts would be established at airports and would be related to an agreement for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States;
- (d) an undertaking at the first stage to renounce the use of nuclear weapons of *all* types, including aerial bombs, rockets carrying atomic and hydrogen warheads irrespective of range, and atomic artillery;
- (e) all tests of nuclear weapons to be discontinued independently of any other disarmament measures;
- (f) liquidation of foreign bases to be carried out by steps;
- (g) the armed forces of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France stationed in the territory of Germany to be reduced by one third;
- (h) similarly, an agreed reduction of the armed forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France stationed in the territory of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) countries, and a reduction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union stationed in the territory of the Warsaw Treaty countries;
- (i) aerial inspection for a sector in Europe bounded in the west by the Greenwich meridian, in the east by longitude 25° E., in the north by latitude 54° N. and in the south by latitude 39° 38' N.; in the Far East, aerial inspection to be extended to the territories of the United States and the USSR east of longitude 108° E, and west of longitude 90° W.;
- (j) propaganda for war, particularly with regard to the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons, to be stopped.

On 14 June, the Soviet Union proposed⁴² separately the immediate cessation of all nuclear weapon tests for a period of two or three years, with control carried out by an international commission, and the establishment, on a basis of reciprocity, of control posts in the territory of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom, and in the Pacific Ocean area.

On 2 July, the Western Powers welcomed the Soviet Union's acceptance of inspection posts for the control and detection of nuclear weapon tests whose temporary suspension, they said, still required precise agreement on, among other points, its relationship to other provisions of a first-stage agreement, such as a reduction in armed forces and armaments and the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

Western Proposals of 2 and 29 August 1957

On 2 August, Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States submitted a working paper on "systems of inspection to safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack."⁴³ As a safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack, the inspection system included:

- (a) aerial inspection;
- (b) ground attack observation posts at principal ports, railway junctions, main highways and important airfields; and
- (c) mobile ground teams with specifically defined authority.

The areas of inspection were: all the territory of the continental United States, Alaska (including the Aleutian Islands), Canada and the USSR. An alternative Arctic zone included all of the USSR, Canada, Alaska, Greenland and Norway north of the Arctic Circle, in addition to a sector west of longitude 140° W., east of longitude 160° E, and north of latitude 50° N., the remainder of Alaska, of the Aleutian and Kurile Islands and of the Kamchatka peninsula. If the Soviet Union accepted either of these two zones, an area of inspection in Europe would be added to cover the territory bounded in the west by longitude 10° W., in the east by longitude 60° E. and in the south by latitude 40° N. If, however, the Soviet Union rejected this zone, a more limited inspection zone in Europe could be discussed on the understanding that it had to include a significant part of the territory of the USSR, as well as the other countries of Eastern Europe.

On 29 August, the four Western Powers presented a further working paper⁴⁴ consolidating their various proposals for partial disarmament and explicitly stating that the following were inseparable measures:

(1) Armed forces would be limited within the first year to 2.5 million men each for the Soviet Union and the United States and 750,000 men each for the United Kingdom and France.

(2) During the same period, States would place a specific quantity of designated types of armaments, to be agreed upon, in storage depots

within their own territories and under the supervision of an international control organisation.

(3) There would be a second-stage limitation of the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union to 2.1 million men each and of those of the United Kingdom and France to 700,000 men each, on condition that compliance with earlier reductions was verified, that some progress was made towards the solution of political issues and that other essential States became parties to the convention. This level could be further limited by negotiation to 1.7 million men each for the United States and the Soviet Union and to 650,000 men each for the United Kingdom and France. The levels of other essential States would be specified at each stage through negotiations with them.

(4) In agreed relation to the level of armed forces, and under appropriate control, the parties would make information available to the international control organisation about their military budgets and expenditures for the year before the convention entered into force and for each year thereafter.

(5) Each party would assume an obligation not to use nuclear weapons if an armed attack did not place the party in a situation of individual or collective self-defence.

(6) All future production of fissionable materials would be placed under international supervision and restricted to non-weapons purposes; equitable transfers of fissionable materials would be made, in successive increments, from previous production to non-weapons purposes, including stockpiling.

(7) Each party would undertake not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons except in cases where they would be used in self-defence against armed attack.

(8) All parties to the convention would refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for a period of twelve months from the date the convention came into force, provided agreement was reached on the installation and maintenance of the necessary control. If this inspection system operated to the satisfaction of each party concerned and if progress was achieved in the preparation of an inspection system for the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, all parties to the convention would undertake to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for a further period of twelve months. Testing could be resumed if the inspection system for the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes had not been installed at the end of twenty-four months.

(9) The parties would establish a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system to assure that the launching of objects through outer space would be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.

(10) The limits of the areas of inspection to safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack would be those proposed by the four Western Powers on 2 August.

(11) An international control organisation would be established within the framework of the Security Control, to include, as its executive organ, a board of control. Important decisions would require the affirmative vote of the representatives of the Governments represented on the Sub-Committee and of such other parties as might be agreed. In addition to other rights and responsibilities, the board of control would have authority to study a system for regulating the export and import of designated armaments.

(12) Each party would have the right to suspend its obligations in the event of an important violation by another party prejudicing its security.

The Sub-Committee ended its work on a note of acrimony and sharp disagreement. The Soviet Union criticised not only the Western package plan but also the very composition of the Sub-Committee, noting that four of the five members were members of NATO where, it was charged, matters were arranged in advance.⁴⁵ The Western Powers stressed that the consultations with other Governments were directed towards proceeding with serious negotiations on partial measures for a first step of disarmament, and their proposals reflected real progress.⁴⁶

Consideration by the General Assembly in 1957

The failure to reach agreement in the Sub-Committee despite serious negotiations, the Soviet criticism of the one-sided composition of the Sub-Committee, the increasing pressure for action to end nuclear tests and the development of long-range missiles placed the question of disarmament uppermost among the preoccupations of the twelfth session of the General Assembly. It was to be the last session at which there would appear on the Assembly's agenda the item "Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments". For the next two years, efforts were concentrated on isolated steps towards disarmament.

Eleven draft resolutions bearing on specific aspects of disarmament were submitted at the twelfth session, most of them directed towards

ending nuclear weapon tests. The focal point for deliberations on partial disarmament was a 24-Power draft resolution⁴⁷ (whose sponsors included France, the United Kingdom and the United States) to give priority to a group of six measures based on the Western proposal in the Sub-Committee. The Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution⁴⁸ which, among other steps, would have given priority to the prohibition of atomic weapons and their elimination and would have called upon States possessing nuclear weapons to assume, as a first step, an obligation not to use such weapons for a period of at least five years. The Soviet draft resolution was rejected in the First Committee on 6 November 1957 by 45 votes to 11, with 25 abstentions.⁴⁹

Japan, India and Yugoslavia were among those who submitted draft resolutions in the hope of finding a new basis for negotiations acceptable to both sides.⁵⁰ These draft resolutions emphasised initial disarmament measures, any one of which might be implemented independently of the others. These attempts at compromise, however, were either rejected or withdrawn.

In the debate, there was general agreement that, while comprehensive disarmament was desirable, only initial steps were then feasible. Those who supported the 24-Power draft resolution agreed that the six measures in the Western proposal were clearly related and should come into force simultaneously. Those who sought a compromise maintained that disarmament plans were not indivisible, that the "all or nothing" attitude should be avoided and that agreement among the major Powers was in any event essential.

The 24-Power draft resolution was adopted by the Assembly on 14 November 1957, by 56 votes to 9, with 15 abstentions.⁵¹ Resolution 1148 (XII) reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 808 (IX) of 4 November 1954,

Emphasising the urgency of decreasing the danger of war and improving the prospects of a durable peace through achieving international agreement on reduction, limitation and open inspection of armaments and armed forces,

Welcoming the narrowing of differences which has resulted from the extensive negotiations in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission,

Believing that immediate, carefully measured steps can be taken for partial measures of disarmament and that such steps will facilitate further measures of disarmament,

1. Urges that the States concerned, and particularly those which are members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, give priority to reaching a disarmament agreement which, upon its entry into force, will provide for the following:

- (a) The immediate suspension of testing of nuclear weapons with prompt installation of effective international control, including inspection posts equipped with appropriate scientific instruments located within the territories of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in, Pacific Ocean areas, and at other points as required;
- (b) The cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and the complete devotion of future production of fissionable materials to non-weapons purposes under effective international control;
- (c) The reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons through a programme of transfer, on an equitable and reciprocal basis and under international supervision, of stocks of fissionable material from weapons uses to non-weapons uses;
- (d) The reduction of armed forces and armaments through adequate, safeguarded arrangements;
- (e) The progressive establishment of open inspection with ground and aerial components to guard against the possibility of surprise attack;
- (f) The joint study of an inspection system designed to ensure that the sending of objects through outer space shall be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes;

2. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to reconvene its Sub-Committee as soon as feasible for this purpose;

3. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to invite its Subcommittee to establish, as one of its first -tasks, a group or groups of technical experts to study inspection systems for disarmament measures on which the Sub-Committee may reach agreement in principle and to report to it within a fixed period;

4. *Recommends* that any such technical group or groups be composed of one expert from each of the States members of the Sub-Committee and one from each of three other States Members of the United Nations which shall be designated by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Sub-Committee;

5. *Invites* the States concerned, and particularly those which are members of the Sub-Committee, to consider the possibility of devoting, out of the funds made available as a result of disarmament, as and when sufficient progress is made, additional resources to the improvement of living conditions throughout the world and especially in the less developed countries;

6. *Requests* the Sub-Committee to report to the Disarmament Commission by 30 April 1958 on the progress achieved.

Expansion of the Commission's Membership

At issue during the twelfth session were not only the Commission's or Sub-Committee's terms of reference, but also the composition of those organs. India submitted an item entitled "Expansion of the membership of the Disarmament Commission and of its Sub-Committee".⁵² The Soviet Union, stressing the necessity of inviting a larger number of States to participate in disarmament talks, proposed the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission consisting of all Members of the United Nations.⁵³ The Soviet draft resolution was rejected in the First Committee on 6 November 1957 by 51 votes to 9, with 21 abstentions.⁵⁴

Resolution 1150 (XII), adopted by the Assembly on 19 November 1957, by a vote of 60 to 9, with 11 abstentions⁵⁵ increased the membership of the Disarmament Commission by adding the following fourteen States: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, India, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union, however, declared that its objections had not been removed and that it would therefore no longer participate in the work of the enlarged Commission or its Sub-Committee.

Another draft resolution, submitted by Belgium, dealt with the question of collective action to inform and enlighten the peoples of the world about the dangers of the armaments race, especially the destructive effects of nuclear weapons. Adopted by the Assembly on 14 November 1957, by 71 votes to 9, with 1 abstention,⁵⁶ resolution 1149 (XII) stated the desirability of seeking ways and means of organising an effective and continuing worldwide publicity campaign under United Nations auspices and disregarding all ideological and political considerations. The General Assembly asked the Disarmament Commission for recommendations on the nature of the information to be disseminated, and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Commission on the means available for conducting such an international campaign. In

addition, the Assembly invited Member States to communicate to the Commission or the Secretary-General any views they might see fit to submit on the scope and content of this campaign. Owing in part to the failure of the Commission to reconvene following the twelfth session, the resolution was not implemented.

Efforts in 1958 to reconvene the new Disarmament Commission were unsuccessful. Thus ended the first United Nations effort, begun in 1952, to draft a co-ordinated and comprehensive treaty for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments.

Secretary-General's Proposal of Agenda Item

In view of the interruption of disarmament negotiations and the dissolution of the Sub-Committee during 1958, the Secretary-General proposed the inclusion of "Question of disarmament" in the agenda of the thirteenth session so as to maintain continuity of consideration of the question by the General Assembly. The Secretary-General stressed the progress made at the Geneva Conference of Experts on an inspection system for a nuclear test ban. In the Introduction to his Annual Report for 1957-1958, he wrote:⁵⁷

Thus, it may be worth considering whether those elements of the problem lending themselves to objective study by experts in science and technology, in military experience, and in law might not be singled out for separate treatment—despite their Interrelationship—in a manner similar to that recently tried at Geneva. Certainly, such an approach would not in itself bring about disarmament, but it might help to improve the atmosphere and clarify many of the problems involved, thus preparing the ground for a time more politically propitious than the present seems to be for a general disarmament agreement.

Introducing his proposed agenda item, "Question of disarmament", the Secretary-General stated: "While the attainment of balanced, world-wide disarmament through the United Nations must remain a primary objective of the Organisation, it must welcome and be associated with all real progress in disarmament in whatever forum it is achieved."⁵⁸

Though the discussion at the thirteenth session reflected the growing interest in achieving a test ban, the Assembly nevertheless adopted resolution 1252 A and D (XIII) which reaffirmed the responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and for seeking a solution of the disarmament problem, and decided, by a vote of 76 to 0, with 2 abstentions, that the Disarmament Commission should, for 1959 and

on an *ad hoc* basis, be composed of all Members of the United Nations.⁶⁰ Resolution 1252 A and D (XIII) reads as follows:

A

A The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the continuing interest and responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, which have found expression in the Charter of the United Nations and in previous resolutions of the General Assembly,

Welcoming the agreement which has been achieved in the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests,

Noting that negotiations on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and on the actual establishment of an international control system on the basis of the report of the Conference of Experts begun on 31 October 1958,

Noting further that qualified persons are expected to meet soon to study the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attack,

Recognising that these developments are encouraging steps in the direction of progressive openness of information concerning technologies and armaments, which may assist in promoting the fundamental aims of the United Nations in the field of disarmament,

I

1. *Urges* that in the negotiations between States that have tested nuclear weapons the parties make every effort to reach early agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests under effective international control;

2. *Urges* the parties involved in these negotiations not to undertake further testing of nuclear weapons while these negotiations are in progress;

II

3. Calls *attention* to the importance and urgency of achieving the widest possible measure of agreement in the forthcoming study of the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attack;

III

4. Expresses *determination* that the trend of the recent encouraging initiatives, including the technical approach, should continue with a

view to contributing to a balanced and effectively controlled world-wide system of disarmament;

IV

5. *Invites* the conferences on nuclear weapons tests and on surprise attack to avail themselves of the assistance and services of the Secretary-General and requests them to keep the United Nations informed;

6. *Invites* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Governments concerned, to render whatever advice and assistance may seem appropriate to facilitate current developments or any further initiatives related to problems of disarmament;

7. *Requests* that the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which various aspects of disarmament were discussed be transmitted by the Secretary-General to the participants in the conferences on nuclear weapons tests and on surprise attack;

V

8. *Reiterates* to the States concerned the invitation, made in General Assembly resolution 1148 (XII) of 14 November 1957, to devote, out of the funds made available as a result of disarmament, as and when sufficient progress is made, additional resources to the improvement of living conditions throughout the world and especially in the less developed countries.

The General Assembly,

Having regard to the universal desire for the establishment of genuinely peaceful conditions in the world and therefore for taking steps to avoid the destruction that would result from a major armed conflict,

Reaffirming the responsibility of the United Nations for seeking a solution of the disarmament problem,

Expressing its determination that all Members of the United Nations should be in a position to contribute to a solution of this problem on a continuing basis,

1. *Decides* that the Disarmament Commission shall, for 1959 and on an *ad hoc* basis, be composed of all the Members of the United Nations;

2. *Transmits* to the Disarmament Commission all the documents, proposals and records of discussions relating to disarmament at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly;

3. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to convene as appropriate and to submit to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, at a special session if necessary, constructive proposals and recommendations in the field of disarmament;

4. *Decides* that the first meeting of the Disarmament Commission shall be convened by the Secretary-General after consultation with the member states and that the Commission, having begun its activities under rule 162 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and taking that rule into account, shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

Conference of Experts on Prevention of Surprise Attack

In the spring of 1958, the Security Council considered a Soviet request for "Urgent measures to put an end to flights by United States military aircraft, armed with atomic and hydrogen bombs, in the direction of the frontiers of the Soviet Union."⁶⁰ In the course of the debate, the United States suggested the establishment of a zone of inspection in the area north of the Arctic Circle and proposed that, without waiting for the renewal of disarmament negotiations, they should begin negotiations on an international inspection system to remove the fear of surprise attack.⁶¹ The Soviet Union demanded the discontinuance of United States flights,⁶² and suggested a summit conference as a preliminary to the renewal of negotiations on the basis of equal representation for East and West.

In the course of the meetings of the Security Council, the Secretary-General intervened⁶³ to stress the importance of making progress on such separate measures as the suspension of nuclear tests, and inspection zones to prevent surprise attack. He maintained that the basic reason for the failure of previous disarmament negotiations was the crisis of trust which was reflected "in an unwillingness to take any moves in a positive direction on their face value and a tendency to hold back positive response because of a fear of being misled."

In the summer of 1958, an exchange of letters between Premier Khrushchev and President Eisenhower led to an agreement to convene a conference of experts for the study of possible measures which might be helpful in preventing surprise attack. The conference opened at the United Nations Office in Geneva on 10 November. Participants were, on the one hand, delegations of experts from Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States and, on the other hand, from the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Albania. A Personal Representative of the Secretary-General also attended.

The group of experts from the five Western countries viewed their task to be that of preparing a technical, military analysis of the problem and of evaluating the effect of various systems of inspection and observations. They considered that disarmament measures were outside their terms of reference. The five Eastern delegations, on the other hand, submitted detailed proposals for a system of inspection and disarmament in Europe as one means of preventing surprise attack. The conference reported to THE Governments which in turn submitted the report and documents to the United Nations.⁶⁴ The conference was suspended on 18 December 1958, and never reconvened.

Nevertheless, the problem was dealt with by both sides subsequently as a source of possible confidence-building measures; and when negotiations on disarmament itself were resumed in 1960, the principle of parity for the two sides, applied at the 1958 conference, was again relied on in determining composition.

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STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

The programme put forward by the Soviet Union for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 continues to arouse tremendous interest throughout the world. The INF Treaty is a genuine embodiment of that programme. Two of what are perhaps the most destabilising classes of missile are now being eliminated. Something that only recently seemed impossible has now become a reality. The first major step has been taken along the road to a nuclear free world. It is no exaggeration to say that the INF Treaty unveils a new political thinking and a constructive approach to resolving the key issues of disarmament and security.

The Soviet Union's decision, as announced by Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev on 7 December 1988, at the United Nations, unilaterally to reduce its armed forces can obviously be a major factor in securing a radical change in the world from arms build-up to arms reduction. Over the next two years, the Soviet Union will reduce its armed forces by 500,000 men while, at the same time, making deep cuts in its conventional weapons. By 1991, six tank divisions will have been withdrawn from the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Hungary and disbanded; assault-landing troops and a number of other formations and units, including assault-crossing units with their weapons and military equipment, will also be withdrawn. Soviet forces in the above-mentioned countries will be reduced by 50,000 men, and armaments by 5,000 tanks. Soviet divisions remaining in the territories of those countries will be given a purely defensive structure. In all. Soviet armed forces in the European part of the Soviet Union and the territories of our European allies will be reduced by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft. Armed forces stationed in the Asian part of the Soviet Union will also be substantially reduced and a major

portion of Soviet troops in the Mongolian People's Republic will be withdrawn.

The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries are taking this bold and courageous step in the interests of strengthening peace and safeguarding international security, thereby, demonstrating their seriousness and their determination to put a peaceful programme into effect and to find radical solutions to the problem of disarmament. I think that the West has yet to realise what is happening. In the mean time, however, a new international climate of confidence is being created, together with the possibility both of launching new negotiations on reducing the level of military confrontation in Europe and of solving disarmament problems in other forums.

We now face a task of unprecedented magnitude, that of reducing the strategic offensive weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States by 50 per cent. At present, the Soviet Union has approximately 2,500 strategic delivery systems with some 10,000 warheads on them, while the United States has roughly 2,300 such delivery systems and over 14,000 warheads. One quite simple comparison speaks for itself: if, under the INF Treaty, some 2,000 warheads in all are eliminated from the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States, a future treaty on strategic offensive weapons would result in the elimination of over 12,000 warheads from the two countries' arsenals. Clearly, if such a treaty on strategic offensive weapons was successfully worked out, it would have a major impact on the fate of the world and the future strengthening of international stability. That is why, the whole of human society has focused so much attention on the Geneva nuclear and space talks between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have been going on between the Soviet Union and the United States since the early 1970s. A long and difficult road has been travelled. A wealth of experience has been accumulated which shows that agreement on strategic offensive weapons can be reached only on the absolute condition that both sides respect the principle of equality and equal security.

In the nuclear arms talks, we have dealt with a number of United States Administrations (the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations). Of course, all of them protected United States security interests and did so persistently and quite skilfully. But, all of them, in negotiating, considered and took into account their partner's views. Negotiating on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security produced results: the drafting of the SALT I (1972) and SALT II (1979) agreements.

How did this principle work in practice? One example we might mention occurred in the drafting of the SALT I Interim Agreement, when the United States had intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ballistic missile submarines with multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs) and the Soviet Union did not and thus had a far lower aggregate number of warheads. On that occasion, the United States agreed that the Soviet Union should have more ICBMs (Soviet Union: 1,526; United States: 1,054) and ballistic missile submarines (Soviet Union: 62 submarines with 950 launchers; United States: 44 submarines with 710 launchers). The United States' large number of warheads was thus offset by the Soviet Union's large number of ICBM launchers and ballistic missile submarines.

The SALT II agreement provided for equality of aggregate levels of strategic delivery systems. Even here, however, the two sides took into account not only their own security interests but also those of their negotiating partner. They made mutual concessions and, by ensuring a balance of interests, made progress towards agreement.

When the Reagan Administration came to the power in the United States in January 1981, it abruptly changed that country's approach to the negotiations. The principle of equality and equal security was to all intents and purposes discarded. In an initial period, the United States Administration recognised only one method of conducting negotiations: from a position of strength. Another by then agreed principle, namely that all strategic offensive weapons (ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines and heavy bombers) must be considered together, as a package, was also called into question. This had always been the guiding principle of the negotiations. The United States, however, tried to secure preferential reductions in ballistic missiles, above all ICBMs, which form the basis of the Soviet Union's strategic defence potential. To that end, it declared ICBMs more "destabilising" and therefore liable to elimination. According to the American approach, weapons in respect of which the United States was strongest—in particular strategic bombers with 20-28 long-range cruise missiles on board each of them—were "inoffensive" and, therefore, not liable to elimination.

The goals pursued by the United States in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in the early 1980s were obvious and amounted to forcing the Soviet Union to adopt unilateral conditions and to gaining military superiority over it. This policy of pursuing military superiority was reflected in the programme launched by the United States in 1981 to sharply build up its strategic offensive weapons.

Of course, it was impossible to reach agreement on strategic offensive weapons on such a basis, which is why the START talks became deadlocked. The Soviet Union and the United States are not the kind of States on which conditions that are unacceptable to them can be imposed. They can conduct talks only on an equal footing, on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. This proved to be the case subsequently and was especially clearly demonstrated by the INF Treaty, which afforded a unique experience of working together to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement. In working out this agreement, both sides made concessions; each met the other half-way and travelled its part of the road.

The conclusion that negotiations must be conducted on an equal footing is also borne out by the entire course of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms which began in March 1985. As soon as the Reagan Administration showed a readiness to work for mutually acceptable, compromise solutions in the area of strategic arms limitation and opted for realism, the two sides were immediately able to make substantial progress towards agreement.

The Soviet-American summit meeting held at Reykjavik in October 1986 was a historic landmark in this process. At Reykjavik, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to reduce their strategic offensive arms by 50 per cent: their delivery systems to a level of 1,600 units and their warheads to a level of 6,000 units. They also expressed their readiness to work for decisions limiting long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). In order to guarantee the possibility of such reductions in strategic offensive weapons, it was necessary, as the Soviet Union proposed, to make a commitment not to exercise the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a period of 10 years and to comply strictly with all its provisions, (limiting "Star Wars" research and testing to the laboratory). However, the United States insisted on its right to test anything related to the development of a broad-scale ABM system with space-based elements—a system prohibited by the ABM Treaty—not only inside the laboratory but also outside it, even in space. The possibility of reaching a historic agreement on strategic offensive weapons at Reykjavik was thus blocked.

Substantial progress on the question of strategic offensive weapons and anti-ballistic missiles was made at the Soviet-American summit meeting held at Washington in December 1987. The two countries confirmed the 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive weapons and also agreed to set a sub-ceiling of 4,900 units on the aggregate

number of ICBM and ballistic missile submarine warheads and to limit heavy ICBMs (1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles) within the aggregate ceiling of 6,000 warheads. Agreement was also reached at Washington to work out an arrangement binding both countries to abide by the ABM Treaty, in the form in which it was signed in 1972, in conducting research, development and, where necessary, tests allowed under the ABM Treaty, and also not to withdraw from the Treaty for an agreed period. The two countries undertook to establish ceilings for long-range SLCMs with nuclear equipment (over and above the 6,000 limit on warheads and the 1,600 limit on delivery systems) and to look for mutually acceptable, effective methods of verifying application of these limits.

The Moscow meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan (29 May-2 June 1988) confirmed the earlier decisions on strategic offensive weapons and anti-ballistic missiles, and significantly broadened the area of agreement.

In the course of summit meetings and meetings at the foreign minister level, the foundations were laid step by step for the work of the Soviet and United States delegations at the Geneva talks. By now joint drafts have been produced for a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons by the Soviet Union and the United States, and for such related documents as a memorandum of understanding on initial data, and protocols on inspection and on the conversion or elimination of strategic offensive weapons. By the end of the tenth round of talks on nuclear and space weapons, on 16 November 1988, work on the texts of all those documents had reached an advanced stage. The outlines of a future agreement are already sufficiently clear. At the same time, further progress is increasingly being hampered by the failure to resolve a number of fundamental problems. In the assessment of the prospects for the talks on nuclear and space weapons, it is very important to have a clear view of those problems.

First of all, there is the question of observance of the 1972 ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union firmly adheres to the understanding reached in Washington in that respect, and calls for observance of the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972. It considers that the parties should undertake not to create, and to prevent the occurrence of, any situation that could prompt either party to exercise the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty referred to in article XV. In the preparation of an agreement on the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union specifically proposes: that the Washington formulation on observing

and not withdrawing from the ABM Treaty should in no way be changed; that the formulation should be taken in its entirety and word for word; and that all questions related to the predictability of the strategic situation and to various aspects of the verification of observance of the agreement should be reflected in a protocol thereto.

The United States is trying to revise the Washington arrangements and secure the Soviet Union's consent to virtually unlimited development and testing of space-based ABM components and systems during the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. At the end of the latest round of talks on nuclear and space weapons, the United States introduced a proposal to that end to permit the development and testing of space-based ABM components using other physical principles, and the deployment in space of information sensors of any kind, including those which could perform ABM radar functions, something prohibited by the ABM Treaty. That proposal underscores the fact that the Americans are adhering to the "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty and, as before, are making it their business to demolish the Treaty and replace it with a "new" treaty that would give them the right to deploy a large-scale ABM system. This is all contrary to the aims and purposes of the talks.

The second problem which needs to be resolved has to do with long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Here a rather strange situation is developing: the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States undertook to set limits on such nuclear missiles and to seek mutually acceptable and effective means of verifying their limitation.

Acting in full compliance with that commitment, the Soviet Union introduced and justified its specific proposals related not only to the limit on SLCMs (400 for nuclear-armed missiles, and 600 for non-nuclear-armed missiles) but also to a whole range of verification measures: the use of national technical means, including remote verification; continuous inspections at plants producing SLCMs and at loading-points where SLCMs are fitted with warheads; inspections at secondary sites where SLCMs are permitted, and on submarines and ships; establishment of a system for the exchange of data and notifications; introduction of a number of restrictions to promote effective verification, for example confining the stationing of SLCMs to agreed types of submarines and ships, and prohibiting the charging of SLCMs on submarines and ships outside their bases and on the open sea.

The United States takes a different approach: despite the commitment, it is avoiding settling the question of SLCMs, and has not put forward

a single constructive proposal. Moreover, it is evading discussion of the Soviet proposals and, to all intents and purposes, is making it its business to prevent any limits on SLCMs. Such an approach by the United States to the question of SLCMs could deadlock the talks. It is perfectly clear that there is no point in reducing certain strategic offensive weapons while at the same time accumulating other such weapons.

There remains the unresolved question of long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). The issue here is the establishment of counting rules. Having in mind the situation as it really is, the Soviet Union recommends that the maximum number of ALCMs for which a given type of heavy bomber is equipped should be taken into account.

The United States is proposing that the count should be on the basis of a number selected at random—up to 10 cruise missiles on any type of heavy bomber. In practice this would mean that for the United States the number of such missiles would be below the real capability of American heavy bombers each of which can carry 20 or more ALCMs, while the capability would be raised too high for Soviet heavy bombers (some of which can carry up to 6 ALCMs). Moreover, on the basis of the American approach, heavy bombers armed with non-nuclear long-range ALCMs would not be counted against the 1,600 limit for delivery vehicles. This means that a significant number of American heavy bombers equipped or converted to carry non-nuclear long-range ALCMs would fall outside the scope of the future treaty. Potentially, such bombers could with relative ease be converted to deliver nuclear weapons. The United States position is illogical, for a heavy bomber, however equipped, is a strategic means of delivering weapons; that is why all such bombers must be counted as strategic delivery vehicles.

Furthermore, there is the question of mobile ICBMs. The Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that making ICBMs mobile helps to increase their survivability and, subsequently, enhances strategic stability. Such an approach was also shared by the United States in the past. But now it would evidently like to use the continuing uncertainty about its own plans regarding mobile ICBMs as a means of obtaining concessions from the Soviet Union. Therefore, under the pretext that such ICBMs cannot possibly be monitored, the United States has called for them to be banned (such a position by the United States also being illogical, for it is not proposing a ban on SLCMs under the pretext that they cannot possibly be monitored; on the contrary, it is striving to prevent any limits on SLCMs).

The Soviet Union has put forward a host of proposals which, taken together, would serve to ensure effective monitoring of mobile ICBMs. Such being the case, the United States has recently taken a realistic approach in recognising that such weapons should not be banned under the future treaty. Nevertheless, the Americans are still resisting efforts to reflect in the text of the draft treaty many of the understandings on mobile ICBMs.

Another point has to do with the setting of sub-limits on warheads on strategic offensive weapons. The Soviet Union is prepared to meet half-way the United States proposal to set sub-limits at 3,300 for ICBM warheads, provided that the same sub-limits are set for SLBM warheads. That would be a just accommodation by each side of the other's concerns. The Soviet approach allows for another option, one that would enable the two sides to determine independently the correlation between ICBM and SLBM warheads within the framework of the agreed level of 4,900. This proposal of ours would not adversely affect the interests of either side. The Americans, however, have accepted neither that option nor the other one. Their aim is to have the sub-limit of 3,300 supply only to ICBM warheads.

It is clear that all the unresolved questions are questions of principle. If the understandings already reached particularly in Washington and Moscow are strictly adhered to, and if the United States demonstrates the necessary political will, those questions can be settled. Resolution of the outstanding questions of principle depends primarily on how prepared the United States is to seek mutually acceptable results in an objective spirit and on the basis of equality of rights.

What would the conclusion of a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons mean? The entry into force of a treaty on strategic offensive weapons would have a beneficial effect on international stability at many levels. First of all, it would remove the threat of an arms race in outer space, and that itself would pave the way for the reduction of strategic offensive weapons; otherwise, the reduction would not be possible, because the development of large-scale ABM systems with space-based elements would lead to a disruption of strategic parity and an arms race in all directions, accompanied by greater mistrust and mutual suspicion, sudden destabilisation, and a heightened risk of war breaking out by accident.

The entry into force of a treaty on strategic offensive weapons would slow down the strategic-arms race and, in particular, would

make the development of new strategic offensive weapons subject to a comprehensive ban. The strategic nuclear arsenals of both sides would be halved, and that would substantially lower the probability of nuclear war. It can hardly be denied that the stockpiling of nuclear weapons, the sophistication of the related technical systems, the longer distances over which nuclear weapons are transported, and the possibility of technical hitches, human error or malicious action make it less and less likely, as Mikhail Gorbachev said, that such weapons will be "obedient".

The entry into force of the treaty would bring into play a comprehensive verification mechanism that would provide an absolute assurance that each side is complying with its obligations, and go a long way towards strengthening mutual trust. Inasmuch as the treaty on strategic offensive weapons relates to the central questions of security guarantees for both parties, verification must be strict and effective. It would be extended, in identical form, to all the strategic offensive weapons of the two parties. The Soviet Union has consistently been calling precisely for such verification. Recently, however, a negative approach to verification has emerged from the American position: attempts to avoid verification that is comprehensive and covers, in equal measure, all the strategic offensive weapons to be reduced under the future treaty; and attempts to weaken the verification mechanism developed and, in part of the inspection process, to confine the mechanism essentially to verification of mobile ICBMs.

The conclusion of a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons, together with strict compliance with the ABM Treaty, would have an extremely beneficial effect on the further reduction of strategic offensive weapons as well as of all other weapons, and on the development of mutually advantageous co-operation between the countries in science, culture, and economic and trade relations. This would be a historic human achievement of immense significance on the road to genuine nuclear disarmament, the abatement and eventual removal of the threat of nuclear war, and an improvement in all aspects of the international situation.

The Soviet Union would welcome such a development. As stressed by Mikhail Gorbachev in his congratulatory telegram to the President-elect of the United States, George Bush, the Soviet Union is prepared to continue and strengthen mutually beneficial Soviet-American co-operation on the broadest range of questions. Further, constructive

interaction between the Soviet Union and the United States would meet the interests not only of the Soviet and American peoples but also of the entire world community. The Soviet Union calls for a continuing process of negotiations and for the achievement, during such negotiations, of the practical results expected throughout the world.

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**TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON
FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (START II)***

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Treaty Between the United State of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,

Stressing their firm commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and their desire to contribute to in strengthening,

Taking into account the commitment by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, as non-nuclear weapon States Parties,

Mindful of their undertakings with respect to strategic offensive arms under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, as well as the provisions of the Joint Understanding signed by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992, and of the Joint Statement on a Global Protection System signed by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992,

* Circulated as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1194).

Desiring to enhance strategic stability and predictability, and, in doing so, to reduce further strategic offensive arms, in addition to the reductions and limitations provided for in the START Treaty,

Considering that further progress toward that end will help lay a solid foundation for a world order built on democratic values that would preclude the risk of outbreak of war,

Recognising their special responsibility as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council for maintaining international peace and security,

Taking note of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/52K of December 9, 1992,

Conscious of the new realities that have transformed the political and strategic relations between the Parties, and the relations of partnership that have been established between them,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ICBM launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that seven years after entry into force Of the START Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate number for each Party, as counted in accordance with Articles III and IV of this Treaty, does not exceed, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, a number between 3800 and 4250 or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 4250.

2. Within the limitations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, the aggregate numbers for each Party shall not exceed:

- (a) 2160, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs;
- (b) 1200, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one warhead is attributed; and
- (c) 650, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.

3. Upon fulfillment of the obligations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall further reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that no later than January 1, 2003, and thereafter, the aggregate number for

each Party, as counted in accordance with Articles I and IV of this Treaty, does not exceed, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, a number between 3000 and 3500 or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 3500.

4. Within the limitations provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article, the aggregate numbers for each Party shall not exceed:

- (a) a number between 1700 and 1750, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 1750;
- (b) zero, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one warhead is attributed; and
- (c) zero, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.

5. The process of reductions provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall begin upon entry into force of this Treaty, shall be sustained throughout the reductions period provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, and shall be completed no later than seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty. Upon completion of these reductions, the Parties shall begin further reductions provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article, which shall also be sustained throughout the reductions period defined in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 6 of this Article.

6. Provided that the Parties conclude, within one year after entry into force of this Treaty, an agreement on a programme of assistance to promote the fulfillment of the provisions of this Article, the obligations provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article and in Article II of this Treaty shall be fulfilled by each Party no later than December 31, 2000.

Article II

1. No later than January 1, 2003, each Party undertakes to have eliminated or to have converted to launchers of ICBMs to which one warhead is attributed all its deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of this Treaty (including test launchers and training launchers), with the exception of those launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities allowed under the START Treaty, and not to have thereafter launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed. ICBM launchers that have been converted to launch an

ICBM of a different type shall not be capable of launching an ICBM of the former type. Each Party shall carry out such elimination or conversion using the procedures provided for in the START Treaty, except as otherwise provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article.

2. The obligations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply to silo launchers of ICBMs on which the number of warheads has been reduced to one pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article in of this Treaty.

3. Elimination of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, including test launchers and training launchers, shall be Implemented by means of either:

- (a) elimination in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the START Treaty; or
- (b) conversion to silo launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing CONVERSION of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Elimination and Conversion Protocol. No more than 90 silo launchers of heavy ICBMs may be so converted.

4. Each Party undertakes not to emplace an ICBM, the launch canister which has a diameter greater than 2.5 meters, in any silo launcher of heavy ICBMs converted in accordance with subparagraph 3(b) of this Article.

5. Elimination of launchers of heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities shall only be carried out in accordance with subparagraph 3(a) of this Article.

6. No later than January 1,2003, each Party undertakes to have eliminated all of its deployed and non-deployed heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol or by using such missiles for delivering objects Into the upper atmosphere or space, and not to have such missiles or launch canisters thereafter.

7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections in connection with the elimination of heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters, as

well as inspections in connection with the conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs. Except as otherwise provided for in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol, such inspections shall be conducted subject to the applicable provisions of the START Treaty.

8. Each Party undertakes not to transfer heavy ICBMs to any recipient whatsoever, including any other Party to the START Treaty.

9. Beginning on January 1, 2003, and thereafter, each Party undertakes not to produce, acquire, flight-test (except for flight tests from space launch facilities conducted in accordance with the provisions of the START Treaty), or deploy ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of this Treaty.

Article III

1. For the purposes of attributing warheads to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs under this Treaty, the Parties shall use the provisions provided for in Article III of the START Treaty, except as otherwise provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article.

2. Each Party shall have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs only of existing types, except for heavy ICBMs. Reduction in the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs of existing types that are not heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph-5 of Article III of the START Treaty, except that:

- (a) the aggregate number by which warheads are reduced may exceed the 1250 limit provided for in paragraph 5 of Article III of the START Treaty.
- (b) the number by which warheads are reduced on ICBMs and SLBMs, other than the Minuteman III ICBM for the United States of America and the SS-N-18 SLBM for the Russian Federation, may at any one time exceed the limit of 500 warheads for each Party provided for in subparagraph 5(c)(i) of Article III of the START Treaty;
- (c) each Party shall have the right to reduce by more than four warheads, but not by more than five warheads, the number of warheads attributed to each ICBM out of no more than 105 ICBMs of one existing type of ICBM. An ICBM to which the number of warheads attributed has been reduced in accordance with this paragraph shall only be deployed in an ICBM launcher

in which an ICBM of that type was deployed as of the date of signature of the START Treaty; and

- (d) the reentry vehicle platform for an ICBM or SLBM to which a reduced number of warheads is attributed is not required to be destroyed and replaced with a new reentry vehicle platform.

3. Notwithstanding the number of warheads attributed to a type of ICBM or SLBM in accordance with the START Treaty, each Party undertakes not to:

- (a) produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it under this Treaty; and
- (b) increase the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM that has had the number of warheads attributed to it reduced in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

Article IV

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, the number of warheads attributed to each deployed heavy bomber shall be equal to the number of nuclear weapons for which any heavy bomber of the same type or variant of a type is actually equipped, with the exception of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role as provided for in paragraph 7 of this Article. Each nuclear weapon for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall count *as* one warhead toward the limitations provided for in Article I of this Treaty. For the purpose of such counting, nuclear weapons include long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), nuclear air-to-surface missiles with a range of less than 600 kilometers, and nuclear bombs.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall be the number specified for heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type in the Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum on Attribution.

3. Each Party undertakes not to equip any heavy bomber with a greater number of nuclear weapons than the number specified for heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type in the Memorandum on Attribution.

4. No later than 180 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall exhibit one heavy bomber of each type and variant of a type specified in the Memorandum on Attribution.

The purpose of the exhibition shall be to demonstrate to the other Party the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber of a given type or variant of a type is actually equipped.

5. If either Party intends to change the number of nuclear weapons specified in the Memorandum on Attribution, for which a heavy bomber of a type or variant of a type is actually equipped, it shall provide a 90-day advance notification of such intention to the other Party. Ninety days after providing such a notification, or at a later date agreed by the Parties, the Party changing the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall exhibit one heavy bomber of each such type or variant of a type. The purpose of the exhibition shall be to demonstrate to the other Party the revised number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers of the specified type or variant of a type are actually equipped. The number of nuclear weapons attributed to the specified type and variant of a type of heavy bomber shall change on the ninetieth day after the notification of such intent. On that day, the Party changing the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall provide to the other Party a notification of each change in data according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum on Attribution.

6. The exhibitions and inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections.

7. Each Party shall have the right to reorient to a conventional role heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. For the purposes of this Treaty, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are those heavy bombers specified by a Party from among its heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs that have never been accountable under the START Treaty as heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. The reorienting Party shall provide to the other Party a notification of its intent to reorient a heavy bomber to a conventional

role no less than 90 days in advance of such reorientation. No conversion procedures shall be required for such a heavy bomber to be specified as a heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role.

8. Heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall be subject to the following requirements:

- (a) the number of such heavy bombers shall not exceed 100 at any one time;
- (b) such heavy bombers shall be based separately from heavy bombers with nuclear roles;
- (c) such heavy bombers shall be used only for non-nuclear missions. Such heavy bombers shall not be used in exercises for nuclear missions, and their aircrews shall not train or exercise for such missions; and
- (d) heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall have differences from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection.

9. Each Party shall have the right to return to a nuclear role heavy bombers that have been reoriented in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Article to a conventional role. The Party carrying out such action shall provide to the other Party through diplomatic channels notification of its intent to return a heavy bomber to a nuclear role no less than 90 days in advance of taking such action. Such a heavy bomber returned to a nuclear role shall not subsequently be reoriented to a conventional role.

Heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that are subsequently returned to a nuclear role shall have differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection from other heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that have not been reoriented to a conventional role, as well as from heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that are still reoriented to a conventional role.

10. Each Party shall locate storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments no less than 100 kilometers from any air base where heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are based.

11. Except as otherwise provided for in this Treaty, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall remain subject to the provisions of the START Treaty, including the inspection provisions,

12. If not all heavy bombers of a given type or variant of a type are reoriented to a conventional role, one heavy bomber of each type or variant of a type of heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role shall be exhibited in the open for the purpose of demonstrating to the other Party the differences referred subparagraph Article. Such differences shall be subject to inspection by the other Party.

13. If not all heavy bombers of a given type or variant of a type reoriented to a conventional role are returned to a nuclear role, one heavy bomber of each type and variant of a type of heavy bomber returned to a nuclear role shall be exhibited in the open for the purpose of demonstrating to the other Party the differences referred to in paragraph 9 of this Article. Such differences shall be subject to inspection by the other Party.

14. The exhibitions and inspections provided for in paragraphs 12 and 13 of this Article shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections.

Article V

1. Except as provided for in this Treaty, the provisions of the START Treaty, including the verification provisions, shall be used for implementation of this Treaty.

2. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Bilateral Implementation Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Bilateral Implementation Commission to:

- (a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and
- (b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty.

Article VI

1 This Treaty, including its Memorandum on Attribution, Elimination and Conversion Protocol, and Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections, all of which are integral parts thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, but not prior to the entry into force of the START Treaty.

2. The provisions of paragraph 8 of Article II of this Treaty shall be applied provisionally by the Parties from the date of its signature.

3. This Treaty shall remain in force so long as the START Treaty remains in force.

4. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardised its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardised its supreme interests.

Article VII

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.

Article VIII

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of SILO Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the elimination of heavy ICBMs and upon procedures governing the conversion of silo launchers of such ICBMs.

I. Procedures for Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and Their Launch Canisters

1. Elimination of heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section at elimination facilities for ICBMs specified in the START Treaty or shall be carried out by

using such missiles for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space. Notification thereof shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) 30 days in advance of the initiation of elimination at conversion or elimination facilities, or, in the event of launch, in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988.

2. Prior to the confirmatory inspection pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section, the inspected Party:

- (a) shall remove the missile's reentry vehicles;
- (b) may remove the electronic and electromechanical devices of the missile's guidance and control system from the missile and its launch canister, and other elements that shall not be subject to elimination pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Section;
- (c) shall remove the missile from its launch canister and disassemble the missile into stages;
- (d) shall remove liquid propellant from the missile;
- (e) may remove or actuate auxiliary pyrotechnic devices installed on the missile and its launch canister;
- (f) may remove penetration aids, including devices for their attachment and release; and
- (g) may remove propulsion units from the self-contained dispensing mechanism.

These actions may be carried out in any order.

3. After arrival of the inspection team and prior to the initiation of the elimination process, inspectors shall confirm the type and number of the missiles to be eliminated by making the observations and measurements necessary for such confirmation. After the procedures provided for in this paragraph have been carried out, the process of the elimination of the missiles and their launch canisters may begin. Inspectors shall observe the elimination process.

4. Elimination process for heavy ICBMs:

- (a) missile stages, nozzles, and missile interstage skirts shall each be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
- (b) the self-contained dispensing mechanism as well as the front section, including the reentry vehicle platform and the front

section shroud, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size and crushed.

5. During the elimination process for launch canisters of heavy ICBMs, the launch canister shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or into three pieces in such a manner that pieces no less than 1.5 meters long are cut from the ends of the body of such a launch canister.

6. Upon completion of the above requirements, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm in a factual, written report containing the results of the inspection team's observation of the elimination process that the inspection team has completed its inspection.

7. Heavy ICBMs shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after completion of the procedures provided for in this Section. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol Relating to the START Treaty.

II. Procedures for Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs, Silo Training Launchers for Heavy ICBMs, and Silo Test Launchers for Heavy ICBMs

1. Conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs shall be carried out *in situ* and shall be subject to inspection.

2. Prior to the initiation of the conversion process for such launchers, the missile and launch canister shall be removed from the silo launcher.

3. A Party shall be considered to have initiated the conversion process for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMs and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs as soon as the silo launcher door has been opened and a missile and its launch canister have been removed from the silo launcher. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol Relating to the START Treaty.

4. Conversion process for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs shall include the following steps:

- (a) the silo launcher door shall be opened, the missile and the launch canister shall be removed from the silo launcher;

- (b) concrete shall be poured into the base of the silo launcher up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher; and
- (c) a restrictive ring with a diameter of no more than 2.9 meters shall be installed into the upper portion of the silo launcher. The method of installation of the restrictive ring shall rule out its removal without destruction of the ring and its attachment to the silo launcher.

5. Each Party shall have the right to confirm that the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section have been carried out. For the purpose of confirming that these procedures have been carried out:

- (a) the converting Party shall notify the other Party through the NRRCs:
 - (i) no less than 30 days in advance of the date when the process of pouring concrete will commence; and
 - (ii) upon completion of all of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section; and
- (b) the inspecting Party shall have the right to implement the procedures provided for in either paragraph 6 or paragraph 7, but not both, of this Section for each silo launcher of heavy ICBMs, silo training launcher for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted.

6. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to observe the entire process of pouring concrete into each silo launcher of heavy ICBMs, silo training launcher for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted, and to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. For this purpose:

- (a) the inspecting Party shall inform the Party converting the silo launcher no less than seven days in advance of the commencement of the pouring that it will observe the filling of the silo in question;
- (b) immediately prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete, the converting Party shall take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the base of the silo launcher is visible, and that the depth of the silo can be measured;

-
- (c) the inspecting Party shall have the right to observe the entire process of pouring concrete from a location providing an unobstructed view of the base of the silo launcher, and to confirm by measurement that concrete has been (Soured into the base of the silo launcher up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher. The measurements shall be taken from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the base of the silo launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the top of the concrete fill, after the concrete has hardened;
 - (d) following notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. The restrictive ring shall not be shrouded during such inspections. The Parties shall agree on the date for such inspections;
 - (e) the results of measurements conducted pursuant to subparagraphs (c) and (d) of this paragraph shall be recorded in written, factual inspection reports and signed by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort;
 - (f) inspection teams shall each consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty; and
 - (g) such inspections shall not count against any inspection quota established by the START Treaty.

7. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to measure the depth of each silo launcher of heavy ICBMs, silo training launcher for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted both before the commencement and after the completion of the process of pouring concrete, and to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. For this purpose:

- (a) the inspecting Party shall inform the Party converting the silo launcher no less than seven days in advance of the commencement of the pouring that it will measure the depth of the silo launcher in question both before the commencement and after the completion of the process of pouring concrete;
- (b) immediately prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete, the convening Party shall take such steps as

- are necessary to ensure that the base of the silo launcher is visible, and that the depth of the silo launcher can be measured;
- (c) the inspecting Party shall measure the depth of the silo launcher prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete;
 - (d) following notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring, and to remeasure the depth of the silo launcher. The restrictive ring shall not be shrouded during such inspections. The Parties shall agree on the date for such inspections;
 - (e) for the purpose of measuring the depth of the concrete in the silo launcher, measurements shall be taken from the level of the lower edge of (lie closed silo launcher door to the base of the silo launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the top of the concrete fill, after the concrete has hardened;
 - (f) the results of measurements conducted pursuant to subparagraphs (c), (d), and (e) of this paragraph shall be recorded in written, factual inspection reports and signed by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort;
 - (g) inspection teams shall each consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty; and
 - (h) such inspections shall not count against any inspection quota established by the START Treaty.

8. The converting Party shall have the right to carry out further conversion measures after the completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 6 or paragraph 7 of this Section or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon expiration of 30 days after notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section.

9. In addition to the reentry vehicle inspections conducted under the START Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct, using the procedures provided for in Annex 3 to the Inspection Protocol Relating to the START Treaty, four additional reentry vehicle inspections each year of ICBMs that are deployed in silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that have been converted in accordance with the provisions of this Section. During such inspections, the inspectors also shall have the right to confirm by visual observation the presence of the restrictive

ring and that the observable portions of the launch canister do not differ externally from the observable portions of the launch canister that was exhibited pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the START Treaty. Any shrouding of the upper portion of the silo launcher shall not obstruct visual observation of the upper portion of the launch canister and shall not obstruct usual observation of the edge of the restrictive ring. If requested by the inspecting Party, the converting Party shall partially remove any shrouding, except for shrouding of instruments installed on the restrictive ring, to permit confirmation of the presence of the restrictive ring.

10. Upon completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 6 or paragraph 7 of this Section or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon expiration of 30 days after notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the silo launcher of heavy ICBMs being converted shall, for the purposes of the Treaty, be considered to contain a deployed ICBM to which one warhead is attributed.

III. Equipment; Costs

1. To carry out inspections provided for in this Protocol, the inspecting Party shall have the right to use agreed equipment, including equipment that will confirm that the silo launcher has been completely filled up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher with concrete. The Parties shall agree in the Bilateral Implementation Commission on such equipment.

2. For inspections conducted pursuant to this Protocol, costs shall be handled pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol Relating to the START Treaty.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article VII of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree to conduct exhibitions and inspections of heavy bombers pursuant to paragraphs 4, 5, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty.

I. Exhibitions of Heavy Bombers

1. For the purpose of helping to ensure verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, and as required by paragraphs 4, 5, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty, each Party shall conduct exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role, and heavy bombers that were reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role.

2. The exhibitions of heavy bombers shall be conducted subject to the following provisions:

- (a) the location for such an exhibition shall be at the discretion of the exhibiting Party;
- (b) the date for such an exhibition shall be agreed upon between the Parties through diplomatic channels, and the exhibiting Party shall communicate the location of the exhibition;
- (c) during such an exhibition, each heavy bomber exhibited shall be subject to inspection for a period not to exceed two hours;
- (d) the inspection team conducting an inspection during an exhibition shall consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty;
- (e) prior to the beginning of the exhibition, the inspected Party shall provide a photograph or photographs of one of the heavy bombers of a type or variant of a type reoriented to a conventional role and of one of the heavy bombers of the same type and

variant of a type that were reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role, so as to show all of their differences that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection; and

- (f) such inspections during exhibitions shall not count against any inspection quota established by the START Treaty.

II. Inspections of Heavy Bombers

1. During exhibitions of heavy bombers, each Party shall have the right to perform the following procedures on the exhibited heavy bombers; and each Party, beginning 180 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, shall have the right, in addition to its rights under the START Treaty, to perform, Airing data update and new facility inspections conducted under the START Treaty at air bases of the other Party, the following procedures on all heavy bombers based at such air bases and present there at the time of the inspection:

- (a) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, in order to confirm that the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped does not exceed the number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution. The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber where the inspected heavy bomber is equipped for weapons, as well as to visually inspect the weapons bay of such a heavy bomber, but not to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior;
- (b) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role, in order to confirm the differences of such heavy bombers from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection. The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber having the differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection, but not to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior; and
- (c) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers that were reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear

role, in order to confirm the differences of such heavy bombers from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection, and to confirm that the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped does not exceed the number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution. The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber where the inspected heavy bomber is equipped for weapons, as well as to visually inspect the weapons bay of such a heavy bomber, and to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber having the differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible to inspection, but not to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior.

2. At the discretion of the inspected Party, those portions of the heavy bomber that are not subject to inspection may be shrouded. The period of time required to carry out the shrouding process shall not count against the period allocated for inspection.

3. In the course of an inspection conducted during an exhibition, a member of the in-country escort shall provide, during inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph 1(a) or subparagraph 1(c) of this Section, explanation to the inspection team concerning the number of nuclear weapons for which the heavy bomber is actually equipped, and shall provide, during inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph 1(b) or subparagraph 1(c) of this Section, explanations to the inspection team concerning the differences that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for mailing amendments set forth in Article VII of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties have exchanged data current as of January 3, 1993, on the number of nuclear weapons for which each heavy bomber of a type and a variant of a type equipped for nuclear weapons is actually equipped. No later than 30 days after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties shall additionally exchange data, current as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty, according to the categories of data contained in this Memorandum, on heavy bombers equipped for nuclear weapons; on heavy bombers specified as reoriented to a conventional role, and on heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that are subsequently returned to a nuclear role; on ICBMs and SLBMs to which reduced number of warheads is attributed; and on data on the elimination of heavy ICBMs and on conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs.

Only those data used for purposes of implementing the Treaty that differ from the data in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the START Treaty are included in this Memorandum.

I. Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers Other than Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role

1. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IV of the Treaty each Party under-likes not to have more nuclear weapons deployed on heavy bombers of any type or variant of a type than the number specified in this paragraph. Additionally, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article IV of the Treaty, for each Party the numbers of warheads attributed to deployed heavy bombers not reoriented to a conventional role as of the date of signature of the Treaty or to heavy bombers subsequently deployed are listed below. Such numbers shall only be changed in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article IV of the Treaty. The Party making a Change shall provide a notification to the other Party 90 days prior to making such a change. An exhibition shall be conducted

to demonstrate the changed number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers of the listed type or variant of a type are actually equipped:

(a) United States of America	
Heavy Bomber Type and Variant of a Type*	Number of Warheads
B-52G	12
B-52H	20
B-1B	16
B-2	16

Aggregate Number of Warheads
 Attributed to Deployed Heavy
 Bombers, Except for Heavy Bombers
 Reoriented to a Conventional Role

(b) Russian Federation	
Heavy Bomber Type And Variant of a Type	Number of Warheads
Bear B	1
Bear G	2
Bear H6	6
Bear H16	16
Black jack	12

Aggregate Number of Warheads
 Attributed to Deployed Heavy
 Bombers, Except for Heavy Bombers
 Reoriented to a Conventional Role

* Heavy bombers of the type and variant of a type designated B-52C, B-52D, B-52E, and B-52F, located at the Davis-Monthan conversion or elimination facility as of September 1, 1990, as specified in the Memorandum of Understanding to the START Treaty, will be eliminated, under the provisions of the START Treaty, before the expiration of the seven-year reductions period.

II. Data on Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role and Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role that Have Subsequently Been Returned to a Nuclear Role

1. For each Party, the numbers of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are as follows:

- | | | |
|-----|---|----------------|
| (a) | United States of America
Heavy Bomber Type and
Variant of a Type Number | Number |
| | -----
----- | -----
----- |
| (b) | Russian Federation
Heavy Bomber Type
and Variant of a Type | Number |
| | -----
----- | -----
----- |

2. For each Party, the numbers of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role as well as data on related air bases are as follows:

- | | | |
|-----|--|--------------------------------------|
| (a) | United States of America
Air Bases: | |
| | Name/Location | Bomber Type and
Variant of a Type |
| | ----- | ----- |
| | Heavy Bombers Reoriented
to a Conventional Role | Number |
| | ----- | ----- |
| (b) | Russian Federation
Air Bases: | |
| | Name/Location | Bomber Type and
Variant of a Type |
| | ----- | ----- |
| | Heavy Bombers Reoriented
to a Conventional Role | Number |
| | ----- | ----- |

3. For each Party, the differences observable by national technical means of verification for heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are as follows:

- | | | |
|-----|--|------------|
| (a) | United States of America
Heavy Bomber Type and
Variant of a Type | Difference |
| | ----- | ----- |
| (b) | Russian Federation
Heavy Bomber Type
and Variant of a Type | Difference |
| | ----- | ----- |

Name/Location -----	ICBM Type on Which the Number of Warheads is Reduced -----
Deployed ICBMs on Which the Number of Warheads is Reduced Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed ICBM After Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each ICBM Was Reduced	----- ----- ----- -----
Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs of that Type	-----
SLBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed SLBMs Is Reduced:	
Name/Location -----	SLBM Type on Which the Number of Warheads is Reduced -----
Deployed SLBMs on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed SLBM After Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each SLBM was Reduced	----- ----- ----- -----
Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed SLBMs of that Type	-----
(b) Russian Federation	Type of ICBM or SLBM
Deployed ICBMs or Deployed SLBMs on Which the Number of	

Warheads is Reduced	-----
Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed ICBM or Deployed SLBM After Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It	-----
Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each ICBM or SLBM Was Reduced	-----
Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs or Deployed SLBMs of that Type	-----
ICBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed ICBMs Is Reduced	
Name/Location	ICBM Type on Which
-----	the Number of Warheads
	is Reduced

Deployed ICBMs on Which the Number of Warheads is Reduced	-----
Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed ICBM After Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It	-----
Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each ICBM Was Reduced	-----
Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs of that Type,	-----
SLBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed SLBMs Is Reduced;	
Name/Location	SLBM Type on Which
-----	the Number of Warheads
	is Reduced

Deployed SLBMs on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced	-----

Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed SLBM After Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It	-----
Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each SLBM was Reduced	-----
Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed SLBMs of that Type	-----

IV. Data on Eliminated Heavy ICBMs and Converted Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs

1. For each Party, the numbers of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs concerted to silo launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs are as follows:

(a) United States of America

Aggregate Number of Converted Silo Launchers

ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs: Name/Location	ICBM Type Installed in a Converted Silo Launcher
Silo Launcher Group: (designation)	
-----	-----
Silo Launchers:	
-----	-----

(b) Russian Federation

Aggregate Number of Converted Silo Launchers

ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs: Name/Location	ICBM Type Installed in a Converted Silo Launcher
Silo Launcher Group: (designation)	
-----	-----
Silo Launchers:	
-----	-----

2. For each party, the aggregate numbers of heavy ICBMs and eliminated heavy ICBMs are as follows:

(a) United States of America	Number
Deployed Heavy ICBMs	-----
Non-Deployed heavy ICBMs	-----
Eliminated Heavy ICBMs	-----
(b) Russian Federation	Number
Deployed Heavy ICBMs	-----
Non-Deployed heavy ICBMs	-----
Eliminated Heavy ICBMs	-----

V. Changes

Each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in the attribution and data contained in this Memorandum.

The Parties, in signing this Memorandum, acknowledge the acceptance of the categories of data contained in this Memorandum and the responsibility of each Party for the accuracy only of its own data.

This Memorandum is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree on such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to change the categories of data contained in this Memorandum or to make other changes to this Memorandum that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article VII of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

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GUIDELINES ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL/LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE IN THE CONTEXT OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 51/45 N

I. Introduction

1. The conflicts of today highlight, on the one hand, the need in the post-conflict situations for a comprehensive approach integrating certain practical disarmament measures, particularly with regard to small arms and light weapons, and on the other hand, the need for further initiatives in the area of conventional arms control/limitation. The excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons, the absence of control to arrest it and the illicit arms trade continue to have a negative effect on the internal security and socio-economic development of affected States.

2. This excessive and destabilising accumulation not only threatens national, regional and international security, prolongs conflicts and hampers conflict resolution, and erodes negotiated peace settlements, but, can be linked to intra and inter-State crime, terrorism, violence and lawlessness. The consequences for economic and social development and for the humanitarian situation in the countries and regions concerned are often devastating.

3. The excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons can best be averted by a combination of reduction and prevention measures:

- (i) The purpose of reduction-measures is the speedy removal of quantities of surplus weapons through their collection and/or destruction;

- (ii) In the case of prevention measures, the objective should be to scale down over time the numbers of small arms and light weapons to a level that corresponds to a country's legitimate self-defence and security interests, to be defined by itself.

4. In the case of both sets of measures, the international community is encouraged to provide assistance in support of national and regional actions and to foster coordination between such actions. A key objective in the consolidation of peace is to allow the administrative capacity and infrastructure that were damaged during the conflict to be rebuilt in a process of conversion from war to peace.

5. Other conventional arms control/limitation and disarmament measures are also required to address the problem, such as arms control, confidence-building and transparency measures, and the combating of the illicit arms trade in small arms and light weapons. Practical disarmament measures have a special relevance to a conflict which is approaching solution; to a recently ended conflict; and as a consequence, to preventing a conflict from re-emerging. Such measures could include arms control, collection, storage and/or destruction, demining, demobilisation and integration.

6. The report of the Secretary-General on the consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures (A/52/289), submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 51/45 N, contains a set of recommendations addressed to

Member States in which measures are proposed to reduce and prevent excessive accumulation and proliferation of small arms. The report of the Secretary-General on small arms (A/52/298) was submitted on 27 August 1997 to the General Assembly. General Assembly resolutions 52/38 G and 53/77 M are also relevant.

II. Scope

7. The guidelines that follow, having regard, *inter alia*, to General Assembly resolution 51/45 N of 10 December 1996 are primarily applicable for the consolidation of peace in post-conflict situations.

III. Principles

8. In formulating and implementing practical disarmament measures for the consolidation of peace in regions that have suffered from conflicts, States should fully respect the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including those contained in paragraph 14 of

the guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly^s resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991,^a adopted in 1996;

- The guidelines that follow should be applied on a voluntary basis and with the consent of the States concerned;
- Peace agreements freely arrived at should be respected and adhered to by all concerned, thereby providing the best guarantee for the consolidation of peace in post-conflict situations;
- In the implementation of the guidelines, the root causes of conflict and the specific conditions and characteristics of the region concerned, such as political, commercial, socio-economic, ethnic, cultural and ideological factors, should be taken into account;
- States within a region, as well as those outside, with a special influence on parties to a conflict, have a particular responsibility to promote arms control and disarmament measures with a view to the consolidation of peace in the region concerned;
- The guidelines that follow should not be used as a means, to interfere in the internal affairs of other States;
- The principles contained in the following documents are also applicable:
 - Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991,^a adopted in 1996;
 - Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security,^b adopted in 1993;
 - Guidelines for the study on conventional disarmament, adopted in 1982.

IV. Practical Disarmament Measures in the Post-Conflict Situations

A. Collection, Control, Disposal and Destruction of Arms, Especially Small Arms and Light Weapons, and Conversion of Military Facilities

9. In accordance with the agreement reached, an early and accurate baseline inventory and periodic reassessment of the arms in the

a. *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/51/42)*, annex I.

b. *Ibid. Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/48/42)*, annex 11.

possession of the combatants is a prerequisite to an efficient arms collection, control, disposal and/or destruction process. Thus, following the collection, control, secure storage and/or destruction of arms, it is necessary to determine which arms are surplus to the legitimate defence requirements of the State, as defined by itself.

10. There should be a secure collection and storage of such arms from the demobilised combatants or those in civilian hands, with the possible use of incentive programmes, provided that these do not themselves create a market for arms, such as “turn-in”, “buy-back”, “swap” or weapons-for-development programmes, or through other appropriate measures.

11. Where an agreement provides for the destruction of arms, the rapid, reliable and transparent destruction of surplus arms is an indispensable step to rendering an agreement concrete. Experience has shown that a public display of the destruction of such weapons can help to dramatise the enactment of peace and to consolidate it.

12. Where appropriate, the conversion of military facilities for civilian use should be encouraged.

13. As part of an effective post-conflict arms control programme, (i) compliance with arms embargoes declared by the United Nations Security Council and (ii) execution of voluntary regional import/export moratoriums should be implemented through, *inter alia*:

- (a) Cooperation between neighbouring security, police and customs organisations, including the assistance of national contact centres of the International Criminal Police Organisation;
- (b) Combined border-guard operations;
- (c) International and coordinated United Nations support for adherence to agreed measures;
- (d) Regional or international agreements to combat illicit arms trafficking.

B. Demining and Other Mine Actions

14. The cessation of mine laying should be an integral part of ceasefire and peace agreements, wherever applicable.

15. In areas where anti-personnel landmines have been laid during a conflict and there is agreement to destroy these mines, post-conflict activities must give priority to an integrated mine action programme which includes mine clearance and destruction, victim assistance and the reintegration of mine victims into civil society.

16. The collection of mines and other explosive ordnance should be discouraged and their destruction ensured *in situ*.

17. Information should be provided on mines laid during the conflict. Such measures as the delineation of mined areas and posting of warning signs should be taken to prevent further victimisation of civilians.

18. States involved in the deployment of mines can play an important role in assisting mine clearance in mine-affected countries through the provision of necessary maps and information and appropriate technical and material assistance to remove or otherwise render ineffective existing minefields, mines and booby traps.

19. A mine awareness education plan and procedures for reporting unexplored ordnance and artifacts should be set out and geared towards both demobilised soldiers and civilians.

C. Demobilisation

20. An early and accurate assessment of the combatants to be separated, assembled and demobilised is a prerequisite to an effective demobilisation programme.

21. Demobilisation agreements may be implemented via a demobilisation centre or cantonment, established for a limited period of time, taking into account necessary medical, logistical (food, housing, etc.) and administrative support and facilities or programmes. They should be clearly separated from humanitarian centres established, for example, for returning refugees.

22. The period between the signature of an agreement and the establishment of the cantonment could, with the consent of the State concerned, be used profitably by neutral parties of observation and control of a ceasefire.

23. Registration and disarmament of combatants should occur simultaneously whenever possible.

D. Integration of Former Combatants

24. The peace agreement should provide for advance planning for integration, at least for the short to medium term, to be undertaken well before the demobilisation process starts. The integration programme could then be implemented in step with demobilisation.

25. Consideration should be given to:

- The establishment, training and operations of combined integrated security forces on a voluntary basis, as appropriate;

- Programmes for the training, education and guidance for the integration into civil society of former combatants and their dependants, including the offer of guarantees for their personal safety;
- The return and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons to their homes as an integral part of the integration process;
- The promotion of sustainable employment and skills training, for example in the areas of rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes.

26. States are encouraged to reflect in their economic programmes the integration of combatants and secure domestic resources for such activities, supplemented, as appropriate, by external support in order to provide, *inter alia*, for effective follow-up action. The needs of different target groups, among the reintegrated combatants, including vulnerable groups such as women and children, should be identified and options designed for their integration to suit local conditions.

V. Confidence-Building in the Post-Conflict Situations

27. In order to ensure the reliable implementation of the provisions of the agreement reached in a post-conflict consolidation of peace, including secure disposal and/or destruction of weapons, consideration should be given, on the basis of mutual agreement, to the following:

- (a) Combined/integrated monitoring, observation and control;
- (b) Transparency and verification, where appropriate, by a facilitator, or international supervision with the consent of the State concerned;
- (c) A commission to mediate differences over interpretation of the terms of the agreement.

28. Implementation of agreed measures can be enhanced by the use of economic social and other incentives, including:

- (a) Humanitarian, medical and logistical aid programmes for former combatants (including families) to encourage and sustain the handover of arms;
- (b) Measures to ensure the safety of former combatants;
- (c) Amnesties granted by the State;
- (d) Reintegration into civilian and professional life, including job training.

29. The re-establishment of public security is an essential first step. The following measures to help build confidence in an unbiased, non-discriminatory security force could be considered:

- (a) The creation and training of military services and security and police forces, at a size appropriate to a post-conflict situation, taking into account the legitimate self-defence and security interests of the State;
- (b) Adequate technical equipment, for example for border monitoring, and training to enable operations to be conducted efficiently and in conformity with national legislation and established norms of international law;
- (c) The inclusion and integration of adequately trained former combatants on a voluntary basis.

30. To assist the reconciliation process and to create confidence in the implementation of the peace agreement, it is recommended that:

- (a) An effective, objective public information campaign be promoted to sensitise the public to the peace process;
- (b) National dialogue be encouraged and intensified through reconciliation programmes in the consolidation of peace;
- (c) Measures aimed at enhancing public involvement through education and awareness programmes conducive to the promotion of peace be encouraged;
- (d) Measures to strengthen coordination among Governments, international organisations and non-governmental organisations be implemented for the smooth transition from emergency humanitarian assistance and post-conflict assistance to long-term development.

VI. Regional and International Financial and Technical Assistance

31. Regional and international financial, technical and technological assistance in rebuilding infrastructure and administrative capacity and civil society, and in economic rehabilitation for the implementation of practical disarmament measures, should include the early involvement of international financial institutions.

32. Regional and international financial and technical assistance should also include:

- (a) Assistance for national and local measures for the collodion, control, disposal and/or destruction of arms, demobilisation

and reintegration of former combatants, as well as for measures for the conversion of military facilities for civilian use in post-conflict situations. Such assistance can help ensure their early success;

- (b) Assistance for mine clearance, victim assistance and mine awareness programmes in mine-affected countries, including assistance to mine-infested countries to remove or otherwise render ineffective existing minefields, mines and booby traps; the provision, as appropriate, of technological assistance to mine-infested countries; new technologies for mine detection and removal; and the promotion of scientific research and development on humanitarian mine-clearance techniques and technology so that mine-clearance activities can be carried out more effectively at lower cost and through safer means. International cooperation should be promoted in this regard;
- (c) Assistance for reintegration measures aimed at education and training and for the creation of employment opportunities or alternative employment opportunities for discharged combatants;
- (d) Assistance for public education and awareness programmes which will contribute to the promotion of peace and build resistance to the unlawful uses of small arms.

33. States that are in a position to do so should lend their support to the Secretary-General in responding to requests by Member States to collect and destroy small arms and light weapons in post-conflict situations as well as to promote new practical disarmament measures to consolidate peace, especial) as undertaken and designed by affected States themselves.

VII. Other Conventional Arms Control/Limitation and Disarmament Measures

A. National Measures

34. States should observe the highest standards of responsibility in the transfer of arms, including small arms and light weapons, as well as ammunition and explosives. Both supplier and recipient States should ensure that the quantity and level of sophistication of their arms are commensurate with their legitimate defence and security requirements, and that they do not contribute to instability and conflict in their regions or in other countries and regions or to illicit trafficking in arms.

35. States should have in place appropriate legislation and effective administrative regulations on arms export, import, transit, re-export

and diversion, and should make the necessary arrangements to ensure their enforcement.

States should work towards the introduction of appropriate national legislation, administrative regulations and licensing requirements that define conditions under which firearms can be acquired, used and traded by private persons. In particular, they should consider the prohibition of unrestricted trade and private ownership of small arms and light weapons specifically designed for military purposes, such as automatic guns (e.g., assault rifles and machine-guns).

37. States considering measures to ensure that arms are exported only to Governments of sovereign States, either directly or through duly licensed or authorised agencies acting on their behalf, are encouraged to draw upon already existing provisions in this field.

38. States should ensure that arms production, trade and holdings (State-owned and private) are under strict and effective control through appropriate licensing, supervision and inspection. They should also consider the establishment and maintenance of:

- National inventories of legally held weapons, specifically designed for military purposes, including up-to-date information on legally licensed dealers and manufacturers;
- A record of imports, exports and other transactions.

39. States should ensure that manufacturers apply appropriate and reliable markings on weapons, particularly small arms and light weapons, as an integral part of the production process, so as to assist national law enforcement agencies in tracing the country of origin and the manufacturer of the weapons in combating illicit arms trafficking.

40. States should undertake to secure their holdings of weapons, including small arms and light weapons, against losses resulting from corruption, theft and withholding through appropriate organisational, technical and personnel measures.

41. States should ensure the effectiveness and professional conduct of security forces and authorities (customs, border control, police, criminal prosecution) involved in the implementation of weapons control measures, through the appropriate selection of personnel, training and technical equipment.

B. Regional/International Cooperation and Transparency

42. States should explore the scope for closer coordination and, on a voluntary basis, the possible harmonisation of their national regulations on arms export/ import/transit, including relevant customs procedures.

43. States and their national authorities involved in weapons control measures should reinforce their collective efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking of arms, particularly small arms, through:

- (a) Exchange of information on illegal activities (sources, routes, caches);
- (b) Combined police, border-guard, intelligence and customs operations, as required;
- (c) Technical and training assistance;
- (d) Establishment of national points of contact;
- (e) Improved judicial cooperation, including to combat the violation of national gun laws and regulations.

44. States are encouraged to consider developing and strengthening appropriate transparency measures at the multilateral, regional, subregional and national levels. Taking into account the particular regional situation and legitimate self-defence and security needs, these might include, based on the agreed initiative of all the States within the concerned regions or subregions and with participation on a voluntary basis, possible regional or subregional arrangements, confidence-building and arms-control measures. International arms transfers should not be used as a means to interfere in the internal affairs of other States.

45. States should consider, on a voluntary basis, the exchange of information on their national policies, legislation and administrative control over armaments, with particular emphasis on small arms and light weapons.

46. States should consider all appropriate measures with a view to promoting restraint and responsibility in conventional arms transfers. States which have established voluntary regional and subregional measures for conventional arms transfers should make available all relevant information on these to any interested State or group of States.

VIII. Role of the United Nations

47. The Secretary-General, in recognition of the important contribution of programmes for voluntary weapons collection and/or destruction, could be invited to consider, on a case-by-case basis, means to facilitate the successful conduct of such programmes.

48. The United Nations should coordinate and facilitate the exchange of information between States. At the request of the States concerned,

the United Nations could provide coordination and assistance, including in seeking regional and international financial and technical support, for the development of programmes to promote and implement disarmament and arms control/limitation measures in the context of the consolidation of peace.

49. The coordination role of the United Nations should be fulfilled in the fields of mine awareness, training, surveying, mine detection and clearance, scientific research on mine detection and clearance technology, and information on and distribution of medical equipment and supplies.

50. The United Nations has a central role in the field of disarmament. The role is enhanced with the designation of the Department for Disarmament Affairs as the focal point to coordinate all action on small arms within the United Nations system.

51. Cooperation and coordination should be increased between the relevant intergovernmental bodies of the United Nations and within the United Nations Secretariat; the Centre for International Crime Prevention with regard to its work related to illicit manufacturing and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition; the Department for Disarmament Affairs; and the mechanism for Coordinating Action on Small Arms in ongoing initiatives related to illicit trafficking in small arms.

52. The United Nations should continue to play a leading role in addressing the issue of small arms.

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**FINAL DECLARATION OF THE REVIEW
CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE
CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR
RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE
DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO
HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS**

The high contracting parties to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, which met in Vienna from 25 September to 13 October 1995, then in Geneva from 15 to 19 January 1996 for the first resumed session and in Geneva from 22 April to 3 May 1996 for the Second Resumed Session, to review the scope and operation of the convention and the protocols annexed thereto and to consider any proposal for amendments of the convention or of the existing protocols, as well as proposals for additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed protocols.

Deeply concerned that the indiscriminate effects of the irresponsible use of land-mines, particularly anti-personnel land-mines, are estimated to kill or maim hundreds of people each week, mostly unarmed civilians, obstruct economic development and reconstruction and have other severe consequences, which include inhibiting the repatriation of refugees and the return of internally displaced persons,

Gravely concerned with the suffering and casualties caused to civilians by the irresponsible use, as well as the proliferation of land-mines, booby-traps and other devices, in particular the acute problem of anti-personnel landmines,

Reaffirming the need to reinforce international cooperation in the area of prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects,

Reaffirming their conviction that a general and verifiable agreement on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects would significantly reduce the suffering of civilians and combatants,

Welcoming the adoption of an amended Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices,

Noting that remotely delivered anti-personnel mines can pose a grave danger to civilian life and livelihood, especially due to the nature of the delivery and the consequent difficulty in marking and fencing them,

Reaffirming also the need to reinforce international cooperation in the area of mine clearance and to devote greater resources towards that end,

Recognising the important role that the international community, particularly States involved in the deployment of mines, can play in assisting in mine clearance in affected countries through the provision of necessary maps and information and appropriate technical and material assistance to remove or otherwise render ineffective existing minefields, mines and booby-traps,

Expressing their appreciation of the financial contributions provided by States and regional organisations to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance and for the contributions in kind provided to the demining stand-by capacity of the United Nations,

Noting the national moratoria and other unilateral measures on halting the production, export, transfer or sale, on reducing stockpiles and on adopting legislation aimed at the total elimination of anti-personnel land-mines,

Noting also that a number of States have further abstained from the acquisition, production, transfer and stockpiling of anti-personnel land-mines,

Noting the fact that a growing number of States, international, regional and non-governmental organisations do their utmost to achieve urgently the total elimination of anti-personnel land-mines,

Conscious of the urgent need to counter the silent and invisible threat to human sight posed by the threat of blinding laser weapons,

Welcoming the adoption of Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons as a codification and progressive development of the rules of international law,

Noting that a number of issues could be considered in the future, for example at a review conference, taking into account scientific and technological developments, including the questions of prohibition on the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of blinding laser weapons and the question of compliance with regard to such weapons, as well as other pertinent issues, such as the definition of “permanent blindness”, including the concept of field of vision,

Recognising the specific role of the International Committee of the Red Cross and encouraging it to continue to work to facilitate further ratification and accession to the Convention, to disseminate its contents and to lend its expertise to future review conferences,

Acknowledging the invaluable humanitarian efforts of non-governmental organisations in armed conflicts and welcoming the expertise they have brought to the Review Conference itself,

Solemnly Declare

- Their commitment to respect the objectives and provisions of the Convention and its annexed Protocols as an authoritative international instrument governing the use of certain conventional weapons, which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects,
- Their determination to call upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention and its annexed Protocols and upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately this instrument will be universal,
- Their conviction that States should strive towards the goal of the eventual elimination of anti-personnel land-mines, consistent with the terms of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 50/70 (0),
- Their commitment to continue to strive for a complete ban on transfer of all anti-personnel land-mines in the context of their eventual elimination consistent with the terms of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 50/70 (0),

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- Their satisfaction at the adoption of an amended Protocol II on mines, booby-traps and other devices,
 - That the prohibitions and restrictions on the use and transfer of anti-personnel mines in Protocol II shall facilitate and advance the achievement of the ultimate goal of the eventual elimination of anti-personnel mines, consistent with the terms of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 50/70 (0),
 - The importance they attach to the earliest possible entry into force of the amended Protocol, and their desire that all States, pending its entry into force, respect and ensure respect for the substantive provisions of the amended Protocol to the fullest extent possible,
 - Their commitment to keep the provisions of Protocol II under review in order to ensure that the concerns regarding the weapons it covers are addressed,
 - That nothing in the amended Protocol II shall be invoked as affecting in the Purposes and Principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations,
 - Their commitment to ban all remotely delivered mines without effective self-deactivation features and either self-destruction or self-neutralisation mechanisms and their recognition of the need to strive for a ban on all remotely delivered anti-personnel mines as viable alternatives are developed that significantly reduce the risk to the civilian population,
 - Their recognition of the importance for the purposes of facilitating and accelerating mine clearance of the application of the prohibition of the use of non-detectable anti-personnel mines,
 - Their commitment to reinforce international cooperation for mine clearance, the development and dissemination of more effective technologies for mine clearance and the transfer of technology to facilitate the implementation of the prohibitions and restrictions set out in Protocol II and to seek to devote the resources necessary for this purpose,
 - Their commitment to assist, to the extent feasible, impartial humanitarian demining missions, operating with the consent of the host State and/or the relevant States parties to the conflict, in particular by providing all necessary information in their possession covering the location of all known minefields, mined

areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices in the area in which the mission is performing its functions,

- Their recognition that the growing number of national moratoria and other unilateral measures restricting or halting the production, use, export, transfer, sale or stockpiling of anti-personnel mines, aimed at their eventual elimination are encouraging steps,
- That they will encourage efforts of the United Nations and other organisations to address all the problems of land-mines,
- Their satisfaction at the adoption of the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV) to the Convention,
- Their conviction of the importance of the earliest possible entry into force of Protocol IV,
- Their desire that all States, pending the entry into force, respect and ensure respect of the substantive provisions of Protocol IV to the fullest extent possible,
- Their recognition of the need for achieving the total prohibition of blinding laser weapons, the use and transfer of which are prohibited in Protocol IV,
- Their wish to keep the issue of the blinding effects related to the use of laser systems under consideration,
- Their commitment to follow up the review process begun at the First Review Conference and, for that purpose, establish a regular review mechanism for the Convention and its annexed Protocols.

The High Contracting Parties recognise that the important principles and provisions contained in this Final Declaration can also serve as a basis for further strengthening the Convention and its Protocols and express their determination to implement them.

REVIEW OF THE PREAMBLE

Preambular Paragraph 3

The Conference recalls the obligation to determine in the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means and method of warfare, whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited under any rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Parties.

Preambular Paragraph 8

The Conference reaffirms the need to continue the codification and progressive development of the rules of international law applicable to certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.

Preambular Paragraph 10

The Conference underlines the need to achieve wider adherence to the Convention and its annexed Protocols. The Conference welcomes recent ratifications and accessions to the Convention and its annexed Protocols and urges the High Contracting Parties to accord high priority to their diplomatic efforts to encourage further adherence with a view to achieving universal adherence by the year 2000.

REVIEW OF THE ARTICLES*Article 1*

The Conference acknowledges and confirms that the High Contracting Parties broadened the scope of Protocol II.

Article 2

The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Convention or its annexed Protocols shall be interpreted as detracting from other obligations imposed upon the High Contracting Parties by international humanitarian law.

Article 3

The Conference notes the provisions of Article 3.

Article 4

The Conference notes that 58 States have ratified, accepted, acceded or succeeded to the Convention.

The Conference calls upon States which are not parties to this Convention to ratify, accept, approve or accede, as appropriate, to the Convention, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention. The Conference, in this context, invites the High Contracting Parties to encourage further accessions to the Convention and its annexed Protocols.

Article 5

The Conference notes the provisions of Article 5.

Article 6

The Conference underlines the importance of international cooperation in the field of dissemination of the Convention and its annexed Protocols and recognises the importance of multilateral collaboration relating to instruction, the exchange of experience at all levels, the exchange of instructors and the organisation of joint seminars.

The Conference takes note of an invitation by a High Contracting Party to a seminar concerning dissemination.

Article 7

The Conference notes the provisions of Article 7.

Article 8

The Conference agrees that future Review Conferences should be held more frequently, with consideration to be given to holding a Review Conference every live years. The Conference decides, consistent with Article 8.3(c) to convene a further Conference live years following the entry into force of the amendments adopted at the First Review Conference, but in any case not later than 2001, with preparatory expert meetings starting as early as 2000, if necessary. The Conference welcomes the adoption of the text of an amended Protocol II in accordance with subparagraph 3(a) of this Article.

The Conference recalls the provisions of subparagraph 3(b) of this Article which stipulates that consideration may be given to any proposal for additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols. The Conference welcomes the adoption on 13 October 1995 of the text of an additional Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV). The Conference proposes that the next Review Conference may consider the question of preparing a possible additional Protocol on small-calibre weapons and ammunition,

The Conference proposes that the next Review Conference consider the question of eventual further measures in relation to naval mines and other conventional weapons, which may be deemed to cause unnecessary suffering or to have indiscriminate effects.

Article 9

The Conference notes with satisfaction that the provisions of this Article have not been invoked.

Article 10

The Conference notes the provisions of Article 10.

Article 11

The Conference notes the request by the delegation of China to correct the original Chinese text of the Convention and its annexed Protocols.

REVIEW OF THE PROTOCOLS**Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I)**

The Conference takes note of the provisions of this Protocol.

Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and Technical Annex to the Protocol

The Conference has comprehensively reviewed the scope and operation of the original Protocol. The Conference is deeply concerned that despite the existence of the Protocol, hundreds of people, mostly unarmed civilians, are estimated to be killed or maimed each week by the indiscriminate effect of the irresponsible use of land-mines, in particular anti-personnel mines; and also that unarmed civilians continue to be victims of indiscriminate effects of irresponsible use of booby-traps and other devices. These actions also obstruct agriculture and economic development and reconstruction, and inhibit the repatriation of refugees and the return of internally displaced persons and cause intolerable situations in many parts of the world,

The Conference concluded that the original Protocol should be strengthened in a number of areas. The Conference therefore adopts the amended Protocol which brings about important improvements in such areas as the scope of its application, general restrictions from the humanitarian point of view, substantive prohibitions and restrictions on mine use, transfers, compliance provisions, mine clearance obligations and in the field of technological cooperation, and anticipates that these and other related issues could be further addressed at future review conferences with due regard to continuing humanitarian concerns,

The Conference encourages the High Contracting Parties which defer the application of the technical requirements as specified in the Technical Annex to make all best endeavours to comply with such requirements in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Technical Annex during the deferral periods,

The Conference looks forward to the first annual meeting of States parties which will be convened pursuant to new Article 13 after entry into force of the amended Protocol,

The Conference proposes that the Depositary convene, at an early date, following entry into force of the Protocol, a preparatory meeting for the first Annual Conference of the Parties under Article 13 of the amended Protocol. Such a preparatory meeting should elaborate and propose for the Annual Conference the draft Rules of Procedure of the Conference and Agenda items which may include review of the operation and status of the Protocol,

The Conference acknowledges the valuable work of relevant agencies and bodies of the United Nations; of the International Committee of the Red Cross pursuant to its mandate to assist war victims and of NGOs in a number of fields, in particular surgical care and rehabilitation of mine victims, implementation of mine-awareness programmes and mine clearance.

Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III)

The Conference takes note of the provisions of this Protocol.

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**CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE:
OBJECTIVES AND PROBLEMS**

Since the summit meeting in Reykjavik, it has become apparent that the East-West relations in the security field have reached a watershed. The United States and the Soviet Union are preparing to place their strategic nuclear rivalry on a new footing. This also has consequences for the security situation in Europe. Under these circumstances, the Europeans must participate actively in the search for new, co-operative solutions. As they do so, their primary task will be to identify and tackle the problems affecting European security in their wider context.

This applies particularly to the relationship between the nuclear and conventional dimensions of the European security complex. In Europe the Warsaw Treaty and NATO confront each other with enormous military potentials. The States of the Warsaw Treaty possess a superior conventional potential, which the West perceives as a threat. If all war, be it nuclear or conventional, is to be prevented—and that is our supreme goal—the Western alliance must maintain for the foreseeable future the ability to deter potential aggressors by means of nuclear as well as conventional systems. This deterrence is the main reason why hostilities have not broken out between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO over a period of some 40 years. A comparison with the devastating wars that have been waged outside Europe during the same period speaks for itself. However, the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Treaty should not be used as an argument against a balanced and drastic reduction in nuclear arsenals, but rather as an argument for increased efforts to establish stability in the conventional sphere. As an integral element of security policy, arms control must play a major role in achieving conventional stability.

This strong interest in the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional forces is in line with the commitment which

the Federal Republic of Germany has shown for many years in the conventional field, e.g., at the Vienna Talks on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (MBFR) and the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE). The divide between the alliances passes through the heart of Germany. If a conventional conflict ever broke out in Europe, the Germans in East and West would be the first to suffer. In view of the destructive power of modern conventional weapons, the devastation caused by a conventional war in Central Europe would be inconceivably greater than all the havoc of the Second World War. Our top priority is, therefore, the prevention of any war in Europe, nuclear or conventional. This is the goal of our defence efforts as well as of our arms control policy. At the same time, in the conventional field too, the maxim applies that autonomous defence efforts are not enough to strengthen security; they must be supplemented by co-operative endeavours and, above all, by arms control negotiations.

Important developments are taking place in 1987 in the field of conventional arms control. For the first time, there are prospects that we shall be able to negotiate about conventional stability in the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. On 17 February, on the initiative of the West, East-West talks began in Vienna with the aim of drawing up a mandate for such negotiations. This development was sparked by the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Council at their Halifax meeting in May 1986, where, in response to a Franco-German proposal, they committed themselves to new steps towards conventional arms control in the whole of Europe.

The Objective

“Our objective”, to quote the Halifax Statement, “is the strengthening of stability and security in the whole of Europe, through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels.” The ministers then agreed at their autumn meeting in Brussels on a catalogue of principles and criteria for negotiations on the establishment of conventional stability in Europe. The central message of their Brussels Declaration was that “military forces should exist to prevent war and to ensure self-defence, not for the purpose of initiating aggression and not for purposes of political or military intimidation”. It follows from this that a long-term goal of the negotiations will be the establishment of conditions in which the security efforts of both sides, in the

conventional as well as the nuclear sphere, are directed towards defensive requirements and in which neither side may maintain or lay claim to an offensive capability.

The Present Situation

The situation from which this long-term task is to be approached must, of course, be realistically assessed. The Brussels Declaration says: "Statements by Eastern spokesmen sometimes imply that the present military situation in Europe is stable and balanced. It is not. On the contrary, it is marked by asymmetries and disparities which vary from region to region but which are detrimental to Western security and which are a source of potential instability."

The conventional situation in Europe is effectively characterised by the capability, I do not talk about intentions—of the Warsaw Treaty, with the Soviet Army at its core, to conduct with prospects of success a strategic attack aimed at the occupation of Western Europe. This capability derives from a combination of factors and of advantages enjoyed by the Warsaw Treaty over the NATO in Europe. Together with its allies, the Soviet Union possesses considerable superiority over NATO in Europe in terms of combat-essential heavy weaponry. This superiority prevails both in individual regions of Europe and on the continent as a whole. It is particularly marked in the sphere of major equipment, which, with its high fire-power and mobility, is a fundamental element of offensive capability. This weaponry and its deployment, geared as they are to offensive operability, are the outward manifestations of the Warsaw Treaty's military doctrine, which is based on surprise and attack (i.e., on forcing a decision within the opponent's territory). The Warsaw Treaty's statement of 29 May 1987 regarding the defensive character of its military doctrine is notable. What is vital, however, is that this declared defensiveness be reflected in force sizes and deployment.

In addition, there are the geographical advantages enjoyed by the Warsaw Treaty. There is little depth between the intra-German boundary and the English Channel or the Atlantic. Western Europe is divided from its main ally, the United States, by the Atlantic, while the parties to the Warsaw Treaty are connected with the Soviet Union in one unbroken landmass extending into Soviet Asia. This all means that the Warsaw Treaty has the advantages of greater depth and of direct and secure lines of communication and supply, whereas the territory of NATO is scattered over a long, thin strip from the North Cape to the Aegean Sea.

Finally, the Eastern predilection for excessive secrecy has resulted in a militarily significant lack of transparency. The Stockholm Conference did succeed in adopting a package of measures to improve this situation, which is a good start, but insufficient in itself. An increase in information and further measures aimed at creating greater predictability and calculability of military activities are needed.

Ways Towards Stabilisation

This analysis shows that the establishment of conventional stability is an immense task. It can be approached only through a step-by-step process of negotiation in which the undiminished security of all concerned is guaranteed at every stage. The States of the Warsaw Treaty and of NATO are agreed on this point. What is essential is that they should agree on the goal of establishing a stable and secure level offerees in conjunction with the elimination of imbalances.

Equal ceilings are a very important and, indeed, essential factor in the establishment of stability, but they are not in themselves sufficient. Consideration must also be given to other relevant factors, such as the deployment, mobility and operational readiness of military forces, the availability of information about them and the geostrategic asymmetries outlined above. The prime concern is that the ability to conduct surprise attacks and large-scale offensives should be eliminated. NATO does not possess this invasion capacity.

Unilateral threat options must be removed. Neither side should have reason to fear the other side's ability to conduct an attack, particularly a surprise attack.

Measured against these objectives and criteria, equal linear reductions, as proposed by the Warsaw Treaty in June 1986, are inadequate. They would tend to magnify the existing imbalances instead of reducing them.

Reductions and other measures should be so structured as to reduce offensive capability. To this end, they must lead primarily to a gradual elimination of disparities in the heavy weaponry which is the basis of offensive capability. A very significant step would be the establishment of equal ceilings at lower levels for combat-essential major equipment such as main battle tanks.

The reduction of imbalances should be accompanied by supplementary measures serving to offset geostrategic asymmetries and to improve transparency, thereby establishing stability. Consideration

could be given in this context to deployment constraints and other measures aimed at impeding the conduct of offensive operations and at avoiding circumvention.

The new negotiations on conventional stability are to cover the conventional potentials of the members of both alliances in the whole of Europe. That does not, however, mean that reductions, limitations or additional constraining measures have to affect all weapons systems and military forces throughout the entire European area of application from the outset. It would make sense to count the forces which actually confront each other. The forces deployed in and designated for specific areas should be compared in accordance with their operational functions. The potentials confronting each other in Central Europe should be dealt with at an early stage of the process. The Soviet forces in forward deployment far beyond the western boundary of the Soviet Union are of particular importance in this respect.

Negotiating Prospects

In their Brussels Declaration of 11 December 1986, the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Council proposed two distinct sets of negotiations:

First, negotiations among all 35 States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) process to build upon and extend the results of the Stockholm Conference;

Secondly, negotiations between the 16 members of NATO and the 7 members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation with a view to eliminating existing imbalances in the area between the Atlantic and the Urals and to establishing a conventional balance at lower levels.

The purpose of the East-West talks in Vienna, which were launched on 17 February 1987 as a result of a Western initiative, is to define jointly, in the form of a mandate, the objectives, subject-matter, methods and scope of negotiations on conventional stability in the whole of Europe. In a parallel move, the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna should decide in favour of continuing the CDE, so that a further set of confidence- and security-building measures can be negotiated. The two sets of negotiations are interconnected. Further confidence-building measures and the gradual establishment of conventional stability in the whole of Europe are necessary and mutually complementary means of improving the security of all European States. The initiation of such

a process of conventional stabilisation could become part of the concluding document of the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna.

What are the chances of new negotiations on conventional stability in the whole of Europe? Experience of the MBFR negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, which have been going on in Vienna since 1973, makes one cautious, particularly in view of the fact that a new approach proposed by the West on 5 December 1985 still awaits a specific response. The prospects will depend upon whether both sides, in particular the Soviet Union, reassess their interests with regard to the balance of conventional forces in Europe, bearing in mind the change of emphasis in foreign, internal and above all economic policy. No threat of aggression comes from the democracies of NATO; they are interested in the steady development of their economies, and the essential defensive measures to which they limit themselves are taken only because they feel threatened. Is it then worthwhile for the Warsaw Treaty to invest further billions in the maintenance and development of its conventional preponderance, thereby arousing distrust and fear in Western Europe and complicating the search for a basis of peaceful co-operation? Is it not time to channel the available resources into economic development and the promotion of human welfare? Is not such an adjustment the logical consequence of the "new thinking"?

The Warsaw Treaty's statements of 29 May 1987 speak of imbalances and asymmetries on both sides in Europe, arising from historical, geographical and other factors. They express readiness to eliminate disparities which have developed in some areas; this would be achieved by means of appropriate reductions by the advantaged party. This readiness is significant and should come to fruition in the negotiations on conventional stability, the mandate for which is currently under negotiation by the two sides in Vienna. After all, whoever has more arms must do more disarming.

The negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces show that it should be possible to achieve considerably asymmetrical reductions to equal ceilings. Conventional forces are particularly expensive and a burden on all of us. Their reduction towards a secure and stable balance at the lowest possible levels would release substantial resources for the common good; at the same time, elimination of threatening options and reduction of tensions would permit wide-ranging co-operation between West and East, for which the CSCE process offers an irreplaceable framework. Such co-operation in Europe would also have the necessary beneficial impact beyond the continent on the entire

family of nations. We should not wait for the 1990s. The first step along this arduous but promising road should be taken before 1987 is over.

Disarmament in the Sphere of Conventional Weapons

When speaking about the new situation after the Soviet-United States summit meeting in Reykjavik, we have in mind the irreversible impact it has had on the way in which we judge disarmament. We consider the present to be the decisive time for defining the forms and content of negotiations on those new developments not only for the immediate future, but also in the long-term perspective for the 1990s.

The problem of conventional weapons and conventional disarmament acquires qualitatively new dimensions, especially with respect to the relationship between those weapons and modern means of mass destruction, primarily the nuclear ones, and the role of those two categories of weapons in military doctrines concerning security.

What are the driving forces of conventional armament? If we look at the historical background, we find that after World War II, which brought about the most extensive use of conventional weapons in human history, conventional armaments assumed different positions in different countries.

After nuclear weapons came into being in the United States and, subsequently, a nuclear club was formed, the military-strategic thinking began to focus predominantly on nuclear categories, with conventional armaments and armed forces relegated to a sort of supplementary function. In the West, thinking along those lines made itself felt in the most distinct manner, first, in the concept of massive retaliation based essentially on a crushing nuclear strike. Later on, as new types and systems of nuclear weapons were developed, this doctrine was transformed into the concept of flexible response, envisaging a gradual escalation of nuclear exchange through the use of different kinds of nuclear forces at different stages of a presumed conflict. The common denominator of these two alternatives lies in the concept of nuclear "deterrence", i.e., the claim that it is possible to prevent a war by demonstrating firm determination to use nuclear weapons. Lately, in referring to an alleged threat of conventional attack by Warsaw Treaty member States, the West has mentioned nuclear deterrence with increasing frequency.

Moreover, it is paradoxical that while, on the global scale, conventional armament holds in military-strategic doctrines a

supplementary position in relation to nuclear weapons, it nevertheless consumes about 80 per cent of the world's military spending and constitutes the main source of the constant increase in military budgets. According to the most modest estimates, the world's arsenal of conventional weapons includes over 140,000 main battle tanks, more than 35,000 combat airplanes, 21,000 helicopters, 1,100 large surface warships and 700 attack submarines. A considerable part of these arms expenditures is devoted to maintaining the world's armed forces, which, according to some estimates, number about 25 million men. It becomes obvious that in the Western economies, conventional armament remains – even under the changed historical conditions – the mainstay of the military-industrial complex and its most lucrative component, producing four fifths of the total profit.

Conventional weapons occupy a dominant position in the security-related considerations of those States that do not possess nuclear weapons, especially of those that are not tied to nuclear powers by politico-military agreements. The Third World countries, confronted with the remnants and consequences of colonial conflicts and exploitation, are compelled, for both objective and subjective reasons, to strive to obtain the most sophisticated conventional weapons available, while facing the gravest danger of their use.

During the past 42 years, over 20 million people have perished in more than 150 local armed conflicts. This number exceeds the number of soldiers killed in World War II. The conflicts have taken place on the territories of more than 70 States, primarily developing ones, and over one half of all United Nations Member States have been involved in them. As a proportion of national income, the expenditures of developing countries on conventional armaments and armed forces are substantially – in some cases several times – higher than those in advanced countries. Altogether, the military spending of developing countries constitutes almost one fifth of total military expenditures. This alone further aggravates their economic underdevelopment and exacerbates the crisis in the world economy and the instability resulting therefrom.

It, thus, appears that the role of conventional weapons varies among countries, which may be producers or consumers. The consumers include, naturally, both those who buy weapons on the world market, i.e., primarily developing countries, and the armed forces of the producer States. The producers, whose political, economic and strategic position depends upon the state of the development of conventional weapons,

often view third world countries as convenient test sites for their weapons. This process, which has been going on, practically undisturbed, for more than 40 years, has inherent, conflicting tendencies that were almost indiscernible in its initial stages, but that are now growing in importance and are changing its quality.

The establishment of a military-strategic balance, the consequent impossibility of waging a victorious nuclear war, and the application of scientific and technological advances in the development of conventional weapons have resulted in a great lessening of the difference between conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction and may lead to their total elimination. Development is proceeding with a view to producing entirely new generations of high-precision types of homing missiles built on the basis of new physical principles (radio waves, laser or infrasound) and of genetic and biophysical principles. Armies are being equipped with weapons based on highly sophisticated technologies, such as FAE (fuel air explosive) munition, electromagnetic guns with high rates of fire, laser weapons for tactical use, guided missiles, highly sophisticated tactical aircraft and remotely piloted vehicles with reconnaissance and attack capabilities. In the context of the present and, even more, of the future, this situation leads us inevitably to two fundamental and interrelated conclusions:

First, it becomes difficult to distinguish between an armed conflict involving the use of conventional weapons and the beginning of a nuclear war; the probability of the escalation of any conflict into a global catastrophe and the risk of conflict in general are growing rapidly.

Secondly, if that is the case, then the justification of the concept of nuclear deterrence — that it prevents one horrible occurrence (war) by posing a threat of an even greater horror (nuclear apocalypse) — ceases to be valid.

In this respect, too, it is correct to conclude that the issue of war and peace has now acquired an entirely new meaning and that it requires a new way of thinking about achieving jointly guaranteed security by non-military, i.e., political, means. It is also evident that the problem of conventional disarmament, just as that of disarmament in the nuclear field, requires a global approach to all its aspects. Naturally, it has to be understood that what is needed above all is a reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, where there is the highest concentration of those weapons. In this respect, one can learn a lesson from the evolution of approaches to nuclear disarmament.

The use of nuclear weapons towards the end of World War II, which resulted in the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, marked the beginning of four decades of an increasingly intensive nuclear-arms buildup, which has produced a destructive and hardly controllable force capable of destroying human civilisation several times over. In my opinion, the danger of nuclear destruction was highlighted in particularly strong terms by the Chernobyl accident, an event that could not fail to affect Europeans' views of the possible use of nuclear weapons and that is evidence of the fact that even the most sophisticated technology is not entirely safe from the risk of breakdown or human error.

At the same time, numerous responsible officials have begun to realise, to an ever greater extent, what the consequences would be if conventional weapons alone were used in the densely populated areas of Europe against chemical plants or nuclear power stations. The result of an attack on such facilities, whether accidental or intentional, would be practically equal to the effect of the use of nuclear weapons. Conventional weapons systems are not subject to any limitations like those that are applied, to a certain extent, to nuclear weapons; therefore, they constitute a potentially highly destabilising factor.

We, thus, face the need to make a momentous political decision: whether to prevent, through a new, global approach and effective regional measures, a qualitatively new stage of conventional armament (new in content and scope and in respect of the conditions under which it would take place) or to open the door wide to overall military-strategic destabilisation. The latter would naturally entail paying the grave political, economic and social price of a new conventional arms buildup. An awareness of that consequence may have recently aroused worries in some Western European Governments about giving up the relatively less expensive nuclear weapons on their territories and replacing them with intensified conventional armament, as was unambiguously demanded of them from overseas.

At present, there are two different approaches to issues of peace and security and to the overall problem of disarmament. The first includes the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which is not a means of doing away with nuclear weapons, but a nuclear system of the fourth generation, which will surpass all the systems that have existed until now (atomic, hydrogen and neutron) by moving atomic radiation to outer space and directing its destructive power to targets on Earth.

In the sphere of conventional weapons, the strategic concept of “follow-on forces attack” (FOFA), known as the Rogers doctrine, was approved by NATO towards the end of 1984 and offensive arms for its implementation have been developed. This doctrine envisages rearming NATO forces by supplying them with new conventional weapons and systems comparable in some respects to weapons of mass destruction. Those armaments—bombers, missiles, devices for detection of and guidance towards targets—are destined for operations to be carried out as far as 500 kilometres deep into the territory of the socialist States. The concept supposes that NATO armed forces would be grouped in a way that would enable them to launch a conventional war involving, from the very beginning, large-scale offensive operations that would take place on the territory of socialist countries.

Grave concerns have also been aroused by NATO’s decisions and plans adopted at its session of ministers of defence in May 1986. Those plans, which aim to obtain the capability of a first strike, envisage enhancement of conventional armament and extensive modernisation of the equipment of armies.

The second approach to issues of peace and security is evident in the attitude of the socialist countries. Their military doctrine is based on different considerations, primarily on the premise that in the present circumstances it is inadmissible to settle any question by military means. Their guiding principle is that genuine security can be provided for in all spheres of international relations only by political means, on the basis of equality for all. This is the objective underlying their proposal for establishing a comprehensive system of international peace and security, which they put forward in the United Nations in 1986 and which has been receiving great attention worldwide.

At the recently concluded session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member States in Berlin, the participating countries reaffirmed that their alliance was of a peaceful nature and that their military doctrine pursued solely defensive purposes. They proposed that the two alliances hold consultations as soon as possible to compare their military doctrines, to analyse the character of those doctrines and to consider jointly their future direction with a view to doing away with mutual suspicion and mistrust, increasing mutual understanding and ensuring that they would be based on defensive principles.

In proposing talks on those issues, the member States of the Warsaw Treaty were responding directly to those Western European politicians

who have displayed strong concerns about claims that considerable conventional instability would result if nuclear weapons were eliminated.

It should be emphasised that the member States of the Warsaw Treaty, desirous of creating the best possible conditions for future negotiations, have declared their readiness to exercise, on the basis of reciprocity, the utmost restraint in the development of their military potentials. This would include the non-increase of armed forces and conventional armaments and also the adoption for one to two years of a moratorium on increases in military expenditures.

As far as verification is concerned, we have proposed, in addition to strict and comprehensive verification measures relating to the process of reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces, to introduce observation of the activities of the troops that would remain in place after the reductions. These measures, together with the exchange of data on armed forces and armaments of all participating States and other international procedures, including on-site inspections, would ensure reliable and effective compliance with the adopted obligations.

A significant step would be taken by implementing the Budapest programme of the Warsaw Treaty countries, issued in June 1986. That programme envisages the elimination of Warsaw Treaty and NATO military bases in the territories of other countries and the reciprocal withdrawals of troops to their respective national territories. It also calls for immediate reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments in the whole of Europe — from the Atlantic to the Urals — to be made in stages until a level of reasonable adequacy, i.e., the level needed for the fulfilment of tasks of defence, is reached. Imbalances and asymmetries in individual kinds of weapons, determined by historical and geopolitical factors, should be eliminated through reductions on the side that has an advantage. The socialist States act on the basis of the fact that there is an overall balance in the Warsaw Treaty and NATO forces in Europe, with 3 million men on each side.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty propose that in the first stage (one to two years), the troops on each side be reduced by 100,000 to 150,000 men. In the next stage, in the early 1990s, the ground forces and tactical air forces in all of Europe would be reduced by 25 per cent, compared to their present level. The number of troops of the two sides facing each other in Europe would thus be decreased by more than a million men, with the greatest reductions being made in the concentration of troops and armaments in the zone of direct contact between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. Both sides would also withdraw

the most dangerous and offensive kinds of weapons from this zone. The process of reductions would then continue, with the participation of the other European States as well.

The proposal envisages the process of reductions on the basis of reciprocity, with the balance of power being maintained. This would be conducive to strengthening military-strategic stability. Reductions would be made in all components of ground forces and attack air forces, all armaments and technical combat equipment organically belonging to the respective units, including tactical nuclear weapons. Thus the negotiations would also cover the so-called short-range nuclear forces, which are mostly dual-capable weapons (able to carry both conventional and nuclear warheads) and which have not been the subject of any negotiations thus far. The contractual obligations of the parties would include, as an integral part, the exchange of information on exercises and movements of troops and a comprehensive system of both national and international verification, including on-site inspections.

In the Budapest Appeal, the socialist States adopted a highly flexible attitude concerning the question of where and how to resolve the problem of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments on our continent. The Political Consultative Committee's session in Berlin reaffirmed that the best forum for talks on those issues would be the second stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. They also expressed readiness to consider other alternatives within the framework of the all-European process, including the convening of a special forum. The socialist States have proposed convening a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in order to open extensive negotiations on radical reductions in armed forces, conventional armaments and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and adequate reductions in military expenditures.

In the Brussels Declaration, the NATO States declared verbally their readiness "to open East-West discussions with a view to the establishment of a new mandate for negotiating on conventional arms control covering the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals", yet until now they have not confirmed that readiness in practice at the consultations in Vienna. Because of lack of willingness on their part, it has been impossible to start actual work on the mandate for future negotiations.

As we see the situation, the consultations on conventional disarmament being conducted by 23 European States have mainly revealed that the NATO States are still not willing to negotiate on radical reductions in armed forces and armaments. They speak only about safeguarding "conventional stability" and doing away with what they assert to be an imbalance that places the West at a disadvantage in Europe as a whole and also in particular areas.

It should be emphasised that raising the problem of conventional disarmament on an all-European scale does not mean that the socialist countries are losing interest in progress and tangible results at the Vienna Talks on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe. We attach great importance to these Talks, especially since disarmament measures adopted there would cover the territory of Central Europe, which, though limited in size, is of extreme significance. They would help to thin out forces located in the zone of direct contact between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, i.e., the area with the greatest concentration of manpower and the most sophisticated combat equipment.

Since the beginning of those Talks in October 1973, the socialist States have put forward 28 compromise proposals of either a global or partial nature. Two proposals are on the negotiating table at present: the position of the NATO States of 5 December 1985 and the draft "Agreement on an initial cutback by the Soviet Union and the United States in land forces and armaments with a subsequent non-increase in the levels of the armed forces and armaments of the sides and related measures in Central Europe", put forward by the States members of the Warsaw Treaty on 20 February 1986 and further elaborated by them in the course of the talks held pursuant to the Final Document of the Stockholm Conference.

Although the positions of the two sides have since become very close or even identical on many points, the Western participants do not appear willing to seek compromise solutions to the outstanding issues. They persist in refusing to negotiate on reductions and limitations of armaments. They are not willing to finalise the scope and form of the initial reduction of Soviet and United States ground forces, and, most importantly, they strive for adoption of inappropriate associated and verification measures that would not correspond, either in scope or in content, to the disarmament measures to be adopted.

Even in this complicated situation, we are ready to continue to work for progress at those Talks and to seek a way out that would

create favourable conditions for transition to talks on reducing armed forces and conventional armaments on an all-European scale.

Stability in Europe might also be significantly enhanced through the implementation of Poland's plan, submitted on 8 May 1987, for limiting armaments and building confidence in Central Europe. This plan offers Central Europe a clear prospect: the elimination of nuclear weapons accompanied by removal of the most dangerous and most offensive types of conventional weapons from the region, the simultaneous expansion of confidence- and security-building measures and strict verification, and mutual recognition of the purely defensive nature of both alliances' military doctrines. The proposals for establishing nuclear- and chemical weapon free zones in Central Europe, the Balkans and Northern Europe would also be conducive to reducing military confrontation and strengthening security in parts of Europe.

The Governments of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic have also proposed establishing a nuclear weapon free corridor in Central Europe that would extend 150 kilometres on each side of the border between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany and between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. The proposal envisages reciprocal withdrawal from the corridor of all nuclear weapons: nuclear munitions, including nuclear mines, tactical missiles, nuclear artillery and nuclear-capable ground attack aircraft and also anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence complexes that might carry nuclear weapons. A considerable part of those weapons consists in dual-capable arms. It is our opinion that establishment of the proposed corridor might also accelerate the solution of the question of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

The socialist countries adhere to the basic principle that disarmament in the sphere of conventional weapons has to be carried out together with nuclear disarmament and the elimination of all other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, primarily chemical ones. They also consider that States possessing nuclear weapons and other countries with major military potentials, especially members of politico-military groupings, have a special responsibility in this regard. However, in reality, the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments to a level that would be reasonably adequate for defence and safeguarding every State's right to security is a matter of global impact, affecting all regions.

To formulate a global approach to the questions of conventional disarmament and to activate the United Nations for that purpose is thus truly topical. This was the premise of the socialist proposal recently

submitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. It called on all member States to work by all means available for success in negotiations on conventional weapons in accordance with agreed principles and to refrain from steps that would impede progress in that direction.

In conclusion, I should like to stress that, there is a real prospect for progress, made possible primarily by the flexible approach of the socialist countries to the problem of conventional forces and armaments. What is needed here, just as in the nuclear field, is the capacity to abandon obsolete stereotyped patterns of thought based on the pursuit of individual or group interests through military strength. Also needed is a new attitude towards achieving collectively agreed upon priorities in the disarmament field, primarily universal recognition of the fact that the problem of conventional disarmament, too, is now a global problem of our interrelated and interdependent world. It is obvious that this new way of thinking has been growing in strength; if this trend continues, it will produce results beneficial for all.

DISARMAMENT IN THE FIELD OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

When you conferred on me the honour of addressing this important international forum on disarmament, I did not realise how difficult the task would be. I had expected to analyse the Vienna Talks on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (M(B)FR), their achievements and failures and the efforts being undertaken at present in Vienna to create a new forum for conventional disarmament talks covering the whole continent of Europe.

However, in the mean time the rather static scene has come into motion, so it will be difficult to pass any definitive judgement. For that, you would have to be a prophet, and I certainly do not claim to possess such powers. Nevertheless, I will try to live up to the challenge to the best of my ability. I take this liberty for three reasons: first, as an Austrian; secondly, as a representative of a peace research institution; and thirdly, as a woman.

Since Austria is a neutral country in the heart of Europe, it has a particular interest in the safeguarding of peace and its corollary, disarmament. Austria is not a military Super-Power, and in any major military confrontation she could not escape untouched by virtue of her neutrality alone, although it is certainly significant that Vienna,

my home town, is not only the third United Nations city, but also one of the major venues of disarmament talks. In the case of conventional weapons, of which I will talk in greater detail later, I don't think I have to elaborate on the significance of peace research institutions and the interest women in general have always had in the maintenance of peace. I have a famous compatriot, Bertha von Suttner, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for organising effective disarmament campaigns already at the turn of the century. The title of her book *Put Down Your Arms* is as potent today as it was then.

I think we cannot plan for the future if we do not first look back into the past, even if this presents a depressing picture. After all, disarmament talks are not a post-war phenomenon. They started at the beginning of the century, but were not able to prevent the two world wars. Ever since the end of World War II, disarmament negotiations have been going on—mainly in two cities of neutral European countries, Geneva and Vienna—not with overwhelming success. In Geneva just now, on 2 June, the United States and the USSR agreed in principle on a common draft to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe. This is a hopeful development, which may lead to a breakthrough. In this connection, I want to stress the importance of the potential influence of public opinion—including that of disarmament campaigns—in shaping disarmament policies. In Vienna we are now at a crossroads with respect to conventional disarmament.

I personally consider the negotiations covering conventional weapons particularly significant. After all, more than 40 years after the end of hostilities in Europe, we are still faced with the biggest concentration of troops and armaments that has ever existed in peace-time in a relatively small geographic area. Furthermore, even if the two superpowers have become pivots of world politics, Europe has remained the strategic centre of East-West confrontation. Of the approximately \$800 billion spent worldwide on armaments, about 70 per cent is used for the NATO and Warsaw Treaty forces. Furthermore, the costs of the conventional arms race are proportionally far higher than those of the nuclear-arms race.

In the early 1970s, the capacity for overkill led to the realisation that a potential conflict could no longer be solved by military means. The necessity of coming to an understanding produced a series of conferences, of which I consider the most important to be the so-called Helsinki process. It started in the Finnish capital in 1973 and led to the signing of the Final Act two years later. Directly linked politically to

that Conference and concurrent with it were the Vienna Talks, which opened, on 30 October 1973 to be exact, with associated measures as an integral part of their mandate. Those talks are still in progress. Thus a process was set in motion which knows no precedent in history. Never before had representatives of two opposing military alliances agreed to sit down in peace-time with the aim of reaching an understanding on reducing their armed forces. Even then nobody expected a quick breakthrough, but it was generally thought that the success or failure of the endeavour would become visible in the foreseeable future. Instead, we are now faced with the 42nd round and the 450th plenary session. For 10 years, the two sides were deadlocked on two major issues: the data question and the problem of verification. As for the data question, the East insisted that a balance of forces already existed, while the West maintained that the Warsaw Treaty forces were in fact larger. As for verification, the controversy centred on the question of where and how verification should take place.

It was only in the tenth year of the negotiations that things began to move. On 18 February 1982, the East for the first time presented the draft of a complete agreement, to which the West replied with its own concept on 25 November. Although the two sides were still wide apart, the mere fact that draft agreements had been submitted was regarded as a sign of a positive development. The task became to unite the two drafts into a common accord. Unfortunately, it turned out that the two sides would not move from their positions and thus no compromise seemed possible for the time being.

This deadlock persisted until 5 December 1985, when the NATO countries dropped their insistence that the sides come to a common understanding on force levels before they agreed to initial reductions of forces and the no-increase commitment, thus, removing the so-called data barrier to any progress. At the same time, the West stressed the importance of verification, which, it maintained, was vital to any agreement. First, it held that verification should consist of permanently manned sites through which all forces of the participating countries entering or leaving Central Europe must pass. Secondly, the West insisted on a detailed exchange of information on forces, down to battalion level, thus establishing a basis for verifying the no-increase commitment. Finally, the NATO countries suggested that each side should have the right to conduct 30 inspections per year during each of the three years of reductions. On 20 February 1986, the Warsaw Treaty countries

submitted their reply in the form of a draft agreement which, while accepting the common ground, departed from the Western view as far as verification was concerned. With regard to on-site inspection, the Warsaw Treaty countries maintained that in every case justification must first be given to the country to be inspected. There the matter rests at present.

The Helsinki meeting—as you all know—had two follow-up meetings. The first was held in Belgrade from 1977 to 1978, and the second in Madrid from 1980 to 1983. It was in Madrid that for the first time within this framework steps were taken which had a direct bearing on the question of disarmament. I am referring to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which received its mandate from the Madrid Meeting and which concluded on 19 September 1986 with the adoption of a document, the first to be agreed upon since the Helsinki Final Act. The Stockholm Document referred to several measures designed to reduce tension in Europe. First, with regard to the threat or use of force, the participating States reaffirm their commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force in their relations with any State, regardless of that State's political, social, economic or cultural system and irrespective of whether or not they maintain with the State relations of alliance. Secondly, with regard to the notification of military manoeuvres, such activities involving between 13,000 and 40,000 men have to be notified one year in advance and those with over 40,000, two years in advance. Manoeuvres involving more than 75,000 men must not take place, unless announced two years previously. Thirdly, with regard to observation, two observers have to be invited for all exercises involving more than 17,000 men. Fourthly, with regard to verification, any country which doubts the observance of the agreement by another State has the right to demand an on-site inspection which must not be refused.

The Stockholm accord was the rare instance of a document which was welcomed by all sides. According to most observers, the Document surpassed the expectations of even fervent optimists, not so much for its content, as for the confidence it was designed to create.

In the mean time, another round of consultations has developed in Vienna, this time on an informal basis. The participants are the 23 members of the two military alliances, who have been meeting alternately at an Eastern or Western embassy in Vienna. The difference between these consultations and the M(B)FR framework is that (a) France, not represented at M(B)FR, is participating in the talks, and (b) the area of

force reductions would not cover Central Europe alone, but the entire continent from the Atlantic to the Urals, including the Mediterranean area. The participants in the "Talks of the 23 " are at the same time the representatives of their countries to the current follow-up meeting in Vienna of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The main question now is whether conventional disarmament should stay out of the CSCE or be linked more closely with the Helsinki process.

And this brings me to the point which, I freely admit, is closest to my heart and which has for a long time been a special field in my research work—the question of confidence and confidence-building measures.

In considering the failure of disarmament negotiations, we have to ask the question: Could it be that the whole mode of negotiating has been wrong? Efforts for peace and disarmament have concentrated so far on reaching treaties in order to reduce the level of troops and armaments. The results have been meagre. What has happened appears to me like an attempt to do away with the symptoms of the arms race without looking at the underlying causes, which are fear and mistrust. Without a study of these causes, disarmament efforts are liable to lead nowhere and end in failure. This seems to me like an attempt to put the cart before the horse or to fight against the fever and not the illness. The only way out of this dilemma is to create an atmosphere of confidence on different levels. Confidence may not be everything, but without mutual confidence there can be no progress. The historical record confirms my contention.

What kind of confidence-building measures are essential? We should distinguish between two types: first, political and psychological measures and, secondly, practical or contractually agreed upon measures.

With regard to political and psychological measures, we are faced with the necessity of undertaking what one could describe as "disarmament of words". At present, words that are hostile to the purpose of peace and disarmament are used in the peace dialogue and conferences. Speeches by representatives—not only those of the two superpowers, but also of other nations—are deliberately directed at the faults and weaknesses of the other party. There must be more voluntary restraint. Nations should try to talk to each other and not against each other. This means that the other party's point of view should never be rejected out of hand. One should always try to understand the other party's case or there can be no progress. Where

should the "disarmament of words" begin? I suggest it should start in all international forums, above all in those of the United Nations, because there is no better place for building confidence among nations than the United Nations, and particularly its disarmament conferences. We cannot have confidence in someone whom we do not know. We have to come to know each other. Confidence-building is absolutely essential if we are aiming at disarmament and a life of peace and security.

Another possible way of building confidence would be to encourage the extension of peace research in East and West. I would suggest, as a concrete step for a confidence-building measure, that one tenth of 1 per cent of the money spent on the arms race be diverted to peace research. Unfortunately, there is little confidence between nations. From personal experience I can say that peace researchers in East and West do have considerable trust in and mutual respect for each other when dealing with concrete problems such as disarmament. Universities worldwide should put more emphasis on peace education. Classes on peace and disarmament should be introduced in East and West. The exchange of students, assistants and professors should be encouraged.

As for the practical confidence-building measures, their importance was stressed in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. Thus the United Nations followed the example adopted by the Final Act of the CSCE in Helsinki, which approved a whole series of confidence-building measures of the so-called first generation; These measures dealt mainly with military topics. Generally speaking, they have been implemented by both sides and have thus contributed to the building of a minimum of confidence which would serve as a basis for further steps.

I have now reached what I think is the logical conclusion, the crux of the matter: disarmament alone, however much we all may wish for it, will not lead to confidence among nations. Rather, it is confidence-building measures that will pave the road to disarmament, and this road is the surest road to security and peace.

REYKJAVIK AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

At no other Soviet-American summit meeting has so much attention been devoted to European questions as at the Gorbachev-Reagan working meeting in the capital of Iceland. Also, at none of them have such important understandings been reached, which directly concern the most vital security interests of European nations. For these reasons, it

seems worthwhile to have a look at the meeting of the Soviet and United States leaders in Reykjavik and ask the question: What has it meant for Europe?

The Reykjavik meeting took place several months after the USSR had presented a three-stage programme for eliminating weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000 and after a wide-ranging discussion of the idea of common security in the course of preparations for and during the debates of the Twenty-seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The Soviet leader proposed the summit meeting because he wished to express the USSR's concern about the continuing arms race, on the one hand, and lack of progress in disarmament dialogue, on the other, and to give a strong impulse to Soviet-American negotiations on the most important aspects of the present arms race. Moreover, on the initiative of the American side, the participants in that meeting discussed questions of human rights in international relations, regional conflicts, and Soviet-American bilateral issues. According to the accounts of both sides, however, disarmament problems occupied the central place.

We are interested here only in the suggestions put forward concerning the European continent. Very briefly speaking, they envisaged the adoption by both sides of the following understandings on this subject: In the three-part package of proposals, which provided for a 50 per cent reduction in offensive strategic systems and a 10-year prohibition on renouncing the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty—including a prohibition on carrying out tests within the SDI programme—there was a proposal for completely eliminating American and Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and for freeing the present number of short-range nuclear weapons. The American side raised no objections to these proposals at the meeting. Besides, the Soviet Union suggested starting negotiations on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, reinforcing its proposal by further extending its unilateral moratorium.

The formula which the Soviet side presented in Reykjavik and according to which the two global powers were to begin removing their nuclear weapons from the European continent constituted a major concession to the United States; it signified acceptance of the "zero option" presented by Reagan in 1981. The most important element of this concession was that Moscow would exclude the British and French nuclear potentials from the total calculation of East-West nuclear forces in Europe. As you know, those potentials are considerable and will be

even greater after the present programmes of development have been completed. Moreover, the NATO potential in Europe would include: American F-111 nuclear bombers stationed in the United Kingdom; nearly 300 Pluton, Pershing I, and Lance missiles; and over 3,000 nuclear artillery warheads.

Following the presentation of these general ideas in Reykjavik, the two sides submitted at the Geneva negotiations in March and April 1987 concretely formulated proposals for Soviet-American agreements on eliminating medium-range nuclear weapons from Europe. At this point, divergencies and difficulties appeared. The draft agreement submitted in Geneva by the Soviet delegation provided for also eliminating from Europe tactical-operational weapons with a range of 500-1,000 kilometres. The American side suggested that the USSR freeze weapons of this type at the present level and that the United States expand its potential by modifying the already deployed Pershing II and Tomahawk missiles. The modification would consist in shortening the range of Pershing II missiles and transferring Tomahawk missiles to ships or aircraft. In other words, the USSR would be expected to agree to a very disadvantageous operation, because it is fairly generally accepted that the previous range of these missiles could be relatively easily restored. The argument that the Western side does not command an appropriate category of weapons is not entirely true. I think, however, that with a minimum of goodwill on the part of the West—not only the United States, but also the other members of NATO—it will be possible to find a way out. I believe that prospects for completely eliminating medium-range nuclear weapons from Europe and for at least reducing to a considerable extent the number of weapons with a range of below 1,000 kilometres will grow brighter. This would constitute indisputable proof of the contribution that the Reykjavik meeting has made to European security.

I believe that the meeting of the Soviet and United States leaders in the capital of Iceland should be viewed more broadly. It should be considered in the context of possibilities for other agreements concerning military aspects of European security and for definite proposals submitted in another forum. I refer here in particular to the agreements reached at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which ended on 19 September 1986, and the readiness of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty to take up negotiations on limiting conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe.

The Stockholm Conference achieved significant progress on the very important question of military confidence-building measures. The Document of the Conference provides for far-reaching steps, of both a substantive and territorial nature, in this field. At the moment, the delegates of 35 States are negotiating in Vienna on a mandate for the second phase of the Conference. There are chances that the mandate will encompass possibilities for negotiating both a third generation of confidence-building measures and concrete steps aimed at limiting armed forces and armaments. The weekly meetings in Vienna of representatives of the 23 States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and NATO should be helpful in working out a realistic programme that will meet the expectations of the European public for multilateral negotiations on all aspects of security and co-operation in Europe.

A unique situation is emerging, in which all the military aspects of security in Europe will soon become the subject of negotiations. This development will concern every kind of nuclear weapon, conventional armed forces and armaments, and confidence-building measures. There will be no "grey zone" weapons, i.e., systems not embraced by any negotiations or remaining outside any international agreements. Naturally, taking up negotiations on a definite question does not guarantee reaching an agreement. However, this is the prelude, without which the finale would be impossible.

Thus, we can speak of a continuation of Reykjavik with respect to Europe. The implementation of the vision outlined at the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting with respect to Europe should create a favourable basis for harmonising negotiations on the main questions relative to military aspects of European security.

It is natural to ask at this point: What would be the appropriate forum for negotiations? Matters pertaining directly to the question of eliminating nuclear weapons should remain in the hands of the two Super-Powers—at least until France and the United Kingdom join in the talks in order to create a global "nuclear order". Of course, this does not preclude the possibility of non-nuclear States' taking up the question of setting up a nuclear free zone in a definite region. Such negotiations would be highly desirable, and, should there be success in Soviet-American talks on eliminating nuclear weapons from Europe, the chances for their success would significantly increase.

The question of negotiations on limiting conventional armed forces and armaments is somewhat complicated. The experience of the 19 States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and NATO that have been conducting

negotiations in Vienna since 1973 has not been very encouraging. For several months now, the delegates of 23 States representing the two military-political groupings have been meeting in the same capital to seek agreement on the subject-matter and the forum of negotiations on conventional disarmament for all of Europe. Two opposing views on the forum of negotiations have been expressed. The socialist countries suggest that the question be examined during the second phase of the Conference of 35 States in Stockholm. The NATO States, however, consider that the problem should be taken up in the forum of 23 States members of the military alliances. I think that a compromise solution is possible, one satisfactory to the three groups of States that determine the political-military climate on our continent.

If a situation develops that is conducive to holding comprehensive negotiations on military aspects of European security, it will be necessary to work out a coherent programme embracing all the basic questions relating to the concept and practical content of military detente. In the past, on Finland's initiative, attempts were made to elaborate such a programme. Unfortunately, they ended in failure because the overall political atmosphere of East-West relations was unfavourable at that time. If there is a success in the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on medium-range nuclear weapons and if multilateral negotiations on the remaining questions begin, the idea of elaborating such a programme should be well received. The programme should reflect the idea of the common security of all 35 States participating in the CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) process. There is no need to prove that the significance of general European solutions in the field of military aspects of security would go far beyond the continent, greatly contributing to the stabilisation of international relations on a global scale.

Thus, in my opinion, the reply to the question posed at the beginning of the paper should be, in brief, that the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik has contributed towards clarifying standpoints on the fundamental question of the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons from Europe. It has defined the basic formula of a future Soviet-American agreement on the complete elimination of medium-range nuclear weapons (1,000-5,000-kilometre range). It has made it possible to formulate the initial positions of the two sides on the possibility of reaching agreement on short-range nuclear weapons, i.e., tactical operational missiles with a 500-1,000-kilometre range, and to outline the form of negotiations on tactical nuclear systems with a range of

less than 500 kilometres. Thus, a convenient starting-point has been provided for a broader dialogue on reducing conventional forces in Europe. The periodic meetings of representatives of 23 States in Vienna and the discussions in the Vienna 1986 forum between representatives of the 35 States signatories to the CSCE Final Act seem to confirm this presupposition.

Thus, Reykjavik has furnished the point of departure for a comprehensive programme of activity embracing all the basic military aspects of European security. The political climate created by this summit meeting is also auspicious for submitting and implementing sub-regional solutions concerning military aspects of security on our continent, including the plan, put forward by Poland on 8 May 1987, for the gradual disengagement and reduction of armaments and for new security- and confidence-building measures in the territories of nine States in Central Europe.

The meeting in Reykjavik also invites a more detailed discussion of the problem of military doctrines and their regional and global aspects. Such discussions should take place among representatives of both political-military blocs. A careful analysis of Warsaw Treaty and NATO operative military doctrines that will allow each side to recognise the other's doctrine as defensive should provide interesting material for studies on future concepts of international security in general. These discussions would enable us to understand better the often repeated thesis that no country—even if it allocates the most extensive resources—is able to guarantee its own security.

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**TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCING
CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE**

Some time this year, barring some exceptional and unforeseen event, the 16 members of the North Atlantic Alliance and the seven States which signed the Warsaw Treaty will conclude the most sweeping arms reduction agreement ever attempted. After decades of cold war, political animosity and military confrontation, statesmen have revolutionised their thinking about the future of Europe and the futility of war as a means for pursuing political objectives.

Although it is impossible to say just when this process of change began, there are several identifiable milestones along the way. The NATO Alliance adopted the Harmel Report in 1967, even as it was in the process of adopting a new strategy — flexible response. Indeed, flexible response (which provided for the possibility of using nuclear weapons in defence of the integrity of the territory of NATO member States) may be interpreted as reflecting one element of the Harmel Report, namely, that NATO should be able to defend itself militarily. The second element, however, held out an olive branch to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. It declared a willingness to negotiate agreements which through their military and political significance could enhance security, stability and peace.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia to crush the Prague Spring in 1968 cast doubt upon the utility, even the credibility, of the second element of the Harmel Report. None the less, in the early 1970s most member States of the two alliances entered into preparatory negotiations to establish the terms of reference for the Vienna talks on reducing conventional armed forces in Europe, known in the West as the mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) negotiations. At the same time, the 33 States constituting Europe (all but Albania) as well as the United

States and Canada were meeting in Helsinki to establish the rules and procedures for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).

Ironically, no progress at all was made in the Vienna MBFR negotiations. The United States had entered into these negotiations as a means of achieving negotiated mutual withdrawals rather than the unilateral United States troop withdrawals then being advocated by Senator Mike Mansfield and other members of the United States Congress. For its part, the Warsaw Pact seemed to have little interest in achieving an agreement, being, as it was, in the midst of a major programme of modernising its armed forces in Central and Eastern Europe. Despite their long duration without agreement, the MBFR talks also contributed to the making of an environment in which serious agreements could be reached. For nearly 15 years, the armed forces of the MBFR participants were the subject of discussions and analysis; the effect of this experience should not be undervalued.

The more politically oriented CSCE process did reach an agreement late in July 1975 when the Helsinki Final Act was signed. Initially greeted with much scepticism, the achievement of political agreement on a framework for addressing the entire spectrum of problems relating to security and co-operation in Europe was, certainly in retrospect, a turning-point in European history.

The farmers of the Helsinki Final Act were wise enough not to allow any one dimension of the political, security and economic structure to dominate the process. Thus each of its three major subject areas—security, economics/science, and humanitarian issues—forms part of an integral whole. With regard to security, the Final Act embraces a modest set of confidence-building measures, including a political obligation to notify major military manoeuvres and provisions for the voluntary invitation of observers to military exercises. The major portion of this section, however, spells out ten principles to guide relations between the 35 participating States. The seventh principle stipulated respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief. This alliance of human rights and security constitutes one of the two elements of genius in the Helsinki Final Act. The other is the concept of follow-up meetings at regular intervals to review the implementation of obligations as well as to consider further proposals. This concept gives life to the notion of process.

The integral nature of the CSCE process was tested in major follow-up meetings in Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna as well as in a series of smaller CSCE expert meetings that probed performance and expectations in each of the three major subject areas—labelled “baskets” in CSCE parlance.

As part of a balanced, comprehensive outcome at the Madrid follow-up meeting in 1983, agreement was finally reached on a mandate for a Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The Madrid meeting was a particularly stormy one. The Soviet Army had invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, a Soviet submarine was grounded on the rocks near a military installation in the Swedish archipelago in 1981, martial law was imposed in Poland, and Western insistence on detailing human rights abuses in plenary sessions and to the press made negotiations difficult. Moreover, the United States Administration under President Reagan was viewed by many in Europe as unfriendly to progress in the area of arms control. None the less, experts continued to hammer out the details of an agreement in spite of the vexed political environment and the apparent irreconcilability of various positions.

At the same time, the decision by the North Atlantic Alliance to modernise its nuclear capabilities in Europe by deploying Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) began to be implemented. This was also a major event in laying the groundwork for arms control agreements in Europe. As much as anything, this demonstrated Western European resolve not to be intimidated by the wholesale deployment of Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missiles aimed at targets in Western Europe. This deployment undoubtedly factored heavily in the development of “new thinking” among the Soviet leadership as it demonstrated the futile and precarious nature of arms buildups as a means of achieving political goals. This made agreements on new confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) and the elimination of INF missiles both more attractive and possible.

After a long period of political stagnation under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev, a process of re-evaluation began under the new General Secretary Yuri Andropov. The necessarily innovative character of new thinking in Moscow, coupled with the ill health of the new leader, slowed the process considerably. Nonetheless, it had already become clear that the Clausewitzian precept that war is the continuation of politics had become inoperative in the nuclear age. Irrespective of the desirability of preserving peace through the threat of nuclear annihilation,

deterrence was a modern day reality. The passing of Andropov's successor, Chernenko, from the scene brought Mikhail Gorbachev to power in the Soviet Union and unleashed those who believed in political dialogue, arms control, and diplomatic agreement as the path to greater stability and thus greater security in Europe.

Contributing significantly to the evolution of new thinking was the growing realisation of severe difficulties in the centrally planned economy of the Soviet Union. Measured against economic growth in the West, particularly Western Europe and Japan, it was abundantly clear that a fundamental change in approach was needed.

It was against this background that the Stockholm Conference, whose mandate had been decided in Madrid, convened. The deaths of both Andropov and Chernenko during the conference almost certainly resulted in some attenuation in the Soviet Government's attention to the question of confidence- and security-building measures. But, the appearance of Mr. Gorbachev resulted in new decisiveness in the Soviet position and a demonstration of desire to reach agreement in Stockholm.

There are several reasons why the agreement on the Stockholm Document was crucial to the probable achievement of an agreement in the Vienna CFE negotiations. Three are noteworthy. First, it represented the first step in a step-by-step process which facilitated overcoming the natural scepticism of military leaders in several countries, not the least in the Soviet Union, about the acceptability of agreements which pursued greater openness in military affairs. Secondly, the agreement embodied the first negotiated right to conduct on-site inspection of military forces in the field. And finally, the outcome at Stockholm demonstrated the possibility of reaching significant agreement in the area of military arms control in a multilateral forum of 35 sovereign and independent States. In this context, it also demonstrated the ability of the two largest military powers to negotiate constructively in the interest of multilateral agreement.

It goes without saying that the INF agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union was also a key in developing the arms control culture and environment which has contributed to the probability of success in Vienna. Several basic principles were established which will carry over into the CFE setting. Parity at lower levels, instituting the principle that the one who has most reduces most, was central to the INF agreement and will be to a CFE agreement as well. A detailed exchange of information validated through intense on-site inspection is likewise integral to both negotiations. And agreement that provisions

for stringent verification, best exemplified in former President Reagan's dictum "trust, but verify", has become a dogma of contemporary arms control agreements.

The third CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna, which ended early in 1989, was, like its predecessor in Madrid, an intense review of the implementation of previous commitments and consideration of new proposals. Significant progress was made in the field of human rights and humanitarian affairs. Two expert meetings on human rights were mandated, one in Copenhagen and one in Moscow. Agreement was also reached to hold several other expert meetings before the next CSCE follow-up in Helsinki in 1992. In the security area, it was agreed to continue negotiations on confidence and security-building measures on the basis of the mandate agreed in Madrid.

At the same time, as the Vienna follow-up meeting was under way, the 23 States belonging to NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation agreed on a mandate for negotiating conventional arms reductions in Europe. While these new negotiations were to be of an autonomous nature, it was agreed they would take place within the framework of the CSCE process. It was also agreed that the CFE negotiations would seek to reduce conventional forces in Europe; neither naval nor nuclear forces would be covered in the negotiations.

Why CFE?

For more than forty years following the Second World War, Europe was plagued with mistrust, suspicion, fear, political competition, military confrontation and potential instability. There is little to be served here by resurfacing all the history that contributed to those forty years. Suffice it to say that by the mid-1980s, Europe was stuffed with arms and armaments—the instruments of war. Yet, an objective consideration of all political, economic and military factors would have shown that war would have been a calamity for all of Europe, indeed for much of the world.

At least three times during those forty years, force of arms had been brought to bear in Europe against ordinary citizens who sought more individual freedom for themselves and their fellow countrymen. While none of these three occasions threatened to bring on another world war, each exacerbated already existing suspicions and estrangements giving sustenance to the cold war.

The dividing line between Western and Eastern Europe appeared to become more indelible in the context of military modernisation and

buildup. With full understanding of the offensive strategy of Warsaw Pact forces, NATO sought to enhance its capability for forward defence. Anti-tank weaponry on the Western side evoked anti-anti-tank measures, such as reactive armour, on the Eastern side. The ability to strike deep was enhanced on both sides with more sophisticated weaponry.

The two Germanys became most illustrative of the situation. In the German Democratic Republic, as many as twenty Soviet manoeuvre divisions plus six East German divisions and approximately 30 main operating air bases populated an area about the size of the American state of Ohio. In the slightly larger Federal Republic of Germany, the 500,000-man *Bundeswehr* was supplemented by four United States divisions and two armoured combat regiments. In addition, the British Army on the Rhine as well as Dutch and Belgian forces maintained a sizeable presence and commitment to the defence of NATO in the northern part of the Federal Republic of Germany. And a contingent of French forces maintained a permanent presence in south-western Germany. Allied air capability was organised into two tactical air forces. Seldom, if ever, have so many forces occupied so little real estate in peacetime.

Neither the MBFR negotiations nor the CSCE process was configured in such a way as to promote negotiated solutions to what was an all-European dilemma. At the same time, both made their unique contributions. MBFR covered only a limited area in Central Europe; it did not extend to Soviet territory in Europe or include all the States in the Western Europe which are politically and militarily critical to European security. ESCE is a political process which entails only political obligations; this is not the format in which one negotiates legally binding treaties. Moreover, CSCE is an association of 35 sovereign and independent States, with the full participation of the neutral and non-aligned States of Europe. The requirement for drastic reductions of military potentials is, in the first instance, the business and obligation of those who possess them—the States belonging to the two alliances.

The concept of reducing military potentials in Europe could not be restricted to the two Germanys or to Central Europe as was the case in MBFR. Therefore, the mandate agreed on in Vienna stipulated that the reductions area would cover all of Europe, including its island States and territories. All 23 States belonging to the two alliances actively participate in the negotiations, with all their relevant equipment in the zone of application constituting part of the agreed totals. CFE will conclude with a treaty requiring ratification by the parliamentary councils of the States parties and become part of the codex of international law.

Initial Approaches

The traditional military security problem in Europe has been the invasion of one State by another. It therefore made great sense when the two sides agreed that two major objectives of the negotiations were to eliminate the capability for surprise attack and to eliminate the capability for conducting a large-scale sustained offensive. Both these objectives relate to the capability to invade, to seize and to hold territory.

In modern warfare, it is the main battle tank that forms the backbone of the ground offensive, that is, the ability to seize and hold territory. Tanks are supplemented by armoured fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and artillery. For these reasons, the initial Western proposal at the CFE talks focused on these armaments and equipment. Later, it was agreed to include combat aircraft and combat helicopters as well as United States and Soviet troops stationed outside national borders.

At the beginning of the CFE process in Europe as a whole, there were more than 73,000 main battle tanks, 26,000 armoured infantry fighting vehicles, 106,000 armored personnel carriers and 57,000 artillery pieces. Much of this equipment is antiquated; but there is much of it also that represents the latest in military technology. More important, what is immediately clear is that there is far more than befits a situation of 40 years of peace in Europe.

In formulating their position for the CFE negotiations, the 16 countries of the Western alliance reasoned that the total number of tanks, armoured troop carriers and artillery pieces in Europe could be cut by approximately 50 per cent. This accords with the first Western objective in the CFE talks: the establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. Therefore, *the first element* of the Western proposal was that after reductions are completed, there should be no more than 40,000 tanks, 56,000 armoured troop carriers (armoured infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers) and 33,000 artillery pieces.

The seven members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation quickly signalled their willingness to adopt this approach as a basis for the negotiations. Indeed, they also voiced a willingness to accept the proposed limits on tanks and armoured troop-carriers; the final limits on artillery were to be established after both sides had agreed on definitions for artillery.

In December 1988, at the forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, General Secretary Gorbachev announced unilateral reductions in the Soviet armed forces which included a reduction of 240,000 troops and 10,000 tanks in Europe—5,300 of which were to be taken from Eastern Europe. In the early stages of the MBFR talks, the West had proposed the withdrawal of a Soviet tank army from the MBFR reductions area. The unilateral reductions announced by Mr. Gorbachev exceeded those proposed in that most ambitious MBFR proposal. NATO welcomed the Soviet initiatives, but noted that much more was required since the Warsaw Pact would still retain more than a 2.4-to-1 advantage in tanks, armoured troop-carriers and artillery pieces.

The *second element* of the Western proposal was founded on the principle that no single country in Europe should be able to dominate the continent by force of arms, or by the threat of the use of force. Thus, a sufficiency rule was presented which proposed that no State be allowed to possess more than 30 per cent of the total numbers of equipment remaining in Europe after reductions to proposed ceilings were completed. For example, of the 40,000 tanks allowed in Europe, no State could possess more than 30 per cent, or 12,000. The same principle applied for armoured troop-carriers and artillery. Warsaw Treaty States also agreed to work on the basis of the sufficiency rule, although in all cases they suggested higher percentages for the sufficiency rule—for the three categories, between 32 and 35 per cent.

Since the desired outcome in Europe also related to the freedom and independence of individual States and enhanced stability in the region, the *third element* of the Western approach suggested that no State should be allowed to station more than 3,200 tanks, 6,000 armoured troop-carriers or 1,700 artillery pieces outside its borders on the territory of another State in Europe. The reaction of the Warsaw Treaty States to this element of the Western proposal was also essentially positive, although they initially suggested higher figures in all three categories.

A *fourth element* of the Western approach was to establish parity between the two groups of States, that is, between the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. For example, this meant that the seven members of WTO could possess, after all reductions were made, 20,000 tanks, and the 16 members of NATO would likewise possess 20,000 tanks.

The principle of parity between the two groups of States in Europe was also accepted by States of the Eastern alliance. The division of

Europe into a system of sub-zones was *the fifth element* of the Western approach. The objective of this system of zones was to ensure that there could be no subregional concentration of force which would be threatening or intimidating. The Eastern approach also contained sub-zones, although designed differently than those suggested by NATO members. In principle, then, both groups agreed on the use of sub-zones.

Initially, the most glaring difference in approach between the two groups of States was Warsaw Pact insistence that reductions also be taken in troops, "tactical strike aircraft", and combat helicopters. For its part, the Western Alliance had not included these categories in its initial proposal because of difficulties in definitions and verification. Fifteen years of experience with the data disputes in the Vienna MBFR talks had convinced many that troops were not a verifiable entity. The mobility and speed of aircraft coupled with the diversity of mission and role made aircraft a complex issue for negotiation among the 23 States. Similarly, the diversity and use of helicopters in both military and civilian endeavour (in many cases the same helicopter model used in civilian enterprise is also used for military combat) would make negotiations excessively complicated.

At the initiative of President Bush in May 1989, the Western Alliance expanded its proposal to include reductions to approximately 15 per cent below current NATO levels in both aircraft and helicopters. This expanded proposal included all land-based combat aircraft (the Eastern proposal had limited reductions to a single category of "tactical strike aircraft"). With regard to helicopters, all attack and assault helicopters were to be included. President Bush also proposed a 20 per cent cut in combat manpower in United States stationed forces and a ceiling on United States and Soviet ground and air force troops stationed outside national borders in Europe at approximately 275,000 each. Withdrawn soldiers and airmen on both sides would be demobilised under this proposal. An additional element of the new initiative prompted by President Bush was an acceleration of the timetable for reaching an agreement in CFE. He suggested that such an agreement could be reached within a year's time and implemented in an additional two to three years.

Towards Agreement

As the CFE negotiations have progressed in the Austrian capital, consensus has begun to form around the main elements of the initial

Western proposal as explained above. Of course, there have been modifications as experts have delved into the detail involved in reaching agreed definitions on the equipment to be reduced and destroyed. The tank category, for example, has become more comprehensive to include light tanks as well as main battle tanks and to take into consideration the possibility of future wheeled tanks. Instead of using armoured troop-carriers as a category, consideration is being given to an overall category of armoured combat vehicles with sub-categories of armoured infantry fighting vehicles, armoured personnel carriers, and heavily armed combat vehicles (tracked or wheeled vehicles which are not tanks and do not carry troops but have a large-calibre main gun).

The two sides are close to agreement on the use of designated permanent storage sites in which treaty-limited equipment not in active units, but counted as part of overall ceilings, can be stored. Such sites would be subject to on-site monitoring. Stabilising measures are also being negotiated which would restrict the size and frequency of large military exercises, limit the use of armoured vehicle launched bridges, and regulate the manner in which stored equipment is withdrawn from storage, used and returned. The most difficult issue remains aircraft reductions. The Soviet Union seeks exemptions from reductions for different categories of aircraft. In Moscow's view, land-based naval aircraft, 1,500 air defence aircraft and 1,500 combat-capable trainers should be exempt from agreed ceilings. Such exemptions, in the Western view, are unacceptable and would even require additional aircraft on the Western side to preserve the principle of parity. As noted earlier, the wide range of helicopter types and usage also makes agreement on helicopter reductions problematic.

In February 1990, President Bush proposed more significant cuts in United States and Soviet troops stationed outside national borders in Europe. Instead of overall ceilings of 275,000, as had been proposed in May 1989, President Bush suggested that each side reduce to 195,000 the troops stationed in the Central European Zone, with the United States being allowed an overall total of 225,000 troops stationed in Europe. At the Ottawa ministerial meeting, the Soviet Union accepted this proposal with the stipulation that there be an absolute ceiling of 30,000 imposed on United States troops stationed in Europe outside the Central zone.

Although details remain to be worked out, both sides agree that an extensive exchange of information must set the stage for reductions as well as the verification of compliance with obligations undertaken.

Both sides have proposed rigorous verification measures, which include on-site inspection, aerial inspection, and non-interference with national technical means of verification. Nevertheless, the complexities of obtaining agreement from 23 sovereign, independent States to the details of on-site inspection remains a daunting task. For example, determining the number of on-site inspections any one State must receive is an intricate exercise, which must take into consideration the number of sites on its territory, the number of treaty-limited items, the size of the territory and other factors. This will not be easy. The number of inspections individual States and groups of States are allowed to conduct is similarly complicated, as are the rights of individual inspection teams at the sites to be inspected. The size of the protocol relating to inspection may well exceed that of the basic treaty text, as was the case in the INF Treaty. None the less, there is every reason to expect that a thorough and effective set of verification measures will emerge from the negotiations.

The speed of political transition in Europe has caused some to question the continued usefulness of the Vienna CFE negotiations. As non-Soviet State signatories to the Warsaw Treaty assert their independence and install freely elected democratic governments, it is frequently argued that this political revolution will itself result in the withdrawal of foreign troops from their territories. This may be true, but that is not the issue. What is at stake is effecting an orderly and permanent transition from a divided to an integrated Europe. In CFE, this means creating the legal obligation to *withdraw and destroy* huge numbers of military equipment items. Again, tank numbers are useful for illustrative purposes: between 30,000 and 40,000 tanks will have to be destroyed by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Treaty States in order to reach the agreed ceiling of 20,000 tanks after reductions. Without a negotiated agreement which has the effect of international law, there would be no requirement for destroying equipment once reduced. Moreover, the negotiations are part of the process of creating a new European security system. The CFE outcome will be instrumental in determining the future directions of the NATO alliance as well as the continued existence of the Warsaw Pact. Setting limits on the future military potential of a unified Germany within the stability promised by a continuing European process also falls within the purview of the CFE negotiations. And finally, the CFE negotiations in tandem with the CSCE provides the necessary framework within which the political revolution in Europe can take place. Without such a framework and

the support it offers, realising the aspirations of individual States would be much more difficult.

The Western approach to the CFE negotiations has from the outset been dominated by the search for greater stability. Negotiated arms reductions, if properly carried out and verified, were considered part of the achievement of enhanced stability. Such reductions were not conceived of as an end in themselves. And, even in the face of such a dynamic political revolution, stability—not reductions—should remain the objective. Stability is neither an *a priori* condition nor a single moment in history. Rather, like history itself, stability is a process. Agreement in the CFE negotiations will be part of that process.

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PROSPECTS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE

In March 1989, the 23 member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) commenced negotiations in Vienna on conventional forces in Europe (CFE), which, due to the multiplicity of the interests of individual countries and the complexity of the subject, may claim to be the most ambitious international arms control project in history. From a European point of view the talks are of the utmost importance. If successful, they will result within a few years' time in substantial improvement in the continent's military security system. In the longer term, CFE may even serve as a useful model for resolving military tension in other parts of the world.

While the formal objective of CFE, according to its mandate, "shall be to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, at lower levels... and the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action", the current first phase of the negotiations will not adequately meet requirements for stability. This becomes apparent if we determine what stability really is, and look at the amount of equipment that will remain after agreed arms reductions have been carried out.

In general terms, stability is relative to the degree of improbability of war. For closer analysis, a distinction should be made between two relevant characteristics of stability.

- (a) Political stability prevails if, due to the absence of political antagonism, individual States or alliances do not have any incentive for attaining political goals by military force. This is

apparently the case, for example, in the relationship between the United States and Canada.

- (b) Military stability may exist if opposing States or alliances do not see any prospects for using military power because the risks involved are unacceptable. In other words, military stability prevails if both opponents are sure that neither of them is in a reasonable position to successfully attack the other side, and that this situation cannot change unexpectedly. This presupposes that the opponents will act rationally. However, this cannot be relied upon in crises, and therefore a state of reliable military stability will not be attained as long as political opponents have at their disposal the means for waging war. Consequently, and as a matter of priority, existing offensive capabilities must be eliminated or substantially reduced.

This will not occur to a sufficient extent in the current, first phase of CFE. A minimum of 20,000 battle tanks, 28,000 infantry fighting vehicles, 16,500 artillery pieces, 5,700 combat aircraft, and 1,900 combat helicopters will be left with each alliance in the zone from the Atlantic to the Urals, if the Western proposals are accepted by all parties. Obviously, numerical parities slightly below actual NATO levels would put an end to the traditional conventional superiority of the WTO and bring about more security for the West. However, while remaining potentials may be regarded as sufficient for defence by both sides, the forces left will be equally capable of initiating and perhaps winning a war of aggression.

New sources of instability should not be accepted by any of the negotiating parties. Interestingly enough, both sides' opening proposals in March 1989 reflected some agreement in principle that CFE should be continued beyond the current phase. If subsequent talks are really going to take place, the sides should establish a qualitative objective for the entire project, rather than simply negotiate further step-by-step numerical reductions on a percentage basis. This approach would reveal how far they are prepared to advance in the arms control process, and possibly help to overcome remaining misgivings about the real politico-military intentions of the respective opponent. A more precise formula than "to strengthen stability and security..." will therefore be needed. Possibly, "sufficient defence" could be a useful label for describing the best possible outcome of an extended CFE process. But, besides a vague idea that sufficient defence is related to a state of military security at low levels of armaments, there is no common perception of the

substantial content of this concept. This becomes apparent when one compares its role in Eastern and Western military thinking.

Sufficient Defence: A Problem of Definition

Aspects of the Current Debate

Ever since Mikhail Gorbachev, in his political report to the 27th Party Congress in February 1986, first formally declared that the USSR stood for limiting military potentials to reasonable sufficiency, a lively debate on this term has been observed in the WTO, and particularly in the Soviet Union. While the former General Secretary failed to explain the exact meaning of reasonable sufficiency in the context of a defensive Soviet military doctrine, the discussions of the last two years have revealed different perceptions by different authors of the related crucial questions: How much is enough for what purpose? Or, to put it more precisely: What numbers and characteristics must the forces have to be considered sufficient for the implementation of what kind of defence concept?

With regard to numbers. Eastern experts' views range from below parity to more than parity with NATO forces at, however, generally lower levels than currently given. Proposals are not usually made in absolute numbers. With regard to qualitative aspects, several authors—mostly civilian—favour the concept of “defensive defence” or “non-offensive defence”, which would be restricted to WTO territory. Other writers, mostly from the military, appear to be less willing to renounce the capabilities needed to support major offensive or counter-offensive options. This reflects the traditional debate on the merits of mobile versus more static defence postures and, in particular, on the role of operational and tactical counter-offensive action in strategic defence.

Western authors dealing explicitly with sufficient defence restrict themselves predominantly to the analysis of the Eastern debate. This does not mean that the subject is anathema in Western strategic thinking. NATO has always been a strictly defensive alliance, challenged to respond to the WTO's superiority in Europe by relying on the minimum military power required for preventing war and granting security to its member States. In substance and intent, this is nothing other than a principle of sufficient defence. So it can be said that the new subject of debate in the WTO is a familiar problem for NATO.

However, there is no agreement on the numbers and characteristics of military forces needed for implementing NATO security policy in the West either. General dissent between official alliance positions and

mostly unofficial experts has been reflected in an alliance-wide debate on "alternative" modes of defence. Moreover, dissent exists between different proponents of "alternative defence" concepts. This is revealed by the various notions brought into the debate, i.a., "social", "defensive", "non-offensive", or "non-provocative" defence, and "structural incapacity for attack". As with the discussion in the Soviet Union, the role of counter-offensive action in a defensive strategy has been at the core of the Western debate.

The term "sufficient defence" is not found in the mandate of the Vienna CFE talks, and the formal aim set for the negotiations is at best a careful approximation of what sufficiency for defence may mean. Besides, different views are revealed by the opening proposals of the two sides. On the one hand, WTO countries call for deep cuts and keeping forces and systems necessary solely for defence and insufficient to launch surprise attack or conduct offensive operations. On the other, NATO countries propose establishing a situation in which surprise attack and large-scale offensive action are no longer credible options and, i.a., suggest "sufficiency" rules for limits on weapons which may be held by individual countries within the zone of the talks.

Clearly enough, "sufficient defence" is a dynamic notion. Different conceptions of the nature, goals, and appropriate modes of defence will give rise to different interpretations. Furthermore, the military strength and probable options of a potential aggressor are decisive factors. Last but not least, the perception of how much may be sufficient under specific conditions is judged in a subjective rather than impartial way. The same is true for "reasonable sufficiency", as used by several Eastern authors. A more precise notion should be introduced. Wojciech Multan's formula "minimum defence sufficiency" may point in the right direction because it emphasises the effort to achieve the lowest possible levels of armament.

Despite remaining deficiencies, minimum sufficient defence may be the best objective to achieve in future stages of the CFE talks. However, if all parties are to adopt the concept of minimum sufficiency, agreement must be achieved on (a) the content and (b) the means of translating minimum sufficient defence into force strengths and structures.

This sets the stage for the considerations that follow, which are intended to provide possible answers to these problems. In particular, four questions will have to be dealt with:

(a) What indeed is defence? (b) What may be an acceptable definition of "minimum sufficient defence"? (c) Can minimum sufficient defence

be achieved through arms reductions? and, if not, (d) What measures are necessary for realising minimum sufficient defence postures?

On the Nature and Modes of Defence

Both NATO and the WTO claim to have always relied on defence. If the aim of defence is understood to be the preservation of the existing situation, then the fact is striking that in the arsenals of both sides mechanised combat ground forces and large numbers of attack aircraft and far-ranging missile and artillery forces suited to seizing ground or hitting targets on the opponent's territory predominate. This is the intrinsic problem in Europe, which has always been of concern to both alliances. For the West, the vast superiority of the WTO's conventional potentials clearly exceeds defence requirements, and their high state of readiness and peacetime concentration close to NATO's Eastern borders are perceived as particularly alarming. While NATO's defence planning never reflected any intention to seize WTO territory, the WTO's traditional offensive military-technical strategy aimed at victory by destroying the Western alliance's military potentials on NATO soil, thereby casting some doubt on the allegedly defensive nature of Eastern military doctrine. Obviously, the definition of defence can be disputed, but if both sides wish to achieve a future state of mutual security, there is an urgent need to synchronise clearly defensive intentions and operational capabilities. This point was made by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany in his address to an East-West seminar on military doctrines, held in June 1989 at the Foundation for Science and Politics in Ebenhausen, the Federal Republic. On that occasion he made the following claim:

"The defensive character of an alliance does not solely result from a political-declaratory negation of military aggression. Confirmation of non-aggression and pledges of non-use alone offer no adequate assurance of security and stability. The defensive character of an alliance must be underlined by the defensive orientation of its military-strategic concepts. It must affect the operational, the strategic and the military-technical levels of the armed forces....There must be no discrepancy between defence policy rhetoric on the one hand, and actual force structures and strategic employment concepts on the other hand."

But, first of all, agreement must be achieved on the fundamentals of defence. What really is defence, as opposed to offence? Carl von Clausewitz, the great German nineteenth century military thinker, was quite clear on the subject:

“What is the nature of defence? To repulse a thrust. And what is its criterion? To await this thrust. Consequently, this criterion turns any action into a defensive one, and by this criterion alone defence may be separated from offence in war.”

There is probably no better description of the difference between defence and offence, which, for Clausewitz, were but two different forms of combat with the common goal of gaining victory by annihilating the invading enemy force. His definition should be accepted by all parties engaged in the CFE talks as the first and fundamental principle of truly defensive doctrines and strategies. Likewise it can also be adopted elsewhere in the world. Any resort to initial military action beyond political borders, including preemptive or preventive measures in acute states of tension, would be ruled out as deliberate options. But, the problem with doctrines and strategies is that they may be of only declaratory value or may be subject to rapid change as long as military means are available for waging war. Also, the principle of awaiting the enemy's thrust does not by itself limit the size and quality of potentials required, and does not, therefore, exclude any of the possible ways of conducting defence on the operational and tactical levels.

However, if stability and security are at stake, the operational modes of defence adopted by opponents are more important than their military doctrines. The modes may be threatening or not, and they may contribute to stability or give rise to perceptions of instability. Again one can learn from Clausewitz, who distinguished between four options of the defender:

- (a) To attack the enemy immediately at the outset of his penetration into the theatre of war;
- (b) To occupy positions close to the border, and to attack the invader upon his arrival in front of those positions;
- (c) To conduct genuine defence operations from close-to-border positions, including counter-attack actions;
- (d) To withdraw from the border and to initiate final resistance in the central parts of the country.

For Clausewitz, defence was, other things being equal, the stronger form of combat. Consequently, he favoured option (d) in which the aggressor would be subject to attrition before encountering maximum opposition by the defender.

For this analysis, Clausewitz's options may be translated into modern experience. A combination of options (a) and (b) can be found in the traditional offensive defence concept of the WTO. This called for reliably superior potentials suited to invading the opponent's territory and overcoming any resistance. However, the very existence of superior offensive capacities must be perceived by the weaker side as threatening, and will certainly not support the cause of stability. Offensive defence concepts cannot, therefore, be allowed to guide either of the opposing parties. Apparently this is now being recognised by the WTO countries, which claim they are about to modify their operational defence concepts, stressing their defensive character.

Option (c) may be recognised in NATO's forward defence concept. This is a purely defensive principle. NATO has plans neither for launching preemptive or preventive strikes nor for occupying an aggressor's territory, and it is prepared to fight on its own soil. Forward defence aims at limiting damage to alliance countries and populations, and at denying easy success to the attacker and avoiding any but temporary and tolerable losses of terrain. This requires conventional means and procedures appropriate for initiating cohesive and close-to-border defensive operations immediately at the outset of aggression, for compelling the attacker to cease aggression and to withdraw, and for regaining lost territories by counter-attack operations in order to re-establish the *status quo ante*. Early termination of war is another essential of NATO's strategy. If this cannot be achieved by conventional forward defence, the alliance is prepared for deliberate nuclear escalation.

For the Western alliance, lacking as it does sufficient space for mobile defensive operations in depth and being dependent on indigenous industrial and personnel resources as well as on public support of its defence efforts, there is probably no better choice than forward defence. If effectively implemented, the benefit of this concept is threefold: (a) it contributes to deterrence and prevention of war; (b) it may guarantee maximum security of the defender in case of war; and (c) it does not compromise anyone except the aggressor.

Therefore, as long as vital political opposition continues to be the determinant factor in inter-alliance or interstate relations, forward defence may be a useful concept not only for NATO but also for the WTO, and for any country.

Clausewitz's option (d) comes close to area defence concepts recently developed by Western alternative defence proponents. The idea is to trade time and space for earlier success, to utilise the entire territory to

be defended or large parts of it for exposing the invading force to continuous attrition, and to submit the aggressor to growing difficulties resulting from extended lines of communication. This was a useful strategy of Russia in the Napoleonic war, and for the Soviet Union in the Second World War. From a purely war-fighting point of view, it might be an appropriate concept for future wars also, but for the following political and military reasons it is unacceptable to the West.

First, the adoption of an area or in-depth defence concept would probably not support the Western security policy directed at preventing war. On the contrary, it might be regarded as inviting rather than deterring an opponent's decision to wage war because reasonable prospects of territorial gains would remain.

Secondly, such an area defence concept would not meet any of the requirements of forward defence.

Thirdly, under contemporary conditions of technological progress, the geographical area available to NATO (in Central Europe the distance from the German Democratic Republic to the Strait of Dover does not exceed 600 kilometres) is simply not deep enough for effectively impeding an aggressor's capability to control the battle and to guarantee continuous combat and logistics support according to plan.

In summary, four conclusions regarding the fundamentals of defence apply:

- (a) On the politico-strategic level, the criterion of defence is to await aggression;
- (b) On the strategic-operational level, a forward defence concept appears to be a solution acceptable to any alliance or State;
- (c) On the operational-tactical level, defensive and (counter-) offensive actions will continue to be elements of the defensive battle;
- (d) Force strengths and structures of alliances and States must be tailored in such a way as to render feasible implementation of conclusions (b) and (c), while simultaneously reducing the risks of deliberate violation of conclusion (a).

A Possible Definition

The fourth point is crucial, but problematic. The core issue is how to bring about an appropriate mix of offensive and non-offensive elements in stability-oriented defensive force postures. The specific problem is: How can capabilities for initiating aggression be eliminated

or substantially reduced without simultaneously compromising effective defence, which, in a forward defence concept, must rely on counter-offensive capabilities?

A key to harmonising these apparently antagonistic goals has been repeatedly presented by, among others, Andrei A. Kokoshin, Deputy Director of the Soviet Institute for United States and Canadian Affairs, in Moscow.

“In other words, WTO defensive capabilities must decisively exceed NATO’s offensive capabilities, while NATO’s defensive capabilities must decisively exceed WTO offensive capabilities. This would finally lead to a situation in which both sides’ defence would be superior to their offence.”

This is a perfect description of the principle of mutual superiority of defence, which is intended to bring about ideal military conditions in Europe, but is potentially applicable to other regions as well.

The following may be concluded provisionally from the previous analysis: minimum sufficient defence is based on forward defence concepts adopted by both of two opposing alliances or States, and is brought into effect at the lowest possible levels of military potentials; the latter are organised in such a way as to ensure mutual superiority of defence.

How to Achieve Minimum Sufficient Defence

The Flaws of an Arms Reductions Approach

Arms reductions may result either in asymmetries at lower levels or in numerical parities that put an end to previously prevailing asymmetries. The latter is the main issue in the current, first phase of the Vienna CFE negotiations, and this is one of the most important differences between the CFE talks and the mutual and balanced force reduction talks (that died unmourned in February 1989, after 15 years of unsuccessful effort). Asymmetrical arms reductions aiming at numerical parities have always been requested by the Western alliance. It is to the credit of Mr. Gorbachev that the East’s traditional demand for equal reductions was finally abandoned—a demand that would have resulted in consolidation of existing disparities and that was put forward for the last time in the WTO’s Budapest appeal of June 1986. But, what is the advantage of numerical parities if, as in CFE, stability is at stake? At first glance the establishment of numerical parities of offensive means may appear to be an adequate solution, but closer analysis reveals two major deficiencies in this approach.

First, history shows that force ratios do not necessarily determine the outcome of military engagements. This was already recognised by Sun Tzu, the classical Chinese author of the fourth century B.C., who postulated that “in war, numbers alone confer no advantage. Do not advance relying on sheer military power.” In fact, the high resolve of political leaders and military commanders, favourable structures and deployment of forces, superior leadership qualities, a lead in combat preparedness, or resolute use of surprise and initiative are often decisive factors, and may even help inferior forces to gain victory in battles or in war. Among many other events, Hannibal’s triumph during the Battle of Cannae in 216 B.C., the German *Wehrmacht*’s victory against France in 1940, and Israel’s war of 1967 have proved that numerical superiority is no guarantee of military success. But, if a conventional war of aggression can be initiated and won by the inferior side, then it is all the more true that numerical parity is no reliable basis for stability as long as one or both opponents maintain the means to launch an attack. Under conditions of political hostility and acute military tension, there may even be no situation less stable. In fact, the calibre of available forces is as important as their numbers, perhaps even more so.

Secondly, while the level of parity between two opponents would not in principle invalidate the option of initiating war, it might severely affect forward defence. This is due to the fact that the minimum of forces necessary for implementing this concept depends not solely on the strength of the potential aggressor but, to a considerable extent, on the length of the territory to be defended. For instance, cohesive forward defence of the 900-kilometre-long Central European front line between the Baltic and the Danube may not be feasible with fewer than 30 to 35 mechanised divisions of the traditional type. On the other hand, the availability of 30 to 35 mechanised divisions on each side would be regarded by both as a source of instability and insecurity.

The conflict between the goal of achieving incapacity for aggression through deep cuts in offensive potentials and that of maintaining the levels of forces required for forward defence cannot be resolved solely through arms reductions. Eliminating existing disparities of offensive potentials is therefore a useful security-oriented step and clearly to the benefit of the weaker side, but not a conclusive remedy for the fundamental stability problem. The flaws of a purely parity-oriented arms control approach have been recognised by the CFE participants. Besides arms reductions, confidence-building and “stabilising” measures are on the negotiation list, with the latter comprising primarily restrictions

on deployment and on states of readiness of offense-oriented armaments. These provisions are suitable for increasing warning time and thus for severely reducing or even eliminating surprise attack capabilities. However, while violations may not occur unobserved, stabilising measures are rather easily reversed in fairly short periods of time and will therefore not eliminate the capability to launch aggression.

Characteristics of a Solution

What is necessary is agreement on, and realisation of, force structures which comply with the demand for mutual superiority of defence and which cannot be reversed in acute states of tension. Since it is obvious that a quantitative parity-oriented arms control approach cannot adequately satisfy both demands, a qualitative approach should be applied in addition, aiming at restructuring the armed forces in such a way as to give them an invariably defensive character. Such structures would comprise two discernible components:

- (a) Strong defence-oriented components best suited for retaining terrain but unsuited for operational offensive action, and clearly exceeding the remaining offensive capacities of the opponent without exceeding the minimum required for implementing forward defence;
- (b) Relatively weak offence-oriented counter-attack elements limited to minimum levels sufficient for supporting forward defence, but insufficient for aggression.

The crucial problem remaining is the conversion of the theoretical approach into military posture. Obviously, while any weapon may be used offensively the same is true for any military formation. Non-offensiveness is, therefore, plainly utopian. What may be achieved at best is some approximation to non-offensiveness, by eliminating capabilities for launching rapid and far-ranging thrusts. Based on the assumption that weapons may be either more offensive or more defensive, the selected weapons mix is of decisive significance.

Ground Forces

Defence-oriented light elements would be used to initiate defensive operations close to the borders immediately at the outset of aggression and to impose maximum attrition upon the invader by fire. Since these forces are to be unsuited for offensive operational action, armour and mobility must be restricted. Therefore, light forces should be composed predominantly of barrier engineering, light anti-tank and non-armoured

infantry units, in this order of priority. Artillery and anti-tank helicopter units would be required, in addition to some mechanised elements which are indispensable for effective defence. While the number of major light units (e.g., divisions), armoured combat vehicles, artillery pieces and anti-tank helicopters should be negotiated between opponents and limited according to the principle of minimum sufficiency for defence, items of typical light equipment (e.g., mines of any kind or portable anti-tank weapons) may be left to the decision of each side, based on specific features of the terrain and individual tactical rules. Absolute numbers cannot be proposed in advance. However, by approximation, one light division might be sufficient for defending a 50-kilometre sector in Europe, and fewer than 200 armoured combat vehicles—corresponding to 27 to 38 per cent of the main battle tanks plus mechanised infantry combat vehicles presently available to mechanised divisions in West and East—well distributed between the various levels of command might suffice to provide each light division with the minimum of tactical flexibility required in combat.

The counter-offensive components indispensable for implementing a forward defence concept may be more easily projected. Their primary mission would be to react as heavy reserve forces aiming at the final destruction of previously reduced elements of the aggressor and at restoring the integrity of the defender's territory by regaining lost terrain. In tactical or operational crises they may be used in blocking operations. They must be capable of rapid cross-country movements, on short notice, by day and night and under enemy fire. They have to rely on fire, mobility and armour, and should therefore correspond to the types of mechanised forces presently available to NATO and the WTO, and to most other armies as well. Ideally, opposing States or alliances should have at their disposal equal numbers of equally sized heavy units, limited to the minimum necessary and sufficient for fulfilling their classical reserve forces' roles.

In order to meet the requirement of mutual superiority of defence, their total strengths should not exceed the fourth part of the ground forces permitted to each opponent. It is certainly difficult to evolve absolute numbers of formations and their main items of equipment without the support of computer war-gaming, but one could tentatively say that one heavy unit disposing of a maximum of 200 main battle tanks and 160 mechanised infantry combat vehicles could be a sufficient reserve force for each 100-kilometre sector of the territory to be defended.

Air Forces

For air forces, arms control objectives should correspond to those applied to ground forces. Since both sides already have at their disposal considerable air defence capabilities, mutual superiority of defensive means and minimum sufficiency for defence may be achieved primarily through reductions of existing offensive air assets. But, what does sufficiency mean for offensive air power?

- (a) If options of surprise attack by ground forces may be ruled out through arms control, there is probably no need for the defender to maintain air attack forces for initial quick reaction;
- (b) The introduction of defence-oriented ground forces in conjunction with deep cuts in offensive systems would significantly reduce the need for direct air support to ground forces in battle;
- (c) Modern air surveillance, target acquisition, data transmission and fire control techniques may allow for transferring traditional close air support and battlefield air interdiction tasks from air to ground forces. However, this does not apply to anti-tank helicopters.
- (d) Depending on the dimension of negotiated ground-force reductions, air interdiction and follow-on-forces attack, as well as the means required for their implementation, may become more or less superfluous.

Obviously, very deep cuts in air power are possible in an extended CFE process. This should even be made a deliberate goal, since offensive air assets may be easily used for surprise offensive action. However, due to their high speed and range, air forces cannot be restricted to specific regions. Since the Super-Powers and other Western countries do have to secure some military out-of-area responsibilities, global aspects will have to be recognised on a selective basis. This will invariably limit prospects for air reductions.

Conclusion

Maybe East and West are about to restrict fundamentally the traditional role of military power as a means for accomplishing political objectives in their inter-alliance relations. Common adoption and realisation of the principles described for minimum sufficiency for defence may help to pave the way for a profound and lasting reform of political relations. This may be achieved even if we accept that armaments

are symptoms rather than sources of the politico-ideological East-West conflict. However, for the time being a state of non-opposition may not be much more than a long-term objective. As long as political antagonism continues to be a determinant factor, nothing like assured conventional military stability can be attained, because non-offensiveness of military potentials is Utopian. This finally raises the issue of nuclear armaments.

Though not explicitly stated previously, one of the fundamental objectives of establishing a conventional minimum sufficiency defence regime for Europe is to reduce the need for early use of nuclear weapons in support of defence purposes. This may indeed be achieved in an extended CFE process. Nevertheless, nuclear weapons will continue to be the most effective stabilising factor for both the Western and the Eastern alliances, and the full range from theatre to strategic nuclear forces will be needed to support the credibility of nuclear deterrence. Reductions of existing nuclear potentials to very low levels of parity are necessary and possible in order to strengthen military stability and security. Here too, a sufficiency rule may apply, certainly not in the sense of sufficiency for defence, but in the sense of sufficiency for war prevention.

CONVENTIONAL PARITY AND CONVENTIONAL STABILITY

Among all aspects of conventional stability in Europe, the most important one is the interrelationship of the following terms: numerical reductions, numerical parity, and conventional stability. The establishment of stability between the two military blocs in Europe is at present considered a priority issue. However, it is necessary to stress that such stability in military relations between modern armies the conventional field, does not simply arise from a quantitative parity. With regard to ways of achieving military stability in Europe, there exists the common attitude of, the two military groups—the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)—that relevant measures could include not only reductions but also limitations, provisions concerning redeployment and related measures, as well as the establishment of equal ceilings applicable to forces and equipment. This notion was formulated by the 23 countries in the mandate for the Vienna negotiations on conventional stability in Europe.

The doctrinal assumptions of both the WTO and the NATO countries, at least those which are publicly reported, do not contain anything

that could be construed as aggressive. They are defensive assumptions. However, as far as the mutual perceptions of States and alliances are concerned, it is the military/technical aspects of military postures, not the political aspects, that represent the critically important source of threat. The image of the enemy is shaped by the overwhelming influence of military doctrines and postures. In the perception of both alliances there has developed a deep-rooted view of a fundamental incompatibility between peaceful political declarations, on the one hand, and the offensive capabilities of their military potentials, on the other.

From the historical point of view, it is necessary to examine the following fundamental questions:

- (a) To what extent are the assumptions held still valid – assumptions dating back to the Second World War and reaffirmed in the post-war period – that offensive operations have the decisive role and that resolute offence alone can assure victory?
- (b) How far are the quantitative and qualitative parameters of armed forces, their structure, deployment, command system, logistics and training still subordinated to the theory of the decisive role of offensive operations?
- (c) To what extent do the principal elements of the notion of “victory” represent aspirations to destroy the enemy on his own territory and to occupy and hold his territory?

The above questions pertain to a problem of fundamental significance for the process of detente in Europe, namely, the readiness of the WTO and the NATO countries to replace the offensive structures of their armed forces and the corresponding content of their respective military doctrines/strategies. Consequences of the theory of the decisive role of offence have been a tendency towards highlighting the offensive means of warfare as well as a sustained aspiration to attain superiority in the means to conduct such combat operations, e.g., numerical superiority of troops and the principal types of weapons. Advances in military technology, in which priority has been given to offensive arms, have only served the purpose of consolidating the view that for victory there is no alternative to offensive operations. The process of the development of offensive capabilities of military potential, accompanied by declarations by both sides of peaceful intentions, only accelerates the arms race and increases the mutual sense of threat.

The functional dimension of the problem of the impact of conventional stability on the politico-military context of East-West relations in Europe includes the following aspects:

- *Conventional stability and crisis stability.* Crisis situations constitute the most credible, albeit most dangerous, test of the true character of the military postures of armed forces. Armed forces offer stability in crisis situations if they are structured in ways that do not encourage early resort to military means and do not unnecessarily precipitate mobilisation. One should also mention in this connection certain confidence- and security-building measures, for instance, zones of limited or dispersed armaments, which have the effect of prolonging the time of military preparations.
- *Conventional stability and stabilisation of the dynamics of armaments.* Military potential should be developed in such a way as not to generate stimuli for an arms race. This can be accomplished provided both sides predicate their conventional capabilities on the principles of defensive defence and reasonable sufficiency. One of the integral elements of the process leading towards conventional stability should be the institution of effective constraints on the development of new conventional technologies.
- *Military doctrines/strategies and conventional stability in Europe.* The starting-point in discussions of a prospective model of military stability in Europe should be the assessment of the military options that prevail in a given area, taking into consideration especially those elements which account for asymmetry in such options. Such an assessment, particularly in Central Europe, will be a difficult task, given the requirement that any assessment of military options must resolve the key question—whom and what to count? Should one count, for instance, the existing armed forces alone, with due reflection of plans for their operational use, or should one also count reinforcements envisaged for Central Europe? To what extent and according to what criteria should one take into account such elements as level of training, quality of equipment and weapons, combat readiness, and the diverse elements of allied credibility, to mention just a few of the most typical characteristics of military strength of a given State or alliance? The establishment of certain general criteria for WTO and NATO military options assessment is, therefore, a particularly critical—albeit complicated—problem.

The attainment of a credible military stability calls for comprehensive action covering three basic spheres: the evolution of military doctrines/

strategies of a strictly defensive character; deep quantitative reductions to eliminate asymmetries; and thorough modifications of the structure of armed forces. The end result of such action should be the elimination of capabilities for surprise attack and for the conduct of large-scale offensive operations. The evolution of the military-technical components of military doctrines/strategies will play a key role in the process of attaining military stability.

The military/technical dimension of the problem concerns, in the first place, the relationship between offensive and defensive elements of military potential, the role of counter-attack and counter-offensive potentials in the defensive doctrines and strategy, and, finally, the relationship between balance, parity and stability.

The problem of the relationship between offensive and defensive elements is the most critical dilemma of defensive postures. The defensive character of a military posture cannot preclude the development by a given State or alliance of a counter-attack or counter-offensive capability. Those capacities can be pursued within the framework of defence. The only open issue is the problem of determining what offensive potential would not be incompatible with defensive doctrine. First of all, such a potential must not give rise to the concern of other States that there exists a possibility of aggression on the part of the given State or alliance. As far as conventional forces are concerned, the offensive character of military potential may be determined not only by quantitative ceilings and the qualitative parameters of weapons, but also by deployment, structure, logistics, command system and reserves. The distinction between defensive and offensive strategy as well as between defensive and offensive potential can be made at the operational and strategic level, but not at the tactical one.

The prevailing numerical relationship of forces of the two politico-military groupings in Europe has been one of balance in the sense that neither side can count on gaining a preponderance that could guarantee winning a war. However, despite the general balance of forces, the military situation obtaining in Europe cannot possibly be characterised as one of stability. The principal reason for the lack of military stability in Europe is the asymmetry in military options that is deep-rooted in the respective perceptions of the two sides. In both official pronouncements and relevant professional literature on the subject, there is an oft-repeated view that the prevailing relationship between the approximate military potentials of the two alliances confirms the theory that military stability in general, and conventional stability in

particular, is not functionally identical with numerical balance or parity. The numerical relationship of forces can in no case be the only, nor even the principal, criterion of the degree of stability. The urgent need to depart from numerical comparison, as the key premise of conventional stability, is now fully appreciated by the politico-military leadership circles of both alliances.

The necessity of bringing about structural changes of military potentials to make them more defensive—as yet another important premise of such stability—is also being increasingly recognised. Mutual readiness of the two sides to seek accommodation and give up offensive options is, therefore, a fundamental pre-condition for effective negotiations to elaborate a prospective model of conventional stability. Such stability, based on reduced total potentials, but including developed defensive structures, should be the most sought-after goal in the efforts of the two politico-military groupings in Europe. One should underline here the pressing need for doctrinal and structural change on both sides because unilateral steps are clearly insufficient. Radical reductions, removal of the existing disproportions and asymmetries, and structural and doctrinal modifications should result in eliminating the capacity for surprise attack on both sides and their respective abilities to conduct large-scale offensive operations. Structural incapacity for surprise attack and for large-scale offensive operations appears, therefore, to represent the basic element of conventional stability.

The desirable, broad interpretation of the term “structural incapacity for attack” could include the following criteria:

- Incapacity for offensive operations, i.e., invasion of the enemy’s territory and seizure thereof;
- Incapacity for counter-attack aimed at the seizure of the enemy’s territory;
- Incapacity for deep strikes into the enemy’s territory even if there is no intention to seize the territory.

In the narrow sense, structural incapacity for attack means the possession by both sides of capabilities that serve the objectives of military dissuasion and sufficient defence and whose organisation, structure, weaponry, doctrines and deployment preclude the possibility of launching surprise attacks and the pursuit of offensive operations.

Such a concept of structural incapacity for attack is the crux of the Jaruzelski plan.

Modifications to WTO military doctrines and strategy should aim at preventing war by achieving the lowest level of forces sufficient for defence. To attain this objective it is necessary to carry through a radical reconstruction of traditional strategy, operational plans and tactics. According to WTO declarations and the relevant literature, “reliable defence” or “reasonable sufficiency” mean the minimum number of the highest-quality armed forces and armaments necessary for reliably ensuring a country’s defence. It would seem that “defensive sufficiency” can be defined as presupposing:

- (a) The commitment of each side not to be the first to launch an attack;
- (b) The harmonisation of structures of armed forces, groupings and deployments with the task of defence;
- (c) The reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons to a level at which neither side would be capable of launching offensive action, while ensuring a reliable defence;
- (d) A strict monitoring of the reduction of armed forces and weapons as well as of the military actions of the two sides.

As unilateral implementation of the principle of defensive sufficiency forces is practically impossible, such sufficiency must, therefore, be based on a mutual process and depend on the nature of the military threat.

One could add the following four specific elements compatible with the principle of defensive sufficiency:

- (a) A non-offensive structure of the armed forces;
- (b) Upper limits on offensive systems;
- (c) Deployment changes with a view to fulfilling strictly defensive tasks;
- (d) Changes in the mobilisation systems and a reduced arms production output.

The adoption by both alliances of the principle of reasonable sufficiency, even with differences of interpretation, would certainly have far-reaching consequences for the content of military doctrine itself, for strategic, operational and tactical assumptions, and for the size, quality and structure of military potentials. The adoption of the principle of sufficiency must result, above all, in a substantive revision of the interpretation of the term “victory”, that is to say, in abandoning

any attempt to destroy the enemy on his own territory and to occupy that territory as well as in confining the objectives of counter-attack to the restoration of the *status quo ante*. Such an interpretation of the notion "victory" would be the direct consequence of depriving the military potentials of both alliances of their capabilities to launch attacks against enemy territory, even if there was no intention to occupy and hold that territory.

The problem of the evolution of military doctrines towards a strictly defensive mode is undoubtedly bound to become one of the most significant elements in the process of lowering the level and changing the structure of military confrontation in Europe. The development of full compatibility between the peaceful, defensive character of political aspects of the military doctrines, on the one hand, and all the military-technical elements of the military doctrines of the two alliances, on the other, has now become one of the fundamental conditions of demilitarising East-West relations.

Among the many important aspects of the interrelationship of conventional stability and emerging conventional technologies, two seem to stand out as especially important. The first one relates to the question of the interrelationship of military stability and transarmament-disarmament. The second one relates to the more detailed question of the consideration of specific new technologies as suitable for either offensive or defensive use.

Some critics of the idea of non-offensive posture put on record different objections alleging that the authors of this idea place too much emphasis on transarmament and do not link it with the achievement of arms reduction. Such objections draw attention, first of all, to the fact that in the process of transarmament the quantity of offensive arms would decrease but the numbers of defensive ones would significantly increase. In fact, what would happen would be that, with one system of weapons being replaced by another system, the intensity of the arms race would stay unchanged.

In connection with this, the theoretically most likely situation, one could legitimately ask whether it is indeed necessary for defensive postures in the future to be based upon existing conventional weaponry selectively reduced or whether they should rather be based on emerging conventional technologies. In the view of this author, the issue of the relative significance of new technologies should not be unduly exaggerated in the context of the adoption of purely defensive postures

by the two military blocs. Technology must clearly take second place to deep reductions and the restructuring of armed forces, as many of the existing systems can be effectively used also in non-offensive postures. The WTO countries consider that disarmament offers the most direct route towards implementing the concept of defensiveness, without calling for far-reaching conversion and modernisation plans. Defensiveness is not a concept necessarily associated with any specific weapons, but rather one that must be viewed in the context of the comprehensive defence system of a State, including military doctrine/strategy, kind of military training and deployment, numerical level and structure of forces. If the declared purpose of a change in the existing, more or less offensive, military postures is to establish a mutually agreed defensive posture on both sides, then it is necessary to achieve gradual reductions directed above all at the offensive capabilities of the respective forces, while leaving intact their existing defensive elements.

The present discussion in Europe on desirable transformations in the military realm of security concentrates on the following two problems of key importance to any model of defensive defence:

- (a) Should a model of defensive defence be developed by States engaged in their unilateral pursuits or should it emerge from negotiations?
- (b) What is the strictly military realm of structural incapacity for attack, i.e. what are the military criteria for defensive sufficiency?

The view, until very recently predominant in both official pronouncements and opinions aired by researchers—that disarmament measures must be negotiated has been markedly altered mainly as a result of political decisions made by some countries to unilaterally reduce and restructure their military potentials. However, the position has been maintained that while unilateral measures are possible and necessary, they are not sufficient for the purpose of achieving the major objectives. It is quite natural that there has been an exchange of opinions, in which the military has played a special role, on how far the unilateral measures can go without upsetting defensive effectiveness. One of the points raised in the course of such debates is that arrival at a certain stage in reductions and restructuring is going to entail the need for the two sides to co-operate in promoting disarmament projects, including negotiations, for it is only through bilateral actions that the defensive may be distinguished from the offensive. Only such sizes and structures of military potentials as are seen as defensive by both the WTO and

NATO will be genuinely defensive. It will, therefore, be imperative to work out common criteria for the assessment of military options and potentials. This holds true also for the principle of reasonable defensive sufficiency.

There is no other way to effect profound alterations in existing threat assessments than to abandon the perception of military potentials as threat elements. A related aspect is the proper appreciation of the impact that each bloc's perceptions of the other's strength and military options have upon armaments policies and the evaluation of the role that changes in the structure of forces and weaponry will play in achieving the desired political effect, i.e., a substantial reduction of the level of military confrontation. The crux of all these approaches is the relationship between the so-called non-provocative nature of the structure of forces, their deployment and weaponry, on the one hand, and the capacity for curbing the arms race and preventing crises from developing into major armed conflicts in Europe, on the other.

The socialist States are now well aware that the establishment of mutual structural defensiveness represents a basic prerequisite for progress in demilitarising East-West relations. The demilitarisation and related democratisation of overall international relations will pave the way for a revision of the philosophies governing the activities of the military-political blocs, a revision entailing a re-interpretation of their objectives, structures, etc. This is a likely scenario of future developments following the establishment of defensive structures in the military potentials in Europe.

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**DOCUMENTS OF THE JOINT EXTRAORDINARY
CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES
TO THE CFE TREATY**

1. Upon the request of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic a joint Extraordinary Conference was convened in Vienna on February 5, 1993, pursuant to Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 and Section VII, paragraph 4, of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of July 10, 1992.

2. At the joint Extraordinary Conference:

- (a) The States Parties agreed on the Document of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and its Annexes, as attached to this document; and
- (b) The participating States adopted the Document of the participating States of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and its Annex, as attached to this document.

3. The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands will circulate this document, together with the attached Documents and their Annexes, in all the official languages of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to all States Parties of the Treaty and participating States of the Concluding Act.

Vienna:

February 5, 1993

Document of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada,

the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which are the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties,

Committed to meeting the objectives and requirements of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as (he Treaty, while responding to the historic changes which have occurred in Europe since the Treaty was signed,

Recalling in this context the undertaking in paragraph 4 of the Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, to maintain only such military capabilities as are necessary to prevent war and provide for effective defence and to bear in mind the relationship between military capabilities and doctrines, and confirming their commitment to that undertaking,

Having met together at a joint Extraordinary Conference chaired by the Hellenic Republic in Vienna on February 5, 1993, pursuant to Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty and Section VII, paragraph 4, of the Concluding Act,

Have agreed as follows:

1. The understandings, notifications, confirmations and commitments contained or referred to in this Document and its Annexes shall be deemed as fulfilling the requirements necessary in order for the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic fully to exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations as set forth in the Treaty and its associated documents.
2. In this context, the States Parties note the Agreement Between the Government of the Czech Republic and the Government of the Slovak Republic, of January 12, 1993, on the Principles and Procedures for Implementing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Protocols to that Agreement, as transmitted on January

20, 1993 by the Czech Republic to all States Parties to the Treaty. In this regard, Articles I, II (paragraph 2), III (paragraphs 1-3), and Articles IV-VII of that Agreement, the Protocol on Maximum Levels for Holdings of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, the Protocol concerning Armoured Vehicle Launched judges in Active Units, the Protocol on Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty Designated for Conversion for Non-Military Purposes, and the Protocol on Active and Passive Declared Site Inspection Quotas for the First Phase of the Reduction Period to that Agreement, and paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Protocol on the Reduction Liability to that Agreement contain necessary confirmations, information, and commitments.

3. The States Parties note the notifications by the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic listed in the Annex to this Document on Notifications Related to the Treaty.
4. The States Parties confirm the understandings specified in the Annex to this Document on Understandings Related to the Treaty.
5. The States Parties confirm all decisions and recommendations adopted by the Joint Consultative Group related to the Treaty.
6. This Document in no way alters the rights and obligations of the States Parties as set forth in the Treaty and its associated documents.
7. This Document shall enter into force upon signature by all the States Parties.
8. This Document, together with its Annexes, which are integral to it, in all the official languages of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, shall be deposited with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as the designated Depositary for the Treaty, which shall circulate true copies of this Document to all the States Parties.

Annex on Notifications Related to the Treaty

A. The States Parties note the following notifications from the Czech Republic as transmitted on January 29, 1993:

1. Maximum level for holdings of conventional armament and equipment limited by the Treaty;

2. Reduction liability in the categories of conventional armament and equipment limited by the Treaty;
3. Number of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles designated for conversion for non-military purposes;
4. List of the points of entry/exit;
5. Lists of inspectors and transport crew members;
6. Diplomatic clearance number;
7. Official languages;
8. Passive inspection quota for the first year of reduction period;
9. Active inspection quota for the first year of reduction period (revised February 1, 1993);
10. Counting of the aircraft destroyed by accident;
11. Armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty and retained outside the territory of the Czech Republic (revised February 1, 1993);
12. List of reduction sites of the Czech Republic;
13. Aggregate number of armament and equipment limited by the Treaty used exclusively for purpose of research and development;
14. Number of armament and equipment limited by the Treaty awaiting export/re-export; and
15. Number and types of conventional armament and equipment removed from service and reduced during previous 12 months.

The States Parties also note that, by its Note Verbale of January 29, 1993, the Czech Republic informed "all Delegations to the Joint Consultative Group that the data of Ministry of Defence, General Staff, Military Command West, Military Command Middle and of all the formations and units subordinated to them contained in the Exchange of Information submitted by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic on December 15, 1992 are valid for Armed Forces of the Czech Republic until superseded by a subsequent exchange of information of the Czech Republic."

B. The States Parties note the following notifications from the Slovak Republic as transmitted on January 29, 1993 (1-11) and February 4, 1993 (12 and 13):

1. Maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment and numbers of national personnel limits limited by the Treaty (revised February 2, 1993);

2. Reduction liability in the categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty (revised February 2, 1993);
3. Number of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles designated for conversion for non-military purposes;
4. List of the points of entry/exit into and out of the territory of the Slovak Republic (revised February 2, 1993);
5. List of inspectors;
6. Standing diplomatic clearance number;
7. Official languages;
8. Passive inspection quota for the first year of reduction period;
9. Active inspection quota for the first year of reduction period (revised February 2, 1993);
10. Numbers of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty awaiting export/re-export and retained outside the territory of the Slovak Republic (revised February 2, 1993);
11. Numbers and types of conventional armaments and equipment renewed from service and reduced during previous 12 months;
12. Aggregate number of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty used exclusively for the purpose of research and development; and
13. Numbers of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty and retained outside the territory of the Slovak Republic.

The States Parties also note that, by its Note Verbale of January 29, 1993, the Slovak Republic informed all Delegations to the Joint Consultative Group that the data of Military Command East and of all formations and units subordinated to it contained in the Exchange of Information submitted by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic on December 15, 1992 are valid for Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic until next exchange of information of the Slovak Republic in March 1993."

Annex on Understandings Related to the Treaty

1. The first paragraph of the Preamble of the Treaty shall be understood to read:

"the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French

Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties,".

2. The "groups of States Parties" referred to in paragraph 1(A) of Article II of the Treaty shall be understood to consist of:

"the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, and Ukraine."

and

"the Kingdom of Belgium, Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America."

3. In Article IV of the Treaty:

—the first sentence of paragraph 2 shall be understood to read:

"within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, including the Faroe Islands, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Italian Republic, that part of the area of the Republic of Kazakhstan within the area of application, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic including the islands of Azores and Madeira, that part of the Russian Federation comprising the portion of the former Baltic Military District on its territory, the Moscow Military District and the portion of the Volga-Ural Military

District on its territory west of the Ural Mountains, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain including the Canary Islands, that part of the territory of Ukraine comprising the former Carpathian and former Kiev Military Districts and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers do not exceed:"

—the first sentence of paragraph 3 shall be understood to read:

"within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, including the Faroe Islands, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Poland, that part of the Russian Federation comprising the portion of the former Baltic Military District on its territory, the Slovak Republic, that part of the territory of Ukraine comprising the former Carpathian and former Kiev Military Districts and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers in active units do not exceed:"

—the first sentence of paragraph 4 shall be understood to read:

"within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers in active units do not exceed:"

4. In paragraph 11 of the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, and without prejudice to any review by the Joint Consultative Group

of its scale of distribution of expenses in accordance with paragraph 2(F) of Article XVI of the Treaty, the term "2.34% for the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic" shall be understood to read "1.56% for the Czech Republic" and "0.78% for the Slovak Republic."

Document of the Participating States of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which are participating States of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of July 10, 1992, hereinafter referred to as the participating States,

Committed to implementing fully the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of July 10, 1992, hereinafter referred to as the Concluding Act, while responding to the historic changes which have occurred in Europe since the Concluding Act was signed,

Recalling in this context the undertaking in paragraph 4 of the Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, to maintain only such military capabilities as are necessary to prevent war and provide for effective defence and to bear in mind the relationship between military capabilities and doctrines, and confirming their commitment to that undertaking,

Having met together at a joint Extraordinary Conference chaired by the Hellenic Republic in Vienna on February 5, 1993, pursuant to Article XXI paragraph 2 of the Treaty and Section VII, paragraph 4, of the Concluding Act,

Have adopted the following:

1. The understandings, notifications, confirmations and commitments contained or referred to in this Document and in its

Annex fulfill the requirements necessary in order for the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic fully to implement the measures in the Concluding Act.

2. In this context, the participating States note the Agreement Between the Government of the Czech Republic and the Government of the Slovak Republic, of January 12, 1993 on the Principles and Procedures for Implementing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, as transmitted on January 20, 1993 by the Czech Republic to all participating States. In this regard, Article II (paragraph 3) of that Agreement and the Protocol on National Personnel Limits to that Agreement contain necessary confirmations, information, and commitments.
3. The participating States confirm the understandings specified in the Annex to this Document.
4. The participating States confirm all decisions and recommendations adopted by the Joint Consultative Group related to the Concluding Act.
5. This Document in no way alters the measures adopted by the participating States in the Concluding Act.
6. The measures adopted in this Document are politically binding. Accordingly, this Document is not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. This Document will come into effect simultaneously with the entry into force of the Document of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe agreed by the States Parties at the joint Extraordinary Conference on February 5, 1993.
7. The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands will transmit true copies of this Document and its Annex, the original of which is in English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish, to all participating States.

Annex on Understandings Related to the Concluding Act

1. In the first paragraph of the preamble of the Concluding Act, it is understood that the reference to “the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic” is deleted and that “the Czech Republic” and “the Slovak Republic” are added to that list in appropriate alphabetical order.

2. In the list of participating States set forth in Section II, paragraph 1 of the Concluding Act, it is understood that the reference to “the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic” is deleted and that “the Czech Republic” and “the Slovak Republic” are added to that list in appropriate alphabetical order.
3. In the list referenced in paragraph 2 above, it is understood that the Czech Republic has a national personnel limit of 93,333 and the Slovak Republic has a national personnel limit of 46,667.

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**INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION
AGAINST THE ILLICIT MANUFACTURING
OF AND TRAFFICKING IN FIREARMS,
AMMUNITION, EXPLOSIVES, AND OTHER
RELATED MATERIALS***

The States Parties,

Aware of the urgent need to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials, due to the harmful effects of these activities on the security of each State and the region as a whole, endangering the well-being of peoples, their social and economic development, and their right to live in peace;

Concerned by the increase, at the international level, in the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials and by the serious problems resulting therefrom;

Reaffirming that States Parties give priority to preventing, combating, and eradicating the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials because of the links of such activities with drug trafficking, terrorism, transnational organised crime, and mercenary and other criminal activities;

Concerned about the illicit manufacture of explosives from substances and articles that in and of themselves are not explosives—and that are not addressed by this Convention due to their other lawful uses—for activities related to drug trafficking, terrorism, transnational organised crime and mercenary and other criminal activities;

* A/53/78, annex.

Considering the urgent need for all States, and especially those States that produce, export, and import arms, to take the necessary measures to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in fire-arms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials;

Convinced that combating the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials calls for international cooperation, exchange of information, and other appropriate measures at the national, regional, and international levels, and desiring to set a precedent for the international community in this regard;

Stressing the need, in peace processes and post-conflict situations, to achieve effective control of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials in order to prevent their entry into the illicit market;

Mindful of the pertinent resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly on measures to eradicate the illicit transfer of conventional weapons and on the need for all States to guarantee their security, and of the efforts carried out in the framework of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD)

Recognising the importance of strengthening existing international law enforcement support mechanisms such as the International Weapons and Explosives Tracking System (IWETS) of the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL), to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials;

Recognising that international trade in firearms is particularly vulnerable to abuses by criminal elements and that a “know-your-customer” policy for dealers in, and producers, exporters, and importers of, firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials is crucial for combating this scourge;

Recognising that States have developed different cultural and historical uses for firearms, and that the purpose of enhancing international cooperation to eradicate illicit transnational trafficking in firearms is not intended to discourage or diminish lawful leisure or recreational activities such as travel or tourism for sport shooting, hunting, and other forms of lawful ownership and use recognised by the States Parties;

Recalling that States Parties have their respective domestic laws and regulations in the areas of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials, and recognising that this Convention does not commit States Parties to enact legislation or regulations pertaining to firearms ownership, possession, or trade of a wholly domestic character, and recognising that States Parties will apply their respective laws and regulations in a manner consistent with this Convention;

Reaffirming the principles of sovereignty, nonintervention, and the juridical equality of States,

Have decided to Adopt this Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials

Article I

Definitions

For the purposes of this Convention, the following definitions shall apply:

1. "Illicit manufacturing": the manufacture or assembly of firearm, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials:

- (a) from components or parts illicitly trafficked; or
- (b) without a license from a competent governmental authority of the State Party where the manufacture or assembly takes place; or
- (c) without marking the firearms that require marking at the time of manufacturing.

2. "Illicit trafficking": the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement, or transfer of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials from or across the territory of one State Party to that of another State Party, if any one of the States Parties concerned does not authorise it.

3. "Firearms":

- (a) any barreled weapon which will or is designed to or may be readily converted to expel a bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, except antique firearms manufactured before the 20th Century or their replicas; or
- (b) any other weapon or destructive device such as any explosive, incendiary or gas bomb, grenade, rocket, rocket launcher, missile, missile system, or mine.

4. "Ammunition": the complete round or its components, including cartridge cases, primers, propellant powder, bullets, or projectiles that are used in any firearm.

5. "Explosives": any substance or article that is made, manufactured, or used to produce an explosion, detonation, or propulsive or pyrotechnic effect, except:

(a) substances and articles that are not in and of themselves explosive; or

(b) substances and articles listed in the Annex to this Convention.

6. "Other related materials": any component, part, or replacement part of a firearm, or an accessory which can be attached to a firearm.

7. "Controlled delivery": the technique of allowing illicit or suspect consignments of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials to pass out of, through, or into the territory of one or more states, with the knowledge and under the supervision of their competent authorities, with a view to identifying persons involved in the commission of offenses referred to in Article IV of this Convention.

Article II

Purpose

The purpose of this Convention is:

to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials;

to promote and facilitate cooperation and exchange of information, and experience among States Parties to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials.

Article III

Sovereignty

1. States Parties shall carry out the obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states and that of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other states.

2. A State Party shall not undertake in the territory of another State Party the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions which are exclusively reserved to the authorities of that other State Party by its domestic law.

Article IV

Legislative Measures

1. States Parties that have not yet done so shall adopt the necessary legislative or other measures to establish as criminal offenses under their domestic law the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials.

2. Subject to the respective constitutional principles and basic concepts of the legal systems of the States Parties, the criminal offenses established pursuant to the foregoing paragraph shall include participation in, association or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit, and aiding, abetting, facilitating, and counseling the commission of said offenses.

Article V

Jurisdiction

1. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses it has established in accordance with this Convention when the offense in question is committed in its territory.

2. Each State Party may adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses it has established in accordance with this Convention when the offense is committed by one of its national? or by a person who habitually resides in its territory.

3. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessity to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses it has established in accordance with this Convention when the alleged criminal is present in its territory and it does not extradite such person to another country on the ground of the nationality of the alleged criminal.

4. This Convention does not preclude the application of any other rule of criminal jurisdiction established by a State Party under its domestic law.

Article VI

Marking of Firearms

1. For the purposes of identification and tracing of the firearms referred to in Article 1.3.a. States Parties shall:

- (a) require, at the time of manufacture, appropriate markings of the name of manufacturer, place of manufacture, and serial number;

- (b) require appropriate markings on imported firearms permitting the identification of the importer's name and address; and
- (c) require appropriate markings on any firearms confiscated or forfeited pursuant to Article VII. I that are retained for official use.

2. The firearms referred to in Article I.3.b should be marked appropriately at the time of manufacture, if possible.

Article VII

Confiscation or Forfeiture

1. States Parties undertake to confiscate or forfeit firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials that have been illicitly manufactured or trafficked.

2. States Parties shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that all firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials seized, confiscated, or forfeited as the result of Illicit manufacturing or trafficking do not fall into the hands of private individuals or businesses through auction, sale, or other disposal.

Article VIII

Security Measures

States Parties, in an effort to eliminate loss or diversion, undertake to adopt the necessary measures to ensure the security of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials imported into, exported from, or in transit through their respective territories.

Article IX

Export, Import, and Transit Licenses or Authorisations

1. States Parties shall establish or maintain an effective system of export, import, and international transit licenses or authorisations for transfers of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials.

2. States Parties shall not permit the transit of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials until the receiving State Party issues the corresponding license or authorisation.

3. States Parties, before releasing shipments of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials for export, shall ensure that the importing and in-transit countries have issued the necessary licenses or authorisations.

4. The importing State Party shall inform the exporting State Party, upon request, of the receipt of dispatched shipments of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials,

Article X

Strengthening of Controls at Export Points

Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to detect and prevent illicit trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials between its territory and that of other States Parties, by strengthening controls at export points.

Article XI

Recordkeeping

States Parties shall assure the maintenance for a reasonable time of the information necessary to trace and identify illicitly manufactured and illicitly trafficked firearms to enable them to comply with their obligations under Articles XIII and XVII.

Article XII

Confidentiality

Subject to the obligations imposed by their Constitutions or any international agreements, the States Parties shall guarantee the confidentiality of any information they receive, if requested to do so by the State Party providing the information. If for legal reasons such confidentiality cannot be maintained, the State Party that provided the information shall be notified prior to its disclosure.

Article XIII

Exchange of Information

1. States Parties shall exchange among themselves, in conformity with their respective domestic laws and applicable treaties, relevant information on matter such as:

- (a) authorised producers, dealers, importers, exporters, and, whenever possible, carriers of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials;
- (b) the means of concealment used in the illicit manufacturing of or trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials, and ways of detecting them;
- (c) routes customarily used by criminal organisations engaged in

illicit trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials;

- (d) legislative experiences, practice, and measures to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials; and
- (e) techniques, practices, and legislation to combat money laundering related to illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials.

2. States Parties shall provide to and share with each other, as appropriate, relevant scientific and technological information useful to law enforcement, so as to enhance one another's ability to prevent, detect, and investigate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials and prosecute those involved therein.

3. States Parties shall cooperate in the tracing of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials which may have been illicitly manufactured or trafficked. Such cooperation shall include accurate and prompt responses to trace requests.

Article XIV

Cooperation

1. States Parties shall cooperate at the bilateral, regional, and international levels to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials.

2. States Parties shall identify a national body or a single point of contact to act as liaison among States Parties, as well as between them and the Consultative Committee established in Article XX, for purposes of cooperation and information exchange.

Article XV

Exchange of Experience and Training

1. States Parties shall cooperate in formulating programme for the exchange of experience and training among competent officials, and shall provide each other assistance that would facilitate their respective access to equipment or technology proven to be effective for the Implementation of this Convention.

2. States Parties shall cooperate with each other and with competent international organisations, as appropriate, to ensure that there is adequate training of personnel in their territories to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials. The subject matters of such training shall include, *inter alia*:

- (a) identification and tracing of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials;
- (b) intelligence gathering, especially that which relates to identification of illicit manufacturers and traffickers, methods of shipment, and means of concealment of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials; and
- (c) improvement of the efficiency of personnel responsible for searching for and detecting, at conventional and non-conventional points of entry and exit, illicitly trafficked firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials.

Article XVI

Technical Assistance

States Parties shall cooperate with each other and with relevant international organisations, as appropriate, so that States Parties that so request receive the technical assistance necessary to enhance their ability to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials, including technical assistance in those matters identified in Article XV.2.

Article XVII

Mutual Legal Assistance

1. States Parties shall afford one another the widest measure of mutual legal assistance, in conformity with their domestic law and applicable treaties, by promptly and accurately processing and responding to requests from authorities which, in accordance with their domestic law, have the power to investigate or prosecute the illicit activities described in this Convention, in order to obtain evidence and take other necessary action to facilitate procedures and steps involved in such investigations or prosecutions.

2. For purposes of mutual legal assistance under this article, each Party may designate a central authority or may rely upon such central

authorities as are provided for in any relevant treaties or other agreements. The central authorities shall be responsible for making and receiving requests for mutual legal assistance under this article, and shall communicate directly with each other for the purposes of this article.

Article XVII

Controlled Delivery

1. Should their domestic legal systems so permit. States Parties shall take the necessary measures, within their possibilities, to allow for the appropriate use of controlled delivery at the international level, on the basis of agreements or arrangements mutually consented to, with a view to identifying persons involved in the offenses referred to in Article IV and to taking legal action against them.

2. Decisions by States Parties to use controlled delivery shall be made on a case-by-case basis and may, when necessary, take into consideration financial arrangements and understandings with respect to the exercise of jurisdiction by the States Parties concerned.

3. With the consent of the States Parties concerned, illicit consignments under controlled delivery may be intercepted and allowed to continue with the firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials intact or removed or replaced in whole or in part.

Article XIX

Extradition

1. This article shall apply to the offenses referred to in Article IV of this Convention.

2. Each of the offenses to which this article applies shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offense in any extradition treaty in force between or among the States Parties. The States Parties undertake to include such offenses as extraditable offenses in every extradition treaty to be concluded between or among them.

3. If a State Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it does not have an extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition with respect to any offense to which this article applies.

4. States Parties that do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognise offenses to which this article applies as extraditable offenses between themselves.

5. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the law of the Requested State or by applicable extradition treaties, including the grounds on which the Requested State may refuse extradition.

6. If extradition for an offense to which this article applies is refused solely on the basis of the nationality of the person sought, the Requested State Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution under the criteria, laws, and procedures applied by the Requested State to those offenses when they are committed in its own territory. The Requested and Requesting States Parties may, in accordance with their domestic laws, agree otherwise in relation to any prosecution referred to in this paragraph.

Article XX

Establishment and Functions of the Consultative Committee

1. In order to attain the objectives of this Convention, the States Parties shall establish a Consultative Committee responsible for:

- (a) promoting the exchange of information contemplated under this Convention;
- (b) facilitating the exchange of information on domestic legislation and administrative procedures of the States Parties;
- (c) encouraging cooperation between national liaison authorities to detect suspected illicit exports and imports of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials;
- (d) promoting training and exchange of knowledge and experience among States Parties and technical assistance between States Parties and relevant international organisations, as well as academic studies;
- (e) requesting from nonparty States, when appropriate, information on the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials; and
- (f) promoting measures to facilitate the application of this Convention.

2. Decisions of the Consultative Committee shall be recommendatory in nature.

3. The Consultative Committee shall maintain the confidentiality of any information it receives in the exercise of its functions, if requested to do so.

Article XXI

Structure and Meetings of the Consultative Committee

1. The Consultative Committee shall consist of one representative of each State Party.

2. The Consultative Committee shall hold one regular meeting each year and shall hold special meetings as necessary.

3. The first regular meeting of the Consultative Committee shall be held within 90 days following deposit of the 10th instrument of ratification of this Convention. This meeting shall be held at the headquarters of the General Secretariat of the Organisation of American States, unless a State Party has offered to host it.

4. The meetings of the Consultative Committee shall be held at a place decided upon by the States Parties at the previous regular meeting. If no offer of a site has been made, the Consultative Committee shall meet at the headquarters of the General Secretariat of the Organisation of American States

5. The host State Party for each regular meeting shall serve as Secretariat *pro tempore* of the Consultative Committee until the next regular meeting. When a regular meeting is held at the headquarters of the General Secretariat of the Organisation of American States, a State Party that will serve as Secretariat *pro tempore* shall be elected at that meeting.

6. In consultation with the States Parties, the Secretariat *pro tempore* shall be responsible for:

- (a) convening regular and special meetings of the Consultative Committee;
- (b) preparing a draft agenda for the meetings; and
- (c) preparing the draft reports and minutes of the meetings.

7. The Consultative Committee shall prepare its own internal rules of procedure and shall adopt them by absolute majority.

Article XXII

Signature

This Convention is open for signature by member States of the Organisation of American States.

*Article XXIII***Ratification**

This Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organisation of American States.

*Article XXIV***Reservations**

States Parties may at the time of adoption, signature, or ratification, make reservations to this Convention, provided that said reservations are not incompatible with the object and purposes of the Convention and that they concern one or more specific provisions thereof.

*Article XXV***Entry into Force**

This Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the second instrument of ratification. For each State ratifying the Convention after the deposit of the second instrument of ratification, the Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification.

*Article XXVI***Denunciation**

1. This Convention shall remain in force indefinitely, but any State Party may denounce it. The instrument of denunciation shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organisation of American States. After six months from the date of deposit of the instrument of denunciation, the Convention shall no longer be in force for the denouncing State, but shall remain in force for the other States Parties.

2. The denunciation shall not affect any requests for information or assistance made during the time the Convention is in force for the denouncing State.

*Article XXVII***Other Agreements and Practices**

1. No provision in this Convention shall be construed as preventing the States Parties from engaging in mutual cooperation within the framework of other existing or future international, bilateral, or multilateral agreements, or of any other applicable arrangements or practices.

2. States Parties may adopt stricter measures than those provided for by this Convention if, in their opinion, such measures are desirable to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials.

Article XXVIII

Conference of States Parties

Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, the depository shall convene a conference of the States Parties to examine the functioning and application of this Convention. Each conference shall determine the date on which the next conference should be held.

Article XXIX

Dispute Settlement

Any dispute that may arise as to the application or interpretation of this Convention shall be resolved through diplomatic channels or, failing which, by any other means of peaceful settlement decided upon by the States Parties involved.

Article XXX

Deposit

The original instrument of this Convention, the English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organisation of American States, which shall forward an authenticated copy of its text to the Secretariat of the United Nations for registration and publication, in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. The General Secretariat of the Organisation of American States shall notify the member States of the Organisation of the signatures, of the deposits of instruments of ratification and denunciation, and of any reservations.

ANNEX

The term “explosives” does not include: compressed gases; flammable liquids; explosive actuated devices, such as air bags and fire extinguishers; propellant actuated devices, such as nail gun cartridges; consumer fireworks suitable for use by the public and designed primarily to produce visible or audible effects by combustion, that contain pyrotechnic compositions and that do not project or disperse dangerous fragments such as metal, glass, or brittle plastic; toy plastic or paper caps for toy pistols; toy propellant devices consisting of small piper or

composition tubes or containers containing a small charge or slow burning propellant powder designed so that they will neither burst nor produce external flame except through the nozzle on functioning; and smoke candles, smokepots, smoke grenades, smoke signals, signal flares, hand signal devices, and Very signal cartridges designed to produce visible effects for signal purposes containing smoke compositions and no bursting charges.

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**INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION ON
TRANSPARENCY IN CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS ACQUISITIONS**

The States Parties,

Bearing in mind their commitments to the United Nations and the Organisation of American States to contribute more fully to openness and transparency by exchanging information on weapon systems covered by the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms;

Reiterating the importance of annual reporting to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms of information on imports, exports, military holdings, and procurement through national production of major weapon systems;

Building upon and reaffirming the declarations of Santiago (1995) and San Salvador (1998) on confidence- and security-building measures, which recommend the application of such measures in the most appropriate manner;

Recognising that in accordance with the Charter of the Organisation of American States and the Charter of the United Nations, member states have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense;

Recognising that the commitments made in this Convention are an important step towards achieving one of the essential purposes established in the Charter of the Organisation of American States, which is “to achieve an effective limitation of conventional weapons that will make it possible to devote the largest amount of resources to the economic and social development of the Member States”;

Recognising that it is important for the international community to contribute to the objective of this Convention; and

Expressing their intention to continue consideration of appropriate steps to advance the effective limitation and control of conventional weapons in the region,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Definitions

For the purposes of this Convention,

- (a) “Conventional weapons” means those systems set forth in Annex I to this Convention. Annex I is an integral part of this Convention.
- (b) “Acquisition” means the obtaining of conventional weapons through purchase, lease, procurement, donation, loan, or any other method, whether from foreign sources or through national production. “Acquisition” does not include the obtaining of prototypes, developmental items, and equipment in research, development test, and evaluation, to the extent that such prototypes, items, or equipment are -not incorporated into the inventory of the armed forces.
- (c) “Incorporation into the inventory of the armed forces” means entry of the conventional weapon into service, even for a limited period of time.

Article II

Objective

The objective of this Convention is to contribute more fully to regional openness and transparency in the acquisition of conventional weapons by exchanging information regarding such acquisitions, for the purpose of promoting confidence among States in the Americas.

Article III

Annual Reports on Imports and Exports of Conventional Weapons

1. States Parties shall report annually to the depositary on their imports and exports of conventional weapons during the preceding calendar year, providing information, with respect to imports, on the exporting State, and the quantity and type of conventional weapons imported; and information, with respect to exports, on the importing State, and the quantity and type of conventional weapons exported. Any State Party may supplement its submission with any additional

information it considers relevant, such as the designation and model of the conventional weapons.

2. Information to be submitted pursuant to this article shall be provided to the depositary as soon as possible, but no later than June 15 of each year.

3. Reporting pursuant to this article shall be in the format of Annex II (A) and (B).

Article IV

Exchange of Information on Acquisitions of Conventional Weapons

In addition to providing the annual reports specified in Article III, States Parties shall notify the depositary of acquisitions of conventional weapons as follows:

(a) Notification of Acquisition Through Imports

These notifications to the depositary shall be made no later than 90 days after incorporation of imported conventional weapons into the inventory of the armed forces. Notifications shall indicate the exporting State, as well as the quantity and type of imported conventional weapons. Any State Party may supplement its submission with any additional information it considers relevant, such as the designation and model of the conventional weapons. Reporting pursuant to this paragraph shall be in the format of Annex II (C).

(b) Notification of Acquisition Through National Production

These notifications to the depositary shall be made no later than 90 days after incorporation of the conventional weapons acquired through national production into the inventory of the armed forces. Notifications shall indicate the quantity and type of conventional weapons. Any State Party may supplement its submission with any additional information it considers relevant, such as the designation and model of the conventional weapons. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Convention, States Parties may also supplement such notifications with information on reconfiguration or modification of conventional weapons. To encourage further transparency in acquisitions through national production, the obligation of each State Party to notify under this paragraph may be fulfilled, in accordance with its domestic legislation, through notice to the depositary of a national funding commitment for conventional weapons to be incorporated into that State's inventory during the upcoming budget year. Reporting pursuant to this paragraph shall be in the format of Annex II (D).

(c) Notification of no Activity

States Parties with no imports or acquisitions of conventional weapons through national production during the preceding calendar year shall so report to the depositary as soon as possible, but no later than June 15. Reporting pursuant to this paragraph shall be in the form set out in Annex 11 (A) and (B).

*Article V***Information from other States**

Any State that is not a member of the Organisation of American States may contribute to the objective of this Convention by providing information annually to the depositary on its exports of conventional weapons to the States Parties to this Convention. Such information may identify the importing State, and the quantity and type of any conventional weapons exported, and may also include any additional pertinent information, such as designation and model of the conventional weapons.

*Article VI***Consultations**

States Parties may consult on information provided pursuant to this Convention.

*Article VII***Application and Interpretation**

Any disagreement that may arise with respect to the application or interpretation of this Convention shall be resolved by any means of peaceful settlement decided upon by the States Parties involved, which undertake to cooperate to this end.

*Article VIII***Conferences of the States Parties**

After seven years from the date of entry into force of this Convention, and upon the proposal by a majority of the States Parties, the depositary shall convene a conference of the States Parties. The purpose of such conference, and of any subsequent conferences, would be to examine the functioning and application of this Convention, and to consider further transparency measures consistent with the objective of this Convention, including modifications, pursuant to Article XI, to the categories of conventional weapons in Annex I.

Article IX**Signature**

This Convention is open for signature by all Member States of the Organisation of American States.

Article X**Entry into Force**

This Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit with the General Secretariat of the Organisation of American States of the sixth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession by a member state of the Organisation of American States. Thereafter, the Convention shall enter into force for any other Member State of the Organisation of American States on the 30th day following the date of deposit by such State of an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession.

Article XI**Amendments**

Any State Party may submit to the depositary a proposal to amend this Convention. The depositary shall circulate any such proposal to all States Parties. Upon the request of a majority of the States Parties, the depositary shall, no sooner than 60 days from the date of such request, convene a conference of the States Parties to consider the proposed amendment. An amendment shall be adopted upon approval by two thirds of the States Parties present at the conference. Any amendment so adopted shall enter into force for the States ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to it 30 days after two thirds of the States Parties have deposited their respective instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval of the amendment, or of accession thereto. Thereafter, such amendment shall enter into force for any other State Party on the 30th day after that State Party deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval of the amendment, or of accession thereto.

Article XII**Duration and Denunciation**

This Convention shall remain in force indefinitely, but any State Party may denounce it. The instrument of denunciation shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organisation of American

States. After 12 months from the date of deposit of the instrument of denunciation, the Convention shall no longer be in force for the denouncing State, but shall remain in force for the oilier States Parties.

Article XIII

Reservations

States Parties may, at the time of adoption, signature, ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession, make reservations to this Convention, provided that such reservations are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention and that they concern one or more specific provisions thereof.

Article XIV

Depositary

1. The depositary of this Convention is the General Secretariat of the Organisation of American States.

2. Upon receipt of information provided by a State Party pursuant to Article III or IV of this Convention, the depositary shall promptly transmit such information to all States Parties.

3. The depositary shall provide to States Parties a consolidated annual report of the information provided pursuant to this Convention.

4. The depositary shall notify the States Parties of any proposals received for convening a conference of the States Parties pursuant to Article VIII.

5. The depositary shall receive and distribute to the States Parties any information submitted pursuant to Article V.

Article XV

Deposit of the Convention

The original instrument of this Convention, the English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the depositary, which shall forward an authenticated copy of its text to the Secretariat of the United Nations for registration and publication, in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. The depositary shall notify the Member States of the Organisation of American States of signatures, of deposits of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval, accession, or denunciation, 'and of reservations, if any.

ANNEX I

The list of conventional weapons covered by this Convention is set forth below. Such list is based on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

In accordance with the Article I, this annex is an integral part of this Convention. Any changes to this Annex shall be adopted in conformity with the amendment procedure stipulated in Article XI.

I. Battle Tanks

Tracked or wheeled self-propelled armored fighting vehicles with high cross-country mobility and a high level of self-protection, weighing at least 16.5 metric tons unladen weight, with a high muzzle velocity direct fire main gun of at least 75 millimeters caliber.

II. Armored Combat Vehicles

Tracked, semi-tracked, or wheeled self-propelled vehicles, with armored protection and cross-country capability, either: (A) designed and equipped to transport a squad of four or more infantrymen, or (B) armed with an integral or organic weapon of at least 12.5 millimeters caliber or a missile launcher.

III. Large Caliber Artillery Systems

Guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of a gun or a howitzer, mortars, or multiple-launch rocket systems, capable of engaging surface targets by delivering primarily indirect fire, with a caliber of 100 millimeters and above.

IV. Combat Aircraft

Fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft designed, equipped, or modified to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons, or other weapons of destruction, including versions of these aircraft which perform specialised electronic warfare, suppression of air defense, or reconnaissance missions. The term "combat aircraft" does not include primary trainer aircraft, unless, designed, equipped, or modified as described above.

V. Attack Helicopters

Rotary-wing aircraft designed, equipped, or modified to engage targets by employing guided or unguided anti-armor, air-to-surface, air-to-subsurface, or air-to-air weapons and equipped with an integrated fire control and aiming system for these weapons, including versions

of these aircraft which perform specialised reconnaissance or electronic warfare missions.

VI. Warships

Vessels or submarines armed and equipped for military use with a standard displacement of 750 metric tons or above, and those with a standard displacement of less than 750 metric tons, equipped for launching missiles with a range of at least 25 kilometers or torpedoes with similar range.

VII. Missiles and Missile Launches

Guided or unguided rockets, ballistic or cruise missiles capable of delivering a warhead or weapon of destruction to a range of at least 25 kilometers, and means designed or modified specifically for launching such missiles or rockets, if not covered by categories I through VI. This category:

- (a) Also includes remotely-piloted vehicles with the characteristics for missiles as defined above;
- (b) Does not include ground-to-air missiles.

ANNEX II (A)

Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions

Article III—Annual Import Notification

REPORTING COUNTRY _____ CALENDAR YEAR _____

<i>A. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS</i>	<i>B. QUANTITY</i>	<i>C. TYPE</i>	<i>D. EXPORTING STATE</i>	<i>E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION</i>
I.		BATTLE TANKS		
II.		ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES		
III.		LARGE-CALIBER ARTILLERY SYSTEMS		
IV.		COMBAT AIRCRAFT		
V.		ATTACK HELICOPTERS		
VI.		WARSHIPS		
VII.		MISSILES AND MISSILE LAUNCHERS		

Bold items are mandatory.

1. In the “additional information” column. States Parties may wish to provide voluntary additional information such as designation, model, or any other information considered relevant. States Parties may also wish to use the

“additional information” column to explain or clarify aspects relevant to the acquisition. States Parties that do not have anything to report should file a “nil” report clearly stating, that no imports have taken place in any of the categories during the calendar year.

ANNEX II (B)

Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions

Article III—Annual Export Notification

REPORTING COUNTRY _____ CALENDAR YEAR _____

A. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS	B. QUANTITY	C. TYPE	D. IMPORTING STATE	E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ²
I. BATTLE TANKS				
II. ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES				
III. LARGE-CALIBER ARTILLERY SYSTEMS				
IV. COMBAT AIRCRAFT				
V. ATTACK HELICOPTERS				
VI. WARSHIPS				
VII. MISSILES AND MISSILE LAUNCHERS				

Bold items are mandatory.

- In the “additional information” column. States Parties may wish to provide voluntary additional information such as designation, model, or any other information considered relevant. States Parties may also wish to use the “additional information” column to explain or clarify aspects relevant to the export. States Parties that do not have anything to report should file a “nil” report clearly stating that no imports have taken place in any of the categories during the calendar year.

ANNEX II (C)

Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions

Article IV—Notification of Acquisition Through Import

REPORTING COUNTRY _____ DATE _____

A. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS	B. QUANTITY	C. TYPE	D. EXPORTING STATE	E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ³
CATEGORIES I - VII.				

Bold items are mandatory.

- In the “additional information” column, States Parties may wish to provide voluntary additional information such as designation, model, or any other information considered relevant. States Parties may also wish to use the “additional information” column to explain or clarify aspects relevant to the acquisition.

ANNEX II (D)

**Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons
Acquisitions**

Article IV—Notification of Acquisition Through National Production

REPORTING COUNTRY _____ DATE _____

A. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS	B. QUANTITY	C. TYPE	E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ⁴
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I.	BATTLE TANKS		
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Bold items are mandatory.

- In the “additional information” column, States Parties may wish to provide voluntary additional information such as designation, model, or any other information considered relevant. States Parties may also wish to use the “additional information” column to explain or clarify aspects relevant to the acquisition.

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

The General Assembly, in paragraph 1 of resolution 50/70 B of 12 December 1995, entitled “Small arms”, requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, a report on: (a) The types of small arms and light weapons actually being used in conflicts being dealt with by the United Nations, (b) The nature and causes of the excessive and destabilising accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, including their illicit production and trade, (c) The ways and means to prevent and reduce the excessive and destabilising accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, in particular as they cause or exacerbate conflict.

In paragraph 2 of the resolution, the Secretary-General was requested to seek the views and proposals of Member States, to collect all other relevant information and make them available for consideration by the panel of governmental experts. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General, in the preparation of the report, to pay particular attention to the role of the United Nations in this field and to the complementary role of regional organisations.

In April 1996, the Secretary-General appointed, on the basis of equitable geographical representation, a panel of governmental experts from 16 countries: Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Mali, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sri Lanka and the United States of America. The Panel held three sessions in New York, from 24 to 28 June 1996, from 20 to 31 January 1997 and from 7

to 18 July 1997. The Panel also met at Tokyo from 26 to 28 May 1997, at the invitation of the Government of Japan

The Panel took account of the replies received from Member States in response to Assembly resolution 50/70 B. It reviewed the conclusions and findings of other United Nations bodies and groups concerned with issues related to small arms, within their areas of jurisdiction. It assessed the relevant information collected by the Secretariat from the research community. It heard presentations by scholars and other invitees on the subjects covered by paragraph 1 of Assembly resolution 50/70 B.

The mandate entrusted to the Panel was carried out without prejudice to the positions taken by Member States on, or the importance allocated by them to, the priorities accorded to nuclear disarmament, weapons of mass destruction and conventional disarmament. Anti-personnel landmines constitute a category of small arms and light weapons. The issue is, however, being addressed in other forums. The Panel, therefore, agreed to avoid duplication of effort and different approaches by excluding anti-personnel landmines from its deliberations.

In accordance with paragraph 1 (c) of Assembly resolution 50/70 B, the Panel concentrated its attention on the actual role of small arms and light weapons in exacerbating armed conflicts being dealt with by the United Nations.

The Panel decided to focus its attention on small arms and light weapons manufactured to military specifications, in view of the work currently being undertaken by the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice on firearm regulation for the purpose of crime prevention and public health and safety. Duplication of United Nations efforts should be avoided as much as possible. The Chairman of the Commission's Expert Group on Firearm Regulation, Mr. James Hayes, briefed the Panel on the work of the Commission on 8 July 1997. The Panel endorses the draft resolution recommended by the Commission for adoption by the Economic and Social Council, entitled "Firearm regulation for the purpose of crime prevention and public health and safety."

To gain a better insight and clearer understanding of the problems created by the accumulation, proliferation and use of small arms in various regions, the Panel agreed to undertake inter-sessional work. As a result, the Panel organised three regional workshops to discuss the characteristics unique to each region and areas of common concern.

The information collected at the workshops provided a major input to the preparation of the present report.

The first regional workshop was held at Pretoria, from 23 to 25 September 1996. It was financed from a voluntary contribution made by the Government of Japan. Logistical and administrative support was provided by the Department of Foreign Affairs of South Africa. Persons invited to participate in the workshop included those from the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda) and the Advisory Mission on the Proliferation of Light Weapons in the Saharo-Sahelian subregion. Also invited were government officials and individual experts from Sierra Leone, Somalia, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. In addition, 7 of the 16 members of the Panel participated in the workshop (the experts from Belgium, Finland, Germany, Japan, Mali, South Africa and the United States of America). The joint appeal on small arms, issued at Pretoria on 25 September, appears in appendix I.

The second regional workshop was held at San Salvador on 16 and 17 January 1997. The workshop was financed from voluntary contributions made by the Governments of Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan and the United States of America. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of El Salvador provided administrative and logistical support. Participants in the workshop included officials from the United Nations Support Unit in El Salvador, the Organisation of American States and the Caribbean Association of Commissioners of Police. Also invited were government officials and individual experts from Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama and the United States of America. In addition, eight members of the Panel participated (the experts from Belgium, Canada, Colombia, El Salvador, Finland, Japan, Malaysia, and the United States of America). The statement on small arms, issued at San Salvador on 17 January, appears in appendix II.

The third regional workshop was held at Kathmandu on 22 and 23 May 1997. With South-West Asia as its focus, the workshop was financed from a voluntary contribution made by the Government of Japan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nepal provided administrative and logistical support. Invitees from Bangladesh, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Nepal, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and Sri Lanka participated. In addition, nine members of the Panel participated (the experts from Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and the United States of America). A call upon Afghanistan was made jointly by all the invitees from the subregion and appears in appendix III.

Overview

In the position paper of the Secretary-General entitled "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" (A/50/60-S/1995/1), it is noted that while there are some agreed global norms and standards against weapons of mass destruction, there are no such norms or standards that can be used in reducing the excessive and destabilising accumulation of small arms and light weapons. These are the weapons increasingly used as primary instruments of violence in the internal conflicts dealt with by the United Nations, they are responsible for large numbers of deaths and the displacement of citizens around the world, and they consume large amounts of United Nations resources.

The excessive and destabilising accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons is closely related to the increased incidence of internal conflicts and high levels of crime and violence. It is, therefore, an issue of legitimate concern for the international community. Groups and individuals operating outside the reach of State and government forces make extensive use of such weapons in internal conflicts. Insurgent forces, irregular troops, criminal gangs and terrorist groups are using all types of small arms and light weapons. The illicit trafficking in such weapons by drug cartels, criminals and traders in contraband goods has also been on the increase.

Small arms and light weapons have been or are the primary or sole tools of violence in several of the armed conflicts dealt with by the United Nations, particularly where fighting involves irregular troops among the conflicting parties. Many of these conflicts have inflicted heavy casualties on the people involved. The vast majority of the casualties have been civilians, mostly women and children. It was estimated that, by 1996, over 35 million people in 23 countries throughout the world were at risk of civil strife either owing to ongoing humanitarian crises or as a result of a slow recovery from past ones.

Irrespective of their duration or level of violence, many such conflicts were or are being fought in populated areas, without concern for established norms of international law. In contrast to disciplined regular armed forces, irregular forces tend to make no distinction between a combatant and non-combatant. Irregular forces are equipped with whatever type of weapon they can acquire. Less expensive than major conventional weapons, ready to use without extensive prior training, particularly against civilians, and fit for transport on a person, pack animal or light vehicle, small arms and light weapons are often the weapons of choice in such situations.

Accumulations of small arms and light weapons by themselves do not cause the conflicts in which they are used. The availability of these weapons, however, contributes towards exacerbating conflicts by increasing the lethality and duration of violence, by encouraging a violent rather than a peaceful resolution of differences, and by generating a vicious circle of a greater sense of insecurity, which in turn leads to a greater demand for, and use of, such weapons.

A particularly disturbing feature of current conflicts is the participation of children. By 1988, as many as 200,000 children under the age of 16 were estimated to have participated in conflicts in 25 countries. Since then, the situation may even have worsened. In the case of protracted conflicts, entire generations of children have been affected.

Among the worst affected victims of recent conflicts fought primarily with small arms and light weapons are the inhabitants of some of the poorest countries in the world. Particularly vulnerable are multi-ethnic societies with a history of tension among groups. Also at risk are countries emerging from long wars of national liberation and confronted with the task of reintegrating former combatants into civil society. In many instances, weapons procured at an earlier stage for purposes of national liberation have become available for the violent overthrow of new Governments by insurgent forces or terrorists, or for acts of criminality for personal gain.

In one way or another, virtually every part of the United Nations system is dealing with the direct and indirect consequences of recent armed conflicts fought mostly with small arms and light weapons. Some of the most intractable armed conflicts being dealt with by the United Nations are those in which a recurring cycle of violence, an erosion of political legitimacy and a loss of economic viability have deprived a State of its authority to cope either with the causes or the consequences of the excessive accumulation, proliferation and use of small arms and light weapons.

The full extent of the destabilising consequences of an excessive accumulation, proliferation, transfer and use of small arms and light weapons is only beginning to be assessed. In the process of negotiating and implementing peace accords to end armed conflicts, the United Nations has learned valuable lessons about the high priority that must be given to weapons-related issues. Among them are experiences with the imposition by Member States of United Nations embargoes in conflict

situations; the retrieval, collection and disposal of weapons; the reintegration into society of former combatants; and the training of personnel for the maintenance of law and order. An encouraging lesson drawn from the recent United Nations experience is the willingness of local communities in some States to volunteer in uncovering, collecting and destroying small arms that are unaccounted for.

Given the serious consequences of the problem as described above, this is a promising time to analyse the small arms and light weapons in use in recent conflicts, the nature and causes of their accumulation and transfer, as well as to recommend to Member States, regional organisations and the international community as a whole, particularly as represented by the United Nations, practical measures to prevent and reduce the excessive and destabilising accumulation and transfer of such weapons, with a view to diminishing their role in exacerbating conflicts.

Weapons in Use

The mandate assigned by the General Assembly to the Panel was to consider the types of small arms and light weapons actually being used in conflicts being dealt with by the United Nations. It is important to consider the unique characteristics of small arms and light weapons in developing the ways and means to solve the problems caused by their excessive accumulation.

Small arms and light weapons range from clubs, knives and machetes to those weapons just below those covered by the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, for example, mortars below the calibre of 100 mm. The small arms and light weapons which are of main concern for the purposes of the present report are those which are manufactured to military specifications for use as lethal instruments of war.

Small arms and light weapons are used by all armed forces, including internal security forces, for, *inter alia*, self-protection or self-defence, close or short-range combat, direct or indirect fire, and against tanks or aircraft at relatively short distances. Broadly speaking, small arms are those weapons designed for personal use, and light weapons are those designed for use by several persons serving as a crew.

Based on this broad definition and on an assessment of weapons actually used in conflicts being dealt with by the United Nations, the weapons addressed in the present report are categorised as follows:

-
- (a) Small arms:
 - (i) Revolvers and self-loading pistols;
 - (ii) Rifles and carbines;
 - (iii) Sub-machine-guns;
 - (iv) Assault rifles;
 - (v) Light machine-guns;
 - (b) Light weapons:
 - (i) Heavy machine-guns;
 - (ii) Hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers;
 - (iii) Portable anti-aircraft guns;
 - (iv) Portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles;
 - (v) Portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems;
 - (vi) Portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems;
 - (vii) Mortars of calibres of less than 100 mm;
 - (c) Ammunition and explosives:
 - (i) Cartridges (rounds) for small arms;
 - (ii) Shells and missiles for light weapons;
 - (iii) Mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems;
 - (iv) Anti-personnel and anti-tank hand grenades;
 - (v) Landmines;
 - (vi) Explosives.

While small arms and light weapons are designed for use by armed forces, they have unique characteristics that are also of particular advantage for irregular warfare or terrorist and criminal action:

- (a) Since weapons in this class are capable of being carried, if a small arm, by one person or, if a light arm, by two or more people, a pack animal or a light vehicle, they allow for mobile operations where heavy mechanised and air forces are not available or are restricted in their capabilities owing to difficult mountain, jungle or urban terrain;
- (b) Under these conditions, mortars or mounted anti-aircraft guns sometimes constitute the main armament of light forces, providing them with high firepower that often causes heavy casualties among the civilian population if used indiscriminately;

- (c) Light anti-aircraft and anti-tank missile systems not only provide the capability to sustain operations in favourable terrain against forces supported by tanks and aircraft but can also be used by terrorists against civil air traffic with devastating effects;
- (d) Since many small arms require a minimum of maintenance and logistics they are suited for protracted operations;
- (e) Since they can easily be concealed they are suited to covert actions and transfer;
- (f) Since they are less complex and, therefore, normally of lower cost than major conventional weapons, especially if they are used or surplus, they are affordable by actors other than the State.

In conflicts dealt with by the United Nations, non-military weapons, that is, those weapons not manufactured to military specifications, such as hunting firearms and home-made weapons, have been used in violent conflicts, terrorism, and the intentional harming of civilian populations. In such cases, and where such weapons are used and accumulated in numbers that endanger the security and political stability of a State, the Panel considered them relevant for the purposes of the present.

Ammunition and explosives form an integral part of the small arms and light weapons used in conflicts. The availability of ammunition is an important independent element, since weapons can be rendered useless without appropriate ammunition. The mass production of modern reliable and effective ammunition requires highly developed and precise industrial tools. It is assumed that all countries producing small arms (more than 70) and light weapons are also capable of manufacturing the relevant ammunition. In addition, in many regions there is a widespread private production of less reliable ammunition by small enterprises and individuals.

Moreover, violence perpetrated through improvised explosive devices has recently exacerbated conflicts and caused severe destruction and death. Even a small quantity of such explosive devices has been used to devastating effect by terrorists and insurgents in various parts of the world. In this context, it has been observed that the unimpeded supply and availability of ammunition and explosives, especially by means of illicit trafficking, compound the effects of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Therefore, ammunition and explosives themselves are a cause for concern in conflicts affected by small arms and light weapons.

The indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines has created a significant global problem well within the mandate of the Panel. Since

the international community is, however, addressing this issue in other forums, the Panel agreed to avoid duplication of effort and different approaches by not including anti-personnel landmines in its deliberations.

In contrast to anti-personnel landmines, small arms are constructed for and capable of precise direct fire without inherent indiscriminate effects. High civilian casualties in recent conflicts are the result of indiscriminate warfare that deliberately targets the civilian population with whichever weapons are available.

New technologies are constantly being developed and applied to small arms and light weapons. Attention needs to be paid to the potential impact of these new developments with respect to their proliferation, accumulation and potential for negative effects in those conflicts dealt with by the United Nations. Particular attention should be given to modern light-missile launchers, together with precision-guided munitions, such as the shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles that can be used for terrorist attacks against sensitive targets, with devastating effects.

IV. NATURE AND CAUSES OF EXCESSIVE AND DESTABILISING ACCUMULATIONS OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

A. Nature

While there is a growing recognition of problems associated with the proliferation, accumulation and use of small arms and light weapons, there are no globally agreed norms and standards to determine the excessive and destabilising levels of this class of weapon.

A majority of the small arms and light weapons being used in conflicts dealt with by the United Nations are not newly produced. Those weapons which are newly produced come from many different countries, as illustrated in the data below on the production of assault rifles for the years 1945-1990:

<i>Name of assault rifle</i>	<i>Number of countries using the</i>	<i>Number of countries manufacturing the</i>	<i>Number of weapons manufactured</i>
<i>rifle</i>	<i>countries using the</i>	<i>manufacturing the</i>	<i>manufactured</i>
<i>rifle</i>	<i>countries using the</i>	<i>manufacturing the</i>	<i>manufactured</i>
<i>rifle</i>	<i>countries using the</i>	<i>manufacturing the</i>	<i>manufactured</i>
<i>rifle</i>	<i>countries using the</i>	<i>manufacturing the</i>	<i>manufactured</i>
FN FAL family	94	15	5-7
AK family	78	14 +	35-50
M-16 family	67	7	8
H&K G3 family	64 +	18	7

The terms “excessive” and “destabilising” are relative and exist only in the context of specific regions, subregions or States. The mere accumulation of weapons is not a sufficient criterion by which to define an accumulation of weapons as excessive or destabilising, since large numbers of weapons that are under the strict and effective control of a responsible State do not necessarily lead to violence. Conversely, a small number of weapons can be destabilising under certain conditions.

Accumulations of small arms and light weapons become excessive and destabilising:

- (a) When a State, whether a supplier or recipient, does not exercise restraint in the production, transfer and acquisition of such weapons beyond those needed for legitimate national and collective defence and internal security;
- (b) When a State, whether a supplier or recipient, cannot exercise effective control to prevent the illegitimate acquisition, transfer, transit or circulation of such weapons;
- (c) When the use of such weapons manifests itself in armed conflict, in crime, such as arms and drug trafficking, or other actions contrary to the norms of national or international law.

B. Causes

Accumulations of small arms and light weapons by themselves do not cause the conflicts in which they are used. They can, however, exacerbate and increase their lethality. These conflicts have underlying causes which arise from a number of accumulated and complex political, commercial, socio-economic, ethnic, cultural and ideological factors. Such conflicts will not be finally resolved without addressing the root causes.

There is no single cause for these accumulations and their subsequent transformation into instability and conflict. The variety of different causes is usefully categorised by demand and supply factors, although the distinction between both factors is not always clear-cut and there are grey areas in between. Accumulations are always a combination of both factors but the predominance of either demand or supply varies by subregion and State, as well as by time period.

At the global level, internal conflicts have served to attract large numbers of small arms and light weapons. In this context, one factor bearing on the availability, circulation and accumulation of these weapons in many areas of conflict is their earlier supply by cold war

opponents. Foreign interference in areas of tension, or conflict by States which pursue strategic or specific regional interests, is still a feature of current realities. Also, alien domination or foreign occupation and violation of the right to self-determination of all peoples in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as other political and socio-economic inequities, have given rise to conflict..

Insurgency and terrorism remain as factors in the destabilising use of small arms, light weapons or explosives. Other factors are drug trafficking and criminality. The link between terrorism and such weapons has been referred to by several international forums.

When the State loses control over its security functions and fails to maintain the security of its citizens, the subsequent growth of armed violence, banditry and organised crime increases the demand for weapons by citizens seeking to protect themselves and their property.

The incomplete reintegration of former combatants into society after a conflict has ended, in combination with the inability of States to provide governance and security, may lead to their participation in crime and armed violence.

In some States and subregions, there is a culture of weapons whereby the possession of military-style weapons is a status symbol, a source of personal security, a means of subsistence, a sign of manliness and, in some cases, a symbol of ethnic and cultural identity. By itself, such a culture does not necessarily lead to a culture of violence in which the possession of these weapons connotes political power and a preference for the resolution of conflict by the use of arms. The transformation of a culture of weapons to a culture of violence, resulting in the increasing demand for weapons, most often occurs when a State cannot guarantee security to its citizens or control the illicit activities in which these weapons are utilised. The task of controlling or lowering the level of use of these weapons is made more difficult in a culture of weapons.

States have the right to export and import small arms and light weapons. The misuse of that right and the relatively recent awareness of the problems caused by the accumulation of small arms and light weapons have resulted in insufficient recognition being accorded to the need to better control the transfer of such weapons.

During the cold war, the increase in licensed production and transfer of technology led to a proliferation of legitimate producers of small arms and light weapons, mainly medium-sized and small enterprises,

in an effort by States to become more independent in the production of weapons considered necessary to their security. This led to the search for export markets in order to dispose of surplus weapons. New production of small arms and light weapons has, however, declined owing to a reduction in national defence budgets.

Another factor to be considered is the large surplus of small arms and light weapons created by the reduction in armed forces in the post-Cold-War period. While a significant portion of these weapons has been destroyed, an unknown number of them has found its way to internal armed conflicts from States that have ceased to exist or lost political control.

The problem of the accumulation of weapons is exacerbated by the fact that, during some conflicts, large quantities of weapons were distributed to citizens by Governments, in addition to being obtained from other sources, including illicit transfers. In several instances, self-defence units were formed by Governments and gun possession laws were liberalised. When the conflicts ended, the weapons remained in the hands of citizens and were available for recirculation within the society, in the region and even outside the region.

Several United Nations peacekeeping or post-conflict peace-building operations have resulted in the incomplete disarmament of former combatants owing to peace agreements or mandates which did not cover small arms and light weapons disarmament, or to shortfalls in the implementation of mandates because of inadequate operational guidance or resources. Thus, large numbers of surplus weapons became available in the conflict areas for criminal activities, recirculation and illicit trafficking.

C. Modes of Transfer

Much of the supply and acquisition of small arms and light weapons is legitimate trade which occurs among Governments or among legal entities authorised by Governments.

During the cold war and in the current period, States have secretly carried out transfers of small arms and light weapons. Such transfers are not necessarily illicit. Any transfer not approved by the competent authorities in the recipient State could, however, be classified by that State as interference in its internal affairs and therefore illegal.

The supply of weapons to regions of tension and conflict is characterised by a lack of transparency that is due to the characteristics

of small arms and light weapons which can be easily concealed during transport.

Networks operating internationally and other modes of transfer used for the illicit transfer of a variety of commodities are also used to transfer weapons. The techniques used involve smuggling, concealment, mislabelling and false documentation. To hide financial transactions, use is made of coded bank accounts protected by the secrecy laws of some financial institutions. To transport weapons, various methods are used, such as ships with bogus registration and flags of convenience.

Illicit actors in this trade include certain groups in exile and private arms dealers, whose motives may include political support of groups within a country, or drug trafficking and other criminal activities conducted for profit.

Several insurgent and armed groups are known to procure weapons and obtain financial support with the assistance of allied groups and organisations based abroad which act as a front and which illicitly traffic in weapons, ammunition and explosives.

Criminal elements and groups engaged in armed internal conflict can also acquire small arms and light weapons by: an exchange between groups and among unauthorised persons; theft, robbery or loss of weapons in legal possession; and raids, ambushes and other hostile acts. Often, weapons resulting from legal transfers between Governments end up on the illegal market because of corrupt governmental officials.

D. Illicit Trade in Weapons

Illicit trafficking in weapons is understood to cover that international trade in conventional weapons, which is contrary to the laws of States and/or international law.

Illicit trafficking in such weapons plays a major role in the violence currently affecting some countries and regions, by supplying the instruments used to destabilise societies and Governments, encourage crime, and foster terrorism, drug trafficking, mercenary activities and the violation of human rights.

In some cases the illicit supply of small arms and light weapons has occurred because there is no adequate national system of controls on arms production, exports and imports, and because border and customs personnel are poorly trained or corrupt.

The differences that exist between the legislation and enforcement mechanisms of States for the import and export of weapons, as well as

the lack of cooperation in that area, facilitates the circulation and illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons. There is also no international convention or agreement that restricts such trade, or a body of rules by which a given transfer can be declared illegal under international law other than the arms embargoes adopted by the Security Council.

Accumulations of weapons by means of illicit trafficking are facilitated by a lack of coordination and cooperation among the States involved. In the case of both the recirculation and supply of weapons from outside the region or subregion, efforts to diminish the negative effects of such weapons are hampered by States that will not or cannot cooperate in such basic functions as sharing information regarding illicit trafficking in weapons and coordinating the cross-border seizure and collection of weapons.

E. Regional Realities

Based on United Nations reports on its peace operations, commissions of inquiry and, most important, the three regional workshops conducted by the Panel, it became clear that there are effects and consequences unique to specific regions, subregions and States.

Africa

The African region is confronted with the challenges of both dealing with socio-economic reconstruction in post-conflict societies and containing various internal conflicts. The uncontrolled availability of small arms and light weapons is not only fuelling such conflicts but is also exacerbating violence and criminality. This undermines the State's ability to govern effectively, thereby threatening the stability and security necessary for socio-economic development. Porous borders, lack of resources and the absence of detailed and comprehensive data on the extent of this phenomenon are inhibiting the region's ability to effectively deal with the problem of proliferation.

Southern Africa is affected by the supply of small arms and light weapons left over from the conflicts in Mozambique and Angola, as well as licensed weapons being stolen or lost. There is a concern among the States in the region that the availability of these weapons is a major factor in exacerbating crime and armed violence, thereby threatening the consolidation of democracy and security which is needed for sustainable development. The weapons of most concern are, among others, handguns, assault rifles and home-made weapons.

Central Africa is dominated by recent internal and ethnic violence and violations of the Security Council arms embargo. The major factor

impeding the development of ways and means of dealing with accumulations of weapons in this subregion is the collapse of the State's ability to govern and provide for its national security and the security of its citizens. This is compounded by the extreme levels of poverty in the subregion.

The weapons proliferating and available in West Africa are not newly produced but are left over from several civil wars of the recent past. This proliferation is enhanced by particularly long and unmanned borders. This destabilising factor has forced some States in the Saharo-Sahelian subregion to ask for and receive United Nations assistance.

Central America

The Central American subregion has seen the end of three major domestic conflicts in the past seven years, where the United Nations played a critical role in their conclusion. As one of the major areas of confrontation during the cold war, this subregion was supplied with large numbers of small arms and light weapons which are still in circulation. They remain available for acquisition by criminal gangs and armed groups, despite the encouraging results from several programmes for the collection and destruction of arms.

Geographically, Central America is a major transit area for the illicit trafficking in drugs and weapons between North and South America, which produces destabilising effects for the entire region.

The States in Central America have a particular challenge in demobilising and a large number of former combatants into useful and productive roles in society, since much of the crime and armed violence is perpetrated by ex-combatants with the weapons they retained after the conflicts were concluded. As a result of post-conflict peace-building processes, the subregion is marked by demilitarisation and the development of democratic Governments which are increasingly able to build the basic institutions that can provide security for citizens of the State and its further economic and social development.

South Asia

The problem of excessive and destabilising accumulations of small arms and light weapons in South Asia was significantly shaped by the war in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1988. During that conflict, both sides in the cold war exported large quantities of both major conventional weapons and small arms and light weapons into the region. Today, Afghanistan is a leading source of unaccounted weapons. The conflict

continues and much of the current inflow of weapons is due to illicit deals involving a circuitous network of manufacturers, buyers, suppliers and distributors which are able to operate because of a lack of State authority. There is a lack of cooperation among several States in the region that also contributes to the problems of covert supply and poor controls over small arms and light weapons.

Insurgents and terrorist groups, as well as drug traffickers, in the region are also supplied with small arms and light weapons by illicit or covert networks. This region is particularly plagued by illicit trafficking in explosives, especially improvised explosive devices which have been frequently used in armed attacks. Most armed groups are based overseas and conduct fund-raising abroad for the illicit procurement of arms and for violent acts in the region.

In this region, the production of and trafficking in drugs are directly linked to the proliferation and acquisition of small arms and light weapons. This problem, and illicit trafficking in weapons in general, is exacerbated by a lack of either local or international controls of land and maritime borders in certain States of the region.

Europe

During the cold war, large numbers of weapons, including small arms and light weapons, were accumulated in Europe. After the end of the cold war in many European States, weapon holdings have been reduced through destruction or cascading. In some instances, the grave weakening or even collapse of State structures, and in particular the dissolution of the Soviet Union, has led to a greater availability of small arms and light weapons that is outside State control. The surfeit of weapons has often aggravated the general feeling of insecurity and, in some cases, fuelled ethnic confrontation and even civil war. The former Yugoslavia and Albania are the worst examples.

The above-mentioned developments, combined with serious economic difficulties, have also had an impact on other regions of the world in the form of an increased flow of weapons from sometimes poorly controlled stocks on the territory of some countries of Eastern-Europe and of stationed forces in the former German Democratic Republic.

Although many European countries reduced weapons production after the end of the cold war, Europe still has significant domestic capabilities for the production of weapons.

In some European countries, insurgent movements, terrorist groups and criminal gangs are involved in the illicit use of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons.

Commonalities Among Affected Regions

The observations made regarding some regions, subregions and States can be summarised in the following commonalities:

- (a) There is an apparent link between the availability of weapons, trafficking in drugs and arms, and the level of violence;
- (b) Transfers of weapons are often unchecked owing to inadequate controls over long and porous borders;
- (c) The crime and violence arising from the availability of small arms and light weapons have made it more difficult to conduct development projects and programmes that address the root causes of conflict. This has led to a decline in economic assistance and investment from donors. Also, States must use more of their scarce resources to provide security and relief to the victims of violence;
- (d) Illicit trafficking in arms in some regions has violent and destabilising effects;
- (e) Where a culture of weapons exists, it may be more easily transformed into a culture of violence, particularly when tension escalates due to the root causes of conflict;
- (f) In some regions, young people are often the victims and perpetrators of violence, particularly where high unemployment and political hostilities exist. They are easily recruited and indoctrinated into violent groups and are more likely to follow a path of violence, even when political hostilities cease;
- (g) National efforts to address excessive and destabilising accumulations of small arms are often insufficient owing to the magnitude of the problem and scarce resources. In many instances, multilateral and regional efforts have been undertaken;
- (h) Another reality in some regions is that an adequate level of security is necessary to solve the problems associated with the excessive and destabilising accumulations of small arms and light weapons;
- (i) Most of the States and regions experiencing problems with armed violence stemming from the excessive and destabilising accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons

also have problems of poverty and lack economic development. These issues are linked;

- (j) In some regions, drug control efforts have increased the demand for small arms and light weapons by both law enforcement authorities and drug traffickers, thereby raising the level of violence.

V. Recommendations

The Panel's recommendations are comprised first of measures to reduce the excessive and destabilising accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons in specific regions of the world where such accumulations and transfers have already taken place. These are followed by measures to prevent such accumulations and transfers from occurring in future.

The Panel recommends the following reduction measures:

- (a) The United Nations should adopt a proportional and integrated approach to security and development, including the identification of appropriate assistance for the internal security forces initiated with respect to Mali and other West African States, and extend it to other regions of the world where conflicts come to an end and where serious problems of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons have to be dealt with urgently. The donor community should support this new approach in regard to such regions of the world;
- (b) The United Nations should support, with the assistance of the donor community, all appropriate post-conflict initiatives related to disarmament and demobilisation, such as the disposal and destruction of weapons, including weapons turn-in programmes sponsored locally by governmental and non-governmental organisations;
- (c) Once national conciliation is reached, the United Nations should assist in convening an inter-Afghan forum to prepare, *inter alia*, a schedule to account for, retrieve and destroy the small arms and light weapons left unaccounted for in Afghanistan;
- (d) In view of the problems stemming from an excess of small arms and light weapons left over from many internal conflicts and the lessons learned from the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations, two sets of guidelines should be developed in order to:

- (i) Assist negotiators of peace settlements in developing plans to disarm combatants, particularly as concerns light weapons, small arms and munitions, and to include therein plans for the collection of weapons and their disposal, preferably by destruction;
- (ii) Provide assistance to peacekeeping missions in implementing their mandates, based on peace settlements;

Former peace negotiators and members of peacekeeping operations of the United Nations should be consulted in the preparation of such guidelines. In this connection, consideration should be given to the establishment of a disarmament component in peacekeeping operations undertaken by the United Nations.

- (e) States and regional organisations, where applicable, should strengthen international and regional cooperation among police, intelligence, customs and border control officials in combating the illicit circulation of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons and in suppressing criminal activities related to the use of these weapons;
- (f) The establishment of mechanisms and regional networks for information sharing for the above-mentioned purposes should be encouraged;
- (g) All such weapons which are not under legal civilian possession, and which are not required for the purposes of national defence and internal security, should be collected and destroyed by States as expeditiously as possible.

The Panel recommends the following prevention measures:

- (a) All States should implement the recommendations contained in the guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991, adopted by the Disarmament Commission in 1996;
- (b) All States should determine in their national laws and regulations which arms are permitted for civilian possession and the conditions under which they can be used;
- (c) All States should ensure that they have in place adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the legal possession of small arms and light weapons and over their transfer in order, *inter alia*, to prevent illicit trafficking;

- (d) States emerging from conflict should, as soon as practicable, impose or reimpose licensing requirements on all civilian possession of small arms and light weapons on their territory;
- (e) All States should exercise restraint with respect to the transfer of the surplus of small arms and light weapons manufactured solely for the possession of and use by the military and police forces. All States should also consider the possibility of destroying all such surplus weapons;
- (f) All States should ensure the safeguarding of such weapons against loss through theft or corruption, in particular from storage facilities;
- (g) The United Nations should urge relevant organisations, such as the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) and the World Customs Organisation, as well as all States and their relevant national agencies, to closely cooperate in the identification of the groups and individuals engaged in illicit trafficking activities, and the modes of transfer used by them;
- (h) All States and relevant regional and international organisations should intensify their cooperative efforts against all aspects of illicit trafficking mentioned in the present report that are related to the proliferation and accumulation of small arms and light weapons;
- (i) The United Nations should encourage the adoption and implementation of regional or subregional moratoriums, where appropriate, on the transfer and manufacture of small arms and light weapons, as agreed upon by the States concerned;
- (j) Other regional organisations should take note, and make use, as appropriate, of the work of the Organisation of American States in preparing a draft inter-American convention against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials;
- (k) The United Nations should consider the possibility of convening an international conference on the illicit arms trade in all its aspects, based on the issues identified in the present report;
- (l) To assist in preventing the illicit trafficking in and circulation of small arms and light weapons, the United Nations should initiate studies on the following:

- (i) The feasibility of establishing a reliable system for marking all such weapons from the time of their manufacture;
- (ii) The feasibility of restricting the manufacture and trade of such weapons to the manufacturers and dealers authorised by States, and of establishing a database of such authorised manufacturers and dealers;
- (m) The United Nations should initiate a study on all aspects of the problem of ammunition and explosives.

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**BILL PRESENTED TO THE U.S. CONGRESS TO
ESTABLISH A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S.
ARMS TRANSFERS**

**104th Congress; 1st Session in the Senate of the United States as
Introduced in the Senate**

S. 326

1995 S. 326; 104 S. 326

SYNOPSIS:

A Bill

To prohibit United States military assistance and arms transfers to foreign governments that are undemocratic, do not adequately protect human rights, are engaged in acts of armed aggression, or are not fully participating in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

DATE OF INTRODUCTION: FEBRUARY 1, 1995

DATE OF VERSION: FEBRUARY 3, 1995 — VERSION: 1

SPONSOR(S): Mr. HATFIELD (for himself, Mr. DORGAN, Mr. FEINGOLD, Mr. BUMPERS, and Mr. HARKIN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

Text

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

Section 1. Short Title

This Act may be cited as the “Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers Act of 1995”.

Section 2. Findings

The Congress finds the following:

1. Approximately 40,000,000 people, over 75 per cent civilians, died as a result of civil and international wars fought with conventional weapons during the 45 years of the Cold War, demonstrating that conventional weapons can in fact be weapons of mass destruction.

2. Conflict has actually increased in the post-Cold War era, with 34 major wars in progress during 1993.

3. War is both a human tragedy and an ongoing economic disaster affecting the entire world, including the United States and its economy, because it decimates both local investment and potential export markets.

4. International trade in conventional weapons increases the risk and impact of war in an already over-militarised world, creating far more costs than benefits for the United States economy through increased United States defense and foreign assistance spending and reduced demand for United States civilian exports.

5. The newly established United Nations Register of Conventional Arms can be an effective first step in support of limitations on the supply of conventional weapons to developing countries, and compliance with its reporting requirements by a foreign government can be an integral tool in determining the worthiness of such government for the receipts of United States military assistance and arms transfers.

6. It is in the national security and economic interests of the United States to reduce dramatically the \$1,038,000,000,000 that all countries spend on armed forces every year, \$242,000,000,000 of which is spent by developing countries, an amount equivalent to 4 times the total bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance such countries receive every year.

7. According to the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, the United States supplies more conventional weapons to developing countries than all other countries combined, averaging \$14,956,000,000 each year in agreements to supply such weapons to developing countries since the end of the Cold War, compared to \$7,300,000,000 each year in such agreements prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

8. In recent years the vast majority of United States arms transfers to developing countries are to countries with an undemocratic form of government whose citizens, according to the Department of State

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices do not have the ability to peaceably change their form of government.

9. Although a goal of United States foreign policy should be to work with foreign governments and international organisations to reduce militarisation and dictatorship and therefore prevent conflicts before they arise, during 4 recent deployments of United States Armed Forces- to the Republic of Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti-the Armed Forces faced conventional weapons that had been provided or financed by the United States to undemocratic governments.

10. The proliferation of conventional arms and conflicts around the globe is a multilateral problem, and the fact that the United States has emerged as the world's primary seller of conventional weapons, together with the world leadership role of the United States, signifies that the United States is in a position to seek multilateral restraints on the competition for and transfers of conventional weapons.

11. The Congress has the constitutional responsibility to participate with the executive branch of Government in decisions to provide military assistance and arms transfers to a foreign government, and in the formulation of a policy designed to reduce dramatically the level of international militarisation.

12. A decision to provide military assistance and arms transfers to a government that is undemocratic, does not adequately protect human rights, is currently engaged in acts of armed aggression, or is not fully participating in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, should require a higher level of scrutiny than does a decision to provide such assistance and arms transfers to a government to which these conditions do not apply.

Section 3. Propose

The purpose of this Act is to provide clear policy guidelines and congressional responsibility for determining the eligibility of foreign governments to be considered for United States military assistance and arms transfers.

Section 1. Prohibition of United States Military Assistance and Arms Transfers to Certain Foreign Governments

(a) Prohibition-except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), united states military assistance and arms transfers may not be provided to a foreign government for a fiscal year unless the president certifies to the congress for that fiscal year that such government meets the following requirements:

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- (1) Promotes democracy-such government—
 - (A) was chosen by and permits free and fair elections;
 - (B) promotes civilian control of the military and security forces and has civilian institutions controlling the policy, operation, and spending of all law enforcement and security institutions, as well as the armed forces;
 - (C) promotes the rule of law, equality before the law, and respect for individual and minority rights, including freedom to speak, publish, associate, and organise; and
 - (D) promotes the strengthening of political, legislative, and civil institutions of democracy, as well as autonomous institutions to monitor the conduct of public officials and to combat corruption.
 - (2) Respects human rights-such government-
 - (A) does not engage in gross violations of internationally recognised human rights, including-
 - (I) extra-judicial or arbitrary executions;
 - (II) disappearances;
 - (III) torture or severe mistreatment;
 - (IV) prolonged arbitrary imprisonment;
 - (V) systematic official discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, national origin, or political affiliation; and
 - (VI) grave breaches of international laws of war or equivalent violations of the laws of war in internal conflicts;
 - (B) vigorously investigates, disciplines, and prosecutes those responsible for gross violations of internationally recognised human rights;
 - (C) permits access on a regular basis to political prisoners by international humanitarian organisations such as the international committee of the red cross;
 - (D) promotes the independence of the judiciary and other official bodies that oversee the protection of human rights;
 - (E) does not impede the free functioning of domestic and international human rights organisations; and

(F) provides access on a regular basis to humanitarian organisations in situations of conflict or famine.

(3) Not engaged in certain acts of armed aggression-such government is not currently engaged in acts of armed aggression in violation of international law.

(4) Null participation in united nations register of conventional arms-such government is fully participating in the united nations register of conventional arms.

(B) Requirement for continuing compliance.-any certification with respect to a foreign government for a fiscal year under subsection (a) shall cease to be effective for that fiscal year if the president certifies to the congress that such government has not continued to comply with the requirements contained in paragraphs (1) through (4) of such subsection.

(C) Exemption.-the prohibition contained in subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to a foreign government for a fiscal year if—

(1) the president submits a request for an exemption to the congress containing a determination that it is in the national security interest of the united states to provide military assistance and arms transfers to such government; and

(2) the congress enacts a law approving such exemption request.

(D) Notification to congress—the president shall submit to the congress initial certifications under subsection (a) and requests for exemptions under subsection (c) in conjunction with the submission of the annual request for enactment of authorisations and appropriations for foreign assistance programs for a fiscal year and shall, where appropriate, submit additional or amended certifications and requests for exemptions at any time thereafter in the fiscal year.

Section 5. Sense of the Congress

It is the sense of the Congress that the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate should hold hearings on controversial certifications submitted under section 4(a) and all requests for exemptions submitted under section 4(c).

Section 6. United States Military Assistance and Arms Transfers Defined

For purposes of this Act, the terms “United States military assistance and arms transfers” and “military assistance and arms transfers” means-

1. assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to military assistance), including the transfer of excess defense articles under sections 516 through 519 of that Act;
2. assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to international military education and training);
3. assistance under the “Foreign Military Financing Programme” under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act; or
4. the transfer of defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services under the Arms Export Control Act, including defense articles and defense services licensed or approved for export under section 38 of that Act.

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**OSCE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING
CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS**

1. The participating States reaffirm their commitment to act, in the security field, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and other relevant CSCE documents.

2. They recall that in Prague on 30 January 1992 they agreed that effective national control of weapons and equipment transfer is acquiring the greatest importance and decided to include the question of the establishment of a responsible approach to arms transfers as a matter of priority in the work programme of the post-Helsinki arms control process. They also recall their declaration in the Helsinki Document of 10 July 1992 that they would intensify their cooperation in the field of effective export controls applicable, *inter alia*, to conventional weapons.

3. The participating States reaffirm:

- (a) their undertaking, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to promote the establishment of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources and their view that the reduction of world military expenditures could have a significant positive impact for the social and economic development of all peoples;
- (b) the need to ensure that arms transferred are not used in violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
- (c) their adherence to the principles of transparency and restraint in the transfer of conventional weapons and related technology, and their willingness to promote them in the security dialogue of the Forum for Security Cooperation;

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- (d) their strong belief that excessive and destabilising arms build-ups pose a threat to national, regional and international peace and security;
 - (e) the need for effective national mechanisms for controlling the transfer of conventional arms and related technology and for transfers to take place within those mechanisms;
 - (f) their support for and commitment to provide data and information as required by the United Nations resolution establishing the Register of Conventional Arms in order to ensure its effective implementation.

4. In order to further their aim of a new cooperative and common approach to security, each participating State will promote and, by means of an effective national control mechanism, exercise due restraint in the transfer of conventional arms and related technology. To give this effect:

- (a) each participating State will, in considering proposed transfers, take into account:
 - (i) the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the recipient country;
 - (ii) the internal and regional situation in and around the recipient country, in the light of existing tensions or armed conflicts;
 - (iii) the record of compliance of the recipient country with regard to international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, and in the field of non-proliferation, or in other areas of arms control and disarmament;
 - (iv) the nature and cost of the arms to be transferred in relation to the circumstances of the recipient country, including its legitimate security and defence needs and the objective of the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources;
 - (v) whether the transfers would contribute to an appropriate and proportionate response by the recipient country to the military and security threats confronting it;
 - (vi) the legitimate domestic security needs of the recipient country;
 - (vii) the requirements of the recipient country to enable it to participate in peacekeeping or other measures in accordance with decisions of the United Nations or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

- (b) Each participating state will avoid transfers which would be likely to:
- (i) be used for the violation or suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms;
 - (ii) threaten the national security of other States and of territories whose external relations are the internationally acknowledged responsibility of another State;
 - (iii) contravene its international commitments, in particular in relation to sanctions adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations, or to decisions taken by the CSCE Council, or agreements on non-proliferation, or other arms control and disarmament agreements;
 - (iv) prolong or aggravate an existing armed conflict, taking into account the legitimate requirement for self-defence;
 - (v) endanger peace, introduce destabilising military capabilities into a region, or otherwise contribute to regional instability;
 - (vi) be diverted within the recipient country or re-exported for purposes contrary to the aims of this document;
 - (vii) be used for the purpose of repression;
 - (viii) support or encourage terrorism;
 - (ix) be used other than for the legitimate defence and security needs of the recipient country.

5. Further, each participating State will:

- (a) reflect, as necessary, the principles in Section II in its national policy documents governing the transfer of conventional arms and related technology;
- (b) consider mutual assistance in the establishment of effective national mechanisms for controlling the transfer of conventional arms and related technology;
- (c) exchange information, in the context of security cooperation within the Forum for Security Co-operation, about national legislation and practices in the field of transfers of conventional arms and related technology and on mechanisms to control these transfers.

CONTROLLING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA: A TREATY PROPOSAL

During the 1990s, multilateral talks began among major weapons exporters to try to control the supply of conventional weapons to the Middle East. Some also called attention to the supply of arms to East Asia. These approaches are as likely to fail as a counter-narcotics policy that relies on controlling supply instead of demand. Because there are a variety of potential sources of weaponry to a region—including production within the region itself—it is very difficult to successfully manage a supply-side approach. We suggest that limiting demand is a better way to achieve a stable balance of weaponry.

Conventional Forces in Latin America Treaty (CFLA)

This article proposes that Latin America be used as a model for conventional arms control, a model that could be exported to other regions. Latin America is an area ripe for experimenting with arms control precisely because levels of hostility are relatively low and militaries are relatively small and balanced. Latin America, where conflicts are less salient than elsewhere in the developing world, can act as a laboratory for an arms regime. Much as the Treaty of Tlatelolco is a model for nuclear weapon free zones, a conventional forces in Latin America treaty (CFLA) would be a model for other regions.

That region has historically demonstrated its vulnerability to the “contagion” of arms purchases: if one State acquired new weapons, its rivals quickly followed suit. Although it is generally viewed as a peaceful region, almost every country in Latin America has a border dispute.

Regulating Conventional Forces in Latin America

One could control arms balances through regulation of arms sales, expenditures, or inventory. This section discusses each in turn.

Regulation of Sales

Many States inside and outside a region, can upset the arms balance by supplying or transferring weapons. This variety of sources makes the supply-side approach to arms control questionable. Since the 1970s, Latin American arms purchases from France, Germany, Italy, Israel, the former Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom have each exceeded those from the United States. Furthermore, Latin America does not import all its weapons from outside the region. Argentina and Brazil have had significant arms industries of their own, producing for their own use and for export. It seems difficult to suppose that all these States would agree to limit the provision of arms to Latin America. The incentive to cheat is obvious: restricting supply will increase prices if demand is constant, increasing the profitability of arms sales.

Out of Region Sources

During the 1980s, United States policy on arms transfers to Latin America focused on strengthening El Salvador and Honduras in their battles against insurgencies and on strengthening Venezuela's ability to guard its sea lanes in order to protect oil shipments. Sales to these three countries accounted for half of the United States total sales of \$2.1 billion between 1985 and 1989. The United States only accounted for 12.2 per cent of all arms shipments to the region in this period, and current figures show a steady decline in sales since then. The United States entry in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms shows that its only transfers for 1992 were 10 combat aircraft to Chile and 4 to Ecuador.

In the case of El Salvador and Honduras, the United States did not upset the balance since it sold weapons to both parties of a dispute and—more important—because the weapons were for counter-insurgency operations and not major offensive weapon systems. Arms sales to Venezuela (most notably the F-16s), however, have exacerbated the imbalance it has *vis-a-vis* Colombia, somewhat mitigated by the large United States presence in Colombia involved in counter-narcotics operations.

In February 1994, the United States concluded an agreement to sell 36 A-4M Skyhawks to Argentina. This deal, and one to sell A-7 Corsairs to Chile, is the first sale of combat aircraft to Latin America in over a decade, and will replace Argentina's ageing A-4Ps (converted A-4Bs) and Chile's equally old Hawker Hunters. This sale should not affect the arms balance between Chile and Argentina. Chile countered by

purchasing 25 Mirage M-5Ms from Belgium; this did not hinder the territorial arbitration.

Although it accounted for 57.6 per cent of arms transferred to Latin America during 1985-1989, Russia/the former Soviet Union no longer plays a dominant role. Arms transfers to Cuba and Nicaragua accounted for 98 per cent of its total. It seems unlikely, however, that more arms from the Russian Federation will officially enter the region due to economic problems with the suppliers and recipients alike. In addition, only Cuba, Nicaragua, and Peru used Soviet weapons and it is unlikely that other countries will opt to establish new training, logistical, and maintenance support structures for these weapons. It must be noted, however, that in Russia and other former Soviet countries in need of hard currency, weapons are for sale on the black market to anyone with the required cash.

Other sources accounted for 19.7 per cent of arms transferred to the region in the 1985-1989 period. Of these, France had the highest share, at 4.9 per cent, owing to the popularity of their aircraft and tanks. Nevertheless, growing discontent with French aircraft due to the high cost of maintenance and general logistical support problems may signal that France will be playing a smaller role in the Latin American arms market. The next largest supplier is Israel, with sales throughout Latin America, most notably aircraft and naval vessels. West Germany's 4 per cent market share made it an important supplier as well. Although it sells to almost all the countries in the region, Argentina and Brazil were the major buyers during 1985-1989, with 84 per cent of its total. The United Kingdom and other European countries together account for 4.8 per cent of arms transfers to Latin America, including armoured personnel carriers, naval vessels, artillery systems, defensive missiles, and small arms. North Korean transfers to Cuba, Nicaragua and Peru accounted for 0.6 per cent of transfers to the region. South Korea, China, Australia, and South Africa combined are insignificant suppliers, accounting for only 0.6 per cent during 1985-1989.

Regional Sources

Until recently, Brazil was one of the largest arms producers in the world. Most of its production was devoted to exports. Brazil exported heavily to Iraq during its war with the Islamic Republic of Iran and to other countries in Africa and the Middle East in the 1980s. It was also successful in selling the EMB-312 Tucano to the United Kingdom for

its new trainer. Within Latin America, Brazil has sold armoured fighting vehicles to Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela; and aircraft to Chile, Honduras and Venezuela. The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) estimates for Brazilian arms exports in 1988 was a respectable \$700 million.

Their military industry appears to be slowing down, however. According to the editor of *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, Brazilian military exports dropped to \$100 million in 1989 and further to \$70 million in 1991. This is a 90 per cent drop in only three years, along with a drop in imports from \$340 million to \$20 million over the same period. Combining these figures with Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) methodology for estimating military procurement as a proportion of the overall budget, it appears that total Brazilian military production in 1991 was only \$169 million.

Argentina had a large defence industry in the 1980s, it produced artillery, armour, aircraft and submarines; the Condor missile programme was of grave concern in the United States. In the last few years, however, the defence industry has been privatised and largely shut down, according to the DIA. The Condor programme has been dismantled, the Pampas aircraft is out of production, tank plants have been closed, and shipyards are up for sale.

Thus it is evident from this section that arms enter Latin America from a variety of sources; Argentina and Brazil are capable, if necessary, of producing high-quality conventional weapons. Any one of several countries could increase its market share in Latin American arms sales if other countries agreed to restrict their own sales. These findings are not unique to Latin America. Obviously, out-of-region suppliers can sell to any part of the globe, but domestic arms industries can provide weapons for other regions as well. For that reason, the proposed treaty in the next section will suggest that an agreement to limit demand would be easier to enforce and maintain than a suppliers' treaty.

Regulation of Expenditures

The second mechanism for regional arms control is regulation of military expenditures. This has a certain simple appeal. Pastor is one of the few to advance a general proposal of this kind. He discusses the obvious benefits to economic and social development of cuts in military spending. His proposal is simply to incorporate Robert McNamara's suggestion that all States cut defence procurement and expenditures by 50 per cent by the year 2000. The Organisation of American States

(OAS) would monitor sales, purchases, and expenditures, with violations yielding unspecified penalties. Such limits on expenditures do not get at the core of the problem, despite their simplicity. If a State cuts expenditures by 50 per cent, but keeps the most advanced offensive forces, this can destabilise the balance by placing a higher value on pre-emptive attack. On the other hand, if Brazil produces weapons for sale to the Middle East or Southern Africa, Latin America is not directly affected. Furthermore, verification of arms expenditures will be very difficult without intrusive auditing of national budgets. This emphasis would be as fruitless as the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks were in Europe in the 1980s.

Regulation of Inventory

The true goal of arms controllers is to balance the number and type of weapons possessed by all sides. Expenditures, sales, purchases—all these are peripheral to the actual military balance. A better framework would, like the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) regulate inventory. The CFE also includes some of the best features of Pastor's proposal: a multilateral treaty, inspections of weapons levels, and adjudication by an international authority. In particular, the 1,000 and more inspections carried out under the terms of the CFE Treaty contributed considerably to transparency among the parties to the Treaty. But the CFE cannot directly translate into a conventional forces in Latin America treaty. Given the multipolar environment of Latin America, and the potential military dominance of the United States, special attention must be given to various confidence-building measures before any agreement could be reached on force levels. Other differences between the two, include the relationship with the United States and the problems of counter-insurgency.

Confidence-Building Measures

Before any arms treaty can be accepted, possible concerns of both military and civilian leaders must be overcome. One useful confidence-building measure would be the diplomatic resolution of the many border disputes still open in Latin America. As Pastor has suggested, if these issues could be submitted to arbitration, perhaps through the OAS, the persuasiveness of geopolitical arguments put forth by the military would be reduced. It might make the most sense for all disputes to be submitted simultaneously, so that the panel could at least consider the effects of multiple rulings against or in favour of a particular country.

The military leaders of each country would need to learn to trust each other, much as those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the former Warsaw Pact did. The November 1995 Conference on Security and Confidence-building Measures in Santiago was an excellent step in this direction. Plans were developed to share information on exercises, budgets, and force composition. Another step would be to increase the use of military exchange programmes. The presence of foreign officers in military academies and programmes of professional military education would significantly reduce the mistrust that comes from the unknown. Some limited joint exercises have already occurred. Brazil schedules exchange visits by officers of several countries at the same time in order to increase the amount of communication between the various militaries. In July 1994, for example, officers from Argentina, Chile, Portugal, the United States and Uruguay were all visiting Brazilian military institutions.

Finally, the United States would need to earn the trust of the Latin American countries. One part of this could be to take the steps mentioned in the previous paragraph—there already are some Latin American cadets attending United States military academies. Confidence will be much harder to build in this case, however, because of United States history in the region.

Since United States forces would remain dominant in the hemisphere, it is especially important that the United States take measures to build the confidence of the Latin American States. Withdrawal of forces stationed in Latin America would contribute to this effort. Panama will remain a symbol of United States power and hegemony as long as United States forces are there. The base at Guantanamo Bay could legitimately remain as long as Cuba refuses to participate. If they did participate, the base would be less necessary. Puerto Rico presents the greatest problem, since it is an American territory. The only combat forces permanently stationed at the Naval Base at Roosevelt Roads, however, are some “adversary” A-4s attached to the composite squadron. While the rest of the support forces at the base could remain, relocating these aircraft to Key West would show United States good intentions.

The United States now seems less prone to unilateral action in Latin America (the Haitian operation is sufficiently multilateral). More emphasis is being placed on economic matters than military, which may lead to a more cooperative relationship. The success of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and its proposed extension into South America (as announced at the Summit of the Americas in

December 1994), can implant habits of equal cooperation with Latin America that have been lacking previously. Even under future administrations, the end of communism and the apparent failures of the supply-side drug war will make the United States less of an agenda-setter. To the extent that the United States no longer dominates the OAS, there is a vacuum for non-American leadership to step forward, which will in turn lead to further equalisation of relations.

Economic Impact

A sweeping agreement such as a CFLA could have a significant impact on the economies of the countries affected. While conventional wisdom would say that reducing military expenditures is good, all things being equal, reductions in arms production could harm parts of the economy. Outside Latin America, there would be minimal effect: as already noted, the region only accounted for 5.6 per cent of world arms imports. Within Latin America, Looney concludes that defence expenditures do help a few countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. This is a surprising list, considering that Mexico and Venezuela have negligible arms industries. While their expenditures may not hurt their economy, one must doubt that the help is significant. In any case, Argentina is dismantling its military production capabilities. As for Brazil, in 1991, when we estimated its defence production at \$169 million, the *CIA World Factbook* estimated its GDP at \$358 billion. Thus defence production directly accounted for less than 0.05 per cent of Brazilian GDP. Even allowing for a generous multiplier effect, and assuming that the capital now expended on armaments would not be invested profitably elsewhere, this proposal will not greatly affect the Brazilian economy: especially since they could still produce for export and produce domestically within the treaty limits.

International Oversight

An arms control regime would require supervision by a regional organisation, either the OAS, or a subsidiary agency like the Organisation for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (which administers the Treaty of Tlatelolco). The OAS would act as a clearing-house for inspections, receipt of signatory information, and enforcement.

Enforcement of any agreement would seem to be a problem, because the OAS has historically been reluctant to intervene in the affairs of other States. In 1959, however, the Inter-American Juridical Committee established a distinction between illegitimate intervention and legitimate

collective action. This finding contrasts the rights of the State with the rights of an international association of which it freely became a member. It concludes that legitimate "collective action seeks to redress the injury inflicted *on a whole international organisation...* in connection with the association itself *on account of the non-fulfillment of solemn multilateral commitments...*" This would seem to indicate that sanctions against the violator of a mutually-accepted treaty would not be illegal intervention.

The other role for the OAS would be to help promote democracy. A CFLA would only last as long as the signatories continued to accept it; it appears that a military regime would be more likely to repudiate the agreement than would a civilian regime. We are not trying to promote a "democracy equals peace" theory, but simply observing that the Latin American militaries continue to think in terms of geopolitics and armed solutions. Democratic leaders are less likely to want a military build-up. The OAS, encouraged by these elected leaders, can act to maintain and reinforce democracy in the region.

The United Nations provides the framework for a weapons registry through the Register of Conventional Arms. Given the participation of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru in the Register, it appears that Latin America may be an appropriate region for an enhanced regional registry. The reciprocal nature of the Register may also make it slightly harder to covertly supply arms to Latin American States.

Technical Issues

Once the concerns of military and civilian leaders have been eased, and the experience of cooperation has reduced the distrust between different countries, the arms control effort could turn to the technical issue of establishing force levels. Forces of the United States cannot be reasonably expected to be in "balance" with those of Latin American States. The vast majority of American forces are dedicated to the security of Western Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Those commitments will have to be honoured with or without a CFLA. Not only is the percentage of American forces "exempted" from CFLA greater than that in a CFE; the imbalance between the United States and Latin America is much higher than that between the United States and Western Europe, and the oceanic "buffer zone" between the United States and Latin America is much smaller than that between the United States and Europe. Since United States inventories would be essentially exempted *in toto* from the treaty, the confidence-building measures discussed above would be essential to the completion of any treaty.

Insurgencies in Latin America, especially in Peru, but also in Colombia, Guatemala, and now Mexico, are likely to remain a problem. The weapons systems most useful to counter-insurgency operations, such as attack helicopters, some aircraft, and perhaps small armoured fighting vehicles, would need to be retained in higher numbers in those countries than elsewhere. The basing “zones” used in CFE would create “safe havens” for rebels if implemented in the same way. The Latin American militaries also have an internal security role less present in Europe.

Finally, the insurgents themselves present a challenge. Obviously, they could not be expected to sign a multilateral agreement and submit to inspections while fighting a war (nor would the Government in power give them such recognition). For the most part, however, they possess lighter weapons than this treaty or any treaty can hope to accurately cover. The greatest concern would be the disposition of any surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that insurgent groups—or conceivably, the cocaine cartels—might have. The Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) SAMs from El Salvador were at least in part stored in Nicaragua and revealed in a May 1993 explosion; perhaps there now are fewer unaccounted for than previously thought.

Force Levels

We are not so bold as to propose specific force compositions in this paper. Any numbers that the leaders of Latin American States find mutually acceptable would accomplish the goals of stabilising arms levels in the region and providing an example for other regions. We will suggest, however, that a framework of relative military balance be devised. These levels should maintain a balance within rivalries as much as possible.

Inspections

Inspections would be conducted as under the CFE. They would be on-site and mutual, although with some annual limits to prevent unwarranted intrusions on State sovereignty. On the basis of non-interference, inspections could be conducted in the presence of officials of the organisation administering the treaty. While satellite coverage is not now as extensive over Latin America as in Europe, the United States could, as another confidence-building measure, offer to provide more frequent space-based surveillance coverage to the Latin American signatories.

Incentives for Participation in a Future CFLA

Why would the leaders of Latin American countries be interested in negotiating this treaty? They have expressed such an interest through the Organisation of American States, most recently in the 1991 Santiago Commitment to Democracy and Renewal of the International System:

“Cooperation to guarantee the peace and security of the hemisphere is one of the essential purposes consecrated in the Charter of the OAS, and the proliferation of arms adversely affects international security and takes resources away from the economic and social development of the peoples of the member States;

“We declare our decision to initiate a process of consultation on hemispheric security in light of the new conditions in the region and the world, from an updated and comprehensive perspective of security and disarmament, including the subject of all forms of proliferation of weapons and instruments of mass destruction.”

Similar statements have been made before, however. The most noteworthy was the 1974 Ayacucho agreement, which called for limiting defence expenditures and prohibiting certain weapons. Its terms were never implemented; this may be due to the relative autonomy exercised by the Latin American militaries at that time. Other than completing ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, little perceptible movement has occurred on arms control.

Nevertheless, there are two reasons to be optimistic that this proposal would be well-received. One of these is captured explicitly in the Santiago Declaration: military expenditures do not contribute to economic and social development, in the opinion of these leaders. Such development is important to the future of Latin America, and of the democratic leaders in particular. Absent a formal agreement, however, the logic of the security dilemma requires each country to match perceived advantages of its perceived rivals. This siphons resources away from other concerns. By breaking the shackles of neorealist uncertainty through openness and cooperation, growth and cooperation will both be facilitated.

The other reason for optimism is the relative political weakness of the military in Latin America since the latest transition to democracy. Unlike the period of the earlier proposals, such as Ayacucho and some follow-up efforts in the 1970s, the military does not rule. It may not even be able to veto the agreement. Given the history of Latin American politics, however, the military remains a potential rival for power against the democrats. A multilateral treaty aimed at reducing uncertainty

and suspicion among the States of the region would undercut the geopolitical rationale for a stronger military. Economic development, strengthened by lower military expenditures, would reduce the likelihood of civil unrest (although 1994 events in Chiapas, Mexico underscore the importance of distributing the gains of development). O'Donnell and Schmitter have argued, in part, that the military will stay out of politics only if they receive a credible, honourable role. Regional arms control offers a way to maintain military salaries and benefits, while cutting overall expenditures. Regional manoeuvres and expenditures, with the prospects for multilateral peace-keeping readiness, fit with the role now accepted by the professional militaries of the northern hemisphere. Both Uruguay and Argentina now participate extensively in United Nations peace-keeping operations. Thus this proposal serves not only the interests of the States, but also the particular interests of the leaders currently in power.

Conclusion

Successful conventional arms control in Latin America would reduce both the likelihood and severity of war in the region by providing a way to escape the security dilemma. If each country purchases or deploys weapons only within mutually accepted limits, there would be less reason for military leaders to become alarmed by their neighbours' activities. A CFLA treaty would also help the economic growth of the region by allowing funds now spent on military hardware to go towards economic investment. If this growth is broad-based, this strategy might relieve some of the internal security problems as well. Thus both aspects of national security would be enhanced by agreeing to control conventional weaponry.

We believe that a CFLA treaty, along the lines described in this article, could be negotiated in the upcoming years. The process of negotiation on more equal terms might itself enhance hemispheric solidarity and stability. Furthermore, a successful CFLA treaty could serve as a model for multilateral arms control that could be extended to Africa and more war-prone regions of the world, such as the Middle East and East Asia.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES: PROSPECTS OF SECURITY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The confrontations in the Alto Cenepa jungle in the heart of South America and the concomitant tensions on the borders of other States in Latin America have reactivated the topic of security in the western

hemisphere. Similarly, the contacts and negotiations at the Meeting of Defence Ministers of the Americas, together with the debates of the Committee on Hemispheric Security of the Organisation of American States (OAS), show that there is no consensus in the hemisphere on definitions of security and conflict-prevention mechanisms. Discussions in international organisations and among academics and intellectuals also point up the differing views on how to characterise the new context and fresh demands in the realm of security. How should the new risks be defined, and how might consensus be reached on them?

In Latin America, security threats in the past were mainly related to border disputes and conflicting ideologies. When the latter disappeared, new threats emerged such as drug trafficking and environmental hazards. The traditional issues, however, are still highly significant. How should the new hemispheric context be defined? Does a new institutional framework need to be created? Should the series of practices and actions intended to prevent the use of force be systematised in an international system? This is the context in which the topic of definitions and the conceptualisation of confidence-building measures (CBMs) and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) must be addressed.

This issue is important in the present state of affairs in the hemisphere. The development of CBMs was one of the items on the agenda of the Meeting of Defence Ministers of the Americas. The Declaration of Santiago on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and the resolutions adopted at that high-level meeting of the OAS, held at Santiago, Chile, from 8 to 10 November 1995, are highly significant, as is pointed out later in this paper.

The headway already made in this context allows for further development of areas of policy coordination which will culminate in the creation of a new international security system, essentially cooperative in nature. CBMs are a pillar of preventive diplomacy. Their development into a cooperative security agreement and its full implementation will give concrete form to the quest for stability and peace.

Post Cold War: Major Hemispheric Trends in Security

In the context of security, the signals have been mixed. The end of the cold war led to great expectations about the possibilities of quickly eliminating the main sources of conflict in the region and, at the same time, establishing new international mechanisms. One such mechanism in the western hemisphere was the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal

Assistance (TIAR). The disappearance of a threat from outside the region and the perception that democracies tend to resolve their differences without using force reaffirmed these positive prospects. However, the resurgence of border disputes, which led to open conflict, combined with differences among countries in terms of resources and compounded by the emergence of new risks and threats, showed a much more complex panorama by the mid-1990s.

The emergence of conflicts and tensions indicates that there is a need for strong political will and a series of effective actions to prevent their possible escalation. It is necessary to prevent situations in which the actors—if they perceive their concrete interests to be seriously at risk—respond in ways that involve a high probability of the use of force. In a crisis situation, options are scarce. As a result, uncertainty increases and decisions are taken in a highly subjective context. This reaffirms the need to build a new, comprehensive international security system in the western hemisphere.

In the Americas, the end of the cold war had a number of different effects with respect to security. For the United States, it meant a basic change, which led it to redefine its foreign policy and, to a very significant degree, reduce and demobilise the forces devoted to regional affairs, in particular the South Commission. In this context, the United States redirected its policies to multilateral, global and hemispheric organisations and to the Latin American and Caribbean countries. Its priorities changed drastically.

The effects of the global change have been felt unevenly throughout Latin America. They are as diverse as the subregions that make up this mosaic of nearly 30 States. The changes are expressed in diverse ways and to differing degrees in each subregion. In Central America, the end of the cold war removed the main external component of security from the debate, making it possible to initiate a deeper process of national reconciliation, on the one hand and, on the other, a substantial change in political systems and institutions, including the armed forces. The demobilisation and demilitarisation process in this region has been profound. In the Caribbean subregion, some basic features of the cold war remain, and these have had a marked influence on the courses of action available there. These remnants are especially evident in relations between the United States and Cuba. This situation has had a widespread effect on prospects for security in the subregion. It is here that the new risks have become especially apparent and that a new type of vulnerability has arisen. In South America, the end of the cold war did

not have a major impact on perceptions of threat and the way in which the key security issues are defined. Tensions involving border disputes have been and still are more common there. The main change in South America is much more closely related to the processes of integration and political consensus-building than to the impact of the end of the cold war.

In this general framework, with complex international trends and diverse manifestations at the hemispheric level, the Latin American region now has the opportunity of making headway in helping to define the new international system. Few States in the region have the right combination of power attributes to have an exclusive impact at the international level. Reaching agreement on the definition of common goals would make it possible for the region to have a greater impact. Time is a critical factor in reaching agreed positions, defining policies and determining courses of action. The sooner the region develops some shared definitions, the greater the possibility that it will have an impact and the better the opportunities for designing efficient strategies.

Quest for Peace

The region itself has already developed a number of different mechanisms and arrangements to deactivate tensions. With respect to weapons of mass destruction, there are two main instruments: the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was opened for signature in 1967 and had been signed by all Latin American countries by the end of 1995, and the Mendoza Accord and the Cartagena Declaration on the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction, both signed in 1991, the former by Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and later Uruguay, and the latter by the presidents of the Andean countries.

A number of declarations by heads of State and Government have sought to establish the basis for stability and international security in the region. In this same context, the countries of the region have agreed to the principles and norms set forth in such multilateral global and hemispheric arrangements as the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the OAS.

Other important declarations in the field of security are the 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho, the various declarations of the Contadora Group (1983-1987) and the Acapuico Commitment to Peace, Development and Democracy, proclaimed at the first Presidential Summit of the Permanent Mechanism for Consultation and Concerted Political Action (Rio Group), held in November 1987. Since that meeting,

statements have been made on international and regional security at each summit meeting of the Group.

In addition, there is a rich network of contacts and declarations at the professional level in military institutions. Bilateral and multilateral meetings are being held regularly among the armed forces of the hemisphere. The multilateral meetings are institutionalised in annual conferences of heads of armies, navies and air forces.

Nevertheless, despite the good will demonstrated by these declarations issued by civilian leaders and high officials of the armed forces, tensions, conflicts and crises keep recurring in Latin America. Although these may be less intense than in other regions and the force used more limited, the consequences in terms of stability and regional peace are significant. Each crisis produces a serious setback in trust and reinforces traditional perceptions of threat.

For these reasons, a series of practical measures is needed to prevent a tense situation from occurring because of an error in judgement, with the consequent danger of escalation. This is the area in which CBMs or CSBMs may be applied.

Changing Regional Context

The regional context from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s is somewhat imprecisely defined. The main trends are still evolving and have not yet become clear; regional diversity is still the case. This can be seen in the following five crucial areas: (a) democratic processes, (b) economic growth, (c) integration processes, (d) regional stability and (e) relations with the United States. To these might be added the features of, and changes in, the concepts of security and defence themselves.

Building a hemispheric cooperative security system is key to preventing the emergence of crisis situations; developing a preventive system will make it possible to act in time and take specific actions to deal with tensions. The core element of cooperative security is the basic understanding of the dimension of relationship: that is, the security of any State depends on the perception of security of another State or States. Therefore, coordination of policies becomes the key to cooperative security. A second essential element is that concrete measures must be taken in an overall policy of *detente*, including political, economic, social and cultural measures. Similarly, a general policy of *detente* is not enough in itself; there must also be a high degree of focus and operationalising on defence/military questions.

In that context, the development of CBMs in the field of defence plays an important role. The general backdrop of democratic understanding and closer economic ties can provide a rich environment for developing specific policies in the area of defence and military relations.

Confidence-Building Measures

CBMs are bilateral and multilateral actions designed to head off situations of crisis and conflict and to strengthen international peace and security. They enhance communication among different actors and create favourable conditions for mitigating perceptions of immediate threat and eliminating any elements of surprise. CBMs presuppose that the parties concerned have different interests and a low level of confidence in their relations. The application of such measures is essential when these differences are such that one of the parties could use force to achieve or defend its interests. In that situation, a mere misinterpretation could unleash an unwanted conflict.

There has been a lively debate on how broad or narrow CBMs should be. Some place them in a broad context of promoting security; and include economic, cultural and social exchanges. They include governmental and parliamentary political contacts, wide-ranging intergovernmental cooperation, diplomatic contacts and educational and cultural activities. Others focus on defence; in other words, the implementation of military measures. They include exchanging military information, developing consultative mechanisms regarding unusual military activities, cooperating with respect to military incidents and accidents, military contacts and visits, notification of military exercises, observation of specific military activities, training and education, and so on.

In the case of Latin America, it is believed that agreements in different spheres must be systematised and that more emphasis must be placed on defence. This is where CBMs have a central value with respect to security. However, in view of the region's diplomatic style, it is important, in my view, not to polarise the debate on the scope of such measures. Rather, a pragmatic answer must be sought. In every situation of risk, tension or threat, determining the origin and the substantive factors thereof makes it possible to carry out a set of political, diplomatic, economic and military measures. The success of the CBMs applied in the area of defence will depend on the general framework of relations. Their incremental or restricted character, in turn, will be proportional

to the ease or difficulty experienced in dealing with the substantive aspects of differences of interests. The general aim must be to achieve mutually beneficial results and to place the parties' relations on a footing of confidence.

It should be borne in mind that CBMs are actions designed to turn a history of mistrust into a situation where, based on actions subject to evaluation, progress is made towards stability and then *detente*. If we believe in declarations, we make the future a matter of faith. If we carry out CBMs as part of a process of creating a climate of confidence, we can interact in a more transparent and predictable way, and diplomacy and politics can play a larger role. CBMs enable us to establish an objective model of evaluation, regardless of our faith in the degree of compliance.

The implementation of CBMs is a substantial part of the process of forming a cooperative security regime in the hemisphere. The Programme of Peace and Security in the Americas (FLACSCO) defined the concept of cooperative security as a system of State interactions which, by coordinating governmental policies, prevents and contains threats to national interests and prevents the perceptions which States have of such threats from turning into tensions, crises or open confrontations.

To implement this concept, the Programme seeks to make headway in ten areas: crisis prevention and maintenance of the status quo, regional modernisation and equilibria, CBMs, arms control and limitation, disarmament, security regimes, bilateral responses, establishment of an institutional framework for cooperative hemispheric security, constructive involvement of the United States in developing a hemispheric security system, and the role of the United Nations.

We attach particular importance in this regard to the development of CBMs. The meeting in Chile gave substantial impetus which is reflected in the Santiago Declaration on Confidence-and Security-building Measures.

Santiago Meeting

The results of the OAS conference on CBMs in Santiago may be said to be very positive. It should be noted that this was the first meeting of plenipotentiaries to analyse and agree on specific measures in this highly important area. Prior meetings had been largely meetings of experts or seminars. Participation in the Santiago meeting was high, in terms of both the number of delegations and the level of representation. In many cases, representatives were vice-ministers. Of particular

significance was the fact that the meeting adopted the Declaration by consensus. Moreover, two major bilateral agreements were signed at this meeting. The representatives of Ecuador and Peru signed an agreement on the establishment of specific measures to reduce tension in the Alto Cenepa area, and the under-secretaries for foreign affairs and defence of Chile and Argentina signed a bilateral agreement on a joint approach to defence and security between the two countries.

The following are the salient points of the Santiago Declaration:

1. The end of the cold war is facilitating the elimination of factors that breed mistrust and is leading to the identification of new modalities of cooperation.
2. There is a link between economic, social and cultural development and international peace and security.
3. Measures must be adapted to the specific conditions of each region.
4. Respect for international law, faithful compliance with treaties and the peaceful settlement of disputes are of the utmost importance and form the basis for the development of CBMs.
5. The acceptance by all States of universal, equal and binding rules is an essential condition for achieving an effective international security system.
6. Only in a favourable climate can progress in limiting conventional weapons be achieved.
7. Identification of the risks, threats and challenges facing the Americas on the threshold of the next millennium must have priority. Settlements are to be sought as quickly as possible through negotiations, on the basis of justice and with full respect for international law and the treaties in force.
8. Member States agree to recommend the application of CBMs in the manner most suitable for each State. Eleven specific measures are listed. Their implementation will require regulation, to be adopted by the General Assembly of the OAS. A report on that subject may be submitted to the Assembly for consideration at its twenty-sixth regular session, with follow-up to be decided by the Assembly at that time.

Key Aspects of the Santiago Declaration

Four main points emerge from the agreements adopted by consensus in the Santiago Declaration.

Security is a shared responsibility. “No State can sidestep its responsibility to participate in the designing of the new [international] system”, said the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile, Mr. Jose Miguel Insulza, when he opened the meeting. The Declaration reaffirmed that one essential condition is for States to subject themselves to equal rules that are also universal and binding.

Respect for international law. One of the underlying principles of the inter-American system is full, unrestricted promotion of respect for international law and faithful compliance with treaty obligations. This perspective was reflected in the Declaration and reiterated in the statements made by various delegations. What is more, this point is of critical importance and has real impact on the question of the settlement of outstanding disputes.

Realistic proposals. The list of measures to be taken is extremely realistic. Establishing and putting them into practice on a gradual basis will ensure that they are implemented, thus making it possible to achieve the desired goals.

Adaptability. The proposed set of actions is marked by a high degree of flexibility. While some of the measures are general in nature, their scope of application is essentially local. The Declaration clearly states that CBMs must be adapted to the geographical, political, economic, social and cultural conditions of each region. Thus their application and implementation will be highly flexible.

It is also clear from the Declaration that verification will play an important role. One of the main conclusions of recent studies, and one that is being stated clearly in the United Nations, is that the international security systems of the twenty-first century will be characterised by efficient systems for verifying the implementation of agreements.

To sum up then, the Santiago Declaration and the progress it reflects constitute a response to the needs and security of different parts of the Americas. It identifies the interests and concerns that must be addressed and formulates appropriate responses to individual cases within the context of growing regional cooperation.

Implementation of the agreements will give impetus to four processes: (a) elimination of mistrust, overcoming basic fears and suspicions; (b) building a new atmosphere of trust in which to implement the agreements and establishing a new pattern of relationships; (c) deepening trust in the broad sense, leading to an increase in partnerships beyond those based on trade; and (d) promoting cooperation

in a local, subregional and continental context. These four processes define a type of progress under which the Americas can achieve the goals of real democracy, effective integration and lasting peace.

THE AGREEMENT ON SUBREGIONAL ARMS CONTROL OR THE "DAYTON AGREEMENT"

The Agreement on Subregional Arms Control, signed at the Ministerial meeting of the Peace Implementation Council in Florence on 14 June 1996, is the result of six months of negotiations among the five Parties: Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. The Parties used the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) as a starting point. This can be seen in many of the provisions of the Agreement.

The Article IV negotiations started on 18 December 1995 in Bonn, Germany and were conducted in Vienna from 4 January until 7 June 1996 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Vigleik Eide, the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-office of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The negotiations have taken place under the auspices of the OSCE, but the mandate came from Annex 1-B of the general Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the "Dayton Agreement"), The guiding principle of the negotiations was a "stable military balance at the lowest level of armaments".

The Agreement consists of the basic document (with 15 articles) and six protocols: the Protocol on Reduction; the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reclassification of Specific Models or Versions of Combat-Capable Trainer Aircraft into Unarmed Trainer Aircraft; the Protocol on Exchange of Information and Notifications; the Protocol on Existing Types of Armaments; the Protocol on Inspection; and the Protocol on the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission.

Agreed Limitations on Armaments

As called for in the Dayton Agreement, the Parties set limits on five categories of armaments—battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery pieces of 75 mm calibre and above, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. These limits are based on the formula identified in the Dayton Agreement, frequently referred to as the 5:2:2 and 2:1 formula. Under the terms of the Agreement, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will be limited to approximately 75 per cent of its current holdings.

Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina will each be limited to approximately 30 per cent of the current Federal Republic of Yugoslavia holdings (Of the latter, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will have limits of two-thirds the total in each category of armaments, with the Republika Srpska's limits being the remaining one third of the total). The specific limits are indicated in Table 1.

The Agreement ensures that these limits are not just numbers on paper but will be rigorously subject to verification. It includes provisions for on-site monitoring of the destruction process, an extensive information exchange, an intrusive inspection regime and an impartial international role to assure that it is being implemented in good faith. It includes unambiguous definitions that clearly identify the armaments to be limited. Such stringent definitions are necessary to ensure that the information provided is precise, not simply based on the interpretation of one of the Parties.

TABLE 1
Limitations on Armaments

<i>Party</i>	<i>Battle tanks</i>	<i>Armoured combat vehicles</i>	<i>Artillery pieces</i>	<i>Attack Combat aircraft</i>	<i>heli-copters</i>
Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia	1025	850	3750	155	53
Rep. of Croatia	410	340	1500	62	21
Bosnia and Herzegovina	410	340	1500	62	21
Fed. of Bosnia and Herzegovina	273	227	1000	41	14
Rep. Srpska	137	113	500	21	7


Methods for Prescribed Reductions

The Agreement contains specific provisions addressing the methods to be used to reduce armaments. These include destruction, conversion for non-military purposes, use for static display or ground instructional purposes, or export, with limits to the amount of armaments which may be reduced using methods other than destruction. With regard to each of these types of reduction except export, the Protocol on Reduction identifies specific procedures which must be followed to accomplish clearly-defined results. In other words, at the end of the procedure the piece of armament subject to reduction should no longer be able to be used for its original intended military purpose.

Implementation Timetable

The Agreement specifies a 12-month reduction period, at the end of which the agreed limits take effect. To measure progress, it further identifies two reduction phases, the first of which ends at the end of 1996. By 1 January 1997, the Parties must have reduced at least 40 per cent of their reduction liability for combat aircraft attack helicopters and artillery, and 20 per cent of their reduction liability for battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles. The general implementation timetable is illustrated below.

TABLE 2
Implementation Timetable



Consultative Commission

Another significant aspect of the Agreement is that it establishes the Subregional Consultative Commission to act as an implementation review body. The Commission provides a consultative mechanism for the Parties to work out differences that might arise in the course of implementation. Chairmanship of the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission will rotate among the Parties. The Parties have agreed,

however, that the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-office will chair the meetings of the Commission in 1996.

Status of Implementation

The Agreement entered into force upon signature on 14 June 1996 and the Parties have already begun organisational steps required for implementation. The Parties have already exchanged information on their holdings of armaments limited by the Agreement and reviewed the initial implementation schedule to ensure there were no questions concerning required notifications. The information, effective as of 1 July 1996, the start of a four-month baseline validation period for inspections, provides the basis for computing reduction liabilities.

The OSCE will assist the Parties to implement this Agreement. The OSCE participating States have been asked to identify personnel who would be available to assist the Parties in execution of the inspection regime. Under the terms of the Agreement, and with the concurrence of the Parties, up to three assistants may be designated to accompany inspection and escort teams during the conduct of these inspections.

Within the agreed limits, the Parties are free to structure, equip and train their forces as they choose. Because of the very unequal (current) force structure and armament levels among the Parties, one or two of the Parties will have some armament limits above their present holdings. This should not be regarded as an invitation to an "arms race", but should be seen as a necessity for future balance and stability in the area. The future levels in these categories will make it hard to build the superiority to start and win another war. Combined with growing transparency, this should, over time, contribute to stability and more cooperative and peaceful ways of living together.

Conclusion

The Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control will not guarantee stability in the area overnight. It is, however, a significant step on the path to this goal. The Dayton Agreement outlined a series of negotiations as part of the Agreement on Regional Stabilisation. Completion of this Agreement now clears the way for the next building-block, the wider goal of "establishing a regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia" (the so-called Article V negotiations). Each step achieved in implementing the peace process helps to ensure that the whole region will become part of the process of increased European cooperation and integration.



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